Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Wallace of Tankerness
Main Page: Lord Wallace of Tankerness (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Wallace of Tankerness's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have listened with interest to this debate as a lay person who has not been much engaged on the Bill in the past. However, like my noble friend Lord Avebury, I had constituency experience and was always impressed by the complexity of the cases brought to me. I am also impressed by the volume of evidence and comment made, not least because I currently happen to be one of the officers of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration. I am not in any sense taking its brief but I feel that this matter needs very careful and continuing consideration.
I well understand that there have been cases of abuse in the past. These may have involved overt or self-styled professionals, and they may have involved bad practices by others, including third parties, who run the immigration cases. I also well understand the point about the cost that the Minister has already made to us in correspondence. I would go beyond that to comment that we really cannot meet all the objectives which his department needs to meet in order to balance its budget if we make wholesale concessions on every single aspect of concern where pressure is developed.
These are complex cases. My difficulty in saying that we need to keep them within scope is—thinking aloud—in determining how one would find a basis for doing so without, as it were, pre-hearing the merits of the cases and without necessarily being able to predetermine the degree of legal complexity in those cases unless and until they had been examined. I know that those are difficulties and I know that the cost is a difficulty, but I say to my noble and learned friend that I do not spend my life rebelling and I do not intend to do so tonight for some of the general reasons that I have given about the need for rigour as we take this Bill through. However, I think that these cases are particularly difficult. If he takes them out of scope now, I think that he will need to keep the whole area under review. In future, he may need to consider at least some residual discretionary fund which can be applied to cases of particular interest or importance or where justice is most engaged. It is on that qualified basis, but in anticipation also of his response, that I may be prepared to tender my vote in his Lobby tonight.
My Lords, the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, as indicated by many contributors to this debate, would bring legal aid within scope for all immigration cases. I readily understand why noble Lords have put forward the amendment and I am sure the noble Lord will accept, as I think he indicated in his remarks, that just because we seek to take many immigration cases out of scope does not mean that we do not value the contributions that immigrants have made. I think the noble Lord, Lord Bach, acknowledges that we certainly do.
To make a change to the Bill in a way proposed by this amendment causes us to look at the rationale and the basic structure of what underlines this legislation at a time of limited resources. As my noble friend Lord Boswell has just said, this is a time when difficult decisions have had to be taken and when there has been a need to focus legal aid on those who need it most in the most serious cases. My noble friend said that he hoped we would consider it. It can be taken as read that, in an area as sensitive as this, for the reasons that have been advanced by many of your Lordships in contributions to this debate, this is obviously a matter which has been given serious consideration. I am confident that all who took part in the debate will appreciate that this is not a blanket exclusion of immigration cases. We have made it clear in the immigration sphere that we are retaining legal aid for asylum cases, which we believe is absolutely essential because the issues at stake can, at times, be as serious as life or death. It is important, too, to recognise that we will protect legal aid for immigration detention and where there is domestic violence. We are also keeping legal aid for most immigration judicial review cases, which are very often the most complex cases.
This approach means that under our reforms we will continue to spend £70 million of the current £90 million budget in relation to immigration cases. My noble friend Lord Newton talked about a disproportionate share. I think that our reform, with an expectation that some £70 million out of the current £90 million budget will continue to be spent, is an indication that this has been examined in some detail.
However, the corollary of protecting legal aid, particularly in the key areas to which I have just referred, is that it is necessary to be more far reaching in others. At a time when our fiscal difficulties have been acknowledged by a number of contributors, I do not see how it is always possible to justify the extended use of limited resources; for example, for foreign students who may wish to study here but who do not have a connection with the United Kingdom. When difficult choices have to be made sometimes it is very easy to accept the principle that those choices are necessary but it is more difficult when you try to translate them into specific areas.
I shall pick up specific points made by a number of contributors, not least by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who acknowledged the accession to the convention that was recently confirmed. The noble and learned Baroness knows, because we debated it in Committee, that the Government provide £2 million per annum for support to trafficked victims to help to rebuild their lives and that can include information about legal rights. I think it is known by your Lordships that that £2 million is distributed by the Salvation Army. The convention requires legal counselling, including information about people’s rights. There are no immigration applications as such that trafficking victims need to make. They are automatically granted 40 days' leave; then they may be granted 12 months’ leave if they are assisting the police, or up to three years’ leave if there are compelling circumstances to do so. That is decided on the known facts of the case and they do not need to apply for it.
My Lords, will the Minister acknowledge that part of the reason for introducing the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner was the poor quality of the advice that people were getting at these tribunals from people who simply did not know what they were doing? The new service was designed to ensure that they would get proper advice, and we should think very carefully before going back to the preceding regime.
