Afghanistan: Interpreters

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, we are not on the back foot. The intimidation policy has been reviewed, and will be kept under review as appropriate, to ensure that it provides a robust and responsive means for addressing concerns appropriately. This will take account of the current security threat and the lessons learnt from handling cases and consultations with local staff. I have a list of what other countries—our allies—do, and it is very much along the same lines as what we do. I am very happy to write to the noble Lord with information on that.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the media today are reporting the case of an Afghan interpreter who worked for the UK being given asylum by Germany, having been refused it by the United Kingdom. Is this really the sort of comparison that we wish to draw to ourselves in the international community, and how does that square with the Minister’s assertion that our policies are broadly the same as those of our partner nations?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I have seen the article in the Times today. As I said to the noble Lord earlier, we go about this in a very similar way to other countries. So far only a very small number have been offered relocation in Germany.

Defence Reform Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, as other noble Lords have remarked, the uncertainty surrounding the Government’s intentions for defence acquisition and support have made it rather difficult to prepare for this debate. The first part of the Bill is designed to pave the way for a government-owned, contractor-operated solution and, as we have heard, that is no longer in prospect, at least in the short term. Nevertheless, there will be substantial changes to the way in which defence equipment is procured and supported, and it is important that we take the opportunity to reflect on the challenges involved, so my remarks will focus on this part of the Bill.

Over the past two decades we have seen major reviews and reforms of defence procurement every four or five years on average. Each one has aimed to resolve serious problems and each has achieved some improvement, but each has failed to address the central issue of cost and time overruns. Before proceeding with the latest of these reorganisations, it is perhaps worth asking why the problem has proved so intractable.

Some years ago, a major management consultancy firm conducted an independent assessment of defence procurement in nations with substantial armed forces. It concluded that the UK’s performance in this area was about average—not that it was good, but because the problems of time and cost overruns were fairly common across comparator nations. We should not be surprised by this. Some people might have the impression that the United States does better than we do, but the facts do not bear out that contention. The track record of complex projects, such as the F22 fighter, the F35 Lightning 2 Joint Strike Fighter, and the ill starred future combat system for the US Army, is unenviable.

One of our most successful acquisitions, in terms of cost and time, was the C17 transport aircraft, which has proved such a godsend in recent operations. We bought it, unmodified, off the shelf once it had been designed, developed and proved in service. It is worth noting that the C17’s development programme was so troubled that the United States Air Force would have cancelled it had there been any alternative.

These problems are not confined to defence. The London Olympics were rightly hailed as a great success story, but the final cost of the Games will be somewhere between four and 10 times the original estimate, depending on which figures one uses—and I probably need only mention the name “HS2”.

That is a description of the water, but, of course, the problem is how to avoid drowning in it. With this in mind, it is important to recognise that, in the case of defence acquisition, failure is not, unusually, an orphan, but has many parents. The first is the nature of the defence business itself. The efficacy and true value of defence equipment can be assessed accurately only once it has been employed tactically on operations, usually in competition with enemy systems and tactics. This problem becomes even more complex when we consider that the equipment being developed today will be tested in combat not tomorrow, but 10, 20 or even 30 years in the future. Judging the likely competition that far ahead, and thus the capabilities required, is no easy task.

The task is even more difficult when one considers the rate of change of some of the technologies involved. A great deal of military capability today relies on extensive computing power and information management systems. Our main attack aircraft, the Tornado, came into service some 30 years ago. Noble Lords may recall that in the early 1980s, the cutting-edge technocrats among us were playing around with the Commodore 64 computer, with its massive 64 kilobytes of memory, and not with iPads.

The second source of difficulty in defence acquisition is the wider political and industrial picture. If we bought everything off the shelf, as we did with the C17, we would have much greater predictability in our defence programme, but we would have no significant defence industry. Employment and order-book pressures may have no bearing on short-term military considerations, but they undoubtedly complicate the procurement of military capability.

The third problem is the annuality of the defence budget and the way this has been handled. In-year cost pressures have to be dealt with in-year, and the traditional way of approaching this has been to delay projects. This saves money in the short term but, of course, drives up the whole-life cost of the project considerably. The MoD’s institution of a contingency fund within the budget to help deal with such pressures is a sensible step, but the danger is that this will lead to persistent underspends, and the loss of funds back to the Treasury. A more sensible approach would surely be a long-term budget that had to be balanced over a period but not in each individual year.

