Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Wallace of Tankerness
Main Page: Lord Wallace of Tankerness (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Wallace of Tankerness's debates with the Wales Office
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, obviously, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said in his introduction, the purpose of the amendment is to make legally aided advice, assistance and representation available for all employment matters.
I have said from the Dispatch Box on one or two occasions in the context of these debates, and I have heard my noble friend Lord McNally say it—no doubt, he has also said it on many occasions when I have not been here—that we are faced with a need to prioritise resources. Clearly when individual issues are properly the subject for debate, it is always possible to make a case for that particular sphere of law or to bring that particular subject within scope. That has been evident from the contributions of noble Lords in this debate. Given the limited pot—it is not a bottomless pocket—my noble friends have had to address how we prioritise. As has been said on numerous occasions, we believed that the more important objective and priorities were those involving life, liberty or homelessness. As a result, we did not feel able to include within scope the employment law issues described by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and others in the context of the amendment.
It is also important to remember that one of the other things that we have looked at and that has been addressed is where there are other opportunities for funding to be made available. That was touched on particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, when he moved the amendment. Also, employment tribunals were designed, at least initially, to be simple. Their purpose is to enable parties to make or respond to a claim without the need for legal representation. While we recognise that clients find advice in the preparation of their case undoubtedly useful, when these tough choices had to be made we did not consider that this group of clients were generally likely to be in the category of particularly vulnerable people whom we have provided for in other parts of the Bill. We do not accept that the tribunal cannot be accessed or that justice cannot be obtained without legally aided advice.
In fairness, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, quoted from the Government’s consultation paper, in which we outlined other sources of advice such as the free helpline of the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service or the trade unions. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, that numerous people are not in trade unions, but a considerable number of people are still covered. I seem to recall USDAW announcing earlier this week a very successful action that it had taken on behalf of its members in branches of Woolworths. It had managed to get claims. I am sure the noble Lord would agree that there is still an important and valid role for trade unions.
ACAS also offers a free arbitration service for some disputes concerning unfair dismissal or flexible working. In some cases, an employer may indeed be willing to engage in civil mediation. There is also help available from the pay and work rights helpline and the redundancy helpline, and the tribunal’s public inquiry line can provide factual information although, I accept, not legal advice. Again, in some cases, voluntary organisations or charities may be able to offer assistance.
A number of noble Lords mentioned other issues that are not immediately pertinent to the debate on legal aid. DBIS is still consulting, although it might not have even got to consultation yet. I will certainly make it my business to ensure that—
Many of the people we are talking about are inarticulate. In my view, they have to have some sort of professional advice, but advice on the spot that is legally articulated on their behalf. No one else will do it. What does the Minister say to that?
There is a distinction between advice that is preparatory to a tribunal and advice in representation. I will check this but at the moment what has been sought is in many respects advice preparatory to tribunal. The number of cases where there is actual representation is very small.
Will merely advising people and preparation be enough? Is it not vital that those in this position should be able to put their case to the tribunal? They cannot always do that by themselves, can they? They need professional advice.
My Lords, in many cases professional advice by representation is not actually available. I have already said that I do not for a moment deny that the advice that people get in the preparation of a case is valuable—of course it is—but we get back to the issue of looking at the competing priorities for funding from a limited pot. We have said that cases involving life, liberty and homelessness are more important priorities. We are looking, too, at circumstances in which the tribunal is itself intended to be a forum in which people could much more readily access such things informally, without the need for, or recourse to, lawyers. When I was a law student, the idea was still alive and fresh. That difficult choice was made against a background where there are other sources of advice available—I shall not list them again—and in the context of a tribunal that is intended to facilitate those who do not have representation. I do not shy away from it being a difficult choice, but it was made against other competing priorities.
I was about to take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, made. We have mentioned other proposals that have been on the airwaves. A different department is responsible, but I will ensure that these concerns are drawn to the attentions of BIS, and will respond to the more specific points when it is possible to draw them to the attention of the department whose responsibility they are. I think that I am right in saying that in some cases the consultation has not been completed.
I put another question to the Minister, although I am very grateful for his answer to that one. He himself suggested that we are no longer in a golden age, if ever we were, in which tribunals were easily accessible and user friendly. Will he say whether the department has received representations and advice from the employment tribunals on this matter and, if so, what it was? Did those tribunals endorse the removal of employment cases from the scope of legal aid?
I think that I asked whether someone could come to my aid and give an answer to that question. Perhaps if I talk slowly, that may be possible. Failing which, I may be able to intervene on the noble Lord, Lord Bach, if he responds to this amendment, or I will have to resort to writing to the noble Lord. Frankly, I do not know the answer, but I shall try to find it out for him.
