Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I too welcome the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, back to his place. We worked together in the latter part of John Major’s Government; subsequently, when he occupied the Benches opposite, I am sure that we would have been on the same side on the Human Rights Bill, devolution and matters of that sort. It is very pleasant to see him back.

My first encounter with the prerogative writs was an application for leave to move for certiorari—what today is called a “quashing order”, to obtain the reversal of a decision to refuse a war pension to my client. He was suffering from what today would be easily recognised as PTSD, as a result of experiences he suffered in Montgomery’s push from El Alamein to Tunis. The Government were represented by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who I am very pleased to see is in his place. Modesty forbids me from saying who won the case, but I would have been incensed if my client had been denied arrears of his war pension to the date of the decision—that would be the effect of the prospective quashing order proposed in this Bill—or denied it to some indeterminate point in the future to give the Government time to correct the defect in the decision, which I had established was unlawful; that would be the effect of the proposed suspended order. If the court had exercised a power to make a suspended and prospective order combined, my client would have won the case but received nothing.

Ubi ius, ibi remedium: where the law has established a right, there should be a corresponding remedy for its breach. The right to a remedy is a fundamental right, historically recognised in all legal systems. It would also have been unthinkable if those not parties to my case, but who benefited from the court’s declaration that the Government had acted unlawfully, had been denied their rights. Of course, we abolished the word “certiorari” some time ago—“too much Latin”, as my grandson, in his first year studying law in Cardiff, would say. It was out of date, too redolent of 800 years of history when, under the British Constitution, the High Court could insist that a Government, public body or inferior court had acted within the law. We called it the rule of law. Today, the rule of law is mocked, privately and publicly, by our own Prime Minister. But what under this Bill would be the point of any person taking proceedings against any public body if, when he had won the game at full time, that body were given extra time until it managed to score the winning try?

Another glaring defect is that the Bill markedly tilts the judge’s hitherto untrammelled discretion in determining the appropriate remedy in the Government or the body’s favour, even though the judge has found that it has acted unlawfully. Under new subsection (9), the court must make a prospective or suspended order or both,

“unless it sees good reason not to do so”.

I ask the Minister to explain and illustrate what he envisages is a “good reason”. New subsection (8) sets out a list of factors that the judge must consider in making an order. Is it intended that one of those factors would suffice to be a good reason?

Let me move on to Clause 2. The Minister has explained the Cart case. The Government have decided to prevent an appeal against refusal of leave to appeal from the first tier to the Upper Tribunal and endeavour to oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. However, it is not just that. The Government seek in the Bill to forge a template for an ouster clause—they freely admit it—which they hope will in the future be used in other Bills.

Let us look at the terms of that. Under the title of “Finality of decisions”, new subsections (2) and (3) declare that

“The decision is final, and not liable to be questioned or set aside in any other court … In particular … the Upper Tribunal is not to be regarded as having exceeded its powers by reason of any error made in reaching the decision … the supervisory jurisdiction”


of the Hight Court

“does not extend to, and no application or petition for judicial review may be made or brought in relation to, the decision”.

It is stamp, stamp, stamp. It is like someone is trying to put out a fire with a broom on the hillside.

I move on to Part 2. On the issue of online court proceedings, I am certainly in favour in principle, but there are concerns to be explored in Committee over the rights of those who have no facility for the use of, or access to, online technology. Similarly, I am concerned, as was the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that young people will not have the same access to interventions available in the criminal justice system to match the problems which have caused them to offend in the first place. As for inquests under Chapter 4, it is essential that we do not miss this opportunity to enshrine the principle of equality of arms into coroners’ proceedings. I have appeared in a number of inquests, sometimes funded by insurance companies, where there was a possibility of the insured being sued for negligence. On other occasions, I have appeared pro bono for relatives of the deceased. It is unconscionable that police forces, hospitals and the like should be fully funded by the state for representation by counsel, or perhaps by solicitors, while grieving relatives with no experience of any sort of court should be left to fend for themselves.

Finally, I shall want to explore the rationale in the 21st century for Rule 27 of the Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013. This might sound a little exotic, but that rule reads in this way:

“No person may address the coroner or the jury as to the facts of who the deceased was and how, when and where the deceased came by his or her death.”


I have always considered it an anomaly that family representatives may not make submissions, either in person or by their lawyer, to a coroner or a coroner’s jury as to what their verdict should be.

