Replacement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

No. A number of very important steps have been taken by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister to which your Lordships are invited to assent. Yesterday, for example, I was very grateful for your Lordships’ support for the Bill that was passed that concerned reversing the national insurance levy, and I am hoping for equal support for my right honourable friend’s initiative in relation to the Energy Prices Bill.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government’s austerity policies have already caused over 334,000 deaths. Why is the Government looking for further cuts in public spending?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I realise the economic stable from which the noble Lord came, but the central responsibility for any Government is to do what is necessary for economic stability, and that means that there will need to be reflection on levels of both spending and taxation. As my right honourable friend has made clear, there will be difficult decisions, there will need to be spending restraint, and departments will need to find further efficiencies, but more details will be set out in the medium-term fiscal plan, as I said earlier.

Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Lord Sikka Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 28th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. I declare my interests. I am an emeritus professor at the University of Essex and the University of Sheffield. I have spent some 43 years in the higher education sector. I have spoken at academic venues all over the world and I have welcomed scholars and other speakers from all over the world.

I just cannot see the need for this Bill. I have not encountered the problems this Bill is trying to deal with. There is more diversity of views on university campuses than at party-political conferences, but I do not see the Minister trying to introduce the notion of free speech for party conferences. Maybe because the Government’s problem is that they are really attacking civil liberties and clamping down on dissent. After all, young people have to learn to express their views and they just do not like it.

The Government claim that the Bill protects free speech, but there is no indication in the Bill or the Explanatory Notes, as far as I can see, of when free speech crosses into hate speech. What are the boundaries? When does one become the other? Free speech is a social construct; it is always in the process of being made but is never finally made. It is shaped by contemporary discourses. On that basis, I am willing to argue against racism, but I will never provide a platform to anybody who is willing to argue for racism. Does that make me unbalanced? I doubt it. I am trying to prioritise social justice over some vulgar version of free speech, and the two inevitably clash. I hope the Minister will be able to tell us how we mediate this clash—how does the Bill deal with this?

In his introductory remarks, the Minister said that the Bill strengthens freedom of speech and academic freedom, but I can find no evidence of this in its proposals. Academic freedoms include freedom of inquiry, investigation, publication and dissemination, and these are all under threat from the funders and the Government. I will give some examples. Too many funding contracts include clauses that give funders the final say on whether research can be published. They can and have blocked, in subtle and not-so-subtle ways, the publication of unwelcome findings—they just do not like it.

A classic example is a pharmaceutical company that funded a researcher to compare its branded thyroid drug with generic competitors. The researcher found that the generic products were just as good as the expensive branded products. The publication of that research would have jeopardised the funder’s sales and profits, so the drug company went to incredible lengths to suppress the research, including taking legal action against the researcher and the university to prevent them publishing the findings. I do not see the Government outlawing any of this or dealing with that problem in the Bill.

Over the years, several studies have focused on links between cancer and passive smoking, and tobacco companies have secretly funded research specifically designed to refute these links. They design the research questions and collect and provide the data, and, in the final analysis, their employees write parts of the paper, which has an academic’s name on it, so that they can gain political advantage from the research.

Industry funding drives researchers to study questions that do not upset the funders, which often means that they focus on maximising benefits and minimising harms related to the particular funder’s products or services. That is unacceptable. Uncomfortable questions are simply not asked. I am an accountant, and you would be hard-pushed to find an industry-funded piece of academic work that examines audit failures in any depth—there are not many studies on it, because people know that they will not get the funding if they want to do that kind of research.

The Government themselves have eroded academic freedoms. In November 2020, the British Medical Journal published an article titled:

“Covid-19: politicisation, ‘corruption,’ and suppression of science”.


It documented four instances of government suppression of research during the Covid pandemic. In one case, the Government procured an antibody test that fell short of the performance claims made by the manufacturer. Researchers from Public Health England and collaborating institutions pushed to publish their study’s findings before the Government committed to buying a million of these tests, but they were blocked by the Department of Health and the Prime Minister’s office. Subsequently, Public Health England unsuccessfully attempted to block the BMJ’s press release about the research paper. The key issue here is the conflicting commercial interests and consultancies of Ministers and their advisers—they just did not want to see this piece of research.

I will give a personal example. Some years ago, I secured a small grant from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales to examine the resignation letters submitted by company auditors. By law, they have to say whether there are circumstances in connection with their resignation that shareholders and creditors need to be aware of. This was a big study. Only 2.5% of the auditor resignation letters at plcs were accompanied by any statement listing the reasons. Almost all filed a nil return, even though there were headlines and front-page news stories about scandals within days of the auditor resigning. There is massive legal non-compliance. We submitted the findings to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, but it was not happy about them. There was no correspondence, and it was all done on the phone: “We will tell you”, “We will come back to you, and then you can come back to us”. Years and months passed by, and it never published the information. I have been in the game long enough, so, in the end, I knew what to do: I found alternative means to publish papers from this—but not everyone can. I never went back to any accountancy bodies for research grants again.

My point is that the Bill does nothing to check the funders’ influence on academic research, and it completely fails to advance academic freedoms. I hope that the Minister will give serious thought to this is. If not, I will consider tabling some amendments to further explore these points.

Elections Bill

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Monday 28th March 2022 Lords Chamber

We need to strengthen controls over public finance in the Bill: involving both major domestic donors and, much more importantly, donors with foreign influence. It is already a problem; it has contributed to a loss of confidence in public life. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will be willing to accept, in some revised form or other, some of the overlapping language that appears in several of these amendments, including the ones which have my name on them.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 212. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, and I also fully support the position taken by my noble friend Lady Hayman on this Bill. There are a number of amendments here which all have a common concern with preventing abuse and ensuring that there is a level playing field, and my amendment is a contribution to that. Amendment 212 seeks to end abuse of “permissible donors” and prevent the flow of foreign money into UK political parties.

