European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate because in many respects government Amendment 302A answers the initial point of concern—that the current limitation on competence in the Scotland Act under European Union law would be replaced by a restriction on retained EU law. Of course, under the new amendment that has gone, but there is a wider point on which the Minister could perhaps assist the Committee, which arises from the draft agreement on the transitional period.

As I understand it, during the transitional period basically the acquis will still apply. I have looked at Articles 4 and 82 of the draft agreement. Article 4 says:

“Where this Agreement provides for the application of Union law in the United Kingdom, it shall produce in respect of and in the United Kingdom the same legal effects as those which it produces within the Union and its Member States”.


Article 82 says:

“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall continue to have jurisdiction for any proceedings brought before it by the United Kingdom or against the United Kingdom before the end of the transition period”.


We will have a lot of debates this afternoon about whether UK Ministers, Scottish Ministers or Welsh Ministers will be exercising powers after exit day, but can the Minister indicate how the United Kingdom Government see the position? If we are going to have to abide by European Union law having the same legal effect as it produces in the Union, is there any room for movement at all? How is effect going to be given to that if, under Clause 1 of the Bill, the European Communities Act 1972 has been repealed?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I cannot allow the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, to continue with his heresy that the Government are right in what they are doing. I noticed the shock that passed over the face of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. What I think the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, does not appreciate is that the proposal of the Government is to introduce frame- works into this country to save the internal market of the UK, whether or not the devolved Administrations consent. All they are prepared to do, as the noble Baroness the Minister said in response to something earlier, is to consult—they are not necessarily seeking agreement. That is where he has it wrong.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 26th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, the House will agree that this has been a very good and well informed debate and rightly so because the issues we are dealing with are of fundamental importance to our justice system. I do not think anyone who has taken part or who will vote feels at all comfortable about the idea that there should be closed material proceedings. Nevertheless, as has been explained by a number of contributors to the debate such as the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Woolf, and, although he is supporting the amendments, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, there is a need in current circumstances for closed material proceedings.

The present situation, standing the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Al Rawi case, is that closed material proceedings are not available under common law and the Supreme Court invited Parliament to consider the position. We have sought not only to make provision for closed material proceedings but, as we have gone from Second Reading, through Committee and Report, to the other place for debate and back to us, in doing so we have put in place proper safeguards which reflect the values of our justice system.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said it was important that we show the greatest and utmost care and consideration in addressing these issues, and we have done that tonight. I can assure your Lordships’ House that, in reflecting on the amendments passed on Report in this House, Ministers gave careful consideration to how we might respond to them.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked about the number of cases that had been settled and how much compensation was paid. As I have explained previously, I am not able to comment on the number or details of many of the cases settled as they are often the subject of confidentiality agreements. However, the House will be aware—indeed, my noble friend Lady Berridge referred to it—that a settlement was recently reached with Mr al-Saadi, on a no-liability basis, to the tune of £2.2 million. I am unable to comment on whether actions have been taken against recipients of other settlements. If such actions have been taken, it would be impossible to comment without breaching the terms of the settlement because it could, for example, indirectly reveal the identity of the individuals concerned.

My noble friend Lady Berridge suggested that perhaps the Government had rushed a settlement to get it in before this legislation went onto the statute book. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that it is not desirable for courts to delay the processing of cases in pre-emptive speculation about what may or may not become available in future legislation. It is unhelpful to suggest that that should be the case. It was and is right that the case of Mr al-Saadi and others should be dealt with quickly and fairly on the basis of existing legislation. The alternative of delaying, pending possible future legislative changes, would be unfair to all parties concerned. I certainly would not like to defend such a situation from the Dispatch Box if that allegation ever had any truth.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said that, unlike cases in which he was involved when he was in government and introduced closed material proceedings with regard to control orders under which there were restrictions on freedom, what we are dealing with here is just about money. It is about more than just money; it is also about the reputation of, and the trust and confidence in, our security intelligence agencies. It may also be about executive actions—for example, the judicial review of decisions taken by a Secretary of State on national security grounds which would not be the subject of pre-existing statutory CMPs.

As I have said, it is not just a question about money because, at the end of the day, we are trying to ensure that there will be some kind of proceedings available whereby taxpayers’ money is not spent in settling cases where the case has not been proved. My noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury referred to secret justice. I have said in these debates that it is second-best justice, but at least it is justice. There is no justice when cases are settled without any proof of the claim being made.

The importance of the safeguards and how we keep these cases to a minimum—they should be the exception—has been reflected in the debate tonight. My noble friend Lord Macdonald has tabled an amendment that would require the courts to have a balancing test akin to the Wiley balancing test that was developed in the context of public interest immunity. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, explained why he thought that was inappropriate; he said that it was too wide and imprecise. The noble Lord, Lord Owen, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, indicated that we are also dealing with situations where there might be foreign sources of intelligence and, crucially, human sources who work on our behalf for our security services. They expressed concern that the imprecision of the test would not be helpful.

My noble friend said that he thought the effect of the Bill as it currently stands, without his amendment, would be that the security services and the Government would opt for CMP rather than PII, public interest immunity, and that somehow that would be convenient for them. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, made the important point that Part 1 of the Bill is about scrutiny of the security services, but Part 2 allows for greater scrutiny. If you wish to push something under the carpet, PII, or settling a case without any evidence being led, is one way of ensuring that information does not come out. Albeit closed material proceedings are closed—for all the reasons that people have articulated in this debate they are not as good as open proceedings—they nevertheless allow the court to examine the material that is there and to apply scrutiny to allegations made against our security services, which otherwise would not be the case.

Regarding openness, my noble friend Lady Berridge referred to the president of the Supreme Court, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and what he said this weekend. The point that was picked up by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, helps make the point that we have been trying to make. Of course, as more than one contributor to this debate has said, the idea of openness is absolutely intrinsic to our system of justice. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, reflected that in his comments this week. It was intrinsic and it was instinctive.

It is absolutely fanciful to imagine that, in applying the tests set out by the Government in the amendments before your Lordships’ House tonight, the judges will somehow forget about openness. It is very clear that the justices of the Supreme Court did not need words in a statute to get them to apply their minds to the importance of openness when it came to making the decision, which they did.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Is my noble and learned friend saying that the judges will apply a balancing test when they exercise their discretion between open justice and the interests of national security—that that is implicit in everything he is saying?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it is very clear that open justice is part of our justice system. It is implied by the words “fair and effective”, and it did not need any words in statute to encourage the justices of the Supreme Court to have regard to the importance of openness in these situations. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, said the following words, to which I think my noble friend Lady Berridge referred:

“No judge can face with equanimity the prospect of a hearing, or any part of a hearing, which is not only in private, but involves one of the parties not being present or represented”.

He went on to say:

“Nonetheless, as Parliament has decided that, in certain circumstances, such a procedure is necessary and permissible in a trial before a judge, we have concluded that, on an appeal from a decision in a case where a judge has considered closed material and given a closed judgment, it may be necessary for this court to go into closed session in order to dispose of the appeal justly”.

In other words, the just decision on that particular point was that the court would go into closed session.

On the other issue, I also do not find there to be any real difference in what Members of your Lordships’ House wish to see, and it is an issue of judgment as to how we achieve it. These cases should be the rare exceptions; there are a very small number of cases. When I gave evidence by letter to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on 31 October, there were 27 cases which, across government, we considered would lend themselves to closed material proceedings. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, expressed his view as to why closed material proceedings were necessary, but in his judgment these amendments should be in the Bill. I have explained this, and indeed others who have contributed to the debate have also explained why it is not necessary.

We all aim at the same thing: at the end of the day, this should take place in a small number of cases. It is a matter of judgment. As I indicated earlier, at this initial gateway of closed material proceedings the court is considering an application having not yet seen all the material for the case. Against this background, we are keen that legislation should avoid the court being required to meet a condition which would then require it to establish definitively at that point whether a fair determination would be possible by any other means.

As I said, that could mean the exhaustion of a range of measures, including a full PII exercise. Of course, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, said, it is something to which the Secretary of State should apply his or her mind. If one reads the judgment of Lord Brown in Al Rawi, he indicates at one point that it would take 60 lawyers the best part of two or three years to go through all the material. That is the scale. If that is the road down which judges felt that they ought to go because of the wording of the Bill, that would underline much of its purpose.

I also pick up the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who seemed to think that the means of achieving it being a backstop and a rare exception was the provision in proposed new subsection (1F) about the court having to be satisfied that the Secretary of State had considered PII. We do not even get to that stage, because the court must not even consider the application unless it is satisfied that the Secretary of State has considered PII. The question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, was very much to the point: the safeguards of last resort, as it were, are not that requirement on the Secretary of State but, rather, the courts being satisfied that the disclosure of material would be damaging to national security, and that it would be in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice for the application to be granted.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 21st November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, in Committee, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford tabled an amendment seeking to amend the effect of the disclosure gateway provisions in the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994. The amendment was based on a suggestion that emanated from the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law. At that time the Government resisted the amendment on the grounds that it was not necessary to secure the agencies’ compliance with their disclosure obligations and that it was wider than appropriate because it would mean the courts could order disclosure into civil proceedings regardless of the connection between those proceedings and the agencies’ functions.

However, following the Committee stage, Professor Sir Jeffrey Jowell from the Bingham Centre wrote to me urging the Government to reconsider the issues raised by the amendment. After careful consideration and consultation with experts on this complex area of law, the Government have concluded that a similar amendment would be necessary. This is a technical area of law and it may help if I briefly explain why the change is needed.

Under Clause 6, the court must, on an application from the Secretary of State, make a declaration that the proceedings are ones in which a closed material application may be made if the court considers that a party would be required to disclose material in the course of proceedings and disclosure would be damaging to the interests of national security. The problem with the Bill as drafted is that it does not make it clear that statutory bars to disclosure into open court should not prevent there being disclosure into closed material procedures.

I assure the House that the Liberty analysis of this amendment is wrong. In an e-mail to parliamentarians its policy director described the amendment as being able to expand the categories of secret information on which the application for a CMP declaration can be based. That is not the case. The amendment makes it clear that the court should ignore any statutory provision that would prevent the disclosure of relevant material into open court but not into closed material procedures when the court is deciding the question of whether a party to proceedings would be required to disclose material. In other words, we do not want to be in the unfortunate position where we are unable to use a CMP as a result of these Acts covering the Security and Intelligence Agencies. These Acts are in part designed to ensure that highly sensitive information is not made public in the interests of our national security. The closed material procedures, however, have been assessed to be secure enough to allow highly sensitive information into a courtroom to be considered by a judge. The Government and agencies want the chance for a judge to come to an independent judgment. We do not want silence on these important matters.