Time and again, this Government have shown a tendency to try to rig the system in their own favour. In areas like mandatory and minimum sentences, and in this Bill, concerned with determining the lawfulness of government action and decision-making, they muscle in to usurp the discretion of that other essential limb of a liberal democracy, the judiciary. It refuses to let judges do their job. It must be resisted.

Criminal Justice: Royal Commission

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 7th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, since the Queen’s Speech in 2019, there has been the small matter of a global pandemic, which has affected the criminal justice system very substantially. We reacted to that: we put in place particular new ways of working. We have taken a lot of that work forward: there is the Second Reading this afternoon of the Judicial Review and Courts Bill, which contains more reforms to the criminal justice system. I therefore think, with respect, that it is a little unfair to say—in fact, it is inaccurate—that we have no intention of implementing that. As to what I said in response to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in Committee, I stand by that, absolutely.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, in the Council of Europe’s recent report on penal matters, England and Wales scored very high in a number of categories, including prison population, prison density, suicide rates, the proportion of prisoners not serving a final sentence and the rate of admissions per 100,000 inhabitants. It is almost a world-beating record. Will the Minister ensure that the terms of reference of any royal commission that is set up include an in-depth consideration of sentence inflation in our courts?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, one of the other things on which we score extremely high internationally is the quality of our judges. That ought to be mentioned as well. So far as prisons are concerned, we published a prisons White Paper in the last six months, which deals with a number of the matters raised by the noble Lord. As to the terms of reference of any royal commission, of course I have heard what the noble Lord has said.

Social Welfare Law Cases: Legal Aid

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am well aware of the noble Lord’s experience and work in this area, and I respectfully commend him for it. If I may say so, I think it is rather unfair of him to say that we are spending peanuts, when actually last year we spent £1.7 billion on legal aid services. I agree with him that access to justice is a fundamental part of any justice system, and our reforms are intended to ensure that people have not only legal aid but legal support at an earlier stage of the proceedings.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, The Impact of LASPO on Routes to Justice, by Dr James Organ and Dr Jennifer Sigafoos of the University of Liverpool and published by the Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2018, found that, due to the lack of legal aid and the demise of specialised advice, the high demand for advice on disability benefits means that the almost complete removal of welfare benefits from the scope of legal aid has had a disproportionate impact on disabled people and those with long-term health conditions. The Minister mentioned a number of areas where pilots are being carried out, but will the Government take steps to restore the funding, at least for this important sector of the community?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I note that when it is Justice Questions we always seem to have longer questions. We are starting a pilot in both Manchester and Middlesbrough to focus on the point that the noble Lord makes: to what extent can we divert people away and solve their problems at an earlier stage? I am aware of the report the noble Lord mentioned, and of others, but we are starting a pilot, so that we have evidence of what actually works on the ground.

Competition Appeal Tribunal (Recording and Broadcasting) Order 2022

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 25th January 2022 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, the statutory instrument before us this afternoon grants the Competition Appeal Tribunal a permanent power to broadcast its hearings to the public using audio and video technology. I put it in terms of a power because the decision to broadcast in any case is subject to judicial discretion, should the judge have a reason in a particular case not to allow a hearing to be broadcast. The draft order is made under Section 32 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice. Importantly, this order replaces a temporary order which will expire on 25 March 2022.

For noble Lords who are not intimately familiar with it, the Competition Appeal Tribunal, more generally known as the CAT, is a specialist tribunal whose principal functions are to hear and decide cases involving competition or economic regulatory issues, including appeals to decisions by the Competition and Markets Authority and some other economic regulators. The CAT is sponsored by BEIS, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, but, as the power to make this order is conferred on the Lord Chancellor, it has therefore been drafted and laid before Parliament by the Ministry of Justice.

Noble Lords will be aware that, during the pandemic, our courts and tribunals swiftly moved to holding hearings remotely using audio and video technology. To ensure that open justice was maintained in these circumstances, a temporary provision in the Coronavirus Act 2020 allowed most courts and tribunals to transmit their proceedings to remote observers who had specifically requested access. The CAT was not included in the Coronavirus Act 2020 provisions. So, to ensure that the CAT could continue to hold its hearings and broadcast them, a temporary statutory instrument, under Section 32 of the 2013 Act that I mentioned, enabled the CAT to broadcast its proceedings via a link on its website.