The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 was really shaped by the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s fifth report, which was published in October 1998 under the chairmanship of Lord Neill of Bladen. In developing its recommendations, the committee invited evidence and considered the issue of foreign donations at some considerable length—chapter 5 of the report covers that. In its evidence to the committee, the Conversative Party stated:

“in the future we will not accept foreign donations.”

That appears on page 69 of the report. There was concern about abuse, and on page 74 the Neill committee report said:

“It is possible to imagine that a foreign corporation wishing to evade the underlying purpose of the provisions which we advocate might cause to be brought into being a UK subsidiary, the sole function of which would be to receive money from the foreign corporation and then channel it to the political party of its choice. This would clearly be an abuse of the system”.


That is a very powerful statement. The committee recommended that the legislation should consider:

“making it a criminal offence to attempt to evade or to render nugatory the statutory provisions limiting donations to those coming from ‘permissible sources’. It would, for example, be a crime for an individual in the United Kingdom, who did not, himself or herself, have the resources to make a large donation, to become a mere conduit pipe through which foreign money was channeled to a particular party.”

The legislation has been grossly circumvented and exploited. I will give a couple of examples of this—that is all I will have time for, although I am sure that the Ministers may be able to add more examples, given their experience and knowledge of the party. The first example relates to Lord Ashcroft, who was once upon a time a treasurer of the party. Around 2008 and 2009, I was asked by a number of media outlets to investigate his donations to the Conservative Party, which added up to £5,137,785. These donations were made by a company called Bearwood Corporate Services, a limited company registered in the UK. However, it never had sufficient profits to be able to pay the donations. My investigations uncovered a complex network of corporations behind it, and the aim of this network was to obfuscate the money trail.

The trail of money began with a company called Stargate Holdings Ltd, which was based in Belize and controlled by Lord Ashcroft. The moneys went in various packages from there to a UK-based company called Astraporta (UK) Ltd. From there, the moneys went to another company called Bearwood Holdings Ltd, and then from there to Bearwood Corporate Services Ltd, and then from there to the Conservative Party. The attempt was to disguise the origins. None of the companies disclosed the payment of political donations. They were all carefully constructed to ensure that they met the definition of a small company, because small companies do not need to disclose political donations. The UK companies involved in this chain either did not trade at all or had insufficient profits to enable them to make the donations. For all practical purposes, the moneys came from Belize and were finally handed over to the Conversative Party. I am sure that a lot of legal advice would have been taken in order to complete that particular route. Clearly, the moneys originated from abroad.

I reported the matter to the Electoral Commission. I told the commission that I was investigating it and what I had initially found. At the minutes of a meeting, the commission noted that it had heard from me. However, in the end, no action was taken by the Electoral Commission.

The second example, which has already been cited, relates to the company called Aquind. This company was incorporated in the UK in 2008, and over many years it remained dormant, but it has paid large sums of money to the Conservative Party. As recently as 2019-20—I have looked at its accounts—the company had no turnover. Indeed, it had no turnover at all at any time in its life. It never made any profit. So, the donations made by the company to the Conservative Party did not originate from any trade or profit in the UK; they obviously came from abroad. The company says that it is ultimately controlled from Luxembourg. I have not looked into who controls the Luxembourg entity, because there is not sufficient time, but I would be happy to take that assignment for the Conservative Party if it wished.

These two examples show how determined donors have been able to play our legal system and bypass it by carefully constructing transactions, and that is not helpful. My suggestion is that companies that make political donations should be able to make them only if they have sufficient realised profits. The term “realised profits” is well understood in the Companies Act. It is nothing new, so I am connecting to it. It generally means the company must generate profits that must result in cash or cash equivalent. If it is not trading, it cannot generate realised profits. This is a way of ensuring our legal system is not abused.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I put my name to Amendment 200 of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, and I have Amendment 210 of my own. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has done most of the heavy lifting on Amendment 200, as he explained. I joined with him because I thought that, where we dealt with donations and national security risk, an additional power for the Electoral Commission—the fit and proper test—might be helpful. I tabled the amendment separately, and then, as the noble Lord explained, we wound them together so they are now one amendment.

The concept of a fit and proper test is well developed. Importantly, it lies at the heart of the powers of the Financial Conduct Authority and other financial regulators. It is important because it can put under the microscope the behaviour of individuals, not just a company itself. It has been found that, when people find that they themselves are going to go under the microscope as opposed to the company they work for, that tends to concentrate the mind rather wonderfully. The fit and proper test has a number of aspects to it that might usefully form part of the Electoral Commission’s armoury: honesty, integrity, reputation, competence and capability and financial soundness, all of which would be helpful for the Electoral Commission to have.

What I was seeking to do with the amendments here was propose a similar arrangement in respect of donations from overseas where there was a security risk. This amendment is not going to try and lay down what the fit and proper test should be in respect of this area, because that will need to be done specifically. I just gave the examples from the financial regulator to show the sorts of areas I think the Electoral Commission could usefully focus its activities on. This amendment, along with the broader amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, tabled, will give the Electoral Commission a full set of tools to police this important part of our national life.

I briefly turn to Amendment 210, which is also in this group. It is a probing amendment—it is not in a final form by any manner of means—but it would prohibit individuals or companies donating to registered political parties where they have been awarded government contracts of more than £100,000. The broad purposes would be to prevent conflicts of interest, to mitigate any appearance of impropriety relating to the awarding of an individual contract, and to contribute towards maintaining public trust and confidence after a number of scandals—Greensill springs to mind.

