(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs drafted, the Bill refers to criminal conduct as conduct
“in the course of, or otherwise in connection with”
the conduct of a covert human intelligence source, and as
“conduct by or in relation to the person”
who is specified as the covert human intelligence source. As has been said, the amendments would establish that criminal conduct is conduct by the covert human intelligence source in the absence of any explanation as to why the additional words to which I have referred are needed, and what the consequences would be, and for whom, if they were not in the Bill. A further amendment in this group also puts on the face of the Bill that a criminal conduct authorisation cannot retrospectively give clearance for behaviour that has already happened before the date the authorisation is given.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights also raised these issues in its report on the Bill when it said that the definition of what amounts to “criminal conduct” for the purpose of an authorisation is wider than simply criminal activity by a covert human intelligence source, and referred to the wording which the amendments in this group would delete. The only explanation for this which the Joint Committee on Human Rights could find was in the draft code of practice, which states that
“a criminal conduct authorisation may authorise conduct by someone else ‘in relation to’ a
covert human intelligence source,
“namely those within a public authority that are involved in or affected by the authorisation.”
No doubt the Government will wish to respond in some detail setting out why the words “in connection with” and “in relation to” are essential, what exactly they mean and, giving examples, explaining why it is considered necessary to enable a public authority to authorise criminal conduct by someone other than the covert human intelligence source, which some might feel is rather at odds with the title of the Bill.
My Lords, having made my maiden remarks at Second Reading, it is a pleasure now to assist the House in scrutinising the detail of this legislation. I hope to reassure noble Lords with regard to the scope, safeguards and limits to conduct that can be authorised under a criminal conduct authorisation. I recognise the feeling of the House on the last appearance of the Bill as a recognition of the complexities and difficulties which attach to this field of criminal investigation.
With regard to the remarks by my noble friend Lord Cormack, he will perhaps recollect that when I spoke at Second Reading I recognised the inelegance of the expression “CHIS”, and I fully share his concerns about it. However, until such time as we have evolved a suitable replacement, if that is possible, I trust I will not trespass on his patience if I continue to use the expression.
The Bill is drafted to allow things to be authorised which are certainly connected to the conduct of the CHIS but not the same thing as it: actions which are connected to the activities of the CHIS but which are not the CHIS activities themselves. This is deliberate and it is to allow for activity which facilitates and supports the core conduct of the CHIS, most obviously to allow the CHIS to avoid detection in order to remain in place and to provide the intelligence needed. The purpose of the expressions “in connection with” and “in relation to” is to ensure that such activity may be authorised. This language also serves the function of ensuring that the scope of a criminal conduct authorisation is properly limited. It helps to make it clear that it is not the case that any and all criminality by a CHIS may be authorised. It cannot be some private venture that the CHIS has involved himself or herself in. The criminal conduct to be authorised must be connected to the conduct of a CHIS and to the criminal conduct authority.
My Lords, Amendments 3 and 5 from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, seek, as she said, to maintain the status quo but on a statutory footing. They would maintain the existing legal position whereby an undercover operative, a CHIS— I demur from the noble Baroness’s use of the phrase “police spy”, which, in addition to pejorative overtones, carries an undercurrent of the 19th-century Russian novel—could still be prosecuted for the activity that the state had tasked them to do.
In answer, first, to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, it has been a deliberate decision to draft the legislation in a way which renders correctly authorised conduct lawful in order to provide greater certainty and protection to undercover operatives—CHIS—where they are carrying out activity that they may have been authorised to undertake. To expand that in answer to the matters raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, this approach is in keeping with other powers in relation to the investigation of crime, such as interference with equipment, interference with property, and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, including an underlying Section 29 covert human intelligence source use and conduct authorisation.
As noble Lords have accepted—and they have not needed to be persuaded—our position is that it is grossly unfair and unreasonable for the state to ask an individual to engage in difficult and dangerous work to frustrate serious crimes while leaving open the possibility of the state prosecuting them for that very same conduct. That answers a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, in his contribution to the debate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has framed her argument in terms of an illustration: a passer-by breaking into a house to save a neighbour. The analogy is that, in that position, the passer-by would have had available to them legal defences, and that the undercover operative—the CHIS—should simply rely upon the discretion of prosecutors rather than enjoy at the outset the full protection of the law for activities carried out within the narrow and tightly constrained boundaries of the criminal conduct authorisation.
We consider the analogy drawn by the noble Baronesses inapposite. The CHIS is not a mere passer-by stumbling across wrong-doing, but rather is placed deliberately in the company of wrong-doers by the state to help the state, or is someone who may have come into contact with wrong-doers and gone on to offer assistance to the police or investigating authorities. In so doing, such a person will often be asked to go along with the criminal activity of those people to earn their trust, so that their criminal activity may be frustrated. They do so in the public interest and often at risk of harm. Our position is that if the state thinks that it is right to ask them to act in this way and can consider the matter in advance, it is not comparable to the situation of a member of the public acting as a good citizen, responding to an unexpected event and going to the assistance of a fellow citizen in danger.
