Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk Countries) (Amendment) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 13th February 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these regulations have been laid to amend the definition of high-risk third countries in the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, which I will refer to as the money laundering regulations.

The Government recognise the threat that economic crime poses to the UK and are committed to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Illicit finance causes significant social and economic costs through its links to serious and organised crime. It also undermines the integrity and stability of our financial sector and can reduce opportunities for economic growth and legitimate business in the UK. The Government are bearing down on kleptocrats, criminals and terrorists who abuse the UK’s financial and services sectors. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act built on the earlier Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act to ensure that the UK has robust, effective defences against illicit finance.

The money laundering regulations are at the centre of the UK’s legislative framework for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing. They set out various measures that businesses must take to protect the UK from illicit financial flows, such as conducting enhanced due diligence—EDD—in certain cases. EDD is required to manage and mitigate the risks arising from certain high-risk transactions or business relationships. Businesses must consider a wide range of multiple different factors when deciding whether there is a high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in a particular situation. They include risk factors associated with the customer, product, service, transaction and delivery channel, as well as any geographical risk factors.

The MLRs set out that firms should consider the risk posed by customers or transactions relating to any countries which have been identified by credible sources, such as the IMF or the World Bank, as lacking effective systems; countries with significant levels of corruption or other criminal activity; or countries subject to sanctions, embargoes or similar measures. As well as these examples, EDD is required in any other case which by its nature can present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

The measures being brought forward today relate to another of the specific situations in which regulated businesses must apply EDD, being in relation to any business relationship or transaction with persons established in a high-risk third country—that is, a country identified as such by the Financial Action Task Force, or FATF.

The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act changed how high-risk third countries may be defined under the money laundering regulations, and this statutory instrument simply implements this change. It removes the separate list of countries from Schedule 3ZA and replaces it with an ambulatory reference to those countries listed by FATF, which is the global standard setter for anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. This means that countries listed by FATF will automatically be in scope of obligations under the regulations.

By taking this approach, we will ensure that the UK remains at the forefront of global standards on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. This protects the UK financial system from illicit finance linked to the jurisdictions being listed. Where countries have made significant progress to improve their defences, it is equally important that we recognise that and promptly remove them from the scope of high-risk countries in the UK.

Ahead of this update, the UK and the FATF lists were already aligned. Indeed, since the creation of the UK list in 2021, the Government have always updated it to reflect changes to the FATF lists, and that remains our policy. This SI does not, therefore, add or remove any countries from scope, nor change the obligations on regulated businesses. It delivers on government policy in a streamlined way and ensures automatic alignment with the FATF lists without the need for frequent but fairly routine secondary legislation. It also ensures that firms will be notified in a timely manner of updates to the lists and their obligations, staying up to date as the risks change.

This statutory instrument has been reported as an instrument of interest by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which noted that it reduces parliamentary oversight of the process of adding or removing countries, although I note that of course it is government policy and would have continued to be government policy to introduce an SI every time the list changes. Therefore, in a sense this is automating the process. However, the Government are committed to keeping Parliament informed and will submit letters to the Libraries of both Houses at the conclusion of each FATF plenary meeting, when countries made have been added to or, indeed, removed from the FATF’s lists.

I also assure noble Lords that if at any time the Government saw fit to deviate from the FATF lists, they retain the authority and autonomy to do so. In such cases, a statutory instrument would be brought before Parliament for consideration.

I conclude by noting that the measures in respect of high-risk third countries are an important mechanism to mitigate the risks posed by illicit financial flows from overseas. We will continue to use this and, of course, many other tools available to us to respond to wider and emerging threats from other jurisdictions, including by applying financial sanctions as necessary. These amendments will enable the money laundering regulations to continue to work as effectively as possible to protect the integrity of the UK financial system. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, we support this very sensible SI and recognise the importance of the work FATF does in the fields of money laundering and terrorist financing. We recognise the importance of its lists of high-risk countries and the importance of the UK aligning itself with these lists, especially as they change from time to time.

Up until today, as the Minister said, we have kept ourselves aligned by using SIs to modify Schedule 3ZA to the MLRs. We have done this eight times; the last occasion was 8 January, a month ago. As the last of these SIs passed through the Commons, the Minister noted:

“I am aware that many noble Lords have expressed frustration at parliamentary time being taken up in the other place by such relatively routine matters to keep our high-risk third countries list aligned to the task force’s”.—[Official Report, Commons, First Delegated Legislation Committee, 8/1/24; col. 4.]


I do not know who those noble Lords were either. The Minister proposed a better way: the removal of the list in Schedule 3ZA and its replacement with, as our Minister said, an ambulatory reference to the FATF list itself.

This SI, which was debated last week in the Commons, does exactly that. It is true that it will undoubtedly save some parliamentary time, but it will remain important to ensure that all interested parties are aware of FATF list changes.

HMT issued updated guidance on high-risk third countries on 22 January. In passing, I should note that I could not find Russia on either list. Is that not a little odd? Coming back to the guidance issued by the Treasury, it would seem perfectly reasonable and not burdensome if HMT were to issue similar updated guidance after each of the three FATF plenary sessions that are held each year. Since Parliament will now lose an automatic mechanism for discussing changes to FATF lists, as the Minister said, I am very grateful for her confirmation of the commitments given to the SLSC to continue the practice of depositing in the Libraries of both Houses a summary of FATF meetings at which list changes are made and publishing an advisory note on the government website.

Financial Services Act 2021 (Overseas Funds Regime and Recognition of Parts of Schemes) (Amendment and Modification) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd January 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these draft regulations make a number of technical changes to support the effective implementation of the overseas funds regime, prior to the first funds marketing under it, and ensure the correct treatment of recognised overseas funds.

The overseas funds regime is a new route that will allow overseas funds to be recognised for the purpose of marketing to UK retail investors, where the Government have determined that their regulatory regime is equivalent to that of the UK. Prior to the introduction of the overseas funds regime, there were two recognition routes for overseas funds allowing them to market to UK retail investors. If they were passporting to the UK prior to the UK’s exit from the European Union, funds may now have temporary recognition, which is due to expire at the end of 2025. The second route enables funds to be individually recognised by the Financial Conduct Authority, but this can be costly and time-consuming for both the fund and the regulator.

At present, there are more than 8,000 funds recognised via the former route and 48 funds recognised via the latter route. This is more than double the number of UK-authorised funds. The cross-border nature of asset management means that the overseas funds regime will be critical to ensuring a competitive funds sector for UK investors with an appropriate range of choice.

At present, no funds have been recognised under this regime. However, the Government are currently undertaking the first equivalence assessment for the states in the European Economic Area in respect of retail funds, specifically undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities—to note, money market funds are excluded from this assessment. Ahead of any equivalence decision or any funds becoming recognised under the overseas funds regime, it is important that the statute book adequately reflects its introduction.

This instrument makes two groups of technical changes. First, it makes amendments to ensure that, where appropriate, funds recognised under the overseas funds regime are treated in the same way as overseas funds which have been individually recognised for the purpose of marketing to retail investors. Secondly, it makes modifications to ensure that recognised sub-funds are appropriately captured. This is because it is common for funds to be structured as an umbrella, with multiple sub-funds beneath it, each with their own investment strategies.

More specifically, this instrument makes changes in the following areas. First, in relation to different pieces of rehabilitation of offenders legislation, it makes consequential amendments to the definition of “relevant collective investment scheme” to include reference to the overseas funds regime. This means that funds recognised under the overseas funds regime are accounted for in the same way as existing individually recognised funds in these pieces of legislation, such as in relation to the disclosure of spent convictions by associates of these funds. The instrument also makes modifications to these pieces of legislation to ensure that recognised sub-funds are appropriately captured.

Secondly, it modifies the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (Wales) Regulations 2003 to ensure that recognised sub-funds are treated appropriately for accounting purposes.

Thirdly, it amends the financial promotions order to allow certain communications made by operators of funds recognised under the overseas funds regime to be exempted from the general restriction on financial promotions. These are limited to cases where the fund in question is communicating with existing investors. This legislation is also modified to appropriately account for recognised sub-funds.

