European Union Referendum Bill
Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts(8 years, 5 months ago)
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Viscount Ridley (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of my noble friend Lord Hamilton’s amendment. The key point was that in discussing the amendment on 16 and 17 year-olds, it was clearly said to us that it did not allow sufficient time to ensure that we get the electoral register right. We also heard that the Electoral Commission thought that there was an issue with individual registration being different from household registration. We may well see a specific issue in Scotland, in that people who got on the register for the Scottish referendum may now find that it is not so easy to get on the register for this one, given the amendment we have just passed, because they have not gone through the individual registration process. There has to be clarity and time to get the electoral register right.
I come back to the point I made in Committee and which has been made here. The crucial thing is to make sure that this is as fair and final a referendum as we can manage, so as to settle the issue once and for all. It would be a great mistake—
Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)
Does the noble Viscount accept that the Scottish Parliament has now brought forward legislation to enfranchise 16 and 17 year-olds for the Scottish parliamentary and local government elections, the former taking place next May? I appreciate his concern about 16 and 17 year-old Scots, but the issue does not really arise because they will already be on the register by virtue of legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament.
Viscount Ridley
That is good news but there are a lot of other people in this country as well as Scots, and we have to ensure that they are properly registered. The next canvass begins, as we have heard, in July 2016. I do not quite understand how that interacts with this business of registering people for the referendum, but I beg my noble friend the Minister to take my noble friend Lord Hamilton’s amendment seriously.
Human Rights and Civil Liberties
Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts(8 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Wallace of Tankerness
That this House takes note of the challenges facing the culture of human rights and civil liberties in the United Kingdom.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)
My Lords, for decades, as a Liberal and Liberal Democrat candidate and MP, I supported campaigns to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into our domestic law. “Bringing Rights Home” was our call, and so understandably I welcomed the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, it never occurred to me during all these years of campaigning that I would be the first government Minister in the United Kingdom to be on the wrong end of a decision under that Act—yet that is what happened on 11 November 1999.
As Justice Minister in the newly established Scottish Government, I had inherited a sheriff court administration which relied on temporary sheriffs to keep the system in working order. However, the Scottish Appeal Court ruled that because the Lord Advocate was involved both in their reappointment, or not, and was also head of the Public Prosecution Service in Scotland, temporary sheriffs could not be regarded as sufficiently independent of the Executive that an accused might have a fair hearing before an “independent and impartial tribunal”. As a result, I was forced to suspend every temporary sheriff in Scotland overnight.
I am not going to pretend: on that day I would much rather that the case had been won. Losing put significant pressure on resources and made for a time the operation of our sheriff courts more difficult. But here is the thing: in the cold light of day, the court was right. What was happening was wrong and, because of the Human Rights Act, it was put right. For all the difficulties this decision caused me, officials and, indeed, the public, I would rather live in a country were there is such a human rights check over decisions and actions of Ministers and the Executive than in a country where Ministers and the Executive can ride roughshod over basic human rights. This, I believe, shows the value of the Human Rights Act. As Liberal Democrats, we on these Benches are instinctively suspicious of government. We believe that the state has the power to improve people’s lives—but, equally, the power to damage them. Such power should not operate in a vacuum. There must be a check on the ability of the state to wield its power, even when its actions are carried out with the best of intentions, and there must be a check to protect individual citizens against the arbitrary use of state power.
This debate is about the challenges facing the culture of human rights and civil liberties in our country. My experiences as a Minister both in Scotland and in the coalition Government have given me some understanding of those challenges and the difficulties of balancing interests that sometimes compete with human rights and civil liberties, not least the need to keep the public safe. I do not pretend that it is always easy. The appalling events in Tunisia last Friday and our response to them have once again thrown into sharp focus the challenge of balancing liberty and security in an age when terrorism stalks the globe. The Prime Minister rightly argues that, armed with our values of justice, democracy, liberty and tolerance, we will prevail over hateful intolerance and its evil manifestations. But the challenge is to ensure that in doing so we do not undermine the very values that we cherish and seek to uphold.
The Home Secretary said in the House of Commons last week—it is pleasant to be able to agree with her—that,
“security and privacy are not … a zero-sum game”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/6/15; col. 1085.]
It is incumbent on the Government to consider issues of privacy and liberty when promoting security and on those on our Benches to reflect the need for this balance and ensure that when we are promoting liberty and privacy we also take account of the interests of security.
I am sure that in this debate we will hear contributions about the communications data Bill—the so-called “snoopers’ charter”. All I shall say on this subject is that I can assure the Government that if they seek to introduce intrusive new laws, rhetoric and assertion by Ministers will not be a substitute for hard evidence that such measures are necessary and proportionate, not least given the recently published report by David Anderson QC, which found the operational case for a number of the proposals far from persuasive.
The ability to challenge the Government is a core part of our liberty and democracy, and one which we must seek to uphold. The European Convention on Human Rights may have been born in the aftermath of the war against fascism and in the face of the spread of communism, but it took the 1998 Act to allow people in Britain to vindicate their convention rights in British courts. I believe that that is something we should cherish and uphold. Let us be clear: when I say that the Human Rights Act gives us the ability to challenge the state, I do not mean in some sort of philosophical debate; I mean on ordinary, day-to-day issues that people often take for granted.
The right to life is not just about life being protected by the state. The right has ensured justice for the families of victims of domestic violence and the families of hospital patients who were not properly supervised and who then tragically took their own lives. The prohibition on torture has ensured that the use of restraint on an older woman in hospital was able to be challenged and that authorities are accountable for failing to protect children who are being abused. The right to liberty and security has ensured that people with mental health problems are not unlawfully detained.
The right to a fair trial or hearing was used by a mother who had suffered mental health problems and had her child taken into care. The court found that the council’s attempts to delay her re-establishing contact with her child and its failure to notify her that the child was already placed with an adoptive family constituted a breach of her right to a fair hearing. The right to respect for private and family life has often been lamented in the press as a block to deporting foreign criminals. But this right helped a couple who had been married for 59 years to live in the same nursing home when their local authority threatened to move one of them to a nursing home too far away for the other to visit. It also secured proper support from a local authority for a child with Down’s syndrome.
Freedom of expression was perhaps most famously protected by the European Court of Human Rights reversing a unanimous decision of the Judicial Committee of your Lordships’ House in the early 1970s and thus allowing the Sunday Times to expose the thalidomide scandal and pave the way for compensation for its victims and their families. Freedom of assembly and association has protected the rights of people to join a trade union and engage in union-related activities. The right to marry has ensured that the needs of transgender people are accommodated by requiring the Government to issue a new birth certificate. The prohibition on discrimination ensured the right of unmarried couples to adopt and has been used in numerous cases to protect disabled people.
I cite these cases because they are examples of what human rights mean in practice—what our convention rights allow us to protect when the state overreaches. These are examples of how we reflect our British values in the country we wish Britain to be. Yet the Government have made clear their intention to do away with the Human Rights Act and to replace it with a British Bill of Rights. The question is: what values will such a Bill of Rights enable or secure that are not already enshrined in the Human Rights Act through its incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights?
Are there rights which we currently enjoy that the Government are keen to strip out of a UK Bill of Rights? Surely it cannot be the protection of freedom of speech or the right to a fair trial, or the right of religion and freedom of assembly, or the right to a private life. Is it the right to free elections that they fear or the right to protection of property, as they pursue their attempts to sell off housing association homes? Which one of these freedoms and rights would not be in a Conservative Bill of Rights? If the answer is that they would all remain, why are the Government so keen to abolish the current Act and put into jeopardy the jurisprudence and case law that have gone with it?
Perhaps the real problem is not with the Human Rights Act but with the fact that it gives United Kingdom citizens a pathway to the Strasbourg court, with the ability to challenge—in Europe, no less—a decision made by government. The right to take a case to Strasbourg will not be revoked by the repeal of the Human Rights Act. Citizens were taking cases to Strasbourg before 1998. The whole point of the Act was to make the convention rights more readily justiciable in our domestic courts. Is it really the Government’s intention to cut off any redress by appeal to Strasbourg, especially when under Article 35 of the convention, the United Kingdom has undertaken not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right? What is the Government’s view on Article 46 of the convention, which imposes on all states parties a binding international obligation to abide by final judgments against them? Repeal of the Human Rights Act would not alter the international obligations that the United Kingdom has undertaken.
The last published edition of the Ministerial Code states as a general principle the overarching duty on Ministers to comply with the law, including international law and treaty obligations. If, as suggested in the Conservative manifesto, the Government wish to curtail the role of the European Court of Human Rights, is the Prime Minister prepared to suspend that part of the Ministerial Code in respect of the European Convention on Human Rights, with all the consequences that would have for a Government who protest the importance of the rule of law—or would the Government renounce the convention, and with it our membership of the Council of Europe?
Often in your Lordships’ House, we talk about Britain’s soft power as an influence for good in the world, but the opposite side of that coin is that if we are backsliding, we become an influence which justifies others’ injustice and intolerance. If hitting the pause button on the Human Rights Act reforms is perhaps a consequence of the Government waking up to the international ramifications of their objectives—on the basic ideal of the rule of law and its international and diplomatic consequences—it should also be an opportunity to consider the domestic consequences of ill-thought through proposals, not least in relation to the devolved institutions of the United Kingdom.
In particular, Northern Ireland has an important relationship with the Human Rights Act and the European convention. The Good Friday agreement enshrined a fundamental role for the ECHR in moderating the values of plurality and equality in Northern Ireland. Human rights protections were a central feature of the peace process; they cannot lightly be brushed aside. There are also international implications, specifically in relation to our relationship with Ireland. The agreement was incorporated as a treaty between the United Kingdom and Ireland and lodged with the United Nations. Article 2 of the treaty binds the United Kingdom to implement provisions of the agreement which correspond to its competency, and paragraph 2 of the “Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity” section of the agreement states:
“The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights … with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency”.
That commitment was given legislative effect through the Human Rights Act. I fear that the United Kingdom’s international standing and its relationship with Ireland could suffer grievously if its obligations under the Good Friday agreement were not observed. Pulling Northern Ireland out of the European convention would violate international law and surely have severe ramifications for the peace process.
Also, the plans may well be stopped in the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly. The Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act define the legislative and executive competences of the respective devolved institutions by reference to the convention rights, as defined in the Human Rights Act. Adam Tomkins, professor of public law at Glasgow University, has speculated on whether a legislative consent Motion would be needed in the Scottish Parliament to repeal the Human Rights Act. He went on to take a clear view that if any British Bill of Rights contained new rights which impinged upon the exercise of the Scottish Parliament’s legislative powers or the Scottish Ministers’ executive powers, a legislative consent Motion would be needed.
Professor Tomkins, for whom I have the highest regard, is now a constitutional adviser to the Secretary of State for Scotland. Is it the Government’s view that legislative consent Motions will be necessary? What happens if they are not forthcoming? Could we have a position where citizens’ rights in Scotland are different depending on whether the public authority exercises devolved or reserved responsibilities? It has the making of a dog’s breakfast and is perhaps a reflection of a policy that was not properly thought through.
What are the real motivations in embarking on a course fraught with constitutional danger? Is it part of a wider move by the Government to make it more difficult for those with legitimate reasons to challenge them? Why are the Government so scared of such challenges? Could it be because the Government fear that a number of their polices coming down the track—cuts in working-age benefits, cuts in disability benefits and the compulsory sell-off of housing association homes—may well be susceptible to challenges in the courts? The Human Rights Act allows us to challenge the decisions of the state, and I would be interested to hear what guarantees the Minister can give us today that the proposed Bill of Rights would continue to allow such challenges to the same extent as we have today.
This is a fight, or a debate, that we would rather not be having. The contract between the state and the public needs to be retained and enhanced, not diminished or swept aside. Rather, we should look to the future and to ensuring that our fundamental rights and liberties are protected in a way that is compatible with the new technologies of the day. We should be looking to the creation of a new digital Bill of Rights that will help safeguard and protect our citizens online and ensure that the same rights enshrined in our law in 1998 hold true as we enter a world of new technology that does not respect boundaries.
At one level, the Human Rights Act is simply a vehicle for bringing convention rights into our domestic law, but it has become more than that. It is woven into the devolution settlements and is widely seen as symbolic of our country’s commitment to openness, tolerance and the rule of law, to which even government is subject. I am sure that the Liberal Democrat Benches are not alone in this House in being unable to comprehend what purpose the Government think they are serving by abolishing such a fundamental Act, which is well understood by the courts and respected around the world. The only apparent rationale is to replace convention rights with a British Bill of Rights which curbs existing rights or to exclude resort to the European Court of Human Rights, putting the clock back almost 50 years with all that that entails in terms of reneging on international obligations.
It is often said that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. The Government should be in no doubt that we on these Benches will be especially vigilant. I beg to move.
Lord Faulks
I am grateful to the noble Lord, and of course I shall come to the question of Northern Ireland and Scotland in due course. There were two consultations, of which the Government will take account, along with their own consultation, to enable them to form the fullest picture possible of the way forward.
Section 2 of the Human Rights Act, as noble Lords have correctly observed, requires courts only to take into account the Strasbourg jurisprudence. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, frankly admitted, the superior courts—the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal—went rather further than simply taking into account the Strasbourg jurisprudence. I think that it is now generally acknowledged that the Ullah case involved a wrong turning. As noble Lords have said, it is true that something by way of a dialogue has ensued. It is also true to say that the Supreme Court has shown something of a retreat or modification of its approach to Section 2. None the less, there is need—there may be some general agreement on this—for clarification. The Strasbourg court should not be demonised, as some of its decisions would continue to be useful, whatever our precise relationship with it, but it may not be the only source of wisdom. We should not pivot entirely off the Strasbourg court when there are useful decisions elsewhere in the world—and, of course, it should not impede the development of the common law as it has always developed.
The convention was drafted, as has been said, by Conservative politicians, and is a remarkable achievement in itself. To encapsulate human rights is perhaps a philosophical task, but I do not think the Government have a difficulty with how they are expressed—it is, of course, only in their interpretation. However, the convention must be seen in the context in which it was drafted, in the aftermath of the Second World War, just as the Magna Carta, so much commented on, must be seen in its particular historical context.
I should make it clear, in answer to a number of questions, that it is no part of our plans to leave the convention. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, referred to the number of cases that he had lost, no doubt having valiantly argued them for the Strasbourg court. When our British Bill of Rights becomes law, as I hope it does, there will still no doubt be some cases before Strasbourg and the successor to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, may achieve better or worse results.
The Prime Minister, in his speech at Runnymede—
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
The Conservative manifesto also said something about curtailing the role of the European Court of Human Rights. Could the Minister, for the benefit of the House, elaborate on what was meant by that part of the manifesto?
Lord Faulks
I am reluctant to say very much more, for the very reason that we have an open consultation. I think I have made it clear that our minds are not closed on this. Earlier in my comments I referred to Section 2, and that particular provision, and its relationship with the Strasbourg jurisprudence. That is a matter that will be considered carefully as part of the consultation for reasons that a number of noble Lords have given.
The Prime Minister made this comment during the celebration of Magna Carta:
“Magna Carta takes on further relevance today. For centuries, it has been quoted to help promote human rights and alleviate suffering all around the world. But here in Britain, ironically, the place where those ideas were first set out, the good name of ‘human rights’ has sometimes become distorted and devalued. It falls to us in this generation to restore the reputation of those rights—and their critical underpinning of our legal system”.
We want our human rights law to be fair and just and to regain public confidence. We intend that a British Bill of Rights will be a positive response to the challenges facing the culture—the subject of the debate—of human rights and civil liberties in the United Kingdom.
It is not just a question of this Government believing this needs to be done. Previous Administrations seem, by what they have said, to have reached similar conclusions, but then have, for one reason or another, failed to follow matters through. During an appearance on the BBC in May 2006, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said about the Human Rights Act:
“We all agree about liberty, about the right to life, the right to privacy, those issues. And the problem is not a subscription to those rights, it is how it operates in practice”.
The last Labour Prime Minister, the right honourable Gordon Brown MP, in July 2007 said in the other place,
“it is right to involve the public in a sustained debate about whether there is a case for the United Kingdom developing a full British Bill of Rights and duties”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/7/07; col. 819.]
