Immigration Bill
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(10 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness Lister of Burtersett
On the principle that a stopped clock is right twice a day, I will speak again so that the annunciator is right. I supported this amendment in Committee and want to support it again. In fact, it is very timely because the UN special rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences is currently on a mission in the UK and gives oral evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights tomorrow. In her preliminary aide memoire, she refers to four particular issues of interest. One is violence in the family and another is what she calls violence in the transnational sphere—that is, violence encountered by women facing new vulnerabilities as a result of increased transnational processes, such as immigrant women, asylum seekers and refugees. Women in that group are very vulnerable if they are in a situation of domestic violence. To their credit, the Government have taken domestic violence very seriously. I hope that we can have a slightly more positive response to the amendment than we did in Committee.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, first I must offer the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, an apology because I do not think I wrote to her on this issue. She has not missed the letter; I missed writing to her. I am sorry about that. I will make sure that I write to her after this debate because there are extensive arguments. I want to keep the argument fairly focused for this evening.
I will start with a generality. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, was kind to say that the Government take this issue seriously. We do indeed. Only last Thursday, I was able to respond to a supplementary question from the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth of Breckland, about a report on the way that police forces deal with domestic violence. I said that the Home Secretary is committed to tackling this scourge. She has made it clear that she expects speedy action to implement the recommendations of that report.
Having said that, it does not necessarily mean that individuals who have been the victims of domestic violence should expect to be able to remain in the UK where their migration status would not otherwise permit them to do so. While I run the risk of repeating myself from last time and being quoted back yet again, as we have discussed previously there is provision in the Immigration Rules to grant indefinite leave to remain to victims of domestic violence who came to the UK intending to make a permanent life here as the partner of someone who is already a permanent resident or who, in the case of the partner of a member of Her Majesty’s forces, is prevented from applying for permanent residence during the period of service. That just reiterates the position of that particular group of people.
However, the position is different for individuals who are in the UK because of a relationship with someone who does not have the right of permanent residence. Those individuals should not have any expectation of remaining in the UK outside that relationship, regardless of the reasons for that relationship breaking down. To grant leave to an individual who is in the UK as someone’s partner but who is not settled here on a basis other than the ongoing partnership would suggest that his or her right to be in the UK was independent of that partnership, which is not the position. It would not be helpful to encourage anyone to think otherwise or, by the grant of a specific period of leave, to give false hope that they might be able to stay. However, we take a pragmatic and practical view in these cases. If a migrant no longer meets the requirements of their leave because a relationship with a spouse or partner has broken down, discretion may be used so that, rather than curtailing leave with immediate effect, the Secretary of State may curtail that leave—if I may use the word “normally”—normally to a period of 60 days. This would allow the migrant time to make arrangements to depart the UK voluntarily without being here illegally, or to submit an application to remain in the UK on another basis. That is a relevant consideration, which I hope noble Lords will understand.
The Government consider that it is fair, reasonable and proportionate to distinguish between those whose partner is here permanently and those whose partner is here temporarily and may never become a permanent resident. I acknowledge that this is a difficult area but I think that noble Lords will understand the difficulties of extending rights in this area. I consider the position that I have outlined is the right one. As I have said, I certainly will write to the noble Baroness, with a copy to noble Lords, and will place a copy in the Library. I appreciate that this is an important issue to get right. None of what I have said dilutes our determination that we should pursue the issue of domestic violence, which ruins lives and is never acceptable. I hope that the noble Baroness understands our position and will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that response, although I am not sure that I understand his position. I wish that I had received a letter. With the benefit of a letter addressing the points that he has made, perhaps my amendment and the points raised in the debate would have been different. He seemed to be saying that no action should be taken. He referred to granting indefinite leave to remain, which is not what we are suggesting. All we are suggesting is a breathing space for someone to make arrangements. However, he went on to imply that perhaps a breathing space may be granted, although I am not sure of the circumstances in which that would be granted.
At one point I thought that the Minister’s reply seemed rather insensitive and unhelpful, but then it seemed that he was being more helpful. I am really not clear about the process. I would be grateful if the Minister would write to me and I could reflect on that. I know that it would not be usual to bring this back at Third Reading but, given that I did not have the response in order to address the points on Report that I would have addressed otherwise, I hope that he will be understanding and that we can discuss this issue further. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment but I would like to return to the issue with the noble Lord, given his somewhat contradictory answer.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Of course, I am very happy to talk to the noble Baroness about the detail of this. I mentioned that the Secretary of State considers these cases and normally there is a 60-day period to get the individual’s status sorted out. We appreciate that this is not easy for individuals to cope with. I think that 90 days was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and also by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. But in practice, 60 days is within the Secretary of State’s discretion.
I will write with fuller detail. I hope that we will have a chance to talk about this before we get to Third Reading.