Finally, retained EU law on disclosure for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products is amended such that funds recognised under the overseas funds regime must provide the same retail disclosure documents as other recognised funds.

These changes are technical in nature and, as set out in the Explanatory Memorandum for the statutory instrument, are extremely unlikely to have any impact on business or public services. However, they are necessary to ensure that funds recognised under the overseas funds regime are treated appropriately and that the regime is able to function effectively. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, we are grateful for the Minister’s clear and concise explanation of what this SI does and why it is necessary. I note the thorough and helpful consultation report, published as long ago as 2020. We are happy to support this instrument and have only a few questions.

The first question is to do with timing. The new OFR will come into operation only when the appropriate equivalence determinations have been made by HMT. The introduction of this new regime has been foreseen for at least two years. During that time, I am sure HMT has been working diligently to decide on the appropriate equivalence determinations. When might we expect these determinations to be published?

My second question arises from the 2020 consultation report. It makes clear the decision not to extend FOS and FSCS protection to the newly authorised funds. This is despite the recommendation of the Financial Services Consumer Panel. Can the Minister explain why these basic consumer protections were omitted?

My third question arises from the decision to reject these protections. In paragraph 2.44, the consultation report notes that:

“In general, respondents to the consultation considered that if the scope of FOS and FSCS remain unchanged, funds should inform investors through disclosures in the fund prospectus”.


The Government agreed that some form of disclosure was necessary, and in paragraph 2.46 said:

“The government will consider the appropriate framework for disclosing the absence of FSCS and FOS in the future. The FCA will also explore whether it is necessary and appropriate to require enhanced risk warnings or explicit acknowledgement from investors about the lack of availability of FOS and FSCS coverage”.


That was over two years ago. How is HMT getting on with the framework thinking? How is the FCA getting on with its exploration? Can the Minister tell us what HMT has concluded about the appropriate framework for disclosing the absence of FOS and FSCS cover and what the FSA has concluded about enhanced risk warnings? If at this late stage there is as yet no conclusion from HMT or the FCA, will she commit to write to us, setting out the conclusions when they are finally arrived at?

[Lord Jones (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister is clearly up to speed on these detailed matters, as I know my noble friend Lord Livermore is—but I am not. I recollect that, when I was in another place, the late Lord Cecil Parkinson, a very able Minister, introduced his great City finance reforms—what we knew then in the other place as the “big bang”. Lord Parkinson was a clever and adept Minister; he rose to even higher rank in government, and was a party chair for the late Lady Thatcher. But it seems to me that, in his reforms, simplicity was not one of the ingredients. With reference to the Explanatory Memorandum, at paragraph 7.1, what are sub-funds? Might the Minister throw some light on that detail?

Data Reporting Services Regulations 2023

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Wednesday 10th January 2024 Grand Committee

In closing, these SIs replace key parts of assimilated EU law, putting in place new frameworks tailored to the UK as the Government deliver a smarter regulatory framework in financial services. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak first to the data reporting services SI. The Explanatory Memorandum for this instrument helpfully reduces its 28 pages to a succinct six pages. It makes plain what the scrutiny situation with regard to the SI will be. Paragraph 7.4 says:

“Before FSMA 2023, the FCA did not have any rule-making powers over DRSPs, except for some limited powers in respect of technical standards, as well as limited powers of direction enabling them to establish the current authorisation process. These were not sufficient to replace the detailed provisions currently in retained EU law”.


Paragraph 6.6 goes on to remind us:

“Separately, Section 11 of FSMA 2023 inserts new section 300H into FSMA 2000 which establishes a general rule-making power for the FCA in relation to DRSPs. Going forward, it will be the responsibility of the FCA to make firm-facing rules in relation to DRSPs within the powers established by FSMA 2023”.


These new FCA rules will not be subject to parliamentary scrutiny—unlike the retained EU law provisions, which were. We should be clear that Parliament will be bypassed by these new FCA rules.

In this SI, we are simply being asked to consider a set of framework proposals for these new FCA rules, not the rules themselves. The helpful de minimis assessment makes this point very clearly in its opening paragraph when it says:

“Retained EU law will be replaced with rules set by our independent and expert regulators, operating within a framework set by government and Parliament”.


We regret that Parliament is being excluded from effective scrutiny here.

There are some questions relating to this framework; I would be grateful if the Minister could address them. In paragraph 7.10 of the Government’s response to the consultation on the WMR, there is a note on the issue of removing the requirement for CTPs to provide data streams free after 15 minutes. The report notes that most respondents favoured removing this requirement but others argued that

“retail and non-professional investors currently benefit from this obligation and removing it, even for CTPs, could risk disadvantaging them”.

Have the Government discussed this with the FCA? Which approach is currently favoured? Are we going to leave the 15 minutes in or take it out?

In paragraph 7.11 of the WMR response, it is noted that some respondents suggested that

“the current requirement in legislation for market participants, operators and data reporting services providers to make data available on a ‘reasonable commercial basis’ (RCB) is not working”.

These respondents argued that this is because the FCA

“does not have sufficient enforcement powers and asked for the FCA to be given appropriate enforcement powers to control the cost of market data”.

Can the Minister say whether this framework SI will allow the FCA to take on these obviously necessary enforcement powers?

I turn now to the 44 pages of the second SI before us, the Securitisation Regulations 2023. We acknowledge the need for action in this area but, as with the previous SI, we strongly regret that Parliament is in effect excluded from scrutiny of the rules to be set by the FCA and PRA. There are several areas in the instrument where it would be helpful to hear more detailed explanations from the Minister.

Paragraph 7.12 of the EM notes:

“This SI makes some changes to the regulatory perimeter, including scoping out”—


I take that to mean “ruling out of scope” rather than “investigating”—

“non-UK AIFMs from the definition of institutional investor”,

and transferring

“the responsibility for the supervision of providing securitisations by occupational pension schemes”

from TPR to the FCA. Can the Minister explain on what basis these two changes are thought to be beneficial and to whom?

I am also puzzled by this comment in paragraph 7.14 of the EM:

“Due diligence requirements for occupational pension schemes will remain in legislation and be supervised by TPR”.


It goes on to say:

“These requirements will be restated as part of a further SI in 2024”.


Why is there a need for restatement? What deficiencies are there in the current legislation?

Paragraph 7.20 of the EM says that

“this instrument exercises sections 71N(3) and 71N(4) FSMA to allow the FCA to disapply or modify their rules in relation to securitisation activity”.

Are there any limitations here to what the FCA may do or does it have carte blanche to do as it sees fit, absent any scrutiny from HMT or Parliament? If there are any limitations, where are they set out?

I close by referring to paragraph 10.4 of the EM and the Q2 2024 date for the publication of the outcomes of the FCA and PRA consultations and, therefore, of their new rules. This is a long wait. It is extremely unfortunate that these outcomes and the final new rules are not available to Parliament to inform our debate on this SI. No doubt we will have many more financial services SIs in this Session. Will the Minister ensure that the relevant consultation outcomes and proposed new rules are available to Parliament before we debate future SIs?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing these two grouped SIs, both of which we support.

The Explanatory Memoranda accompanying these regulations note that the repeal of retained EU law remains subject to the entry into force of commencement regulations in order to ensure that there is no overlap or gap between the two different regimes. How soon is commencement expected once this package of SIs has been debated and passed?

I note that the consultations and reviews underpinning these regulations were held in 2021. Although the industry has commented on drafts of the SIs, not all feedback was incorporated and, in some specific areas, the regulators’ rules are still being finalised. Is the Minister satisfied that the changes in timelines have been communicated adequately to the relevant entities? Does she believe that any further communication needs to take place before commencement?

The Explanatory Memorandum for the first of these SIs notes, as did the Minister in her introduction, that

“there is no consolidated tape provider in the UK”.

Apparently, the MiFID II framework “attempted” to bring one about but the requirements for running a tape were thought to have made it “commercially unattractive”. The EM goes on to outline new measures contained in the SI aimed at facilitating a UK consolidated tape, including giving the FCA the power to run a tender exercise based on revised governance arrangements.