My Lords, we are not proposing to abandon the regime. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, pointed out, immigration advice is tightly regulated by the OISC, to which complaints can be made.
Substantial savings are required. The change that we propose will save an estimated £20 million a year out of a total of £90 million spent in this sphere of law. It is important to show a balance; it is not just a case of taking immigration cases out of scope. Cases affecting some of the most vulnerable people will remain in scope. I do not for a moment doubt the motivations behind the amendment. However, I assure noble Lords that the matter has been given careful consideration. My noble friend Lord Boswell asked about complex law being kept under review. He will be aware that the power to add, within scope, that has been proposed for Clause 8 is a safety net that could be used if, in the light of experience, the somewhat apocalyptic scenario described by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, came to pass. Of course, there will be a post-implementation review after five years.
I hope that noble Lords will recognise that in a very difficult area we have sought to strike the right balance in cases that are particularly demanding and that particularly affect asylum seekers, such as cases of domestic violence and where people are being held in detention, and that we are addressing some of the most difficult cases in the immigration field. However, we had to draw the line somewhere. It could never be in the right place for all noble Lords. I can only assure them that it was done with some care and thought, and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this important debate, and not least to the Minister, who in his usual reasonable way explained the Government’s position. I am afraid that I cannot accept the explanation. To save £20 million in order potentially to set back the system by many years and to cause difficulties for so many people is not a sensible saving of money.
The noble Lord, Lord Newton, talked about other expenditure the Government had found. He was too polite to say what I will say. My example is the £250 million the Government found to make fortnightly bin collections weekly. It is absurd to save £20 million here but spend £250 million there—such an absolutely wrong sense of priorities—that any satirist would have enormous fun writing a story about it. Jonathan Swift should be living at this hour.
I will simply ask the House to recall the comments of two of our most distinguished judges: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Their words a few minutes ago gave the lie to the argument that this was a sensible move by the Government. Almost all other noble Lords who spoke said that the measures were not worth taking and were wrong in themselves. I ask the House to ask the Government to think again. I beg to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, we agree with the amendments in this group. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, said:
“Ministers say that Travellers must obey planning laws like everyone else; but they demolished the system created by the previous Government under which an obligation was imposed on local authorities to provide planning permission for Travellers’ sites that would accommodate the number of Travellers in each area, as determined by an independent assessment of needs, buttressed by public inquiries. Since the Secretary of State gave local authorities carte blanche to rip up those plans and decide in their unaided wisdom”—
that was the phrase he used—
“whether to allocate any land at all in their development plans to Travellers’ sites, the number of sites for which it was intended that planning permission should be granted has plummeted by half, according to research conducted”.—[Official Report, 24/1/12; col. 928.]
In his reply, will the Minister explain to the House why the Government took that decision and changed the policy that had been set up under the previous Government?
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Avebury explained in moving this amendment, Amendments 77A, 77B, 77C and 77D are aimed at ensuring that legal aid remains available for possession proceedings for persons who are clearly trespassers on the property or land where they are residing, in particular for people living on unauthorised encampments. Under the Bill, legal aid would no longer be available in such cases.
I valued the opportunity to meet my noble friend Lord Avebury, the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and their colleagues from the Community Law Partnership. It was an opportunity for them to set out in more detail what underlies their amendments and for me to indicate where the Government are coming from on this. My noble friend raised a particular point about the judicial review vis-à-vis the county courts, to which I will return.
Let me say clearly that as a matter of principle the Government believe that they should not be funding individuals to resist eviction where they have unarguably entered and remained on the property or site as a trespasser. The whole rationale of this Bill is to focus scarce resources on the cases that are the highest priority.
I remind noble Lords that the Government amended the Bill in Committee to make it crystal clear that legal aid will continue to be available for possession and eviction matters where there are grounds to argue that the client has not entered the property or site as a trespasser and where there are any grounds to argue that the client has not remained on the property or site as a trespasser. I believe that, with this safeguard in place, it is not an appropriate use of resources to retain funding more widely.
I readily acknowledge that the legal aid position in relation to judicial review is different from the position in relation to possession proceedings concerning those who are clearly trespassers. However, as my noble friend Lord Avebury indicated, we are generally retaining legal aid for judicial review. In any major reform such as this, it is reasonable and necessary to draw relatively broad lines in order to achieve an effective system. We believe that our approach is a reasonable one in the circumstances.