Justice and Security Bill [HL]
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach)
My Lords, I beg to move that your Lordships do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1. I shall speak also to Commons Amendments 2 and 3, 26 to 43 inclusive, and 45.
Part 1 of the Bill makes significant changes to the system for independent oversight of the intelligence agencies and the wider intelligence community. It extends the Intelligence and Security Committee’s statutory remit, granting it additional investigative powers. It changes the ISC’s status to a committee of Parliament created by statute. The ISC in future will be appointed by Parliament and will report to Parliament as well as to the Prime Minister. The Bill also extends the remit of the Intelligence Services Commissioner.
When the Bill was last in this House, we had a series of detailed and well informed debates. At Report I made a commitment that we would bring forward amendments in the Commons concerning the status of the ISC. We have done that. We have also moved a number of other amendments in the Commons that address concerns that were originally raised in this House.
I turn first to Commons Amendments 1, 41, 43 and 45. These concern the status of the ISC. During the debates in Committee and at Report, there was some very well informed debate about the future status of the ISC. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, who I regret is not in his place today, made the case for the ISC becoming a Select Committee. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, and my noble friend Lord Lothian, current members of the ISC, argued for changing the name of the ISC to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to make clear the parliamentary character of the ISC. Following that debate, I announced the Government’s intention to make clear the parliamentary character of the ISC and to make a number of necessary consequential amendments. The amendments that the Government moved in the Commons would deliver on the Government’s intention.
Amendment 1 would adopt the amendment first tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and my noble friend Lord Lothian, and would change the name of the Intelligence and Security Committee to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. Amendments 41 and 43 would make the equivalent changes in Schedules 2 and 3. These amendments would more fully realise the Government’s intention that the ISC should be a committee of Parliament, created by statute.
Commons Amendments 40 and 42 are closely related to the “of Parliament” amendments that I have just discussed. The Data Protection Act 1998 applies to Parliament but with special rules to determine who the data controller is. The data controller is the person within any organisation on whom most of the obligations under the DPA fall. Section 63A of the DPA states:
“Where the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are … processed are determined by or on behalf of”,
either House,
“the data controller … shall be the Corporate Officer”,
of the relevant House. It is not appropriate that the corporate officer should be the data controller for data processed by the ISC, but this is the likely effect of Section 63A once the ISC is a committee of Parliament. For that reason, Amendment 40 would add a provision to disapply Section 63A of the DPA so far as the ISC is concerned so that, notwithstanding that the new ISC will be a committee of Parliament, its data controller can continue to be its clerk.
In addition, both the House of Commons and the House of Lords are subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000—the FOIA. As a committee of Parliament, it is arguable that the ISC, too, would be subject to the FOIA, as other Joint Committees are. To avoid this consequence, Amendment 42 would add a provision to the Bill which would amend references to the House of Commons and House of Lords in Schedule 1 to the FOIA to make it clear that they are not subject to the Act as regards information held by the ISC. This amendment would preserve the status quo, in that the FOIA does not apply to information held by the ISC now and it would not do so in future.
In addition, Amendment 42 would add the ISC to the list of bodies in Section 23 of the FOIA. The result of this would be that ISC information—information which has been supplied to or by the ISC, whether directly or indirectly, or which relates to it—in the hands of another public authority subject to the FOIA would be exempt information for FOIA purposes.
We now turn to Commons Amendment 39, which would provide statutory protections for evidence given by witnesses to the ISC. First, such evidence may not be used in any civil or disciplinary proceedings. Secondly, evidence given by a person who is a witness before the ISC may not be used against that person in any criminal proceedings. These provisions would replicate an important part of the protection that witnesses before a Select Committee have by virtue of parliamentary privilege. They would provide encouragement to witnesses appearing before the ISC to be full and frank in their evidence. The protection against the use of evidence in criminal proceedings would be narrower than the equivalent protection for civil and disciplinary proceedings. They would not impinge on an individual’s right to defend him or herself in criminal proceedings. Of course, evidence that is deliberately misleading is of no assistance to the ISC. Accordingly, the protections would not apply to evidence given by a witness to the ISC in bad faith.
On Commons Amendment 26, I said at Report that one possible consequence of the “of Parliament” change is that the ISC would have the power to take evidence on oath. Following further analysis, we concluded that the consequence of changing the status of the ISC to become a statutory committee of Parliament was that the ISC may, in future, take evidence on oath. Our view was that existing statutory powers applicable to Commons and Lords committees would give the ISC the authority to administer oaths. This view shaped amendments which the Government tabled, and which were agreed to, in Committee in the Commons. However, the House service raised a concern with the Government about this, disagreeing with our analysis that the “of Parliament” change gives the ISC the authority to take evidence on oath. Its view is that the Bill should contain an express power for the ISC to take evidence on oath. In response to that concern, the Government tabled an amendment in the Commons to put the ISC’s power to take evidence on oath beyond doubt. It is not necessary that the Bill specify who has the power to administer oaths on behalf of the ISC; that can be left for the ISC to determine, under its general power to determine its own procedure.