I wish to ask the Minister three related questions. First, what practical impact is the lack of a UK tape having and what alternative data sources are being used? Secondly, what is the timescale for the tender process? Thirdly, what will the Government do should there be no suitable bids or if concerns around the governance of a tape remain?

The Explanatory Memorandum for the second of these SIs notes that the FCA will have the power to review and modify its securitisation rules for specific purposes. When is the next overall review of securitisation expected?

Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk Countries) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Wednesday 10th January 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these regulations have been laid to update the UK’s list of high-risk third countries in Schedule 3ZA to the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfers of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, which I will refer to as the money laundering regulations.

The Government recognise the threat that economic crime poses to the UK and our international partners, and are committed to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The Government are committed to bearing down on kleptocrats, criminals and terrorists who abuse the UK’s financial and services sectors. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act built on the earlier Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act to ensure that the UK has robust, effective defences against illicit finance.

The money laundering regulations provide the legislative framework for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing, and set out various measures that businesses must take to protect the UK from illicit financial flows. Under these regulations, businesses are required to conduct enhanced checks on business relationships and transactions with high-risk third countries, which are listed for these purposes in Schedule 3ZA to the money laundering regulations. These are countries identified as having strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes which could pose a significant threat to the UK’s financial system.

This statutory instrument amends the money laundering regulations to update the UK’s list of high-risk third countries. It removes Albania, the Cayman Islands, Jordan and Panama from the list, and adds Bulgaria, Cameroon, Croatia, Nigeria, South Africa and Vietnam. This means that the UK’s high-risk third-country list will be aligned with the decisions of the Financial Action Task Force, the global standard-setter for anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing.

FATF’s methodology ensures that countries around the world are subject to expert, robust evaluations of their anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes. Where countries are found to have strategic deficiencies which they fail to address, FATF members can agree to add them to one of two lists: jurisdictions under increased monitoring and jurisdictions subject to a call to action.

By aligning our own high-risk third-country list with that of FATF, we ensure that the UK remains at the forefront of global standards on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. This protects the UK financial system from illicit finance linked to the jurisdictions being listed. Where countries have made significant progress to address their strategic deficiencies, it is equally important that we recognise that and promptly remove them from the UK’s list.

This is the eighth SI amending the UK’s list of high-risk third countries to respond to the evolving risks. In June, Schedule 3ZA was amended to remove Cambodia and Morocco after they were de-listed by FATF, but otherwise updates to the high-risk third-country list have been paused since November 2022. As set out in the Explanatory Memorandum, that was to allow time for a full impact assessment to be conducted. This was required due, in particular, to the listing of Nigeria and South Africa, given their significant economic ties to the UK. The pause in updating Schedule 3ZA has led to the need for this more significant SI, with six countries being added and four removed.

I am aware that many noble Lords have expressed frustration at parliamentary time being taken up by these relatively routine matters, which keep our high-risk third-country list aligned to FATF. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act enables the Government to amend the money laundering regulations to create an ambulatory reference to the FATF lists. This will result in the same legal effect, with regulated businesses being required to apply enhanced due diligence to relevant business relationships and transactions with these countries, but without the need for secondary legislation after every change to the FATF lists.

The Government will bring forward an SI to implement this provision in the MLRs shortly and, in notifying the Committee of this, I emphasise two things. First, the Government retain the authority and autonomy to deviate from the FATF list at any time if the Government change their policy decision with regard to mirroring the FATF lists and, secondly, if we were to do so, it would require further secondary legislation and a debate in both Houses of Parliament.

I conclude by noting that the high-risk third-country list is an important mechanism that the Government have to clamp down on illicit financial flows from overseas threats, but we will also continue to use other mechanisms to respond to wider threats from other jurisdictions, including, for example, by applying financial sanctions.

These amendments will enable the money laundering regulations to continue to work as effectively as possible to protect the integrity of the UK financial system. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak to this made SI, which is a model of its kind. It is succinct, admirably clear and well supported by a helpful EM and an exemplary impact assessment. We are happy to support it and we have only a few comments to make.

We continue, of course, to be enthusiastic about the work of FATF both in general and in the particular cases of money laundering and terrorist finance which are addressed by this SI. It is clear from the EM that FATF is extremely active in these areas. Reading the appendices to HMT’s updated guidance of 4 December makes it clear that there are both significant signs of progress and significant issues yet to be resolved. The removal of four countries from the old Schedule 3ZA is somewhat outweighed by the addition of six countries, two of which—Nigeria and South Africa—represent large challenges to the implementation of successful MLR regimes. Nevertheless, for many of the countries on the new Schedule 3ZA brought into being by this SI, FATF has been able to detect progress but not yet sufficient progress to warrant removal from the list.

As the Minister pointed out, the United Kingdom has revised this list seven times previously to follow FATF’s findings and I think we all hope that this revision will be the last in its current form. Debating this SI in the Commons on Monday, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury said, as the Minister explained:

“I am aware that many noble Lords have expressed frustration at parliamentary time being taken up in the other place by such relatively routine matters to keep our high-risk third countries list aligned to the task force’s”.—[Official Report, Commons, First Delegated Legislation Committee, 8/1/24; col. 4.]


I have no idea who these people are, but clearly they were extremely influential because the Economic Secretary to the Treasury has proposed a solution, as the Minister explained. He proposed using the powers in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act to amend the MLRs to create an ambulatory reference to the FATF list which will result in the same legal effect as at present, but without the need for a SI every time there are changes. All of that seems much more sensible than having to debate an SI every time the list changes, but it raises the question of whether the Government have in contemplation any adjustments to the current FATF list that they want to make independently of the list itself, as it were. Perhaps the Minister could comment on that when she replies.

Returning to the current instrument, I commend the impact assessment. It is thorough, reasoned and appropriately self-critical. I am, as are the authors of the assessment, somewhat sceptical about what appears to me a likely false precision in the associated costs of implementing this SI. The high-level estimate of £237 million for transition costs seems just that—very high—as does the upper estimate of £131 million per annum in ongoing costs. The impact assessment thoroughly explains the data problems involved in arriving at these estimates and explains the methods and proxies used to arrive at them. It concludes its summary by saying that:

“Over the longer term the government is taking proactive steps to improve the available data on the cost of compliance with MLRs, which should help to inform IAs in future years”.


Will the Minister write to us saying what these proactive steps are and over what timescale they will be adopted?

The IA reminds us that the NCA believes that,

“it is a realistic possibility that over £100 billion pounds is laundered every year through the UK or through UK corporate structures”.

It goes on to say that:

“In particular, the size of the UK’s financial and professional services sector, the openness of our economy and the attractiveness of London for investors makes the UK particularly exposed to international money laundering risks”.


These risks will not disappear, but the UK’s role as a money laundromat should reduce as the MLR provisions in this SI and elsewhere take effect. Will the Minister undertake, in any subsequent revisions to our MLR regime, to give us the latest estimates of money laundered through the UK or UK corporate structures? We need to see clear evidence that our MLR regime is working.

Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2023

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Wednesday 13th December 2023 Grand Committee

Together, these SIs deliver important changes to ensure that the financial services regulatory framework continues to function effectively for consumers and businesses alike. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, we have no comment to make on the second statutory instrument in this group, except to say that we agree with what the Minister said during the debate in the Commons that for the entirely consequential changes brought about by this instrument “consequential” means “necessarily following on from” not “of consequence”.

We support this instrument, but we have a little more to say about the first. As a mathematician by education, I should start by saying how pleased I was to see e—Euler’s number, the base of natural logarithms —make an important appearance on page 2 of the instrument, albeit without any explanation at all for the reader of what it might mean. I think that may be rather odd.

The EM explains that the discount factor—a means of reducing the amount of capital that small and medium-sized firms hold for their trading and derivative activities—was removed in error from the capital requirements regulation, both here and in the EU. Reinstating it via this SI will help ensure that the UK remains competitive with other jurisdictions. We entirely support this remedial measure but note the SLSC’s comments about the matter. The Minister has already mentioned some of them.