The final problem I will touch on is the ability of defence acquisition personnel to negotiate and contract effectively with defence companies. I do not want to imply any criticism of the staff within defence equipment procurement and support. There seems to be a growing sense in the public sector that the way to improve the performance of personnel is to denigrate them. I do not consider this a wise policy, and I agree with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Levene of Portsoken, in this regard. However, there is considerable evidence to suggest that in some cases we are putting the wrong kind of people up to deal with defence companies. They find themselves overmatched, not by the intrinsic worth of their industry counterparts, but by their training and experience. The numbers may be small, but the malign effects can be very large.

This is not, in most cases, the fault of the people involved. It is the fault of the organisation that is exposing them in such a way. Defence equipment and support need negotiators and lawyers who can match those in industry, but to get them they will have to pay the going rate, which has not been possible under the present system. We certainly need to fix this, and I welcome the moves that the Minister has announced. However, I cannot believe that the GOCO route, which clearly remains an aspiration, is the only—or even the best—long-term way of going about this. Nor do I think that any solution will be a magic bullet, and I fear that there has been some sense of that in this afternoon’s debate. Staff skills levels and experience are a problem but, as I have tried to explain, there are many other challenges. The fundamental difficulty, to my mind, is how to combine cutting-edge technology with financial predictability.

Some have suggested that so-called “requirement creep” is the issue, and that if we define the requirement and leave it alone, we will solve many problems. This is probably true, but I doubt that it would represent value for money for the taxpayer in the long run. Equipment that from conception to out-of-service will be around for upwards of half a century must be kept up to date. The one thing worse than overspending on defence equipment is surely spending less on equipment that cannot do the job required of it.

I am reminded of the US defence company which, some years ago, tried to persuade us that it was better value to buy a fighter with 75% of the required capability but only 60% of the predicted cost. This demonstrated a total misunderstanding of the nature of value. The proposition might look attractive, but, when one understands that having 75% of the capability would mean losing 100% of the air combats, the picture changes. It is hard to think of a proposition that could offer worse value for money.

The problem, of course, is that changing the requirement does drive up the cost. To some extent, this is unavoidable, but I have long believed that we need a multitrack approach to our procurement processes. We can have the slow, majestic, leviathan process when it comes to large platforms. After all, the fundamental elements of an airframe or a ship do not change much or rapidly over its lifetime. However, we need capability spaces within those platforms. In these, we need plug in and play sensors, information systems and weapons to deliver cutting-edge capability. The acquisition of such systems needs to be much faster and more agile than the acquisition of the platforms themselves. This is one way in which we can square the circle of performance and financial predictability.

There are, of course, other possible approaches. What is important is that this latest attempt to reform defence acquisition and support should address the full range of underlying problems, not just one of them. If it does not, it will follow in the path of its many predecessor reforms; it will bring some improvement but make no substantial difference to the underlying issue—and in four or five years, we will be here again, discussing yet another set of proposals for reform.

Defence: Procurement

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 21st November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the answer is no. The materiel acquisition partner’s team comprises Bechtel, as the noble Lord says, PricewaterhouseCoopers and PA Consulting, a consortium of world-class private sector businesses. The team has extensive experience of complex programme management; between them, they have delivered programmes to the United Kingdom, the United States and to 140 other countries around the world. Bechtel has ranked as the largest programme-managing engineering and construction company in the United States for the past 14 years. Specifically, MAP members have been involved in the Crossrail and High Speed 1 rail projects, as well as the Jubilee line, and in transforming major businesses in both public and private sectors.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it has been suggested that the consortium that withdrew did so because it did not trust the MoD’s numbers and there was far too great a risk of it being held to account on meeting targets based on erroneous assumptions. Could the Minister comment on that criticism and its accuracy?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I cannot comment on the Ministry of Defence’s accounting procedures, but I have full confidence in them.

Reserve Forces

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his support. He is absolutely right that the figure is 38%. I have seen the hugely valuable work that they do in Camp Bastion. Both the Armed Forces and the National Health Service benefit from the work that is going on and we will need these medical people in the future. I cannot give a specific percentage figure but I can assure the noble Lord how vital these people will be to us.

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, the Written Ministerial Statement rightly makes reference to the potential implications that the basing changes may have on cadet force units where these are collated with reservist units. I welcome the statement that alternative accommodation will be pursued in such cases but, of course, “pursue” is a slightly slippery word and does not quite imply the same as “achieve”. Will the Minister undertake to keep a very close eye on this to ensure that the changes being made with regard to the Reserve Forces cause no harm to what is widely acknowledged to be the finest youth institution in the land?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I can give the noble and gallant Lord that assurance. We take the cadets very seriously. In the few cases where a unit closes, mostly the cadets will remain in the building but on a very few occasions they will be moved very nearby. I have been a patron of sea cadets and I have first-hand knowledge of the important work that they do.