While the Minister awaits advice, will he tell us about the processes that led to the drafting of the impact statement? A number of us have argued that there will be knock-on consequences for the public purse to the budgets of other departments and the wider economy from taking these cases out of scope. What examination have the Government made of the cost implications elsewhere for their own policies, which the Minister keeps telling us he is applying only under duress, to save money on the legal aid budget itself? The justification offered by Ministers for this is that it is essential to contribute to the reduction of the deficit, and this is how they are going to contribute to the reduction of the deficit. Many of us simply do not believe that the net effect of these policies will be to reduce the deficit—it will be to increase it. What calculations have the Government made about that?
As the noble Lord acknowledged, the question goes wider than this particular case. I remember dealing with or at least considering the matter in relation to an earlier amendment last week. While it is often said, I do not think that any substantive evidence has been given that the cost to the public purse will be greater as a result of these policies. Certainly, if part of the purpose is to ensure that the deficit was addressed, it would not make sense to rob Peter to pay Paul, or whichever way round it is. The Government’s view is that in the totality there is benefit and that this will make a significant contribution to the reduction of the deficit. I apologise to the noble Lord, but despite the extended debate I still do not have the answer to his question.
My Lords, since this seems to be a harry-the-Minister moment and I need to make up for yesterday, can I put a couple of questions to my noble and learned friend that I would like him to think about while he is waiting? First, in my considerable experience of tribunals generally, employment tribunals have always really thought that they should be courts. They behaved much more like courts than any other form of tribunal. Indeed, the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council was so called because the employment tribunals insisted that they were not administrative justice and wanted “tribunals” in the title, reflecting their feeling of difference. Perhaps he could comment on that.
Secondly, and linking with this legal aid point, I picked up on the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I take the point about priorities, and I am not going to say that the other things which he mentioned are of lower priority than this. I had a constituency case, years ago, where somebody was up against one of the big banks, with QCs all over the place, so to me the question is: is it fair, just and right that people should be left without advice and assistance when they are up against that sort of might? I am not sure that the answer is yes.
My Lords, the lesson of this is to get an answer quickly so that you do not get other questions accumulating. I know that my noble friend has considerable experience from his time in dealing with tribunals. I cannot remember what his exact role was, but I know that he was very much involved and I remember meeting him when he had that role and I was in another Parliament. As I indicated, over the years it has perhaps become much more formalised but we should not lose sight of the fact that the intent of the tribunals system generally, no matter what they might want to call it, is to have a forum in which people can much more readily come and put their case forward than one with all the formality of the court. Indeed, as I indicated, that was part of the thinking as to why we are dealing with the tribunal system. Perhaps the necessity of it is, let us say, that there was a less compelling argument as to why these cases should therefore be brought within scope than would otherwise be the case.
My Lords, one of the points that I made was that the Government were intending to change the nature of the tribunals, by removing the lay people who sit on unfair dismissal cases and replacing them by a judge sitting alone. In other words, they are giving a much more legal feeling to the person who appears before them than when there were laypeople on tribunals. I am not a lawyer, but I have a lot of experience of tribunals. I sat for many years as a member of the arbitration commission, and so on, so I know quite a lot about the way in which laypeople operate on tribunals. It is certainly a much more friendly arrangement for an individual appearing before such a tribunal than if he or she appears before a judge sitting alone. That changes the nature of the tribunal and of the apparatus. I wanted to raise that with the Minister.
I accept that there is obviously a distinction between a tribunal and a more formal court setting. It was in the context of those proposals, which are not before us in legislation, that I indicated I would respond in more detail. Likewise, I will respond to the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. He asked a perfectly straightforward and fair question and I very much regret that I cannot give him an answer, but I will certainly do so and ensure that that response is circulated to other Members who have participated.
Would the Minister, between now and Report, consider the experience of someone such as myself, who was removed from employment because I wished to join the appropriate trade union? Under the Government’s proposals, preventing employees joining trade unions by threatening them will, in addition to the other disadvantages, provide an incentive for unscrupulous employers to try to stop their employees joining trade unions. In my case, it was a major company which recently has gone bust.
My Lords, it is always possible to speculate on what might happen in one case or another. To take the noble Baroness’s point, if it were a case where there were efforts to prevent her joining a trade union, that suggests that there was trade union involvement there, and one of the points that I have made is that trade unions have been a source of support over many years. However, it is difficult to look at the circumstances of one case without drawing conclusions that may be inappropriate. I simply observe that there are other forms and sources of advice that could be available in such circumstances, but perhaps not least from a trade union.
I conclude by making it clear that, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, highlighted, although legal aid has been removed for employment cases, it will be retained for judicial reviews and claims relating to contravention of the Employment Act 2010; discrimination claims are available there. That is consistent with what we had indicated we believed to be an important priority. In those circumstances, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, the concept that employment tribunals are a cosy chat between an employee and his boss in front of a very receptive body of people is quite wrong these days. An impression of unfairness is created for the employee who is seeking his rights when he finds perhaps even a QC appearing on behalf of a wealthy employer. I have appeared many times for employers, sometimes for employees and sometimes on my own behalf.