It has been argued that our approach in the Bill cuts across case law that permits public law arguments to be raised in possession proceedings themselves, a point made by my noble friend. As we discussed when we met, along with colleagues from the Community Law Partnership, the Government do not necessarily accept that argument. It is correct that case law has developed so as to allow public law arguments to be raised directly in possession proceedings. Our proposals in relation to legal aid do not affect that. However, there is no legal bar on seeking a judicial review of a public authority’s decision to bring possession proceedings.
We recognise that, as with all judicial reviews, the decision on whether to grant permission for such a judicial review to be brought will be entirely at the discretion of the court. The court will consider a number of factors, such as the availability of alternative remedies, including any grounds that could be raised by way of defence to the possession proceedings.
It has also been argued that retaining the trespasser exclusion in relation to possession proceedings while retaining legal aid for judicial reviews will be much more costly for the legal aid fund. I indicated that I wanted to reflect on this issue. Regrettably there are no detailed data, as the Legal Services Commission does not record whether a recipient of legal aid is a trespasser. Nevertheless, we believe that the number of possession cases involving trespassers that are funded under the current legal aid scheme is likely to be relatively small. Of those cases, fewer still are likely to involve seriously arguable points of public law. Accordingly, we do not consider that the current approach in the Bill will have significant cost implications.
In any event, the amendments would restore legal aid under paragraph 28 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 for trespassers generally, including cases involving trespass to private property or cases involving public authorities where no public law issues in fact arise. In these circumstances, we do not believe that the width of the amendment proposed by my noble friend would be a proper and wise use of the limited funds available.
I appreciate that my noble friend and the noble Baroness are particularly concerned about the Gypsy and Traveller communities. As I stated in Committee, the Government certainly understand the potential impact of the Bill’s provisions on these communities. Nevertheless, we consider that the proposed changes to the scope of legal aid set out in the Bill are both proportionate and necessary to our objective of targeting legal aid to those who need it most while achieving a more affordable system.
I emphasise that the provisions to which these amendments relate apply to trespassers generally, whoever they are. They are not specifically targeted at the Gypsy and Traveller communities. My noble friend asked whether, given the criminal offence of squatting created elsewhere in this Bill, the trespasser exclusion in paragraph 28 now specifically targets Gypsies and Travellers only. The exclusion in paragraph 28(1) of Part 1 of Schedule 1 applies to trespassers generally and not just to Gypsies and Travellers on unauthorised encampments; for example, an individual who squats in a non-residential building would not be committing a criminal offence under the provisions of the Bill and would be subject to the trespasser exclusion for legal aid if the owner of the building brought possession proceedings to evict them. Therefore, we do not accept the argument that the Bill’s trespass exclusion now targets Gypsies and Travellers in particular.
Before I move on to the mobile homes amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked whether the abolition of the regional strategy pitch targets would lead to fewer traveller sites. The Government’s draft planning policy makes it clear that local authorities should set pitch targets based on robust evidence, and the Government are currently considering the responses to the consultation on the draft policy. Rather than imposing top-down targets which fuelled opposition to development, the Government believe that we are offering councils real incentives to develop additional traveller sites in their areas. The previous model of top-down pitch targets under regional strategies did not deliver, not least because between 2000 and 2010 the number of caravans on unauthorised developments increased from 728 to 2,395.
As I mentioned in Committee, the Homes and Communities Agency is responsible for administering the Traveller pitch funding programme and monitoring the use of the funding awarded to local authorities and registered providers. In January this year the Government announced the allocation of £47 million of Traveller pitch funding, which will help provide more than 600 new pitches and refurbish more than 160 existing pitches between now and 2015. This funding is based on payment by results at completion—a question was raised as to why nothing has actually been paid out yet—but £47 million has been allocated and the delivery of the funding allocations will be monitored through the Homes and Communities Agency’s established programme management framework, with quarterly contract review meetings forming part of the process.
The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, spoke to Amendment 77E, which seeks to bring into scope legally aided advice for any matter arising under the Mobile Homes Act 1983. That Act gives rights to residents who have agreements with site owners to live in their own mobile homes on site. We do not believe that this amendment is consequential to Amendments 77A to 77D.
As I have already argued and as we have already said many times in debates, we are facing a serious financial position. If the justice system is to contribute the necessary savings, it is necessary to focus legal aid on the highest priority cases. Accepting this amendment would mean funding low-priority cases, such as disputes about the sale or inheritance of mobile homes. Once again, I cannot see how this is a good revision of our proposals or an affordable one, not least given that legal help and representation will in any case continue to be made available where the individual is at immediate risk of losing their home, including possession and eviction from a mobile home site.
The noble Baroness asked about harassment, to which I think I made reference in Committee. I confirm that paragraph 32 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to this Bill brings into scope harassment injunctions under Sections 3 or 3A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which would cover issues where there is harassment.
