Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Alderdice
Main Page: Lord Alderdice (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Alderdice's debates with the Scotland Office
(3 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberWe now come to the group beginning with Amendment 6. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in the group to a Division should make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 6
My Lords, we are indeed fortunate to have working for us, in both Houses, the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I find its reports invariably well argued and well researched. The arguments and logic of those reports are not to be easily dismissed. We have been fortunate this afternoon to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and my noble friend Lord Dubs putting their experience on the committee at our disposal. They have argued the case very well.
It is unthinkable that innocent members of the public who are adversely, and perhaps grievously, affected by covert action have no clear means of recourse. That needs to be clarified and written into the Bill. It is also important that those involved in all such covert action, which must be authorised by people with judicial authority and experience—the will of the House has come across clearly in all the debate—have limits on what can and cannot be done, and who is to be held responsible and in what way. These amendments help to clarify that situation. In that sense, they should be taken extremely seriously. I am grateful to have heard the experience of those who have worked on this so thoroughly in the Joint Committee on Human Rights being shared with us this afternoon.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has withdrawn so I call the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
My Lords, this group of amendments focuses on compensation for crimes committed pursuant to a criminal conduct authorisation. I suggest that the applicable principles should be these.
First, it would be unfair to expose undercover operatives to personal civil liability for doing something they were expressly authorised by a public authority to do, just as it is generally considered unfair and contrary to the public interest to prosecute them for that. This, despite my profound respect for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and for all his police experience is my problem with Amendment 6.
Secondly, some means of compensation should exist for injury or loss caused by a crime committed pursuant to a criminal conduct authorisation: not from the person who perpetrated the crime but from the authority which authorised it, or from the state more generally. So what should that means of compensation be?
The first and obvious route, already referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton —but not, I think, responded to by the Minister—is via the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and its equivalent in Northern Ireland. That is not expressly referred to in these amendments, but can the Minister confirm whether it is available to the victims of crime committed pursuant to criminal conduct authorisations under the scheme of the Bill and if not, why not?
The second possible route to compensation, suggested by Amendment 8, is for the CHIS who perpetrates a crime to be capable of being sued and then, if necessary, indemnified by the authorising authority. I see the attraction of that, but of course criminals are rarely perceived as having deep enough pockets to be worth suing. I can also see considerable practical difficulties in keeping their status as a CHIS secret once the indemnity comes into play. It was interesting to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, that this amendment is based on an Australian model. It would be interesting to know how much that model is actually used.
The third possible route is by proceeding directly against the authorising authority in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Amendment 71 is designed to give effect to that, but I wonder whether it actually adds to what is already in RIPA. A new subsection (5)(g) is proposed for its Section 65, so as to include conduct authorised under new Section 29B. But new Section 29B will be in Part II of RIPA, which is already specified in Section 65(5)(d).
How would a person be made aware of the possibility of proceedings in the IPT? The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 already requires IPCO not only to inform a person of a serious error, where it is in the public interest to do so, but, by Section 231(6), to inform them of any right they may have to apply to the IPT. By Section 232, IPCO is required to give any necessary assistance to the IPT. So far so good, although I wonder how often, as a matter of practice, it will be considered by a judicial commissioner to be in the public interest to inform a person of a serious error of this kind. To do so will often risk blowing the cover of the CHIS, notwithstanding the fact that the IPT proceedings themselves are very secure.
In short, it seems to me that the Amendment 8 route could be created, and that the Amendment 71 route may already exist, but that both are likely to be hamstrung in practice by the requirements of keeping secret the existence and identity of a CHIS. That rather points up the advantages of ensuring that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority is available to the victims of crimes committed by undercover operatives in the same way as it is to the victims of other crimes. I hope the Minister will feel able to comment.
Finally and more generally, I make a procedural suggestion, following the proposal of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that a special committee be appointed to take evidence from the police and MI5 on matters considered too sensitive, perhaps, for the ears of the rest of us. I know the Minister is thinking about that proposal, but should it not meet with favour, an alternative might be to task the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation with investigating the position and reporting back. The current reviewer, Jonathan Hall QC, is highly expert in all matters relating to police law, not only counter- terrorism. He is widely respected for his impartiality and has, of course, the very highest security clearance. I recall, as independent reviewer, performing a similar function when the Bill that became the Justice and Security Act 2013 was going through Parliament, and though I cannot commit the independent reviewer, I should be happy to share that experience if others see merit in the idea.