The question really is: how is it that the mistake, and it was a mistake, was introduced into the UK after it had already been corrected in the EU? Does this not suggest incompetence or, at the very least, insufficient awareness of relevant activity in key trading partners? What steps has the Treasury taken to eliminate this kind of error?

We also support the extension of the transitional period for third-country benchmark regimes for five years to 31 December 2030. As the Minister said, if we were to lose access to these third-country benchmarks, it could weaken our position as a centre for global FE and derivatives. This SI gives us six years to sort out a new regime, as I believe the EU is also contemplating.

How, when and with what do we intend to replace these transitional arrangements? What steps are currently being taken to make sure that we do indeed replace them, or are we content to extend this supposedly transitional arrangement indefinitely? Are we engaged in discussion with our EU counterparts over the matter? The Treasury told the SLSC that the risks arising from the extension of the transition period were “small, manageable and temporary”. The Minister mentioned and addressed that issue, but I would be grateful if she could expand on exactly what the risks are, how they are manageable and why they are temporary. Having said all that, I close by saying that we support this SI.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, overall, we agree with these regulations. When the first of these two grouped SIs was debated in the House of Commons, my honourable friend Tulip Siddiq, the shadow Economic Secretary, posed two questions to the Minister. Unfortunately, he did not address either of them in his response, so I will ask them again today. Of course, the noble Baroness is welcome to write with an answer, if that is preferable.

The two questions are on changes to capital requirements. First, given that the Prudential Regulation Authority is proposing to remove the SME supporting factor when it confirms its final rule, are the Government not reintroducing a measure that the PRA plans subsequently to abolish? Secondly, if the PRA goes ahead with its plan, what reassurance can the Government provide that the UK’s SME lending market will not be left at a significant competitive disadvantage against its European counterparts due to the increased cost of capital?

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked about the reintroduction of a discount factor, which was mentioned by the Minister in her opening remarks. I note that the discount factor was previously “unintentionally” removed from the relevant regulation in both the UK and the EU. I also note that the discount factor was removed from UK law in January 2022, and that this was identified as an issue only 18 months later, in July 2023. However, apparently, the factor was reinstated by the EU into its own laws four months prior to it being unintentionally removed from UK law back in September 2021. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, observed, it is odd that a mistake was introduced in the UK after it had already been corrected in the EU. The Minister is clearly correct to note that the UK does not mirror changes to EU law post Brexit, but does she think that keeping up to date with developments in the EU, where parallel measures remain part of UK legislation, could help to ensure that avoidable errors such as this do not occur?

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2023

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Wednesday 13th December 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, let me say at the outset that we support this statutory instrument and the two that are to follow—but we do have some questions and comments. I note that, last week, the Commons debated all three instruments together, as one group. Why have the Government chosen to take a different approach in this House by splitting the debate into two sections? What does this signify, if anything?

Dealing with the instrument before us, we believe that it contains relatively uncontroversial and appropriate updates to existing legislation, following on from the TSC’s recommendations as made in its report on the collapse of London Capital & Finance in June 2021, as the Minister noted. The committee said that the FPO

“would benefit from reform due to the increasing risks associated with the exemptions that allow customers to self-certify as high net worth or sophisticated”.

It continued:

“The Treasury should—as a matter of priority—re-evaluate the Financial Promotion Order exemptions to determine their appropriateness and consider what changes need to be made to protect consumers”.


That was two and a half years ago. Perhaps the Minister could explain why it has taken so long to address the TSC’s recommendation. It is obvious that the risks addressed by the TSC continue to increase, as even a cursory glance at the inviting investment ads on any Tube train will show.

Some questions arise directly out of the consultation carried out by the Treasury in preparation for the SI. Angel investors had some doubts about raising the high net worth thresholds. They noted that raising the thresholds

“could reduce the potential for broadening angel network participation, including among less represented groups such as women and ethnic minorities. They also raised concerns that lower angel investor participation in the future could reduce SME investment, particularly for younger start-ups”.

I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us why these worries were discounted, particularly for the SMEs.

The consultation report also noted that

“many responses provided suggestions for improvements to the investor statements to ensure greater investor engagement. These included adding additional risk warnings and positive frictions, to encourage investors to engage meaningfully”.

These suggestions appear not to have been taken up by HMT. Can the Minister tell us why that is?

We also note that, in its third report, the SLSC encourages HMT to reassess the thresholds contained in this instrument on a more timely basis, as the Minister has mentioned. It is 18 years since the thresholds were last updated. Why cannot the Government agree to a regular—say, quinquennial—change to smooth out the boundary changes? In closing, I confirm again our support for the clearly necessary updates proposed by this SI.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, we agree with these regulations, but I will ask the Minister just one question, which follows on from the final question of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. As the Minister said in her opening remarks, the exemptions to the financial promotions regime were last substantively updated in 2005, nearly 20 years ago. Given current high inflation rates, and the fact that prices have already risen nearly 5% since the January 2023 data used to reset the thresholds in this instrument, these new figures could arguably be said to be already out of date. I note what the Minister said in her opening remarks, but can I push her to provide at least an approximate timeframe for when the thresholds are likely to be reviewed again?

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, it is exactly three months ago today that we debated this issue in Committee, when the Minister heard many examples of what had been going on. She has done rather more than any of her predecessors in acknowledging that there is a problem with how the AML rules are applied to PEPs and that change needs to happen—but she has gone even further and done something about it. I will not say that it is simply because she is a woman and that is what we do, but it is interesting that she has done it. As we heard, she has tabled Amendments 96, 97, 118 and 119, which she has outlined.

I have added my name, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said, to Amendment 105, which goes a bit further and is more specific than the Government’s amendment. Ideally, they might have accepted it and made a carve-out for our family members; as we have heard, we may be guilty because we are here, but they have done nothing wrong and it is awful that they are caught by it. So I welcome the Minister saying in her introduction that the review will specifically look at whether it is possible to tweak that somewhat.

As I said in Committee, this has been going on for rather a long time. The noble Lord, Lord Flight, was the first noble Lord to raise it that I could find, in 2013, and I have been on about it since 2015, as the House knows. We have had Written Questions, Oral Questions, meetings, press coverage and all of that. In addition to the inconvenience for us, this has also meant that all these banks and others are wasting their time looking at our business instead of, as we have heard, at some other people. It is not just Amex and others; it is car purchase firms and everybody else inconveniencing us and wasting their time.

The Minister has acknowledged that it is time for legislation. The key part of her proposal is distinguishing between domestic and foreign PEPs and a requirement both on HMT and the FCA to do something. What the Government have done may not be perfect, but it is a real step forward. I think the Minister is well aware that we will keep a rather beady eye on what is happening, and we will be back here if nothing changes.

In the meantime, we should thank the Minister for what she has done. We have made a big step forward and I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, will not be pressing his amendment. It is right that we accept where we have got to with the Minister, and we will watch that being implemented.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 105 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and I congratulate him on his determination and persistence. I do not quite understand his dislike of Turkish barbers, but we can deal with that some other time.

His amendment’s simplicity and its direct modification of the regulation is an appealing approach, as is the absence of the word “review”. I was very pleased to see the government amendments in this group, chiefly because, of course, they are government amendments. I am very grateful for the Minister’s clear and long-standing commitment to resolving, or at least ameliorating, the problem. I have only a couple of observations about the government amendments.

The explanatory statement to Amendment 96 says that UK PEPs

“should be treated as representing a lower risk than a person so entrusted by a country other than the UK, and have lesser enhanced due diligence measures applied to them”.

The amendment itself, in proposed new subsection (3)(b), states that

“if no enhanced risk factors are present, the extent of enhanced customer due diligence measures to be applied in relation to that customer is less than the extent to be applied in the case of a non-domestic PEP”.

Neither of those offers a definition or sets an upper limit to what this lesser form of due diligence should be. Is that decision to be left entirely to the financial services companies? If it is, can we reasonably expect uniformity of definition and behaviour?