P&O Ferries

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd March 2022 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Sikka]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to appoint an independent inquiry to investigate the business practices of P&O Ferries and its parent company.

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have condemned the appalling way that P&O Ferries has treated its staff. These loyal employees have been working tirelessly to keep our country supplied with essential goods, particularly through the pandemic. We wrote to P&O Ferries seeking information on the decisions it took, to determine whether it had breached UK employment law. We are carefully considering its reply, which the Secretary of State and BEIS have just received. If the rules have been broken, we will not hesitate to take further action.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, let us look at the facts. P&O has abused the employment rights of its workers. It took public money while its parent company paid £270 million in dividends. Its UK operating profits are almost wiped out by unexplained administrative expenses. The company is engaged in profit shifting and pays little or no corporation tax. Its 2020 accounts show a pension deficit of £95 million. Any responsible Government would immediately investigate P&O’s abuses. Can the Minister explain why this Government have not begun an independent inquiry?

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

We are taking a number of steps. We are engaged with the Insolvency Service regarding the steps P&O Ferries took in this whole restructuring and redundancy exercise. The £15 million received by P&O was part of the furlough scheme and therefore to the benefit of the employees rather than the company. I know that P&O will still be accountable for the deficit in the pension contribution to the Merchant Navy Ratings Pension Fund. The Government are working very hard in a fast-moving situation to get answers to all those questions and to take the appropriate action.

Coronavirus Grants: Fraud

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Patel (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, it is the turn of the Cross Benches.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I do not accept the premise that lenders are failing on fraud, and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will know that I am not in a position to name individual lenders. However, lenders continue to work closely with the Government on counterfraud, including recovering £1.2 million on facilities identified as fraudulent so far. It is important that lenders are held accountable for taxpayers’ money, and all lenders continue to be subject to a robust audit process by the British Business Bank.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, two 30-second checks would have saved the Government billions of pounds. First, no one can open an ISA account without providing a national insurance number, but the Government did not require that information from anyone seeking furlough support. Secondly, all applicants for Covid loans should have been required to provide an HMRC reference number. That would have killed off all dormant companies and offshore tax haven companies. Will the Minister please explain why these two 30-second checks were not applied?

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

That is a very fair question and of course the sort of detailed question that I cannot answer. In terms of the fraud that we are looking to identify as part of the loan book, as of 17 December 2021 some £67 million worth of claims had been settled for the loan scheme. Of those, £13 million for 337 facilities had been flagged by lenders as suspected fraud. That is the sort of detail that we want to get into.

Afghanistan

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Wednesday 18th August 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the tragedy of Afghanistan has been exacerbated by power games played by major nations. In the 1970s, western powers were not willing to accept a communist Government in Afghanistan and sought to undermine them by arming and funding the insurgents. The Soviet Union responded by invading in 1979 to prop up its client state. The US and western state powers responded by creating and funding al-Qaeda, yet still there is no reflection on the funding of terrorist organisations to further political objectives—the UK Government have continued to suppress documents relating to their support for al-Qaeda.

The Taliban itself came out of the counter-revolutionary insurgency organised by the CIA in the 1970s and 1980s. The objective was to overthrow the country’s Government. Eventually, the Soviet Union was driven out, but rogue elements gained power. As the noble Lord, Lord Suri, reminded us, during the 1996-2001 brutal rule of the Taliban regime, minorities, including Hindus and Sikhs, were forced to wear yellow badges reminiscent of the yellow Star of David that Jews were forced to wear in Nazi Germany—yet there was only muted protest from western powers.

The 9/11 tragedy changed that. The US-led war on terrorism somehow became an expensive occupation. The attempts to build Afghanistan in the image of the West have failed, just as they have failed in Iraq, Libya, Syria and elsewhere. The result has been chaos and the deaths of thousands of innocent people. We need a fundamental rethink of foreign policies.

I have three questions for the Minister. Can he assure the House that an independent inquiry will examine the folly of the UK’s foreign policies? Secondly, why did the Government not designate the Afghanistani Taliban as a terrorist group under the Terrorism Act 2000? Thirdly, what are the Government’s preconditions for any recognition of the Taliban Government in Afghanistan?

House of Lords: Remote Participation and Hybrid Sittings

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Thursday 20th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this vital debate. We are having it at a time when many companies are giving their workers greater flexibility in terms of working from home or other location. It seems that remote working and meetings are now the future. This House cannot call itself progressive if it continues to hark back to the old, archaic ways of operating, which disabled many from discharging their public duty.

A number of noble Lords today have referred to the pre-Covid era and claimed that a physical Parliament was better able to hold the Government to account. Was there really ever such a golden age? In September 2019, the Government prorogued Parliament. Was the House able to hold them to account? Was that better than what might have been done if the House was meeting in a hybrid form? There probably never was a golden age when Ministers always answered the questions actually asked. Holding Governments to account is a vital matter, and failures are connected more to ethics and morality of Ministers and weaknesses in constitution than to the mode of this House’s sitting per se.

The hybrid arrangements give Members flexibility. Those who wish physically to attend can do so; those who are unable to be physically present can still participate in debates. They can network and make informal contacts with others physically and/or virtually, as I have done. Reducing the need to travel from far-flung parts of the country also cuts Parliament’s carbon footprint.

Since joining this House, I have participated in Oral Questions, Private Notice Questions, short debates, debates on statutory instruments and Committee and Report stages of Bills. My observation is that hybrid proceedings have enabled more noble Lords to speak and provide a diversity of views. That is surely a positive thing.