Talking to the BBC later the same year in October, he said:
“Jack Straw is signalling the start of a national consultation on the case for a new British Bill of Rights and Duties…This will include a discussion of how we can entrench and enhance our liberties— building upon existing rights and freedoms but not diluting them—but also make more explicit the responsibilities that implicitly accompany rights”.
He said that on BBC News on 27 October 2007.
I also refer the House to comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, in May’s edition of Prospect. She said:
“Britain can replace the HRA and retain a decent, humane legal system. The human rights lobby has reacted with horror at the government’s proposal. But they are mistaken … A British Bill of Rights is a good idea”.
A majority of the commission on a Bill of Rights thought the same. I served on that commission, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said. He was part of the majority. I would not claim for a moment that our reasoning was precisely the same, but the conclusion that we reached was identical.
Many other countries, within the Council of Europe and outside, have their own equivalent of what we will have in a British Bill of Rights. I hope that by engaging in a proper consultation on our proposals for how the United Kingdom’s human rights framework should be reformed we will be able to identify many points of agreement across the whole political spectrum, including with more members of Her Majesty’s Opposition. It has quite rightly been said, I think by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and others, that at various times different political parties have varied enthusiasms for a British Bill of Rights. We intend to try to produce a Bill of Rights that can produce real consensus across the parties.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, no doubt had an eye on devolution when tabling this Motion for today’s debate. Certainly, since the election and since the debate about the shape of the future human rights framework has begun in earnest, it has been repeatedly raised as an apparently intractable issue that will stump any reform and of which the Government are currently unaware. The Government are fully alive to the devolution dimension, and we will consider the implications of a Bill of Rights for devolution as we develop our proposals. I think the noble and learned Lord will understand if I do not comment on meetings that the Secretary of State has, or on discussions, but I assure him and the House that we will fully engage with the devolved Administrations and the Republic of Ireland in view of the relevant provisions of the Belfast, or Good Friday, agreement. I heard what my noble friend Lord Lexden said in that regard.
It is important to emphasise that the United Kingdom’s international obligations neither begin nor end with the European Convention on Human Rights, a point underlined by the fact that, as we debate here today, a team from the United Kingdom is being questioned about our country’s performance against the commitments we have signed up to in the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Whatever form the Bill of Rights finally takes, the Government have no intention to resile from its many other international obligations, such as those arising under the United Nations convention against torture, which prevent removal of a person to another country,
“where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”.
We were not a lawless country before 1998. We will not be in the future. We will comply with our many international obligations.
I am sorry that the position of those in my party was compared to Syriza by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. We have been described as zealots by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, who has previously described the position that we take as being part of the Tea Party tendency in the Conservative Party. Worst of all, he accused me the other day of being a Eurosceptic. None of those things I believe to be true.
I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for calling it. Much of what has been said has been extremely valuable. I hope the debate, both formally and informally, will continue. Much of what has been said will help to influence what the Government decide. I am glad that my noble friend Lord Lexden reminded us that the originator of “one nation” was Stanley Baldwin, not Disraeli, as is so often thought. “One-nation government” is a phrase that has been bounced from one side of the Chamber and possibly beyond recently. We intend to govern as a one-nation Government. This British Bill of Rights will, I hope, be quintessentially a one-nation document, including all the parts of the United Kingdom and, so far as possible, the agreement and consensus obtained from all the parties. I am grateful for all contributions. I know this debate will continue.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this worthwhile debate. We have had the benefit of historical perspectives from the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, and some very keen legal analysis from my noble friends Lord Lester and Lord Marks and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Carswell, while practical issues, particularly disability rights, were raised by my noble friend Lord Addington. We heard a very passionate speech from the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, which brought home the real personal meaning of rights for many people. Those who heard the noble Lord’s speech will remember it for some time to come. He reminded us that one of the important issues about rights is that they are often about trying to protect minority interests against what is sometimes referred to as the tyranny of the majority. Some of the case examples given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, showed how majority interests can sometimes ignore minority interests.
I listened carefully to what the Minister said. I am very grateful for what he said about consultation and the invitation from the Lord Chancellor that will be speeding its way to my noble friend Lord Lester. He made a number of points. He said that there is a willingness to consult. That is a far cry from some of the rhetoric at the time of the election and beforehand. If he wonders why there is concern that rights are going to be restricted, it is because of the kind of rhetoric that has driven this, and we are right to be vigilant. He talked about enhancing rights. My noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames gave him a wide range of additional rights that could be added.
The Minister gave a very clear indication that there is no intention to leave the convention. I think that answers the question my noble friend Lord Lester asked about whether that had been qualified by Ministers in the other place saying that everything is on the table. He seems to have made it very clear that leaving the convention is not on the table, which is welcome. I take the point he made about having regard to the devolved Administrations. We look forward to making our contribution to any consultation that takes place. As I indicated in my opening remarks, we will be extremely vigilant because there are very important rights that have been used in so many practical ways and we do not wish to see our standing as a country that upholds the torch of human rights being diminished.
Justice and Security Bill [HL]
Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts(11 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Wallace of Tankerness
That the amendments for the Report stage be marshalled and considered in the following order:
Clause 1, Schedule 1, Clauses 2 to 15, Schedules 2 and 3, Clause 16.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
My Lords, how is it possible to get clarification of what the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said in reply to a question? I was not clear whether he said that a Private Notice Question, if we tabled one, would be answered by him this week. It is unsatisfactory that we have not had an apology or any explanation for one of the worst débâcles we have seen for years.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)
My Lords, this is an important government amendment on an issue that has been the subject of considerable debate in your Lordships’ House and, indeed, in the other place, on legal aid for cases of domestic child abduction. We have always been clear that legal aid should be available to both prevent and remedy international child abduction and, as indicated on Report, we have been listening sympathetically to the powerful arguments about legal aid for domestic child abduction. We agree that the unusual nature of these cases, including the terrible impact on those involved, means that legal aid is justified to find a child who has been unlawfully removed within the United Kingdom.
We think that our amendment, which has been worked up in the light of discussion with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, achieves this. One point that the noble and learned Baroness has asked the Government to put on the record, which I am happy to do, concerns what we mean by unlawful removal. Unlawful in this sense has a civil rather than a criminal meaning, so if a parent with contact tried to take a child permanently from the parent with residence, that would be unlawful.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, it is only a few weeks since the noble Lord, Lord McNally, described Lord Newton as a national treasure except when he voted against the Government. I intervened somewhat mischievously to say that that was what made him a national treasure. In fact, of course, he was a national treasure for a long time before that. I have good memories of working with him when he was a very approachable Minister and I was the leader of my local authority. I also had the pleasure of serving under him as a member of the Local Services Honours Committee, which he chaired with great care, always exhibiting great thoughtfulness and fairness. He was a man of great conviction and great courage, as he demonstrated fully in your Lordships' House for so many months. We will all miss him, as other noble Lords rightly said.
I turn to the amendments in this group and join the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in acknowledging that the Government have made significant improvements to the Bill and in congratulating the noble and learned Lord on doing that. I also congratulate the noble and learned Baroness on initiating these very welcome changes. I endorse what she said about further developments. Now, of course, the Government have the capacity to bring them about without primary legislation. The Opposition look forward to that in due course and certainly support the amendments in this group.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I start by associating myself with the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, about Lord Newton. I first encountered him in 1983 when I was a newly elected Member of Parliament and he was the Social Security Minister. I had a particular constituency issue and he could not have been more helpful or understanding. That was my experience of him as a Minister throughout my time in the other place.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, outlined her wish list. I think that she understands why the Government are unable to accept at the moment that legal aid should be available for these prevention matters. We find it difficult to see how the orders covered would be used in practice for prevention of removals in situations of urgency for which a case for funding is made, rather than for securing return after removal. If a child was in the process of being abducted and the situation was an emergency, legal aid would be available for the purpose of securing their return. It is more difficult to see why legal aid should be available to fund applications that are more contingent in nature, where there is no imminent danger of abduction or associated emergency but the measure is being sought on a precautionary basis. Very often those cases will be the stuff of general private family law proceedings, and we see the risk of such orders being sought for the benefit of funding in what are general disputes over where a child is to live and with whom—which, as we made clear in other areas, we will not fund.
Having said that, I welcome the co-operation that there has been, and very much appreciate the comments made by the noble and learned Baroness about the officials who worked on this and productively engaged with her and with those who advised her. I hope that what we brought forward meets the concerns raised. I have no doubt that we will be reminded of the wish list when we have had a bit more experience of the Act in operation. Again, I thank all those, both inside and outside the House, who worked toward a constructive solution on this matter.
“( ) an order under section 34 of that Act for the child’s return;”
“Victims of trafficking in human beings33A (1) Civil legal services provided to an individual in relation to an application by the individual for leave to enter, or to remain in, the United Kingdom where—
(a) there has been a conclusive determination that the individual is a victim of trafficking in human beings, or(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is such a victim and there has not been a conclusive determination that the individual is not such a victim.(2) Civil legal services provided in relation to a claim under employment law arising in connection with the exploitation of an individual who is a victim of trafficking in human beings, but only where—
(a) the services are provided to the individual, or(b) the individual has died and the services are provided to the individual’s personal representative.(3) Civil legal services provided in relation to a claim for damages arising in connection with the trafficking or exploitation of an individual who is a victim of trafficking in human beings, but only where—
(a) the services are provided to the individual, or(b) the individual has died and the services are provided to the individual’s personal representative.Exclusions(4) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule.
(5) Sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) are subject to—
(a) the exclusions in Part 2 of this Schedule, with the exception of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 of that Part, and(b) the exclusion in Part 3 of this Schedule.Definitions(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that an individual is a victim of trafficking in human beings if a competent authority has determined for the purposes of Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention (identification of victims) that there are such grounds.
(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) there is a conclusive determination that an individual is or is not a victim of trafficking in human beings when, on completion of the identification process required by Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention, a competent authority concludes that the individual is or is not such a victim.
(8) In this paragraph—
“competent authority” means a person who is a competent authority of the United Kingdom for the purposes of the Trafficking Convention;
“employment” means employment under a contract of employment or a contract personally to do work and references to “employers” and “employees” are to be interpreted accordingly;
“employment law” means an enactment or rule of law relating to employment, including in particular an enactment or rule of law conferring powers or imposing duties on employers, conferring rights on employees or otherwise regulating the relations between employers and employees;
“exploitation” means a form of exploitation described in section 4(4) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (trafficking people for exploitation);
“personal representative”, in relation to an individual who has died, means—
(a) a person responsible for administering the individual’s estate under the law of England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, or(b) a person who, under the law of another country or territory, has functions equivalent to those of administering the individual’s estate;“the Trafficking Convention” means the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (done at Warsaw on 16 May 2005);
“trafficking in human beings” has the same meaning as in the Trafficking Convention.”
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, Amendments 15 and 17 bring into the scope of legal aid cases in which the victims of human trafficking seek damages in either the civil courts or an employment tribunal. They would also provide legal aid to this group for immigration advice. The Government have always anticipated that legal aid would be available under the exceptional funding scheme for these damages claims, where such cases met the test for exceptional funding under what is now Clause 10 but which we came to know as Clause 9 during the earlier passage of the Bill. However, we listened to the concerns raised by noble Lords about whether in practice this would always be appropriate. I am pleased to say that we have responded positively to the concerns, and not least to the case made at Second Reading, in Committee and on Report by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.
The House should be aware that paragraph 40 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 already provides for legal aid to be granted to victims of sexual offences to bring damages claims in relation to the offences. People who have been trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation and who wish to claim damages through the civil courts will already be able to get legal aid.
As I indicated on Report, we also considered whether legal aid should be available for the immigration aspects of trafficking. We listened to and accepted the arguments on this, given the particular vulnerabilities of this group of people. We plan to set out in regulations further provision on when it is appropriate for a victim of human trafficking to qualify for civil legal aid for immigration matters. Our intention is not to restrict numbers, and we will ensure that all victims for whom it is appropriate to provide advice will receive it. However, we cannot have a completely open-ended commitment for all immigration matters; otherwise, it is conceivable that victims of trafficking who, for example, apply for a student visa 15 years down the line will continue to qualify for legal aid for no good reason. The regulations will limit eligibility to a period relevant to the experience of being trafficked. We are discussing the most appropriate period of time, but we intend that it will be no less than an individual’s discretionary leave to remain, which can be up to three years.
I am pleased that we have been able to have a constructive engagement and hope that these amendments address the concerns that have been raised. This amendment includes legal aid for immigration advice for victims of trafficking. I beg to move.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
As the co-chairman of the All-Party Group on the Trafficking of Women and Children, I again congratulate the Government and express my gratitude not only to Ministers in this House and in another place but to the government lawyers and officials. The people who were so helpful on the previous set of amendments have been equally helpful on this, and I and those behind me are enormously obliged to them for the care with which they have gone through this and their ability to recognise, listen to, take on board and accept the points that have been made which are now reflected in this excellent amendment.
I wonder whether I might again produce a wish list for consideration at some later stage. There are four points that I would like to make. First, there are those who have been trafficked who do not know that they have been trafficked and will need advice about whether they have been trafficked. Secondly, there are implications for referral to the national referral mechanism. That point was discussed with the government lawyers. I understand why Ministers do not want to help those who do not refer themselves, but there will be a group or groups of people who will fall through the net. Thirdly, there are those who do not know whether they may have an entitlement to leave to remain other than by an asylum claim, such as discretionary leave to remain. That group will also not be covered. The fourth group is rather different. It is those who would wish to challenge a decision by the Home Office that they do not come within the NRM. Those are perhaps matters for another day. At the moment, those behind me and I are enormously grateful for what we have already got.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I am grateful for the general welcome that has been given to the amendments, and indeed for the work that has gone in behind the scenes to get us to where we are today. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has indicated that she will continue, and that she has a further wish list. The fourth point in her wish list was to find out how to challenge a decision of the national referral mechanism. I am advised that that would be done by way of judicial review, which is within the scope of legal aid.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee raised more detailed questions about the operation of the provision. I will look at those matters and try to write to her with an answer. She also asked whether there are any plans to limit immigration legal aid in this context, apart from the time limits under regulations. The answer is that there are currently no plans to do so. In referring to the progress of these amendments and this issue through your Lordships' House, my noble friend also remarked that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has kept at it. I have no doubt that, even after this legislation becomes law, those who take a keen interest in the serious—appalling—issue of the abuse of individuals will keep a watchful eye on the issue and keep at it, and I am sure that the Government will certainly be made aware of any concerns that arise. On that basis, I hope that the House will agree to the amendment.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, the House had the opportunity to debate issues similar to those raised in the amendment during detailed discussions in Committee and on Report. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern came up with the phrase “in the interests of justice to prevent injustice”, which I said at the time had a certain seductive charm and that I would think about it. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, moved the amendment and argued his case with seductive charm, as did the noble Lord, Lord Hart. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, was very much to the point, as was, very briefly, the noble Lord, Lord Bach.
I can assure the House that we have thought about these points. The Government believe it is right that there should be an exceptional funding scheme to provide an essential safety net for the protection of an individual’s fundamental rights of access to justice, and Clause 10 achieves this important end. It will be necessary to provide services to an individual under Clause 10(3)(a), where a failure to provide some measure of legal aid would, for example, clearly amount to a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees an individual’s right to a fair trial and access to the courts.
As has been said on a number of occasions when we have debated exceptional funding determinations under what was Clause 9 but is now Clause 10(3), they will be made in accordance with the factors that the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights have held to be relevant in determining whether publicly funded legal assistance must be provided in an individual case.
In considering whether legal aid should be provided in an individual case engaging Article 6, the director will need to take into account, for example, the importance of the issues to the individual concerned and the nature of the rights at stake; the complexity of the case; the capacity of the individuals to represent themselves effectively; and the alternative means of securing access to justice.
It is not lost on me that the noble and noble and learned Lords who tabled the amendment have carefully mirrored the existing formulation of the clause in their proposed addition. I thank, particularly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, for triggering this discussion and this line of thought in Committee. I again assure the House that I have considered the alternative formulation carefully. However, as I said on Report, we are satisfied that the provision that the Bill currently makes in respect of excluded cases is both appropriate and sufficient.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
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The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)
My Lords, we have, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, indicated, moved on to Part 2, but I open by saying that on my walk from Dover House to the House this afternoon, I, too, fell. I went over on my ankle on what I think was a crack in the pavement, so I have every sympathy with him and I trust that he will need neither medical nor legal assistance as a result. Indeed, I hope I will not either.