It is a credit to the skill of the handlers, and to the commitment and trust of covert human intelligence sources, that they have been prepared to continue with the prospect of prosecution always alive. However, as we understand the situation, we must accept that we have lost intelligence and failed to recruit undercover operatives because we have not been able hitherto to give them confidence that the state will not prosecute them for the things that the state has asked them to do. This tension has existed for many years and it is right that we use the Bill to resolve it. In fact, making this legal position clear is likely to help with the recruitment and retention of human intelligence sources.
It would also be undesirable from a legal perspective to create an express power for public authorities to authorise activity which remained criminal. However, I reassure the noble Baroness that where a CHIS, or an undercover operative, commits any criminality outside the tight parameters of the authorisation, the prosecuting authorities can of course consider it in the normal way. The Bill does not prevent those impacted by an authorisation seeking redress. I include in that the matter raised by noble Lords in relation to civil redress. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal has the same powers to grant remedy as other courts.
The noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, and the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, were concerned that the Bill may be seen as something which allows a CHIS carte blanche to commit criminal activities. That is not the case. Criminal conduct authorisations are tightly drawn. Persons acting undercover will be working within a relationship with their handler, who is trained and experienced in conducting such work, and subject to a powerful oversight regime. A CHIS will never be granted carte blanche to commit any or all crimes. This is communicated clearly to people finding themselves in that situation, appointed to that position or recruited to that position. Where a covert human intelligence source commits criminality outside the tight provisions of the authorisation, the prosecuting authorities will consider the matter in the usual way.
In response to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, it is the case—as I think the noble Lord acknowledged, albeit with substantial caveat—that covert human intelligence sources acting outside authorised conduct have been prosecuted in the past. The Bill ensures that that can happen in future if the boundaries of the authority under which they work are transgressed. It is precisely to combat the sort of outrages identified by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that the Bill is framed. That is why it seeks to build on the oversight of the commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, asked about the visibility of authorisation forms and the effectiveness of the regime. I assure him and others in the Committee that there will be oversight of the new regime. That is the role the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office plays in overseeing all authorisations. That body will provide public commentary on the effectiveness of the regime as part of the reports which it prepares. It has access to all documents and all information bearing upon the CCAs about which we were speaking.
The noble Baroness, Lady Blower, spoke about the situation applying according to the law of Canada. We have looked carefully at the provisions applying in countries with legal systems similar to ours. However, similar though the legal system of Canada is, none the less there is a different regime of control, as the security imperatives in Canada are different from ours.
Finally, I shall comment on the observations by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We consider that the status quo is not desirable in the current situation. We acknowledge the decisions in the Third Direction case. We look to place the activities of people fulfilling these necessary functions on a statutory basis. I think—if I have gauged correctly the views of the Committee—that placing these powers on a statutory footing is more or less universally considered desirable. Clearly where we will potentially be at odds is in the framing of the terms of the statute. However, my respectful conclusion is to say that the continuation of the status quo is not desirable.
For the reasons that I have identified, we consider it desirable—in spite of the qualifications and concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and others—to render the situation whereby criminal conduct, tightly defined in individual circumstances, will be identified in advance rather than excused retrospectively.
I have received one request, so far, to speak after the Minister. I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
My Lords, the noble Lord clearly heard what I said about the view that we have lost intelligence and failed to recruit CHIS, and that failing to introduce a power in these terms is likely to impair the recruitment and retention of CHIS. I do not have to hand the figures that he seeks, but I undertake to write to him.
On the “brown envelope” scenario, when it is drawn to the attention of a presiding judge passing sentence that a member of a criminal organisation—a gang, a conspiracy or whatever—has actively assisted the police and the investigating authorities in bringing the prosecution, it is important that we maintain a proper boundary. A person becoming aware that the police are aware of criminal activity, who elects to go to the police in their own interests in order to assist them, and by so doing earns a degree of mitigation, is very different from a person becoming a CHIS in the course of criminal activity, or one who is associated with criminal organisations for that direct and specific purpose. The noble Lord shakes his head, but I insist that we must maintain boundaries. A person who, during or prior to a prosecution, assists the prosecution and the police, is different from a person inserted into an organisation with the purpose of deriving intelligence about its activities.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, spoke about the appointment of a committee to look into these matters; as he said himself, this was a matter which occurred to him shortly before this debate. I will look into the implications and communicate further with him.