Afghanistan: Interpreters

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 27th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

As I said, my Lords, we will not abandon these people. It is a very complex subject. I have met a number of these people, as I am sure a number of other noble Lords have, in Afghanistan, and this relates not only to interpreters but also to people with other skills. Not all of them want to come to this country. Afghans are a proud people and some want to stay and use their language skills to help their country. If possible, we want to help them to do that. The Afghans will not thank us for removing some of their most able people.

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, good interpreters are crucial in a wide range of the operations that the UK Government seek to undertake. Does the Minister agree that we will find it increasingly hard to obtain the services of such interpreters if we are perceived to be discarding them when they are no longer needed? Doing the right thing too slowly can foster that perception. The Government’s current approach risks not only being unjust but actually being harmful to our future capabilities.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord makes a good point. As I said earlier, we will not abandon these people. The National Security Council met earlier this month to consider the issue and civil servants have been sent away to consider how best to deal with it. However, we will not abandon these people.

Armed Forces: Redundancies

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I will certainly write to my noble friend on this issue. It is my understanding that most of these events are covered by the Treasury reserves.

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, the Minister has said that the Armed Forces should have sufficient numbers to deal with most eventualities in future. Those numbers were set out as part of Future Force 2020 in the defence review. Will the Minister reconfirm to the House that, as the Prime Minister stated when he announced the outcome of the review, it would only be viable if we had real-terms increases in defence expenditure from 2015 onwards? Without those real-terms increases, Future Force 2020 will not be achievable.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I can confirm to the noble and gallant Lord that that is indeed what the Prime Minister said. I cannot envisage the outcome of the next SDSR, which will be after the next election, but I very much hope that that is what will happen.

Armed Forces: Reserve Forces

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 1st November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, reservists have a long and distinguished history in this country and have been key to securing the security of these islands and the interests of this country’s peoples over many years, but nothing stays the same. The means of protecting our security and interests necessarily evolve over time, which means that reservists, along with their regular counterparts, need to evolve too. They have done so. It would be wrong to think that the reservists of today are the same as those of the Cold War. Far from it—the idea that they are somehow weekend warriors is completely out of date. Over the past several years reservists have served and sometimes, alas, died and been wounded alongside their regular comrades. I for one deprecate the suggestion that “Dad’s Army” is still alive and well and I salute the courage and fortitude of those reservists who have served their country so well in recent times.

That is not to say, however, that all is as it should be in the Reserve Forces or that there is no scope for further change and improvement. Much needs to be done, and the recent review of reserves is an important step in that direction. I have been fortunate enough to have reserve units under my command. I was privileged to be the honorary colonel of a TA Royal Engineer regiment for several years, and during my time as Chief of the Defence Staff I saw at first hand what a magnificent contribution our reservists made to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of these experiences I also became acutely aware of the scale of the challenge that our reservists face and the difficulties that we must tackle if we are to improve the situation. Recruiting has always been an issue, but poor retention has exacerbated the problem. All too often new recruits have fallen by the wayside because their initial enthusiasm was not matched by the effort that went into their training. They spent long periods, sometimes stretching into years, waiting for places on the relevant courses. Meanwhile, they could not be used for the purposes and in the roles that attracted them to the reserves in the first place, and as a consequence many of them left.

If we are to do better with our Reserve Forces, we will need to be prepared to put in the necessary resources—not just to deliver the appropriate training to everyone but to deliver it in a timely manner. This is not just about man training days; it is also about the right number of instructors and other training resources, none of which comes cheap. Even if we have the right numbers with the right training we have to be able to employ them effectively. I welcome the review of reserves’ focus on the “whole force concept” and its emphasis on the better use of scarce skills in key areas, but this means reservists who are used on a regular and continuing basis. Meanwhile, most of those people have civilian jobs, through which they provide for themselves and their families, build for the future and provide for their retirement. No amount of enthusiasm for their military roles can make them forget that, so the future model for the use of reserves must take account of these needs. It is not just about being able to go back to their civilian roles; it is about sustaining their wider career aspirations while serving in the reserves.

