(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
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Lord Trefgarne
To ask His Majesty’s Government whether deterrence remains a core element of the United Kingdom’s defence policy.
Lord Trefgarne (Con)
My Lords, I will not detain the Committee for all the time allocated to me but will do my best to be clear and precise. Deterrence covers a wide range of defence activity. Nuclear is at the top. We have never fired a nuclear weapon in anger, following the two weapons fired by our US allies to end the Second World War. Nuclear weapons are to be used only when our “supreme national interest” so requires. So far, that has not occurred. I hope I can be assured that the new Defence Ministers in post have accepted briefings on these matters, whatever their inclinations may be.
At the other end of the scale, we cast our minds back to 1982 when HMS “Endurance” was on patrol in the south Atlantic. We withdrew it, somewhat unwisely, and the rest is history. The noble Lord, Lord West, who is not here this afternoon, played an important part in the Falklands conflict all those years ago, as I believe did the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. Are any British forces deployed to the south Atlantic at present? It seems that potential enemies there are again making unhelpful noises about the Falkland Islands. They were easily deterred last time by a single vessel; when we withdrew it, the rest became history.
Yesterday we heard from the Chancellor about defence spending generally. I felt that her remarks were not wholly awful. But deterrence has to be credible, and I hope that point is made to Chancellor Reeves as well as to the rest of us. There are also threats elsewhere in world, not just in the south Atlantic, and I hope we are taking account of those. I do not intend to detain your Lordships any longer.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, for giving us the opportunity to debate this important issue. I will talk about deterrence in the broadest sense. In so doing, I declare my interest as chair of the National Preparedness Commission.
Deterrence is not just about the ability to hit back hard against an aggressor, thereby making that aggression less likely. It is also about demonstrating a level of preparedness against the threat posed and a degree of resilience to recover quickly from any attack mounted. The first duty of government is to keep the country safe and protect its citizens. That is an essential platform on which the nation’s economic growth and prosperity depend.
Increasingly, hostile states pursue their objectives in the grey zone between peace and open conflict. Conventional campaigns are supplemented or preceded by tactics of hybrid warfare involving cyberattacks, campaigns of misinformation and disinformation, and disruption to civil infrastructure, the economy and the vital services on which citizens and communities depend. For example, we have seen a spate of unexplained fires in installations around Europe, and in the past 24 hours have read the news with great interest in that context.
Such grey-zone operations may take place without any associated conventional military activities. They are often conducted by proxies, non-state actors or groups that may be state-controlled, state-sponsored or state-tolerated; or they may be conducted by covert means. They may be plausibly deniable and, although they may fall below the threshold of armed conflict, their consequences are likely to be just as serious as those of a more conventional attack.
Recent years have seen attacks on undersea cables and fuel pipelines; cyberattacks by state-sponsored actors, such as those leading to the SolarWinds hack in 2020 or the Hafnium attack in 2021; the jamming and spoofing of navigation satellite systems; and various sorts of drone activity, which of course can be conducted from hundreds of miles away. A preparedness to respond effectively to such attacks, or to recover quickly from them, makes them less worth while for the adversary and therefore helps to deter them.
The consequences of these grey-zone activities are not just immediate or limited only to recovering from the event itself. Of course there are costs involved in addressing the immediate challenge but, more seriously, there may be a weakening of the nation’s ability to respond effectively to other attacks. More significantly, such attacks and the failure to deal with them effectively may undermine public confidence in the state and the ability of the Government to protect their citizens. That would be a win for any adversary.
Similarly, the objective of misinformation and disinformation campaigns is to sow discord and undermine faith in a legitimate, democratic Government. Such campaigns are fuelled by social media and ever more sophisticated applications of artificial intelligence, but the intent is to undermine citizens’ faith in their Government and the democratic process itself.
Dealing with such challenges may not necessarily involve a military response. It will need a response from the rest of government, local authorities, emergency services and, indeed, the whole of society. Such a level of preparedness and resilience is an essential part of the nation’s defence capability, and it has to be a key component of modern deterrence.
Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, with whose remarks I entirely agree. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has asked whether deterrence is still at the core of the UK’s defence policy; the Minister’s answer will surely be yes, so I shall use my allotted time to highlight just four of the many consequences of that anticipated affirmative.