Once again, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Thomas for having raised this issue in Committee. While we may not have agreed on every point today, I am always grateful for his tireless work in holding the Government to account and for his detailed contribution. I am particularly grateful to the Bingham centre for taking time to scrutinise the Bill and for writing to me and asking the Government to rethink. The centre is an important legal research institute and the Government welcome its contribution to make sure that the Bill is suitably drafted. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, have I not always said that this is a listening Government? I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for taking on board what I said on the last occasion, which I confess I have now totally forgotten. However, clearly it was very persuasive and I thank the noble and learned Lord for the amendment.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 23rd July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The amendment is not related to intercept evidence. Intercept evidence is part of it, but I am saying that the open civil proceedings should continue and that the judge should come to his conclusion on admissible evidence. Intercept is an illustration. Indeed, my amendment arises, as the noble and learned Lord will remember, from his unusually equivocal answer last Tuesday when I asked him the direct question.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I apologise if I was equivocal, but I thought that I had indicated that the issue revolves around the use of intercept evidence, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned when he quoted what I said. I rather thought that the quote he used was quite unequivocal, which caused the surprise.

My noble friend asked whether the purpose of the Bill was to make inadmissible material admissible to support the Government. It is worth indicating that the purpose behind the closed material provisions is to ensure that the court can consider as much relevant material as possible, be it helpful or unhelpful to the Government. The most obvious example is material that might otherwise be excluded by PII, but material that might otherwise be inadmissible because of RIPA provisions we seek to make admissible in these provisions.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated that the Government had not considered intercept before in closed material proceedings. Section 18 of RIPA, as amended, has a long list of contexts, including any proceedings before SIAC. The most recent time when Parliament considered this matter was in paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. Were the amendment to be incorporated into the Bill, a judge in a closed material proceeding could not consider relevant intercept material because the law prevents its disclosure in open hearings.

Paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 includes provision for an amendment to Section 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to allow for intercept material to be admitted in any Section 6 proceedings. It is our view that the amendment is necessary if intercept material is to be adduced or disclosed in the closed part of any proceedings where the court has declared that a closed material application may be made. If Section 18 is not amended, the current prohibition on disclosure in Section 17 of RIPA will prevent intercept material being adduced within such proceedings. Consequently, it would narrow the scope of material available in the case and could undermine the wider purpose of CMPs, which is to make available as much material, helpful or unhelpful to the Government, as possible.

I have highlighted that a judge can consider intercept material in reviewing an application for a CMP or in proceedings where a declaration has been made. It is right and proper that this is the case, but I accept, and it is evident from the debate, that it is a matter that attracts views on different sides. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, referred to some of the history of the use of intercept evidence.

Some surprise was expressed in the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in response to the Government’s Green Paper on justice and security. Paragraph 49 states:

“Since one of the driving forces behind the Green Paper is said to be the Government’s desire to ensure that, wherever possible, evidence is put before a court rather than excluded from its consideration, it does seem surprising that the admissibility of intercept as evidence is not included within the scope of the Green Paper”.

It goes on:

“We accept that the Green Paper is mainly concerned with civil proceedings, and the question of the admissibility of intercept as evidence has tended to focus on its use in criminal prosecutions. However, intercept is also relied on by the Government in a number of other contexts and we find it surprising that the Government is going to such trouble to make sure that evidence can go before a judge when material which sometimes forms a substantial part of the material relied on by the Government will still not be admissible under the proposals in the Green Paper. There is now a very long history of Reports, from this Committee and others, urging legislative reform to enable the admissibility of intercept. In our Report on the TPIMs Bill, we expressed concern about what appeared to be the significant decline in the number of successful prosecutions for terrorism offences over the last few years ... We reiterate our and our predecessor Committee’s recommendations that legislation to provide for the admissibility of intercept as evidence be brought forward as a matter of urgency”.

I accept that that goes wider than is specific to this Bill, but it indicated some surprise that, in the Green Paper at least, the Government had not flagged up the possible use of intercept, if indeed the intention is indeed to get as much relevant material before the court as possible. Therefore, the Government have made provision in the Bill for that to happen.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, that perhaps goes wider than the specific issue of intercept evidence. However, I have of course indicated on a number of occasions a willingness to engage.

For completeness, my noble friend asked about the United States procedures. While they are similar in many respects, it is important to remind ourselves that the legal frameworks between the United States and the United Kingdom also differ. There are significant operational differences, so comparisons are of limited value, but it is certainly an issue on which I am willing to engage with my noble friend.

It is clear that there are different views on this and, in his memorandum to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Mr David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, said:

“The major benefit of existing CMPs are that they allow the court or tribunal to decide the issues before them on the basis of all the evidence—including the intercept evidence that is otherwise not admissible in legal proceedings. If a CMP is to be introduced into civil proceedings, it should be on condition that section 18(1) of RIPA be amended so as to add civil litigation CMPs to the list of proceedings in which intercept evidence can be admitted”.

On the point made by my noble friend Lord Marks, I think there is a perception that this will always be in the interests of the Government. I accept the decision of Mr Justice Ouseley in the case of AHK, which I think related to naturalisation and so would come out separately under Clause 12 but under a judicial review. The Secretary of State might well, in a judicial review, come to a particular decision because she had access to material from intercept. If that evidence is not to be made available, and is to be withheld from the court that is considering a Secretary of State decision that is being judicially reviewed, justice might well not be done to the claimant.

The point is that other statutory CMPs can hear RIPA material—intercept evidence. Therefore, the exception to the rule would be if we did not allow this RIPA material to be held in civil proceedings, which could be to the detriment of claimants bringing cases against the Government. It is very clear that this is an issue that we will wish to consider.

On the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, I accept that there are important differences between criminal procedure and civil procedure. I am advised, too, by my noble friend Lord Henley that your Lordships will have another opportunity to explore this issue when he answers an Oral Question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, tomorrow on the wider issues relating to intercept evidence.

There are evidential differences between criminal and civil proceedings, so the fact that intercept evidence may be used in closed material proceedings of a civil nature does not read across to criminal cases where the disclosure obligations on the prosecution to the defence are much stronger than the corresponding disclosure obligations in civil proceedings.

I have sought to address the specific points of procedure that were mentioned by my noble friend Lord Hodgson and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, as well as to deal with the issue of intercept evidence. I hope that, having heard these arguments, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Perhaps I may repeat that I do not, in my amendment, refer only to intercept evidence. It deals with what is admissible evidence in civil proceedings. At the end of that, I am still left in some doubt. I started with the position that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, enunciated that a judge would be able to do what was justice in a particular case and would not require direction. But it struck me when we discussed the matter last Tuesday that this was a means of putting before the judge—the decider of the facts—material that he would never otherwise see if the proceedings were open. It is fundamentally unfair that that should be so.

Is that the position of the Government? Do they really want the judge to decide not whether closed proceedings should be held, which is what Section 6 is about, but in the trial of the issue—the determination of who wins the case—whether to use material, of which intercept evidence is one example, that if there were no such proceedings would never play a part in the trial? Is that the position?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, there is a danger of going over some of the ground that we went over at an earlier stage. There are two stages to what we are proposing. There is what we have commonly come to describe as the gateway stage and there is the subsequent stage where individual pieces of evidence are argued over and special advocates make representations on those individual pieces of evidence. If the impression has been given that somehow intercept evidence is in a category of its own and will not be allowed to be challenged by the special advocates, then that is a wrong impression. Like other pieces of evidence, it will be subject to robust argument and debate overseen by a judge who, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said, is there to ensure that there is fairness. It is not a question that somehow such evidence is in a special category and in a box not to be challenged and not to be talked about.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, may I ask a succinct question? The Minister has justified the absolute ban in relation to the security services and has encouraged claimants to sue the British Government, as opposed to suing a foreign Government and making a Norwich Pharmacal application. If the claimant were to sue the British Government, would material in the hands of the security services which had been obtained through a friendly ally be disclosable in Section 6 proceedings?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I think this is the point. If the claimant were to sue the British Government, if the allegation was that the British Government had been directly involved in wrongdoing—although there has been no such suggestion; I think that would get pretty short shrift—we would come back to what we have said with regard to this whole debate on Section 6 proceedings. We would wish as much information to be before the court as possible. The crucial difference between these proceedings and the proceedings in Norwich Pharmacal, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, explained well, is that under civil damages claims, if the information should come out or the court does not allow the material to remain closed, it is still open to the Government to withdraw from the case or to settle the case. The crucial difference between that and Norwich Pharmacal is that if PII is not successful, then there is no alternative but to disclose.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Is it right that the court would see that material? Would it see the material from a friendly foreign power that was absolutely barred from disclosure in the Norwich Pharmacal proceedings?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Yes, the court would see it. If I have got that wrong, I will certainly say so; but I think that that is the whole point of having closed material proceedings. The material can be made available to the court so that the whole picture can be obtained. The Secretary of State retains the option not to put the material into the public domain, although consequences may flow from that.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends for tabling these amendments. The issue of the role of the judge in providing fairness during a close material procedure is important. As my noble friend Lord Marks said, we have been looking in our debates at the careful balancing exercise by a judge in these matters. As he has said and other noble Lords have indicated, the issue of public perception and public confidence is important too. I understand why my noble friend might consider it fairer to have a separate judge to deal with the applications for a declaration that a CMP should apply and on individual pieces of evidence. This is a matter about which my noble friend Lord Thomas has been particularly anxious. He raised it at Second Reading and he has raised it with me and with the Lord Chancellor. We have given careful consideration to it. He has had the advantage of being able to anticipate what I am about to say to him, but I would still like to say it and perhaps give some explanation as to why we are not being persuaded by the merits of the proposal.

It is better from the point of view of the administration of justice and judicial case management that the judge trying the case should be the judge who determines whether a CMP should be allowed and what materials should be heard in closed proceedings. That judge has a direct interest in ensuring that he or she oversees a fair trial process. In earlier debates it has been put to the Government that we have supplied insufficient room for judicial discretion and it seems to us that a single judge in charge of the entire process is more likely to guarantee judicial discretion than if the roles of disclosure and trial are compartmentalised.

My noble friend is right to say that there will be cases too when masters decide pre-trial issues. My anticipation of what is likely to happen is much as described by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and echoed by my noble friend Lord Faulks. It is more likely that these issues come up in the course of the proceedings. In TPIM cases, for example, there are disclosure issues at the beginning. There is an ongoing issue of disclosure. These will be addressed as the case goes on. Indeed, fresh issues may well arise mid-case. It was also pointed out that in cases where public interest immunity is asserted, this is normally dealt with by the judge hearing the case. I am not saying that it could not be dealt with as a preliminary issue but it very rarely is.

In addition, the whole point of the CMP provisions is to ensure that relevant but very sensitive evidence, which would otherwise be excluded from the proceedings under PII, is considered by the judge. It is not a question of the purpose of this being to exclude material altogether from consideration in the case. It is in fact the opposite: it is to allow it to be considered in some very exceptional circumstances. It is about allowing the judge to know the full facts, even if they cannot be shared with the claimant for reasons of potential damage to national security. There will usually be no question of the judge’s mind being swayed by evidence that ought not to be taken into account at all. It is about allowing the judge to take evidence into account.