This Committee has made it a privilege to be a Member of your Lordships’ House, which today I have heard at its best, expressing with great care and detail the sheer strength, depth and wisdom of noble Lords’ concerns about the Bill in its current form. Many other noble Lords have similar concerns, but for various reasons were unable to participate. The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, rightly pointed up the Northern Ireland experience, and with all matters of human rights and the rule of law, we ignore that voice and that particular experience at our peril.
The noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, rightly pointed out that supporters of these amendments come from all sides of the House. That should give the Minister pause for thought. So much has been said in these polarised times in our nations about extremism versus moderation. Sometimes I do not even know what these words mean any more, save that the ultimate moderation that holds our nations together is the rule of law. My friend—if not my noble friend—the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, rightly describes this as a very conservative principle and tradition. However, equally for liberals and progressives, there can be no human rights or even democracy without the preservation of the rule of law.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, pointed to our legal traditions, but also made a particular point about successful work of his own at the Bar deconstructing the mens rea of someone who had no criminal intent because they were acting in the public interest; that ties in with my amendment very well indeed. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, may have used colourful language which offended the Minister, but it is how many members of the public will feel about what is being provided for here without the safeguard of the amendments that I have put forward.
My noble friend Lady Bryan was right to point up the excellent briefing from Justice. I neglected to declare an interest as a member of Justice, but I hope that noble Lords will forgive me, because I suspect that many of them, particularly noble and learned Lords, are members of that wonderful law reform organisation. My noble friend Lady Bryan made the crucial point: where are the hard cases of undercover operatives who are just doing their work and doing no more than necessary being prosecuted by rogue prosecutors against the public interest and common sense, because we have not seen them?
Of course, there is only one thing better than one Lord Thomas, and that is two Lords Thomas contributing so eloquently to a debate, particularly when one of them is the former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. I will let that hang in the air for a moment, because I know that the Minister will not have ignored that very powerful intervention from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. What is wrong with the current law? Where is the evidence? How can we do our duty without the ability to examine the case for moving from the status quo that has served our nations so well in this difficult and grey area and held the ring for so long?
My noble friend Lord Hendy was absolutely right to bring up the ongoing Mitting inquiry, in which he represents some of those who have been subject to abuse of power. There have been abuses under the current law; how much greater will the possibility of abuse be if we cross this Rubicon into granting blanket advance immunities to so many agents of the state, including from the criminal fraternity?
What of the victims, as my noble friend Lady Blower so rightly pointed out? She reminded us of perhaps the greatest jurist of my lifetime: Lord Bingham, who articulated equality before the law as a vital rule of law principle. She also reminded us that Article 13 of the ECHR requires an “effective remedy” for victims of crime. I know that the Minister attempted to address this, but how can “lawful for all purposes” possibly square with giving an appropriate remedy to a victim of a crime that is suddenly rendered no longer a crime?
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has been a police officer for 30 years, and, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer suggested, that gives his practical experience in the field particular weight. I imagine that noble Lords listening and those who will read his intervention tomorrow will be very careful to consider his wholesale dismantling of the argument against maintaining the so-called tension, which operates as a safeguard against the abuse of power. It is good for operating on the mind and ethical framework of any CHIS or undercover operative, particularly one who is not even an officer of the state but is a mere agent and, I repeat, quite possibly from the criminal fraternity.
My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer also rightly took us to the very powerful report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which expresses so many concerns about the Bill in its current form. There is so much potential for violations of human rights and abuse if the Bill is unamended. I have tried to engage constructively by way of this amendment, which does minimal violation to the scheme of the Bill and addresses the problem posed by the ongoing litigation but, none the less, preserves the status quo that has served us so well and is about preserving the rule of law.
It is said to be a breach of the rules of theatre to break the fourth wall, but, for all its beauty and glory, your Lordships’ House is not a theatre; it is a legislature. I want to be fair to the Minister, who is new to your Lordships’ House and to this Bill and who cannot possibly have been involved in the earlier stages of the policy formulation that led to its precise drafting. It is very difficult to be in the Chamber for one of these Committees, to listen to all the arguments—particularly when they are so powerful and come from all sides—and to respond on the spot, on your feet and immediately, as he has had to do. None the less, I hope that he will listen to the sheer breadth and depth of concern, which might well be addressed by way of my amendments or something like them.
The noble and learned Lord takes issue with my analogy about other citizens and passers-by. He says that these agents of the state are not mere passers-by, but that argument cuts both ways. The mere passer-by is mostly not from the criminal fraternity and normally does not have a vested interest, of whatever kind, in getting a particular outcome, quite possibly, even as an agent provocateur, as we have seen in the past. Why should an undercover operative, a CHIS, quite possibly a civilian or even someone from the criminal fraternity, have a protection in law that even a uniformed police officer does not have when he or she puts themselves in harm’s way on a daily basis? The so-called tension is a healthy one, and it should not be resolved by way of the absolute immunity that is the ultimate evil in this Bill.