That has worked successfully. In a recent case concerning Newcastle United Football Club, around 33,000 individuals from over 50 countries were interested in watching the hearing, with around 4,000 observers watching it at any one time. Whether that was due to the legal issues in that case or was related to Newcastle United Football Club, I am afraid I cannot assist the Committee.

This current and temporary SI will expire, as I say, on 25 March this year, when the Coronavirus Act 2020 is due to expire. Because the broadcasting in this tribunal has been a success, we want to make the CAT’s ability to broadcast its proceedings permanent.

This instrument reproduces the existing temporary order, with two additional provisions which I should bring to the Committee’s attention. One is provision to revoke the temporary order, which is self-explanatory. The other mirrors provision included in other instruments under this power in relation to the Court of Appeal and Crown Court and requires that any use of the footage of the CAT must be fair and accurate. For example, it cannot be used for party-political broadcasts, advertisements or promotions, light entertainment or, need I add, satire. Additionally, the CAT has guidance accompanying each hearing listed for broadcast containing a warning that it is not permitted for any person to record a live-stream hearing and that breaching this requirement would constitute contempt of court.

I underline the point that this order strengthens the principle of open justice, which is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction and has been for centuries. It means that those who are interested will be able to watch the CAT’s proceedings from the convenience of their homes or offices, or anywhere else. Importantly, it retains ultimate judicial discretion over the actual broadcast in any particular case. I commend this instrument to the Committee.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, the Liberal Democrats have always supported open justice and continue to do so. Therefore, we very much support this instrument. During the lockdown periods, I watched my daughter-in-law, who is a judge of the First-tier Tribunal, conduct her hearings online. She has done so consistently in providing justice in the north-west. I have been very impressed with the way in which justice has been seen to be done in that area. I have nothing further to add.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too support these measures. It seems entirely sensible that they should continue, as they seem to have been operating satisfactorily during the various lockdowns we have been through.

As the Minister said, judicial discretion is retained. I would be interested if he could give an example of when it may be appropriate for the judge to determine that the proceedings should not be made available to members of the public who may wish to hear what is going on.

I have done my fair share of remote hearings in court from my dining room table. I sometimes did hearings in court and then proceedings in Parliament on the same day, from the same dining room chair. It can be done and I have made sure that my colleagues on the magistrates’ Bench have had training on how to behave when doing hearings via MS Teams or Zoom. In fact, we have a retired magistrate who is a former TV producer. It is very interesting to be trained to do this properly, because it is very easy for standards to slip. For the Committee’s information, we are arranging further training entitled “Keep the bar high; don’t let standards slip”, because it is very easy for that to happen when one is working remotely. We support the instrument.

Taking Control of Goods (Fees) (Amendment) Regulations 2021

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Thursday 13th January 2022 Lords Chamber

I know Ministers care about mental health; today, they have the opportunity to do something concrete to improve the mental health of those in greatest need. I want to thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, for writing to me. It seems the Government are unwilling to make commitments at this stage and want to await the outcome of the litigation. Nevertheless, I look forward to the Minister’s response today.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, in her very clear and lengthy exposition of the position. I applaud her efforts and seek to follow in her footsteps.

In his Written Statement on 18 November, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, James Cartlidge, said:

“While we take the view that the taking control of goods legislation when considered … with the common law position permits the recovery of VAT costs from debtors in this way, we have accepted … that this is an area where it would be beneficial to set out the position in regulations to put the matter beyond doubt.”—[Official Report, Commons, 18/11/21; col. 34WS.]


Well, they have done that, but some questions remain.

In enforcing a debt there are three parties: the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor and the enforcement agent. What this instrument does is permit the enforcement agent to recover from the judgment debtor a sum of money equivalent to VAT on his costs and expenses, even though the judgment creditor is not registered and therefore not liable to collect or account for VAT to the Treasury.

A number of questions arise. First, what if the enforcement agent is himself not registered for VAT? How does he account to the Treasury for a sum equivalent to VAT? Would he not just pocket it? What happens to that money? Secondly, when did the common law take cognisance of VAT? Perhaps the Minister will explain the meaning of Mr Cartlidge’s reference to the “common law position”? I find it difficult to comprehend why, if the judgment debtor would not have to pay VAT to the judgment creditor, the common law would force him to pay it to the tipstaff on behalf of the bailiff.