It is quite clear that this Government, like the last, are committed to the maintenance of our strategic nuclear deterrent, through the continuous at-sea deployment of our Trident-armed submarines. But as we transition from the Vanguard to the Dreadnought, we shall for some time need to operate both classes of boat. However, the two types are very different and will require different crews and different logistic support chains. This will place a considerable strain on the Royal Navy and on defence resources in the round. What planning has taken place to ensure that the strain can be borne without damaging other areas of defence capability?
Of course, nuclear deterrence by itself is not nearly enough. Effective conventional deterrence exercised through NATO is essential if we are to have any chance of avoiding future war. But almost everyone, perhaps most importantly the Secretary of State for Defence himself, recognises that our Armed Forces are too small and inadequately equipped to constitute much of a deterrent at present.
Remedying this will be a long, difficult and expensive task, but, as the saying goes, it is the job never started that takes longest to finish. The substantially increased investment in our fighting capability, our combat sustainability and the defence-industrial capacity that underpins both needs to start now. When will the Government give clear evidence that the security of this country and its people really is their top priority?
I have mentioned nuclear and conventional deterrence, but these cannot be considered in isolation. The NATO doctrine developed during the Cold War recognised the need for a so-called escalation ladder that provided for a graduated response to increasing levels of aggression. One important element of graduated response was the provision of an increased element of choice in the boundary between conventional and nuclear war. Moving from conventional fighting to an all-out strategic nuclear exchange was seen as far too big a step. It would present politicians with almost impossible choices and would leave little or no room for second thoughts on either side. NATO’s tactical nuclear capability is greatly reduced from the Cold War, and the UK’s is now non-existent. What thought have the Government given to these missing rungs on the escalation ladder, which are an important contribution to the overall effectiveness of a deterrence posture?
Finally, deterrence begins in the mind. One area of conflict that is attracting increased attention is termed “cognitive warfare”. It is about getting into the minds of one’s opponents and undermining their will and capacity to resist. It is not a new concept, but new technology such as AI is offering new ways of doing old things. China takes cognitive warfare very seriously, and Russia is already deeply engaged in it. We are currently poor at defending against it, and our offensive capabilities are even worse. We need to do much better if our deterrent capability is to be credible to potential aggressors. What priority are the Government giving to this crucial area of capability?
Today I have been able to do no more than scratch the surface of some very important issues. I hope that future debates will enable me to expand on them. Meanwhile, I ask the Minister to reflect on them most carefully.
Lord Harlech (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. I declare my interests as a serving Army Reserve officer and a member of the APPG for Climate, Nature and Security. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Trefgarne on securing this important and timely debate. As noble Lords have already alluded to, deterrence is a broad subject, so I shall focus my remarks on the High North.
Due to climate change, natural resources and shifting geopolitical interests, the Arctic High North region has gained significant strategic importance for the United Kingdom. As the region warms, the melting sea-ice creates new opportunities and challenges, establishing the Arctic as a hot zone of environmental degradation, international competition and heightened insecurity. Opening new sea routes makes previously inaccessible resources such as oil, gas and minerals available, transforming the Arctic into a theatre of contest.
The Arctic region is home to critical shipping routes, such as the Northern Sea Route, which are becoming more viable due to melting ice. The NSR runs along Russia’s Arctic coast, providing a shortened connection between Europe and Asia. These routes could shorten global shipping times by nearly 40% and bypass traditional choke points such as the Suez Canal, offering significant economic advantages.
The region contains vast untapped natural resource reserves, including oil, gas and minerals. Control over these resources has become a geopolitical priority for nations with Arctic interests, including Russia, the United States and China, with China self-identifying, despite geographical terms, as a near-Arctic state. The Arctic’s proximity to critical defence zones makes it an area of military interest, particularly nuclear deterrence, early-warning radar systems and missile defence installations. In short, Arctic militarisation is amplifying strategic competition.
Russia has significantly ramped up its military presence in the Arctic, reopening old Soviet bases, building new ones and deploying advanced military capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines and long-range missiles. The Arctic Trefoil base on Franz Josef Land is one of the most advanced installations, designed to operate all year round in extreme Arctic conditions, equipped with advanced radars, missile systems and infrastructure to support hundreds of personnel.