Commons Amendments 2, 3, 28, 29, 30 and 31 concern the ISC’s ability to oversee operational matters. The Bill extends the ISC’s statutory remit, and makes clear its ability to oversee operational matters. This is a crucial part of the Bill’s aim of strengthening oversight. The amendments would both extend and clarify the ISC remit to oversee operational matters; they respond to concerns of the ISC that were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, during debates in this House. The noble Lord’s first concern was that there may be exceptional circumstances in which the Government might want the ISC to consider particular operational matters falling outside the existing criteria. His second concern was that the requirement that both the ISC and the Prime Minister be satisfied that the criteria for operational oversight were met might slow down the provision of information to the ISC on routine operational matters.
In response to these concerns, the amendments made in the Commons would mean that the Bill would provide for three routes by which the ISC may consider particular operational matters. The first route is the one that was already in the Bill—when the Prime Minister and the ISC are agreed that the matter is of significant national interest and is not part of any ongoing intelligence and security operation. The second route is when the Government request the ISC to consider a matter notwithstanding that either or both of those criteria are not met. This meets the first concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Butler. The third route is where the ISC’s consideration of a matter is limited to considering information provided to the ISC voluntarily by the agencies or another government department. This meets the second concern raised by the noble Lord.
For the first and second routes only, the ISC and the Prime Minister would need, additionally, to be satisfied that the consideration of a particular operational matter is consistent with the memorandum of understanding agreed between them. The ISC’s powers to require the agencies or other government departments to provide it with information would be available in the first two cases, but not for the third—on the consideration of information volunteered to the ISC. This would be the effect of Amendment 3 and consequential Amendments 28 to 31.
Amendment 27 addresses the future resourcing of the ISC. In Committee in the Commons, the Minister for Security made clear that it remained the Government’s intention that we should make the ISC more parliamentary and move it away from Government. Officials from government, the House service and the ISC secretariat have discussed what we think will be an acceptable solution agreeable to all parties. This is that the ISC secretariat should become a separate body, grant-aided by the House. This would be similar, for example, to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association UK. The National Security Adviser has written to the Clerk of the Parliaments and to the Clerk of the House of Commons setting out formally that this is the Government’s intention. My understanding is that the House of Commons Commission and the House of Lords House Committee are willing in principle to take on responsibility for grant-aiding the ISC. This solution meets the Government’s policy intention that responsibility for the ISC secretariat should be moved away from Government. As the ISC itself becomes a committee of Parliament so, subject to what I will say shortly, responsibility for the funding and resourcing of the ISC secretariat would pass from Government to Parliament.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his very detailed explanation of the amendments before us. In fact, he was able to talk about not just the amendments but some of the discussions that we had in Committee and on Report and about some of the background. I thought that at one point he might be challenging the noble Lord, Lord McNally, regarding his marathon speech during ping-pong of the Crime and Courts Bill, but fortunately he was not able to reach those dizzy heights.
I shall be fairly brief as I think that the Minister has covered many of the points and I suspect that your Lordships are more interested in some of the issues that we will be debating where there is not so much agreement as there is on these amendments. We welcome many of the amendments in this group. I am grateful to the Minister because the Government have obviously listened to many of the arguments made in Committee and on Report in your Lordships’ House and have brought forward amendments to recognise that.
As he will understand, I particularly welcome Amendments 32 to 37, which are identical to those that the Opposition introduced to place a power of veto on disclosure of information to the committee at the level of Secretary of State rather than Minister of State. I well remember the lengthy debates that we had in your Lordships’ House and I am glad that we were able to convince the Government that that was the right course of action. We are grateful.
I will raise one other issue in relation to the other amendments on which I should like the Minister to give me an assurance. In Committee and on Report, our position was that it was desirable for the committee to have full parliamentary privilege. At that time, we supported the view taken by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours that the only way to achieve that would be by establishing the ISC as a full Select Committee of Parliament, obviously with the additional safeguards necessary for a committee of that kind. That did not find favour with your Lordships’ House or with the Government. The view taken was that that was not the way to proceed as it was thought to be too difficult. Therefore, we welcome the steps that the Government have taken since that debate to provide greater protections in statute for the ISC along the lines of parliamentary privilege.