Section 90 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 gives power to the Lord Chancellor if he “considers it necessary or expedient” to make

“supplementary, incidental or consequential provision”

or

“transitory, transitional or saving provision”

by regulations. In Schedule 12—on which this instrument also depends—paragraph 13(3) deals with taking control of goods, paragraph 42 with the sale of goods, and paragraphs 50(4) and 50(7) with the application of the proceeds. How is there power to make this instrument, which, in effect, imposes taxation upon the judgment debtor which he would not have to pay if the judgment creditor were registered for VAT? It is arbitrary; it is luck, a matter of chance.

The Minister will appreciate that if you have worked, as I have, as a solicitor in a close mining community in north Wales—not dissimilar to Tredegar, I may say—there is always concern about the activities of bailiffs and their tactics. I include in that claiming fees for visits to the debtor which were never made, or where the knock on the door was particularly soft and a second visit follows. Clients are not aware or made aware of their ability to go to court to tax the bills for their expenses, and these are not inconsiderable sums. If it is council tax, parking fines, or a debt under £1,500, for example, it is £75 for a letter, a £235 fixed fee for a visit to your home and a £110 fixed fee for taking and selling your possessions. Over £1,500, there is an extra fee of 7.5% on each of the latter two stages. A High Court judgment of under £1,500 attracts fixed fees of £190 for a visit, £495 for failing to keep to an enforcement agreement and £525 for taking and selling your belongings. If it is over £1,500, 7.5% is added to the enforcement and sale fees.

We are about to face a period of inflation, high interest rates and a rise in the cost of living. This will be familiar to those of us who are old enough but not to the youngsters raising their families. I hope somebody judicially reviews this instrument because I do not think it is properly made and I very much hope it will come back to haunt what is left of this Government.

[Lord Best (CB)]

My Lords, I support this Motion to Regret in the name of my noble friend Lady Meacher. The last thing needed by those trying to deal with a problem debt is an extra 20% charge on top of the collection costs in tax that should clearly have been levied on the creditors, not the debtors. It is surely a great injustice for debtors to have been charged VAT when they should not have been and to have to go to considerable lengths to recover money they have been falsely charged. It is certainly a matter of deep regret and the remedies proposed by my noble friend seem entirely justified.

Perhaps I could take this opportunity, on the subject of bailiffs, to note that there is considerable political and practitioner interest in bailiff reform. Will the Minister reaffirm the Government’s support for the enforcement conduct authority as organised by the Centre for Social Justice in partnership with both the bailiff sector and the debt advice sector? Impressive work has been done by the CSJ in securing agreement between those representing bailiffs and those providing debt advice, such as the charity StepChange. This now needs government to take matters forward and grant statutory powers to this new body to give it real teeth. Perhaps the Minister could comment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I support everything that noble Lords have said so far. Unless the clause is significantly amended along the lines suggested, I could not possibly support it if it were taken to a Division.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, as this is about causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving, the state of mind—the mental element—is involved. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, referred to the case of Lawrence in 1982, a decision of Lord Diplock. In that same year I was appearing before the Appellate Committee in a case called Caldwell, in which a person who was intoxicated had gone to sleep in the doorway of a hotel, lit a fire to warm himself and severely damaged the hotel. The issue was whether he was reckless in so doing. What was his state of mind, his mental element? It was agreed that he had no intent to do it but Lord Diplock held that the conviction should be upheld because an ordinary person who was not intoxicated would have realised the consequences of what he was doing, although Caldwell himself had not done so. He spent quite a long time in prison, and it took 22 years for my argument to succeed in the case of G in 2002, when Lord Bingham held that Caldwell had been wrongly decided and that the test of the mental element has to be subjective—that is, it is necessary for the person to have a subjective understanding of what is going on. That is very similar to the issue we are discussing in this case.

However, I believe that Clause 66 is simply wrong in principle. It threatens to penalise the outcome of the offence—serious injury—with imprisonment when the mental element of the offence of careless driving is no more than negligence. I accept that there is a precedent for penalising driving offences by reference to outcomes. Clause 65, relating to causing death by dangerous driving or careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs, has that effect, but dangerous driving and careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs both have a far more serious mental element than simply careless driving. Dangerous driving involves falling far below the standard of a reasonable driver, and the drink or drugs offence involves deliberate impairment. In either case, the offending driver is knowingly taking a risk with the safety of other road users, so it is his mental element that is being punished in those serious cases.