Russia views the Arctic as vital to its national security and economic future—Arctic oil and gas account for 20% of Russia’s GDP—and its activities there have heightened regional tensions, necessitating a strategic response from NATO and its allies. Russia has deployed sophisticated air defence systems such as the S-400 and Pantsir-S1 to protect its northern territories. These systems can intercept aircraft and missiles at long ranges, providing a protective shield over key Arctic installations and energy infrastructure. Russia has also deployed Bastion coastal missile defence systems along its Arctic coastline. These systems are designed to defend against naval incursions, allowing Russia to control access to the NSR and deter foreign naval forces from operating in the region. Russia frequently conducts large-scale exercises involving thousands of troops, warships, aircraft and submarines.
Deterrence in the Arctic will involve a combination of military preparedness, advanced technology and diplomatic efforts. For the UK, it is vital to maintain a credible deterrent by having the capability to project power in the High North, particularly naval and air power, through all-domain awareness and access considerations for airfields and port infrastructure. Can the Minister say what the United Kingdom is doing to secure supply chains and enhance crisis management capabilities in this region?
To conclude, the UK should focus on deterring aggression, mainly from Russia, and ensuring the stability of crucial Arctic waterways. Through NATO co-operation, military preparedness, and a strong naval presence, the UK can be positioned to safeguard its interests and contribute to the broader defence of the Arctic.
Lord Bilimoria (CB)
My Lords, there is direct deterrence and extended deterrence. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, spoke about the credibility challenge that arises when states question the reliability of a defender’s commitment to protect allies, impacting extended deterrence.
The UK’s continuous at-sea deterrent, the CASD, has kept a nuclear-armed submarine patrolling undetected since 1969 to deter aggression. The nuclear policy in 2024 maintains a minimum credible and independent deterrent, used only in extreme self-defence and authorised solely by the Prime Minister. In 2023 the previous Conservative Government updated and prioritised an integrated multidomain deterrence strategy to counter state and transnational threats, with NATO as central. The UK’s nuclear deterrent pledged to NATO’s defence would be used only in extreme self-defence.
The Labour Government have affirmed NATO as a core to European and global security, and have committed to a new UK-EU security pact and improved defence ties with France, Germany and the Joint Expeditionary Force partners. The current Government pledge absolute support for the UK’s nuclear deterrent, including a triple-lock commitment to four nuclear submarines, continuous at-sea deterrence and future upgrades. Can the Minister confirm all this? Foreign Secretary David Lammy and Defence Secretary John Healey highlighted NATO’s role against Russia’s aggression and reinforced nuclear defence capabilities only in July this year.
Engaging with the moral implications of deterrence policy can lead to responsible decisions regarding the UK’s nuclear arsenal. Effective deterrence requires understanding and addresses complex motivations and perceptions. There are two strategies: deterrence by denial, which seeks to make aggression infeasible and relies on military presence, and deterrence by punishment, which threatens severe consequences but may be perceived as less credible. Historical evidence suggests that denial strategies are generally more reliable than punishment strategies, as they provide clearer signals of intent and capability to potential aggressors. The United States used deterrence effectively in Europe during the Cold War, leveraging its presence to complicate aggressors’ calculations and act as a trip-wire.
Combining deterrence threats with reassurance is crucial to avoiding provoking aggression, as seen with the US strategies towards North Korea. Success in deterrence requires clear communication of what is being deterred and the actions that will follow if ignored.
NATO has now been hugely strengthened by Finland and Sweden joining. At the Madrid summit in 2022, NATO identified Russia as the most significant threat to Euro-Atlantic security and terrorism as a direct, asymmetric threat. Twenty-three NATO allies are projected to meet or exceed spending 2% of GDP on defence, compared to only three allies in 2014. That is very good news. Collective defence is at the heart of the alliance, as set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which is a huge deterrent in itself.
We must continue to remember that the purpose of nuclear deterrence is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. Collaboration is key to this—the way in which we collaborate with the United States and France on nuclear deterrence, ensuring cost-effective operations. Our independent nuclear deterrence supports thousands of jobs nationwide.
I am a proud honorary group captain in 601 Squadron of the RAF. The “but” here is that the Defence Secretary has expressed concerns that our Armed Forces are unprepared for war, emphasising the need for improved deterrent capabilities against future aggression. The outsourcing of recruits has meant that only 10% of applicants successfully joined the British Armed Forces in 2023. Does the Minister agree that that must change?