If we were to accept this amendment it would amount to a strange anomaly whereby exceptions would be made for people who live in mobile homes so that they received legal aid for lower-priority matters whereas people living in other homes would not. We find it difficult to justify that it would be coherent to create such differences between the level of legal aid available to different kinds of home owner. I recognise the commitment which my noble friend and the noble Baroness have to the Gypsy and Traveller community. I appreciate the opportunities we had at our meeting and in this debate to set out our respective positions, but, for the reasons given, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Whitaker and Lady Turner, for their contributions to this debate. I should like to begin by pointing out that the noble and learned Lord did not cover the case of the family camped on the roadside for reasons of absolute desperation. There was nowhere else for them to go. They needed to consult a doctor and stopped temporarily in order to receive medical advice and treatment. That was the sort of case we had in mind when framing these amendments in consultation with the Community Law Partnership. It still seems to me that they should have the right to be able to contest an action for possession on public law grounds and that they should be able to do this in the county court. With respect, my noble and learned friend did not refute the allegation that it would be far more expensive to deal with these cases by way of judicial review in the High Court. All he said was that there would not be very many of them but that does not seem to be a very valid argument against the amendment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Turner, said that local authorities had an obligation to provide sites, which they manifestly have failed to honour. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, was good enough to quote what I said at an earlier stage about the contrast between regional spatial strategies under which definite plans were in hand to grant planning permission for sites. That was scrapped and we were left with the unfettered decisions of the local authorities, which I am afraid will not result in the delivery of the sites. My noble and learned friend mentioned the £47 million allocated by the Homes and Communities Agency to local authorities and social housing agencies to provide some 700 pitches. But the agencies in question have not even begun to identify the land on which this money will be spent, let alone apply for planning permission.
Figures provided by the Irish Traveller Movement in Britain in its survey of local authorities show that the number of sites for which planning permission is intended has plummeted by 50 per cent from the figures that were given in the regional spatial strategy. I consulted Essex County Council to see what was happening there. As noble Lords will recall, there was a high profile eviction case at Dale Farm in Basildon. The figures from the council show that under the regional spatial strategies, the minimum number of pitches that were to be provided by 2021 was 965, whereas the planned Gypsy and Traveller pitches in the individual local authority plans that have so far been developed under the present system total 93. So in the county of Essex the situation is worse even than the ITMB survey revealed. Only 10 per cent of the pitches that were intended under the regional spatial strategy are going to be granted planning permission in these particular local authorities. I hope to provide figures for the rest of the east of England, where the regional spatial strategy was fully developed under the previous Government, to show that the intentions of my noble friends of £47 million to provide pitches are pie in the sky. I will offer them 10 to one against the delivery of 700-odd pitches by 2015 for any level of bet they would like to take.
I am very disappointed that we have not been able to make more headway on this minor amendment, but as with the noble Lord, Lord Bach, on the previous amendment, I am afraid that we have come to it late at night, and I do not propose to press it to a Division. I shall withdraw the amendment with the utmost regret.
My Lords, it is absurd that we are debating such a crucial set of amendments as this at 10.15 in the evening. This is a crucial part of the Bill and the House should be much fuller. However, we have heard some very impressive speeches from around the House on Clause 9, which is a key clause in the Bill and, I imagine, a key clause in the Government’s thinking on the structure of Part1 of the Bill.
We had a substantial debate at an earlier hour in Committee on these amendments, with the exception of Amendment 93A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. However, the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and my amendments were debated. There was a widespread feeling around the House on that occasion, as there is tonight in a much emptier House, that Clause 9 is much too narrow in scope. It does not allow for the flexibility that is crucial if exceptional cases are to have any real meaning. In our view, this is such a narrow clause and it will be so difficult to put into practice that a great deal will be left to the director to decide. At the moment, we do not know under what rules the director will have to make his decisions, and it is a shame that we do not.
We still greatly support the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Carlile of Berriew. It seems to us a very sensible amendment and one that, if the Government do not intend what my noble friend Lord Judd was implying, they should accept. However, they do not accept it in those terms. The noble and learned Lord the Minister listened carefully when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said in Committee:
“My second point is that, although ‘the interests of justice’ is a rather general and vague subject, on the other hand if you turn it round and say that the director, before he allowed this ground to prevail, had to be satisfied that there was a real risk of injustice unless legal aid was granted in a particular case, that would focus on the issue in the case in a more distinct and direct way than the phrase ‘the interests of justice’”.
In response, the noble and learned Lord said:
“I am certainly interested in what my noble and learned friend said about turning the phrase around, which has a certain seductive charm.”