The Minister was very helpful in explaining Amendment 39, which grants witnesses, in relation to any evidence they give to the committee, statutory immunity from civil disciplinary proceedings and from criminal proceedings under certain circumstances where the disclosure has been made in good faith. That is hugely significant and we are grateful for that move forward. I am sure that the noble Lord remembers, as I do, the lengthy discussions that we had on this issue when the Bill was last before the House. However, is he able to provide greater clarity on the extent to which protection exists for other individuals involved in the proceedings of the ISC? If he does not have the answers today, I shall be happy for him to write to me. My understanding is that Members of Parliament are currently not protected by parliamentary privilege in relation to their work on the committee, and nor are the staff working on it in relation to the evidence held by the committee. Clearly, that is very important, as most of the evidence that the committee receives is likely to be covered by the Official Secrets Act as well as the Civil Service Code.
Can the Minister provide clarity on three further points? First, do the protections provided by Amendment 39 apply to witnesses who provide written evidence—for example, whistleblowers who provide evidence anonymously or in writing? Secondly, what protections are provided for the staff of the committee and the Members of Parliament serving on the committee? For example, if the ISC were passed anonymous information covered by the Official Secrets Act, would the ISC then be able to act on that information to investigate it or would the handling of the information cause its members and staff to be in breach of the Act? Finally, does the fact that these are statutory protections and not privilege mean that it would be possible for the Government or an employer to obtain an injunction preventing a witness appearing before the committee?
I do not raise those issues in any way as criticism. I repeat that we welcome the steps that the Government have taken towards the committee having greater parity with the powers and privileges of a full Select Committee. It would be helpful if the noble Lord could answer those points, although we broadly support the amendments and are grateful to him and to the Government for taking on board comments made by your Lordships and the Official Opposition in Committee and on Report.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, for their broad welcome for the amendments. This House has played a sizeable role in the process leading to the amendments. I do apologise. I was not deliberately seeking to delay the proceedings of the House but I felt it was important that I reported back as I see this as a significant change and one in which this House has played a key role.
The noble Lord, Lord Butler, asked about operational circumstances. I can provide the reassurance that there is no intention to restrict the ISC’s receipt of information on operational matters. The amendment makes it clear that information can be provided at the ISC’s request as well as by agencies or departments on their own initiative. I hope that reassures the noble Lord. He also referred to resources and asked for comfort. I am not sure that any Minister can give comfort on resources at the present time but perhaps I can say that the Government acknowledge that the ISC will require an increase in resources to reflect its expanded oversight role. However, as he rightly pointed out, negotiations are current. I would not want to comment further on those but I hope the noble Lord finds that that is of some comfort. It is certainly a recognition by the Government of the new role for the ISC.
The noble Lord also asked about restrictions on the ISC publishing material. It is not the intention to restrict the ISC from publishing non-sensitive and non-classified information in press releases or open letters. As I said, any information that could be in an ISC report can be published by it on an informal basis as well. I hope that gives a clear indication that things are not being made more restrictive.
I have a note here that might address the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith—if I can read the detail. On the due protection supplied to witnesses providing written evidence, the answer is yes. On questions two and three about the handling of leaked information or an injunction preventing a witness appearing, it says here that I will write on those matters. I have to say that I hope I can write slightly more clearly than this note, which is meant to provide me with information. It does say that I will write. Given the nature of the questions, I think the noble Baroness will understand that it is important that I do not mislead the House by trying to ad hoc or wing it. I will happily write to her and place a copy of the letter in the Library. I beg to move.
Justice and Security Bill [HL]
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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“Use of intercept evidence in employment cases involving national security
(1) Section 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (exclusion of intercepted communications etc. from legal proceedings: exceptions) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), after paragraph (d) insert—
“(dza) any proceedings before an employment tribunal, or (in Northern Ireland) an industrial tribunal, where the applicant or the applicant’s representatives are excluded for all or part of the proceedings pursuant to—(i) a direction to the tribunal by virtue of section 10(5)(b) or (c) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 or (as the case may be) Article 12(5)(b) or (c) of the Industrial Tribunals (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/1921 (N.I. 18)) (exclusion from Crown employment proceedings by direction of Minister in interests of national security), or(ii) a determination of the tribunal by virtue of section 10(6) of that Act or (as the case may be) Article 12(6) of that Order (determination by tribunal in interests of national security),or any proceedings arising out of such proceedings;(dzb) any proceedings on an appeal under Article 80(2) of the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/3162 (N.I. 21)) where—(i) the appeal relates to a claim of discrimination in contravention of Part 3 of that Order (employment cases) and to a certificate of the Secretary of State that the act concerned was justified for the purpose of safeguarding national security, and(ii) a party to the appeal or the party’s representatives are excluded for all or part of the proceedings by virtue of section 91(4)(b) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, or any proceedings arising out of such proceedings;”.(3) In subsection (2)—
(a) in the opening words, for “(db)” substitute “(dza)”, (b) after “anything—” insert—“(zza) in the case of proceedings falling within paragraph (dza), to—(i) the person who is or was the applicant in the proceedings before the employment or industrial tribunal, or(ii) any person who for the purposes of proceedings so falling (but otherwise than by virtue of appointment as a special advocate) represents that person;(zzb) in the case of proceedings falling within paragraph (dzb), to—(i) any person who is or was excluded from all or part of the proceedings on appeal under Article 80(2) of the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, or(ii) any person who for the purposes of proceedings so falling (but otherwise than by virtue of appointment as a special advocate) represents that person;”.”