On the other hand, as other noble Lords have said, careless driving involves driving that falls below the standard of care of a prudent driver—no more than carelessness, negligence or, in the terms of the clause itself, “inconsiderate” driving. A mistake, or inadvertence, may suffice. To make such an offence imprisonable because it results in serious injury is not a step that we have ever taken before, and offends against the principle that the seriousness of an offence should depend not just on the act done but on the state of mind of the offender.

Almost every accident is the result of negligent driving on the part of at least one of the drivers involved—that is, in the absence of mechanical failure or an unexpected event, such as the wasp sting that we have heard about, but such events are extremely unusual. Sadly, a vast number of accidents involve serious injury—a broken limb, for example, being “serious injury” for this purpose. The vast majority of accidents arising from negligence, whether or not they cause serious injury, do not lead to prosecutions. The clause would leave it to police and prosecuting authorities to pick out the few accidents that they wished to lead to prosecution, and would expose drivers to the risk of imprisonment for an accident that arose out of a simple mistake.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

The noble Lord has made a very interesting speech, but is it right that negligence and the harm that it does cannot be reflected in imprisonment for any criminal offence? What is the position in relation to health and safety at work? My understanding of the law is that once someone is convicted of what is in effect negligence in relation to providing conditions at work, the court can take such matters into account—for example, if they were negligent and someone lost an eye, that would increase the penalty, and imprisonment would be a possibility. I might be wrong about that.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

That is an interesting point. Manslaughter can obviously be by negligence.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Gross negligence.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

Gross negligence, yes—although it is interesting that the word “gross” is put before it. But these are different offences, and it may be that I should confine my criticism to the road traffic situation and not extend it as a general principle of English law.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, there have been some powerful contributions to this debate. I agree with the comments that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and my noble friends have made.

It is perhaps necessary that we should say in the debate that there are members of the public whose families have been drastically affected by serious injury resulting from careless driving who feel that there should be a stronger penalty, and that the particular circumstances in the accident with which they are familiar justify a stronger penalty. This is the simple point I want to make: the territory that we enter here is of believing that prison is the only way that society can say, “We are not going to put up with this. This is very bad. Drivers should drive better, and people should be aware of the dangers that they engage in if their concentration lapses.” Prison is probably one of the least effective ways of dealing with the individuals that we are talking about.

As my noble friend Lady Randerson pointed out, the effects of these accidents—or rather incidents, following the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—which result in serious injury are devastating for all those involved. However, the Government need to resist the constant temptation to believe that spending a lot of money on sending people to a place that will not improve their driving—or indeed anything—but is likely to lead to despair and reduce their ability to contribute to society in years to come is a sensible course of action. They should recognise that this is a misuse of the expensive, although important, resource of custody.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, can I just ask the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, why he thinks that an offence in the transport sector might be different from the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act? Is it because transport is a middle-class crime and health and safety is not, on the whole, or is there something different?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

Driving is an activity which is universal. Equally, the mistake—or negligence—is also universal, and I do draw that distinction. I appreciate where the noble Lord is coming from, but that is the distinction I make.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, I very much agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and other noble Lords who have spoken. It seems that there is a perfectly obvious, very serious penalty which can be applied to the most egregious cases of careless driving, where there is very serious injury, and that is a lifetime ban on driving. That would be much more effective than imprisonment.

Non-fatal Strangulation and Suffocation

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Thursday 8th July 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, of course we need all agencies to be aware of their responsibilities. I have already spoken about the police. To pick another example, judicial training in domestic abuse is included in family law and criminal courses run by the Judicial College; it is prioritised for induction and continuation training. All judges get that training before they hear family cases and are therefore on top of domestic abuse issues.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, may I underline the point made by the noble Lord at the beginning of this session? My daughter-in-law did a thesis on the connection between violence, domestic abuse and sporting events. It is clearly a considerable problem. He is right to remind us of that.

The New Zealand Law Commission advised that the offence should require proof of strangulation but not proof of injury, on the basis that so many of these strangulation incidents do not cause visible physical injury. Is that the approach that the noble Lord is taking? Where does consent come into the new offence?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I will take the point about visible signs of injury first. A visible sign of injury is not needed: the offence requires the Crown to show beyond reasonable doubt that the person strangled or otherwise did something to affect another person’s breathing. You do not necessarily need visible signs of injury. The consent point raised by the noble Lord is a huge legal point. I summarise it by saying that it effectively follows the decision of the House of Lords in R v Brown that you cannot consent to serious harm. To say any more would, I am afraid, exceed the time allowance.