My noble friend asked about intercept evidence. The provision in Clause 6 is to put to one side whether or not there would be an exclusion for intercept material in determining whether a party would be required to disclose material, but it is the intention of the Bill that intercept evidence should be permitted. The provision for this is in paragraph 9 of Schedule 2. It is of course a matter for the courts and an individual judge in a particular case as to what weight would be given to that evidence. I hope that answers the very specific question that my noble friend raised.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

As I understood it, paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 refers to what the judge hears in the Section 6 proceedings. What I do not see, when he draws my attention to it, is that the judge can take into account intercept evidence in determining the issues between the parties in the trial. It seems to be quite wrong that you could take into account intercept evidence that you have heard in closed proceedings for the purposes of the trial when it would be inadmissible if the proceedings were not closed.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I refer my noble friend to paragraph 9 and indicate that it is the intention that intercept evidence should be permitted before the court. We may wish to have a debate as to whether that is right or wrong—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Perhaps I may point out the problem that then arises. The press have been full of “secret trials” and so on, and now, if the noble and learned Lord is right, the Government are proposing a secret trial, because inadmissible evidence, which you could not adduce in any form in an open proceeding, whether it is sensitive or not—intercept evidence may not be sensitive; the methods of obtaining it may be but the evidence may not be—could not be introduced in an open trial. Yet the noble and learned Lord is saying that the judge can decide the case—not the Section 6 application but the case—on inadmissible evidence that he has heard in secret. What are the press going to make of that?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I will no doubt be corrected if I have got this wrong but I think it is the case that it is currently permissible in some other areas where there are closed material proceedings. We may well wish to have a fuller debate on intercept evidence rather than dealing with it as part of a debate on whether there should be a separate disclosure judge. I confirm that in fact it is available in all other closed material proceedings, so this is keeping it in line with what happens elsewhere. No doubt we may return to this if my noble friend wants a more fundamental debate on the role of intercept evidence. I just point out what the position is with regard to the Bill, since he asked a specific question.

In any event, judges are accustomed to consider material for the purpose of making evidential and disclosure decisions. It is normal for judges at all levels to decide whether evidence is admissible and, if it is not, to put it out of their minds. I know that there has been some discussion about the extent to which that is possible. Obviously, it is the case in dealing with PII claims where PII is successfully asserted. My noble friend asked about the number of PII claims in criminal cases in magistrates’ courts. That is not really the point that we were seeking to make in the speaking note which he saw; rather we sought to make the point that in magistrates’ courts there must, day in, day out, be cases, not of PII, in which magistrates have to decide on the admissibility of evidence. The argument is heard before the magistrates as to whether particular evidence is admissible or not and, if it is not, they have to put it out of their minds. The point I was making is that there is no problem in principle, even in criminal cases in magistrates’ courts, for judges to decide issues of fact and law. There are cases, too, when they will have to put out of their minds evidence which they have deemed to be inadmissible.

A separate judge would make review of disclosure decisions as the case progresses cumbersome, as was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The disclosure judge would need to follow the progress of the case in order to understand potential implications for the fairness of proceedings before he or she was able to rule on disclosure issues, and that could cause delay. I accept that this is not the same as the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, earlier this evening, but some of the same considerations arise.

I take this opportunity to clarify what I said in an earlier exchange with the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, when he said that the Bill will abolish juries. I think that I responded by saying that these are civil proceedings presided over by a single judge and do not relate to criminal proceedings where there would be a jury. For clarification and for the avoidance of doubt, the position is that the Bill amends the Senior Courts Act 1981, and its Northern Ireland equivalent, which contain a residual right to jury trial in some civil cases. I do not think that that was what the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, had in mind, but it is important to say that for completeness and clarification.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

For the avoidance of doubt, I was involved in a case of false imprisonment tried as a civil case in the Royal Courts of Justice in front of a jury, and I am not aware that that possibility has been abolished.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

For completeness, the Bill allows the court, however, to refuse an application for a jury where it is of the view that the trial will involve a CMP. Highly sensitive information clearly could not be shared with a jury without presenting serious national security concerns and risks, but the original point is that the Bill does not affect trial by jury in criminal cases, since the Bill does not relate to criminal cases. Of course, criminal cases have been adduced with regard to Northern Ireland, where the practice is to have a separate disclosure judge but in a very specific context—the trial of serious terrorist offences in a climate where there a real risk of paramilitary and community-based pressures on jurors and a history of terrorist threats against judges. There, it is a very valuable safeguard, but I do not believe that such considerations apply to CMPs in civil cases.

I reassure my noble friend who raised this matter earlier that although we have given them considerable consideration, we remain unpersuaded by the arguments for a separate disclosure judge. We believe that the approach we are proposing here will lead to fairness with the same judge involved in all aspects of the case. Therefore, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am not surprised, but I am very disappointed by that answer. I hope that things can settle down over the Recess so that the matter can be reconsidered. It seems obvious to me that it would be in the interests of justice for there to be a separate disclosure judge as I have described.

On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, of course issues can arise in the course of the case where what did not appear to be relevant becomes relevant. That can be covered—and one way of doing it would be to give the special advocate a watching brief throughout the case. Particularly if the Attorney-General is paying his expenses, there is no reason why he should not continue in that role, to watch how the case develops and to see if applications need to be made.

It must be in the public interest that disclosure should come at the proper time, early on in the proceedings before a case is ready for trial. At that point, as I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, serious decisions are made: is this case one where you make or accept an offer, settle or negotiate? In what way can you shorten the cost and expense of a trial? Certainly in my experience, one always attempts to do that because a settlement may produce a better result than a judgment in your favour if you negotiate hard and well.

I wish I could expand a little further on this, but I am afraid I cannot. I ask leave to withdraw the amendment but hope that we will have further discussions on the matter and come back to it on Report.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for a clear explanation of something which, I am afraid, I approached with complete bewilderment. I simply did not know the point he was aiming at. I do now and I am persuaded by his argument. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be sympathetic to the case he has made because it is convincing and consistent with the approach to the Intelligence and Security Committee. Given that precedent, I would have thought not that it would damage the interests of the security services, but rather that it would strengthen the role of the courts and uphold the principles that Members across the House seek to maintain in terms of the operation of the justice system. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will accede to his noble friend’s plea.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for bringing forward this amendment. He rightly points to two pieces of legislation which govern the security and intelligence agencies, the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994. As my noble friend has indicated, they place an obligation on each of the agency heads to prevent the disclosure of information obtained by the agencies except on certain limited grounds set out in those Acts. In particular, the disclosure of information is permissible where necessary in the proper discharge of the functions of the agencies. Information held by the security and intelligence agencies will include information and intelligence from human source reporting, and therefore is essential to the agencies’ operational effectiveness and the protection of national security.

As I understand it, the concern behind this amendment seems to be that these provisions would prevent the agencies complying with their disclosure obligations in civil proceedings. However, it is our view that the amendment is unnecessary. The agencies take their disclosure obligations very seriously. In England and Wales, if the claim is a civil damages claim, for example, Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules will generally apply. Standard disclosure requires parties to disclose the documents on which they rely—documents which undermine their or another party’s case and documents which support another party’s case. If the claim is for judicial review, all public authorities are subject to a duty of candour which requires the public authority, when presenting its evidence, to set out fully and fairly all matters that are relevant to the proceedings. Naturally, part of considering these disclosure obligations is the question of whether PII should be claimed or, if Parliament passes Part 2 of the Bill, whether the Secretary of State should apply for closed material proceedings. In a case where the agency is being sued for civil damages or someone is applying for judicial review, it is part and parcel of the proper discharge of an agency’s function to defend actions taken in the discharge of its functions. I therefore believe that the amendment is unnecessary.

My noble friend has made reference to paragraph 3(4) of Schedule 1 concerning the ISC provisions. This paragraph reflects a provision in the Intelligence Services Act 1994 which treats disclosure by the agencies to the ISC as necessary for the proper discharge of their functions. It may be asked, as my noble friend did, why this provision is needed there and not in the context of civil litigation. It is simply because it is right to make it clear, as existing legislation does, that disclosure to the ISC is permitted.

My noble friend may well be raising a case where it is a question of third-party disclosure. He mentioned a case of Evans v Ministry of Defence and, on the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I understood him to indicate that that argument did not win the day. It is a case that I wish to consider in the light of what my noble friend has said. If the effect of this amendment would be to treat the disclosure into any civil proceedings, regardless of the identity of the parties or the subject matter of the proceedings, as somehow part of the proper discharge of the agencies’ functions, that would conflict with the agencies’ need and ability to operate in secret. This is vital to maintaining the trust and confidence of those with whom they work; or, as was said in the previous debate by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, information may come from a particular agent, and the secrecy of that is important. I am thinking in particular of proceedings that do not at all involve the agencies and where a request for disclosure is made. It is right that in these circumstances the courts consider whether disclosure would be necessary for the proper discharge of an agency’s functions before an order for disclosure is made.

I have indicated to my noble friend that I will look at the Evans case. Based on what he said, I am advised that it may be similar to and consistent with the arguments that the agencies made in the Omagh bombing case—namely, that Section 22A is a bar to third-party disclosure, and that it was for the courts to decide. I hope that he hears that the agencies take seriously the requirements of disclosure in civil proceedings under Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. On that ground I urge that the amendment is unnecessary and ask my noble friend to withdraw it.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am most grateful to my noble friend for indicating that he will look at these cases. In the light of that I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

If I may add to that, my Amendment 58 seeks to add words to Clause 7(1)(c) that would introduce a test of proportionality. Clause 7(1)(c) says,

“that the court is required to give permission for material not to be disclosed if it considers that the disclosure of the material would be damaging to the interests of national security”,

to which my amendment would add,

“and that damage outweighs the interests of justice in disclosure”.

That would introduce a balancing test for the judge. As I understand what my noble and learned friend is saying, Clause 6(2) is concerned with the gateway and that could be satisfied by the production of a sample of material. But when you get to the second stage, the judge would be considering things in absolute detail, endeavouring to perhaps make things available by redaction or other means. Even when doing that, my Amendment 58 would be a very appropriate addition to Clause 7(1)(c).

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I know my noble friends are trying to be helpful and I am sure that equally they will understand why I am not prepared to make a concession on the hoof, as it were. This is clearly something one would wish to consider and clearly we will also have the opportunity in good time to consider my noble friend’s Amendment 58. I am glad that he made the distinction between getting through the gateway—which is what Amendment 45 applies to—and the second stage. We are of the view that if the two tests in Clause 6(2) are satisfied to the discretion of the judge, the application for the closed material procedure must succeed and thereupon the detailed consideration of the documentation takes place under the rules of court, which are to be set out under Clause 7.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I have some sympathy with the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, that habeas corpus proceedings should fall within the civil proceedings provisions of the Bill. I am less persuaded by the argument to include any action against the police. It would probably seem wrong to exclude these specific actions from the procedures, not least in the light of the Crime and Courts Bill, with the creation of the National Crime Agency, the extension of powers to the border agency and the like, and the possible involvement of ordinary police forces under the auspices of the NCA in matters which could go to issues of terrorism or other aspects of national security.