Part 2 implements the Government’s reforms to civil litigation funding and costs following, as has been discussed already in this debate, Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendations. These reforms have a number of important components. Abolishing the recoverability of success fees and “after the event”, or ATE, insurance is key to the Government’s aim of returning a sense of proportion and fairness to the current regime. My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford talked about premiums going sky-high. I will return to these issues in more detail in the course of responding to specific amendments.
As part of these reforms, the Government will introduce QOCS—qualified one-way costs shifting—for personal injury cases. This is an area of law where most claimants are individuals, acting under CFAs, and most defendants are insurers or other well-resourced organisations which can well afford to defend themselves. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern asked a very specific question, to which I hope that by the time I conclude my remarks I can give him an answer, about those who are funding themselves and not acting under a CFA. The Government agree with Lord Justice Jackson that QOCS in these cases is the right way forward and strikes a fair balance between claimants and defendants. In particular, it means that in many cases claimants will no longer have to take out expensive ATE insurance.
On ATE insurance, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked what engagement there had been with the insurance industry on these matters. I am advised that insurance both “after the event” and “before the event” can certainly help. It is self-evident that it could help with legal costs. The “after the event” insurance market has developed alongside the current CFA regime and, of course, there is substantial financial interest in seeing that regime continue. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ATE industry’s public stance is to lobby hard against the proposals that we are bringing forward. Ministry of Justice Ministers and officials have met a significant number of different insurers as the proposals have been developed since Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendations were published early in 2010. Although we acknowledge that some ATE insurance providers have said publicly that they will pull out of the ATE market if the changes go ahead, others have indicated that they will look positively at developing products which meet new market needs as the details of these proposals are finalised. We are also introducing a 10 per cent increase in damages for non-pecuniary loss, such as pain, suffering and loss of amenity, which is being taken forward by the senior judiciary.
Lord Ramsbotham
My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord sits down, perhaps I may ask whether he has considered the position of two groups of families who may be considering making civil claims against the Government following inquests. I refer to the families of members of the Armed Forces and of those who die in either police custody or prison.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, this may not be quite what the noble Lord was thinking about, but in some cases, as my noble friend Lord Faulks indicated, if there is a question of a claim following a bereavement, we have indicated that we intend that there should be an uplift in these cases.
On the question of why we are not introducing QOCS for judicial review claims—this may be the circumstance to which the noble Lord was referring—the responses to the consultation indicated that conditional fee agreements were less commonly used outside the area of personal injury and were not frequently used in judicial review proceedings.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
I hope my noble and learned friend will forgive me for mentioning that I have tabled an amendment dealing with precisely that point. It is for debate at a later time and proposes that QOCS should apply in cases where, for example, there is a death in custody—and to other matters referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I am grateful to my noble friend. Debate on his amendment might allow a better exploration of the important point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, that exchange was quite useful because it illustrated the argument against what the noble and learned Lord seeks to persuade us to agree to; namely, the proposition that these are matters for the Rules Committee. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has tabled a sensible amendment that covers the situation raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. However, under the Bill these will not be matters for Parliament. The scope of access to justice will not be in the Bill and will not be the subject of legislation. The matter will be in the hands of the Rules Committee. That is a delegation of responsibility too far in a very significant area of public policy. Therefore, I cannot accept the arguments of the noble and learned Lord.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has tabled amendments that we will debate later. I say in advance that I have sympathy with some of them, including the one to which he referred. Perhaps he will forgive the obvious pun: we understand that there are not many doubting Thomases on the government Benches. He will also understand that we do not necessarily share that perspective and that a degree of scepticism is more naturally to be found on this side.
In respect of one or two other matters, the Heil v Rankin decision is based on a particular level of damages. It is not a binding provision, applicable across the piece, as is suggested in terms of the 10 per cent uplift. It seems to us, and not only to us, that it is imperative, given that we are now dealing with the matter of principle of access to justice via this particular method, that the legislation should encompass the range of issues that arise. It can do so in the form of a starting position and provide for additional regulations to be approved by Parliament later. That would have been an option. I would like to think it might still be an option but I am not getting much encouragement from the noble and learned Lord. I cannot accept that the Government’s position is satisfactory. I am grateful up to a point for an indication that one object of these amendments will take place—that is to say that change will be synchronised. I wish that the noble and learned Lord and I had not synchronised our stumbles today. But in terms of legislation, that is a welcome assurance. Nevertheless, there are significant points of principle here and in the circumstances I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I thought the party of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, was a party of conscience and reform. Conscience appears to have taken a back seat. I have a good deal of sympathy with most of the amendments to which he has spoken and I shall briefly comment on them.
Although we would prefer that the success fee were not deducted at all from a successful claimant, the noble Lord’s proposal is clearly better than the Government’s proposal. So, to the extent that the Government might be disposed to listen to him on this, we would support that in lieu of what we regard as an even better position.
The other amendments to which the noble Lord spoke largely depend on matters being determined by rules of the court, which would appear to have a discretion to make the necessary changes, for example, under Amendments 142B, 142BA and 142BB, with the Lord Chancellor, in the case of Amendment 142B, identifying the proceedings but not necessarily requiring the change to be made.
I entirely share the noble Lord’s view about environmental claims, and a subsequent amendment in my name covers much the same territory. In Committee, I quoted at some length the legal opinions to which the noble Lord referred at that time and dealt with the point about the Aarhus amendment and the points made by his noble friend Lord Lester, which, I agree, misstate the position in respect of protective costs orders. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, is absolutely right to say, as I said on that occasion, that they do not offer a sufficient defence, as it were, to those in that position.
I similarly agree in relation to the civil liberties claims and, again, we have tabled an amendment in somewhat similar terms, with the exception that under the opposition amendments the Lord Chancellor would effectively take the decision which would change the nature of the position in relation to those claims. As that would have to be, as the noble Lord implied at one point, through secondary legislation or affirmative resolution, it is a more accountable way of dealing with matters than simply leaving it to the courts to determine.
In these circumstances I apprehend that the Government will not be disposed to accept these amendments. Perhaps the Minister will be willing to undertake further discussions with his noble friend, if not with anybody else. If not, as the matter clearly will not be put to the vote tonight, I can only record our unfortunate disagreement with the position in which we will end up because it will not be satisfactory. I do not accept that it is undesirable and wrong to look at particular instances which might fall outside the general rules. The Government have acknowledged to some degree that this should be the case in relation to recoverability under clinical negligence. If they can do that in respect of clinical negligence, then they can equally extend a similar principle elsewhere. Having said that, we await the noble and learned Lord’s response.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his amendments. It will come as no surprise to the House if I yet again echo what has been said on numerous occasions on Report: the architecture, as my noble friend Lord McNally referred to it, of this part of the Bill seeks to ensure that there is fundamental proportionality and fairness across the board in these claims, and that is why we have adopted the proposals of Lord Justice Jackson.
The cumulative effects of Amendments 132B, 132C, 132E, 133B, 133E, 139D, 140A, 141ZA, 141ZB and 142B would be, as my noble friend said, a refinement on what has been proposed. When the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, talks about my party and my noble friend’s party as being a party of conscience, it is because we feel that some of the fees that have been charged have been unconscionable under the existing scheme. That is why we wish to address the issue.
My noble friend wishes to introduce staged success fees. I am very grateful to him for his complex set of amendments; he has set out what the fees would be at different stages, on the multi-track approach. His proposals would introduce staged success fees in ATE insurance premiums, the cost of which would be split between the losing defendant and the successful claimant. Some recoverability of success fees in ATE insurance premiums would therefore remain.
I assure my noble friend and the House that we have given the amendments careful consideration, even at this late stage. They are proposed as a compromise and are supported by some but not all personal injury claimant representatives. It is fair to recall that these proposals are not entirely new. In his report, Lord Justice Jackson made primary recommendations that have essentially been adopted by the Government in Part 2. He also made an alternative set of recommendations which, while not identical, bear some considerable similarity to the proposals put forward by my noble friend.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
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Lord Boswell of Aynho
My Lords, I have listened with interest to this debate as a lay person who has not been much engaged on the Bill in the past. However, like my noble friend Lord Avebury, I had constituency experience and was always impressed by the complexity of the cases brought to me. I am also impressed by the volume of evidence and comment made, not least because I currently happen to be one of the officers of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration. I am not in any sense taking its brief but I feel that this matter needs very careful and continuing consideration.
I well understand that there have been cases of abuse in the past. These may have involved overt or self-styled professionals, and they may have involved bad practices by others, including third parties, who run the immigration cases. I also well understand the point about the cost that the Minister has already made to us in correspondence. I would go beyond that to comment that we really cannot meet all the objectives which his department needs to meet in order to balance its budget if we make wholesale concessions on every single aspect of concern where pressure is developed.
These are complex cases. My difficulty in saying that we need to keep them within scope is—thinking aloud—in determining how one would find a basis for doing so without, as it were, pre-hearing the merits of the cases and without necessarily being able to predetermine the degree of legal complexity in those cases unless and until they had been examined. I know that those are difficulties and I know that the cost is a difficulty, but I say to my noble and learned friend that I do not spend my life rebelling and I do not intend to do so tonight for some of the general reasons that I have given about the need for rigour as we take this Bill through. However, I think that these cases are particularly difficult. If he takes them out of scope now, I think that he will need to keep the whole area under review. In future, he may need to consider at least some residual discretionary fund which can be applied to cases of particular interest or importance or where justice is most engaged. It is on that qualified basis, but in anticipation also of his response, that I may be prepared to tender my vote in his Lobby tonight.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)
My Lords, the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, as indicated by many contributors to this debate, would bring legal aid within scope for all immigration cases. I readily understand why noble Lords have put forward the amendment and I am sure the noble Lord will accept, as I think he indicated in his remarks, that just because we seek to take many immigration cases out of scope does not mean that we do not value the contributions that immigrants have made. I think the noble Lord, Lord Bach, acknowledges that we certainly do.
To make a change to the Bill in a way proposed by this amendment causes us to look at the rationale and the basic structure of what underlines this legislation at a time of limited resources. As my noble friend Lord Boswell has just said, this is a time when difficult decisions have had to be taken and when there has been a need to focus legal aid on those who need it most in the most serious cases. My noble friend said that he hoped we would consider it. It can be taken as read that, in an area as sensitive as this, for the reasons that have been advanced by many of your Lordships in contributions to this debate, this is obviously a matter which has been given serious consideration. I am confident that all who took part in the debate will appreciate that this is not a blanket exclusion of immigration cases. We have made it clear in the immigration sphere that we are retaining legal aid for asylum cases, which we believe is absolutely essential because the issues at stake can, at times, be as serious as life or death. It is important, too, to recognise that we will protect legal aid for immigration detention and where there is domestic violence. We are also keeping legal aid for most immigration judicial review cases, which are very often the most complex cases.
This approach means that under our reforms we will continue to spend £70 million of the current £90 million budget in relation to immigration cases. My noble friend Lord Newton talked about a disproportionate share. I think that our reform, with an expectation that some £70 million out of the current £90 million budget will continue to be spent, is an indication that this has been examined in some detail.
However, the corollary of protecting legal aid, particularly in the key areas to which I have just referred, is that it is necessary to be more far reaching in others. At a time when our fiscal difficulties have been acknowledged by a number of contributors, I do not see how it is always possible to justify the extended use of limited resources; for example, for foreign students who may wish to study here but who do not have a connection with the United Kingdom. When difficult choices have to be made sometimes it is very easy to accept the principle that those choices are necessary but it is more difficult when you try to translate them into specific areas.
I shall pick up specific points made by a number of contributors, not least by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who acknowledged the accession to the convention that was recently confirmed. The noble and learned Baroness knows, because we debated it in Committee, that the Government provide £2 million per annum for support to trafficked victims to help to rebuild their lives and that can include information about legal rights. I think it is known by your Lordships that that £2 million is distributed by the Salvation Army. The convention requires legal counselling, including information about people’s rights. There are no immigration applications as such that trafficking victims need to make. They are automatically granted 40 days' leave; then they may be granted 12 months’ leave if they are assisting the police, or up to three years’ leave if there are compelling circumstances to do so. That is decided on the known facts of the case and they do not need to apply for it.
Lord Newton of Braintree
My Lords, will the Minister acknowledge that part of the reason for introducing the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner was the poor quality of the advice that people were getting at these tribunals from people who simply did not know what they were doing? The new service was designed to ensure that they would get proper advice, and we should think very carefully before going back to the preceding regime.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, we are not proposing to abandon the regime. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, pointed out, immigration advice is tightly regulated by the OISC, to which complaints can be made.
Substantial savings are required. The change that we propose will save an estimated £20 million a year out of a total of £90 million spent in this sphere of law. It is important to show a balance; it is not just a case of taking immigration cases out of scope. Cases affecting some of the most vulnerable people will remain in scope. I do not for a moment doubt the motivations behind the amendment. However, I assure noble Lords that the matter has been given careful consideration. My noble friend Lord Boswell asked about complex law being kept under review. He will be aware that the power to add, within scope, that has been proposed for Clause 8 is a safety net that could be used if, in the light of experience, the somewhat apocalyptic scenario described by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, came to pass. Of course, there will be a post-implementation review after five years.
I hope that noble Lords will recognise that in a very difficult area we have sought to strike the right balance in cases that are particularly demanding and that particularly affect asylum seekers, such as cases of domestic violence and where people are being held in detention, and that we are addressing some of the most difficult cases in the immigration field. However, we had to draw the line somewhere. It could never be in the right place for all noble Lords. I can only assure them that it was done with some care and thought, and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Bach
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this important debate, and not least to the Minister, who in his usual reasonable way explained the Government’s position. I am afraid that I cannot accept the explanation. To save £20 million in order potentially to set back the system by many years and to cause difficulties for so many people is not a sensible saving of money.
The noble Lord, Lord Newton, talked about other expenditure the Government had found. He was too polite to say what I will say. My example is the £250 million the Government found to make fortnightly bin collections weekly. It is absurd to save £20 million here but spend £250 million there—such an absolutely wrong sense of priorities—that any satirist would have enormous fun writing a story about it. Jonathan Swift should be living at this hour.
I will simply ask the House to recall the comments of two of our most distinguished judges: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Their words a few minutes ago gave the lie to the argument that this was a sensible move by the Government. Almost all other noble Lords who spoke said that the measures were not worth taking and were wrong in themselves. I ask the House to ask the Government to think again. I beg to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Bach
My Lords, we agree with the amendments in this group. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, said:
“Ministers say that Travellers must obey planning laws like everyone else; but they demolished the system created by the previous Government under which an obligation was imposed on local authorities to provide planning permission for Travellers’ sites that would accommodate the number of Travellers in each area, as determined by an independent assessment of needs, buttressed by public inquiries. Since the Secretary of State gave local authorities carte blanche to rip up those plans and decide in their unaided wisdom”—
that was the phrase he used—
“whether to allocate any land at all in their development plans to Travellers’ sites, the number of sites for which it was intended that planning permission should be granted has plummeted by half, according to research conducted”.—[Official Report, 24/1/12; col. 928.]
In his reply, will the Minister explain to the House why the Government took that decision and changed the policy that had been set up under the previous Government?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Avebury explained in moving this amendment, Amendments 77A, 77B, 77C and 77D are aimed at ensuring that legal aid remains available for possession proceedings for persons who are clearly trespassers on the property or land where they are residing, in particular for people living on unauthorised encampments. Under the Bill, legal aid would no longer be available in such cases.
I valued the opportunity to meet my noble friend Lord Avebury, the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and their colleagues from the Community Law Partnership. It was an opportunity for them to set out in more detail what underlies their amendments and for me to indicate where the Government are coming from on this. My noble friend raised a particular point about the judicial review vis-à-vis the county courts, to which I will return.
Let me say clearly that as a matter of principle the Government believe that they should not be funding individuals to resist eviction where they have unarguably entered and remained on the property or site as a trespasser. The whole rationale of this Bill is to focus scarce resources on the cases that are the highest priority.