Criminal Justice (Electronic Commerce) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2021

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 30th June 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for his introduction. The Explanatory Memorandum could have done with illustrative examples to clarify the new position following the implementation of these regulations. I support the committee in insisting that this instrument had a hearing.

As I understand it, the e-commerce directive applied to companies engaged in internet trading, search tools, social media platforms and the like. A trader based in this country trading online in the EEA could be criminally liable under the laws of this country only, and would not have to comply with the criminal law of any EEA state in which he was trading. The strength of the country of origin principle, “the CoOP”, was that it was reciprocal; other countries dealt with traders operating within their jurisdiction similarly.

However, since the end of the transition, UK internet traders or social media platforms have had to adhere to the laws of each EEA country in which they operate. Equally, EEA traders can be prosecuted if they do not comply, when operating in the UK, with our criminal law. Perhaps the Minister can confirm that a UK trader now must have regard to the criminal law in each EEA country in which he operates, but will not be liable in this country for offences committed abroad, because the courts of this country will have no extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute here for such offences. If, therefore, a trader wishes to advertise his wares on the internet in, say, Belgium, Denmark or Germany, he will have to ensure that his advertisements or the products he is selling comply with the criminal laws of each country.

Take pornographic material, for example. If a trader in London publishes obscene material in EEA countries, he can be prosecuted there but no longer in the UK. He can be prosecuted by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in those countries but, unless the material is published in the UK as well, no prosecution is possible here.

Does it then follow that such a trader can sit in London and purvey his material in EU or EEA countries, safe in the knowledge that, in the absence of the European arrest warrant, it would be extremely difficult to extradite him to Belgium, Denmark or Germany, where the offence is committed? The converse is that, if a European trader publishes obscene material in this country, he can be prosecuted in UK courts if we can get hold of him. Absent the European arrest warrant, that is likely to be difficult.

The Explanatory Memorandum says:

“Removal of the CoOp”—


the reciprocal arrangements—

“will only bring regulation of UK ISS operating in the EEA in line with their operation in other foreign countries, and does not affect our ability to prosecute UK nationals or residents who commit offences outside the UK”—

this final section is underlined—

“where our courts have jurisdiction to do so.”

The Minister will know how limited extraterritorial jurisdiction is in this country: for murder, manslaughter in certain circumstances, sexual offences against persons under the age of 18, forced marriage and female genital mutilation—a short list. We are about to consider legislation which implements the Istanbul convention—ironically, the convention promoted by more Europeans than the Council of Europe—on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. The fact sheet published by the Home Office last month indicates the extent of the proposed extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It does not include publicly publishing obscene materials or fraud.

Personally, I am sick to death of scams from abroad, sometimes from west African countries, which force every one of us to set up barriers on the internet, email and telephones. I hate the idea that persons could set up in this country to defraud people on the continent or flood their markets with pornography. Would it not be simpler if, rather than drawing up our skirts to avoid contamination by the EU or the EEA on every occasion, we now negotiated to enter into a new reciprocal agreement? As I see it, these regulations are a necessary consequence of Brexit, but creating a platform for criminals to defraud European citizens is in no way desirable. I await to see whether I have misunderstood the whole purpose of these regulations.

End-to-end Rape Review

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

The issue about the extent to which rape is properly prosecuted in this country is now a real one. The Lord Chancellor rightly apologised for the lack of prosecutions, yet did nothing to deal with the problem properly. He announced a sum of money, in the region of £150 million, most of which went to refuges. Refuges are very worth while but will not deal with the problem of the lamentably low rate of convictions for rape. The average amount of extra expenditure on rape cases, if one applies it to the number of rape cases the Government estimated last year, is £15 a case.

Why have the Government not made more resources available, if their apology is serious? Why have they not rolled out Section 28, which allows for victims of rape to give evidence as soon as possible after the crime has been committed and for their evidence to be recorded?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

I congratulate the authors, researchers and statisticians who have contributed so much to this comprehensive and excellent review. I trust that the Government will fully resource its recommendations, but agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that there is no sign of it so far.