The noble Lord may have a point about habeas corpus and it would be interesting to hear the Minister’s response to that, but I do not think that the Opposition could necessarily support the amendment as it stands. There is the problem that we will refer to later about definitions of national security and the like, which possibly offer a more fruitful way of narrowing the scope of the provisions of the Bill. Having said that, I entirely concur with my noble and learned friend’s view. Anything that I say on subsequent amendments or indeed in relation to this amendment is without prejudice to the stance that we take, but we are yet to be persuaded of the case for closed material procedures in the first instance. All the discussions that have taken place so far, and that we will continue to have in relation to this part of the Bill are subject to that distinct reservation. We are not, therefore, conceding the point when we look to see what ultimate fallback provisions might be desirable and necessary if it is the wish of your Lordships’ House on Report to go forward with the Bill in much the condition that we now find it. We will be looking to discuss amendments and we hope that the Government will respond positively to some of them but in relation to this amendment we will be commending the latter part to the Minister’s attention.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My noble friend’s amendment seeks to narrow further the contexts in which a CMP can be used. I hope I can demonstrate to your Lordships that the Bill is already very narrowly drafted and that the amendment could remove justice from those who are entitled to it. The Bill as drafted allows CMPs to be used only in relation to information damaging to the interests of national security, only in the High Court, Court of Appeal or Court of Session, and not in a criminal cause or matter.

The amendment would mean that CMPs could not be used in any action against the police or law enforcement agencies, or any action seeking a person’s release from detention. Where such cases involve information that cannot be disclosed for reasons of national security, this amendment would not allow judges to reach a judgment based on all the facts. Claims relating to national security should, surely, be capable of being heard, rather than material being excluded by way of public interest immunity, regardless of whether the defendant is the police or a government department. As was reflected in the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, the police play a vital role in national security in, for example, counterterrorism investigations. There may be many civil cases which would involve the police—it would not necessarily be directed against a Secretary of State—and it would be unfortunate if they were to be excluded from the possible use of CMPs. Judges should be able to come to a judgment on the full facts in any case relating to national security.

The Bill is designed to increase justice for claimants and defendants in all civil cases where national security means that, otherwise, information could not be put into open court. This amendment would take that justice away from claimants who bring a national security case against the police or law enforcement agencies, or where, as my noble friend explained, the case is about a person’s release from detention. Cases about a person’s release from detention in the UK will generally be in the context of a criminal cause or matter where CMPs are not available, but should this not be the case, it is important that all of the material is before the court, if possible, rather than being excluded by PII.

My noble friend gave a quotation about habeas corpus going back to the reign of King Edward I. I hope that I do not strike too nationalistic a tone, but north of the border, Edward I is not seen as a fount of justice and liberty. That apart, my noble friend raises a serious point. It is our considered view that in the context of habeas corpus cases it is vital that the court is in possession of relevant material before making a decision to issue a writ. Without all of the relevant information, it may not be possible for the court to come to the right decision.

I know that noble Lords are concerned that the nature of the types of cases covered by this amendment creates a greater need for transparency, and that, indeed, in some circumstances, such as proceedings into potential violations of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, there is a requirement for transparency. The argument that public confidence requires fully open proceedings in such cases is an understandable one, but I believe that these concerns can be addressed through our current proposals. Nothing in this Bill is incompatible with the ECHR. My noble friend has raised a serious point about detention. I will reflect further on it, but our approach is that it is important, even in these cases, that all the material, if possible, is made available to the court before a decision is made, rather than some of being excluded through PII. I will reflect on what he has said, but our view is that we have struck the right balance. I hope that on that basis he will be able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I know that my noble and learned friend is heading for the sleeper so perhaps we can send homewards to think again about this issue. Habeas applications in the United States have a special procedure and the importance of it is that the applicant for habeas is given some idea of what he is facing. I am not saying that habeas corpus applications should be completely open, but it is inappropriate to apply the strictures and limitations contained in the Bill to applications of that sort. It is a matter that we can discuss. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It was helpful of my noble friend to raise that. Clause 6(2) states that there are two ways in which a judge must be satisfied before he must grant an application for closed material proceedings. The first is that the party to the proceedings would be required to disclose material to another person in the course of the proceedings. That would normally come under Rule 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Again, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that Clause 6(3)(a)(i) is there because there could be circumstances in which a judge could take the view that you would not be required to disclose something because you could assert public interest immunity, and that argument would succeed. Apart from the fact that there might be public interest immunity, if disclosure would be required under normal rules in civil proceedings, that would be the first test that the judge has to apply.

The second test is that it would be damaging to the interests of national security. It was said by a number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill, that the courts over many years have been very respectful of the government position on that. The Bill makes it very clear that the application would be one in which special advocates would be involved. They could assert to the judge that the case had nothing to do with national security and that the Government were trying to cover up some embarrassment. That is why the second test is there. The two conditions must be fulfilled: first, there must be a requirement to disclose; and, secondly, disclosure would be damaging to the interests of national security.

In practical terms, the Secretary of State would be in the best position to judge the scope and nature of national security-sensitive material. Despite the fact that the absence of a CMP might be detrimental to their interests, other parties will not even be aware that relevant national security information exists, and would not be able fully to judge what damage there might be if the information were released. It is therefore clear that the argument for the Secretary of State making the application is a strong one. Nevertheless, it can remain open to a third party to approach the Secretary of State and request an application for a CMP should they require one. One example of this might be if the police were party to proceedings involving national security-sensitive material, for example in relation to counterterrorism. The Secretary of State would assess the risk of damage and make an application for a CMP on their behalf.

If the public interest were more widely drawn than national security, there would be a stronger case for other parties to the proceedings to be able to apply for a CMP. However, as my noble friends Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lady Berridge made clear—I was asked about this by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer—one concern is that the Government might want to have their cake and eat it, and might choose between claiming PII and applying for a closed material procedure opportunistically—opting for PII to exclude material and cover up wrongdoing and CMP where closed material would help their case. We do not believe that this is a realistic concern.

I assure noble Lords that the intention behind the CMP proposals is precisely that allegations against the Government are fully investigated and scrutinised by the courts. The intention is that all relevant material, helpful or unhelpful, will be put before the courts. Although it is in the first instance for the Secretary of State to instigate the CMP application, or to make a claim for PII, the power to order CMP or accept a PII certificate will rest with the judge, who will be alert to any unfairness to the non-government party, and with the CMP would have the case-management powers under Clause 7 to ensure that individual pieces of evidence are treated fairly through requiring disclosure or exclusion. It is inconceivable that a judge assessing the PII claim would conclude that the public interest in excluding material outweighed the public interest in its disclosure if the Government were cynically seeking to use PII to exclude material that undermined their case or assisted another party to the proceedings, especially where the court would know that the possibility existed of making an application for the use of a closed material procedure.

This is where the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, is relevant. He said that these matters could be looked at in the round and should not be put in silos. That is what we anticipate happening. The concern is perfectly legitimate and I fully understand it. However, we do not believe in reality that that would happen, and that the judge who was asked to grant a closed material proceeding or a public interest immunity certificate would allow such cynical ploys to succeed.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

That sounds like one of the great lies. “I am from the Government and I am here to help you”. The noble and learned Lord is saying that a Minister faced with a claim against him is inevitably going to be like a judge and not weigh one thing against another. If he can win his case by going for PII instead of closed material procedures, which I suggest he can, why would he not choose to go for PII? That is why I say my suspicions would be aroused if the Minister who had that choice went for PII, knowing that excluded material could not form part of the judgment. That is the problem. For the past five minutes the noble and learned Lord has been emphasising that the judge has this decision; he has this discretion; he looks at this material; he makes up his mind. The Bill is a straitjacket whereby the Minister controls which procedures are to be followed as well as what material is to be disclosed. So I hope the noble and learned Lord will reflect on what he has been saying.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Perhaps I may add that my Amendment 45, which we have not come to, is designed to replace the word “must” in Clause 6(2) with “may”—in other words, a discretion for the judge to decide whether to make a declaration based on the criteria that he must apply.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, again we are falling into the trap of jumping to stage 2 and thinking that the application immediately rules everything as closed material, which is not the case. If there is a body of evidence which can be presented to the judge showing that interests of national security are absolutely pertinent to the determination of this case, it is “must”; there must be closed material proceedings. But, as I have indicated, that does not mean that every piece of evidence is to be excluded and is not to be disclosed. If the Secretary of State cynically applies for PII when a CMP is available, the judge may not be disposed to grant PII. What I understood from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, is that the reality, particularly if you have special advocates arguing the case, is that unless the Secretary of State seeks a CMP for this kind of material he will have less of a chance of getting his PII accepted. Even if a CMP application was not made by the Secretary of State and a request was made to him for a CMP which he refused, that in itself would be judicially reviewable. If that refusal was seen to be unfounded and irrational, or the only rationality was to hide malfeasance, then clearly that would weigh heavily with the Secretary of State. I have indicated what we intend to achieve by this. I repeat: the intention is that all relevant material, helpful or unhelpful, will be before the courts. I think we can have a worthwhile discussion as to how that could be brought about.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am cautious about hazarding the estimate that the noble and learned Lord asks of me. In the Green Paper, we indicated that the kind of cases that we were looking at were 27 current claims. The most recent figures that I have, as of yesterday, show that the numbers have fluctuated somewhat since October 2011 at the publication of the Green Paper. Currently, there are estimated to be 29 live cases, which were of the type cited in the Green Paper. To give an estimate of the number of cases where sensitive information was central to the case, based on current cases handled by the Treasury Solicitor, there are 29 live cases but they exclude a number of appeals against executive actions that are currently stayed. There are 15 civil damages claims; three asset-freeze judicial reviews; seven exclusion judicial reviews; four lead naturalisation judicial reviews; and around 60 further naturalisation judicial reviews stayed behind these cases. I hope that gives the noble and learned Lord and the House an idea of the kind of figures that we are dealing with where we believe that sensitive information is central to the case, based on the estimate of the Treasury Solicitor at this time.

The recent settlement of the civil damages claims brought by the Guantanamo Bay detainees underlines the point that I was making. The evidence which the Government needed to rely on in order to defend themselves was highly secret intelligence material, which could not be released in open court. One option open to the Government would have been to claim PII over that material. If the PII claim had been successful, the Government would have succeeded in excluding a very large quantity of material, but material that they would have wanted to rely on to defend their position. The only practical option was to settle the claims for significant sums without admitting liability.

Although the numbers of these cases are small, they often contain extremely significant allegations about the actions of the Government and the security and intelligence agencies. There is a real public interest in being able to get to the truth of such allegations. Indeed, I think it is arguable to say that the rule of law is supported by courts being able to reach determinations on such matters. Although such settlements are often made without any admission of liability being made, as we all know, mud sticks. Allegations have been made in public that have never been examined or rebutted, and many people choose to believe that they are true. The damage to the reputation of this country can be immense and those unrebutted allegations can be used by individuals seeking to garner support for terrorism in retaliation for perceived wrongdoing by this country.