I am a member of the GREAT Campaign’s advisory board. We in the UK have the strongest combination of hard and soft power, which gives us great global influence. Our strong nuclear deterrent is a huge element in this combination of hard and soft power.
Earl Attlee (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Trefgarne for introducing this Question for Short Debate. I used to read my father’s Hansard when my noble friend was a Minister in the Foreign Office and in the Ministry of Defence.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is absolutely correct: this is not just about conventional military deterrence. He is right to be worried about the home base and society’s sentiments. If those things were damaged in a conflict, in the grey area, it could have devastating effects on our conventional operations.
I am sure that the answer to my noble friend’s Question is “yes, but”. Many noble Lords have touched on nuclear deterrence, where our defence posture and signalling are absolutely clear and effective. As we have seen, we have not been cowed by President Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling in the conflict in Ukraine. I am pleased to observe that this Government are as sound as their predecessor on nuclear deterrence but, several years ago, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, observed that an inadequate conventional deterrent will result in the nuclear trip-wire being set too low. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, just asked the Minister about tactical nuclear weapons and deterrence; I look forward to his answer.
In conventional deterrence, our signalling is not positive or clear to any potential adversary. For instance, it is easy for a potential adversary to measure our land logistics capability and intent. They will note that we are still selling off perfectly serviceable, brand-new logistic vehicles to meet resource accounting and budgeting requirements. In the current situation, at the large scale of effort we ought to be able to deploy on land in 12 weeks, but I do not think we can do it at all at the moment.
I keep banging on about the essential need to undertake large-scale exercises out of area and overseas to demonstrate and test our conventional capability—or the capability that we should have. My noble friend Lord Harlech touched on the fact that the Russians regularly exercise with large numbers of troops. Yes, it is expensive to do and you can save money by not undertaking such exercises, but it is cheaper than increasing your capability and provides much more conventional deterrence. It also exposes any unrecognised weaknesses in your current capability. Currently, we have too few big exercises and the exercises we undertake are too short in duration, in order to save money.
Noble Lords must not be deluded by the wide range of military operations that we undertake all over the globe at small scale. We are now in the era of state-on-state conflict; that is what we need to deter. We will not achieve that through small operations and exercises, or the completely underresourced Armed Forces that the Minister inherited from the previous Administration.
Lord Harries of Pentregarth (CB)
My Lords, my interest in this area arises from my early academic research on the principles of discrimination and proportion in the just war tradition and their applicability in a nuclear age. This interest was further intensified in my time as dean of King’s College London during the 1980s, when I had the privilege of being a member of a number of think tanks reflecting on the nature of nuclear deterrence, many of them under the influence of the much-missed Sir Michael Quinlan, the architect of British defence policy in its strategic and ethical aspects.
I continue to support a policy of deterrence which contains a nuclear component, but I do so with moral fear and spiritual trembling. It is a morally awesome policy to support. It can be supported only in the belief that it is in principle fundamentally stable, not because human beings are any better than they were—far from it—but because, for the first time in human history, it could not conceivably be in the interest of any power to go to war with another which possessed nuclear weapons. In the words of President Reagan, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
I was never a supporter of CND, but it performed an important role in reminding the world of the horrific nature of these weapons. I was appalled a few years ago when there was a period of tension between India and Pakistan to listen to some of the generals involved talking about using nuclear weapons as though they were like any other weapons. They are not like other weapons, and we must never forget that.
We must also not forget that the moral principles which apply to the use of all armed force are equally applicable in a nuclear age: I mean the principles of discrimination and proportion. There are very distinguished ethicists who believe that even the threatened use of nuclear weapons would violate these principles, but when I was most involved, British defence policy was built on the conviction that this was not inevitably the case. I trust that this is so. In that connection, I want to identify with the question raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, about graduated deterrence and the ladder of escalation, because that is fundamental to not only British deterrence policy but the possibility of maintaining the use of weapons which are discriminate and proportionate. It is a vital question to which I hope the Minister will be able to give a satisfactory response.
There is an old saying about fighting a present war with the outlook of a previous one. I believe that the major threat at the moment is not the nuclear weapons of another state but their capacity for cyberwarfare. Nuclear weapons are no deterrent to another country that has the capacity to render our whole command and control system inoperative. Although I continue to support our deterrence posture, with its nuclear component, my main concern is in relation to our ability to protect our own command and control structure and our capacity to deter other countries from disrupting it. I hope that the Government will be able to give some reassurance on that.
