Defence Policy: Deterrence

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 31st October 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, with whose remarks I entirely agree. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has asked whether deterrence is still at the core of the UK’s defence policy; the Minister’s answer will surely be yes, so I shall use my allotted time to highlight just four of the many consequences of that anticipated affirmative.

It is quite clear that this Government, like the last, are committed to the maintenance of our strategic nuclear deterrent, through the continuous at-sea deployment of our Trident-armed submarines. But as we transition from the Vanguard to the Dreadnought, we shall for some time need to operate both classes of boat. However, the two types are very different and will require different crews and different logistic support chains. This will place a considerable strain on the Royal Navy and on defence resources in the round. What planning has taken place to ensure that the strain can be borne without damaging other areas of defence capability?

Of course, nuclear deterrence by itself is not nearly enough. Effective conventional deterrence exercised through NATO is essential if we are to have any chance of avoiding future war. But almost everyone, perhaps most importantly the Secretary of State for Defence himself, recognises that our Armed Forces are too small and inadequately equipped to constitute much of a deterrent at present.

Remedying this will be a long, difficult and expensive task, but, as the saying goes, it is the job never started that takes longest to finish. The substantially increased investment in our fighting capability, our combat sustainability and the defence-industrial capacity that underpins both needs to start now. When will the Government give clear evidence that the security of this country and its people really is their top priority?

I have mentioned nuclear and conventional deterrence, but these cannot be considered in isolation. The NATO doctrine developed during the Cold War recognised the need for a so-called escalation ladder that provided for a graduated response to increasing levels of aggression. One important element of graduated response was the provision of an increased element of choice in the boundary between conventional and nuclear war. Moving from conventional fighting to an all-out strategic nuclear exchange was seen as far too big a step. It would present politicians with almost impossible choices and would leave little or no room for second thoughts on either side. NATO’s tactical nuclear capability is greatly reduced from the Cold War, and the UK’s is now non-existent. What thought have the Government given to these missing rungs on the escalation ladder, which are an important contribution to the overall effectiveness of a deterrence posture?

Finally, deterrence begins in the mind. One area of conflict that is attracting increased attention is termed “cognitive warfare”. It is about getting into the minds of one’s opponents and undermining their will and capacity to resist. It is not a new concept, but new technology such as AI is offering new ways of doing old things. China takes cognitive warfare very seriously, and Russia is already deeply engaged in it. We are currently poor at defending against it, and our offensive capabilities are even worse. We need to do much better if our deterrent capability is to be credible to potential aggressors. What priority are the Government giving to this crucial area of capability?

Today I have been able to do no more than scratch the surface of some very important issues. I hope that future debates will enable me to expand on them. Meanwhile, I ask the Minister to reflect on them most carefully.