This is the backdrop against which our plans to allow material to be heard in court via CMPs should be seen.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Perhaps my noble and learned friend would explain how the public would be more informed and the allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the Government would be exploded by the use of CMP procedures when, by definition, it would all remain secret.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, the point I was seeking to make is that if one goes down the route of PII, the issues will never be tested at all. It may be that so much material has to be withheld that it is not possible for a determination to be made and the Government may be forced to settle. I do not believe that that enhances the confidence of the public in the security services.

It is an irony somewhat overshadowed by the controversy over CMPs that, before recent developments in case law, courts were themselves successfully using this approach in civil cases where sensitive evidence was involved to ensure it could be heard but also considered and tested. For example, a peace campaigner called Maya Evans sought to challenge United Kingdom policy in relation to the transfer to the Afghan authorities of suspected insurgents detained by UK Armed Forces in the course of operations in Afghanistan.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 14th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, this may not be quite what the noble Lord was thinking about, but in some cases, as my noble friend Lord Faulks indicated, if there is a question of a claim following a bereavement, we have indicated that we intend that there should be an uplift in these cases.

On the question of why we are not introducing QOCS for judicial review claims—this may be the circumstance to which the noble Lord was referring—the responses to the consultation indicated that conditional fee agreements were less commonly used outside the area of personal injury and were not frequently used in judicial review proceedings.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I hope my noble and learned friend will forgive me for mentioning that I have tabled an amendment dealing with precisely that point. It is for debate at a later time and proposes that QOCS should apply in cases where, for example, there is a death in custody—and to other matters referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Debate on his amendment might allow a better exploration of the important point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 12th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble Baroness acknowledged that I referred to some of the issues about unaccompanied children, but I will certainly draw her remarks and the point that she made about the Refugee Council to the attention of my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, one of the comforting sayings at the Bar, which I have found over 50 years to be absolutely true, is that when one door shuts another opens. It seems to me that, if he has heard of that saying north of the border, the noble and learned Lord will be aware that he has set out in his reply the basis of innumerable applications for judicial review of the decisions made by the director of legal aid services. It is impossible for there not to be a challenge to the statement made by the noble and learned Lord because almost anything can be brought within the ECHR rules, generally speaking, if you really try. We have heard reference to Articles 2, 6, 7, 8 and 14 tonight, which gives us five articles to play with.

I can assure the noble and learned Lord that the legal profession will look forward to testing his description and the ambit of the clause for a considerable period—case after case. It would be so much simpler if a broad discretion were given to the director of legal aid services, coupled with guidance that we could look at, in order that there would be some ambit to it. If the formulation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, which was found to be so seductive last time, were adopted with guidance, that could prevent an awful lot of future litigation. With that very pleasant prospect in mind, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 7th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford would seek to provide legal aid for all onward appeals on issues arising from a social entitlement chamber. My understanding is that that would be advice on matters of asylum support, criminal injuries compensation and welfare benefit. I am not able to judge offhand whether it covers the whole extent of what was passed earlier this evening by your Lordships but we are in the same area.

My first point is that the amendment would go beyond the existing scope of civil legal aid to the extent that it would allow legal aid for advocacy in the Upper Tribunal on welfare benefit, asylum support and criminal injury matters. We are restricting legal aid and I ask my noble friend to bear that in mind. It is the case that legal aid for legal representation has never been routinely available for the Upper Tribunal for matters of welfare benefit, asylum support or criminal injuries compensation. An estimate has been made that to do so could cost up to £7 million per year.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Is that on the basis of an assessment of how many cases a judge would declare complex? I propose a filter for these cases; only those that are complex should go there.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That is the point I was about to make. It is possibly based on the majority of cases currently going to the Upper Tribunal. As my noble friend rightly points out, we perhaps do not know how many cases would be certified as complex. That is an unknown unknown. I think my noble friend gets the point I am trying to make: we do not know that.

My noble friend makes an important point that the complexity of those cases arising out of the social entitlement chamber would be one factor that could engage Article 6 and lead into the exceptional funding in Clause 9. That exceptional funding is intended to take account of Article 6 issues. As he indicated in moving his amendment, that would require taking into consideration the complexity of each individual case considered under Clause 9. He indicated that that could lead to a waste of resources and he asked what was lost were a judge to make the determination rather than a legal aid director. One possible response is that the director’s determination under Clause 9 is whether the case is such that the refusal of legal aid would be a breach. Clearly, each case would have to be determined on its individual merits.

We move on to bringing into scope cases which are certified to be of significant wider public interest. Under the current legal aid scheme, there is a rule that allows any excluded case other than a business case to be brought back into scope if it is of significant wider public interest. As I have indicated previously, the Government do not intend to include such a rule in the civil legal aid scheme created by the Bill.

My noble friend also made a point that I wish to reflect on. I think he referred to the Cart case in terms of judicial review. If one were to go down that route, where legal aid would be available, the balance would be in terms of costs as opposed to what he proposes, where there would be a possibility of certification of a case in the significant wider public interest.

Without being in a position to make any commitment as to the outcome, on the point that the noble Lord raised—as well as the point that he made that not all cases would necessarily qualify that went to the Upper Tribunal or beyond—I have discussed the issue with my noble friend Lord McNally and we would be willing to consider this further if the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment. However, I make it clear that I cannot guarantee that he will necessarily ultimately get the result that he wants. But he has raised matters that I want to reflect on and pursue further. I include the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in that. There are important legal issues at stake.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am most grateful to my noble friend for that reply. I ask him to add this point to his deliberation. If the judge who has tried the case and knows all the facts and circumstances certifies that it is complex, the case can go forward on its merits to the Upper Tribunal under what I am suggesting. If the judicial review procedure is followed, an application for leave will be made to the Upper Tribunal, so that whoever sits in the Upper Tribunal has to determine first of all whether leave can be granted in this particular case. It happens in criminal courts all the time that cases go forward on the basis of a certificate from the judge, from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court in particular. The particular judge is in so much better a position to decide whether this is a case that merits a certificate and whether the merits of the case are such that it should be given permission to go up. That is a far better situation than the one whereby the defeated applicant applies for leave for judicial review to a judge in the Upper Tribunal who has to spend his time considering the papers put in front of him. If the noble and learned Lord has any contact with members of the judiciary, he will know that one thing that they do not like doing is to wade through piles of applications for judicial review from scratch to try to determine whether there is a point worth arguing in the administrative court. So there is a practical side to it that I suggest he should take into consideration. I am grateful to him for his response and on that basis hope to have further discussion and, perhaps, return to the matter on Third Reading. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 30th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it is very evident from the three interventions that this matter is clearly exercising the Committee. I certainly note from the experience of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, having chaired a rules committee that perhaps we are going into territory which we may not have been in before. As to what my noble friend has said, I sometimes hesitate to put things on the face of the Bill because, as we all know, once there, they limit what a rules committee might be able to do if faced with an obvious set of circumstances where it does not believe there should be one-way costs shifting, and it can inhibit that. However, I take the point that unreasonableness could be going too far towards the other extreme in terms of its lack of clarity.

My noble friend asked: if it is not possible to put something in the Bill, what assurances could be given? That is something we shall certainly want to reflect on when considering these contributions. I am sure that we shall have an opportunity to address this again at the next stage of the Bill, and if there are assurances that can be given, I would hope that we would be able to do so. Perhaps I may leave it at that for the moment. We recognise the importance of the points that have been made.

I should restate that there already appears to be broad agreement that there should not be a primary financial threshold in personal injury cases for QOCS, although that would not necessarily apply were QOCS to be extended at some later date to other categories of personal injury. I hope that reassures my noble friend on that particular point.

Amendments 143 and 144 seek to replace the Lord Chancellor’s discretionary power under Clause 45(2) with a duty to make regulations in respect of the recovery of “after the event” insurance premiums relating to expert reports in clinical negligence cases. I can give the Committee the assurance that we intend to allow for this recoverability so that poor people can get expert reports in clinical negligence cases without having to pay for them upfront. However, we have deliberately kept a degree of flexibility around the drafting of the regulations.

The effect of Amendments 144A to 144D is to extend the recoverability of ATE insurance premiums to all civil cases. Unlike the current exception for clinical negligence, the proposed exception is intended to apply to ATE insurance which covers the risk of paying opponents’ costs as well as funding expert reports.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, with great respect, I advanced the amendments in the context that one-way cost shifting will go through, as the Government say it will, in which case the defendant’s costs are immaterial. The only ATE insurance that will be required will be for the disbursements of the claimant himself, which would not otherwise be covered. That is the area to which I am referring in those amendments.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, we believe that the package of proposals seek to end ATE insurance premiums being charged to the defendant with the specific exception of clinical negligence cases. To start unpicking it in such an important respect would not retain integrity of the proposals as a whole. I hope that I am not misinterpreting what he said, but my noble friend has suggested that it might be possible to split or share the recoverability of success fees or ATE insurance premiums. Indeed, I think that the Bar Council has suggested that some success fees or ATE insurance premiums should be payable by the losing side with the remainder payable by the claimant. Lord Justice Jackson made alternative recommendations on partial recoverability of success fees and ATE insurance premiums in the event that his principal recommendations were not accepted. But the Government had a full public consultation on both the primary recommendations and the alternatives and gave careful consideration to the responses. We decided to take forward the primary recommendations—abolishing the recoverability of success fees and ATE insurance premiums—as the best way of restoring proportion and fairness to the CFA regime.

It has been suggested, as referred to in Amendment 146, that the market may not provide for or adjust itself sufficiently to take account of these. The amendment requires the Lord Chancellor to,

“have regard to the financial and commercial viability of the insurance market”,

in making regulations under Clause 45(2). I accept that the changes the Government are seeking to implement are fundamental, but we expect the insurance market to respond positively to them. It is easy to say ahead of an event that all sorts of appalling things will happen, but after 1999 the market certainly adjusted to the opportunities with ATE premiums, and it is not surprising that those who wish to maintain the status quo are making substantial representations to that effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I think I understand what the noble Lord is saying and I think I gave an indication on that point. Let me just try to find that—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

May I help by saying that my Amendment 162 goes directly to that point?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As I said in response to my noble friend Lord Thomas, we do not believe that that is necessary because it is the Government’s intention that such matters would be included in the definition of non-monetary benefit awarded to the claimant in any event should the additional penalty be calculated in that way. Clause 53 gives us the flexibility to do that so that the rules can be made across all categories of law. It is our intention that they should be. However, perhaps I may put that in writing, in a letter to the noble Lord that I will circulate to other Members of the Committee, to explain the matter in more detail.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am most grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and, in particular, to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for her support on the issue—which I regard as having constitutional significance—about whether the Civil Procedure Rules should be formulated without Parliament having any input into them at all. It seems to me that it is for us to decide, one way or the other, what the particular parameters should be.