That is the phrase that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, used. He continued, with his usual careful caution:
“I would not want to immediately agree to that but, without commitment, it is certainly something that I would want to think about”.—[Official Report, 24/1/12; col. 989.]
This is the perfect opportunity for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, to tell us whether he did think about it and what his conclusion was. It is an attractive offer. It is based on the original amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and on what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, had to say about it. I shall be interested to know his view on that. Amendment 93A fits in very well with the debate that we had earlier this evening, in which the Government found few friends around the House as regards their argument. I suspect that there are very few friends in the House at present as regards what the noble and learned Lord may say about Amendment 93A. We back it.
The first of my amendments is exactly the same as the one that I moved last time. It is based on a draft amendment by the Law Centres Federation. It is not necessary for me to praise the law centres movement yet again in the House; the House has a very strong feeling that it has done a fantastic job over the past 40 or 50 years. When it puts forward a draft amendment to a Bill like this, the very least that we can expect is that the Government take it seriously. It would have different criteria, having regard to the previous circumstances of the case, including: the client’s vulnerability; the client's capacity to represent himself or herself; the client's health, including mental health issues; the actual availability of alternative sources of advice and assistance; the fact that the client is under the age of 18; or it is otherwise in the interests of justice. So we come back to the phrase in Amendment 93 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, rejected that amendment last time. I dare say he will do so again in a few minutes. I still wonder why, when it seems to cover so many of the crucial things that are of importance for any clause that deals with exceptional cases.
My Amendments 95 and 96 deal with the position of chief coroner, who barely survived, but survived eventually, even though it was the Government’s intention to get rid of him before he started his job. It was good that the Government were persuaded to keep him. On Clause 9(4)(b), where the director has made a wider public interest determination in relation to the individual and the inquest, it would be helpful, rather than harmful or delaying, for the director to consult with the chief coroner. We still think that is a good idea and we cannot see why the Government reject it. These are important amendments and I know that they will be treated seriously by the noble and learned Lord, but to keep Clause 9 as narrowly based as it is on the ECHR and the European Court of Justice rulings is, in our view, much too restrictive and will in the end cause a great deal of concern for clients who really ought to get some legal aid under any exceptional provision but who will be barred from doing so because of the narrowness of the definition of Clause 9.
My Lords, notwithstanding the hour—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bach—I agree with him that this is an important group of amendments. Clearly, there is concern about the parameters of the exceptional funding scheme that will be created by Clause 9. It is very clear that many of your Lordships would prefer a very broad discretionary power, perhaps akin to that proposed in Amendment 94, on the face of the Bill. However, I ask that we reflect on the fundamental purposes of the changes that we are making to the general legal aid scheme. We need these reforms in order to create a fair, balanced and sustainable legal aid scheme. We have taken into account the importance of the issue; the litigant’s ability to present their case, including their vulnerability; the availability of alternative sources of funding; and the availability of other routes to resolution. It is also right that there should be an exceptional funding scheme to provide an essential safety net for the protection of an individual’s fundamental rights of access to justice. Clause 9 achieves this important end.
I acknowledge that we have limited the exceptional funding power in such a way as to ensure the protection of an individual’s rights to legal aid under the European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law. I acknowledge that this is a high threshold. However, it is right to limit exceptional funding to those important cases in which an individual’s fundamental rights of access to justice are challenged. I do not agree with the initial comments of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, which suggested that this would be impossible to operate. Certainly it is our anticipation that there will be several thousand applications to the fund. As I stated in Committee, there will not be a fixed budget for exceptional funding. It will also be available—we will come on to this later—where there is a wider public interest in an individual being represented at inquest proceedings into the death of a family member.
It is also important to note that the individual must qualify for such services in accordance with Clause 10, which will mean that decisions on exceptional funding will be subject to the means and merits criteria. The director of legal aid casework will make all exceptional funding decisions. This is a departure from the current position where the Lord Chancellor makes individual funding decisions on excluded cases. Clause 4(3) provides that the Lord Chancellor may issue guidance or directions about the exercise of the director's functions, including functions exercised under Clause 9. Through this guidance, the Lord Chancellor will set out the legal criteria that the director must take into account in determining an exceptional case application.
I confirm that the guidance will be based largely on the factors that domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights have held to be relevant in determining whether publicly funded legal assistance must be provided in an individual case. It will be published in a clear and accessible format so that applicants and their solicitors can see whether their case will be likely to meet the necessary tests. Certainly it is our intention to publish more details of the operation of the proposed exceptional funding scheme, with associated guidance.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked a question about excluded cases that she had put to my noble friend Lord McNally. I have not had a conversation with my noble friend in which he imparted the question to me. In another context, she suggested that there might be a discussion outwith the debate. I am sure that my noble friend will be happy to answer her question in that context.