The review of reserves goes some way to recognising that by highlighting the need for legislative changes, better employer protection and greater recognition of employers. Having grappled with this thorny issue over a number of years in partnership with some other noble Lords who are in their places this afternoon, I do not believe that the review goes far enough. In my view what is required is nothing less than a cultural shift in this country. We need a mindset where having reservists in the workforce is not just something to be tolerated but something to brag about. We need a situation where a civilian employer who does not have reservists in the workforce feels rather uncomfortable, or at least rather regrets the fact. That reserve service must be seen as a badge of honour for the employer as well as for the employee. I do not think that a kite mark by itself, useful though it may be, will take the trick.

Cultural shifts are possible, but they are notoriously difficult to achieve. They require sustained leadership over an extended period. By “sustained” I mean over the course of many years, not just a few months—and they need that leadership at the highest level. They also require the necessary investment of resources over that period. Even with these, success is not guaranteed—but without them, failure is certain.

The review of reserves sets out an imaginative road map for our Reserve Forces, and a bold plan for sustaining and improving their effectiveness in the complex world of the early 21st century. It provides a sound theoretical underpinning for the proposals in Army 2020. My concern is about whether the plan will be delivered in practice. Will successive Governments have the political determination and staying power to deliver the necessary cultural change to make the proposals work? Will they sustain the necessary levels of investment to deliver a trained capability of the right size? Or will our Reserve Forces be left, as they were so often in the past, to make do and mend as best they can when the initial enthusiasm for the current initiative has faded? I hope that the Minister will reassure us on that score. I know that he feels—as I do—that our reserves deserve much better.

Defence Equipment and Support

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I cannot give my noble friend that assurance, but I am pretty certain that the Chiefs of Staff will have had strong reassurances on that issue.

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, I am in no doubt of the need to improve the overall performance of Defence Equipment and Support. However, I have lost count of the number of major reorganisations to which the mechanisms for defence acquisition and logistic support have been subjected over the past decade and a half. It seems unreasonable to expect superior performance from any organisation that spends almost its entire time studying its own navel. Can there be sufficiently wide-ranging consultation this time so that whatever emerges from this particular exercise has some chance of enduring for at least a number of years, and so that we can get some performance out of the organisation rather than a wholesale change of deck-chairs every few years?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord makes a good point. As we said in the Statement, no decision will be taken until the end of the year. We want to discuss this with as many people as possible, not least our own workers and the trade unions, so I can reassure the noble and gallant Lord.

Army 2020

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 5th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

One battalion, which I think is about 650, will go down to company strength. That will be an integrated company that will perform the ceremonial at Holyrood and Edinburgh Castle and will take soldiers from the rest of the Scottish regiments.

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, if the plans for Army 2020 are to have any chance of success, we shall need a fundamental change in this country of culture, not organisational process, with regard to the status of reservists in society and the workplace. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence has just announced a triennial review of the National Employer Advisory Board, a crucial body contributing to the development of reserve policy. Rather than a routine triennial review at this stage, would it not make sense to seize the opportunity to bring together employers, reservists and regulars to work out a plan to achieve the culture change without which Army 2020 simply will not work?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord makes a very good point about employers. A lot of discussion is taking place with employers. As I have said twice, we attach much importance to our relationship with employers. This will not work unless we bring them on side. A lot is happening, but I would be very interested to hear any suggestions from the noble and gallant Lord.

Defence Budget

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 14th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

I thank my noble friend for his support. I do not underestimate the difficulties, but, as my noble friend said, the current Secretary of State is very numerate. He is on top of his brief, and I am fully confident that we can carry these plans out.

[Lord Stirrup]

I welcome the new arrangements that the Minister has announced, but following on from what the noble Lord, Lord King, said, it seems to me that the MoD enters into contracts which, to my inexpert eye, more or less boil down to, “If you want more than you originally asked for, you pay more; if you want less than you originally asked for, you pay more; and, actually, if you want what you originally asked for, you pay more”. For the MoD’s books to have a chance of remaining balanced, we will need contracting staff and legal staff who are at least as good as those employed by industry. When will the Minister be able to say something about the approach that the new Chief of Defence Materiel will take on this subject? How will he recruit that level of skill within his staff that ensures that contracts are to the benefit of both sides and not just of the one?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord makes a very good point. There have been cases in the past where the department has been let down in negotiations with industry by the legal staff. We are looking closely at this issue; we are aware of it and of the sums of money that need to be paid. It is certainly in our in-tray at the moment.