Why would we expect the banks to significantly change their current behaviour? Would it not be more likely that they will simply water down some minor aspect of the diligence they currently feel is due and carry on otherwise much as they do now? In a way, that is what is happening anyway. The banks mostly ignore the FCA’s current guidance, as set out in paragraph 2.35 of FG17/6. The FCA, in response to that, applies no sanctions. Nowhere in the government amendments is there mention of sanctions for non-compliance with the new arrangements.

Given the rather cavalier disregard some banks have displayed towards the current guidance, do we not need some sanction for future non-compliance, or a way of making the FCA properly enforce its own guide- lines? What use are guidelines if they are not enforced? I would be very grateful if the Minister could say how a workable definition of “lesser due diligence” is to be arrived at and how the new regime may be enforced.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a director of two investment companies, as stated in the register. I was interested to hear the remarks of my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean about American Express. He said that he had had a gold credit card with that company since 1979. Well, I had a gold card issued by American Express in 1978. I was very proud of having that card. I did not use it often, but it is one of those cards that clears automatically every month so there is no danger of running up unpaid debts and paying 20% or 30% interest.

In November 2021, I missed an email from them asking me for KYC information, including my passport details, proof of address and a utility bill, and I omitted to reply. I then got another email a month later—with no telephone call or letter through the post—saying that my account will be closed down. I telephoned them and, after waiting for three-quarters of an hour or so, I spoke to someone who agreed that they did not really need KYC information on me, but if I supplied it and uploaded it to their website, my account would not be cancelled, and all would be fine. I duly did that, but the account was still cancelled in about February 2022. I was not happy about this, because, as I said, I rather liked my gold card issued in 1978, so I took issue with them.

Over the past 15 months, I have spoken with them about six times; I have been on the chat function about six times. I now have two names of individuals and an email address I have been corresponding with, but my account is still cancelled—although they still send me a monthly statement through the post giving me a credit balance. I will print out the Hansard report of this debate and attach it to my next email to American Express, because I am not giving up on this.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

107: After Clause 71, insert the following new Clause—
“Interest rates for mortgage prisoners
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 137FD insert—“137FE FCA general rules: interest rate for mortgage prisoners(1) The FCA must make general rules requiring authorised persons involved in regulated mortgage lending and regulated mortgage administration to introduce a cap on the Standard Variable Rates charged to mortgage prisoners and to ensure that mortgage prisoners can access new fixed interest rate deals at an interest rate equal to or lower than an interest rate specified by the FCA.(2) In subsection (1)—“mortgage prisoner” means a consumer who cannot switch to a new mortgage deal (with a new lender or with their existing lender) and includes—(a) all 195,000 mortgages identified in CP576 Mortgage Prisoners Review, and(b) those who have a regulated mortgage contract with one of the following types of firms—(i) inactive lenders: firms authorised for mortgage lending that are no longer lending;(ii) unregulated entities: firms not authorised for mortgage lending and which contract with a regulated firm to undertake the regulated activity of mortgage administration; or(iii) closed mortgage books within larger financial groups: a closed mortgage book that is within a larger financial group but in a different entity to an active lender;“new fixed interest rate deals” means the ability for the consumer to fix the rate of interest payable on a regulated mortgage contract for periods of 2 years and 5 years with their existing lender;“Standard Variable Rate” means the reversion rate which is a variable rate of interest charged under the regulated mortgage contract after the end of any initial introductory deal.(3) The general rules made under subsection (1) must set the level of the cap on the Standard Variable Rate at a level no more than 2 percentage points above the Bank of England base rate.(4) The general rules made under subsection (1) should make new fixed interest rate deals available to mortgage prisoners who meet criteria determined by the FCA.(5) When specifying the criteria which mortgage prisoners need to meet to access the new fixed interest rate deals required by subsection (1) the FCA should take into account the criteria used by active lenders to enable their existing customers to access product transfers and ensure that similar criteria apply in the rules required by subsection (1).(6) When specifying the interest rates for new fixed interest rate deals required by subsection (1) the FCA should specify rates for a range of Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratios taking into account the average 2-year and 5-year fixed rates available to existing customers of active lenders through product transfers.(7) The FCA must ensure any rules that it is required to make as a result of subsection (1) are made not later than six months after this Act is passed.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would require the FCA to introduce a cap on the Standard Variable Rates charged to mortgage prisoners and ensure their access to fixed rate interest deals.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as co-chair of the APPG on mortgage prisoners and I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for adding his name to this amendment.

The amendment is similar to the one we debated in Committee: the only difference is that it gives the FCA the power to determine which mortgage prisoners may qualify for new fixed interest rate deals. The Committee amendment was more prescriptive. Its chief purpose was to allow discussion of the new Martin Lewis-funded LSE report on resolving the plight of mortgage prisoners. I said then that we would bring back the amendment on Report if no discernible progress had been made. No discernible progress has been made. The LSE report contains detailed and costed proposals and was published on 8 March this year. HMT officials were present at the launch and copies of the report were made available. When we debated the amendment in Committee on 13 March, the Minister committed to arranging an urgent meeting to discuss the report.

That urgent meeting with HMT, interested Peers, Seema Malhotra MP, researchers and representatives of the mortgage prisoners finally took place on 26 April, six weeks after the Minister had promised to arrange it. I am pretty sure that that long delay was not the fault of the Minister but simply a clear indication of the very low priority that HMT gives to the matter. In fact, the Minister had written to me to say that he was extremely disappointed that HMT had made no contact, and that his team had called for the meeting to be organised on multiple occasions and had stressed the urgency of the situation.

The Minister was absolutely right to stress the urgency. We stressed it again in our letter of 17 May to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, asking HMT to make a full response to the LSE proposals before Report. We have had no response to the letter or to the LSE report.

Interest rates are rising significantly and the already intolerable burden on mortgage prisoners is growing steeply, increasing their misery, despair and uncertainty. HMT seems not to understand that or even to care much about it. We know that HMT officials have recently had contact with the academic authors of the LSE report. We also know that those officials told the academics that they hoped to have a response to the report before the Summer Recess. That would be five months since HMT first had sight of the report—an intolerable and unjustifiable delay and a clear indication of the low priority the Treasury is giving the matter.

The treatment of mortgage prisoners is certainly uncaring and at times almost contemptuous. Whatever the outcome of today’s debate on this amendment, I urge the Minister to galvanise the Treasury team and replace what seems to be a leisurely approach with real urgency. After all, in February 2020 the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury said in a letter to Martin Lewis:

“My officials … will take any new proposals under full consideration if they meet our strict requirements that they a) deliver value for money for government (not just individuals), b) are a fair use of taxpayer spending, and c) address any risks of moral hazard”.


The LSE report explains how its proposals satisfy those requirements. I ask the Minister to deliver urgently on John Glen’s promise.

Mortgage prisoners are not to blame for the very high SVRs that are ruining or have ruined their lives; the Government are to blame. HMT sold mortgages to vulture funds without protection for the mortgagees. It later claimed to have been misled by those funds but in fact, research funded by Martin Lewis found that the Treasury was aware of the potential problems as early as 2009, when it recognised that the sale of closed books to investors had the potential to harm borrowers. Martin Lewis’s report went on to say:

“It has subsequently become clear that many prisoners did suffer harm; our first report detailed negative effects including paying high interest rates and difficulty in remortgaging, leading in some cases to anxiety, depression, physical and mental ill health and the prospect of losing the family home”.


Interventions by the Government to date have helped at most 2,200 of the 195,000 mortgage prisoners, and in fact only 200 borrowers have been directly helped to switch as a result of the modified affordability tests run by the FCA. As things now stand, the Government and the FCA are not proposing any further action to help mortgage prisoners. All this misery and harm could have been prevented, but even now the Government still refuse to acknowledge their responsibility or to provide any help.

The amendment would provide immediate and practical support to mortgage prisoners. It would introduce a cap on the standard variable rates paid by mortgage prisoners. Capping at 2% over the base rate would return the margins to what they were prior to the financial crisis. That should stop firms exploiting their captive customers but would have no impact on the wider market.