The excuse, or the reasons, given by the Minister would be far more acceptable if he were to say, “Well, if a union is backing an employee, that is fair enough; they can pay for legal representation”. If he is there on his own, why not just have the boss—the person who did the sacking—in front of the tribunal, not lawyers who in many cases are overpaid when they are dealing with the individual appearing in front of them?
To pick up my noble friend Lord Thomas’s point, I do not think I ever suggested that tribunals were a cosy chat; indeed, I suggested that they were of a somewhat different nature from those of 30 or 40 years ago. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that employment tribunals were designed to be simple and accessible, and that the parties can make a response to a claim without the need for representation. Similarly, an employment tribunal and its chairman must, so far as is practical, ensure that the parties are on an equal footing—that is actually in the rules.
With regard to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, says, it is the case that where an employment claim involves both discrimination and non-discrimination matters, we will consider that under the rules that we put in place for connected matters under paragraph 40 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Bill. Those rules will be set out in regulation but, as with any application that is within scope, this will not necessarily bring in these cases automatically. Of course there is still the merits test, albeit that it was a category that was in scope.
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in what I was going to describe as a short debate but is now a medium-sized one. None the less, it has been a passionate debate, with many strong views being expressed. I am grateful, too, to the Minister for answering the sometimes difficult questions that were rightly posed to him. I am particularly glad to thank the noble and learned Lord for acting as a recruiting sergeant for trade unions. Speaking as a member of a trade union, I think that that is a splendid thing to do from the government Front Bench. He is quite right; this is a strong argument for people to join trade unions and get the help that that brings. I know he was making a serious point.
On this occasion, the Government and even the noble and learned Lord are being rather naive about tribunals. It seems that the best justification for what the Government are doing is that because tribunals were designed to be informal, they are therefore informal and it is fine for individuals to represent themselves in person on a regular basis, even when the other side is represented by a QC or a lawyer of any kind. There is nothing that the tribunal can do to make it fair if that is the position. One thing that the state has done to make it fairer is to give individuals who do not have the benefit of trade union membership or any other resource—who do not have the money to pay for lawyers—some legal advice and, in occasional cases, representation at a tribunal, just to equalise the situation a little. I have no doubt that employment tribunal judges and the lay members who sit on tribunals welcome the fact that individuals have had advice or are, on occasions, represented. That makes their task that much easier than it is when there is complete inequality of arms.
I ask the Government why they are making a system that works pretty well at the moment more unfair and more likely to lead to injustice—this is true about a whole range of these issues but we are talking here about employment tribunals—for savings of some £4 million a year. That is if there will be savings, but I will come to that. Many arguments have been put forward against this change from all sides of the Committee this afternoon.
The question that I want to ask is: given that the only possible reason for doing this is to save some public money—we know, of course, that public money must be saved—is the Minister really satisfied that this will save any money at all? The obvious consequence of there being no legal aid is that bad cases will be taken forward by individuals, which will clog up the tribunal and slow it down because the individual will not have had advice or representation. Good cases will not be pursued, which is an attack on justice, or, if they are pursued, will take much longer to be heard because of the large number of bad cases that suddenly find themselves before the tribunal.
I am rather frightened that too many people are going to find themselves without any remedy. That is bound to arise in many instances. I hope that the Minister will sympathise with them because having an effective remedy is vital. I am not talking about professional advice but about being able to take something to a tribunal and being heard—and being heard equitably. It is not simply that people of this kind—we are talking about consumers at the moment—ought to feel that when they are treated shoddily their point of view will be heard. I am afraid that that is unlikely to be the case and they will be sort of disfranchised. People who are inarticulate and disfranchised can resort to rather unhelpful remedies.
My Lords, the effect of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would be to make civil legal services available for consumer matters. There is a degree of familiarity about the pattern of these debates. I do not think that I am speaking out of turn in saying that the previous Administration and the Labour Party went into the last election with an understanding that the legal aid system would have to be reformed. What I find difficult in listening to the debates—and I hope that I am not offending anyone—is the sentiment, “Lord make me chaste, but not just yet”. We must reform legal aid, but when examples are presented people say, “We don’t want to reform that part of it”.
The Minister is making an important point, and he is justified in making it, but it is false. We have set out what we would have done to make savings in the legal aid budget. Our proposals would have applied largely to the criminal law, and particularly to the role of solicitors. Although I am prepared to go into details, the Committee would not be very interested in it at this stage. Our proposals would have saved a considerable amount of money. The Law Society itself has made recommendations on savings. I know that noble Lords from the Liberal Democrat Benches will later suggest a possible source of savings on criminal legal aid as well. There are alternatives out there. The one thing we committed ourselves not to do was to cut social welfare law, because we recognise that, for a relatively small amount of money, it did an incredible amount of good. Our opposition to the Government is based on the fact that they have picked on social welfare law, attempting to decimate it so that it no longer exists. That is a justified criticism that has not yet been answered.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for setting out that position. As he said, we will come to issues of criminal legal aid later today—I hope; I am sure.