Some noble Lords have assumed that, just because Members are not present in the House, maybe they are just skiving or loitering around, but of course that does not mean that they are not carrying out their public duties. Unlike the Front-Benchers, we Back-Benchers do not really have any staff support. We have to carry out our own research in order to intervene and speak, and that keeps us busy. Many of us have online meetings with a variety of stakeholders who have an interest in matters being discussed in the House. Insistence on physical presence would severely reduce that interaction, impoverish debates and alienate stakeholders.

I like the advance notice of Questions and listing of speakers. This is far better than just hoping to catch the Lord Speaker’s eye in a crowded House. In any case, the physical space of the House is such that it can accommodate only a limited number of Members. Those unable to find a good seat, or any seat, will never be able to catch the Lord Speaker’s eye and therefore probably not get many opportunities to make a contribution. The remote submission of Questions and remote voting are far better than wasting time in long queues and should be retained.

Some earlier speakers gave the impression that the pandemic, or the worst of it, may soon be over. I would urge caution. New variants are constantly emerging, and the virus will continue to mutate for some time, just like the flu virus continues to mutate. Yesterday, the Health Secretary urged the public to take part in trials to find out whether a third dose of Covid vaccine could protect against new variants. Many experts think that large sections of the population will need an annual booster jab. This is likely particularly for senior and vulnerable citizens, and this House has more than a fair share of that part of our society. Insistence on returning to the pre-Covid arrangements will expose many Members to avoidable risks, especially as they will need to travel on crowded trains and buses. I urge the House to consider all aspects of the debate today.

Covid-19 Update

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Thursday 13th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

As I have said, my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has been talking to the First Ministers about this, and those discussions will continue.

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, in 2010, 2.5 million people in England were waiting to start their NHS treatment. This reached 4.52 million in December 2019, with nearly 224,000 waiting for more than 52 weeks. Today, the number on the waiting list is 4.95 million, with 436,000 waiting for more than 52 weeks. Can the noble Baroness tell the House what the waiting list will be in six and 12 months from now, and when the Government will be able to reduce it to 2010 levels?

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

The noble Lord is right to set out the challenge, but I do not think it would be responsible of me to pluck a figure. “I do not know” is the obvious answer—I do not think anyone does. All I can say is that we are working hard with the NHS to tackle these backlogs. It is an absolute priority and we should thank our NHS staff for the incredible work they have done through the pandemic and what they will be doing to help us tackle this backlog.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Sikka Excerpts

3rd reading & Report stage
Monday 19th April 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sikka]

33: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“FCA duty to make a statement about ministerial directions on investigations
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 1T (right to obtain documents and information) insert—“1U Duty to make a statement about ministerial directions on investigationsWhere a Minister directs, comments on, or intervenes with an FCA investigation into wrongdoing or malpractice by a company, the FCA must make a public statement about the nature of any such intervention.””

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for supporting this amendment. It was discussed in Committee, but the Government’s response has raised more questions than answers.

The amendment seeks transparency about ministerial interventions or directions on investigations, especially into malpractice by companies. It would require the FCA to make a statement as and when Ministers intervene. Currently, ministerial interventions and directions, especially those that stymie investigations, are made in secret. Parliament and the public are not informed, and there is no opportunity to question Ministers. Such interventions mean that selected corporations receive ministerial favours and others do not. In the absence of investigations into the criminal practices of major corporations, it is impossible to develop effective legislation or financial regulatory practices.

In Committee, I provided some evidence of how the UK Government protected criminal organisations. It related to HSBC, which, by its own admission, had been engaged in criminal conduct in the US. In 2012, it was fined $1.9 billion for money laundering offences, which at that time was the largest fine ever levied upon a corporation. HSBC also faced the prospect of a criminal prosecution.

HSBC was supervised by the Financial Services Authority, an independent regulatory body in the UK. The US fine did not persuade the FSA to investigate. Instead, on 10 September 2012, the then-Chancellor George Osborne, the Bank of England and the FSA secretly wrote to US regulators and urged them not to prosecute HSBC, as the bank was apparently too big to fail.

The ministerial interventions came to light not because of any statement made by the Government but through a July 2016 report by the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services. The report was titled Too Big to Jail, and reproduced the Chancellor’s letters and some email and telephone conversation records, though these are not comprehensive. It is clear that the Bank of England, the Treasury and the regulator colluded to protect a bank engaged in criminal conduct. The matter came to light in July 2016, but there was no Statement made to Parliament to explain why a criminal organisation was being protected by the Government. By July 2016, the FSA had morphed into the FCA, but the FCA did not launch an investigation either.

The report by the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services shows that the Government were also shielding other UK banks. These included Standard Chartered, which was fined £670 million for money laundering, and a closer reading of the same report shows that the Government also intervened to protect Barclays.

In Committee, I referred to my legal endeavours to secure a copy of the Sandstorm report, which provides some information about frauds and fraudsters at the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. The bank was closed in July 1991, but there has been no forensic investigation into the biggest banking fraud in the 20th century. Most of the Sandstorm report is available in 1,300 US libraries. The UK courts have forced the Treasury to release a copy to me, and it shows that the Government are still protecting individuals linked to al-Qaeda, Saudi intelligence, and the royal families of Abu Dhabi and other countries in the Middle East, as well as arms dealers, smugglers, fraudsters, convicted criminals, BCCI senior personnel, and some politicians.

What kind of Government protect criminal organisations and wrongdoers? What kind of democracy do we have when such interventions are not explained to Parliament and the people? One of our greatest failures is to not develop durable institutional structures, effective laws and enforcement, and a major reason for this is that many frauds and abuses are simply covered up.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, before I respond to this amendment, I would like to express my sadness on behalf of us all at the news of the death of the noble Lord, Lord Judd. Lord Judd took part in our debates on the Bill only just before Easter. He was a Member of this House for some 30 years, a man of great wisdom and wide experience, but above all a man of great kindness, who had an abiding concern for those less fortunate than himself both in this country and across the world. We shall miss him.