To ensure that mortgage prisoners can gain some certainty over their mortgage payments, the amendment would also require mortgage prisoners who meet FCA criteria to be offered fixed rates. These fixed rates would vary according to the loan-to-value of the mortgage prisoner, so would be reflective of risk.

The amendment does not single out mortgage prisoners for help that is not available to other borrowers in the active market. It just ensures that mortgage prisoners are able to access fixed-rate deals on the same terms as others in the active market. It stops mortgage prisoners being exploited by vulture funds and inactive lenders and it ensures that they are treated fairly. The amendment requires the FCA to set the criteria for accessing new fixed-rate deals and interest rates based on those in the active market so that mortgage prisoners are treated the same as those in the active market and can access new deals with their existing lender.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, and in particular the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for tabling this amendment. I start by emphasising that the Government take this issue extremely seriously. We have a great deal of sympathy for affected mortgage borrowers and understand the stress they may be facing as a result of being unable to switch their mortgage. That is precisely why we, and the FCA, alongside the industry, have shown that we are willing to act, and have carried out so much work and analysis in this area, partly in response to prior interest from this House, as alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman. This has included regulatory changes to enable customers who otherwise may have been unable to switch to access new products.

The Government remain committed to this issue and welcome the further input of stakeholders. For this reason, during Committee, the Government confirmed that they were carefully considering the proposals put forward in the latest report from the London School of Economics. Since then, as noted in the debate, I have met with the noble Lord and further members of the APPG and representatives of the Mortgage Prisoners Action Group to discuss the findings of the report and the issue of mortgage prisoners more widely.

The Economic Secretary to the Treasury has also written to the noble Lord, including to provide further clarity on the proceeds from the sale of UKAR assets. The LSE report recommends free comprehensive financial advice for all. That is why the Government have continued to maintain record levels of debt advice funding for the Money and Pensions Service, bringing its budget for free-to-client debt advice in England to £92.7 million this financial year.

The other proposals put forward by the London School of Economics are significant in scale and ambition. While the Treasury has been engaging with key stakeholders, including the LSE academics behind the report, for some time, including since Committee, we have concerns that these proposals may not be effective in addressing some of the major challenges that prevent mortgage prisoners being able to switch to an active lender. For example, the proposals would not assist those with an interest-only mortgage ultimately to pay off their balance at the end of their mortgage term.

We continue to examine the proposals against the criteria put forward originally by then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, John Glen, to establish whether there are further areas we can consider. I remind the House that those criteria are that any proposals must deliver value for money, be a fair use of taxpayer money and address any risk of moral hazard. This does not change the Government’s long-standing commitment to continue to examine this issue and what options there may be. However, it is important that we do not create false hope and that any further proposals deliver real benefit and are effective in enabling those affected to move to a new deal with an active lender, should they wish to.

I will not repeat the arguments against an SVR cap, as we discussed them at length previously in this House. An SVR cap would create an arbitrary division between different sets of consumers, and it would also have significant implications for the wider mortgage market that cannot be ignored. It is therefore not an appropriate solution, and I must be clear that there is no prospect of the Government changing this view in the near term. In the light of this, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this customarily brief debate on mortgage prisoners. I especially thank the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for his contribution today and in Committee.

I am uncertain about what the Government’s response consists of. It seems to me that perhaps it consists of three things. The first is exculpatory—it was not our fault. It was the Government’s fault; it cannot be anybody else’s fault that these mortgage prisoners are in the position they find themselves in.

The second thing I am uncertain about is what the Government are actually going to do. I hear expressions of good will and care for mortgage prisoners but I do not hear anything at all that amounts to a plan, or the sight of a plan, or an objective, or something concrete that would help these people. I did not even hear whether we will get a response to the LSE report any time before the Summer Recess, or indeed whether there is a date by which response can be made—perhaps the Minister can enlighten us. I remind her again that by the Summer Recess it will be five months since the LSE report was presented, and the Treasury surely has had time to analyse it in some detail and to make a considered response.

It is quite clear that the real distress experienced by these mortgage prisoners is not understood or felt deeply within the Government or the Treasury. When we had a meeting with the Minister, we had a couple of the leaders of the Mortgage Prisoners group alongside us who told us some terrible stories about what has happened to their families over the past 10 years; 10 years of paying too much money—more than they should have done and more than they needed to in many ways—to these vulture funds.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) A Minister of the Crown may by regulation revoke or replace any legislation referred to in Schedule 1 provided that—(a) a document containing a proposal for those regulations has been laid before each House of Parliament,(b) the document has been referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses, and(c) a period of at least 40 days has elapsed after that referral, not including any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or either House is adjourned for more than four days.(2) If the Joint Committee, after considering any regulations laid under this paragraph, finds that—(a) the regulations represent a substantial change to the preceding retained EU law, or(b) the Government have not carried out sufficient public consultation lasting at least six weeks before laying the draft before Parliament, a Minister of the Crown must arrange for the instrument to be debated on the floor of each House and voted on before the period in sub-paragraph (1)(c) elapses.(3) If any amendments to the regulations, whether or not proposed by the Joint Committee, are agreed by both Houses of Parliament the regulations must be made in the form so amended.(4) If one House agrees amendments to the regulations under sub-paragraph (3) the Minister may not make the relevant statutory instrument until the other House has debated and voted on a motion to agree or disagree with those amendments.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak first to Amendment 1 and then to Amendments 116 and 117. The Bill gives the Ministers and regulators power to shape our financial services regimes, but it does not allow for any meaningful parliamentary scrutiny of the changes that Ministers and regulators may introduce into law. This is another very clear example of what the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Blencathra, and their committees, warned about—the significant and continuing shift of power from Parliament to the Executive. The DPRRC report says in its introduction:

“We have concluded that it is now a matter of urgency that Parliament should take stock and consider how the balance of power can be re-set”.


It goes on to highlight the problem of what it calls

“Legislative sub-delegation of power: where ministers can confer powers on themselves or other bodies”,

which is precisely what this Bill is about. The report, called Democracy Denied?, goes on to say:

“we conclude that conferring legislative sub-delegation of power is potentially a more egregious erosion of democratic accountability than a simple delegation to a minister”.

The Minister is aware of these concerns. In our previous discussions, she has noted, by way of compensation no doubt, that there will be opportunities for Parliament to be consulted and for post-hoc accountability reviews. Neither of those things, desirable though they may well be, is a substitute for meaningful legislative scrutiny. This scrutiny is what Amendment 1 proposes to introduce, and I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Lisvane, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for adding their names to the amendment.

The amendment is based on the Amendment 76 of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, to the REUL Bill, which your Lordships agreed to on 17 May by 231 votes to 167. This amendment was discussed at ping-pong in the Commons 10 days ago, and was rejected by the Government on three grounds. The first was that the Government do not accept the principle that Parliament should be able to amend statutory instruments. The second was that the scrutiny proposed would take up too much parliamentary time. The third is the really rather astonishing and disappointing view of the reach and capability of our Joint Committees. I shall not comment on that last point, except to say that it is obviously mistaken, as many of us here could attest.

The objection against taking up too much parliamentary time seems pretty odd, as scrutiny is obviously the essence of our role. In any case, that objection may, if one is charitable, have some force in the case of the monster that is the REUL Bill, but surely has none in the case of this much shorter and more coherent Bill.

As for the Government’s not accepting the principle that Parliament should be able to amend statutory instruments, that surely needs qualification. We have heard that qualification discussed in the preceding business. There are two examples of Acts of Parliament containing provisions for the statutory instruments that they generate to be amended—the Census Act 1920 and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Both those Acts allow for SIs to be amendable in the way that our Amendment 1 proposes, only by agreement of both Houses. There are no free-standing or wide-ranging powers.