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I have a speaking note for this amendment and I will not take the risk of moving it formally because it adds a new clause to the Bill. I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I explain this quite lengthy and complex clause, although it is simple enough in its intention. It would allow intercept material to be adduced in closed material procedures in national security cases in employment tribunals.
Intercept material is excluded from legal proceedings under Section 17 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, but an exception already applies in limited circumstances by virtue of Section 18 of that Act. The section lists those specialised proceedings, including the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and cases relating to terrorism prevention and investigation measures proceedings, where intercept material can be used in the closed part of the proceedings. It is the Government’s objective to find a practical way to allow the use of intercept evidence in court. Section 18 does not currently include employment tribunals, and the amendment seeks to change this. The change would enhance the effectiveness and fairness of employment tribunals, it would be consistent with the objectives of this Bill and wider government policy, and it will help protect national security. Perhaps I may take these issues in turn.
The first is consistency with the Bill and its effectiveness. By allowing intercept material to be adduced in a limited number of cases where such material may be available, the amendment would enable employers to defend claims, for example, for unfair dismissal with a broader set of evidence than is currently available. The ability to adduce intercept material in CMPs is consistent with the wider provisions of this Bill, in particular paragraph 9 of Schedule 2, which includes a provision for an amendment to Section 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act to allow for intercept material to be admitted in any Clause 6 proceedings. This further amendment would bring employment tribunals in line with the small number of specialised civil proceedings in which the disclosure of intercept product is already permissible.
Perhaps I can now address the question of operational necessity. This amendment does not represent an academic exercise. There will be cases before employment tribunals where an employer is not properly equipped to defend its actions as it is unable to adduce the full breadth of material available. For example, there will be cases where the Government are defending a claim for unfair dismissal following the removal of a former employee’s vetting clearance. Currently, if the vetting is based on intercept material, it would not be possible to adduce that material in support of the vetting decision. The national security vetting system is designed to provide an assurance that those with access to sensitive information do not pose a security risk. It is very important that an assessment of the risk is made on the basis of all the relevant material, regardless of the source.
Where a decision is made to withdraw vetting clearance it is important to the integrity of the system that the decision can be maintained and is capable of being defended from legal challenge. Where intercept product or intelligence based on intercept is integral to the decision, its unavailability in employment tribunal findings could result in employers wrongly losing their case and an adverse impact on the national vetting system. Furthermore, departments may become reluctant to rely on information provided by the security and intelligence agencies for fear of not being able to defend decisions taken. It is also important that those bringing proceedings in employment tribunals can be confident that the tribunal has access to all the information on which a decision was made so that decisions can be properly examined.
I believe that the widening of the number of settings for a very small number of important cases in which intercept material can be considered should be welcome. I hope that noble Lords will see fit to support this important amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Dubs
My Lords, I do not dissent from the Minister’s reasoning, and indeed am grateful to him for explaining the issue. However, he has opened the door to a much wider issue that I want to touch on but not debate, because the hour is too late and this is not the Bill on which to do it.
The Minister will be aware that many noble Lords, including those of us on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, have for a long time been arguing that intercept evidence should be permissible in criminal cases as a way of bringing people to justice who otherwise cannot be brought to justice and have to be dealt with in other, less sensible ways, such as control orders, TPIMs and things like that. If the Government are so anxious to justify the use of intercept evidence in these instances, I wonder why we cannot take a step further and consider very seriously the use of intercept evidence in criminal cases where we would have a proper system of justice and where people who are guilty of offences, or thought to be guilty, could actually be brought to trial as opposed to being dealt with in the way that they are. This is a bit of a thin end of the wedge, but it is important and I would like to feel that the Government will think hard about it.
On the Joint Committee on Human Rights, we were on two occasions able to meet civil servants dealing with this, who always said to us that they were looking at it but that it was difficult. I can see it is difficult, because it is hard enough in this case and even harder in criminal cases. Will the Government consider looking seriously into the use of intercept evidence in criminal cases now that they have this as a very useful precedent?
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I endorse my noble friend’s remarks. I touched on a similar point during Second Reading and I think other Members of your Lordships’ House have also expressed an interest in this matter. We obviously do not expect the Minister to confirm that the principle will be adopted forthwith, but it would be helpful if an indication could be given as to when the Government might respond to the interest in this that has been evident in various of our debates as this Bill has made progress through the House.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am grateful to noble Lords for extending the scope of our debate somewhat, outside the frame of the particular Bill that we are dealing with. It raises some very interesting issues and both the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee got to the nub of the issue. I take the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, to perhaps not make a commitment on this issue. However, I can describe the parameters, because Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to a fair trial, differs between civil and criminal proceedings. In particular, the exacting standards imposed by the criminal limb of Article 6, which is at the heart of the legal difficulties for a workable IAE regime, do not apply in the context of civil proceedings.