Amendment 93 would allow the director to fund excluded cases where he or she determines that it is in the interests of justice generally to do so. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said, Amendment 94 would allow the director to make an exceptional case determination where it is appropriate to do so in the circumstances of the case, taking into account certain prescribed criteria. In moving his amendment, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford referred to Amendment 22, which we debated—I think—on Monday of last week. I indicated that I would take the matter away and think about it. His diary has now caught up with mine and I understand that we will meet tomorrow to discuss it further. He indicated that many issues that he believes will be covered under that amendment will go up to the director for a similar determination under Clause 9. Clearly that is something that we can pursue when we meet.
The phrase “interests of justice”—and the more seductive turnaround of the words proposed by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern—is capable in this context of wide interpretation. The amendment would create a power that is considerably broader than the one we currently propose under Clause 9. As I acknowledged, Clause 9 is limited and we have already set out why it has to be so.
Our concern with Amendment 94 is again that it could be open to wide interpretation. Nevertheless, I will repeat an assurance that I gave before to the noble Lord, Lord Bach. Many factors listed in his amendment, such as the client’s capacity to represent themselves, their vulnerability, and alternative sources of funding, are to be found in the jurisprudence on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As such, they would form part of the test for exceptional funding to be taken into account by the director in those cases where Article 6 is engaged.
In considering whether legal aid should be provided in an individual case, the director will need to take into account, for example, the importance of the issues to the individual concerned and the nature of the rights at stake; the complexity of the case; the capacity of the individual to represent himself or herself effectively; and alternative means of securing access to justice.
Importantly, Clause 4(4) explicitly prohibits the Lord Chancellor giving directions or guidance to the director in relation to an individual case. We believe that this change will guarantee the objectivity of the decision-making process for both in-scope and excluded cases and serve as a safeguard against political interference in the making of any individual exceptional funding decisions in future.
My noble friend Lord Avebury tabled Amendment 93A, which is concerned with immigration cases in which an individual risks being unable to obtain qualified and affordable representation and where there may be a risk of injustice if the appellant is not represented. As we have made clear, and as we debated earlier this evening, the Government believe that asylum cases and immigration detention cases must be treated as a priority for funding. I am sure it will readily be agreed that the consequences of these cases are of much higher seriousness, involving threats to life and limb or to the liberty of the person.
Clause 9 indicates that civil legal services other than services described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 are to be available to an individual under this part if subsection (2) or (4) is satisfied. Paragraphs 1 to 27 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, if we include the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, all deal with aspects of immigration, including asylum, protection for legal aid for immigration detention and cases where there is domestic violence. In addition, we are also keeping legal aid for most immigration judicial review cases. Many cases will already be within scope and have a right to legal aid.
Protecting funding in these areas, which I hope your Lordships will agree are of fundamental importance, means that we have had to make difficult choices about other immigration cases, which have not been considered to be as high a priority. At the same time, we have been clear that funding for cases falling outside the scope of the civil legal aid scheme should be focused on those cases in which the failure to provide legal aid would amount to a breach of an individual’s rights under the ECHR or directly enforceable European Union law.
As my noble friend Lord Avebury noted, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is currently clear that decisions concerning issues of immigration, nationality and residence do not engage Article 6 because they do not involve the determination of civil rights or obligations. My noble friend asked whether lack of immigration legal aid would breach Article 8 or Article 14. Exceptional funding would cover whatever legal aid is required by the European Convention on Human Rights or is enforceable under European Union law. As I have indicated, case law as it currently stands generally means what Article 6 requires, but if the case law were to change, the exceptional funding scheme would have to respond to that. As such, the Government’s position is that immigration cases will not generally qualify for exceptional funding, other than a few cases that may arise under other aspects of EU law. However, the fact that immigration cases would currently be unlikely to qualify for exceptional funding does not mean that injustice must inevitably arise from a lack of legally aided representation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked about children and social workers. Children will rarely be applicants in non-asylum immigration cases and will normally be considered as part of their parents’ application. Child applicants are much more likely in asylum cases for which legal aid will remain available. The noble Baroness also referred to unaccompanied children. Unaccompanied children with an asylum or immigration issue would have a social worker assigned to them. Their role includes helping the child access the same advice and support as a child permanently settled in the United Kingdom, and they could also offer assistance in filling in forms, explaining terms and providing emotional support. I was asked particularly about training in immigration law. The proposal is not for social workers to give detailed legal immigration advice but to help with form filling. As I indicated in an earlier debate, we intend to work with the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner to exempt local authorities from regulation so that they can offer low-level advice and assistance.
