My Lords, let me add very briefly my weight to the comments of my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham and my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig, with whom I agree. It may be worth the House reflecting, first, on the fact that the current Chief of the Defence Staff has given his view that his top concern in terms of personnel pressures actually lies with the Navy. Secondly, a few moments ago we were debating the consequences of Russia’s action in Ukraine and the importance of NATO preparedness in the face of that. NATO’s greatest weakness—and, indeed, our own—and Russia’s most likely avenue of attack, should anything go awry, is likely to be in cyberspace. Noble Lords might like to reflect on whether this country is investing enough in that area.
It is clear that this country was previously not investing enough in the defence of the realm and that, in the light of the current situation, it is not investing enough now. As my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham has said, if the Government—whoever forms the Government in 2015 and beyond—do not live up to the requirement to increase defence expenditure in real terms in that year and in each year beyond, our situation will only get worse.
My Lords, Part 3 of the Bill makes important changes that have been broadly welcomed by noble Lords. They will help revitalise our Reserve Forces and, along with the other measures in the White Paper, make them feel valued and valuable and, crucially, more usable.
The changes we are making to our Reserve Forces are part of what is known as Future Force 2020, which will provide military capability in a different way from the past to deliver the range and scale of military forces and skills required. The whole of the Armed Forces, not just the Army, is being transformed to meet the likely future demands on defence. There is often a narrow focus on numbers when concerning changes to the Armed Forces. I am therefore pleased that this amendment focuses more on capability.
The changes we are making to our Armed Forces are guided by the defence planning assumptions, the unclassified version of which is published in the SDSR. Detailed assessments of our force structure’s capabilities are undertaken against a range of scenarios, but they are not put into the public domain for very good reasons of national security. In capability terms, the unclassified defence planning assumptions outline that Future Force 2020 will still enable us to conduct an enduring stabilisation operation of up to 6,500 personnel, one non-enduring complex intervention of up to 2,000 personnel, and one non-enduring simple intervention of up to 1,000 personnel at the same time.
The Army will be structured around the reaction force and the adaptable force. The former are high readiness forces that will provide the Army’s conventional deterrence for defence and will be trained and equipped to undertake the full spectrum of intervention tasks. The latter will be geared more towards defence engagement and homeland resilience, but with the ability to conduct combat operations, particularly enduring stabilisation operations. So we have designed a flexible, adaptable and capable force structure that enables the Army to meet likely future threats.
Noble Lords will recognise that there has been considerable debate about Future Force 2020. To focus narrowly on the Army is, I believe, not helpful and misleading, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, said. The other two services are vital to the UK’s defence capability. The Army cannot and does not operate in isolation, even in landlocked countries such as Afghanistan. If we are to consider the capability of our Armed Forces, we must do so in the round, collectively. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, made the point very well about the recent comments of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Royal Navy. We expect the changes we are making under Future Force 2020 to take effect by 2020. We have acknowledged that between coming out of Afghanistan and fully implementing the Future Force 2020 changes, there is some risk attached, but asking for an annual report on the capability of the Army now would be premature and rather misleading. It is only fair to judge the effectiveness of Future Force 2020 from that year onwards.
Recognising the importance of routinely assessing the capabilities of our Armed Forces against the threats and challenges they may face, this Government instigated the five-yearly strategic defence and security review process. It allows for detailed consideration of changes in the strategic environment and the force structure required to counter the threats and issues identified. If we were to increase the frequency of those reviews to a yearly report on the Army’s fighting power, as this amendment suggests, we could reduce defence to a series of knee-jerk reactions, concentrating on only a small timescale and not allowing any kind of strategic decision-making and long-term planning.
The second reason for rejecting this amendment is that while one crucial role for the Armed Forces will be conventional deterrence, including intervention tasks should they be required, the range of tasks we ask of our Armed Forces is much broader. The armed services make a unique and valuable contribution to the security of the UK, her citizens and those around the world, through activities contributing to conflict prevention, defence engagement, involvement in international defence diplomacy and defence alliances, as well as contributing to peacekeeping, security operations such as counterpiracy off the coast of Somalia, and homeland resilience such as assisting with the recent UK flood relief work. The future force has been designed to be able to respond effectively to these international commitments and align them with national priorities. It therefore seems unhelpful to focus a report on the narrow concept of fighting power. A report focused solely on fighting power would not best reflect the development of the whole range of these capabilities.
Also, as the British Defence Doctrine points out, fighting power will always be considered relative to that of other parties. The notion of effectiveness itself will also change over time, as the strategic context and our national objectives change, making comparisons challenging. An assessment of fighting power would also represent a statement of the relative strengths of defence and could play into the hands of those who wish to reduce the security and relevance of the Armed Forces. We would therefore be unwilling to release a public assessment.
In terms of being open and honest, how is reserve recruitment going at present?
I was coming on to that point in response to the point that my noble friend Lord King made.