Furthermore, the nature of CMPs—which may well be involved of course, because of the nature of the intelligence—means that legitimate national security interests, such as the need to protect sensitive techniques or capabilities, can be more certainly protected than in criminal proceedings. I think all noble Lords would understand that. The proposals in the Bill demonstrate our commitment to making progress wherever it is possible. We continue to engage with the cross-party advisory group of privy counsellors in this work.
“3A (1) An order under section 15(2) may, in particular, make provision about the application of section 12, and paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of Schedule 2, to any direction or decision of the Secretary of State which—
(a) is of a kind falling within section 2C(1)(a) and (b) or (as the case may be) 2D(1)(a) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, and(b) was made before the section 12 commencement day.(2) Provision of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) may, in particular, provide for—
(a) the Secretary of State to certify under section 2C(1)(c) or (as the case may be) 2D(1)(b) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, on or after the section 12 commencement day, any direction or decision falling within sub-paragraph (1),(b) the termination of any judicial review proceedings, or proceedings on appeal from such proceedings, which relate to a direction or decision which is so certified (whether such proceedings began before, on or after the section 12 commencement day).(3) In this paragraph “the section 12 commencement day” means the day on which section 12 comes into force.”
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, noble Lords will know by now that Clause 12 of the Justice and Security Bill amends the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act so that the commission—SIAC—is able to consider applications to set aside exclusion or naturalisation decisions, which have been made on the basis of sensitive material.
Currently, we have a rather unsatisfactory arrangement whereby the only course of action open to an individual who wishes to challenge the decision to exclude them from the United Kingdom, or refuse to allow them to naturalise as a British citizen, is to seek judicial review. The problem is that our High Court does not have the capacity for closed proceedings. Where the decision in question has been made by the Secretary of State on the strength of sensitive evidence, the court cannot consider it. The JR claim is therefore stymied, to the satisfaction of neither party, nor to the interests of justice.
In the case of AHK, the High Court called upon Parliament to remedy this situation through legislation; hence, Clause 12. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has also supported this approach. The amendments before the House are intended to ensure a tidy transition from the old arrangements, towards the new arrangement in which SIAC will consider the application to review decisions such as these.
First, there is a jurisdictional matter relating to the United Kingdom’s Crown dependencies. Officials in the Isle of Man and Channel Islands have requested the power to extend the provisions in Clause 12 to their own territories by way of permissive extent. Accordingly, we should allow for these sections of the Bill to be so extended, with or without modification. The Government and our friends in the Crown dependencies are quite sure that we would not want inadvertently to create a loophole on the Isle of Man or Channel Islands whereby justice is done differently from the UK mainland.
These amendments also propose that the Bill’s rule-making power shall include provision for “transitional” exclusion and naturalisation cases. The Government are keen to allow for a seamless and fair transition from old arrangements to new. It would not do to have a two-tier system in operation, in which judicial review proceedings already before the courts would continue to be heard in the imperfect setting of the High Court, while decisions made after the commencement of Clause 12 would benefit from being heard in SIAC. There are a number of JRs already on the books of the High Court, with judges unable to consider key evidence on which the Secretary of State’s decision was based. Accordingly, it seems right and proper that, in these cases, the claimant be given an opportunity to apply to have their case heard afresh in SIAC, where a decision can be made that takes into account all of the relevant evidence.
There will also be a number of cases in which, for instance, a decision has been made to exclude someone shortly before the commencement of Clause 12, leaving them a window of opportunity for applying for a JR which runs over into the new arrangements. It would be untidy to allow these claims to be considered in the High Court, and would create a two-tier system. It would be preferable for the Secretary of State to be able to certify material as sensitive on or after commencement, thereby transferring the venue of redress to SIAC. I should add that the amendments will allow for the rule-making power to take effect—commence—from the day that the Bill receives Royal Assent. This is consistent with the rule-making power already set out in the Bill.
These amendments, while not altering the fundamental purpose of Clause 12, will ensure that we are fair when offering individuals a suitable avenue of redress in respect of decisions that have been made against them, and will eliminate the possibility of inconsistency as to how we go about that. I beg to move.
Justice and Security Bill [HL]
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, we have tabled Amendment 22, which replicates the one tabled in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and is very similar to one tabled by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours.
This amendment requires a memorandum of understanding that will further define the remit of the ISC and other elements of its functioning. We consider that this should be approved by Parliament. Throughout the debate we have been arguing for greater ties between the ISC and Parliament in order to underline its accountability to Parliament rather than the Executive. This is an important example of how we can assist in effecting such change.