This is going over old ground, but it is important. The scale of the deficit reduction that has been required exceeded what many of us thought before we came into government in May 2010. As I said, that has resulted in some difficult decisions. On two occasions, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said that it was unfair to make that point with regard to professional negligence cases. He cited the response to the consultation, when we said that those were claims concerned primarily with recovering damages and that we considered that their relative importance was generally low compared, for example, with issues of safety and liberty. He seemed to say that that is so blatantly true that it does not add anything.
If one has limited resources, those are the kind of priority judgments that must be made. In Schedule 1, we have tried to apply those priorities in different circumstances. Again citing the response, he said that people who would be bringing damages claims were not likely in general to be vulnerable compared with detained mental health patients and elderly care home residents, who are unable to present their own case. He agreed that that is clearly the case. If we have to establish priorities, I think he would agree that priority would go to a detained mental health patient or an elderly care home resident.
If there was an unlimited fund of resources, the noble Lord’s point would have far more force, but given that there is not, given that decisions have had to be made as to what comes within scope and what does not, I think the balance that we have sought to strike of giving precedence to issues of life, liberty and homelessness is proper.
It is for that reason that we did not include consumer claims within the scope. The noble Lord raised the question of professional negligence cases. It is fair to say that, when we come to Part 2, conditional fee agreements may be available for cases involving damages. That makes the provision of legal aid in such cases less likely to be justified. As has already been well rehearsed, other sources of advice are available on consumer matters. There are trading standards officers, Consumer Direct and alternative non-court based solutions through regulators or ombudsmen—such as the Financial Ombudsman Service for people with complaints about financial services or Otelo for complaints relating to telecommunications.
The noble Baroness, Lady Howe, talked about the cut in CABs’ funding. Of course, there will be an impact on CABs’ funding from legal aid, although it is estimated that that is only 15 per cent of CABs’ funding. At the risk of saying this yet again, the Chamber will be well aware that the Government announced a further £20 million funding in June last year for not-for-profit advice agencies and are considering funding for future years. Last February, £27 million was announced for continued funding administered by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills for this financial year to maintain the face-to-face debt advice programme in citizen's advice bureaux and other independent advice agencies across England and Wales.
To pick up the important point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, additional funding has been announced for not-for-profit advice agencies, and the Government are considering funding for those organisations for future years. As parallels the previous debate, we will retain legal aid for consumer matters where they concern an alleged contravention of the Equality Act 2010. Many cases involving the Equality Act will be within scope.
At the end of the day, it boils down to the fact that, with finite resources, priorities have to be made. We have had one of, if not the most, generously funded legal aid schemes in the world. Even after the changes are implemented, should the House pass the Bill, it will still be a very generously funded legal aid system. Regrettably, some choices are very difficult, but I hope that the priorities we have identified stand up to scrutiny. It is more than axiomatic that when you have limited funds, life, liberty and dealing with homelessness and discrimination are important and that people who are less able to articulate their case or defend themselves should have priority. On that basis, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Howarth and Lord Clinton-Davis, my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, for their contributions. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Bach for his intervention, although if the Government were proposing only to decimate legal aid—to take 10 per cent off—I would almost be prepared to accept that. I think he was using the phrase in the vernacular sense rather than the literal sense, because we face a much bigger reduction in legal aid and advice on funding than the 10 per cent actually means.
To refer back to my noble friend Lord Howarth's contribution in an earlier debate, he was asking about the knock-on costs of some of the changes. It may interest him to know that I have tabled a Question for Written Answer inviting the Government to say what estimates they have made of the cost to other government departments and whether those departments have accepted them or made any representations about them.
The noble and learned Lord again advances the mantra about life and liberty, and of course they are most important. I am tempted to say that the Government believe in life and liberty but not in the pursuit of remedies, to paraphrase. More importantly, we are seeing the virtual death of equality before the law. There are areas where inequality will be deepened for a modest saving, at the very best. That is a socially divisive measure. It runs contrary to the big society concept and some of the words that we are hearing. The practical effect will be the denial of justice to far too many people. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but it is a matter to which we may well return.
My Lords, I will be very brief. We on the Front Bench support the amendment unreservedly. I will make three points. Given that these cases address complex or novel points of law, they are clearly beyond the ability of the average litigant in person—and, if she is to be believed, even of my noble friend Lady Mallalieu, although I am not sure about that.
Secondly, such cases are the lifeblood of our legal system. They give it its unique character and ensure that it is kept in line with evolving social mores and values, and with extranational jurisprudential developments. They are a crucial part of our legal system. Thirdly, a failure to guarantee that such cases can be heard would be a complete failure of any regime purporting to protect the needs of the average litigant.
Perhaps I may repeat the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. Are these cases covered by the exceptional cases regime in Clause 9? If they are, under the terms of the amendment, I would be very grateful if the noble and learned Lord would say that on the record. I will go no further than to thank the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for the very thoughtfully crafted amendment that we commend to the House.