Amendment 33 seeks to require the FCA to make a public statement on the nature of any intervention a Minister may make concerning an FCA investigation into an individual firm. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, made a number of allegations against Ministers, past and present, and the Treasury. I do not have the facts or the briefing to enable me to respond to him today on so many detailed issues. Indeed, I have to say that, for the most part, I did not recognise the picture that he painted. I hope, therefore, that he will allow me to write to him on what he has said, copying in noble Lords speaking in this debate, and in doing so I shall attempt also to address the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. However, I can respond to the issue of principle raised by this amendment, which is what we are here to focus on for the purposes of the Bill.

The House may recall that, in Committee, I outlined the current legislative framework which establishes the FCA as an independent, non-governmental body. In my remarks today, I hope to build on that discussion and reassure noble Lords that this amendment is not necessary. Ministerial intervention in the activities of the FCA, were it to occur, would be one of two things: either legally permitted under existing statute, or illegal. What actions are legally permitted within the legislative framework? Under the framework established by Parliament, the Treasury and hence Ministers have strictly limited powers in relation to the FCA. Indeed, the Treasury’s ability to direct or influence the regulators is set out in statute. Most crucially, the Treasury has no general power of direction over the FCA.

The Financial Services Act 2012 sets out the legislative mechanisms through which the Treasury can launch investigations, provided under Section 77 of that Act, which provides a mechanism for the Treasury to direct the FCA to conduct an investigation into events related to a person carrying on a regulated activity. Section 77 was made use of recently, as noble Lords will know, in relation to the regulation of London Capital & Finance, or LCF. Under Section 78, the Treasury can provide direction as to the scope of an investigation, the timeline that it should cover and how it is conducted. So the scope of the powers available to the Treasury is tightly circumscribed by statute. That has to be right, because the ultimate independence of the FCA is vital to its role. Its credibility, authority and value to consumers would be undermined if it were possible for the Government to intervene in its decision-making or ongoing supervision of authorised firms.

As the FCA has acknowledged in its mission statement, Parliament has given the FCA a range of tools in order to deliver its objectives. These tools range from guidance, to censure, to its Section 166 FSMA powers, which allow the FCA to seek the view of an independent third party or “skilled person” on aspects of a regulated firm’s activities if it is concerned or wants further analysis. These accompany independent powers for the FCA to make decisions on how to use these tools most effectively. In my remarks in Committee, I did not intend to suggest that the FCA cannot investigate events that occurred before it was created. I merely pointed out that the events being discussed were historical. The FCA can and does look at historical behaviour of the firms that it supervises.

In the context of this amendment, it is necessary to appreciate that the FCA is an independent body and that there are laws which govern and strictly limit the directions that the Treasury can and cannot give it. However, were such directions to be given under Section 77 and 78 of the 2012 Act, I cannot conceive of a situation where Ministers and the Treasury would not make that fact public.

That covers the intervention that is legally permitted; what about nefarious interference? In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised the Ministerial Code, as indeed she has today, and asked whether the provisions of the code were applicable in this instance and strong enough in relation to engagement with regulators. I have since written to the noble Baroness on this topic and a copy has indeed been placed in the Library. However, for the benefit of the House I will expand on that now.

The Ministerial Code requires Government Ministers to

“maintain high standards of behaviour and to behave in a way that upholds the highest standards of propriety.”

In addition, Ministers must act in accordance with the highest standards as set out in the seven principles of public life: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. I particularly point to the requirements under the openness principle for Ministers to

“act and take decisions in an open and transparent manner.”

I hope that this assures noble Lords that, even if Ministers were tempted to interfere improperly, the Ministerial Code provides the proper protections against this. In short, if a Minister were to attempt it, he or she would simply not get away with it. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans in a real sense made my point for me. If anyone has evidence of improper behaviour by Ministers, the regulators or firms, they should of course raise that through the proper channels.

It is not a case of my arguing along the lines of “Trust me—I’m a Minister.” I hope that I have demonstrated that the appropriate legislation and the appropriate code and principles of ministerial behaviour are already in place in this space to safeguard against any undue interference as envisaged by this amendment. I hope that this reassures noble Lords that this amendment is simply not necessary, and that the noble Lord is thereby content to withdraw it.

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I join the noble Earl, Lord Howe, in expressing sadness at the death of Lord Judd, and send my condolences to all his loved ones.

In her response, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, raised the interesting point that some matters were confidential and that Ministers or the Government cannot therefore talk about them. There is also a broader issue of parliamentary accountability and public interest, and of being open and accountable, which should always triumph over the pursuit of private interests. I do not think that any of the issues I have spoken about touch upon the position of spy satellites or troop movements and are not, therefore, a real threat to national security. They may be a threat to private arrangements which some elites have negotiated with Governments, but that is another matter.

I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for his detailed explanation. He said that if there is any evidence about ministerial interventions it should be brought to the attention of the proper authorities, but the difficulty is that there is no mechanism by which this intervention is placed on public record. We only become aware of it because of revelations in other cases. In the case of BCCI, which I cited, it was after five and a half years of litigation against the Treasury that I managed to secure a copy of the Sandstorm report. The Government did their utmost to prevent the disclosure of that document, so there simply are no formal channels for any evidence. That means that we can only investigate past events, try to put the bits and pieces together and build up a picture about ministerial interventions.

