Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Davies of Brixton

Report stage
Monday 7th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 13 to 15 and 99. Clauses 7 and 8 propose radical reform of the relationship between the FOS and the FCA, and of the method of determining complaints to the FOS. These proposals will have a critical effect on consumer protection. They will turn the independent FOS into a subset of the FCA and make successful complaints harder to progress or achieve. Parliament designed and brought the FOS regime into being to provide accessible, no cost procedures for quickly determining complaints. At its heart is the “fair and reasonable” test. This test is abolished by the Bill, despite having been explicitly confirmed in July last year in the memorandum of understanding signed by the FOS and the FCA. The Bill will reduce access to free and impartial redress, introduce additional bureaucracy and costs, and ultimately risk damaging confidence in the financial services industry.

The Government have not supplied any meaningful hard evidence that might justify, or at least explain convincingly, the rationale for these reforms. They say only that the Government’s review found that,

“in a small but significant minority of cases, the FOS has acted as a quasi-regulator”.

They do not say how small or how significant these cases are, or how significance was defined and engaged, and they have completely ignored repeated requests from these Benches to provide a clear description of the problem being addressed and of the necessity for such radical changes.

Three months ago, at Second Reading, I asked for hard evidence. I got none, not even an acknowledgement of the request. I asked again on the first day in Committee, and again had no result. I asked again on the last day in Committee. This time, the then Minister—who is in his seat—apologised for not writing in answer to my questions and promised to get back to me

“as soon as we have that information to hand again”.—[Official Report, 8/7/26; col. GC 161.]

I have heard nothing since. This lack of response displays an almost contemptuous approach to parliamentary scrutiny, and it also makes obvious that the Government are unclear about the existence of any significant problem in the way that the FOS and the FCA operate under their current MoU.

I am grateful to Sarah Pritchard, FCA deputy CEO, for her attempts to persuade the Government to answer our questions in a meaningful way. In her letter to me and my noble friend Lady Kramer of 6 August, she said:

“We recognise that you have consistently sought further evidence from HM Treasury to support the case for reform, particularly the contention that uncertainty in FOS decision making may be constraining innovation. Following our meeting, we have formally re-iterated this request to HM Treasury and highlighted the importance of ensuring parliament has access to the evidence and analysis underpinning these proposals”.


HMT appears to deal with these things even-handedly; it has ignored her as well.

Her letter went on to say:

“One area where legislative change is being proposed concerns the interaction between our rules and the Ombudsman’s ‘fair and reasonable’ test. The aim is to provide greater consistency and alignment between regulatory requirements and complaint outcomes, while preserving the Ombudsman’s discretion to consider the wider circumstances of the case”.


This sounds like the arrangements currently in place under the MoU, but the Bill goes much further in practice. In effect, it reduces the scope of this discretion and reduces the FOS to a subset of the FCA, with the FCA rulebook being the determinator. It is very hard to see that this preserves the independence of the FOS and, of course, independence is desirable.

In evidence given to the Treasury Select Committee on 15 July, Nikhil Rathi said:

“From the FCA’s perspective, we want an independent Financial Ombudsman Service. That is a really important safeguard for your consumers”.


Both Mr Rathi and Mr Alder, the FCA chair, in the same TSC session, went on to express concern about the interaction between the FCA’s interpretation of rules and the FOS’s decision-making. Mr Rathi said that

“with a system where people can try to instrumentalise it so that everything that they disagree with can get pushed to us to try to deal with in 30 days because it is deemed ambiguous, you will gum up the system”.

His chair emphasised the point of this:

“To Nikhil’s point, if we get this wrong, the system will become gummed up … As a result, the main objectives of those changes in the legislation will not be met. It is very important that we get this right”.


This is the very real danger of a requirement for the FCA to respond to a referral from the FOS within 30 days. In the same session, Sarah Pritchard said:

“We have been clear that we want the Financial Ombudsman Service to deliver quickly for consumers. We do not want to turn into a backdoor appeal mechanism. Where there are important matters around the intention of our rules, absolutely we should be there to clarify. We are already taking referrals from the Financial Ombudsman Service that do that”.


The July 2025 MoU between the FOS and the FCA is in operation now. It seems clear that this blueprint has taken into account current and anticipated problems, but it differs radically from the FOS proposals in Clauses 7 and 8, including on the absolutely critical criterion of the FOS making a determination. If the MoU is working and if it is working with, as it says, the fair and reasonable test at its heart, why are the Government proposing to abolish that test and the FOS’s effective independence?

My Amendments 13 and 14 address these issues. Amendment 13 would remove Clause 7, with its referral method and four other pages of prescriptive micromanagement, including a kind of Henry VIII power on page 6. Amendment 14 seeks to restore the “fair and reasonable” test agreed in the MoU.

Consumer groups have noticed the proposed changes in the Bill and many are very strongly opposed. For example, Martin Lewis of Money Saving Expert strongly supports the removal of Clause 7 and the replacement of Clause 8 with the current “fair and reasonable” test. In all, 12 leading consumer organisations have written to us asking for support for Amendments 13, 14 and 15. I will not read out the whole list, but they have agreed a statement that says:

“At a time when the cost-of-living crisis is pushing household budgets to breaking point, the Government should not be altering the fairness test and introducing new bureaucratic hurdles in the very system that provides redress for financial loss”.