My Lords, I, too, thank my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford for tabling the amendment. It would bring into scope any appeal to the Upper Tribunal and appellate courts where a relevant court or tribunal has certified, for example, that the case raises a complex issue of law or is a matter of significant wider public interest. It is important to note that this would broaden the existing scope of civil legal aid, as well as bring into scope a range of cases that we intend no longer to fund. The amendment extends the legal aid scheme beyond its existing bounds by, for example, allowing legal aid—albeit subject to the relevant court certifying one of the matters listed in the amendment—for advocacy in the Upper Tribunal on welfare benefit matters, or on business cases before the Supreme Court.
Further, Clause 9 ensures that in any individual case where it would be a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to withhold legal aid, funding will be provided. Both my noble friend Lord Carlile and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked whether the amendment merely replicated what was in Clause 9. I will put on the record that it does not, in specific respects that I will explain later. It is the case, however, that in deciding whether the withholding of legal aid would breach Article 6, the director of legal aid casework must consider the complexity of the issues and the importance of the matter at stake. This addresses the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu. The ability of the applicant to present their own case is a relevant factor, along with other relevant circumstances. Therefore, in cases where Article 6 is engaged, the exceptional funding scheme we have proposed will include taking into consideration the complexity of each individual case considered under Clause 9.
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the representations and arguments put forward. Amendment 90 would delete paragraph 16 of Part 2 of Schedule 1:
“Civil legal services provided in relation to compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme”.
I think I am right in saying that the architecture does not apply right across the board for criminal injuries, but only in cases that are brought within scope under Part 1.
I note what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said about the potential complexity of applying and the advice given to possible applicants, although I think it is fair to say that applications can be made online and by telephone, and the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority itself provides help and guidance.
I rather suspect that the numbers involved are small, although I could not indicate just how many, but I have listened, I believe that some important points have been made, and I want to reflect on this—without any commitment. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I am extremely grateful for—not to say surprised and delighted by—the noble and learned Lord’s generous offer, and I hope that we can take matters forward in the spirit that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, referred to. I withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the government amendments in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord McNally are designed to give better effect to the stated policy intention.
Under the proposals that we are putting forward, advocacy should be available for preliminary and incidental proceedings only where those proceedings take place in the same forum or venue as the proceedings that are in scope. We do not believe that this is sufficiently clear in the Bill as currently drafted. Therefore, Amendment 90D deletes from paragraph 5 of Part 4 of Schedule 1 the reference to Part 3, and Amendment 90E introduces a new sub-paragraph that clearly sets out that advocacy will be available in preliminary or incidental proceedings in the same venue as those set out in Part 3.
Amendment 90F is consequential to the amendments that I have just described. Amendment 90G inserts a new sub-paragraph to provide a power that allows regulations to make provision on when one set of proceedings is related to another. Amendment 90C makes it clear that advocacy for an in-scope area will be available in relation to bail proceedings and enforcement proceedings in any venue. Amendment 90B has been tabled to ensure that correct references are made in paragraph 24 in relation to the rest of Part 3. More technically, Amendment 90ZA corrects a slip in the original drafting and makes the wording of paragraph 10 of Part 3 of Schedule 1, which is about advocacy for the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales, consistent with the wording of the rest of Part 3 of Schedule 1. I beg to move.
My Lords, it is important that we have moved on to Clause 9, covering exceptional funding, because this has been discussed in earlier amendments. Amendment 91, moved by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, would allow the director to fund excluded cases where he or she determines that it is generally in the interests of justice to do so. I am sure that Members of the Committee will readily acknowledge and appreciate that in this context, the phrase “interests of justice” is capable of wide interpretation. The amendment would create a power, which I am sure is its intention, that is considerably broader than the one currently being proposed in Clause 9 as it stands. It is right that there should be an exceptional funding scheme and that it should provide a potential safety net for the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights of access to justice, and we believe that Clause 9 achieves that important end. Exceptional funding determinations under Clause 9(3) will be made in accordance with the factors that the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights have held to be relevant in determining whether publicly funded legal assistance must be provided in an individual case.
Following on from that and looking at the jurisprudence, in considering whether legal aid should be provided in an individual case, the kind of factors that the director will need to take into account include: the importance of the issues to the individual concerned and the nature of the rights at stake; the complexity of the case; the capacity of the individual to represent themselves effectively; and alternative means of securing access to justice. These factors are broadly similar to the considerations that the Legal Services Commission currently takes into account in criminal proceedings where it is in the interests of justice for legal representation to be provided. I would suggest that our exceptional funding provisions are likely to meet the concerns of noble Lords in civil cases where, for example, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged. Indeed, in moving his amendment, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford accepted that there is substantial case law from Strasbourg in relation to family law and he almost seemed to acknowledge himself that there was a potential for very many cases indeed to qualify under the exceptional funding provisions as set out in the Bill. However, we believe that the insertion of the general phrase “interests of justice” would be open to very broad interpretation and would risk undermining the approach, scope and rationale for making changes to the legal aid system.