The Government seem to be sticking to this rather confected set of objections to parliamentary scrutiny. Noble Lords who were here for the preceding ping-pong on the REUL amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will have heard the repeated resistance to parliamentary scrutiny. That is despite the SLSC’s calling for the REUL Bill to contain

“an enhanced scrutiny mechanism that enables Parliament to decide that an instrument makes changes of such policy significance that the usual ‘take it or leave it’ procedures—even if affirmative—relating to statutory instruments should not apply but that a further option should be available, namely a procedure by which the Houses can either amend, or recommend amendments to, the instrument”.

The Bill before us is essentially a financial services carve-out from the REUL Bill and it suffers from the same lack of effective scrutiny provisions. What was necessary for parliamentary scrutiny of the REUL Bill is also necessary for this. Our Amendment 1 responds to the SLSC’s call. It brings in a sifting process. It allows a Joint Committee discretion over what constitutes substantial change to preceding retained EU law. It requires a debate on the Floor of each House if the Joint Committee makes a finding of substantial change or that there has been insufficient public consultation. It also allows SIs generated by the Bill to be amended if, and only if, both Houses agree. This is not a prescription for frequent and casual intervention but a narrowly drawn means of altering SIs on those rare occasions when both Houses find the case compelling.

The amendment returns a measure of meaningful parliamentary scrutiny to the Bill. It allows careful parliamentary scrutiny of proposed changes to our critically important financial services regime. Without it, there would be none; Ministers and regulators would decide, and Parliament would be bypassed yet again.

I turn to Amendments 116 and 117. These amendments, taken together, would allow either House to insist on an enhanced form of scrutiny for SIs it deemed likely to benefit from more detailed examination and debate, as well as from recommendations for revision. The usual SI procedures, as we all know, do not allow this and do not constitute parliamentary scrutiny in any meaningful sense: we cannot amend and we do not reject. The super-affirmative procedure set out in Amendment 117 would allow a measure of real, detailed scrutiny, a means of hearing evidence and a means of making recommendations to Ministers. It would not allow the amendment of SIs: that power remains exclusively with the Minister.

Identical amendments were debated in Committee. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who is not in her place, added her name to the amendments and spoke in support; so did the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, also not in his place, commented:

“If a piece of legislation is proposed and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, you have to think that it is pretty wide-ranging—in fact, close to impossible”.—[Official Report, 23/3/23; col. GC 329.]


I think he meant that as a compliment, but it is not entirely clear.

The super-affirmative procedure is appropriate here because, for example, Clause 3 allows for very significant policy changes to be made that could be significant in the context of the restatement of EU law, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, noted in the debate. The Minister thinks that the super-affirmative procedure is unnecessary and promises instead that

“the Government will seek to undertake a combination of formal consultation and informal engagement appropriate to the changes being made”.—[Official Report, 23/3/23; col. GC 331.]

That is not even a real commitment, with the phrase “will seek to undertake”, and it is certainly nothing close to meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. We need the super-affirmative procedure, and I commend these amendments to the House. I beg to move Amendment 1.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a director of two investment companies as stated in the register. I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, in bringing forward his Amendment 1 and other amendments. I feel strongly, as he has suggested, that what has been agreed for the REUL Bill should also be acceptable for this Bill. Indeed, one of my later amendments makes the same point. As he said, the Bill is in some sense a carve-out from the REUL Bill dealing exclusively with financial services. As for his other amendments, I will not repeat the arguments I made in Committee, but I look forward to hearing whether the Minister can give any greater assurance to the House today than she did at that time.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Penn) (Con)]

My Lords, before turning to the amendments at hand, I add my thanks to those of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, for the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, to this Bill and the Labour Front Bench on Treasury matters. The noble Baroness referred to the noble Lord’s generosity; I have definitely found that to be the case. He has always had a very constructive approach and approached his work with kindness and wisdom, which is a great combination to bring to this House.

The amendments before us from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, Amendments 1, 116 and 117, would introduce new parliamentary procedures when exercising the powers in the Bill. As noble Lords have noted, very similar amendments were proposed to the retained EU law Bill, passed and then reversed by the Commons. We have just had a debate this afternoon on a modified version of those amendments, to which I listened very carefully, although I am not as expert in the passage of that Bill as some other noble Lords in the Chamber.

Many of the arguments covered in that debate also apply here, so I do not intend to repeat them at length. I want to focus on some specific considerations in relation to this Bill, which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, noted, takes a different approach to repealing retained EU law for financial services. That is because it enables the Government to deliver fundamental structural reform to the way in which the financial services sector is regulated.

The Government are not asking for a blank cheque to rewrite EU law. This Bill repeals EU law and creates the necessary powers for it to be replaced in line with the UK’s existing Financial Services and Markets Act 2000—FSMA—model of regulation, which we are also enhancing through this Bill to ensure strong accountability and transparency. A list of retained EU law to be repealed in Schedule 1 was included in the Bill from its introduction in July 2022 to enable scrutiny of this proposal.

Going forward, our independent regulators will generally set the detailed provisions in their rulebooks instead of firms being required to follow EU law. The Bill includes a number of provisions to enable Parliament to scrutinise the regulators; the Government have brought forward amendments to go further on this, as we will discuss later on Report.

Amendments 1, 116 and 117 would introduce rare parliamentary procedures, including the super-affirmative procedure, and create a process to enable Parliament to amend SIs. As I said in Committee, those procedures are not justified by the limited role that secondary legislation will have in enabling the regulators to take up their new responsibilities. The Government have worked hard to ensure that every power in the Bill is appropriately scoped and justified. As I noted in Committee, the DPRRC praised the Treasury for a

“thorough and helpful delegated powers memorandum”.

It did not recommend any changes to the procedures governing the repeal of EU law or any other power in this Bill.

The powers over retained EU law are governed by a set of purposes that draw on the regulators’ statutory objectives. They are limited in scope and can be used only to modify or restate retained EU law relating to financial services or markets, as captured by Schedule 1. However, of course, the Government understand noble Lords’ interest in how they intend to use the powers in this Bill and are committed to being as open and collaborative as possible when delivering these reforms.

The Government have consulted extensively on their approach to retained EU law relating to financial services and there is a broad consensus in the sector behind the Government’s plans. As part of the Edinburgh reforms, the Government published a document, Building a Smarter Financial Services Framework for the UK, which describes the Government’s approach, including how they expect to exercise some of the powers in this Bill. It also sets out the key areas of retained EU law that are priorities for reform. Alongside this publication, the Government published three illustrative statutory instruments using the powers in this Bill to facilitate scrutiny.

When replacing retained EU law, the Government expect that there will be a combination of formal consultation, including on draft statutory instruments, and informal engagement in cases where there is a material impact or policy change, such as where activities that are currently taking place in the UK would no longer be subject to a broadly equivalent level of regulation. The Government will continue to be proportionate and consultative during this process, just as we have been up to this point.

Through the retained EU law Bill, the Government have also committed to providing regular updates to Parliament on progress in repealing and reforming retained EU law. I am happy to confirm that these reports will also cover the financial services retained EU law listed in Schedule 1 to this Bill.

I hope that I have satisfied noble Lords that the Government are committed to an open, transparent and consultative approach to implementing the reforms enabled by this Bill. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to withdraw his Amendment 1.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

I thank all those who have spoken in this brief debate—some more warmly than others, perhaps. In my initial speech, I forgot to be especially nice about Denis, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe; I regret that. I am of course disappointed by both his absence and the response of his successors. I repeat: when it comes to the need for real parliamentary scrutiny, the contents of this Bill are quite as important as the contents of the REUL Bill. That seems to me to be the essence of the matter. All the other arguments about the need to focus and get on with it on Report seem mechanistic; indeed, they are close to being excuses, in some ways.

The essential problem is that Parliament will be unable to scrutinise revocation and replacement, as it is set out in this Bill. I accept that it is not likely that we will revolutionise the way we treat these things as a result of this intervention, but perseverance is the only way of making any progress towards making certain that Parliament recovers its ability to scrutinise properly and does not continue to lose that ability. Although on some occasions—this is one of them—the outcome may be unsatisfactory in the short term, I am convinced that, over time and with enough persistence, we can find a way to do what the DPRRC recommended, which is restoring the balance between Parliament and the Executive. Having said all that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order 2023

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 16th May 2023 Grand Committee

This SI will reinforce the UK’s reputation as a fair and transparent place to invest, with robust regulatory standards and serious consequences for those who do not comply with our laws. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, this SI seems admirably straightforward and uncomplicated. We support it and I can be brief. I have only a couple of questions and one observation.