I remind noble Lords that the Government amended the Bill in Committee to make it crystal clear that legal aid will continue to be available for possession and eviction matters where there are grounds to argue that the client has not entered the property or site as a trespasser and where there are any grounds to argue that the client has not remained on the property or site as a trespasser. I believe that, with this safeguard in place, it is not an appropriate use of resources to retain funding more widely.
I readily acknowledge that the legal aid position in relation to judicial review is different from the position in relation to possession proceedings concerning those who are clearly trespassers. However, as my noble friend Lord Avebury indicated, we are generally retaining legal aid for judicial review. In any major reform such as this, it is reasonable and necessary to draw relatively broad lines in order to achieve an effective system. We believe that our approach is a reasonable one in the circumstances.
It has been argued that our approach in the Bill cuts across case law that permits public law arguments to be raised in possession proceedings themselves, a point made by my noble friend. As we discussed when we met, along with colleagues from the Community Law Partnership, the Government do not necessarily accept that argument. It is correct that case law has developed so as to allow public law arguments to be raised directly in possession proceedings. Our proposals in relation to legal aid do not affect that. However, there is no legal bar on seeking a judicial review of a public authority’s decision to bring possession proceedings.
We recognise that, as with all judicial reviews, the decision on whether to grant permission for such a judicial review to be brought will be entirely at the discretion of the court. The court will consider a number of factors, such as the availability of alternative remedies, including any grounds that could be raised by way of defence to the possession proceedings.
It has also been argued that retaining the trespasser exclusion in relation to possession proceedings while retaining legal aid for judicial reviews will be much more costly for the legal aid fund. I indicated that I wanted to reflect on this issue. Regrettably there are no detailed data, as the Legal Services Commission does not record whether a recipient of legal aid is a trespasser. Nevertheless, we believe that the number of possession cases involving trespassers that are funded under the current legal aid scheme is likely to be relatively small. Of those cases, fewer still are likely to involve seriously arguable points of public law. Accordingly, we do not consider that the current approach in the Bill will have significant cost implications.
In any event, the amendments would restore legal aid under paragraph 28 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 for trespassers generally, including cases involving trespass to private property or cases involving public authorities where no public law issues in fact arise. In these circumstances, we do not believe that the width of the amendment proposed by my noble friend would be a proper and wise use of the limited funds available.
I appreciate that my noble friend and the noble Baroness are particularly concerned about the Gypsy and Traveller communities. As I stated in Committee, the Government certainly understand the potential impact of the Bill’s provisions on these communities. Nevertheless, we consider that the proposed changes to the scope of legal aid set out in the Bill are both proportionate and necessary to our objective of targeting legal aid to those who need it most while achieving a more affordable system.
I emphasise that the provisions to which these amendments relate apply to trespassers generally, whoever they are. They are not specifically targeted at the Gypsy and Traveller communities. My noble friend asked whether, given the criminal offence of squatting created elsewhere in this Bill, the trespasser exclusion in paragraph 28 now specifically targets Gypsies and Travellers only. The exclusion in paragraph 28(1) of Part 1 of Schedule 1 applies to trespassers generally and not just to Gypsies and Travellers on unauthorised encampments; for example, an individual who squats in a non-residential building would not be committing a criminal offence under the provisions of the Bill and would be subject to the trespasser exclusion for legal aid if the owner of the building brought possession proceedings to evict them. Therefore, we do not accept the argument that the Bill’s trespass exclusion now targets Gypsies and Travellers in particular.
Before I move on to the mobile homes amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked whether the abolition of the regional strategy pitch targets would lead to fewer traveller sites. The Government’s draft planning policy makes it clear that local authorities should set pitch targets based on robust evidence, and the Government are currently considering the responses to the consultation on the draft policy. Rather than imposing top-down targets which fuelled opposition to development, the Government believe that we are offering councils real incentives to develop additional traveller sites in their areas. The previous model of top-down pitch targets under regional strategies did not deliver, not least because between 2000 and 2010 the number of caravans on unauthorised developments increased from 728 to 2,395.
As I mentioned in Committee, the Homes and Communities Agency is responsible for administering the Traveller pitch funding programme and monitoring the use of the funding awarded to local authorities and registered providers. In January this year the Government announced the allocation of £47 million of Traveller pitch funding, which will help provide more than 600 new pitches and refurbish more than 160 existing pitches between now and 2015. This funding is based on payment by results at completion—a question was raised as to why nothing has actually been paid out yet—but £47 million has been allocated and the delivery of the funding allocations will be monitored through the Homes and Communities Agency’s established programme management framework, with quarterly contract review meetings forming part of the process.
The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, spoke to Amendment 77E, which seeks to bring into scope legally aided advice for any matter arising under the Mobile Homes Act 1983. That Act gives rights to residents who have agreements with site owners to live in their own mobile homes on site. We do not believe that this amendment is consequential to Amendments 77A to 77D.
As I have already argued and as we have already said many times in debates, we are facing a serious financial position. If the justice system is to contribute the necessary savings, it is necessary to focus legal aid on the highest priority cases. Accepting this amendment would mean funding low-priority cases, such as disputes about the sale or inheritance of mobile homes. Once again, I cannot see how this is a good revision of our proposals or an affordable one, not least given that legal help and representation will in any case continue to be made available where the individual is at immediate risk of losing their home, including possession and eviction from a mobile home site.
The noble Baroness asked about harassment, to which I think I made reference in Committee. I confirm that paragraph 32 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to this Bill brings into scope harassment injunctions under Sections 3 or 3A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which would cover issues where there is harassment.
If we were to accept this amendment it would amount to a strange anomaly whereby exceptions would be made for people who live in mobile homes so that they received legal aid for lower-priority matters whereas people living in other homes would not. We find it difficult to justify that it would be coherent to create such differences between the level of legal aid available to different kinds of home owner. I recognise the commitment which my noble friend and the noble Baroness have to the Gypsy and Traveller community. I appreciate the opportunities we had at our meeting and in this debate to set out our respective positions, but, for the reasons given, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Avebury
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Whitaker and Lady Turner, for their contributions to this debate. I should like to begin by pointing out that the noble and learned Lord did not cover the case of the family camped on the roadside for reasons of absolute desperation. There was nowhere else for them to go. They needed to consult a doctor and stopped temporarily in order to receive medical advice and treatment. That was the sort of case we had in mind when framing these amendments in consultation with the Community Law Partnership. It still seems to me that they should have the right to be able to contest an action for possession on public law grounds and that they should be able to do this in the county court. With respect, my noble and learned friend did not refute the allegation that it would be far more expensive to deal with these cases by way of judicial review in the High Court. All he said was that there would not be very many of them but that does not seem to be a very valid argument against the amendment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Turner, said that local authorities had an obligation to provide sites, which they manifestly have failed to honour. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, was good enough to quote what I said at an earlier stage about the contrast between regional spatial strategies under which definite plans were in hand to grant planning permission for sites. That was scrapped and we were left with the unfettered decisions of the local authorities, which I am afraid will not result in the delivery of the sites. My noble and learned friend mentioned the £47 million allocated by the Homes and Communities Agency to local authorities and social housing agencies to provide some 700 pitches. But the agencies in question have not even begun to identify the land on which this money will be spent, let alone apply for planning permission.
Figures provided by the Irish Traveller Movement in Britain in its survey of local authorities show that the number of sites for which planning permission is intended has plummeted by 50 per cent from the figures that were given in the regional spatial strategy. I consulted Essex County Council to see what was happening there. As noble Lords will recall, there was a high profile eviction case at Dale Farm in Basildon. The figures from the council show that under the regional spatial strategies, the minimum number of pitches that were to be provided by 2021 was 965, whereas the planned Gypsy and Traveller pitches in the individual local authority plans that have so far been developed under the present system total 93. So in the county of Essex the situation is worse even than the ITMB survey revealed. Only 10 per cent of the pitches that were intended under the regional spatial strategy are going to be granted planning permission in these particular local authorities. I hope to provide figures for the rest of the east of England, where the regional spatial strategy was fully developed under the previous Government, to show that the intentions of my noble friends of £47 million to provide pitches are pie in the sky. I will offer them 10 to one against the delivery of 700-odd pitches by 2015 for any level of bet they would like to take.
I am very disappointed that we have not been able to make more headway on this minor amendment, but as with the noble Lord, Lord Bach, on the previous amendment, I am afraid that we have come to it late at night, and I do not propose to press it to a Division. I shall withdraw the amendment with the utmost regret.
Lord Bach
My Lords, it is absurd that we are debating such a crucial set of amendments as this at 10.15 in the evening. This is a crucial part of the Bill and the House should be much fuller. However, we have heard some very impressive speeches from around the House on Clause 9, which is a key clause in the Bill and, I imagine, a key clause in the Government’s thinking on the structure of Part1 of the Bill.
We had a substantial debate at an earlier hour in Committee on these amendments, with the exception of Amendment 93A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. However, the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and my amendments were debated. There was a widespread feeling around the House on that occasion, as there is tonight in a much emptier House, that Clause 9 is much too narrow in scope. It does not allow for the flexibility that is crucial if exceptional cases are to have any real meaning. In our view, this is such a narrow clause and it will be so difficult to put into practice that a great deal will be left to the director to decide. At the moment, we do not know under what rules the director will have to make his decisions, and it is a shame that we do not.
We still greatly support the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Carlile of Berriew. It seems to us a very sensible amendment and one that, if the Government do not intend what my noble friend Lord Judd was implying, they should accept. However, they do not accept it in those terms. The noble and learned Lord the Minister listened carefully when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said in Committee:
“My second point is that, although ‘the interests of justice’ is a rather general and vague subject, on the other hand if you turn it round and say that the director, before he allowed this ground to prevail, had to be satisfied that there was a real risk of injustice unless legal aid was granted in a particular case, that would focus on the issue in the case in a more distinct and direct way than the phrase ‘the interests of justice’”.
In response, the noble and learned Lord said:
“I am certainly interested in what my noble and learned friend said about turning the phrase around, which has a certain seductive charm.”
That is the phrase that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, used. He continued, with his usual careful caution:
“I would not want to immediately agree to that but, without commitment, it is certainly something that I would want to think about”.—[Official Report, 24/1/12; col. 989.]
This is the perfect opportunity for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, to tell us whether he did think about it and what his conclusion was. It is an attractive offer. It is based on the original amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and on what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, had to say about it. I shall be interested to know his view on that. Amendment 93A fits in very well with the debate that we had earlier this evening, in which the Government found few friends around the House as regards their argument. I suspect that there are very few friends in the House at present as regards what the noble and learned Lord may say about Amendment 93A. We back it.
The first of my amendments is exactly the same as the one that I moved last time. It is based on a draft amendment by the Law Centres Federation. It is not necessary for me to praise the law centres movement yet again in the House; the House has a very strong feeling that it has done a fantastic job over the past 40 or 50 years. When it puts forward a draft amendment to a Bill like this, the very least that we can expect is that the Government take it seriously. It would have different criteria, having regard to the previous circumstances of the case, including: the client’s vulnerability; the client's capacity to represent himself or herself; the client's health, including mental health issues; the actual availability of alternative sources of advice and assistance; the fact that the client is under the age of 18; or it is otherwise in the interests of justice. So we come back to the phrase in Amendment 93 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, rejected that amendment last time. I dare say he will do so again in a few minutes. I still wonder why, when it seems to cover so many of the crucial things that are of importance for any clause that deals with exceptional cases.
My Amendments 95 and 96 deal with the position of chief coroner, who barely survived, but survived eventually, even though it was the Government’s intention to get rid of him before he started his job. It was good that the Government were persuaded to keep him. On Clause 9(4)(b), where the director has made a wider public interest determination in relation to the individual and the inquest, it would be helpful, rather than harmful or delaying, for the director to consult with the chief coroner. We still think that is a good idea and we cannot see why the Government reject it. These are important amendments and I know that they will be treated seriously by the noble and learned Lord, but to keep Clause 9 as narrowly based as it is on the ECHR and the European Court of Justice rulings is, in our view, much too restrictive and will in the end cause a great deal of concern for clients who really ought to get some legal aid under any exceptional provision but who will be barred from doing so because of the narrowness of the definition of Clause 9.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, notwithstanding the hour—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bach—I agree with him that this is an important group of amendments. Clearly, there is concern about the parameters of the exceptional funding scheme that will be created by Clause 9. It is very clear that many of your Lordships would prefer a very broad discretionary power, perhaps akin to that proposed in Amendment 94, on the face of the Bill. However, I ask that we reflect on the fundamental purposes of the changes that we are making to the general legal aid scheme. We need these reforms in order to create a fair, balanced and sustainable legal aid scheme. We have taken into account the importance of the issue; the litigant’s ability to present their case, including their vulnerability; the availability of alternative sources of funding; and the availability of other routes to resolution. It is also right that there should be an exceptional funding scheme to provide an essential safety net for the protection of an individual’s fundamental rights of access to justice. Clause 9 achieves this important end.
I acknowledge that we have limited the exceptional funding power in such a way as to ensure the protection of an individual’s rights to legal aid under the European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law. I acknowledge that this is a high threshold. However, it is right to limit exceptional funding to those important cases in which an individual’s fundamental rights of access to justice are challenged. I do not agree with the initial comments of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, which suggested that this would be impossible to operate. Certainly it is our anticipation that there will be several thousand applications to the fund. As I stated in Committee, there will not be a fixed budget for exceptional funding. It will also be available—we will come on to this later—where there is a wider public interest in an individual being represented at inquest proceedings into the death of a family member.
It is also important to note that the individual must qualify for such services in accordance with Clause 10, which will mean that decisions on exceptional funding will be subject to the means and merits criteria. The director of legal aid casework will make all exceptional funding decisions. This is a departure from the current position where the Lord Chancellor makes individual funding decisions on excluded cases. Clause 4(3) provides that the Lord Chancellor may issue guidance or directions about the exercise of the director's functions, including functions exercised under Clause 9. Through this guidance, the Lord Chancellor will set out the legal criteria that the director must take into account in determining an exceptional case application.
I confirm that the guidance will be based largely on the factors that domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights have held to be relevant in determining whether publicly funded legal assistance must be provided in an individual case. It will be published in a clear and accessible format so that applicants and their solicitors can see whether their case will be likely to meet the necessary tests. Certainly it is our intention to publish more details of the operation of the proposed exceptional funding scheme, with associated guidance.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked a question about excluded cases that she had put to my noble friend Lord McNally. I have not had a conversation with my noble friend in which he imparted the question to me. In another context, she suggested that there might be a discussion outwith the debate. I am sure that my noble friend will be happy to answer her question in that context.
Amendment 93 would allow the director to fund excluded cases where he or she determines that it is in the interests of justice generally to do so. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said, Amendment 94 would allow the director to make an exceptional case determination where it is appropriate to do so in the circumstances of the case, taking into account certain prescribed criteria. In moving his amendment, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford referred to Amendment 22, which we debated—I think—on Monday of last week. I indicated that I would take the matter away and think about it. His diary has now caught up with mine and I understand that we will meet tomorrow to discuss it further. He indicated that many issues that he believes will be covered under that amendment will go up to the director for a similar determination under Clause 9. Clearly that is something that we can pursue when we meet.
The phrase “interests of justice”—and the more seductive turnaround of the words proposed by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern—is capable in this context of wide interpretation. The amendment would create a power that is considerably broader than the one we currently propose under Clause 9. As I acknowledged, Clause 9 is limited and we have already set out why it has to be so.
Our concern with Amendment 94 is again that it could be open to wide interpretation. Nevertheless, I will repeat an assurance that I gave before to the noble Lord, Lord Bach. Many factors listed in his amendment, such as the client’s capacity to represent themselves, their vulnerability, and alternative sources of funding, are to be found in the jurisprudence on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As such, they would form part of the test for exceptional funding to be taken into account by the director in those cases where Article 6 is engaged.
In considering whether legal aid should be provided in an individual case, the director will need to take into account, for example, the importance of the issues to the individual concerned and the nature of the rights at stake; the complexity of the case; the capacity of the individual to represent himself or herself effectively; and alternative means of securing access to justice.