Finally, my Amendment 15 would create breathing space to enable a proper evidence-based review to take place, with a report to Parliament on its findings and recommendations. Amendment 15 sets out the proposed independent review process and its scope and timelines. It requires the review to take place not before the second anniversary of signing the MoU and then to report within 12 months. Amendment 99 would simply put the commencement of Clauses 7 and 8 on hold until the review’s report has been laid before Parliament. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, on making a very powerful case for keeping the existing system under which the FOS operates. The problem here, expressed in the considerable representations that we have received from consumer groups, is a lack of clarity about the problem that this is meant to address, coupled with clear concerns about the loss of the fair and reasonable requirement. That is the central point. We have a system that works, in which there is a degree of consumer confidence. The reason for interfering in that system is not clear to the bodies representing consumers, so my Government have to do more to justify these changes.

Interestingly, I had some discussions with the previous Minister, who is now sharing the same Bench as me, and one of the points that came out is that it is quite difficult for the Government to point to cases in which they expect a different result following this change from what was happening before. It would be unreasonable for the Government to pick on individual cases and say, “Those people really should not have had that finding from the ombudsman”, but that is at the heart of what is being proposed here.

Before my noble friend the Minister’s elevation, I discussed this with him at length. He assured me at the time that the impact on the consumer would not be material—that the way that the legislation is worded, in particular the rules that the FCA would have to interpret for the FOS, would embrace the concept of “fair and reasonable”. It would certainly help a great deal in allaying my concerns if those assurances could be given to the House. The Minister probably cannot express it in these terms, but it would help if he could say that these changes are contingent and will be reviewed and judged on their effect. That would allay my continued concerns about what is being proposed here.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Davies of Brixton

Committee stage
Monday 12th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I am still mystified as to why Amendment 220 is not included in this group. It is left bereft, right at the end of the Marshalled List. Is there a reason?

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

If the noble Lord is asking why it is there, I am afraid I will have to plead the Public Bill Office.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Davies of Brixton

Committee stage
Monday 20th February 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I add briefly to my noble friend’s comments on the need for a proper and joint assessment of systemic risk in pension funds and their management strategies. I think the need is urgent, as the LDI debacle has shown. Indeed, there is continued turmoil and unrest in the sector. I notice that Risk.net reported last Friday that UK pension funds are exploring legal claims against LDI managers, their fiduciaries who they tasked with running the LDI strategies. Five law firms have told Risk.net that they have been approached by pension schemes invested in both pooled and segregated funds to investigate whether legal action can be taken against the relevant managers.

There are apparently also questions being asked, not surprisingly, about whether fund managers had fully explained to trustees the risks associated with LDI, a point raised by the chair of our Industry and Regulators Committee in his brief letter of 7 February to Andrew Griffiths. It is a point that has a direct bearing on the generation of systemic risk.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I intended to make a second point about risk. Everyone tends to think about risk in terms of systemic risk—the finances of the country come under some pressure—but there is another risk that is not given sufficient attention, which is the risk that pension funds will fail to deliver the benefits that people expect to receive. That risk is given insufficient attention, but I hope it will be covered if there is a system where someone is given responsibility to look at risk. There is the risk of not getting out the benefits expected, as well as the risk to the financial system.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Davies of Brixton

Report stage
Wednesday 14th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, these amendments are all on the same broad theme. As the previous speaker mentioned, there is a broad consensus that something needs to be done to provide a formal role for parliamentary scrutiny in the work of financial regulators. I do not want to detain the House, but I will take the opportunity to emphasise points that I have made at earlier stages. The basic question, to me, is: who regulates the regulators? The question is why we should trust the regulators; the answer is openness and engagement. Clearly, we have a particular interest here but can, I believe, contribute massively to the work of the regulator.

For us to raise these issues is not to question the expertise or good will of the people who serve on the regulators’ boards or work in their offices. It is simply wrong to assume that, once appointed, they can be left to get on with the job. As is apparent in the debate, there is clear consensus about the need for scrutiny. That is not contested. Obviously, there are clear reasons why they would benefit—the expertise of this House is a factor—but my particular concern is to establish systems that minimise the risk of regulatory capture. This is the experience, widely found, whereby regulators tend to become dominated by the interests they regulate and not by public interest.

I emphasise that this is not about corruption; it is more, in my mind, a social and cultural problem. I do not think the concept, in theory, is contested. The answer is to strengthen and develop the widest possible involvement of all sorts of bodies in the work of the regulators. Clearly, Parliament has a particular role and these amendments explore possible approaches to it. I hope the Minister can say a bit more than what was in the letter. Does the Minister consider regulatory capture to be something that occurs, and where the systems that are established address it and minimise the risk?

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 18, 19 and 20 in this group. I support them all but prefer the more prescriptive Amendment 20. In these matters, it seems to me that ambiguity is not our friend. Wide latitude in interpretation can easily frustrate intent. As my noble friend Lady Bowles has so forcefully explained, that intent here is to ensure that Parliament has some effective scrutiny role in the activities and rule-making of the PRA and the FCA, by requiring that the information Parliament may need to do this is properly supplied. At present, this is absent or insufficient or likely to be post hoc and ineffective.

This is a specific example of a much larger problem in the relations between the Executive and the legislature. There is an increasing tendency for the Executive to bypass, or try to bypass, Parliament or to reduce scrutiny to formulaic rituals with no real influence on outcomes, such as our SI procedures. The seriousness of this tendency has been commented on fairly widely and frequently in the past few years.