Lord Balfe (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, for initiating this debate, and I hope that the Hansard is sent to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen. Of course, deterrence must remain a cornerstone of our defence policy, otherwise there is no reason to have one at all. But it is also important to realise that other countries have a very good grasp of our defence capacity. I do not know whether other noble Lords watched the American series, “Corridors of Power”, a PBS production, from which you could see that the Americans had a much clearer grasp of the limitations of European power than we appear to have.
We need to define much more clearly what we wish to do, then we need to find the resources to do it. I am not terribly impressed with the 2.5% or 3% argument. What we need to look at is what we need and a pathway for achieving it. I was struck last Friday in our debate when the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, pointed out that we had given Ukraine £172 million-worth of equipment, but that it would cost £2.7 billion to replace it. That shows how out of date it was, but it also shows how much money we need to spend to bring our forces up to a level where they can do their job. That is far more important than percentages.
We need to define clearly what our role is in defence. First, it is clearly to defend the home territory. Secondly, I suggest that we need to keep our garrison in the Falklands. Thirdly, we need to keep our bases in Cyprus, which are quite valuable for operations in the Gulf. Finally, we need to pull our resources together with our Baltic allies to look at both the High North, referred to by my noble friend Lord Harlech, and the Baltics, which are within Europe but certainly threatened by Russia. Only by getting together Finland, Sweden and all the countries around the Baltic, including Poland, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, are we going to be able to put forward a credible defence. We have to work together and exercise together; we have to have joint exercises and revive the Arctic Council as a viable organisation to talk to the Russians, but also to protect the High North.
Finally, cables and electronic warfare are part of the future, but I often feel that they are seen as an add-on rather than as a key part of our defence capacity, as they should be.
Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)
My Lords, like other noble Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, for enabling us this afternoon to talk about deterrence and core aspects of UK defence. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and I keep meeting in this venue. We talked about the SDR two weeks ago, we were here again last week, and we are going to meet again in an hour to talk about defence expenditure—so I am not going to touch on defence expenditure, as did the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria. I want to pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the new defence team, because one concern that the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, implied was that the new Government might not be serious about deterrence or about defence.
On Tuesday evening, as a trustee of the Armed Forces Parliamentary Trust, which runs the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme, I was at a graduation dinner. Present were the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, because he had been part of the scheme, the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman of Darlington, and Luke Pollard, Min AF. We have among our ministerial ranks people have previously taken the time from the Back Benches or from opposition to ask what defence is all about. It is important to realise that the Government are saying on defence and deterrence almost exactly the same as the previous Conservative Government and almost the same as the Liberal Democrats. We are now all committed to CASD and to the defence of the realm, and we understand the importance of deterrence.
On deterrence and preparedness, which we heard about from the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, and given that I am winding for the Liberal Democrats, I remind noble Lords of the importance not just of defence commitments but of diplomacy and development, because if we establish the right relationships before we end up in a state where we need to prepare for war, we might make better use of the British budget. Deterrence is important, CASD matters, but so do our alliances, such as NATO and the bilateral relationships which this Government are seeking to build and foster. That is all incredibly important, yet, as we have heard from various noble Lords, the challenges we face in the 21st century are rather different.
In his incredibly important contribution, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, reminded us about a range of issues that we need to think about in nuclear policy and, more broadly, about discrimination and proportionality. He reminded us that our nuclear posture was initially determined in a period of balance: the Cold War, when mutually assured destruction meant that it was unlikely that any side would use a nuclear weapon. They had their deterrent function. In the current world, we face not just state-based threats but threats from non-state actors; not just conventional threats but cyber and hybrid threats. In respect of naval policy, we have the noble Lord, Lord West, repeatedly banging the drum for maritime. Who is banging the drum to deal with hybrid threats and cyber, and to ensure that we have a fully-fledged deterrent alongside our nuclear deterrent?
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Trefgarne is right to pose his vital Question. It gets to the heart of what a defence capability is, as he, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, so clearly described.
On defence capability, it is not enough to want one, it is certainly not enough to talk about one, and there is no point in having one unless it deters. I say to your Lordships that, for me, this all came into sharp relief when Scotland was confronted by the independence referendum in 2014. One of the strongest arguments for staying within the United Kingdom was defence and security, and the attempt by those seeking independence to explain what the defence capability of an independent Scotland would be was risible: no nuclear deterrent, a tiny presence of maritime assets with no strategic purpose, a very small military infantry with negligible assets and a virtually non-existent air capability. As for cyber and space, that was far too far in the future to be worrying about.