It has been acknowledged that Amendment 91A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, covers similar territory in that it would allow the director to make exceptional case determinations when it was appropriate to do so against specified criteria. As with Amendment 91, the potential ambit of this is extremely broad, and certain elements would be open to very wide interpretation. Again, however, I believe it is worth noting that many of the factors listed in the amendment, such as,
“the client’s vulnerability … the client’s capacity to represent themself … and … the availability of alternative sources of”,
funding will form at least part of the test for exceptional funding where Article 6 is engaged.
Amendment 91A also specifically refers to clients under the age of 18. In considering whether an individual case meets ECHR exceptional funding criteria, the director would be obliged to consider the ability of the client to present their own case, having regard to the complexity and importance of the issues in terms of what is at stake. Where a child brings an action without a litigation friend, that would be a relevant factor in deciding whether or not they have the ability to present their own case. In the end, the factors I have indicated will be taken into account by the director in deciding whether the absence of legal aid would mean that it was practically impossible for the applicant to present their case or would lead to an obvious unfairness in the proceedings.
The noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked whether legal aid would apply to advice and assistance. The answer is that in principle it could do so to the extent that it would avoid the breach of an individual’s rights under, for example, Article 6. Amendment 92 raises the issue of the chief coroner—
My Lords, in relation to Amendment 91, does the noble and learned Lord accept that Clause 9(3) as currently drafted will require the director to spend much of his or her time making determinations as to the scope and application of convention rights rather than focusing on the easier question of whether or not the interests of justice require legal aid? I would suggest to the noble and learned Lord that there is a real danger of satellite litigation as to whether or not convention rights or EU rights are in fact breached. Would it not be much more sensible and efficient, and much less expensive, to leave the director to focus on what he or she will be good at, which is asking whether the interests of justice require legal aid?
As ever the noble Lord puts a seductive argument, but there is a certain advantage in the director being required to have regard to convention rights because, if the test was the wider one of the undefined interests of justice, I am not sure whether that would lead to any less satellite litigation; it is possible that it could lead to more. He says that it would be easier, but when faced with that test without any guidance—with the exception of a certain amount of specificity set out in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach—there would not be any real steer for the director if that is all he is to be left with when making decisions.
It would be very difficult to challenge a director’s decision as to whether the interests of justice are met because it is a subjective test. If the test, as under Clause 9(3), is hard-edged—that is, whether there is a breach of the convention—it is much easier to bring a legal claim in that respect.
Having a definition which in these circumstances would be so broad—which I think the noble Lord is saying is a merit of it—opens up vast scope, as I said in response to my noble friend Lord Thomas.
I shall have my chance to reply later, but it is important that we focus on this. My noble and learned friend says that it is a broad interpretation and opens up a wide field, but everything is governed by that word “exceptional”. We have referred to that word in earlier discussions and debate during the passage of this Bill. “Exceptional” takes it out of the ordinary; it is unusual, outside what is normal. That cuts down the broad interpretation. You need a wide field because exceptional cases do not arise simply in relation to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to as the “floor”—the minimum rights guaranteed by the convention; they can come out from left field, as the Americans would say. Something quite unexpected is exceptional, which would not necessarily engage the rights under the European convention or European law. “Exceptional” cuts down the broad interpretation for which the noble Lord is arguing.
It may cut it down, but it leaves it still without any parameters, subject to “exceptional”, whereas in what is being proposed the kind of factors which the director would be required to take into account are those which I think people would agree are relevant, particularly in determining whether an application is exceptional. The importance of the issue is to the individual concerned: the nature of the rights at stake, the complexity of the case, the capacity of the individual to represent him or herself effectively and whether there are alternative means of securing access to justice. These are not airy fairy considerations; they are ones which I would fully expect the director to be able to bring to bear in dealing with individual cases, and I am sure he would do so. Everyone who makes an application no doubt thinks that their case is in the interests of justice and that it should be funded. At least, there is some indication here as to what criteria the director will apply.
On Amendment 92, I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said, and we will ensure that the specific questions that he asked about the chief coroner get a response as soon as we can. His amendment would make it a requirement for the director to consult the chief coroner and have regard to his views before making a significant wider public interest determination about whether to fund advocacy at an inquest. Inquest cases can currently be funded if there is a “significant wider public interest” in the applicant being represented. This is a term with a clear definition under the funding code: benefits to the wider public must be tangible, must be likely to accrue to a substantial number of people and must arise as a consequence of the representation. It is not enough for there to be a general public interest in the case.
The Government consider it important to retain the ability to fund inquest representation on the basis of the wider public interest because the provision of such representation may lead to findings which help prevent future deaths. That is why Clause 9(4), which I think in its generality the noble Lord welcomes, gives the director the power to provide funding on the basis of a “wider public interest” determination.