Finally, I am beginning to suspect that the “lawful for all purposes” formulation was not adopted with a great deal of deliberation. I am beginning to suspect that it was used because it was used before and is in the framework of RIPA, where it is, pretty much, appropriate because that is about surveillance. As the Minister has said, it has been used in certain narrow confines before, but this Bill authorises unlimited criminal conduct and, potentially, very serious crimes, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights has pointed out. Therefore, a “lawful for all purposes” advance immunity that is appropriate for bugging, surveillance and minor criminal damage is simply not acceptable or conscionable in this case.
I am delighted to follow my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, who has made a real contribution to the quality of the debate in this Committee and will make a real contribution to the changes necessary to the Bill. I shall speak particularly to Amendment 71, in the name of my noble friends Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, previewed, it seeks to make it clear that there is a jurisdiction in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal to give compensation to people.
This group concerns compensation for innocent victims. It seems to me that innocent victims can take two forms. One is somebody who is completely innocent and, pursuant to a crime authorised by a CHIS, gets beaten up, for example, by the CHIS. What remedy does that person have? Secondly and separately, there is the person who is a target of CHIS activity; for example, somebody who, it is thought, might be about to commit a crime and their premises might be burgled, pursuant to an authorisation under the Bill. What remedy does that person have? Let us assume, particularly, that the whole authorisation was wrongheaded from the start because, as everybody accepts in this process, errors get made. So, there is the innocent victim of crime on one hand and, on the other, the target of CHISery who is the wrong target and a judicial review would be allowed in relation to that.
On the face of the Bill, if it is all lawful, then there is no remedy at all. Will the Minister please explain what remedy there is? The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, made it clear that he thinks activities under Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which this is amending, already provide a remedy. Indeed, in the Commons in answer to this amendment, the Security Minister replied:
“Let me be clear: there is no barrier under the Bill for affected persons seeking a judicial review of a decision made by a public authority. Similarly, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal already has jurisdiction in relation to conduct to which part 2 of RIPA applies, which will include the amendments made by the Bill. I am, though, listening to concerns expressed by Members about the Bill’s potential impact on routes of redress, and I am happy to consider whether anything further is needed.”—[Official Report, Commons, 15/10/20; col. 613.]
It would be helpful to have, first, a repetition of the assurance that the IPT covers judicial review-type relief—on the basis, presumably, that the original authorisation is unlawful—and therefore the reference to the fact that whatever is done under the authority is lawful does not apply to the original grant of the authority.
Secondly, will the noble and learned Lord deal with the issue of the innocent victim of the crime when there is a lawfully authorised criminal conduct authorisation, and the consequence of that is that somebody is, for example, severely beaten up? What remedy does that totally innocent victim have in such circumstances? The effect of the Bill is to say that the conduct is rendered “lawful for all purposes”. It cannot mean that. It cannot mean that the totally innocent victim, who has other remedies, is deprived of all those remedies because it is authorised under a criminal conduct authorisation: it cannot have intended that.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said, it may be key that we focus on the public authority which provided the authorisation and do not lose sight of the person giving the authority by focusing on the liability of the CHIS themselves. This point was clearly considered by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in suggesting its amendment to try to deal with this.
People are very concerned about the innocent victims. I strongly invite the noble and learned Lord to deal also with the practical issues referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. For all the remedies in the world you create, if you can never tell the victim what has happened, how does that person get a remedy? That is an important point.
My Lords, Amendments 6 and 8 seek to remove the exemption from civil liability for CHIS criminal conduct. While I understand the intent behind these amendments, which is to allow those impacted by a criminal conduct authorisation to be able to seek civil redress, there are good reasons why the Bill has been drafted in this way.
I explained in response to amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, why the Bill has been drafted to render correctly authorised conduct lawful for all purposes. Those reasons apply equally to criminal and civil liability. An authorisation will have been granted because it was deemed necessary and proportionate to tackle crime, terrorism or hostile state activity. Where that authorisation has been validly and lawfully granted, it is right that criminals or terrorists cannot then sue the undercover operative—the CHIS—or the state for that same activity.
I appreciate that the spirit of these amendments is to ensure that any innocent persons impacted by an authorisation can seek redress where appropriate. I reassure noble Lords that all authorisations are, in the first place, very tightly bound and, as part of the necessity and proportionality test, the authorising officer will consider any other risks of the deployment. An authorisation must consider and minimise the risk of impacting those who are not the intended subject of the operation.
The Bill does not create an exemption for all and any civil liability. For example, the conduct that is the subject of the Undercover Policing Inquiry would not be exempt from civil liability under the Bill’s regime.