Let me just pick up on two points. First, should the means of the claimant come into it at all? The insurance industry does not want that, but the proposal in the Bill is that the claimant’s means should be taken into consideration. What about the meaning of “unreasonable”? The meaning is so broad that it should really be narrowed down. On that issue, I want to hear further from my noble and learned friend and I shall be talking to him about it between now and Report. I will take the issue further if necessary.

Secondly, on the question of splitting the burden of the insurance premium, it seems to me that that is a sensible way to go forward. The corks from the champagne bottles will be popping down in the City when people read my noble and learned friend’s response that the premium will fall entirely upon the claimant. Why should it not be split? There would be advantages both ways in splitting the premium: first, there would be an incentive for the claimant to ensure that premiums are not too high and are not, as at the moment, left completely in the air; on the other hand, if you split the premium in the staged way that my amendment proposes, there would be a great incentive on the defendants to settle. The course that I have suggested includes advantages beyond the mere way in which the liability falls. I would like to hear a little bit more about why the Government prefer Lord Justice Jackson’s first proposal, as opposed to his alternative proposal, which I am not persuaded is the better one. I shall certainly return to that matter again.

I remind my noble and learned friend that, on this side, I have accepted that the success fee should be paid by the claimant from his damages, subject of course to a limitation of up to 25 per cent. I agree with him—in fact I made the point earlier—that the probability is that solicitors involved in non-risk litigation will advertise, “No success fee payable here”. Those bigger firms that get involved in the riskier litigation will do a very determined assessment of what risks they are prepared to carry in advertising their own services subject to a success fee. I see that there is an advantage in that. I shall read and study what the Minister has said and, I hope, discuss the matter further with him and come back on specific issues at Report. At the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it is always possible to speculate on what might happen in one case or another. To take the noble Baroness’s point, if it were a case where there were efforts to prevent her joining a trade union, that suggests that there was trade union involvement there, and one of the points that I have made is that trade unions have been a source of support over many years. However, it is difficult to look at the circumstances of one case without drawing conclusions that may be inappropriate. I simply observe that there are other forms and sources of advice that could be available in such circumstances, but perhaps not least from a trade union.

I conclude by making it clear that, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, highlighted, although legal aid has been removed for employment cases, it will be retained for judicial reviews and claims relating to contravention of the Employment Act 2010; discrimination claims are available there. That is consistent with what we had indicated we believed to be an important priority. In those circumstances, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, the concept that employment tribunals are a cosy chat between an employee and his boss in front of a very receptive body of people is quite wrong these days. An impression of unfairness is created for the employee who is seeking his rights when he finds perhaps even a QC appearing on behalf of a wealthy employer. I have appeared many times for employers, sometimes for employees and sometimes on my own behalf.

The excuse, or the reasons, given by the Minister would be far more acceptable if he were to say, “Well, if a union is backing an employee, that is fair enough; they can pay for legal representation”. If he is there on his own, why not just have the boss—the person who did the sacking—in front of the tribunal, not lawyers who in many cases are overpaid when they are dealing with the individual appearing in front of them?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I shall have my chance to reply later, but it is important that we focus on this. My noble and learned friend says that it is a broad interpretation and opens up a wide field, but everything is governed by that word “exceptional”. We have referred to that word in earlier discussions and debate during the passage of this Bill. “Exceptional” takes it out of the ordinary; it is unusual, outside what is normal. That cuts down the broad interpretation. You need a wide field because exceptional cases do not arise simply in relation to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to as the “floor”—the minimum rights guaranteed by the convention; they can come out from left field, as the Americans would say. Something quite unexpected is exceptional, which would not necessarily engage the rights under the European convention or European law. “Exceptional” cuts down the broad interpretation for which the noble Lord is arguing.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It may cut it down, but it leaves it still without any parameters, subject to “exceptional”, whereas in what is being proposed the kind of factors which the director would be required to take into account are those which I think people would agree are relevant, particularly in determining whether an application is exceptional. The importance of the issue is to the individual concerned: the nature of the rights at stake, the complexity of the case, the capacity of the individual to represent him or herself effectively and whether there are alternative means of securing access to justice. These are not airy fairy considerations; they are ones which I would fully expect the director to be able to bring to bear in dealing with individual cases, and I am sure he would do so. Everyone who makes an application no doubt thinks that their case is in the interests of justice and that it should be funded. At least, there is some indication here as to what criteria the director will apply.

On Amendment 92, I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said, and we will ensure that the specific questions that he asked about the chief coroner get a response as soon as we can. His amendment would make it a requirement for the director to consult the chief coroner and have regard to his views before making a significant wider public interest determination about whether to fund advocacy at an inquest. Inquest cases can currently be funded if there is a “significant wider public interest” in the applicant being represented. This is a term with a clear definition under the funding code: benefits to the wider public must be tangible, must be likely to accrue to a substantial number of people and must arise as a consequence of the representation. It is not enough for there to be a general public interest in the case.

The Government consider it important to retain the ability to fund inquest representation on the basis of the wider public interest because the provision of such representation may lead to findings which help prevent future deaths. That is why Clause 9(4), which I think in its generality the noble Lord welcomes, gives the director the power to provide funding on the basis of a “wider public interest” determination.

The onus has never been on the decision-maker to consult coroners—I am well aware that I am in the presence of someone who had to make these decisions on many occasions and I recognise the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in these matters. Indeed, many coroners may not wish to give a view at all. Some are not prepared to give a view about substantive elements of the case until the inquest is being held. However, under the current guidance on the existing exceptional funding system, the views of coroners are material, though not determinative, to decisions concerning the requirement for funding to be provided in order to fulfil the state’s obligations under Article 2 of the European convention.

Consequently, coroners are far more likely to give a view about potential ECHR engagement in inquests than on whether the case has significant wider public interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I understood my noble and learned friend to say a moment ago that “exceptional” means no more than it is a case outside Schedule 1, not that it is exceptional in the class of cases. That is a very different concept. I had understood “exceptional” to be in a class of cases that are not covered by Schedule 1 and not in scope and that you would need to have an exceptional case in that class of cases. However, if “exceptional” means, as my noble and learned friend said—and no doubt he will think about it—that it is merely a case that is outside Schedule 1, that is a very different situation.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I shall certainly think about it. Clearly, if it falls within scope, it falls within scope, whereas we have discussed some cases which would not necessarily fall within scope. We had a lengthy discussion on clinical negligence, which does not fall within scope but would nevertheless be an exceptional case—obviously as determined and defined in Clause 9.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My point is that a clinical negligence case, on what the noble and learned Lord said, as I understood it, would be exceptional. So that qualification is immediately fulfilled and then you are concerned only with the convention rights. However, any clinical negligence case would be exceptional.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

No. When debating clinical negligence cases we agreed that they did not fall within Schedule 1. However, clinical negligence cases would be exceptional if they met the criteria set out in Clause 9. In particular I go back to the debate on the criteria which relate to the individual’s convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that this is a floor operation rather than a ceiling operation but, nevertheless, Article 6 of the European convention is an important threshold and, in that respect, is exceptional. I hope I have not made things less clear. The policy is to limit this to where a failure to accept cases and make an exceptional determination would breach an individual’s convention rights or any right to the provision of legal services enforceable under European Union law. That is the nature of the exceptional circumstances.

If we go any further we will probably tie ourselves up in knots. We almost got there when we were looking at clinical negligence cases in which the exceptional circumstances as defined here, with particular reference to convention rights, would apply.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 18th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I hear what my noble friend says. I will check, but I was not aware that the Government had encouraged people to come in in those circumstances. The point that I was about to make was that UK Border Agency guidance in these cases, when people are coming in under an immigration route, is that it sets out presumption of a grant of an application if the relevant criteria are met. The evidence required, such as marriage and birth certificates, should not require specialist legal assistance to collate. Indeed, the entry clearance officer may on occasion ask for DNA testing to prove a family relationship, but in these circumstances the test will be free of charge to the applicant.

These cases do not require specialist legal advice and, as we have indicated with other immigration cases, it is not necessary for them to remain within the scope of civil legal aid. Nevertheless, I recognise what my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford said in moving his amendment. In spite of the fact that most cases should be relatively straightforward, as my honourable friend the parliamentary under-secretary Mr Djanogly indicated, there are some cases which are complex—I would certainly repeat what he indicated in the other place—so we will look at this again. I say this without wanting to raise an expectation, but it is important that we look at the issues where there are complex cases, and I undertake to look at that aspect again.

On Amendment 71, as my noble friend indicated we have dealt with most of these issues in the course of the evening. I am prepared to elaborate on the answers again, but perhaps he could just take as read the answers given in respect of those cases. Again, the issue relates to the fact that, as a general rule, we have taken the view that, unlike cases of asylum, where legal aid will be in scope, in cases of immigration the number of cases that turn on a point of law are relatively low and the cost of funding them is one that we believe can be better applied and applied in a more focused way on cases where the needs are greater.

On the question asked by my noble friend Lord Avebury about the UNHCR letter, I do not recall seeing the letter and nor does my noble friend Lord McNally. However, it is my understanding that Mr Djanogly has not only seen it but replied to it and has done so in the terms in which I have replied to the debate. In those circumstances, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am grateful for the assurance that the Minister has given that he will look at this matter again and consider what the attitude of the Government should be in complex cases involving family reunification.

I would point out that, on the question of claiming asylum, the Government said in their response to the consultation:

“Applications to join family members are treated as immigration cases, and are generally straightforward because they follow a grant of asylum”.

That is what my noble and learned friend told us just now. The Government’s response went on:

“Respondents argued that these cases are akin to claims for asylum … if a person wishes to claim asylum it is open to that person to do so either as a dependant of a primary asylum claimant or to do so in his or her own right. Legal aid for any such asylum claim will be in scope”.

As my noble friend Lord Avebury has said, the family members with which this amendment is concerned are outside the United Kingdom and cannot claim asylum unless they get here. The only way that they can get here would be through some hazardous and clandestine journey to get to this country and make a claim. It would be unlawful under the Immigration Act 1971 for a person in this country, including a person who has been granted asylum, to assist them in any way but if they can get here and claim asylum, they then apparently get legal aid to fight their claim. That seems ludicrous. I am sure that my noble and learned friend, in considering the matter further as he has promised to do, will take that into account, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 18th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

This is quite important. As my noble friend will recognise, the overall structure of what is proposed to be in scope does not provide for legal aid for damages. However, I recognise what he says about damages being part of an overall judicial review claim. It is important that we look at this and ensure that what appears in the Bill delivers the intention. I am sure that we will return to this matter on Report.

My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford spoke to Amendments 55 to 59, which concern the exclusions from legal aid which we have made for some immigration judicial reviews. Before I turn to the specific amendments, it might be helpful if I briefly remind the Committee of the Government’s reasoning on this matter. My noble friend raised the question of the lack of consultation—as did the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who I am delighted to engage with again at the Dispatch Box. I think that the last time we did so was in the debate on the fixed-term Parliaments legislation. It has been six months but seems like a year.