The onus has never been on the decision-maker to consult coroners—I am well aware that I am in the presence of someone who had to make these decisions on many occasions and I recognise the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in these matters. Indeed, many coroners may not wish to give a view at all. Some are not prepared to give a view about substantive elements of the case until the inquest is being held. However, under the current guidance on the existing exceptional funding system, the views of coroners are material, though not determinative, to decisions concerning the requirement for funding to be provided in order to fulfil the state’s obligations under Article 2 of the European convention.
Consequently, coroners are far more likely to give a view about potential ECHR engagement in inquests than on whether the case has significant wider public interest.
I apologise for interrupting my noble and learned friend. He may be aware that a boy called Jake Hardy died today as a result of suicide in Hindley Young Offender Institution, a matter that I am sure we would all regret and wish to express our deep sympathy to his family. Can he really see a distinction in inquests between a case in which that young man’s family have an interest and a case in which a wider public have an interest? Is it really the intention of the Government that the family should not be entitled to legal aid if it is not identified that there is a wider interest in the outcome of the inquest? That is a distinction made by this clause.
My Lords, I have to confess that I have not heard that news, although they are obviously tragic circumstances and I associate myself with expressions of regret. When one does not know the circumstances, I always find it very difficult to extrapolate from them to a wider general principle. I hope that my noble friend will forgive me if I do not follow him down that line, because I simply do not know all the facts and circumstances.
In decisions on whether legal aid is required to fulfil the state’s obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR, it would seem incongruous to make it a statutory requirement for the chief coroner to be asked for his or her views on the significant wider public interest aspect of the case. To compel the director to consult the chief coroner in all cases which come for a determination is likely to add considerably to the administrative element of the assessment process and lead to delays for bereaved families. In turn, it would represent a burden on the chief coroner, who would almost certainly be unfamiliar with the circumstances of many cases, unlike the individual coroner who is holding the inquest. The chief coroner would therefore be required to acquaint him or herself with information pertaining to a number of cases with no obvious benefit for bereaved families, who have a locus in this. In these circumstances, there is no obvious benefit in individual coroners or the chief coroner mandating what would inevitably be an additional process in the legal proceedings.
Amendment 92A would compel the director to make provision for the payment of reasonable costs incurred by any person making a successful application under this section. The concept of “reasonable costs” is open to broad interpretation and might be seen to authorise payments at a commercial rather than a legal aid rate. Nevertheless, discussions with the Legal Services Commission about the precise remuneration arrangements for exceptional funding applications are ongoing and we fully expect to propose that the costs associated with the making of successful exceptional funding applications will be payable. I hope that that gives some reassurance to the noble Lord.
The exceptional funding scheme being introduced by the Government will give the director a narrowly drawn power to provide civil legal services that are not available under Schedule 1—hence their being “excluded cases”—where there are exceptional circumstances. We have reviewed questions of the European convention and issues relating to the death of a family member. An individual must qualify for such services in accordance, too, with Clause 10, which means that decisions on exceptional funding will be subject to the means and merits criteria. However, we believe that this is an essential safeguard for fundamental rights of access to justice which will underpin our proposals for changes to the scope of civil legal aid. The Director of Legal Aid Casework will make these exceptional funding decisions. This is a departure from the current position where the Lord Chancellor makes individual funding decisions in relation to excluded cases. Clause 4(4), which has already been debated, explicitly prohibits the Lord Chancellor from giving directions or guidance to the director in relation to individual cases. This will guarantee the objectivity of the decision-making process, in respect of both in-scope and excluded cases, and serve as a safeguard against political interference.
Clause 9(3)(a) provides the director with the power to make an exceptional case determination where the director considers that the failure to provide legal services to an individual would be a breach of the individual’s rights under the convention or European Union law, as we have discussed.
I recognise that concerns have been expressed about the parameters of the exceptional funding scheme that the Bill will create. I am sure—it is obviously the case—that many noble Lords would prefer a broader discretionary power in the Bill but, if I may take the Committee back to the fundamental purposes of the changes that we are making to the general legal aid scheme, we need these reforms to create a fair, balanced and sustainable legal aid system. We have taken into account the importance of the issue; the litigant’s ability to present his or her own case, including the vulnerability of the litigant; the availability of alternative sources of funding; and the availability of other routes towards resolution. We have used these factors to prioritise funding so that civil legal aid will be available in the highest priority cases—again, I repeat, essentially where, first and foremost, people’s lives and liberty are at stake; they are at risk of serious physical harm; they risk the immediate loss of their home; or their children may be taken into care. If we make wholesale changes to the exceptional funding provisions in the Bill, we risk undermining the overall reforms to the scope of civil legal aid.
That said, it is nevertheless our expectation that there will be several thousand applications under the new scheme and that there will not be a fixed budget for exceptional funding. It is our intention to publish more details concerning the operation of the proposed exceptional funding scheme and the associated guidance in due course. The guidance will largely be based on the factors that the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights have held to be relevant in determining whether publicly funded legal assistance must be provided in an individual case.