I do not wish to repeat everything that was said in the earlier debate, other than to remind the House that in trying to get the balance in immigration cases we have sought to focus legal aid on those areas that are of much greater seriousness to the individual; for example, where the individual is subject to domestic violence. More generally, we have gone as far as we can on exceptional funding, but we have made it clear that there is a narrow determination with regard to the European Convention on Human Rights.
Amendment 95 would make it a requirement for the director to consult with the chief coroner and have regard to his views before making a “significant wider public interest” determination about whether to fund advocacy at an inquest. Inquest cases can currently be funded if there is a “significant wider public interest” in the applicant being represented. This is a term with a clear definition under the present funding code: benefits to the wider public must be tangible, must be likely to accrue to a substantial number of people and must arise as a consequence of the representation. It is not enough for there to be a general public interest in the case itself.
The Government believe it is important to retain the ability to fund inquest representation on the basis of wider public interest, because the provision of such representation may lead to findings that help prevent future deaths. That is why Clause 9(4) gives the director the power to provide funding on the basis of a wider public interest determination.
The onus has never been on the decision-maker to consult coroners, many of whom will not wish to give a view at all. Indeed, some coroners are not prepared to give a view about substantive elements of the case until the inquest is being held. However, under the current guidance on the existing exceptional funding system, the views of coroners are material, though not determinative, to decisions concerning the requirement for funding to be provided in order to fulfil the state’s obligations under Article 2 of the European convention. Consequently, coroners are far more likely to give a view about potential ECHR engagement in inquests than on whether the case has “significant wider public interest”.
We envisage that, under the new exceptional funding system, the director will continue to consider the views of individual coroners when taking decisions on whether legal aid is required to fulfil the state’s obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It would therefore seem somewhat incongruous to make it a statutory requirement for the chief coroner to be asked for his or her views on the “significant wider public interest” aspect of the case.
We believe that compelling the director to consult with the chief coroner in all cases is likely to add an unnecessary bureaucratic element to the assessment process, which could lead to unfortunate delays. It would represent a significant burden on the chief coroner, who would be unfamiliar with the circumstances of each case, unlike the individual coroner holding the inquest. The chief coroner would be required to acquaint him or herself with information pertaining to a number of cases. We do not believe that there would be any obvious benefit for bereaved families, individual coroners or indeed the chief coroner in mandating this additional process in law.
I am not sure whether the noble Lord mentioned Amendment 96 in this group, which would compel the director to pay,
“reasonable costs incurred by any person making a successful funding application under this section”.
Perhaps it would be helpful to say that the concept of “reasonable costs” is open to broad interpretation and could be seen to authorise payments at commercial rather than prescribed legal aid rates. However, I can reassure the noble Lord that although discussions about the arrangements for exceptional funding applications are ongoing, we expect to propose that a payment may be made towards the costs associated with the making of an application where that application is successful.
I trust that my response indicates that the exceptional funding scheme is intended to provide an important safety net where an inequality of arms would lead to an obvious—and possibly unlawful—unfairness in proceedings. I accept that many people would like to see this cast much more widely and more cases brought within the ambit of exceptional funding. However, I have explained the architecture of the Bill and why it is cast in the way it is, with particular reference to the European Convention on Human Rights and the other specific issues with regard to coroners’ inquests.
My Lords, on unaccompanied children, I accept the point that social workers will not be expected to provide formal legal advice, but in the other place the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice said that they could turn to law centres, pro bono representation or the Refugee Council for such formal legal advice. As I am sure the Minister knows, the Refugee Council and the Law Centres Federation have written to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State to say that it is simply impossible for that gap to be filled in that way and to point out that the Refugee Council does not provide that kind of support. Will the Minister take that on board? I still do not know where these children will get that legal advice if they need it.
The noble Baroness acknowledged that I referred to some of the issues about unaccompanied children, but I will certainly draw her remarks and the point that she made about the Refugee Council to the attention of my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.
My Lords, one of the comforting sayings at the Bar, which I have found over 50 years to be absolutely true, is that when one door shuts another opens. It seems to me that, if he has heard of that saying north of the border, the noble and learned Lord will be aware that he has set out in his reply the basis of innumerable applications for judicial review of the decisions made by the director of legal aid services. It is impossible for there not to be a challenge to the statement made by the noble and learned Lord because almost anything can be brought within the ECHR rules, generally speaking, if you really try. We have heard reference to Articles 2, 6, 7, 8 and 14 tonight, which gives us five articles to play with.