I also seek to offer reassurance that routes of redress will be available to those who have been impacted by a criminal conduct authorisation where that authorisation has been unlawfully granted, following the observations from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, on the situation where the wrong stems from the authorisation granted being improper or too broad. The Bill does not prevent affected persons from seeking a judicial review of a public authority’s decision to authorise criminal conduct. If a judge concluded that the decision had not been lawfully made, the affected person could seek a remedy through the courts. The noble and learned Lord referred to the statement made in the other place on this. Equally, as with other investigatory powers, any affected person or organisation can make a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal which will then be independently considered by the tribunal.
A further important safeguard is the obligation on the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to inform a person of a serious error that relates to them, where it is in the public interest. This includes situations where the commissioner considers that the error has caused significant prejudice or harm to the person concerned. The commissioner must also inform the person of any rights they have to apply to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is an example of the commissioner actively seeking out persons who have been wronged as part of their remit to consider all documentation, facts and circumstances surrounding the granting of a CCA.
Amendment 71, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is unnecessary. Any person or organisation can already make a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal with regard to conduct under Part II of RIPA; that complaint will be considered independently by the tribunal. The IPT operates one of the most open and transparent systems in the world for investigating allegations that agencies have breached human rights. It hears cases in open where possible and publishes detailed reports on its work and rulings. This will remain unchanged under the Bill.
These criminal conduct authorisations are very tightly bound so that they meet the necessity and proportionality test. A number of routes of redress will be available to persons wronged to challenge the validity or lawfulness of the authorisation and then seek the appropriate remedy, whether through judicial review or a complaint to the independent tribunal.
The matter of applications to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others. I regret to advise the House that I do not have information specific to the CICA in front of me, but I will write to him and others who have expressed an interest on that point.
On a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, it is important to bear in mind that RIPA already excludes civil liability for authorised CHIS conduct, so what is introduced in the Bill is not new.
I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton.
The remedy lies in the approach to the tribunal and the obligation on the commissioner to notify a person who is wronged of their right.
Can the Minister confirm that the totally innocent victim can go to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and make a claim for damages for assault and battery?
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. In speaking to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, I do not want to get into an argument over who has more respect for whom, but I have the utmost respect for him and his experience as a former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. There is a fundamental disagreement he has surfaced with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and me over what was described in a previous group as the tension in the fact that a CHIS committing a crime is potentially subject to criminal prosecution and being sued for civil damages. I note that the noble Lord does not believe that is right, whereas the noble Baroness and I think it is.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1, and do propose Amendments 1A and 1B as amendments thereto—
My Lords, I will speak to Commons Amendments 1 to 5 and Amendments 1A, 1B and 4A to 4E, which are in my name.
Private international law is a technical area of law, but it is important to people and businesses that become involved in legal disputes with a cross-border aspect. A family may need to enforce a maintenance decision when one parent moves abroad, or a small business that has been left out of pocket by a foreign supplier may need to seek redress. Agreements on private international law create reciprocal rules to enable UK businesses, families and individuals to resolve these difficult and challenging situations. They prevent multiple court cases taking place in different countries and allow for the decisions of UK courts to be recognised and enforced across borders. All of this helps to reduce costs and anxiety for the parties involved.
The House will recall that this Bill contains two substantive clauses. The first implements three key Hague conventions which currently apply as a consequence of our former membership of the European Union, allowing us to continue to co-operate on important aspects of private international law with existing partners. The second establishes a delegated power to implement further agreements on private international law now that we have regained full competence in this area from the European Union. This stood part of the Bill on its Lords introduction but was removed on Report. Commons Amendments 1, 2, 4 and 5 simply return this clause, and related provisions, to the Bill.
There is also Commons Amendment 3, which I hope will be uncontroversial and will not address in detail. It adds a permissive extent clause to the Bill allowing the implementing power to be extended to the Isle of Man; this is at the request of the Isle of Man Government. This is the standard approach to extending UK legislation to the overseas territories or Crown dependencies and in this case does not directly affect the United Kingdom. My noble and learned friend Lord Keen spoke in detail on this amendment back in May but was unable to move the amendment at the time.
The agreements implemented under Clause 1 are widely supported by interested parties in the legal and finance sectors, and indeed by Members in this House and the other place. The 1996 Hague Convention aims to improve the protection of children in cross-border disputes. It deals with issues such as residence of and contact with children whose parents live in different countries. The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements aims to ensure the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to international commercial transactions. The 2007 Hague Convention provides rules for the international recovery of child support and spousal maintenance. The Government have already taken the necessary international steps to ensure our continued membership of these agreements following the end of the transition period.
It is vital that the UK’s membership of these agreements continues seamlessly from the end of the transition period. This means that Clause 1 needs to be in force within a few weeks. Although the implementation of the Hague conventions contained in Clause 1 is agreed and not subject to further amendments, the timing aspect creates an imperative for us to agree a way forward on the delegated power promptly.