In these circumstances, we believe that this will be a route down which applicants will go and, as my noble friend said when moving his amendment, that it will cover a considerable number of cases. I invite my noble friend to withdraw the amendment and to be reassured by the structure and architecture which is in place with this important clause, in addition to those cases which already will be in scope under Schedule 1.
My Lords, having listened to what we have heard in connection with these amendments, it occurs to me, first, that, for some reason which is no doubt clear to some, “exceptional” is used in order to be defined, so the exceptional quality does not come into the definition of exceptional cases.
My second point is that, although “the interests of justice” is a rather general and vague subject, on the other hand if you turn it round and say that the director, before he allowed this ground to prevail, had to be satisfied that there was a real risk of injustice unless legal aid was granted in a particular case, that would focus on the issue in the case in a more distinct and direct way than the phrase “the interests of justice”, which has been used in many contexts in the past. I agree that, on the whole, it is a vague phrase, but turning it round might make it a little more attractive to my noble and learned friend.
My noble and learned friend focuses on the word “exceptional”. My understanding of the term “exceptional cases” and the architecture of the proposed scheme is that there will be civil legal services available as described in Part 1 of Schedule 1, subject to Parts 2 and 3, for cases which are in scope. There will also be civil legal services available for cases which do not fall within Schedule 1 but which are, as it were, exceptional. That is set out in Clause 9. I am certainly interested in what my noble and learned friend said about turning the phrase around, which has a certain seductive charm. I would not want to immediately agree to that but, without commitment, it is certainly something that I would want to think about.
That said, the provisions we have here are quite substantive in their degree of direction and the extent to which the director can apply the convention jurisprudence as to which cases would fall within subsection (3). So there is a degree of certainty. Obviously, each case will depend on its merits, but at least there will be some indication of the kind of factors and the relevant jurisprudence that the director will take into account. As I have said, I certainly find that the concept of “the interests of justice”, undefined as it is, is probably too vague to be in the Bill without undermining the scope of the scheme that is being proposed.
I understood my noble and learned friend to say a moment ago that “exceptional” means no more than it is a case outside Schedule 1, not that it is exceptional in the class of cases. That is a very different concept. I had understood “exceptional” to be in a class of cases that are not covered by Schedule 1 and not in scope and that you would need to have an exceptional case in that class of cases. However, if “exceptional” means, as my noble and learned friend said—and no doubt he will think about it—that it is merely a case that is outside Schedule 1, that is a very different situation.
My Lords, I shall certainly think about it. Clearly, if it falls within scope, it falls within scope, whereas we have discussed some cases which would not necessarily fall within scope. We had a lengthy discussion on clinical negligence, which does not fall within scope but would nevertheless be an exceptional case—obviously as determined and defined in Clause 9.
My point is that a clinical negligence case, on what the noble and learned Lord said, as I understood it, would be exceptional. So that qualification is immediately fulfilled and then you are concerned only with the convention rights. However, any clinical negligence case would be exceptional.
No. When debating clinical negligence cases we agreed that they did not fall within Schedule 1. However, clinical negligence cases would be exceptional if they met the criteria set out in Clause 9. In particular I go back to the debate on the criteria which relate to the individual’s convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that this is a floor operation rather than a ceiling operation but, nevertheless, Article 6 of the European convention is an important threshold and, in that respect, is exceptional. I hope I have not made things less clear. The policy is to limit this to where a failure to accept cases and make an exceptional determination would breach an individual’s convention rights or any right to the provision of legal services enforceable under European Union law. That is the nature of the exceptional circumstances.
If we go any further we will probably tie ourselves up in knots. We almost got there when we were looking at clinical negligence cases in which the exceptional circumstances as defined here, with particular reference to convention rights, would apply.
My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, replies to the debate, I hint to the Minister that he should listen very carefully both to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, suggested and to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, invited him to say about the expression “exceptional”. Can he also let us know—not in due course but reasonably quickly—some more details about how it is intended that Clause 9 will work and the kind of funding that will be available under it? He said those questions would be replied to in due course, but it is important before we pass Report in this case to know a bit more about the Government’s intentions in Clause 9.
My real point in getting to my feet now is that, though I may have missed what the Minister said, I do not think he answered my short query about whether the way that Clause 9 is drafted at the moment excludes any prospect of legal aid for initial advice and assistance. That is an important point in relation to the fact that that initial advice can stop things in their tracks at a much earlier stage and save the legal aid fund a lot of money.
My Lords, first, I indicated when replying to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern that I certainly want to reflect on what he said. It would be wise to do so. On the question that the noble Lord raised, I think I replied but I can quite understand in the context of my reply that the noble Lord did not hear it. I now want to make sure that I get it right. My reply was to the effect that initial advice and assistance could in principle be granted under Clause 9, to the extent that to grant it would be necessary to avoid a breach of the individual’s rights, for example, under Article 6. That is perhaps not as wide as the noble Lord hoped, but in principle there could be circumstances where it would be available.