This issue will remain with us, but one thing we cannot deny is that, even under the FCA’s rules and the Ministerial Code, which the Minister cited, the unredacted version of Lord Justice Bingham’s report on the Bank of England’s supervision of BCCI still remains a secret document. That is really bizarre. The Sandstorm report is on the internet, because I put it there, but as far as the state is concerned it is somehow a secret document.

As I said, this issue is not going to go away. In the post-Covid world there may well be more scandals and more issues. There will, therefore, be more questions about government accountability and interventions. For the time being, I withdraw the amendment, but hope to return to it in the future. I thank noble Lords for their indulgence.

Amendment 33 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Sikka]

34: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“Supervisory Board
(1) There is to be a Supervisory Board to perform the function of monitoring the FCA and PRA.(2) The Supervisory Board must consist entirely of stakeholders.(3) Recruitment for the membership of the Supervisory Board is to be conducted through open competition and the appointments are to be confirmed by the House of Commons Treasury Committee, or another relevant House of Commons Select Committee.(4) The Chancellor of the Exchequer may nominate individuals to the Supervisory Board.(5) The following are ineligible for appointment to the Supervisory Board—(a) current and past employees of the FCA and the PRA, and(b) current employees of organisations supervised by the FCA and the PRA.(6) A member’s membership of the Supervisory Board cannot exceed a period of five years beginning with the day the member’s appointment is confirmed under subsection (3).(7) The Supervisory Board has no responsibility for—(a) the day-to-day operations of the FCA or the PRA, and(b) investigations and enforcement of the rules devised by the FCA and the PRA.(8) The Supervisory Board’s functions are to—(a) provide strategic oversight of the Executive Boards of the FCA and PRA responsible for day-to-day operations;(b) inquire into the adequacy of resources used and available to the FCA and the PRA;(c) seek explanations from the Executive Board for reasons for the delay in launching and completing investigations; and(d) seek explanations from the Executive Board in relation to the efficiency and effectiveness of the FCA and the PRA in discharging their statutory duties.(9) The Supervisory Board shall have powers to—(a) demand explanations from the Executive Board on any matter affecting the protection of consumers from harmful practices;(b) secure information from the Executive Board about their transparency and accountability to the public; and(c) liaise with whistle-blowers and examine FCA and PRA policies for protecting and rewarding whistle-blowers.(10) The Supervisory Board must hold open meetings with the Executive Boards of the FCA and the PRA at least once every three months.(11) The working and background papers of the Supervisory Board must be made publicly available.(12) The Supervisory Board must lay before each House of Parliament an annual report highlighting matters of concern relating to the operation of the FCA and PRA which it has discovered in exercising its powers and functions.(13) The Supervisory Board must be consulted on appointment and reappointment of the Chief Executives of the FCA and the PRA.”Member’s explanatory statement
The new Clause will create a Supervisory Body for each of the FCA and the PRA. Its function would be to internally monitor the Executive Boards of the FCA and the PRA and provide a diversity of views on the conduct and practices of the FCA and the PRA.

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for supporting this amendment, which seeks to democratise regulators by giving the people a direct say in their governance structure, and thus act as a bulwark against capture by corporate interests. Almost every regulator claims to serve the people, but normal people—as I like to call them, rather than ordinary people— are kept off the boards. This amendment would put people inside the regulatory bodies. The amendment proposes a two-tier board structure for the FCA and the PRA. One tier, the executive board, would be responsible for the day-to-day operations, just as it is today. The second tier, a supervisory board consisting of stakeholders, would exercise oversight of the executive board and its practices. The amendment sketches out the composition and some of the powers, rights and duties of the supervisory board and its modus operandi, which is complete sunshine.

Throughout the debate on the Bill, many noble Lords have expressed concerns about the failures of the FCA. Capture by corporate interests has been identified as a major factor. The colonisation of the FCA and the PRA boards, working parties and committees by corporate interests means that their interests are prioritised and anything threatening is filtered out of consideration altogether. The FCA and the PRA are more likely to have one-to-one meetings with finance industry elites than with the victims of banking frauds or mis-sold financial products, or individuals concerned about the RBS and HBOS frauds and bank forgeries.

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The amendment also proposes that the FCA and PRA be required to attend hearings in front of a supervisory board. Here, again, I remind the House that they must already attend such hearings before parliamentary committees. Parliament is well placed to ensure that these hearings focus on the most vital areas. The FCA, for example, must attend general accountability hearings before the Treasury Select Committee twice a year. The PRA must appear before that committee after the publication of its annual report. In addition to these regular hearings, as I have stated previously, parliamentary committees of both Houses are able to summon the regulators to give evidence on an ad hoc basis. Requiring the regulators to also attend regular hearings before a supervisory board would therefore be unnecessarily burdensome; it would not substantively enhance our current oversight regime. Therefore, given the existing processes that I have just set out, which already offer ample opportunity for independent supervision of the regulators, I hope the noble Lord will consider withdrawing this amendment.

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank everyone for their contributions and deep insights. As I listened to the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes, I was briefly reminded of the historical development of the role of the non-executive director, which became popular after the 1973 US crash due to fraud at the Equity Funding Corporation. After that, audit committees staffed by non-executive directors became mandatory for companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

However, if you look at the history from about 50 years before that you will find non-executive directors frequently described as inexperienced, lacking in technical knowledge and not knowing enough about business. How could they really invigilate boards of directors in 15 to 20 hours a year? It is strange that so many years after non-executive directors were established we are now hearing the same kinds of points being made against the involvement of stakeholders in the governance of regulatory bodies.