My Lords, Amendments 6 and 8 seek to remove the exemption from civil liability for CHIS criminal conduct. While I understand the intent behind these amendments, which is to allow those impacted by a criminal conduct authorisation to be able to seek civil redress, there are good reasons why the Bill has been drafted in this way.
I explained in response to amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, why the Bill has been drafted to render correctly authorised conduct lawful for all purposes. Those reasons apply equally to criminal and civil liability. An authorisation will have been granted because it was deemed necessary and proportionate to tackle crime, terrorism or hostile state activity. Where that authorisation has been validly and lawfully granted, it is right that criminals or terrorists cannot then sue the undercover operative—the CHIS—or the state for that same activity.
I appreciate that the spirit of these amendments is to ensure that any innocent persons impacted by an authorisation can seek redress where appropriate. I reassure noble Lords that all authorisations are, in the first place, very tightly bound and, as part of the necessity and proportionality test, the authorising officer will consider any other risks of the deployment. An authorisation must consider and minimise the risk of impacting those who are not the intended subject of the operation.
The Bill does not create an exemption for all and any civil liability. For example, the conduct that is the subject of the Undercover Policing Inquiry would not be exempt from civil liability under the Bill’s regime.
I also seek to offer reassurance that routes of redress will be available to those who have been impacted by a criminal conduct authorisation where that authorisation has been unlawfully granted, following the observations from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, on the situation where the wrong stems from the authorisation granted being improper or too broad. The Bill does not prevent affected persons from seeking a judicial review of a public authority’s decision to authorise criminal conduct. If a judge concluded that the decision had not been lawfully made, the affected person could seek a remedy through the courts. The noble and learned Lord referred to the statement made in the other place on this. Equally, as with other investigatory powers, any affected person or organisation can make a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal which will then be independently considered by the tribunal.
A further important safeguard is the obligation on the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to inform a person of a serious error that relates to them, where it is in the public interest. This includes situations where the commissioner considers that the error has caused significant prejudice or harm to the person concerned. The commissioner must also inform the person of any rights they have to apply to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is an example of the commissioner actively seeking out persons who have been wronged as part of their remit to consider all documentation, facts and circumstances surrounding the granting of a CCA.
Amendment 71, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is unnecessary. Any person or organisation can already make a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal with regard to conduct under Part II of RIPA; that complaint will be considered independently by the tribunal. The IPT operates one of the most open and transparent systems in the world for investigating allegations that agencies have breached human rights. It hears cases in open where possible and publishes detailed reports on its work and rulings. This will remain unchanged under the Bill.
These criminal conduct authorisations are very tightly bound so that they meet the necessity and proportionality test. A number of routes of redress will be available to persons wronged to challenge the validity or lawfulness of the authorisation and then seek the appropriate remedy, whether through judicial review or a complaint to the independent tribunal.
The matter of applications to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others. I regret to advise the House that I do not have information specific to the CICA in front of me, but I will write to him and others who have expressed an interest on that point.
On a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, it is important to bear in mind that RIPA already excludes civil liability for authorised CHIS conduct, so what is introduced in the Bill is not new.
I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton.
It is new, because CHIS conduct under the existing Bill significantly did not include criminal conduct. There was a little bit that was included, but this is a wholly different regime and I do not think it is right to say there is no change there. However, I did not rise to say that; I wanted to raise the point about being lawful for all purposes. If it is lawful for all purposes, tortious claims cannot be brought by the totally innocent victim—the person beaten up pursuant to the authority, assuming the person beaten up is not the subject of the CHIS but is just somebody caught up in it. Putting aside the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, which the noble and learned Lord will come back to us on, why should that person—singularly, throughout the whole of English civil law—not have a remedy? Is he saying that person does not have a remedy? If he is saying that they do, what is that remedy? Everyone else beaten up in the course of a crime has a tortious remedy.