I focus on one of the review’s findings—namely that, in 57% of all adult rape cases, the victim feels unable to pursue their complaint. Given that in 90% of cases the victim knows the perpetrator—as a member or friend of the family, fellow student or worker, friend or acquaintance—that may not be too surprising. I strongly suspect that very few of those withdrawals concern the small minority of cases where the perpetrator is unknown. I am interested to know whether the Minister has a figure for the percentage of withdrawals in cases of stranger rape.

So, what are the reasons for disengagement by the victim? First, there is delay. Giving evidence is always a stressful experience, as I know well. Standing exposed in a witness box with one’s honesty, accuracy of recollection and motives challenged is not pleasant. Giving evidence about intimate sexual encounters must be agonising and overwhelmingly stressful. Only those with a high degree of courage and persistence can be expected to stay the course without considerable support. I very much welcome the pilot schemes for the recording of evidence and cross-examination early, well before trial. How soon can those pilots be evaluated and rolled out? Months, if not years, of waiting for a trial must disincentivise victims pursuing their case.

Secondly, there is the intrusion into privacy. In January 2018, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, introduced a debate on this topic. I suggested an algorithm which would require the defence to co-operate by setting out their case in a defence statement and, at that point, indicating keywords for the search of mobile phones. The revised Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure, published in 2020, set out such a system and it is now operational. The review recognises the importance of privacy by its requirement that mobile phones be returned within 24 hours. If that is done, I hope this disincentive to reporting rape will be removed.

Thirdly, we come to sentencing. I am not convinced that longer and longer sentences have any benefit. The review points out that the minimum sentence guideline is now six years and that the average term served for rape is nine years. This increase in sentencing coincides with a decrease in convictions. So many cases depend upon consent, without these days, in England and Wales, any need for corroboration. The lack of consent by the victim must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and that is the highest degree of proof.

A victim, already oppressed by delay in bringing a case to court, must generally also contemplate the destruction of the life of an offender whom she knows and may even love. That may also be a potent reason for her to disengage from the case. That there should be a substantial and significant sentence of imprisonment for rape is not in doubt, but excessive increases year on year may have unexpected consequences to the detriment of justice.

Ultimately, the jurors are the judges. Acquittals reflect societal attitudes. At the moment, judges seek hard to dispel the myths and prejudices of the past, with lengthy exhortations and directions to the jury—but attitudes begin in the classroom, and we must train teachers to inculcate respect for others and, above all, the meaning and parameters of consent.

In the last few years, we have developed teams of specialised investigators and prosecutors, special measures for court hearings and victim support services. All these are steps in the right direction but have manifestly had no impact on the rate of convictions. We must try harder. We will support the Government further in implementing the policies that are set out in this review.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, I turn first to the points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. First, I should repeat the apology that the Lord Chancellor gave in the other place yesterday, setting out by reference the reasons why he gave it, given the time.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said, it is not right to criticise the Government’s response to the rape review for lacking in ambition. On the contrary, we have set out clear ambitions for rape cases with the police and the CPS, and we have set out actions against which they, and we, can be held to account. We want to return the volume of trials for rape to pre-2016 levels, with corresponding expectations for police referrals and cases charged. We want to ensure that no victim is left without a phone—noble Lords will appreciate how important the data found on phones these days can be in these prosecutions—for more than 24 hours. We should not underestimate how difficult it can be for a victim to hand over her—it is invariably her—phone and to know that it will be looked at. We will also publish updates every six months, detailing our progress against our expectations, with scorecards monitoring progress against key metrics, including timeliness and victim engagement in each part of the system. That will enable us to provide information on a regional and local level, to see where things are working well and where there is room for improvement.

I turn to the other substantive point that the noble and learned Lord made, about Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, which enables people to have their cross-examination recorded in advance. The pilots of this provision have focused on complainants for sexual and modern slavery offences. We are extending them from three to six Crown Courts. I want to increase the availability of Section 28, but we need to do this properly. This is a radical departure from the normal court process, where evidence is given at the same time, in front of the jury. The pilots enable us to understand the impacts of this way of giving evidence—not only the impact on the evidence itself but the operational impacts on the courts, because they have to set out, and set up, a bespoke hearing for such evidence to be given.