To my mind, democratisation of regulatory bodies is essential. Periodic scrutiny by parliamentary committees is not a substitute for the real-time involvement of stakeholders and their oversight of the executive board. I have listened to all the arguments carefully and will withdraw the amendment; no doubt, I will refine it and return to it at some time in the future.

Amendment 34 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, we simply do not need another body set up to look at the financial services industry. It is already in effect a core function of the Treasury and if the Treasury thought that it needed some help in identifying the issues that the proposer of this amendment identifies, it does not need the cover of primary legislation to set one up. In addition, Parliament itself has always taken a keen interest in the financial services industry. The long-standing Treasury Select Committee of the other place examines regulators as well as key emerging themes in relation to financial services and your Lordships’ House has recently created an Industry and Regulators Committee, which is having its first meeting as we speak. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, my noble friend Lord Blackwell and I are members of the new committee. Therefore, it should not surprise the House if in due course there is a focus on matters relating to the financial services sector.

I suspect that the subtext of this amendment is a belief that the financial services sector is wicked and has a negative impact on the UK economy. I do not believe that belief is widely shared in your Lordships’ House. On the other hand, there are few—if any—Members of your Lordships’ House who think that the financial services sector is perfect, and that includes me. The important point is that we already have the scrutiny mechanisms that I have described to give a proper focus to the activities and the impact of the financial services sector. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, that this amendment should not be pressed to a vote.

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to speak after the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. The key issue, which has been touched on by a number of speakers, has been how to secure effective, responsible and accountable regulation. This amendment presents another model. We have already heard about a number of models.

Numerous aspects of life have been financialised, and the finance industry affects every household and almost every walk of life—all the more reason to examine its effects on the economy and daily life. The last 50 years have been littered with examples of mis-sold financial products. We have had a banking crisis in every decade since the 1970s, but still the finance lobby is too powerful for Governments to resist. We need structures and policies that can mitigate the negative effects of the finance industry.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 24th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, this is the first time that I have spoken on the Bill on Report and I draw the attention of the House to my interests as set out in the register—in particular, shares that I hold in listed financial services companies.

I have considerable sympathy for the amendment because the financial regulators are not very accountable. At the moment, there are set-piece appearances before the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and occasional appearances before committees of your Lordships’ House but these do not amount to a systematic and comprehensive examination. The Government often rely on the fact that annual reports are laid before Parliament but the annual reports of regulators get no more attention paid to them than the annual reports of companies. With rare exceptions, they provide few insights of value. By their very nature, annual reports accentuate the positive and shy away from the negative.

The problem of the accountability of regulators is not confined to financial services regulators. I could say much the same about Ofcom, Ofgem and other regulators, but we cannot solve the problems of the world in this Bill. The accountability of the PRA and the FCA is covered in the future regulatory framework, the consultation that has recently been completed. We discussed this a little on our first day in Committee and I hope that my noble friend the Minister will provide some information on the next steps when he responds to the amendment. The consultation closed over a month ago and the Treasury must have some idea on what it will be doing next and when.

If the outcome of that review, so far as accountability is concerned, is a well-developed form of parliamentary scrutiny, either jointly between both Houses of Parliament or within each House, the need for an independent review clause such as that contained in Amendment 2 would recede. Parliamentary committees can look at issues in depth but only if they are properly focused and well resourced. On that basis, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, might want to await the legislation implementing the outcome of that review rather than tackle the issue in this legislation, because action could be set in a broader, more holistic context regarding how the regulators will operate overall in due course.

If the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, wishes to pursue her amendment—I thought I heard her say that it was more of a probing amendment for today—it would be wise to look again at its drafting because it calls for one review covering four regulators, but they are all different in what they do and how they do it. I am not convinced that there would be sufficient focus if one review tried to cover all the regulators—the two major ones and the two smaller units with regulatory responsibilities, one in the Bank of England and the other being the Payment Systems Regulator in the FCA.

In addition, I, like the ABI, wonder whether a review every two or three years is too frequent for the kind of in-depth review that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has in mind. A rolling series of reviews, perhaps carried out over five years but concentrating on individual regulators, would provide more information of value to those seeking to hold them to account. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has the right ideas in the amendment, although it may not be right for this Bill.

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to support Amendment 2. Throughout the earlier stages of the Bill, a number of noble Lords have drawn attention to the failures of financial regulators. Essentially, it was argued that they are captured by the finance industry and therefore advance its interests. They are too slow to protect people from malpractices. Over the years, numerous financial products have been fraudulently sold, including pensions, endowment mortgages, precipice bonds, split capital investment trusts, interest rate swaps, payment protection insurance and much more. The names of the products change from the aforementioned to mini-bonds and supply chain finance, but the basic problems are still the same and the regulators have failed to secure positive change in the culture of financial services enterprises.

During debates, Ministers have emphasised the tax contribution of the finance industry but have been silent on the costs imposed by that industry on society. Scholarly research shows that between 1995 and 2015 the oversized and scandal-ridden finance industry made a negative contribution of £4,500 billion to the UK economy, equivalent to around £67,500 for every woman, man and child in the UK. Of the £4,500 billion, £2,700 billion is accounted for by misallocation, whereby resources, skills and investments are diverted away from productive non-financial activities to the financial sector. The other £1,800 billion arises from the 2007-08 banking crisis that ushered in never-ending austerity. The economy and most people are yet to recover from that. That £4,500 billion is a massive cost and we simply cannot afford it. The status quo is not tenable and it is too expensive. The cost of the financial curse for the UK cannot be reduced by carrying on the regulatory business as usual, which is what the Government seemed to indicate in Committee.