Importantly, Clause 4(4) explicitly prohibits the Lord Chancellor giving directions or guidance to the director in relation to an individual case. We believe that this change will guarantee the objectivity of the decision-making process for both in-scope and excluded cases and serve as a safeguard against political interference in the making of any individual exceptional funding decisions in future.
My noble friend Lord Avebury tabled Amendment 93A, which is concerned with immigration cases in which an individual risks being unable to obtain qualified and affordable representation and where there may be a risk of injustice if the appellant is not represented. As we have made clear, and as we debated earlier this evening, the Government believe that asylum cases and immigration detention cases must be treated as a priority for funding. I am sure it will readily be agreed that the consequences of these cases are of much higher seriousness, involving threats to life and limb or to the liberty of the person.
Clause 9 indicates that civil legal services other than services described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 are to be available to an individual under this part if subsection (2) or (4) is satisfied. Paragraphs 1 to 27 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, if we include the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, all deal with aspects of immigration, including asylum, protection for legal aid for immigration detention and cases where there is domestic violence. In addition, we are also keeping legal aid for most immigration judicial review cases. Many cases will already be within scope and have a right to legal aid.
Protecting funding in these areas, which I hope your Lordships will agree are of fundamental importance, means that we have had to make difficult choices about other immigration cases, which have not been considered to be as high a priority. At the same time, we have been clear that funding for cases falling outside the scope of the civil legal aid scheme should be focused on those cases in which the failure to provide legal aid would amount to a breach of an individual’s rights under the ECHR or directly enforceable European Union law.
As my noble friend Lord Avebury noted, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is currently clear that decisions concerning issues of immigration, nationality and residence do not engage Article 6 because they do not involve the determination of civil rights or obligations. My noble friend asked whether lack of immigration legal aid would breach Article 8 or Article 14. Exceptional funding would cover whatever legal aid is required by the European Convention on Human Rights or is enforceable under European Union law. As I have indicated, case law as it currently stands generally means what Article 6 requires, but if the case law were to change, the exceptional funding scheme would have to respond to that. As such, the Government’s position is that immigration cases will not generally qualify for exceptional funding, other than a few cases that may arise under other aspects of EU law. However, the fact that immigration cases would currently be unlikely to qualify for exceptional funding does not mean that injustice must inevitably arise from a lack of legally aided representation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked about children and social workers. Children will rarely be applicants in non-asylum immigration cases and will normally be considered as part of their parents’ application. Child applicants are much more likely in asylum cases for which legal aid will remain available. The noble Baroness also referred to unaccompanied children. Unaccompanied children with an asylum or immigration issue would have a social worker assigned to them. Their role includes helping the child access the same advice and support as a child permanently settled in the United Kingdom, and they could also offer assistance in filling in forms, explaining terms and providing emotional support. I was asked particularly about training in immigration law. The proposal is not for social workers to give detailed legal immigration advice but to help with form filling. As I indicated in an earlier debate, we intend to work with the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner to exempt local authorities from regulation so that they can offer low-level advice and assistance.
I do not wish to repeat everything that was said in the earlier debate, other than to remind the House that in trying to get the balance in immigration cases we have sought to focus legal aid on those areas that are of much greater seriousness to the individual; for example, where the individual is subject to domestic violence. More generally, we have gone as far as we can on exceptional funding, but we have made it clear that there is a narrow determination with regard to the European Convention on Human Rights.
Amendment 95 would make it a requirement for the director to consult with the chief coroner and have regard to his views before making a “significant wider public interest” determination about whether to fund advocacy at an inquest. Inquest cases can currently be funded if there is a “significant wider public interest” in the applicant being represented. This is a term with a clear definition under the present funding code: benefits to the wider public must be tangible, must be likely to accrue to a substantial number of people and must arise as a consequence of the representation. It is not enough for there to be a general public interest in the case itself.
The Government believe it is important to retain the ability to fund inquest representation on the basis of wider public interest, because the provision of such representation may lead to findings that help prevent future deaths. That is why Clause 9(4) gives the director the power to provide funding on the basis of a wider public interest determination.
The onus has never been on the decision-maker to consult coroners, many of whom will not wish to give a view at all. Indeed, some coroners are not prepared to give a view about substantive elements of the case until the inquest is being held. However, under the current guidance on the existing exceptional funding system, the views of coroners are material, though not determinative, to decisions concerning the requirement for funding to be provided in order to fulfil the state’s obligations under Article 2 of the European convention. Consequently, coroners are far more likely to give a view about potential ECHR engagement in inquests than on whether the case has “significant wider public interest”.
We envisage that, under the new exceptional funding system, the director will continue to consider the views of individual coroners when taking decisions on whether legal aid is required to fulfil the state’s obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It would therefore seem somewhat incongruous to make it a statutory requirement for the chief coroner to be asked for his or her views on the “significant wider public interest” aspect of the case.
We believe that compelling the director to consult with the chief coroner in all cases is likely to add an unnecessary bureaucratic element to the assessment process, which could lead to unfortunate delays. It would represent a significant burden on the chief coroner, who would be unfamiliar with the circumstances of each case, unlike the individual coroner holding the inquest. The chief coroner would be required to acquaint him or herself with information pertaining to a number of cases. We do not believe that there would be any obvious benefit for bereaved families, individual coroners or indeed the chief coroner in mandating this additional process in law.
I am not sure whether the noble Lord mentioned Amendment 96 in this group, which would compel the director to pay,
“reasonable costs incurred by any person making a successful funding application under this section”.
Perhaps it would be helpful to say that the concept of “reasonable costs” is open to broad interpretation and could be seen to authorise payments at commercial rather than prescribed legal aid rates. However, I can reassure the noble Lord that although discussions about the arrangements for exceptional funding applications are ongoing, we expect to propose that a payment may be made towards the costs associated with the making of an application where that application is successful.
I trust that my response indicates that the exceptional funding scheme is intended to provide an important safety net where an inequality of arms would lead to an obvious—and possibly unlawful—unfairness in proceedings. I accept that many people would like to see this cast much more widely and more cases brought within the ambit of exceptional funding. However, I have explained the architecture of the Bill and why it is cast in the way it is, with particular reference to the European Convention on Human Rights and the other specific issues with regard to coroners’ inquests.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
My Lords, on unaccompanied children, I accept the point that social workers will not be expected to provide formal legal advice, but in the other place the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice said that they could turn to law centres, pro bono representation or the Refugee Council for such formal legal advice. As I am sure the Minister knows, the Refugee Council and the Law Centres Federation have written to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State to say that it is simply impossible for that gap to be filled in that way and to point out that the Refugee Council does not provide that kind of support. Will the Minister take that on board? I still do not know where these children will get that legal advice if they need it.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
The noble Baroness acknowledged that I referred to some of the issues about unaccompanied children, but I will certainly draw her remarks and the point that she made about the Refugee Council to the attention of my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
My Lords, one of the comforting sayings at the Bar, which I have found over 50 years to be absolutely true, is that when one door shuts another opens. It seems to me that, if he has heard of that saying north of the border, the noble and learned Lord will be aware that he has set out in his reply the basis of innumerable applications for judicial review of the decisions made by the director of legal aid services. It is impossible for there not to be a challenge to the statement made by the noble and learned Lord because almost anything can be brought within the ECHR rules, generally speaking, if you really try. We have heard reference to Articles 2, 6, 7, 8 and 14 tonight, which gives us five articles to play with.
I can assure the noble and learned Lord that the legal profession will look forward to testing his description and the ambit of the clause for a considerable period—case after case. It would be so much simpler if a broad discretion were given to the director of legal aid services, coupled with guidance that we could look at, in order that there would be some ambit to it. If the formulation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, which was found to be so seductive last time, were adopted with guidance, that could prevent an awful lot of future litigation. With that very pleasant prospect in mind, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, this is another minor and technical amendment designed to correct a drafting inconsistency between Clause 7 and Clause 10. Clause 10(4) is intended to cover the possibility of a different level of service being appropriate to a matter that falls within the scope of Part 1 of Schedule 1—for example, legal help or legal representation. In Clause 10(4), we currently use the phrase “description of service” when our intention is simply to refer to “forms” of service as we have in Clause 7(2). The amendment simply standardises the terminology between Clause 7 and Clause 10(4). I beg to move.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has indicated, the amendment would require regulations to be made under Clause 11 to make provision for appeals to a court, tribunal or other person against determinations made by the director under Clauses 8 and 9, and against the withdrawal of such determinations. I can reassure the House that the Government’s intention is to continue with the existing effective appeal procedures that are currently used by the LSC. First, an internal review on all determinations on civil legal aid will be available. This is required by Clause 11(5). Secondly, we are retaining the current system of independent lawyers, known as independent funding adjudicators, who volunteer to carry out independent reviews of funding decisions in in-scope civil and family representation cases. Clause 11 already allows us to make regulations to set out those appeal processes in secondary legislation, as they are set out currently.
The existing system, which deals with over 11,000 reviews and 3,500 appeals to independent funding adjudicators each year, is both efficient and effective and costs an estimated £60,000 per year to administer. I am not sure that he did, but it may be that the noble Lord envisions instead a tribunal to review these appeals. The review by Sir Ian Magee initiated by the previous Administration into the governance of legal aid looked at the option of directing all legal aid appeals to a tribunal and concluded that this would cost up to £1 million per year to administer. We do not believe it would be sensible to replace a system that works well with an unknown system at possibly 15 times the current cost.
This amendment would also require an appeal in cases covered by Clause 9. Again, we intend to retain the existing system under which, although there will be an internal review available in accordance with Clause 11(5), there will be no appeal to an independent funding adjudicator where applicants remain dissatisfied. I do not agree that these cases should attract a right of appeal to an IFA. It would not be appropriate to refer exceptional funding decisions to an IFA. This is because of the particular nature of the assessment at the heart of such cases, which will focus on an interpretation of the relevant obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to provide legal aid. Exceptional case determinations, along with all other decisions by the director, would be amenable to judicial review. I think my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford confirmed that in his response to an earlier debate. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, if there is no intention at any stage to provide for appeals to a court, tribunal or other person against such determinations, why is the option included in the first place? Either the Government intend at some point for some categories of case to be dealt with in that way or they do not. If they do, they should make regulations. If they do not, subsection (6) is otiose. However, I am making no progress with the noble and learned Lord, and at this hour I do not propose to take the matter further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, Amendment 101A seeks to provide for the possibility of a wholesale independent review of clinical negligence claims by an independent person, and this would appear to provide for a review of both the civil procedure and legal aid funding. Having sat through the speeches at Second Reading and having responded to the debate on clinical negligence in Committee and again last week to other amendments moved on Report, like any other Member of the House I am under no illusion as to both the importance and sensitivity of this area. My noble friend Lord Phillips said something about the exceptional challenge that these issues give rise to and, when we debated amendments on Report last week, my noble friend Lord Faulks spoke to this amendment even though it was degrouped at that time.
The amendment has the somewhat novel effect of permitting the Lord Chancellor to introduce an exceptionally detailed and costly review function for an entire area of civil litigation. Albeit that it is now couched in terms of a power rather than a statutory requirement, there would certainly be an expectation raised if Parliament were to pass it. There are, therefore, fundamental problems.
I have alluded to the costs issue, and this cannot be overstated. One assumes that it is straightforward for the Government to set up a review, but a research, monitoring and evaluation framework of the magnitude proposed here does not give sufficient weight to the financial constraints under which the Government are operating. I recognise that the Government have in recent times committed resources to previous reviews, but the resources are somewhat more strained. At a time when we have had successive groups of amendments in which cases have been advanced for legal aid in particular areas to bring them within scope, which we have had to resist on the grounds of cost and because it was not part of the scheme, it is difficult to commit or even give the possibility of committing to a significant expenditure that would follow on from a review of this nature.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Beecham
My Lords, some nerve damage is being sustained by the noble Lord. Let us, however, concentrate on the issue, which is rather more important than claiming credit for amendments; namely, the future of patients who undergo clinical negligence and who have claims. We have heard much talk about equality of arms in litigation. I fear that what the Sophies of this world may face is more akin to a farewell to arms. That is the danger we face if legal aid is not extended.
There is a hierarchy of amendments before us tonight. Of course I endorse the Government’s amendment, as far as it goes. Equally, we support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. However, for us the best amendment—because it effectively embraces both the others—is that tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. We wish her well should she decide to test the opinion of the House at an appropriate moment.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)
My Lords, I think that it is evident to the House that we have had a very important, serious-minded and sensitive debate. I listened to many of the speeches at Second Reading when many of these points were aired, not least on perinatal and neonatal injury. I also responded to the debate in Committee when, again, passion and concern was expressed in all parts of the House.
The debate benefited from noble Lords’ experience. My noble friend Lady Eaton referred to her personal and professional experience. My noble friends Lord Faulks and Lord Carlile have professional experience in the legal sphere, as has the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis. While I anticipate that I am not going to be able to bring succour to all those who spoke, I hope that in responding to the debate I may indicate that this is an issue that the Government have treated seriously, and on which they have sought to respond to many concerns expressed in earlier debates. We believe that the provisions that we are putting in place provide a proper means of addressing these important issues.
Concerns were expressed at Second Reading and in Committee about the serious and complex cases involving brain-damaged babies for whom a conditional fee agreement might not be able to be secured, and thus they would need to rely on exceptional funding under Clause 9, which could leave their families in an uncertain position. For that reason, the Government brought forward Amendment 68. I welcome the fact that it was welcomed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on the opposition Front Bench, and by my noble friends Lord Faulks and Lord Thomas of Gresford. My noble friend Lord Carlile said that it was a moment—perhaps a very rare moment—of ministerial bliss this evening; and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, accepted that it was a significant concession. As I indicated, it was brought forward in recognition of the concerns raised, and to put beyond doubt that legal aid will remain available for babies who suffer brain injury at birth that will lead to a lifetime of care needs.
We recognise that in these cases there are difficulties in obtaining funding through CFAs because of the extent and expense of the investigations required. We stated that we expected to spend about £6 million on legal representation in clinical negligence cases that merited exceptional funding through Clause 9; and we said that we expected a significant proportion of the £6 million to be spent on serious infant brain-damage cases. Given that fact, we decided that it would be appropriate to bring these cases back in scope. We hope that this will provide certainty to families and make the application process more straightforward.
The amendment provides funding for claims for medical negligence causes of brain injury as a result of which a child is severely disabled. I listened to, and understood, the inevitable concerns expressed about where one should draw a line, and I will say something about that. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, spoke very briefly but with a weight of personal experience, and asked whether we could identify the issues of principle that underpinned the amendment. Our intention is to cover cases of medical negligence where the child is most vulnerable: during its time in the womb, during delivery and immediately afterwards. For that reason, the amendment provides for funding in cases where negligence occurs in the period beginning with the mother’s pregnancy and continuing until eight weeks after birth. We recognise that premature babies are in a particularly vulnerable situation. That is why the amendment also provides that where a baby is born prematurely, the eight-week period will be taken to start from the point at which the mother would otherwise have begun her 37th week of pregnancy.
Because our intention is to cover birth and pregnancy-related negligence, we have had to draw the line at some point after birth. The amendment refers to the eight-week period because it is in the first few weeks of life that a child is at their most vulnerable. This period is also one in which postnatal medical care is expected to take place. It is also provided for in the guidance from the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence entitled Routine Postnatal Care of Women and their Babies. In cases where negligence occurs beyond the eight-week point, there will remain a safety net in the form of the exceptional funding scheme under Clause 9. I will say more about that when I address the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Eaton and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. I will address the question of whether the failure to fund would amount to a breach of the individual’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
It is important to stress that exceptional funding decisions will necessarily be taken by the director on a case-by-case basis. My noble friend Lord Carlile asked if there could be a multi-party action to satisfy the Clause 9 criteria. He will be among the first to recognise that it is difficult and possibly unwise to speculate about hypothetical cases. However, in principle it would be possible. Each application would be assessed against the criteria, and it may well be appropriate to fund the lead case in a claim if there is a requirement for it to be funded under, for example, Article 6 considerations. It may be the case that other claims could then progress on a CFA basis. The question would turn on the individual case, but there could be a lead case where failure to fund it would amount to a breach.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked what was meant by enforceable European Union rights. They are rights to legal aid which might have direct effect in domestic law. An example would be rights enshrined under Article 47 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides the equivalent of Article 6 protection in cases falling within the scope of European Union law.