The question that such a depleted resource begged was: what is the point of having it? It did not deter, it offered no meaningful contribution to our allies and it was of little interest to NATO. However, this usefully demonstrated that you would actually be better off not having a capability, spending the money on something else and hoping that better-resourced friends would come to your aid if necessary. That is of course not where any of us would want to be and, thankfully, not where the majority of voters in the referendum wanted to be, so independence was rejected.
In fairness to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I thought then and still think now that the UK has a strong defence capability. Our continuous at-sea deterrent is at the disposal of NATO, one of only two nuclear powers offering that support. We have invested in the Navy, have modernised equipment for the Army and are actively progressing a successor to Typhoon. Importantly, we have also invested in the new domains of cyber and space. I have to say that I become angry when politicians of whatever stripe diminish that strength, and it is certainly unhelpful for a government Minister to call our capability into question. In fairness to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I have never been aware of him doing that.
Underpinning that capability by maintaining investment, demonstrating credibility and ensuring that our deterrent posture is clear requires both vigilance and action by the Government. That is why their attitude to defence, as confirmed by yesterday’s Budget, has got us to a very undesirable position. To talk incessantly about lifting defence expenditure to 2.5% of GDP, to tell everyone in sight that that is your political resolve, to raise a reasonable expectation that you will flesh out the timeline and the trajectory in the Autumn Statement and then to lapse into a deafening silence is deeply damaging on all fronts. By placing a question mark over both the timing and the level of strategic resource for defence, the Government are undermining credibility, and that immediately impacts on our ability to deter. Our allies need to know that they can trust us and that we are solid. Our adversaries need to see that investment and know that we shall not hesitate to deploy our capability when the need arises.
Later today we shall discuss more specifically the 2.5% of GDP in the debate of my noble friend Lord Trenchard, but in my opinion yesterday’s Budget was not good news for defence. It has diminished our stature, impugned our credibility and weakened our deterrence posture. I urge the Minister to use his wisdom and considerable clout to get the Government to review the position.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I shall deal with a couple of the important questions that have been posed and then lay on the table some of the Government’s position on deterrence.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, for bringing forward this important debate. The issue of deterring those who would do us harm is of real significance. The discussion about how you do that, from conventional forces right through to the effect of a continuous at-sea deterrence, is an important question for us all. The noble Lord deserves a lot of praise for bringing this forward.
I shall deal with a couple of issues that are of huge significance to this country, to our alliances and to our position in the world. A number of noble Lords have raised the nuclear deterrent. We as a new Government are 100% committed to the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent. We are committed to it with respect to the continuous at-sea deterrent, with the four new Dreadnought submarines. In answer to the point made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, about the transition from Vanguard to Dreadnought, there are significant training programmes and work going on about how that transition is best done. I reassure him that considerable work is going on with respect to that.
The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, raised the point about the Falkland Islands. The British Government remain absolutely committed to the right of self-determination of the people of the Falkland Islands. These are hugely significant and important questions that were raised by a number of noble Lords and the position needs to be stated at the outset. There is no policy change in respect of that.
The noble Lord asked about the forces commitments there. I visited the Falkland Islands. As the noble Lord will know, there is a huge military presence there of British forces. I think other noble Lords speaking in this debate will have visited that base. There are Typhoon fighters there. There are air defence systems and numbers of troops, as well as regular naval patrols, to reassure the Falkland islanders and to make a statement about the desire and intent of His Majesty’s Government to ensure that that right is protected.
The ladder of escalation was mentioned. It is always difficult to say, as you move from one rung of the ladder to another, exactly which rung you reach is the point at which something should happen. It is particularly difficult to lay that out and say specifically when something should happen, as many others who have taken defence decisions will have found. But you can lay out general principles, and they are laid out in various treaties.
That is why we are defending and doing what we are doing with respect to Ukraine. That is why we have talked, in no uncertain terms, about our determination to work to maintain the law of the sea. That is why we have said that Article 5 of NATO remains a key component. That is why we have said that territorial integrity remains important. When a country seeks to undermine or flout that, your exact immediate response and where you draw the line will sometimes depend on the particular circumstances.