Our regulators need to be effective and proactive but they seem to neglect their duty to the people. This is well documented in the reports on London Capital & Finance and the Connaught Income Fund. The FCA knew that mini-bonds were a problem but was slow to act at London Capital & Finance, and the same pattern has now been repeated at Blackmore Bond. The FCA does not welcome public scrutiny. Just look at the excuses it concocted to conceal the report on frauds at HBOS. The saga is still not resolved and same goes for frauds at RBS.

It is well documented that thousands of people are trapped in the £3.7 billion collapse of Woodford Investment Management. The Woodford Equity Income Fund was first authorised by the FCA in 2014. In 2015, the FCA was informed about the fund’s precarious existence as it was investing excessively in unlisted securities that affected its liquidity, but the FCA ignored the information until at least 2017.

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Moved by

[Lord Sikka]

7: Clause 22, page 28, line 23, at end insert—
“32B Gibraltar-based persons: reporting requirements(1) A Gibraltar-based person carrying on an activity approved under Schedule 2A, or which has permission by virtue of relevant Gibraltar provision to carry on an activity, in the United Kingdom must be registered under section 1046 of the Companies Act 2006.(2) A company of the type referred to in subsection (1) is to be regulated in respect of activities that it undertakes in the United Kingdom by a relevant person as defined by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.(3) A reference to a relevant Gibraltar provision is to be read with section 23 of the Financial Services Act 2021.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require any Gibraltar-based person carrying on activities in the UK to file their accounts at Companies House and to be regulated in the UK with regard to their UK activities.

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans sends his apologies. Due to unforeseen circumstances, he is unable to speak to Amendment 7. At very short notice, he has asked me to speak for him.

Amendment 7, in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and myself, would require companies operating under the Gibraltar authorisation regime, or GAR, to be registered and to file their accounts in the UK at Companies House. It would also ensure that GAR companies are regulated in respect of their UK activities, in accordance with UK regulations.

I beg your Lordships’ indulgence. In order to minimise any disservice to the right reverend Prelate, my speech will be in two parts. First, I will relay what the right reverend Prelate would have said. Secondly, I will briefly add my own comments.

In the words of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans: I have placed this amendment because I did not feel that my concerns about Gibraltar were adequately satisfied in Committee when I tabled a similar amendment. I will be frank: I got the impression that because Gibraltar was an associated territory, there was a reluctance to ensure that it could not be used by companies to reduce their tax obligations. I understand that the Gibraltar authorisation regime allows for continuity of the financial services that existed when we were a member of the EU. But this should not discount the fact that a single market in financial services is being created here. Gibraltar is not necessarily a serial, global tax haven. According to the Tax Justice Network, Gibraltar ranks 30th in the corporate tax haven index, whereas the UK is ranked 13th. In no way do I want this to be an attack on the territory of Gibraltar, particularly having highlighted that the UK is ranked as a worse tax haven.

This amendment attempts to speak to a specific UK-Gibraltar issue on tax avoidance. The current relationship allows a Gibraltar-based company to operate, conduct its business and receive what would be taxable income in the UK, but then to pay corporation tax in Gibraltar. There is a corporation tax disparity between the UK and Gibraltar. Our corporation tax is 19% whereas Gibraltar’s is 10%.

During his evidence session to the Commons Committee, the Minister from Gibraltar said that the corporation tax rate was not a factor in companies relocating to Gibraltar. No doubt the Mediterranean climate and lifestyle make it a very attractive place to reside, but I would not presume that the warm climate is responsible for 20% of the UK’s private insurance market being underwritten from Gibraltar, despite the territory holding not even 0.1% of the UK’s population.

Financial services are one of Gibraltar’s primary industries, hence the tabling of this amendment. One might assume that greater transparency would apply to the finance and other sectors, ideally through stricter and more thorough reporting standards between Gibraltar and the UK. It is common practice in many industries for transactions placed in the UK to be processed via servers in Gibraltar—a technicality that allows what is, in reality, taxable income in the UK to be taxed in Gibraltar.

Obtaining evidence on the cost of the system to the UK Treasury is difficult. However, we have reliable data for the online gaming and gambling sector. Research and private investigations have shown that some of the UK’s major gambling firms actually pay corporation tax in the UK of between 3% and 13% by either headquartering in Gibraltar or using subsidiaries based there. We know of this only because the size of these firms brought them under journalistic scrutiny. If these practices were well documented for one sector, it would be illogical if other sectors did not follow the same incentives. After all, the purpose of reducing corporation tax is only one major reason for relocation to Gibraltar.

This amendment does not deal with the issue of taxation. In fact, even if the Government adopted the amendment, these practices would still continue. It would ensure that companies operating under the GAR regime abide by the Companies Act 2006, which mandates foreign countries to register and file accounts at Companies House.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, to conclude the debate on the right reverend Prelate’s amendment.

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

I thank all the contributors to this debate, which has been very informative and helpful. Given that roughly 25% of UK motor insurance is written from Gibraltar, it is clear that large amounts of profit made in the UK are being booked in Gibraltar and that the public purse here is being deprived of large amounts of tax revenue.

Of course, we might take the view that Gibraltar has been hit hard by Brexit and therefore deserves some support, but, as I pointed out, the beneficiaries of those profits are not necessarily people in Gibraltar but are actually corporations using Gibraltar to extract revenue from the UK. The ultimate destination of those profits is not really known because there is no transparency at all. Whether somebody is engaging in tax evasion or tax avoidance, the effect on the UK public purse is the same: the loss of revenue.

We still need greater transparency but at the moment, we do not have it. I hope that, when we have a public form of country-by-country reporting, perhaps that will provide some form of transparency, but at the moment the Government are not committed to that.

Nevertheless, I thank everybody for their contributions to the debate, and with the permission of the House and on behalf of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.