Amendment 13, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, seeks to bring into scope civil legal services for obtaining multiple expert reports in medical negligence cases. He indicated that government Amendment 68 would provide legal aid for cases where the most expensive and extensive medical reports would be required, and that his amendment would cater for the remainder. However, we believe that it would not be limited to the remainder of those cases that are presently funded by legal aid. Solicitors currently have to choose whether to use a legal aid route or a CFA route to fund a case. Only 18 per cent of cases where the funding method is known use legal aid. As my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford indicated, some 82 per cent of cases proceed down a conditional fee agreement route.
The amendment would open up legal aid to many cases that are funded by way of CFA, and could mean that lawyers who currently have to carry the no-win no-fee risk to get their success fee could apply for legal aid to cover the expert report in every case where their client is financially eligible, and still get their no-win no-fee success fee in respect of their other legal costs. This is not a fair balance for the taxpayer. It could also result in a significant expansion of the legal aid scheme. The taxpayer should not be required to pay where these cases have already been taken forward and paid for by alternative means. The position would also be limited to those who are financially eligible for legal aid. That would mean that those who are outside that eligibility—which could be many people—would have no assistance in funding expert reports in criminal negligence cases.
I recall that in Committee the noble and learned Lord presented a torrent of figures, and I indicated that we would look at them. I encouraged officials to look at them and I know that there was some engagement, that he met my noble friend Lord McNally and that there were exchanges on these figures. In this situation, we must agree to differ. The Ministry of Justice analysts carefully reviewed the calculations. We sought to explain the Ministry of Justice’s calculations. The matter is very technical; I have tried to get my head round both sets of figures.
Lord Clinton-Davis
If there is no consensus between the experts, what happens then?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
It is very evident. We want to encourage joint expert reports, but clearly there will be cases when that is not possible because there is a division of opinion. In our debates on Monday evening, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, indicated some of the very conflicting expert reports in cases she had heard about shaken baby syndrome. That is not clinical negligence, but it is clearly an example of conflicting reports. Nevertheless, where it is possible to go towards joint expert reports, it should be encouraged.
My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford also quite properly drew attention to the fact that while we have quite rightly focused on some of the very serious cases and consequences of clinical negligence, in many cases of clinical negligence the damages could be under £20,000. Your Lordships may be aware that the Government have recently announced the extension of the low-value claims process for personal injury claims. We are working closely with the National Health Service Litigation Authority and claimant lawyer representatives to set up a pilot for dealing with low-value clinical negligence cases. These discussions are ongoing. They will be a valuable way of trying to identify ways in which some of the lower value cases can be dealt with.
My noble friend drew the attention of your Lordships’ House to the scheme in Wales under the NHS Redress Act 2006. Clearly that is something we would look at, although I note that it is tied in with a complaints and concerns regime and does not necessarily replace the existing judicial system. Claimants are still free to pursue a claim. I have always thought that it is one of the strengths of devolution that different ways are found in different parts of our United Kingdom to address issues such as this. It is only right that we look at the experience in different parts of the United Kingdom, and if there is something to learn we should be willing to learn it.
I am obliged to refer to government Amendments 26 to 30 and 58 to 67. They are technical in nature. My noble friend Lord McNally has written to all Peers describing their detail, so I do not propose to detain the House further.
We have listened to very strong representations in earlier debates about clinical negligence in the context of perinatal and neonatal cases. We have sought to address it through conditional fee agreements, which are increasingly part of the way in which clinical negligence cases are dealt with, and through the exceptional funding. We are ensuring that there is provision in other cases. As I have indicated, I regret that we have not been able to have a meeting of minds with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. I will place the Ministry of Justice’s calculations in the Library of your Lordships’ House. When those who wish to look at them have done the calculations and wish to come back to us, we will seek to give them a response. In these circumstances, I ask the noble and learned Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
My Lords, I address only my own amendment. It is very limited in scope and is designed to save money. I am very grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Wigley, Lord Newton and Lord Faulks, the noble Baronesses, Lady Mallalieu and Lady Finlay, and other noble Lords. It seems to me that they have demonstrated conclusively that the financial argument in favour of this amendment is irresistible. It is simply not good enough for the Minister to say by way of answer that we must agree to differ on the figures. The figures supporting the case that I have put forward were put before the Government on 2 March. Indeed, they have had similar figures since we were in Committee, but they have not answered these and it is now 7 March.
If the Government are as serious as they keep on saying they are about saving money, they ought to accept this amendment. Even on their own figures, they would save £6.2 million. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, who it is clear wish to see “independence” in the Bill. It is probably not a matter of dispute or conflict between those who have contributed and the Government that individual cases, as set out in Clause 4(4), will be undertaken robustly and without political interference. I certainly share the view expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, who said that it was important that the director is not political or in any way susceptible to political pressure. I think that Members on all sides of the House would agree with that.
Perhaps it would be of help, and pick up on the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, if I took a moment to explain to your Lordships the type of relationship that we anticipate between the Lord Chancellor and the director of legal aid casework. One of the main objectives in abolishing the Legal Services Commission is to ensure that Ministers have greater accountability for legal aid in policy, administration and expenditure. We have no intention of recreating the non-departmental public body status of the current Legal Services Commission. That is one of the purposes of the Bill and it is why we have indicated in Clause 4(1) that the director of legal aid casework would be a civil servant. That is at the structural level, but it is accepted that it is fundamentally important in getting the balance right that an area should be carved out, which is sought by Clause 4(4), in which the Lord Chancellor may not issue the director with guidance or directions: namely, in relation to carrying out the director’s functions in individual cases.
In terms of policy objectives and the prohibition at Clause 4(4), the director’s freedom from political interference in carrying out his functions in individual cases is paramount. It remains the Government’s view that the protection afforded in the Bill and the additional transparency, about which I shall say more in a moment, achieves the right balance between not risking the director’s freedom from political interference in individual cases and not compromising the structural relationship that is sought to be achieved here.
Lord Clinton-Davis
What advice did the Law Society and the Bar Council give to the Government about this particular provision?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
The noble Lord indicated that in his contribution to the debate. I am seeking to reassure noble Lords that that reassurance is there on the substance. In individual cases it will be unlawful for the Lord Chancellor to interfere in any way. Moreover, a number of features incorporated in the Bill provide for transparency and parliamentary oversight.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My noble and learned friend always speaks with great persuasiveness, but I cannot see any point that he has made that makes the amendments that are being debated a problem for him. Amendment 3 makes the independence,
“subject to any direction or guidance given under subsection (3)”,
which covers one of the points that he made. As I say, there seems to be no argument that I can think of that makes the amendment inconsistent with the framework that the Minister has put forward. If that is right, given the universal anxiety about this point about independence, why in heaven's name not put it in the Bill?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
In fairness to my noble friend, it is a good question, which I have asked myself. The answer, as I have tried to indicate in my earlier elaboration of the structure of the Bill, is that we are not trying to recreate a non-departmental public body. Consideration of whether it would be possible to incorporate the words “independent” or “independence” into Clause 4 as proposed would require us to consider very carefully whether that might inadvertently affect the proposed structure, but in no way does it detract from the heart of this matter. In respect of individual cases, the director of legal aid casework will in no way be subject to the influence or interference of the Lord Chancellor.
We need to try to get that structure right while allowing for the provisions that will be there, as my noble friend picked up and as the noble Lord, Lord Hart, indicated, in the part of the amendment that refers to direction and guidance. If that is combined with the very clear protection given—the freedom from any interference by the Lord Chancellor in individual cases—that gets the structure right without inadvertently affecting the proposed architecture of the Bill.
We seek to supplement this. The new clause that the Government propose in Amendment 5 is intended to provide a statutory requirement for the director to produce an annual report for the preceding financial year, detailing how the director has carried out his or her functions during that time. That would naturally include detail of the director’s interaction with the Lord Chancellor and how the Lord Chancellor’s directions and guidance had been used to guide decision-making over the reporting period. A noble Lord asked whether the director would have a voice. There will clearly be an opportunity for a voice because it will be his or her report that is submitted and subsequently presented to Parliament.
I hope that noble Lords will be reassured that this additional measure will provide further transparency in relation to the director’s functions and help to demonstrate that the prohibition as to interference in individual cases has been and will be adhered to. These are important safeguards to ensure the independence of the director.
Lord Newton of Braintree
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but I have a number of questions at this stage along with a mounting sense of absurdity and unreality. Am I not right in thinking that in the ordinary course of events any civil servant has to be the servant of the Minister whom he serves? That is my general assumption. Secondly, if this civil servant is not to be in that position, does he not in effect become a non-departmental public body in his own right, as an individual? Thirdly, was it not the position of this Secretary of State on the Public Bodies Bill that these are decisions that he ought to take as Secretary of State? That was the whole purpose. My noble and learned friend, for whom I have huge admiration and who usually does terribly well on sticky wickets, has not kept the ball out of the wicket on this occasion.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I do not agree that the person would become a non-departmental public body in his or her own right. My noble friend raises an important point because, as has been indicated on a range of issues, guidance will be given and criteria set. There will be a framework; there will be a responsibility for the Lord Chancellor; but the crucial point—and there is concern across the House on this—is that in individual cases there cannot be that level of interference. We believe that that is secured by the provision in Clause 4(4) that it would be unlawful for the Lord Chancellor to interfere in a way that undermined that freedom of decision-making in individual cases. More than that, other measures in the Bill provide for transparency to show that that is not being in some way undermined.
Lord Howarth of Newport
We accept entirely and welcome that the Lord Chancellor will have no power to direct or even guide the director of legal aid casework, but what about classes of case? Suppose the Lord Chancellor thought that too much legal aid was going to women who are victims of domestic violence, if we succeed in carrying the amendment that was passed earlier today all the way through. Would the Lord Chancellor be able to give guidance to the director that he ought to ease up in providing legal aid in that category of case? We have to be concerned on the broader point that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, expressed so strongly in Committee and just now.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
For example, guidance will be given under Clause 9 on exceptional funding, which could relate to classes of cases, but the criteria that are set and are there in regulations will be there by secondary legislation. That can in no way be trumped. Secondary legislation will have to be approved by your Lordships' House by the affirmative procedure. That cannot be undermined or circumvented by guidance. When the regulations are eventually brought forward, we will have an opportunity to look at that. That will be the primary source and it would not be possible for the Lord Chancellor by some other means to undermine what was in the regulations. If you wish to change them, you have to come back to Parliament with further regulations and Parliament would have a further opportunity for debate.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
The Minister may have noticed that I have kept quiet on this amendment until now, but I am genuinely in difficulty in understanding the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Newton, about a civil servant working to a Minister. If, as the Bill requires, the director is a civil servant, is it not his duty to work to a Minister? In which case, how will he run an independent organisation within a government department? I am sorry, I do not understand.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)
The noble and learned Baroness puts her finger on it, as she often does. Yes, it is to be a civil servant. I indicated earlier that in such a crucial area of individual cases, that individual will be a civil servant appointed on merit, who will not be subject to ministerial interference. There is common ground that that is quite proper.
As the noble and learned Baroness rightly said, there are other aspects of a civil servant’s work where that relationship with the Minister is different. I hasten to add—I think the House has got the message—that there is no question of interference in the individual cases. I sought to make the point that incorporating the words “independent” or “independence” into the clause could upset the balance that would apply in other parts of the director’s work. I think the House would generally accept that there ought to be that relationship between the Lord Chancellor and the director. We do not wish inadvertently to skewer the whole architecture of this when the Government share what is at the heart of everyone’s perfectly legitimate concerns. We have enough clear provisions in the Bill to secure the independence of the director in making these individual decisions.
I ask noble Lords to reflect on that. We do not wish inadvertently to change the whole structure of the Bill, given that the point of concern is properly addressed by the prohibition on interference, buttressed by the many ways in which Parliament and others will be able to look at the way the powers are exercised. That is transparent. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hart of Chilton
I thank the Minister for that charming and beguiling presentation of the arguments that he seeks to address. I am afraid that it does not really address the central issue. Everybody agrees that this individual will be independent but the Government appear unable or unwilling expressly to say so. Every noble Lord who spoke in the debate wanted there to be some unequivocal statement in the Bill that this individual will be independent. The beguiling words have not answered that. It is welcome that there will be an annual report and I understand the arguments that have been put forward, but that is not sufficient to answer the central issue that there should be a manifest, unequivocal statement that the individual should be—and be seen to be—independent. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, this is a short and simple amendment. In replying to the last debate, the Minister indicated that guidance and directions would have to be published. That is of course helpful, but what would be more helpful in reinforcing the independence of the director is if the guidance and directions had to be approved by a vote in each House. Given the potentially wide scope of directions and guidance, it seems sensible to provide for such consideration and, indeed, for an affirmative vote. I beg to move.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, if Amendment 4A were accepted, it would mean that directions and guidance issued by the Lord Chancellor would require the approval of this House before being in force. Directions or guidance cannot conflict with secondary legislation made under Part 1—a point I made in the previous debate—and we cannot see any reason for bringing them separately before the House. As I have already said, Clause 4 requires the Lord Chancellor to publish all directions and guidance given to the director. Transparency is achieved through this provision and, as I hope that the House agrees, the director would be required to produce an annual report on the operation of their functions. The report will include an explanation as to how directions and guidance have shaped decisions. I can also assure your Lordships’ House that the Lord Chancellor will, as a matter of good administration, keep guidance and any directions issued under continual review. That emphasises the fact that, if it is to be kept under continual review, having to bring them back every time to be amended would be an unnecessarily burdensome process in the efficient administration of the legal aid scheme. It would not in any way enhance the transparency that we seek to achieve—and on that we have common ground. Accordingly, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, the House has gone some distance in reinforcing the independence of the director, and I trust that the Government will accept that position. On that perhaps optimistic assumption, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, this is again a perfectly simple amendment, and the Minister anticipated it in his reply to the previous amendment in indicating that matters will be reviewed. The amendment provides for a more systematic review, perhaps, than the Minister implied. Since his implication was that there may be a number of changes over time, it seems sensible that there should be a consolidation, and a three-year period should be sufficient to allow a view to be taken about progress and the actions of both government and the director under the terms of the legislation. I should have thought that it was a simple enough request. It does not require parliamentary approval in this case but it at least allows for a considered view to be taken after a reasonable period of time. Given that this is a new process, one would have thought that that would be helpful. I hope that the Minister on this occasion might see his way to accepting the amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Again, my Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has indicated that the purpose of his amendment is that any guidance or directions issued under Clause 4 must be reviewed on a regular basis in an interval of not more than three years from the time that they were issued. As I indicated in respect of the previous amendment, it is not possible for any of the directions or guidance to conflict with the secondary legislation made under this part of the Bill.
We believe that the review provided for by the amendment is unnecessary as a statutory requirement. However, I assure the noble Lord and your Lordships’ House that the Lord Chancellor will, as a matter of good administration, keep guidance and any directions issued under continual review. Protections are afforded to the director through the operation of Clause 4. There is also an opportunity for transparency, which is achieved through the publication of directions and guidance. These are important safeguards and, in the Government’s view, those arrangements are not improved upon or added to by the amendment. As I indicated, in some circumstances there might well be a maximum period of three years, but the amendment poses an additional statutory burden. I have given an assurance that the Lord Chancellor, as a matter of good administration, will keep the guidance and directions under continual review, and I hope that with that reassurance the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I am certainly prepared to accept the assurances that the Minister has given. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Annual report
(1) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each financial year, the Director must prepare an annual report for the financial year.
(2) The annual report must state how the Director has carried out the functions of the office in the financial year.
(3) The Director must send a copy of the report to the Lord Chancellor.
(4) The Lord Chancellor must—
(a) lay the copy of the report before Parliament, and(b) arrange for it to be published.(5) In this section “financial year” means—
(a) the period beginning on the day on which section 4 comes into force and ending on the following 31 March, and(b) each successive period of 12 months.”
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)
My Lords, we welcome this opportunity to consider the undoubted contribution that experts make by giving evidence in our courts. Some examples have been given in the course of this debate. Before I address specific points, let me say that our basic position is that the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is inappropriate and possibly unworkable. It seeks to impose on the Lord Chancellor a duty to review the quality and accessibility of expert evidence.