Before I address the amendments, I will clarify the types of agreements that can be implemented under the delegated power. The power only covers the implementation of international agreements on a very narrowly defined area of law: agreements which are typically uncontroversial and have received widespread support in Parliament in the past. The Bill only allows implementation of private international law agreements which it defines in subsection (7) of the relevant clause. Principally, such agreements cover rules on jurisdiction to hear disputes which raise cross-border issues; which country’s law should apply to such cases; recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; and co-operation between judicial and other authorities in different countries on these matters. It will not be possible for matters outside the areas covered by the definition of “private international law” in the clause to be implemented using the power.
I know that, in the past, debate on this Bill has touched on topics such as the Hague-Visby Rules, or the 1961 Warsaw Convention on the carriage of goods by air. Let me be clear: these conventions—bar possibly one or two provisions—are out of scope of the power, and if the UK joined these conventions today they would still need to be implemented by primary legislation. This Bill is only concerned with implementing provisions on private international law, not any international agreements on private law matters generally.
Bearing that point in mind, I turn to the amendments. This House has already discussed the delegated power at length and made its views known. However, the clause comes back from the other place with a majority of 149, so, despite the reservations many of your Lordships have and have expressed, I believe we need to accept that such a clause has a place in the Bill and think about how to make it more acceptable to this House. The amended clause will still allow private international law agreements to be implemented promptly. This is important because, following the end of the transition period, there is a need to update the United Kingdom’s private international law framework. The Government have already made clear their intention to join the Lugano Convention. This power minimises any gap in its application if we are able to rejoin that convention and allows us to respond flexibly if we are not.
Implementation of these narrow and technical private international law agreements is largely about drawing down into domestic law detailed rules that have already been agreed at an international level. There is very limited ability for Ministers to deviate from these once the UK agrees to become bound by the relevant agreement. The rules in the agreement will not be amendable, and implementation will often largely be a yes or no question, coupled with making provisions largely of a procedural or technical nature, making the affirmative statutory instrument procedure appropriate. There are well-established precedents for implementing agreements which meet our definition of private international law by secondary legislation. It is not just that much of our current private international law framework was implemented under the powers of the European Communities Act. Even before that, there were many examples of agreements of this type being implemented through secondary legislation. The most notable of these is the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933.
Without this power, each new private international law agreement or update to an existing agreement would require primary legislation. Given the need to update our private international law framework and the current busy parliamentary agenda, such a requirement would be disproportionate and damaging. The intellectual arguments about the extent to which the implementation of international agreements by secondary legislation is constitutionally appropriate are important, but the other House recognised that those arguments are not the beginning and end of this debate. We must remember that these agreements can have a real impact on the lives of the general public, and delays in implementing them and reaping their benefits could negatively impact UK businesses and families. It is my view that the power provides a proportionate solution to an important problem, while retaining a far greater role for Parliament in the scrutiny process than it has had for many years.
All that said, I recognise the many and varied concerns that have previously been raised about this power. Opinions are sincerely held and there is merit to many of the points which have been made. I have sought to familiarise myself with the views your Lordships expressed in the Chamber during earlier debates, and I have listened closely to concerns expressed by noble Lords in engagement with myself and ministerial colleagues in recent weeks. The amendments in my name are a good-faith attempt to find a way forward. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, described the suite of amendments that I have put before this House as “substantial and constructive”. They attempt to strike a balance, sensitive to the aims of the Government and the concerns of your Lordships’ House.
First, Amendment 4A removes from the power the ability to create criminal offences which are punishable by imprisonment. In my analysis of the debates on this Bill, it is clear that this aspect of the power has been the most widely criticised. I certainly see that this is a sensitive issue, and it is right that the Government act cautiously. Although private international law agreements do not generally require contracting parties to create criminal offences, there are exceptions. Some conventions include non-discrimination clauses that require states to apply the same enforcement methods for foreign judgments as are available in domestic cases.
My Lords, it is indeed a privilege to follow the magisterial and extensive exposition of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, whose depth of experience and knowledge I defer to. He referred to the Bill as an intruder, which was an interesting description.
The Second Reading took place on 17 March, just at the beginning of lockdown. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, outlined the wide scope of the issues raised by the Bill. He said:
“Without private international law agreements, UK businesses, individuals and families would struggle to resolve the challenges they face when dealing with cross-border legal disputes.”—[Official Report, 17/3/20; col. 1439.]
The Minister echoed that opening today but I was surprised when he suggested that the area of law was narrow. As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, it may encompass disappearing railway carriages in Italy, which has an Agatha Christie ring about it.