The final issue that I need to address is the point that was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser: if we are having an annual report on the reserves, why should we not have such a report on the Regular Army? The reserves are a unique set-up: part-time volunteers who juggle work, family and military commitments. In recognising the importance of the reserves and in seeking to revitalise them through the Future Reserves 2020 programme, it was considered important to have an external independent view of how we were doing because the changes impact on reservists, employers, families and communities.
The reserve associations are community-facing organisations which provide an essential bridge between our Armed Forces and the civilian population. An association exists for each of 13 administrative areas of the United Kingdom. They provide advice and support on behalf of our volunteer reserve forces and cadets, work with the chains of command of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force and establish and maintain links with the community. They therefore have the knowledge, skills and experience to report effectively and independently on the Future Reserves 2020 programme. Clause 47 puts that into statute. The reserve associations would not be able to fulfil that same role for the Regular Army, as that is not where their expertise lies.
My noble friend Lord King mentioned the reserves, and that recruiting got off to a bad start. My noble friend Lord Lee also asked about this. In the Ministry of Defence, we have given a lot of time to this issue. We are working hard on it. We have recently increased the bounty to encourage regulars to join the reserves, which was a point which my noble friend also made. Over the past three or four weekends, I have been out to see reserves training in Scotland and different parts of England. I can report that morale is high. The senior officers to whom I have spoken are optimistic that we shall reach the numbers that we have set out, so I am confident. I had organised for the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and two or three other Peers to visit the recruiting centre in Upavon. We had to cancel that because we had a Statement in the House, but I think that it is in the grid to have another visit there.
My noble friend Lord Palmer asked what manpower would be needed to prepare the report. The answer is a small number. My noble friend also asked what information is already in the public domain. The answer is plenty—the annual report and accounts and the Army 2020 update both cover progress in detail. He asked whether revealing deficiencies might help our enemies. We would not wish to reveal any weakness that may help our enemies, which will and does limit what we can release.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, referred to “radical change” that had not been discussed by the National Security Council. I had better write to the noble Lord as I have quite a lot of information here that I am not going to be able to read out.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, asked whether we were spending enough on cyber. The Government have recognised the importance of addressing the cyber threat to the UK and we have established a joint cyber unit of regulars and reserves.
I hope that I have answered most of the questions, but if I have not I will certainly write. I have set out why I do not believe the amendment should be accepted and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw it.
My Lords, first, I thank the Minister for his reply and all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford for responding to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, and do not intend to pursue it any further in the light of the response that my noble friend gave on that point.
A number of concerns have been raised. One is about the potential security implications of producing the report called for in the amendment and, indeed, the report called for by the Defence Select Committee. Since the report would be prepared by the Government and by the Secretary of State for Defence, one would assume that that in itself was a safeguard against anything being revealed that would put at risk our national security.
The issue was also raised that the report refers only to the Army and not to the other services. Obviously, that was in the light of the fact that this has come from a Defence Committee report which was geared to looking at the Army and Army 2020. Of course, if that is felt to be a major stumbling block, there is no reason at all why the Government—if that is their objection—could not come back at Third Reading with an amendment that included the other two forces. The alternative, of seeing this amendment not go through because it does not refer to the other forces, would simply mean that we end up with no report at all.
It is also worth stressing that the key element of the Defence Select Committee’s concerns was actually on the progress being made on the implementation of the Army 2020 plan. I went through the comments that it had to make at some length, because the comments were geared to real concerns about whether the plan would or could be implemented as intended and what the implications would be if it were. It was in that context in particular that the committee called for reports on the progress of all aspects of the Army 2020 plan.
I feel that I have addressed some of the concerns that have been raised. There can be no security implications when the report will be produced by the Government and the Secretary of State for Defence—they are not going to start revealing things that will be of use to those who are hostile to us. The concerns that have been expressed over the implementation of the Army 2020 plan are over how it is going to be implemented, whether it will be implemented as intended and what the implications will be. Primarily what is being sought are reports updating us on the progress that is being made and, as the Defence Select Committee said, detailing any setbacks there have been.
There are reports about what is happening with the reserves. I do not accept the Government’s argument that that is totally different from what is being asked in respect of the Army 2020 plan. They are both reports on progress being made towards implementing objectives set out for our future Army strength. In view of that, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, before the noble and gallant Lord sits down, it may assist him and other noble Lords to know that the Government are prepared to support the amendment in principle and that we intend to bring forward a government amendment, achieving these aims, at Third Reading. I will, of course, respond fully to the issues raised at the end of the debate, in the usual way, but I want to make our intentions clear now.
My Lords, that is obviously most welcome news and I thank the Minister and the Government for making it clear at this stage. On that basis, I will be prepared to withdraw my amendment. However, for the purposes of the debate, I beg to move.
My Lords, the amendments in this group deal with the issue of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of a future decision to proceed with a GOCO. The question of what information should be available to Parliament has been discussed extensively during the passage of the Bill, and that debate has been carried on this afternoon. As I have already indicated, the Government support Amendment 9 in principle and intend to bring forward a government amendment at Third Reading. We think that Amendment 9 strikes the right balance between ensuring Parliament has sufficient information to consider a GOCO proposal and not setting undue constraints on a future Government, the Defence Select Committee or the commercial process.