By definition, expert witnesses are highly qualified. They are experienced professionals in specific technical fields. In respect of the quality of their evidence, experts are subject to the standards required by their respective professional membership bodies. From a regulatory perspective, the relationship between a professional body and an individual expert is not one on which the Lord Chancellor could or should encroach.
It is not within the Lord Chancellor’s remit to assess and determine the quality of the advice provided by any given expert witness, nor should it be. We have heard in contributions to the debate not only that there are far too many experts in some cases but that they can sometimes be of variable quality. It is very invidious to ask that the Lord Chancellor should in some way be the judge of that. A huge range of expert advice is delivered in civil cases. More than 50 types of expert are covered by the current fee scheme for funding advice by experts. I agree with the view expressed by my noble friend Lord Faulks, who said that these matters are very much outwith the province of the Lord Chancellor.
The financial implications of creating a monitoring and evaluation framework, as well as an independent quality standard, that covers all these various disciplines, and the administrative resource required to make such a system work, mean that it really is not feasible. Irrespective of the financial implications, as my noble friend Lord McNally indicated when this matter was debated in Committee, we do not see how such a system could be viable. As was brought home very clearly by the contribution of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, disputes over the accuracy and quality of expert evidence can themselves be the subject of extensive dispute and litigation. The examples that she gave, from her vast experience, of brittle bone injuries and shaken baby cases showed that you sometimes get extremes of expert evidence. I am not sure how one could put the Lord Chancellor in the position of having to make a judgment on its quality. He is not the appropriate arbiter of that kind of expert evidence. Equally, to impose the kind of duty anticipated by this amendment ignores the practical realities of expert provision. By definition, they are experts in their fields and can sometimes be relatively few in number. Their geographical distribution is bound to vary over time. With the best will in the world, I do not see how the Lord Chancellor could or should control or influence that distribution to ensure accessibility.
Important points have been made through the experience brought to bear on this debate by noble Lords who are perhaps trustees of organisations that have provided evidence, as well as through their practical experience, either in the judiciary or at the Bar. A lot of these come back to funding—a point made the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, when he moved the amendment. They are perhaps more appropriate to the issues around the funding orders, which were introduced on 3 October last year. Perhaps I may say something about these. They are not particularly germane to this amendment but they are germane to the debate that we have had. It was by way of these funding orders that the expert witness fees were codified for the first time. Historically, though guideline rates were published by the Legal Services Commission, rates of remuneration were effectively determined by the courts. This caused a range of issues for the LSC, not least spending control and data collection. The codification of rates is intended to address this issue.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and another noble Lord mentioned the difference between the codified rates in London and rates outside London. The codified rates were based on the benchmark or guidance rates applied by LSC caseworkers when assessing expert witness services as part of a solicitor’s final bill, subject to a reduction of 10 per cent in line with the 10 per cent reduction that was being imposed on legal aid solicitors’ fees. The benchmark rates were developed by experienced civil bill assessment staff at the LSC and were based on their experience of typical hourly rates charged by experts in their respective geographical regions. The rates reflect the LSC’s experience that there is a greater supply of experts in London, which allows more competitive rates to be paid. The benchmark rates have been applied by the LSC for some time and there are only limited anecdotal reports of problems with access to experts. I assure your Lordships that the Ministry of Justice is working with the Legal Services Commission and stakeholders to monitor the effect of the fee levels and to gather further data to inform the Government’s longer-term plans to put in place a scheme of fixed and graduated fees for experts.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth of Breckland, mentioned the Family Justice Review. The recommendations that have come out of that review are being looked at and will help to inform the development of a more detailed payments scheme for experts in the future. I will look at what the noble Earl said, as he may have made one or two further specific points. If I can reply to those points, I will certainly write to him.
I understand where many of the concerns are coming from in principle. However, as my noble friend Lord Faulks indicated, much of this matter is in the hands of the courts and some things are happening in this regard. However desirable the amendment might appear, it would be almost unworkable in practice and, indeed, would put the Lord Chancellor in an invidious position in trying to make quality assessments, which would not be appropriate to his role. Accordingly, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Turner of Camden
I am not a lawyer, and this is a very complicated set of amendments in a single group. My concern arises because for many years I was a trade union official with responsibility for the legal cases service that we provide to our members. My concern, and that of the TUC, is that the Bill changes the balance away from people who are poor who have had an accident at work and want to seek compensation for their injuries. It has destroyed the balance, as they see it, between the wrongdoer and the injury victim, denying claimants access to the courts and with the money taken from them simply serving as a windfall for negligence defendants and sometimes for their insurers. Even if representation can be obtained, many on a low or middle income may not claim because they are unable to fund disbursements upfront or because of a general feeling regarding the costs, or the risk of the costs, involved. Trade unions collectively assist up to 150,000 personal injury claimants a year. There is a concern that their ability to look after their members will be impacted by the Bill, and in particular by Clauses 43 and 45, which we are currently discussing with this group of amendments.
As has already been explained, back in 1999 mechanisms were put in place to ensure that all reasonable legal costs could be claimed by a successful claimant from the negligent party to protect access to justice, particularly for those on a low or modest income, and to protect claimants’ entitlement to their compensation in full. Such costs include success fees and “after the event”, or ATE, legal insurance. In our opinion, Clauses 43 and 45 would probably reverse that position, destroying injured claimants’ rights.
Clause 43 stops recoverable success fees. Currently, claimants can find lawyers to take on their cases on a no-win no-fee basis using a conditional fee arrangement because the lawyer is paid a success fee. This is an additional cost paid in successful cases to cover the risk of running a whole basket of claims, some of which will be lost. It is the recoverability of this success fee from the insurer that the clause will ban. Instead, the claimant might have to pay up to 25 per cent of their damages to their lawyer as a success fee—if they can find a lawyer to take the case. As Jackson knows—we have been talking about the Jackson report because it is on his recommendations that a lot of this legislation is based—this will harm claimants, and he proposed an increase in damages for the injury alone of 10 per cent to compensate. However, this will not work. Those pursuing employer liability claims will lose out, and this uplift may prove largely unnecessary if the Bill relates only to RTA claims. We are concerned not about that but about accidents at work in this particular briefing.
So far as concerns accidents at work and industrial injury, there is a further concern that if this legislation takes effect there will be a reduction in the number of compensation cases that can be pursued, and that that in turn will have an effect on safety at work, health and safety legislation and so on. That is another impact that this legislation will have on compensation for injuries that workers may sustain in their employment.
Clause 45, at the stroke of a pen, stops a claimant recovering the cost of ATE insurance to cover the risk of paying a defendant’s costs or disbursement. Without ATE, many claimants will not be able to take the risk other than in very straightforward cases.
For those reasons, those of us who are concerned with trade union cases and with work injuries and so on are worried about the impact that this legislation, if not amended, will have on the possibility of people injured at work being able successfully to pursue compensation cases. The Government sometimes seem determined to prevent individuals who feel that they need compensation pursuing their cases. I sometimes think that they have been taken in by all the publicity in recent years about our becoming a compensation culture. I do not think that that is true at all. It is obviously true that many people feel that, if they are injured at work or through somebody else’s negligence, they have a right to claim compensation for their injury and they therefore looks for means to secure that compensation. Sometimes they go to a union if they belong to one, or they may go to other organisations that provide advice and support to individuals. Those individuals will not feel able to do so if there is a risk that they will not get their case taken, or will be landed with fees that they have to pay themselves because they will not get full recovery, having had to pay the compensation success fee to the lawyer involved.
That is terribly unfair, and I hope that during the passage of this Bill we will be able to table amendments that will deal with some of those concerns. Some of the amendments in this group will deal with the concerns that I have voiced this afternoon. They were expressed previously when we had Second Reading and I do not want to repeat everything that was said then, but I want to emphasise that I am talking about people who have very little money. When they are injured at work, often the compensation is no more than £3,000, which may not appear to be a very large sum of money, but to somebody working as a cleaner, it is an enormous sum. Certainly, it is not a trivial amount. People with small claims, who feel that they have been injured and are entitled to compensation for their injuries, may have doubts about whether they can proceed, and they will not find people willing to take up their case. That would be a great pity; it would block people’s access to justice. I thought that in any reform, we should be concerned with improving access to justice. The Bill, especially in these clauses, does not do that. I hope that we can amend them during our discussions.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)
My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and my noble friend Lord Phillips, in thanking my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford for introducing this compendious set of amendments. It is useful to do that because it brings together all the different strands of this package. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, my noble friend Lord Thomas introduced the issue and spoke to the amendments with great clarity. In doing so, he raised a number of important issues to which I hope to respond. I shall, obviously, deal with the amendments, but if accepted, they would completely undermine the reforms that we are trying to make to civil litigation costs.
I shall try to take the amendments together in some of the natural groupings: Amendments 118 to 120 and Amendments 127, 131 and 133 all relate to Clause 43; Amendments 138, 143 to 146, 147A and 148A all relate to Clause 45; Amendments 158, 159, 160 to 162 and 190 to 193 all relate to Clause 53; and Amendments 137B and 137C would insert a new clause.
To respond to the general comments that have been made, both by my noble friend Lord Thomas and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, perhaps it is worth emphasising the importance of Part 2 of the Bill, even though I shall not go down the Shakespearean historical paths of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. Part 2 includes provision to implement fundamental changes to the current no-win no-fee conditional fee arrangements regime. As my noble friend Lord Thomas has indicated, it is taking us back to the regime introduced by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern when he was Lord Chancellor in the 1990s. We believe that the Bill will restore a fair balance to civil justice. It is worth reminding ourselves that conditional fee agreements were used successfully then without the substantial additional costs that have followed the changes introduced by the previous Government in the Access to Justice Act 1999. Under our changes in this Bill, meritorious claims will be resolved but at a more proportionate cost, while unnecessary or avoidable claims will be deterred from progressing to court. We believe that these changes can help businesses and other defendants who have to spend too much time and money in dealing with avoidable litigation—actual or threatened. It is worth reminding ourselves that if a defendant feels pushed into a position where they feel they have to settle a claim that they think does not have any merit at all because of the potential costs that they might incur if they proceeded to defend the action, it is not justice. It is not justice if unmeritorious claims are allowed to succeed.
Lord Martin of Springburn
I apologise for being late for the Committee; I was travelling from Scotland. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will acknowledge that cases that involve 100 per cent recovery are those that go to court. There are stages where settlements can be made. The defendant can make an offer that can be accepted. If it is done at an early stage there will not be the 100 per cent costs that we were talking about.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My plane from Edinburgh, too, was delayed today; I understand the noble Lord's difficulties. He mentioned the arrangement for making offers. Part 36 arrangements were spoken to by my noble friend Lord Thomas when he moved the amendment. I will come to the matter in responding to the debate.
As I indicated, very often these cumulative costs can lead defendants to feel under pressure to settle a claim when they have no legal reason to do so, through fear of incurring payment of excessive costs as the case proceeds.
Without Clauses 43 and 45, high and disproportionate costs in civil litigation will continue. Access to justice will not become more meaningful for all parties, as we intend. If all the amendments to Clause 43 were agreed, the fundamental elements of the Government's reform package would be lost, and defendants would continue to be liable for significant additional costs across a range of cases. It is useful to put the level of costs in some context. My noble friend Lord Phillips pointed out that one general liability insurer indicated that, in 1999, claimants’ solicitor’s costs were equivalent to just over half the damages paid; by 2004, average claimants’ costs were roughly the same as the damages; and, by 2010, average claimants’ costs represented one and a half times the damages received by the injured victims, and indicated that while average damages paid have increased by one-third since 1999, average claimants’ costs have increased by two and a third times over that period. These figures reflect Sir Rupert Jackson’s findings that claimants’ costs are substantially higher than defendants’ costs, and that claimants’ costs in CFA cases are substantially higher than in non-CFA cases.
Lord Beecham
If damages had increased, as recommended in 1999, and kept pace with inflation, that ratio would not be quite as wide, would it?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
We will come to increased damages. Damages are totally to one side in this. The point I was making was about the difference between claimants’ costs and defendants’ costs. For example, in clinical negligence cases in the period 2005 to 2010, claimants’ costs paid increased by 45 per cent while the NHS Litigation Authority’s legal costs declined by about 30 per cent. That reflects Sir Rupert Jackson’s findings that claimants’ costs are substantially higher than defendants’ costs. That is one of the things that we seek to address.
It might be helpful if I indicate at this stage our current timetable for the implementation of Lord Justice Jackson’s proposals in Part 2—subject, of course, to parliamentary approval. We believe that these are important measures and we want to implement them as soon as possible in order to control the costs of civil litigation. However, I will reflect on some of the specific issues that were raised by my noble friend Lord Thomas. These proposals will require the making of new regulations and changes to the Civil Procedure Rules. We wish to make sure that we get the details of these regulations and rules right, and that will inevitably take some time.
We are also conscious that stakeholders will need appropriate notice of when the changes will be implemented and how the details will affect them. We have already announced that the legal aid provisions in Part 1 will be implemented in April 2013, subject to parliamentary approval. For these reasons, I can inform the Committee that, subject to parliamentary approval, the Government intend to implement the Jackson provisions in Part 2 in April 2013 as well.
As I have outlined, Amendment 127, tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Martin, if allowed to stand, would allow continuation of the current regime of recoverable success fees—which, for the reasons I have indicated, we are determined to tackle. Therefore, we will resist that amendment.
I turn to Amendments 118 to 120. The Government have said that in personal injury cases there will be a cap on the amount of damages that may be taken as a success fee. It is important to remind ourselves that the cap of 25 per cent in personal injury cases is a maximum in order to protect claimants’ damages. Lawyers do not have to charge a success fee of 25 per cent of damages. Indeed, in many personal injury cases where there is little risk of difficult legal issues arising, it may well properly be the case that a zero success fee, or a much smaller success fee, would be appropriate. Indeed, there is no need to claim a success fee at all. As my noble friend Lord Thomas said, an element of competition will start to emerge, and no doubt some firms of solicitors will get a reputation for taking on cases with very modest or no success fees, whereas other firms prepared to take on more risky litigation would have higher success fees. The cap will be set at 25 per cent, but that is intended in personal injury cases only and is to protect claimants’ damages. In particular, it will not apply to damages for future care and loss, which can be very substantial. I do not accept that the amendments tabled by my noble friend are necessary, because he mentioned some non-personal injury cases where that 25 per cent cap will not apply, albeit that the fee under the Bill would refer to a percentage of damages. Obviously, in non-personal injury cases, the 25 per cent rule would not apply. Amendment 118 would allow lawyers to increase the notional fee and overall costs, whereas the policy intention is to reduce these costs. Therefore, we do not believe that Amendments 118 to 120 are necessary or appropriate.
Amendments 131 and 133 seek to exempt certain types of claim from our package of reforms to the existing CFA regime. We cannot accept these amendments as they undermine the Government’s reform of civil litigation funding and costs. Under our reforms, people will still be able to bring cases on CFAs in areas where they are currently used. We are also making improvements that will help claimants wishing to fund claims on a CFA that were not available previously, and we are protecting claimants’ damages. I just referred to the 25 per cent cap; as has also been recognised, there will be a 10 per cent increase in non-pecuniary general damages such as those for pain, suffering and loss of amenity. This change is being taken forward by the senior judiciary.
Amendment 131 proposes that the success fee should be recoverable where,
“the defendant has been unreasonable (in whole or in part)”.
This relates to the recoverability of success fees from the defendant, which we do not believe should be the case. To allow for recoverability where the defendant is alleged to have been unreasonable, at least to some extent, is a recipe for satellite litigation and even more costs being generated. It will introduce uncertainty and the opportunity to allege unreasonable behaviour in every case—one can see the certain incentive to do so—which would not be acceptable.
I will return later to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Martin, but we are introducing changes that will require defendants to behave properly in relation to offers. The changes to Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules—Offers to Settle—are touched on in Clause 53 and the amendments that have been moved in relation to that. The changes will incentivise defendants to make earlier and better offers; otherwise, they will suffer increased financial penalties. With regard to Amendment 133 and the question of funding of appeals, the same general arguments apply as for unreasonable behaviour by the defendants. The Government are not persuaded that any special provisions need to be made in respect of appeals, and appeals can be funded on the same basis as cases in the first instance.