The new clause inserted by the other place reflects that width. The Westminster Government or a devolved Government may, by regulation, implement any international agreement so far as it relates to private international law. Further, the appropriate national authority may, by regulation, apply any agreement between the different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom or give effect to any arrangements between the UK Government and the British Overseas Territories, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands. The emphasis throughout is on any future agreement of whatever nature that involves private international law anywhere in the world or internally within the United Kingdom.
It would appear that the Government have listened to the many voices suggesting that these clauses are excessively wide. Consequently, in response, the Minister today introduced the outline of a sunset clause, limited in the first instance to five years. He said that the urgent need is “ to update the framework” lost by our leaving the EU. The principle that there should be a temporal limit to the exercise of these wide powers in the uncertainties of the present time is clearly a good one. Unfortunately, the Government have decided that, like the British Empire, the sun shall never set upon these provisions. That is the effect of granting power to extend the operative period, not just for a further period of five years but, under proposed new subsection (3D), to renew the power to extend the period indefinitely. It just keeps rolling along. That makes a mockery of a sunset clause; consequently, I am delighted to support the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.
As I said at earlier stages of the Bill, our hugely unsatisfactory procedures for passing secondary legislation by resolution, whether affirmative or negative, may be tempered in the interests of democracy by consultation with interested parties. Amendment 4 pays lip service to that concept but, in effect, gives power to the Minister to choose whomsoever he thinks appropriate to consult. The wording is loose, such that although there is a duty to consult if the Minister thinks subjectively that there is nobody appropriate—as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said—he does not have to exercise that choice; or, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, said a moment ago, he could walk out into the street and consult someone.
The purpose of the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames is to bring some objectivity to the exercise. The Minister may be surprised to know that the shelf life of a Minister in this and the previous Government tends to be no more than two years, and that Secretaries of State come and go through the various offices of state without necessarily knowing anything at all about their work. As WS Gilbert put it over 100 years ago, the way to advancement may well be to polish up the brasses on the big front door of No. 10.
Consequently, it is only sensible to have the guiding hand of the head of the judiciary in the various jurisdictions. No doubt the Sir Humphreys of this world can suggest that the Secretary of State rounds up the usual suspects, but that is no substitute for the Lord Chief Justice and his peers, who have a lifetime of experience of the legal world and the whole of the judiciary to draw on for advice as to who the suspects should be. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it is inconceivable that they should not be consulted in any event.
I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks and, in particular, his call for a full and transparent report on the fruits of the consultation.
My Lords, I begin by thanking noble Lords for their thoughtful and erudite contributions. I thank them also for their courteous and warm words of welcome to me at the Dispatch Box. I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in a phrase that I think will resonate with the entire House and with which none of us would disagree: our imperative is the preservation of this country’s good name and its standing in private international law matters.
The matters raised in the course of our discussions overlapped to some extent but I will, if I may, do my best to treat the contributions to the debate in the order in which they were made. First, I shall address the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in relation to Amendment 1C, which omits some text from my Amendment 1A, the effect of which would be to allow the sunset period—which my amendment allows to be extended for five years by affirmative statutory instrument—to be extended only once.
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 2 and 3.
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 4, and do propose Amendments 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D and 4E as amendments thereto—
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 5.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what progress they have made towards their commitment in the Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper, published on 14 March 2018, to “explore the legal and practical challenges of limited reform relating to the law on marriage and religious weddings”.
[Inaudible]—difficulties in addressing this issue that mean we are doing so with the greatest care. The Law Commission separately is looking at aspects of the problem and has consulted with a wide range of groups with an interest. The Government continue the exploration both of limited reform and of non-legislative options. Any proposals affecting how religious groups are permitted to conduct marriages must be thoroughly assessed for fairness.
My Lords, I remain deeply concerned, because there is no evidence of any significant progress since the publication of the Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper over two years ago. Given the strong recommendations of the Casey review, the sharia law review, the new Civitas report and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Private Members’ Bills I have submitted since 2011, with cross-party support and the support of Muslim women’s groups, will the Minister give an assurance at last that government legislation will be introduced as a matter of urgency? So many Muslim women in this country are suffering in ways which are totally unacceptable and, as I always say, would make our suffragettes turn in their graves.
My Lords, my noble friend’s concern about this matter is indeed a matter of record. The Government are aware that the Law Commission is tasked with investigating the matter and reporting. Its report is anticipated by the middle of next year. The Government’s manifesto commitment was to explore the matters; that exploration will be based upon the thorough and meticulous research which is being carried out.
The Government previously assured the House that there is no need for a change in the law because all citizens can access their rights according to law. Yet the chasm between the de jure situation and the de facto reality is an abyss into which countless women are falling and suffering as a result. Is the Minister able to assure the House that repeated commitments to “continue the exploration” of reform are not used to kick these issues into the long grass?