Although we have some experience of this working for vulnerable victims, primarily children, victims who can be intimidated or are subject to distress, such as victims of rape and sexual violence, are in a different category. That is why we need to look at the pilots and see how it works in practice before we roll it out nationally, if that is what we do.

I turn to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. The reasons for complainants’ withdrawals are complex, regardless of whether the victim knows the perpetrator. I do not have specific data for withdrawal in stranger-rape cases, but what we do know is that in all cases, good-quality support is a key factor in maintaining victim engagement with the process. That is why we are funding more ISVAs, and we will consider putting that on a statutory basis. As for delay and prerecording cross-examination, I think I have dealt with that point already.

As I said earlier, we recognise that a lack of privacy can be a deterrent and that having your phone gone through can be a very distressing process. We want to ensure that the focus is on the alleged perpetrator and investigating them, rather than on investigating the alleged victim. That is why we do not want to see victims without their phones for long periods of time, and only information that is necessary for an investigation will be asked for. In addition to new guidance for police and information for the public, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill will clarify the power used to extract information from victims’ devices and will include privacy safeguards.

As to sentencing, I must disagree with the point made by the noble Lord. Rape is a very serious offence and merits a significant sentence. I take issue with his proposition that there have been excessive increases. On the contrary, I suggest that the sentences for rape, which ultimately are a matter for the judiciary, are entirely appropriate for the very serious nature of that crime.

However, I agree with the noble Lord’s point about the importance of education. A tackling violence against women and girls strategy is forthcoming. It will focus on prevention, recognising the importance of education for preventing violence against women and girls. If I may say so, from my own knowledge of what is being taught to my children in secondary school today, the education given to children today in areas such as consent and sexual relationships is far improved and much better than it was years ago. That is a very important part of the process, and I agree with the noble Lord that education is a key component in this debate.

On that note, I echo another point that the Lord Chancellor made yesterday in the other place: we will work across party lines when it comes to this issue. I therefore welcome the noble Lord’s concluding remarks, in which he indicated that he too would be prepared to work on that basis.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 18th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Hope, quoted the Government’s expressed desire to

“restore the balance … between the executive, legislature and the courts.”

It is also a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, with whom I largely agree on this topic. It is misleading to talk in terms of balance rather than of function. In our constitution, the legislature makes the laws, the courts interpret and apply them in specific situations and, in theory, the Government obey them. The problem arises when the Government do not wish to obey the laws that Parliament or the common law have created and seek to reject courts’ interpretation of them.

It is not a question of balance. In a judicial review, the scales of justice do not weigh the interests of the Executive against the strictures of the law. The concept of the scales of justice in a court setting is that, where an individual or organisation seeks judicial review of a government decision, the judge’s duty is to apply the law without favour to either side. If the Government’s purpose in introducing a judicial review Bill is to carry out the recommendations of the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, it will be unexceptional. No doubt we can argue about the details of the two main areas he recommends. If, on the other hand, the Government pursue the aims outlined in the Lord Chancellor’s statement setting out the further consultation to make areas of policy non-judiciable, that is an entirely different matter. The noble Lord’s committee would not support it, as he has made abundantly clear.

Ouster clauses are not effective because the courts assume that Parliament does not intend to give licence to a Government or to a Minister to break the law. Mr Brandon Lewis, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, attempted to introduce clauses that expressly involved the Government in illegality by breaking the Northern Ireland protocol. This episode demonstrated that Parliament will not stand for it. The attempt was defeated overwhelmingly by all parties, including former Prime Minister Theresa May and responsible and experienced Members on the Government Benches in this House.

I suppose it would be possible for the Government to introduce into a Bill or statutory instrument a clause that reads, “On questions of policy, a Minister can do what he likes”—or, to put it rather more formally, “A decision by a Minister under this Act shall not be set aside or voided by reason of illegality”. I very much doubt whether such a clause in its naked simplicity would get past a competent Attorney-General, never mind Parliament itself.

The Government can huff and puff when they lose a case, but that does not change the reality that they function within the rule of law as interpreted by the courts. As for the courts themselves, their decision in a particular case may have implications for the policy that the Executive wish to implement, but it is well understood that the system of judicial review does not permit a judge to substitute his own views or his own decision on the issue. All he or she can do is quash the decision that has been made and invite the decision-maker to think again. As for ousting the jurisdiction of the court, you can sum it up in seven words: “If it is illegal, it is justiciable.”