However—this is the point of deterrence, and I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne—it must be known that this country, with its allies, will not stand aside and watch international law or rules be flouted. That is the important statement. That is why, as noble Lords will have heard me say and will have said themselves, what we are doing in Ukraine is so important. We are saying that we will not stand to see those laws flouted. When the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, was in my position, that is exactly what she said, quite correctly; that is what the then Government said, quite correctly. Those statements are important.
My noble friend Lord Harris was right to raise the issues of cyberwarfare, information and disinformation and the resilience of the population, which are all important matters. They are new aspects of war, especially cyberwarfare He will have visited, as I have, numerous places where we are trying to put defences in place and build resilience into computer systems, datasets and so on to resist those who would attack us. With his knowledge of local government, my noble friend has much more experience than me in the resilience of the population and in civil emergencies and defence, which we will have to address. I will just say that, when I look back in history, I see that the resilience of the British people has been immense when they have had to resist the threat of attack or have indeed been attacked. The whole area of cyberwarfare and information is important, as my noble friend said.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, for his remarks about the importance of identifying the threats that we face and trying to configure the Armed Forces in order to meet those future threats. That is important and it is part of what the defence review seeks to do. Indeed, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and I have often discussed, it is important that you know what you are seeking to do in order to configure your Armed Forces to meet a particular threat, which can sometimes be quite difficult. We have heard from numerous noble Lords about the importance of cyberwarfare, so that will be an increasing demand and it will be important for us all to work, across government, on that aspect.
We face other issues, as the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, pointed out. We talk about the threat of China as though China is thousands upon thousands of miles away; with climate change, it is now thousands of miles nearer and, indeed, is seeking to exploit the High North through the opening up of sea passages that were not available even a couple of decades ago. I know that, if you talk to Norway, Iceland and many other countries such as the Baltic states—I mentioned Finland—they are all increasingly concerned about not only Russia, of course, but the implications with respect to China.
The noble Lord can be reassured that, like the work that has happened previously, which the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, will have been involved with, we are seeking to extend and develop our relationships with those countries. The Joint Expeditionary Force is a classic example of countries coming together to try to see how they meet common threats.
I cannot remember whether it was the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, or the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who mentioned the importance of the Arctic Council. Going back to the point by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, we are seeking to reinvigorate that and work to ensure that it maintains the rule of law according to treaties that most nations of this world have signed. We will enforce those laws and expect them to be adhered to. Countries should know that there are consequences if they do not adhere to them. That is part of what we seek to do.
The noble Lord, Lord Harlech, will also be reassured that on Monday I am speaking to a conference of Norwegian military and parliamentarians about the High North. Again, it is one of those areas that, even a few years ago, we would perhaps not have thought of in the way that we do now. Many of these things are extremely important.
The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, also mentioned the nuclear deterrent. He heard the answer that I gave and will hopefully be reassured.
On the point by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, we are looking seriously at cognitive warfare, and it will have to be an increasing priority for government. It is a capability that we will need to look at to see how we develop it. I thank him very much for raising that point.
On some of the broader points made, let me say this. We talk about hard power. On deterrence, we have a NATO-first policy as a Government. The carrier strike group sailing around the Mediterranean into the Indo-Pacific, whatever route it takes in the end, visiting numerous countries there as an international alliance, says this to countries across the world: we are sailing our carrier strike group, led by the “Prince of Wales” carrier, with aircraft on it, with allies, to assert the freedom of navigation and the rule of the law of the sea, and we expect other countries to adhere to that. That is why we bothered to do that. That is why we have a nuclear deterrent.
There is an issue in the debate about what sort of Armed Forces we will need to ensure that they can fight the battles of the future. The strategic review that we have at the moment is seeking to deal with that. I will tell noble Lords one thing I heard. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her remarks; we will debate the points about money by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, more fully in the next debate, and I thank her for her remarks as well. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, will have heard the CDS make what I thought was a very good speech at the dinner. He said that one of the things Britain should do more than it does—and I totally agree—is to rediscover its own confidence in the things it can do and the things it does to deter others from taking actions that they might. We should all reflect on that. We sometimes look at the challenges we face, which is quite right, but alongside that we should look at the things that we do and do well. This country should have pride and confidence in what it does, not only in this continent but across the globe.