If the ISC is ultimately accountable to Parliament, it seems right that Parliament should approve the MoU that governs the ISC’s relationship with the Government over and above that which is set out in the Bill. I am sure that we will replicate this debate next week in the Crime and Courts Bill about the framework document for the National Crime Agency. If something is outside the remit of what is in the legislation, it is very helpful to have sight of that and Parliament should have the opportunity to debate and approve it.
The Government have argued against the establishment of the ISC as a full Select Committee of Parliament. One of the arguments is that it is necessary to circumscribe in statute the rules under which the committee may operate. It seems justified and very reasonable that the MoU should be subject to greater scrutiny and formalisation by coming before the House and having formal parliamentary scrutiny and approval before it can be acted upon.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach)
My Lords, legislation is often a process of distillation and this evening the House has distilled itself down to this particularly rich mixture.
The Government intend to use the memorandum of understanding to make a substantial contribution to central government’s intelligence and security activities. It will be subject to ISC oversight. It is our intention that the activities should include certain activities within the Ministry of Defence, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office and the central government intelligence machinery in the Cabinet Office, including the Joint Intelligence Organisation. The scope of the memorandum, therefore, is wider than the three core agencies.
As my noble friend Lord Henley said in response to an amendment from the Opposition on this same subject in Committee, it is right that the memorandum of understanding should spell out the precise remit of the ISC in relation to bodies other than the agencies, because the memorandum of understanding can make provision at a level of detail which is not appropriate in primary legislation. This is particularly important because parts of government departments engaged in intelligence and security activities may be engaged in other activities which would not properly fall within the remit of the ISC.
The House will know that things change over time—departments reorganise. Functions done in one department one year may be done in another the following year. The intelligence world is no different from any other part of government. A memorandum of understanding is flexible. It can be changed much more easily than primary legislation. It will enable the intention of the Government to be realised now and in the future.
The effect of the amendment spoken to by my noble friend Lady Hamwee would be that, instead of the ISC’s widened remit beyond the three agencies being defined precisely in a memorandum of understanding, it would be defined in primary legislation, which is not in the interests of a good definition of the ISC’s role and is less flexible as I have said.
The Government’s intention is that the memorandum of understanding will enable the ISC to oversee certain activities; for example, within the Ministry of Defence as I have described. A memorandum of understanding is the best place to make provision at this level of detail.
The effect of Amendment 22, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, would be that a memorandum of understanding agreed between the Prime Minister and the ISC for the purposes of Clause 2 would need to be approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament before it could take effect. The memorandum of understanding is an important document. It will define the activities of government in relation to intelligence or security matters, other than the activities of the agencies, which the ISC may oversee. It will also specify additional principles and provisions, other than the criteria specified in the Bill, with which the ISC’s consideration of operational matters must be consistent. It will also specify the arrangements by which the agencies and other government departments make information available to the ISC.
The Bill also provides that the memorandum of understanding may include other provisions about the ISC or its functions. It must be agreed between the Prime Minister and the ISC and can be altered or replaced at any time by agreement. It is therefore different from a parliamentary document.
While the ISC is dissolved on Dissolution of Parliament, the memorandum of understanding will continue in place during a succession of government until a new memorandum of understanding is agreed with the Prime Minister.
As is usual with a memorandum of understanding, there is no parliamentary approval procedure. While the memorandum of understanding will be an unclassified document which is published and laid before Parliament, its precise terms are very likely to be shaped by matters which are sensitive in terms of national security and cannot therefore be made public. However, there is no restriction on the document laid before Parliament being debated in Parliament, and, indeed, one might expect on occasions for it to be so debated. Of course, the terms of the memorandum of understanding must be agreed with the ISC itself: a committee composed of parliamentarians that, as a result of the changes that we have been talking about, will be a committee of Parliament appointed by and accountable to Parliament. Requiring these parliamentarians to seek the approval of their parliamentary colleagues would be quite a restriction on the independence of that body.
Lord Campbell-Savours
First, on this preliminary document, which will not be the final document, will there be anything more in front of the Commons when they consider this in Committee than what is provided to us before Third Reading? Secondly, why should not preliminary drafting work, which I presume is going on now, be made available to the House—or certainly to the Commons—at an earlier stage?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I think I can reassure the noble Lord that I am doing my best to make sure that this House is informed before Third Reading of the nature of the document and the context in which it is being presented. I hope that the same document would indeed be available to the House of Commons. Until the Bill is enacted, the document cannot of course be laid before the House other than in a framework format. I hope that I have reassured the noble Lord that he and his colleagues in another place will have the information on which to see how this aspect of the Bill—the memorandum of understanding—is designed to bring flexibility into the procedures of the ISC.