My noble friend and the noble Lord raised the question of a lack of consultation. However, in response to our consultation on legal aid the Judges’ Council of England and Wales highlighted the large number of immigration judicial reviews that were without merit. That point was raised in the consultation and my noble friend has accepted in speaking to his amendments that there are a number of unmeritorious cases taking up time. This change was made against that background. Although only a minority of those cases would currently receive legal aid, the Government’s view is nevertheless that it is wrong in principle for such cases to remain within the scope of funding. We are therefore seeking to remove two classes of immigration judicial review from the scope of legal aid, again subject to certain exceptions which I will come on to discuss.

The noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked whether I would double-check the figures on taking these parts of judicial review out of scope. Of course we will double-check them, and if there is further information we will make it available not only to the noble Lord but to all those participating in our proceedings.

The first category of case that we seek to exclude is one where there has already been at least one appeal before the tribunal or another judicial review within the past year on the same or a substantially similar issue. The second category concerns judicial reviews of removal directions rather than the underlying immigration decision. Such proceedings are often brought at the last minute—sometimes literally as people are being put on to a plane. We recognise that there will be some genuine, if unusual, cases within these categories that could still warrant legal aid. That is why we have made exceptions to our proposed exclusions—if the Committee will bear with the double negatives, which seem to be quite frequent in this part of the Bill. These are intended to take into account the potential for changes in an individual’s circumstances over time. In both categories, the exclusion is subject to a one-year time limit. We have also made exceptions for judicial reviews of decisions by the Home Office to certify under Section 94 or Section 96 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. These provisions curtail asylum appeal rights in certain circumstances and so maintaining legal aid for a potential judicial review is, we believe, an important safeguard.

We are therefore keeping judicial reviews of a decision by the Home Office to refuse to treat further submissions as a fresh claim for asylum. Again, this maintains the availability of legal aid for judicial review asylum cases where there may not have been an appeal to the tribunal. It has been suggested that most types of immigration cases will not be able to get legal aid, but most types of immigration judicial review will still be in scope. The provisions in the Bill remove only two relatively limited types of judicial review, and even these provisions are subject to the exceptions that I have outlined.

On the specific amendments spoken to by my noble friend Lord Thomas, Amendment 55 seeks to keep all immigration judicial reviews within the scope of legal aid. From what I have said, noble Lords will see why the Government do not agree with that amendment.

Amendments 56 and 57 relate to the operation of the exclusion of judicial reviews on removal directions. The Government seek to exclude judicial reviews of removal directions from the scope of legal aid because there will already have been a chance to appeal the underlying decision. More specifically, Amendment 56 would in effect retain legal aid for these judicial reviews in circumstances where there had been no appeal of the original underlying decision, or at least no appeal before the removal had been effected.

It is true that some decisions to remove can be challenged only by appeal from overseas, as Parliament decided. While judicial review can still be used as a means of challenging this, it does not follow that legal aid should be available in all these cases. As I explained earlier, in asylum cases where there is no right of appeal or where, as in Section 94 cases, any right of appeal arises only outside the UK, legal aid will remain available for judicial review. However, we believe that choosing not to exercise this appeal right should not bring someone within the scope of legal aid.

Amendment 57 raises a technical point, as my noble friend recognised. It is based on the belief that the provision around the “leave to appeal” in paragraph 17(6)(b) is unnecessary because there is no provision to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal in these cases. However, there is a leave-to-appeal stage to the Upper Tribunal, so we think that the current drafting is sound, albeit that this is a very fine technical point.

The intention of Amendment 58, as I understand it and as was stated by my noble friend, is to avoid a potential definitional problem to do with the meaning of asylum across the 1951 refugee convention, the EU procedures directive and the qualification directive. Again, it is recognised that this is technical but of course important, and it is about the definition of protection cases—that is, non-refugee convention cases.

The Government understand the concerns but on balance we think that they are misplaced. Our view is that the reference in paragraph 17(7)(a) of Schedule 1 to an asylum application within the meaning of the EU procedures directive is sufficient to cover all applications for international protection. I am happy to put it on the record that that is our intention. However, the amendment goes further than the Government intend; it seems to provide legal aid in all judicial reviews connected with asylum matters, not just those where there has been no previous opportunity to appeal. I believe that it would be wrong to retain legal aid for judicial review cases that are very likely to be without merit, regardless of whether they are asylum cases. Nevertheless, I express my appreciation to my noble friend for raising this issue and regarding the specific points that he made, we will certainly look at whether anything further is required here.

Amendment 59 seeks to add two further exceptions to the exclusions. The first is to make an exception for cases that have not previously benefited from legal aid. I understand the logic: without legal assistance, someone may not have put the right arguments forward first time around, so when it comes to potential judicial review, should they not have legal aid to ensure that they get it right? Our response is that if legal assistance means that they can put new arguments forward—sufficiently new that the court or tribunal is considering a different issue—they would still be eligible for legal aid for the judicial review. This is because exclusion applies only where the judicial review is in respect of the same or substantially similar issue. However, if they are still raising the same or substantially similar issue, even with the potential benefit of a lawyer, we do not believe that they should be eligible for legal aid.

The second exception, as sought by Amendment 59, relates to cases where the appellants have been successful in their previous appeal for judicial review. We think that there is an issue here and we will certainly look at that.

I hope that we have given a satisfactory explanation. This is a technical matter but I do not for a moment deny that these are serious issues. In asking my noble friend Lord Carlile to withdraw the amendment in the light of the assurances that I have given, let me give him a further assurance. He asked whether judicial review funding would cover the damages remedy sought through the judicial review, and the answer is yes. If we can find the right words, we will give proper effect to our intention.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Before my noble friend Lord Carlile replies regarding his amendment, I thank the Minister for his reply to my amendments, which raised difficult technical points. I hope that he will forgive me if I read what he has said with some care, as no doubt he will read the whole debate with some care. I look forward to seeing what technical amendments he may feel are necessary to deal with the points that I raised. I am also grateful to him for the assurances that he has given, certainly in relation to part of the amendments.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 16th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I think the position is that if they lose they do not pay it. That is what we are retaining in cases of clinical negligence. In short, poor people will not have to pay up-front for the necessary expert reports in clinical negligence cases.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The problem is that you cannot get a conditional fee agreement unless you have a case, and you cannot get insurance unless you can show that there is a case. In clinical negligence, you do not have a case unless you have the medical reports. That is the problem. The Government’s solution, as put forward in Clause 45, does not solve the problem at all.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, we certainly believe that going down this road will mean that poor people do not have to pay up-front for their necessary expert reports. Indeed, that is why we draw a distinction between our reforms as they affect clinical negligence and the reforms that affect claims for damages in other areas.

We are working closely with the NHSLA and other stakeholders to discuss how the commissioning of these reports can be improved so that joint expert reports can be commissioned wherever possible. That would involve the NHSLA commissioning and sharing expert reports on liability with claimants at an early stage. There is a lot of agreement that that is what we should be doing—trying to get it at such an early stage. That, in turn, will help to encourage the early notification of claims.

My noble friend Lord Faulks and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, expressed some concern about whether there would be a market for ATE insurance if it was not recoverable in other areas. We certainly recognise that these concerns about the funding of medical expert reports have been expressed, but the reality is that claimants usually take out ATE insurance. We expect the ATE market to adapt to the new arrangements. As my noble friend Lord Faulks accepted—although he queried whether it should have been done earlier, rather than during the passage of legislation—a working party has been set up to consider the recoverability of ATE and to ensure that premiums for expert reports reflect the risks involved. ATE insurance brokers have been asked to contribute to this working group. It is a concern to which we are alert and one that we seek to address.

Furthermore, we wish to reassure the Committee that we will be introducing qualified one-way cost shifting, which will be available in personal injury claims and, therefore, will by definition apply in clinical negligence claims. Qualified one-way costs shifting will mean that, in the majority of cases where damages for clinical negligence are sought, the claimant is not at risk of having to pay a winning defendant’s costs. We have therefore protected the claimant’s interests to ensure that they are not denied access to justice for fear of having to pay the defendant’s costs if they were to lose.

One of the main areas of concern in respect of expert reports is those cases concerning babies who suffer obstetric brain injury. This has been reflected in a number of contributions. While we consider that in most clinical negligence cases funding will be available through a combination of conditional fee agreements and ATE insurance, we have always recognised that there may be obstetric injury cases with high disbursement costs, which are currently funded by legal aid but for which it may be difficult to secure conditional fee agreements.

My noble friend Lord Faulks expressed concern as to whether the provisions in Clause 9 with regard to these exceptional payments, which we will debate later, would be fit for purpose and meet the task which we wish them to achieve. It is because of this that we have sought to make funding available. The safety net would be in the form of an exceptional funding scheme, which will ensure the protection of an individual’s rights to legal aid under the European Convention on Human Rights as well as those rights to legal aid that are directly enforceable under European Union law. In considering whether exceptional funding should be granted in cases engaging Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the director will take into account general jurisprudence set out by the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6. The jurisprudence takes into account the following relevant factors: the ability of the client to present his or her own case; the complexity of the matter; the importance of the issues at stake; and all other relevant circumstances. It is important to put this into context. Our impact assessment estimates that we will continue to spend £6 million of the £16 million we currently spend on clinical negligence cases on exceptional funding cases. We estimate that the vast majority of this £6 million—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

We do not wish to inflict the scenario which my noble friend indicates. The scale at which we believe the exceptional funding will be used is indicative of our expectation that exceptional funding will be available to assist these very profound cases. No one is disputing the seriousness of this. However, the amount of money that is being made available is not insignificant by any stretch of the imagination—£6 million out of the £16 million that is sought to be saved overall—which indicates that this measure is not just incidental but tries to address very directly the proper and sensitive concerns that have been raised.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My noble and learned friend referred to Clause 9 and to exceptional cases. He will be aware that a specific category of special exceptional cases is delineated in that clause: namely,

“advocacy in proceedings at an inquest under the Coroners Act 1988”,

where there is a “wider public interest determination”. Are the Government prepared to consider whether in this very sensitive type of case there could be a subsection inserted into Clause 9 which deals with the very difficult issue of clinical negligence instead of leaving it under the broad wording of subsection (2)?

Justice: Personal Injury Cases

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 20th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, my noble friend raises the important point about damages in respect of bereavement. As he noted in his question, conventionally these matters have been dealt with by the judiciary. Certainly, the proposed 10 per cent increase will be taken forward by the senior judiciary. I will ensure that the important point my noble friend makes regarding damages for bereavement is drawn to its attention.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, the Minister will know that the NHSLA—that is, the legal arm of the NHS—opposes these changes and desired that legal aid should continue in clinical negligence cases. That was its answer to the consultation process. What is its current position?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am not aware that it has made any further pronouncements on the matter. However, the Government believe that a conditional fee arrangement backed by ATE insurance will ensure that the vast majority of clinical negligence claims will be able to be investigated and that the ATE insurance market will adapt to the new arrangements. It is also important to point out that in Clause 9 of the Bill there is an exceptional funding scheme, which may well be relevant in profoundly serious cases where clinical negligence arises. However, I am sure that my noble friend will make a contribution on these matters when this is debated, I hope next month.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Thursday 14th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, I start by agreeing with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, that it is important that we have an efficient system of prosecution available in this country to deal with cases, when the evidence is available, that relate not only to war crimes but also to many of the other offences listed in this clause in respect of which the United Kingdom has sought to assert universal jurisdiction. My noble friend Lord Palmer of Childs Hill made it clear that nothing in this clause seeks to end universal jurisdiction, nor indeed does it end the right of private prosecution for universal jurisdiction cases. Although such grave offences may well seem better suited to prosecution by the state, we think it right that citizens should be able to prosecute them.