Amendment 9 requires the Government to publish an impact statement and White Paper before proceeding with a GOCO. The Government have always been clear that Parliament should be able to debate and consider in detail a decision to proceed with a GOCO in future. We agree that that would be a major decision and that it is right that Parliament should have the opportunity to hold the Government of the day to account for such a decision, should they decide to proceed with Part 1 of the Bill. We have also been clear that we expect any future Government to publish an impact assessment on the options before proceeding with a GOCO and to issue a White Paper setting out those options in detail.
We have discussed the issue of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of a future decision to proceed with a GOCO in great detail, both in Committee and with interested colleagues, and I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to that debate.
The requirements set by Amendment 9 seem reasonable, as they would impose two statutory requirements on the Secretary of State before an affirmative order to commence Part 1 could be laid before both Houses of Parliament. That would ensure that Parliament had sufficient information to properly debate the GOCO proposal under consideration before Part 1 could be brought into force.
We acknowledge the merit of some form of statutory requirement to provide detailed information on the GOCO proposals in future and that it is reasonable to put such a requirement into the Bill. We did not initially think that a statutory requirement was necessary, but we have been convinced otherwise by noble Lords from all sides of the House. That is an example of what the Members of this House do best—ensuring that legislation is properly scrutinised, and amended where necessary. We will therefore bring forward a government amendment at Third Reading that will make it a legal requirement for a future Government to publish appropriate information on the GOCO options before the order commencing Part 1 is brought forward.
We think that Amendments 10 and 11 go too far. They would do two things. First, they would place in statute the need for a future Government to publish a number of documents before proceeding with a GOCO. Secondly, they would make the affirmative commencement order that brings Part 1 into force subject to the super-affirmative procedure.
I will deal with those two things separately. On the publication of documents, the requirement would be for an impact assessment that covers specific options. This in itself does not present any difficulties; as I said earlier, we are prepared to accept a statutory requirement to produce an impact assessment.
However, proposed subsection (2B)(a)(iii) in Amendment 10 goes too far in that it requires the impact assessment to include any options that may be recommended following consultation with the Defence Select Committee. That is a very unusual provision. It effectively sets a statutory requirement for a future Government to consult the Defence Select Committee on the way forward. Although the Ministry of Defence would, of course, welcome any report that the Select Committee produced on the department’s proposals, we need to be very careful in this House about setting out statutory requirements on a House of Commons Select Committee. The Defence Select Committee already has the power—if it wishes—to look at any aspect of MoD business and I do not think it would be right for us to tell it what it must do. It is for the committee, not us, to decide what its programme of work should be.
On the other parts of Amendment 10—which would require an independent report on the options and the Defence Select Committee to review and report on that report—again I think this is too much. I really do not see what an independent report would add to the impact assessment set out earlier in the amendment, which would already set out the issues and analysis objectively. I do not think it is right to make it a legal requirement for the Defence Select Committee to review such a report. This raises fundamental questions about fettering the ability of a Select Committee to decide its own programme of work and it would be wrong for this House to direct what a Commons Select Committee must do.
Amendment 11 would also make the commencement order for Part 1 subject to the super-affirmative procedure. This would require the Secretary of State to consult on the order, including with anybody recommended by the Defence Select Committee. This would seem completely unnecessary given the requirement to publish an impact assessment and totally inappropriate in relation to a commencement order. Super-affirmative procedures may be appropriate where secondary legislation covers significant policy matters but not in relation to commencement orders. It is not clear what we would consult on given that the order will simply say when the provisions should come into force. Amendment 11 confuses the issues. I accept that there is a need for Parliament to consider any GOCO proposals but I fail to see what would be achieved by the requirements in Amendment 11. It would not provide the House with any more scrutiny of the proposals in question and introduces an unnecessary and overly complex procedure where none is required. I must therefore strongly resist Amendment 11, which I think is both unprecedented and wholly inappropriate.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said that the super-affirmative procedure would be unprecedented for a commencement order. The other circumstances in which super-affirmative procedures are used are very different. There is no precedent for using a super-affirmative procedure for a commencement order. A super-affirmative procedure is relevant only where an order covers significant changes in policy or has significant legal effect. A commencement order does neither.
I thank my noble friend Lord Roper for his support and wise advice during the passage of the Bill. I also thank my noble friend Lord Trefgarne for his support. Given that the Government have made it clear that they support Amendment 9 in principle and that we intend to bring forward a government amendment at Third Reading, I ask the noble and gallant Lord and other noble Lords not to press their amendments in this group.
My Lords, I thank the Government and the Minister once again for deciding to take away Amendment 9. I also thank very much the noble Lord, Lord Roper, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord Levene—who regrettably was not able to be present—for their support and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.