The first question relates to paragraph 7.7 in the EM. Why is it necessary to keep NASDAQ and the successor to the SWX Swiss Exchange explicitly in scope, and to add the New York Stock Exchange for that matter? Are they not already brought into scope by this SI’s adoption of the definitions in Article 4? I am sure that there is a good reason but I would be grateful if the Minister can explain what it is.

My observation concerns paragraph 7.8 of the EM. It points out that

“the set of securities to which the criminal offence of insider dealing applies to is narrower than the securities covered … in MAR”.

It goes on to give examples of the missing securities. It lists currency options, credit default swaps and units in collective investment undertakings, such as exchange traded funds—and says that the list is not exhaustive. It rather coyly says that this is “not optimal”. I agree entirely. I understand that this SI corrects that but, given the historical absence of these securities in the list of activities that may be pursued in the criminal courts for insider dealing, today’s SI rather looks like having just noticed that the stable door has been left open for 20 years and hastily closing it. It is good that no more horses will be able to bolt but that invites the question of how many have already bolted and how many, if any, were caught by the civil procedures in MAR. Does the Minister have an assessment of how many criminal cases would or could have been brought had the missing securities categories been within the purview of the Criminal Justice Act and how many were taken forward instead under the MAR provisions?

Finally, why does this instrument not come into force immediately? Does not the 21-day delay provide a further window for possibly unactionable criminal malfeasance? I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

We agree with the Minister’s assertion that there should be serious consequences for those who break the law. We also agree with the comments from the Liberal Democrat Benches and echo the comments about the seriousness of insider dealing. We share the curiosity shown in the other place when this instrument was considered about the length of time it has taken to bring in this measure, given we understand that it came about as a result of a review that took place in 2015. I am not asking this to be facetious, but what assessment have the Government made of the number of criminal offences that would have been caught had this measure been in place sooner, which were treated under the civil regime because this instrument had not yet been brought? We want to highlight the consequences of leaving things quite this late, because we are concerned. That underscores our support for this measure. The Government are right to address this gap between the two regimes and we support this instrument.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their support for this statutory instrument.

On the time it has taken to deliver this measure and the potential impact in the meantime of not having the criminal regime and the civil regime aligned, it is important to note that since the Fair and Effective Markets Review was published, considerable work has been undertaken to modernise the UK’s market abuse legislation. For example, the civil regime for market abuse was updated in 2016 by the EU market abuse regulation and the Government and UK regulators have implemented the majority of the recommendations from the Fair and Effective Markets Review, including making changes in the Financial Services Act 2021 to increase the maximum sentence for criminal market abuse from seven to 10 years, bringing it into line with comparable economic crimes such as fraud and bribery. The Government have also recently completed a broader review of the criminal market abuse regime as part of the 2019 to 2022 economic crime plan. While this measure has taken longer to implement, there has been other action in this space in the meantime, including delivering on other recommendations from that review.

On the impact of the length of time in which the scope of the criminal offences has been different from that of the civil offences, it is important to note that the FCA has a number of tools available to tackle market abuse, of which the criminal insider dealing offence is only one. In addition to prosecutions under the criminal regime, between 2013 and 2022 the FCA has had 36 regulatory outcomes relating to market abuse, with regulatory fines totalling more than £70 million in that period.

The Government do not have data on the number of criminal prosecutions that have not been pursued due to the difference in the scope of the regimes. The FCA does not routinely record and track cases that it cannot take forward. This includes cases taken forward under the civil regime that could have resulted in a criminal prosecution with the changes made by this SI. Moreover, it is important to remember that there are a number of reasons why the FCA may choose to pursue a civil rather than a criminal prosecution other than the scope of the two regimes. For example, the FCA will consider the severity of the offence in question and whether the evidence meets the higher legal threshold needed to secure a criminal conviction.

It is not possible to say with certainty whether the FCA’s decision not to pursue criminal proceedings in a particular case was due to the issues that this statutory instrument addresses or to other factors, and we do not believe that attempting to determine that retrospectively would be a good use of government legal resources. It is a perfectly legitimate question to ask but, given that other mechanisms were available to the FCA to tackle market abuse under the civil regime—and it has also continued to bring prosecutions under the criminal regime—we can be reassured that it has been able to take action in this period. The Government are confident that the FCA has a strong track record of identifying, investigating and prosecuting insider dealing.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked why we include specific US and Swiss exchanges and why they are not covered under the more general definitions that have been used in this SI to avoid the need to update this list again as specific named instruments change. My understanding is that for the more general definitions there are commonly understood definitions used in the UK and EU markets that this can work for, but that when you are looking at other exchanges further afield outside that scope, there remains a need to name those trading venues. That is the difference between continuing to need to name some trading venues versus going for the more general definition-based approach that this SI has done.

As to why we have chosen to include specific US and Swiss exchanges in addition to the UK and EU exchanges that will be covered by this measure, the FCA has seen a persistent trend of organised crime groups recruiting UK insiders to disclose inside information relating to securities traded on those markets. While of course this abusive behaviour is also possible for other third-country venues, this SI includes the third-country markets where the FCA has observed the greatest risk of harm. With regard to other third-country trading venues, and indeed in respect of these ones too, you would expect the home regulator to take action to tackle market abuse in those cases.

I hope that with those remarks I have answered the questions put forward today.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

Will the Minister address the point about the 21 days?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I can write to the noble Lord on that. It is probably the standard implementation period for a change of this nature. As I said in answering on the assessment of the FCA’s tools and track record on being able to tackle market abuse before this update was made, we do not think that will have a substantial impact on the ability to tackle these issues in that implementation period. I think that that addresses the point but, if there is anything further to add to that, I shall also write to the noble Lord.

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) (Amendment) Order 2023

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd May 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, we support both of these instruments, with some reservations and a few questions.

I will speak first to the commodity derivatives and emission allowances order. As the Minister said, it proposes a very sensible reduction to regulatory burdens. I note that the procedure followed in this case was a kind of super-affirmative, as prescribed in Schedule 8 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The instrument was published in draft to enable recommendations to be made by a committee of either House; no such recommendations were made but some questions nevertheless arise.

Perhaps the key question is when we will see the FCA’s new replacement regime, mentioned in paragraph 7.8 of the Explanatory Memorandum. Paragraph 10.2 of the EM notes that respondents to the consultation

“did not want to return to a wholly qualitative definition of ‘ancillary trading’”

and

“were in favour of the FCA developing a simplified method to determine when an activity is ancillary”—

one that would give them the legal certainty that qualitative definitions would not. I think this means that, until January 2025, when the SI comes into force, the current rules continue to apply. If that is the case, and if the current regulatory burden is so obviously unnecessary, why do we have to wait so long for the new regime?

The EM also notes:

“HMT is committed … to ensuring that the FCA has the right powers to set any transitional provisions that may be necessary to deal with the situation in which a firm’s trading activity can no longer be regarded as ancillary”.


I take this to mean that the FCA does not currently have these powers. If that is the case, perhaps the Minister can say why the usual transitional powers article was not included in this SI.

I now turn to the financial promotion SI. I agree that that it is vital both to increase consumers’ understanding of the risks associated with crypto assets and to ensure that the promotion of these assets is subject to the same standard of regulation as is the case for broader financial services; I welcome the proposed order. I am glad to see that the proposed implementation period has been reduced from six months to four months but I wonder whether this is still too long and invites an avalanche of unregulated promotion in those four months. Can the Minister explain why the four-month period was chosen and say what consideration was given to a shorter period? I would also be grateful for more explanation of the exemption mentioned in paragraph 6.4 of the EM— specifically why it is necessary and how long it will last—and for an assurance that it does not create any unhelpful loopholes.