Clause 155 allows anyone to apply to a court to initiate a private prosecution for universal jurisdiction offences by using arrest warrants where appropriate. It prevents a warrant being issued in cases where there is no realistic prospect of a viable prosecution taking place. As these are cases where issuing a warrant would achieve nothing, that is surely right. That point was made by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford in moving his amendment. Indeed, with a singular exception, no one has dissented from the reform and from the purpose of Clause 155, which introduces the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Through this amendment, what we are looking at is the question of whether the criteria applied and approach taken by the DPP in giving consent is something which should be on the face of the Bill. It is certainly the Government’s view, which I think is shared by most noble Lords who contributed to the debate, that it should not.

Those of us who have read the clear and cogent evidence given by the DPP to the Public Bill Committee in the other place will have seen clearly how, if Parliament passes this provision, he intends to exercise the duty of whether or not to give consent. He has also made it clear that he proposes to apply the same code tests to the evidential and public interest tests that are used for prosecutions generally, and he has further indicated, as has been mentioned in this debate, that where necessary he would apply the lesser standard of the threshold test. He indicated to the Public Bill Committee that he intends to publish guidelines so that everyone will know how he would deal with decisions on whether or not to give consent.

I, too, want to endorse the comments of noble Lords that we can have confidence that the DPP will exercise his discretion properly. He has a track record which gives us full confidence that he will do that. I share the view expressed by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, that that is a good reason not to inhibit that discretion by putting things into statute. These tests are of general application and it is not clear why they should be set in stone by this amendment. Indeed, in Committee my noble friend Lord Carlile said that the amendment attempts,

“to fix in statutory stone something that is much more evolutionary—and needs to be”.—[Official Report, 16/6/11; col. 1011.]

We would not wish to stop that evolution, particularly given the commitment to transparency on the part of the DPP.

A further point was noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, in Committee and has been highlighted today, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It relates to the public interest dimension of the threshold test, which is not mentioned in the amendment. I rather thought that my noble friend Lord Thomas was suggesting that it was not necessarily part of the threshold test. However, paragraph 5.12 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors states:

“If both parts of the Threshold Test are satisfied, prosecutors must apply the public interest stage of the Full Code Test based on the information available at that time”.

If we put something in statute, there is a danger of actually missing something out that is in the test as it applies at the moment. Perhaps that underlines why it is not desirable to have this in legislation.

My noble friend has indicated that he is not going to press his amendment, and I think that will meet with the general support of the House. I encourage him to confirm that.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, a great deal of heat has been engendered in the course of the debate and I do not propose to add to it, although certain things were said about deconstructing this amendment with which I do not agree. However, I can take them up at a different time. Let me make it clear that there have been discussions between my noble friend Lord Macdonald and Mr Keir Starmer and they have come to a conclusion that is acceptable to both; namely, that the test should be published in guidance. No doubt it will be applied appropriately and in accordance with the traditions of this country, which are that the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney-General should act in the public interest and not for the purposes of any political party. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Privacy Injunctions

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 23rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I certainly hear what the noble Lord says and, as he has indicated, the terms of reference are still to be agreed. Without any commitment on whether it might be included, I will certainly draw his comments and the Bill that he previously introduced to the attention of my right honourable friends. It also might be fair to point out that for many years now—long before the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into our domestic legislation—there have been quite strict rules in place on the naming of children in court proceedings. It is fair to say that, by and large, those have very much been observed.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

We on these Benches welcome the report, which recognises that where secrecy is ordered it should only be to the extent strictly necessary to achieve the interests of justice. We also welcome the provision of notice to the press of an application of this type and the requirement of an openly available judgment. Does my learned friend—my noble friend—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Does my noble and learned friend accept that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides for the right to freedom of expression, is qualified? It is that the exercise of that freedom,

“carries with it duties and responsibilities”,

and,

“may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society”.

It specifically refers to,

“the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.

Would he agree with me that judicial authority must be maintained? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, the court sees the evidence and comes to a balanced judgment, and any attempt to interfere with that, even by the use of parliamentary privilege, simply because a politician cannot agree with the judgment when he does not know the facts, is to be deplored?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, my noble friend is right to quote at length Article 10. As I said earlier to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, these issues and the tensions between Articles 8 and 10 were considered at considerable length during the passage of the Human Rights Bill and express provision was made in Section 12 of that Act to give further guidance to the judiciary to establish that balance.

The other point that I would make, in substantially agreeing with my noble friend, is that in my experience, in politics and law, unless you have been involved in the case you usually do not know all the facts of the case. Very often that is in terms of sentencing; it is only the judge and the people involved in the case who know all the facts and on the basis of those facts come to the judgment that they make. That is a duty and that is what they do.

European Court of Human Rights

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Thursday 24th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes an important point: this country’s implementation of ECHR judgments has been very good and consistent with our obligation to respect and implement our international treaty obligations. He referred to the number of additional cases. The process that was started at Interlaken, where the United Kingdom was represented by the distinguished former Attorney-General, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, is under way, and it is hoped that when Britain has the chairmanship of the Council of Europe for six months starting in November this year, we will be able to build on these reforms.

The Government’s position on prisoner voting has been set out, but we have also requested that the court’s judgment in the case of Greens and MT v UK should be referred to the Grand Chamber of the European Court. If the Grand Chamber agrees to the referral, it will look at the case again and issue its own judgment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, given that there are 250 applications to the Supreme Court for appeals in this country and 2,700 applications from the United Kingdom to the European Court, do the Government have any plans for having two or three more divisions of the Supreme Court in this country, perhaps sitting in Downing Street, to hear human rights cases as a court of final appeal, with full legal aid, and thus give some succour to the legal profession?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am not aware that the Government have any plans to set up such additional divisions of the Supreme Court, but I am sure that the point made by my noble friend will have been noted by the Ministry of Justice.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 26th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

No; I wish to answer some of the points that have been made in the debate.

The amendment stipulates the figure of 35, which—as was said by one or two contributors, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, in moving his amendment—reflects the figure set out in the 1986 Act, which stated that there should be no fewer than 35 Members from Wales. I observe that the same Act stated that there would be no fewer than 71 Members for Scotland. That provision was repealed by the Labour Government. I do not complain about that; indeed, I encouraged them to do so. The number of Members of Parliament from Scotland under the Labour Government fell from 72 to 59, and is set to fall again under the Bill to 52, which is about a 26 per cent reduction. That will be relevant when we come to consider issues about devolution raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan.

My noble friend Lord Roberts of Conwy gave a clear expression of the Government's position as admitted in evidence. One of the underlying purposes of the Bill is to try to secure fairness—equal vote, equal value—throughout the United Kingdom. The amendment which has been moved and those which have been spoken to would go against that fairness of one vote, one value throughout the United Kingdom. We believe that every elector’s vote in elections to the other place should have the same value, regardless of where that vote is cast in the United Kingdom. It is important to emphasise that we are not in any way proposing less representation for Wales than other parts of the United Kingdom. Indeed, the value of a vote in Wales will be the same as the value of a vote in England, the same as the value of a vote in Scotland, the same as the value of a vote in Northern Ireland.

We have allowed for a 10 per cent range of tolerance between the largest and smallest constituency to take account of local and other factors. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, gave the impression—a caricature—that it was simply a matter of drawing square boxes on maps. That is not the case and does great disservice to the Boundary Commission, which will look at the issues and take account, to the extent that it thinks fit, of important matters such as special geographical considerations—the size, shape and accessibility of a constituency. The noble and learned Lord put it very well when he gave the illustration that a parliamentary boundary does not define which rugby team you will play for. As my noble friend Lord Crickhowell, said, when people are asked where they belong, they tend to answer in terms of old counties or smaller towns and communities. They tend not to identify where they belong in terms of parliamentary constituencies.

I am not sure whether my noble friend Lord Steel is present—I saw him at one point—but he will recall that when he represented the seat of Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles, having the rugby teams of Hawick and Gala in the same constituency set up some interesting issues of rivalry between different communities. As I said in response to a debate yesterday evening, Members of Parliament by their nature represent a number of different communities within their constituency. The noble Viscount, Lord Tenby, and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, made the point about size and accessibility. Brecon and Radnorshire, which is the largest constituency in Wales, is often given as an example. To give a sense of perspective, it is worth stating that at 1,160 square miles, the current Brecon and Radnorshire constituency is considerably smaller than the constituency represented by my honourable friend Lord Thurso in Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross, which is just under three times larger than Brecon and Radnorshire. Then there is the constituency represented by my right honourable friend Mr Charles Kennedy, of 4,909 square miles. Of course, there are geographical limitations which the Government have submitted in the rules.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, does my noble and learned friend recall that the late Lord Livsey, who for many years was the Member of Parliament for the then Brecon and Radnor constituency, was one of the most loved Members of Parliament, hard-working and known throughout the whole of that constituency?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I think that that would be accepted and acknowledged on all sides of the Committee. It is not just me standing here saying that it is feasible to represent a constituency of such a size, but the electors of Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross, and of Ross, Skye and Lochaber have returned their respective Members of Parliament on several occasions, which suggests that they have been able to address the genuine needs of a constituency covering many communities.

Crime: Rape

Debate between Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 16th June 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for his kind remarks. I had much pleasure working with him on your Lordships’ Constitution Committee over the past 18 months. I understand his point and perhaps the implied reference to a recent case. We have indicated that the most immediate issue we are considering relates to anonymity. However, rape is never far away from the consideration of both Houses of Parliament. I have no doubt that the point about age, to which the noble and learned Lord referred, will recur in our debates.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I also congratulate the noble and learned Lord on his appointment. Will he ensure that any changes to the criminal law are evidence-based and that no change in the anonymity rules is brought into effect until there is an opportunity to get statistics from police forces all round the country on whether the anonymity of the defendant would result in fewer women coming forward with their complaints?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his welcome. I certainly share the view, which is not specific to this case, that evidence-based legislation, particularly in relation to criminal matters, is almost invariably the best way forward. That is why we have said we will consider options and that any option we bring forward will be based on considerable debate and, I hope, evidence. Indeed, in another place Ministers have called for and welcomed evidence that will be given by people with expertise in this matter. I very much hope that in this House noble Lords who have expertise will be willing to share their views and any evidence which would help us to arrive at a proper option.