I can assure the noble and learned Lord that the legal profession will look forward to testing his description and the ambit of the clause for a considerable period—case after case. It would be so much simpler if a broad discretion were given to the director of legal aid services, coupled with guidance that we could look at, in order that there would be some ambit to it. If the formulation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, which was found to be so seductive last time, were adopted with guidance, that could prevent an awful lot of future litigation. With that very pleasant prospect in mind, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, this is another minor and technical amendment designed to correct a drafting inconsistency between Clause 7 and Clause 10. Clause 10(4) is intended to cover the possibility of a different level of service being appropriate to a matter that falls within the scope of Part 1 of Schedule 1—for example, legal help or legal representation. In Clause 10(4), we currently use the phrase “description of service” when our intention is simply to refer to “forms” of service as we have in Clause 7(2). The amendment simply standardises the terminology between Clause 7 and Clause 10(4). I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has indicated, the amendment would require regulations to be made under Clause 11 to make provision for appeals to a court, tribunal or other person against determinations made by the director under Clauses 8 and 9, and against the withdrawal of such determinations. I can reassure the House that the Government’s intention is to continue with the existing effective appeal procedures that are currently used by the LSC. First, an internal review on all determinations on civil legal aid will be available. This is required by Clause 11(5). Secondly, we are retaining the current system of independent lawyers, known as independent funding adjudicators, who volunteer to carry out independent reviews of funding decisions in in-scope civil and family representation cases. Clause 11 already allows us to make regulations to set out those appeal processes in secondary legislation, as they are set out currently.
The existing system, which deals with over 11,000 reviews and 3,500 appeals to independent funding adjudicators each year, is both efficient and effective and costs an estimated £60,000 per year to administer. I am not sure that he did, but it may be that the noble Lord envisions instead a tribunal to review these appeals. The review by Sir Ian Magee initiated by the previous Administration into the governance of legal aid looked at the option of directing all legal aid appeals to a tribunal and concluded that this would cost up to £1 million per year to administer. We do not believe it would be sensible to replace a system that works well with an unknown system at possibly 15 times the current cost.
This amendment would also require an appeal in cases covered by Clause 9. Again, we intend to retain the existing system under which, although there will be an internal review available in accordance with Clause 11(5), there will be no appeal to an independent funding adjudicator where applicants remain dissatisfied. I do not agree that these cases should attract a right of appeal to an IFA. It would not be appropriate to refer exceptional funding decisions to an IFA. This is because of the particular nature of the assessment at the heart of such cases, which will focus on an interpretation of the relevant obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to provide legal aid. Exceptional case determinations, along with all other decisions by the director, would be amenable to judicial review. I think my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford confirmed that in his response to an earlier debate. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, if there is no intention at any stage to provide for appeals to a court, tribunal or other person against such determinations, why is the option included in the first place? Either the Government intend at some point for some categories of case to be dealt with in that way or they do not. If they do, they should make regulations. If they do not, subsection (6) is otiose. However, I am making no progress with the noble and learned Lord, and at this hour I do not propose to take the matter further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 101A seeks to provide for the possibility of a wholesale independent review of clinical negligence claims by an independent person, and this would appear to provide for a review of both the civil procedure and legal aid funding. Having sat through the speeches at Second Reading and having responded to the debate on clinical negligence in Committee and again last week to other amendments moved on Report, like any other Member of the House I am under no illusion as to both the importance and sensitivity of this area. My noble friend Lord Phillips said something about the exceptional challenge that these issues give rise to and, when we debated amendments on Report last week, my noble friend Lord Faulks spoke to this amendment even though it was degrouped at that time.
The amendment has the somewhat novel effect of permitting the Lord Chancellor to introduce an exceptionally detailed and costly review function for an entire area of civil litigation. Albeit that it is now couched in terms of a power rather than a statutory requirement, there would certainly be an expectation raised if Parliament were to pass it. There are, therefore, fundamental problems.
I have alluded to the costs issue, and this cannot be overstated. One assumes that it is straightforward for the Government to set up a review, but a research, monitoring and evaluation framework of the magnitude proposed here does not give sufficient weight to the financial constraints under which the Government are operating. I recognise that the Government have in recent times committed resources to previous reviews, but the resources are somewhat more strained. At a time when we have had successive groups of amendments in which cases have been advanced for legal aid in particular areas to bring them within scope, which we have had to resist on the grounds of cost and because it was not part of the scheme, it is difficult to commit or even give the possibility of committing to a significant expenditure that would follow on from a review of this nature.