My Lords, the Government have no intention of kicking the matter into the long grass. The Law Commission’s report is anticipated in the second part of next year. In the mean- time, the Government are contemplating also the introduction of interim measures and continue to explore the matter themselves, alongside the work being carried out by the Law Commission.
My Lords, the Government have a clear responsibility to protect the legal rights of vulnerable girls entering into that religious marriage. Simply saying all citizens can access their legal rights is like saying that all citizens have a right to dine in the Dorchester. Will the Minister agree that, while religious ceremonies should be respected, both marriage partners should be made aware of the law of the land on gender equality and women’s rights?
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord’s point. As my predecessor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, has remarked in your Lordships’ House in the past, the matter is a social and educational question as much as it is a legal one. It is in order to establish the extent of the problem that the Government are continuing to await the findings of the Law Commission and to look in detail at the meticulous research being carried out.
My Lords, does the Minister understand that it is relatively common for couples to come to family courts in England and Wales saying that they are married under sharia law, only to be told that the court does not recognise this status of marriage? The Government plan to support awareness programmes arising out of Dame Louise Casey’s review of marriage published in 2015. Can the Minister tell us what steps have been taken to provide such educational material in the citizens advice bureaux and in the family courts across the country?
My Lords, sharia law is not part of the legal system of England and Wales, and that has been made clear in the past. In relation to the provision of material via the citizens advice bureaux, to which the noble Lord refers, I will write to him about the availability of that material and how it is being promulgated through these bodies.
Last month, I attended a nikah ceremony at the impressive Cambridge eco mosque, and I was impressed by the young imam there, who made it perfectly clear that he would refuse to perform a nikah for non-British couples and those who had not already taken part in a legal marriage in this country. Are the Government satisfied that this good practice is happening in all religious ceremonies across the country?
My Lords, the point raised by the noble Baroness is important. To repeat the terms of a previous answer, that matter is part of the social and educational function, which the Government are exploring.
My Lords, for the record, may I set straight that it is not sharia marriages but sharia-compliant marriages, or religious ceremonies? My generation of women understood implicitly that a valid marriage is a registered one. This appears not to be the case for a significant proportion of my daughter’s generation, because the law has allowed this ambiguous anomaly to continue. The Government are fully cognisant that up to 100,000 religious ceremonies do not proceed to civil register. Will the Minister undertake to address this at the Government’s earliest convenience, through a small amendment to the Marriage Act, which has been called for for some time by leading organisations? That would not only safeguard women but empower women with their full rights.
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Baroness for her correction. With regard to a change in the law, it is precisely to avoid the creation of inconsistency and anomaly that the Government are waiting for the conclusion of the Law Commission’s investigations and their own work before considering whether legislation is appropriate.
My Lords, there seem to be complex reasons behind the number of marriages that are not legally binding. Does my noble and learned friend agree that any way forward must take account of these issues?
Some couples have a legally binding religious marriage, while others do not, whether by choice or because they did not know that they could. We need a much better understanding of the factors behind this because, without such real insight into these matters, no solution can change what is happening or be sensitive to the issues facing individuals and the differing voices within communities. That is the Government’s approach.
My Lords, the honourable Member for the Medway area recently introduced the Marriage (Authorised Belief Organisations) Bill in the other place. It would mean that people who wished to be wedded at a humanist ceremony would not to have to attend a registry office afterwards to make the marriage legally binding. Will the Government support this Bill? Secondly, nearly a decade after the issue of unregistered Muslim marriages was first discussed by a Conservative-led Government, how do the Government reconcile their stated support for the rights and protection of women with their failure to act on this issue for over 10 years?
My Lords, the Government invited the Law Commission to make recommendations about how marriage by humanist and other non-religious belief organisations could be incorporated into a revised or new scheme for all marriages that is simple, fair and consistent. The Government will decide on provision on the basis of those recommendations. The Law Commission published a consultation paper on 3 September as part of its review, and welcomes responses from all.
My Lords, does the Minister appreciate that the right to a legally recognised marriage in their own place of worship was secured after a long struggle by non-conformists in England and Wales, and that nothing should be done to diminish that right or, indeed, to prevent us extending it to other groups? But what constitutes a legally valid religious wedding, and what rights, protections and obligations in law it confers, also needs to be clear. Nobody should be tricked, misled or pressured into a form of marriage that is not valid in law.
My Lords, I wholeheartedly endorse the noble Lord’s observation that nobody should be tricked or compelled into a marriage that is not recognised by law. To continue the theme of my earlier answers, the Government are very concerned that, as well as being an opportunity for legal reform, these matters are socially and educationally important, and the Government continue to investigate the social and educational reasons why people enter into marriages that are not valid.
My Lords, the time allowed for this Question has elapsed.