As has been acknowledged in this debate, in personal injury cases we are introducing a system of qualified one-way cost-shifting—QOCS—which will protect losing claimants from having to pay the defendant’s costs. Although these measures are being taken forward outside of the Bill, including through the Civil Procedure Rules, they are an important feature of the overall package. To maintain a level playing field, these changes should apply equally and to all categories of cases. Otherwise, in cases covered by these amendments, the losing party will still be liable to pay not just the winning party’s ordinary costs but all the additional costs associated with CFAs, without any justification.
The effect of Amendments 137B and 137C is almost identical, the difference lying only in the amounts they suggest. I have spoken about the changes we are making to CFAs. As part of his package of reforms, Lord Justice Jackson recommended that the level of general damages in tort cases such as for pain, suffering and loss of amenity should be increased by 10 per cent. The Government have accepted this recommendation, and the increase will apply to all cases, however they are funded.
However, Amendment 137B seeks to make this increase part of primary legislation by incorporating it into the Bill. Amendment 137C specifies that the increase should be 33 per cent. I believe that an increase of 33 per cent would be an overcompensation. As well as exceeding the level of the proposed cap on success fees, it would be a substantial windfall for claimants not on CFAs, who would not be liable for any success fee. It would also increase the burden on defendants, which goes against the grain of these reforms.
I understand that noble Lords wish to see a commitment to a 10 per cent increase in the Bill. However, we have given the matter much thought and we do not believe that to do so is either necessary or practical. The level of general damages has historically been for the judiciary to decide. This was so in the Court of Appeal case of Heil v Rankin, which increased the level of such damages. Again, we believe it would be appropriate for the senior judiciary to take this increase forward, as indeed it is.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
Perhaps the Minister will not mind if I add a very few words. I had not intended to intervene but, as a former chairman of a rules committee, I have to say that I have considerable faith in the good sense of the way in which it does its work. But the points that have been made are extremely relevant. It is not really the business of a rules committee to change something so dramatic. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has said, I would add that “unreasonable” is extremely difficult. The words used by the noble Lord are the standard words that have been used from time immemorial, as the lawyers say. “Unreasonable” is nothing like as serious as the other term but is liable to cause considerable difficulties of interpretation.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, it is very evident from the three interventions that this matter is clearly exercising the Committee. I certainly note from the experience of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, having chaired a rules committee that perhaps we are going into territory which we may not have been in before. As to what my noble friend has said, I sometimes hesitate to put things on the face of the Bill because, as we all know, once there, they limit what a rules committee might be able to do if faced with an obvious set of circumstances where it does not believe there should be one-way costs shifting, and it can inhibit that. However, I take the point that unreasonableness could be going too far towards the other extreme in terms of its lack of clarity.
My noble friend asked: if it is not possible to put something in the Bill, what assurances could be given? That is something we shall certainly want to reflect on when considering these contributions. I am sure that we shall have an opportunity to address this again at the next stage of the Bill, and if there are assurances that can be given, I would hope that we would be able to do so. Perhaps I may leave it at that for the moment. We recognise the importance of the points that have been made.
I should restate that there already appears to be broad agreement that there should not be a primary financial threshold in personal injury cases for QOCS, although that would not necessarily apply were QOCS to be extended at some later date to other categories of personal injury. I hope that reassures my noble friend on that particular point.
Amendments 143 and 144 seek to replace the Lord Chancellor’s discretionary power under Clause 45(2) with a duty to make regulations in respect of the recovery of “after the event” insurance premiums relating to expert reports in clinical negligence cases. I can give the Committee the assurance that we intend to allow for this recoverability so that poor people can get expert reports in clinical negligence cases without having to pay for them upfront. However, we have deliberately kept a degree of flexibility around the drafting of the regulations.
The effect of Amendments 144A to 144D is to extend the recoverability of ATE insurance premiums to all civil cases. Unlike the current exception for clinical negligence, the proposed exception is intended to apply to ATE insurance which covers the risk of paying opponents’ costs as well as funding expert reports.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
My Lords, with great respect, I advanced the amendments in the context that one-way cost shifting will go through, as the Government say it will, in which case the defendant’s costs are immaterial. The only ATE insurance that will be required will be for the disbursements of the claimant himself, which would not otherwise be covered. That is the area to which I am referring in those amendments.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, we believe that the package of proposals seek to end ATE insurance premiums being charged to the defendant with the specific exception of clinical negligence cases. To start unpicking it in such an important respect would not retain integrity of the proposals as a whole. I hope that I am not misinterpreting what he said, but my noble friend has suggested that it might be possible to split or share the recoverability of success fees or ATE insurance premiums. Indeed, I think that the Bar Council has suggested that some success fees or ATE insurance premiums should be payable by the losing side with the remainder payable by the claimant. Lord Justice Jackson made alternative recommendations on partial recoverability of success fees and ATE insurance premiums in the event that his principal recommendations were not accepted. But the Government had a full public consultation on both the primary recommendations and the alternatives and gave careful consideration to the responses. We decided to take forward the primary recommendations—abolishing the recoverability of success fees and ATE insurance premiums—as the best way of restoring proportion and fairness to the CFA regime.
It has been suggested, as referred to in Amendment 146, that the market may not provide for or adjust itself sufficiently to take account of these. The amendment requires the Lord Chancellor to,
“have regard to the financial and commercial viability of the insurance market”,
in making regulations under Clause 45(2). I accept that the changes the Government are seeking to implement are fundamental, but we expect the insurance market to respond positively to them. It is easy to say ahead of an event that all sorts of appalling things will happen, but after 1999 the market certainly adjusted to the opportunities with ATE premiums, and it is not surprising that those who wish to maintain the status quo are making substantial representations to that effect.
Lord Martin of Springburn
On the incentive to settle early—I am trying to put this in layman’s terms—is the noble and learned Lord saying that a claimant can, through his solicitor, put it to the defendant that it would be a reasonable settlement, for example, to pay X amount or to print something in a particular magazine that would help the defendant to get his reputation back? Is the noble and learned Lord saying that, if such an offer is refused by the defendant, that would be taken into consideration by the court?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I think I understand what the noble Lord is saying and I think I gave an indication on that point. Let me just try to find that—
Lord Thomas of Gresford
May I help by saying that my Amendment 162 goes directly to that point?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
As I said in response to my noble friend Lord Thomas, we do not believe that that is necessary because it is the Government’s intention that such matters would be included in the definition of non-monetary benefit awarded to the claimant in any event should the additional penalty be calculated in that way. Clause 53 gives us the flexibility to do that so that the rules can be made across all categories of law. It is our intention that they should be. However, perhaps I may put that in writing, in a letter to the noble Lord that I will circulate to other Members of the Committee, to explain the matter in more detail.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
My Lords, I am most grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and, in particular, to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for her support on the issue—which I regard as having constitutional significance—about whether the Civil Procedure Rules should be formulated without Parliament having any input into them at all. It seems to me that it is for us to decide, one way or the other, what the particular parameters should be.
Let me just pick up on two points. First, should the means of the claimant come into it at all? The insurance industry does not want that, but the proposal in the Bill is that the claimant’s means should be taken into consideration. What about the meaning of “unreasonable”? The meaning is so broad that it should really be narrowed down. On that issue, I want to hear further from my noble and learned friend and I shall be talking to him about it between now and Report. I will take the issue further if necessary.
Secondly, on the question of splitting the burden of the insurance premium, it seems to me that that is a sensible way to go forward. The corks from the champagne bottles will be popping down in the City when people read my noble and learned friend’s response that the premium will fall entirely upon the claimant. Why should it not be split? There would be advantages both ways in splitting the premium: first, there would be an incentive for the claimant to ensure that premiums are not too high and are not, as at the moment, left completely in the air; on the other hand, if you split the premium in the staged way that my amendment proposes, there would be a great incentive on the defendants to settle. The course that I have suggested includes advantages beyond the mere way in which the liability falls. I would like to hear a little bit more about why the Government prefer Lord Justice Jackson’s first proposal, as opposed to his alternative proposal, which I am not persuaded is the better one. I shall certainly return to that matter again.
I remind my noble and learned friend that, on this side, I have accepted that the success fee should be paid by the claimant from his damages, subject of course to a limitation of up to 25 per cent. I agree with him—in fact I made the point earlier—that the probability is that solicitors involved in non-risk litigation will advertise, “No success fee payable here”. Those bigger firms that get involved in the riskier litigation will do a very determined assessment of what risks they are prepared to carry in advertising their own services subject to a success fee. I see that there is an advantage in that. I shall read and study what the Minister has said and, I hope, discuss the matter further with him and come back on specific issues at Report. At the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Newton of Braintree
My Lords, given that this is Committee, perhaps I may intervene again. I forgot to say, because I stood up in some haste, that the numbers point is interesting, as a consequence of what I call the slow burn, where a lot of cases that are appearing now relate to injury caused many years ago. My understanding is that cancer is one of the few whose incidence is, if anything, increasing rather than decreasing, because of the delay from the time of causation in such cases coming through. I think I have got that right, but whether I have or not I am delighted that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, joined us in support of this point.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, perhaps I may deal with Amendments 121, 122, 129, 130, 134, 136A, 136B, 151, 152, 156AA, 156AB and 156C together. All seek to exempt certain types of cases from the Government’s reforms of no-win no-fee conditional fee agreements—CFAs. My noble friend Lord Newton described some of these amendments as being parts of a blunderbuss approach. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, described it as a bit of a shopping list. I shall come on to the issue relating to mesothelioma sufferers.
The amendments clearly stem from concerns that individuals may be unable to afford to bring certain personal injury cases. My noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree anticipated later amendments in the group beginning with Amendment 137A, which will be moved by the noble Lord, Lord Alton. I recognise that other issues arise such as the difficulty in trying to track down previous employers. I know that my noble friend Lord McNally will respond to that group of amendments and bear in mind what my noble friend Lord Newton said. When I was a Justice Minister in Scotland, I remember the plight of many mesothelioma sufferers, who were trying to get the process expedited so that their cases could be brought to court because many of them had a very short life expectancy. I certainly recognise the importance of those cases and I am sure that there will be a fuller debate on the back of the amendments to be moved and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Alton.
The difficulty with the other amendments in this group, as my noble friend Lord Newton said, is that when taken together they do not leave very much of the original intention of the Bill. With regard to recoverable or non-recoverable success fees being shifted to the defendants, it was pointed out in the previous debate that such fees have led to an escalation of costs. A plaintiff does not have the same interest, or may have no interest, in seeking to contain costs in those circumstances. One amendment relates to situations in which the defendants are public authorities. Some people have to pay the price of these additional costs. In motor insurance cases, we pay them through increased premiums. Council tax payers will no doubt bear some cost when escalating costs are picked up by public authorities.
The changes that we are bringing about will lead to costs becoming more proportionate. Equally, claimants will still be able to bring necessary and meritorious claims, and receive damages when they are due. However, as with privately paying clients, claimants on CFAs may have to pay some of their legal costs out of damages recovered. However, as I have indicated, we are introducing a number of measures that will help claimants to pay their solicitors’ success fees. The point was well made by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, in response to the previous debate, that in many cases no success fee is charged and some solicitors may have a selling point: “We will litigate for you, and no success fee will be charged”. That is more than likely to happen.
We must also remember that there will be a 10 per cent increase in general damages for non-pecuniary loss such as pain, suffering and loss of amenity. There will be a cap on the success fee at 25 per cent of damages awarded but, significantly, that will not apply to damages for future care and loss in personal injury cases. That will help to protect a claimant’s damages.
We have already discussed qualified one-way cost shifting. That will mean that losing claimants in personal injury cases who act reasonably will not have to pay a winning defendant’s costs, which in turn will reduce the need to have expensive ATE insurance products. Amendment 156AB is intended to ensure that the changes to the ATE insurance arrangements under Clause 45 do not come into force until the QOCS regime has come into force. I assure the Committee that we intend the package of reform to come into force at the same time.
On Amendment 156C, Clause 46 prohibits membership organisations from claiming the costs incurred by self-insuring against risk. That point was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, in our previous debate. As I understand it, under the Access to Justice (Membership Organisation) Regulations 2005, bodies are listed by the certification officer. Trade unions represent an important number of those bodies, but a number of others have also been listed under Section 30 of the Access to Justice Act 1999.
As has been said on many occasions, the Government have decided to abolish the recoverability of ATE insurance premiums, and believe that this change should apply equally to arrangements for membership organisations. Retaining the recoverability of ATE insurance premiums for membership organisations would create an unfair advantage and mean that defendants in claims brought by members of such organisations would continue to be liable for significant additional costs in such cases and be placed at a disadvantage.
Lord Justice Jackson made no formal recommendations in reference to member organisations. In such a compendious report, one may wonder why not. Nevertheless, in his response to the consultation, he supported the Government’s proposal that changes to the recoverability of ATE insurance premiums ought to apply equally to the arrangements for membership organisations in order to remove any unfair advantage. That view was shared by 63 per cent of respondents to the consultation, who thought that retaining recoverability of the self-insurance element for membership organisations would create an unfair advantage. It is to ensure that that unfair advantage does not occur that we resist the amendment, and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Newton, that this is a group of probing amendments to see which, if any, the Government might feel on reflection ought to be accepted and the scope of the current scheme in effect retained. Clearly, the answer has not been one to encourage optimism on this side of the House, but there are cases, particularly the last one to which the noble and learned Lord referred, where the Government are trying, as so often, to have it both ways.
In previous debates we have heard trade unions invoked as a source of advice and support for their members once legal aid goes. This is an area in which trade unions have for a long time been active in promoting the interests of their members. They will now lose that benefit. In my view, there is a strong case for the Government to look again at the position. I accept that they want organisations such as trade unions to support their members in the field of legal advice, but if so, they ought to endeavour to facilitate that, not at the Government's expense but by retaining success fees and the self-insurance element that the noble and learned Lord proposes to remove.
Asbestosis is probably the most acute of the diseases involved, and when we will come to a debate on it I will strongly support the noble Lord, Lord Alton. It is sometimes forgotten that it is not just direct exposure to asbestos that causes problems and has resulted in litigation but indirect exposure. There have been cases in which wives dealing with laundry and clothes that have been contaminated with asbestos fibres have themselves suffered injury. They have eventually succeeded in obtaining compensation, but that is an illustration of the kind of difficulty and complexity that can arise. There may well be other cases. Every few years, a new condition reaches the courts. Asbestosis was one; miners’ lung disease, pneumoconiosis, was another; and there are others. Although it is certainly true that, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out, some lawyers rather exploited the position in some of those cases involving minters, on the other hand many lawyers took these cases on over a very long period at considerable risk to themselves before obtaining settlements. That eventually led to the sensible outcome of a national scheme that determined a scale of damages and, for that matter, the scale of costs. There will be other cases. One imagines that cases may arise over time in the nuclear industry. There have already been some in which radiation has caused damage. I hope that at the very least the Government will look at those cases sympathetically.
The noble and learned Lord referred again to the number of cases that are being pursued. However, I remind him of the figures that I quoted in the first debate: the very detailed analysis of 69,000 cases showed that a third would simply not have been brought under the proposals presently in the Bill. A significant proportion of cases would therefore be pursued, many of them no doubt successfully although others not.
If we are still in the business of trying to promote access to justice by spreading the risk so that it is not always against lawyers’ interests to run cases with a lesser probability of success, that is something that the system should encourage. The fear is certainly that cases with less than a 75 per cent chance of success will just not reach the courts. A very respected firm, Thompsons, which acts for a number of trade unions, indicates that at the moment it takes cases with a risk level as low as 50 per cent, and it cannot see how it could conceivably do that in the future. Yet some of the very cases that we have been talking about involving asbestosis, pneumoconiosis and so on started off with a probable success rate of 50 per cent at best and arguably even worse. If we are not to close the door on emerging cases of that kind or on cases with perhaps a two-thirds chance of success, we have to have a balance to which success fees can contribute. The Opposition’s case is that that ought not to be simply a matter for successful defendants; it ought to be a collective insurance risk. That is the position that we seek to get to.