Indeed, we wish to ensure that the memorandum of understanding is not used to restrict in any way the ISC’s remit or its functions as set out in the Bill. As we explained in our memorandum to the Delegated Powers Committee—another memorandum—the purpose of this clause is to enable provisions to be included in the memorandum of understanding to ensure that the ISC’s oversight of operational matters does not: interfere with the statutory accountability of the intelligence services to their Ministers; overlap with the roles of other independent oversight bodies, such as the Intelligence Services Commissioner; or lessen the effectiveness of the intelligence services and other intelligence and security bodies, or place any undue resource burden upon them. We believe that a clear understanding between the Government and the ISC as to how the ISC can most effectively oversee operational matters without compromising these imperatives is best achieved in a flexible instrument agreed between them. These amendments would, I fear, seem to preclude that. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I got the assurance that I wanted almost at the end there, in the response to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I was certainly not seeking to reduce the oversight of the parts of Her Majesty’s Government that relate to intelligence and security matters and which are beyond the three agencies. Quite the contrary; I want to make it clear that I do not think my amendments would have done that.
Having heard the Minister tell the House that it is intended to protect the scope of the work of the ISC and, like others, looking forward to seeing some form of document within the next few days because I think Third Reading is next week, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, since we are considering the last group of the evening, I confess to being envious of the noble Lord, Lord Butler. I have been in your Lordships’ House a relatively short time in comparison with him, but I have never had an amendment signed by both the Official Opposition and the Government. I congratulate him on that achievement.
There is not very much that I can say on this amendment that will not be said even better by others. However, I will say something regarding our Amendment 27. This is a revised version of an amendment which I tabled in Committee. This amendment would amend the grounds on which the Prime Minister may exclude matters from the annual reports. These are currently broadly defined in the Bill as that which the Prime Minister considers,
“would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the Security Service”.
It goes on in that vein. We have argued that the primary reason for the Prime Minister to request the redaction of material contained within the annual report should be on the basis of national security, or that it risks a disclosure of sensitive information as defined in the Bill. Again, we have reservations that the reason given in Clause 3(4) is a bit of a catch-all provision which allows the Prime Minister to prohibit the publication of material perhaps considered too critical and which may damage the reputation of government agencies.
Of course, we acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which the Government will need to prevent the publication of material. That may not be only on the basis of national security or the sensitivity of information. It could also be where the information might threaten the UK’s economic interests. However, it would be better to make such additional criteria transparent and accountable, in order to prevent any misrepresentation of the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Amendment 27 allows the Prime Minister to prohibit publication on grounds in addition to national security and the sensitivity of information, along the lines defined in the Bill, but also requires that the scope of the information must be set out in the MoU with the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is a moderate and reasonable amendment and I hope that the Minister will give it his consideration.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, moved his amendment. It received support from around the House and I am pleased to say that the Government are in a position to accept it. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and my noble friend Lord Lothian made the important point that the committee should be independent. I agree wholeheartedly. It will submit its report, not a draft of its report, to the Prime Minister, who may insist on redactions to the document but may not insist on any other changes. Again, I agree with this, so we are happy to accept the amendment.
Amendment 27 would have the effect of changing the grounds on which the Prime Minister might exclude any matter from a report to Parliament. It would add to the grounds for exclusion already described so that material might be excluded if it were of such a nature that it would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the security service, the Secret Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Headquarters or any person carrying out activities that fall within Section 2(2); if it were sensitive information as defined in paragraph 4 of Schedule 1; or if it were information that, in the interests of national security, should not be disclosed. For convenience, I will refer to the three possible grounds for excluding material as the prejudice to functions ground, the sensitive information ground and the national security ground. The amendment would also require that matters considered to fall under the prejudice to functions ground—currently the only ground for excluding information from the Bill—should be set out in a memorandum of understanding.
The ISC must be able to report candidly to the Prime Minister on sensitive matters. Inevitably, it will not always be possible to publish the full content of its reports because of the nature of the material contained in them. I do not think that there is any dissent in the House from that position. It follows that there must be an ability to redact information before ISC reports are published or laid before Parliament. In Committee, and amendment was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith—to which she referred—which would have made the criteria for excluding material from the published report just the grounds of sensitive information and national security. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who is not in this place, explained that it was a probing amendment to try to find out why it was necessary to use the definition that was in the Bill rather than that in the amendment, which presented grounds similar to those in Schedule 1 for withholding information from the ISC. In the case of withholding material from the ISC, both grounds had to be fulfilled, whereas for these purposes material could be excluded from a report if either ground were fulfilled.
The sensitivity of information and national security grounds add nothing in substance. Material that falls within those grounds will necessarily also fall within the prejudice to functions grounds—unless in the case of sensitive information that is so historical or so widely known publicly that it is no longer sensitive, in which case there would be no real justification for excluding it from an ISC report to Parliament anyway.