Lord Sharkey
Main Page: Lord Sharkey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Sharkey's debates with the Home Office
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak in harmony with the previous two speakers. I have some experience of this area, having wrestled in a judicial capacity with more than one appeal in relation to the Proceeds of Crime Act, and I have also recently taken the chair of the board which supervises more draconian legislation than the Bill for the confiscation of unexplained wealth in Mauritius. These unexplained wealth orders are designed to deal with the very real difficulty of proving facts which are likely to be in the exclusive knowledge of the holder of wealth. It would be simply contrary to the policy to impose the criminal rather than the civil burden of proof in respect of matters such as the value of property in which a person has an interest or the very question of whether he has an interest in that property at all.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 10, 13, 20 and 22 to 25 in this group, all of which are probing amendments. Amendment 10 modifies subsection (4) of the newly inserted Section 362B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The subsection sets out one of the three conditions that must be satisfied before an unexplained wealth order may be made:
“The High Court must be satisfied that … the respondent is a politically exposed person, or …there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that … the respondent is, or has been (whether in a part of the United Kingdom or elsewhere), or … a person connected with the respondent is, or has been, so involved”.
As I read it, it means that simply being a politically exposed person satisfies the condition. That is enough for the High Court: it does not need,
“the reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in serious crime”,
to be satisfied as well. That seems unnecessarily and dangerously broad.
It is probably unnecessary to remind the Committee that we are all PEPs. So are our families and our close associates. As the Government have made clear, and as the FCA is about to say in guidelines, most Back-Benchers, their families and associates should not require additional due diligence. Given that, we or our equivalents abroad should not be exposed to a harsher, more extensive and more intrusive regime. By replacing “or” with “and”, and by qualifying the definition of PEPs by inserting,
“who merits additional due diligence according to Financial Conduct Authority guidelines”,
my amendment removes this harsh, special treatment of non-EEA PEPs. For the condition to be fulfilled, the amendment requires that the PEPs are not ordinary PEPs but merit this additional due diligence and that there should be reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in serious crime.
Amendment 13 removes the exemption of UK and EEA PEPs from the conditions in subsection (4) of new Section 362B, in order to give the Minister the opportunity to explain why UK and EEA PEPs should not be treated exactly as all other PEPs.
Amendment 20 gives the Minister an opportunity to clear up an apparent anomaly. On page 5, subsection (2)(b) of the newly inserted Section 362E sets out the penalty for failure to respond properly to an unexplained wealth order. For summary conviction in England and Wales—and later, we see, in Scotland too—the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both. However, on the very next page, in subsection (2)(c), the penalty on summary conviction in Northern Ireland for exactly the same offence is set at imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine, or both. So in England and Wales and Scotland, you can go to prison for up to 12 months, but in Northern Ireland it is up to six months. Why? I would be grateful if the Minister could explain.
Before the noble Lord goes on to the next amendments, could he help the Committee with one point? He points to the position of PEPs and describes the potential vulnerability that quite ordinary people might have to these orders, but does he not think that subsection (3) of new Section 362B is a sufficient protection? It provides that the High Court,
“must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the known sources of the respondent’s lawfully obtained income would have been insufficient for the purposes of enabling the respondent to obtain the property”.
That provides a hurdle that has to be surmounted, as well as establishing that someone is a PEP.
If it were absolutely clear that you cannot obtain an unexplained wealth order without satisfying that condition, I would be happy, but I am not entirely sure that it is, and I would welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the noble Lord is correct.
Amendments 22 to 25 will allow the Minister to point out—if other noble Lords do not do so beforehand—where I have entirely missed the point. They refer to page 7 and subsections (2), (3) and (4) of new Section 362H. These subsections allow rules of court to provide for the practice and procedure to be followed relating to unexplained wealth orders before the High Court in Northern Ireland. There are similar but not identical subsections later in the Bill dealing with the same matter in Scotland. However, the Bill seems to be silent on how these matters are to be dealt with in the English and Welsh courts. I am sure I have missed something obvious here and would be grateful for enlightenment from the Minister.
There is another apparent anomaly in the sections dealing with the variation or discharge of an unexplained wealth order. I notice that the provision in Scotland is significantly different from that in Northern Ireland. On page 18, line 43, to line 1 on page 19, the Bill allows applications for variation or discharge to be made by “Scottish Ministers” or by,
“any person affected by the order”.
That is not the case for Northern Ireland, where application can be made only by the enforcement authorities or the respondent. Why is there this difference between Scotland and Northern Ireland? My Amendment 24 makes the process in Northern Ireland the same as in Scotland but, again, what about England and Wales? I look to the Minister to put me right on all this.
My Lords, I welcome the legislation on UWOs. I have a number of declarations of interest, and I own residential and commercial property in the UK. I do not think that I have any unexplained wealth, but I have some experience—admittedly, some 30 years ago—of working as a tax adviser. It was quite common in those days for the Inland Revenue, as it was then, to demand explanations of what it thought was unexplained wealth from various taxpayers. That was quite common practice, so the concept of the state seeking an explanation of wealth is not new in practice.
We have a situation where, certainly in central London, a shocking number of multimillion pound properties lie dormant and are owned by overseas parties. To the extent that this goes some way to change that situation, it must be very welcome. It would also be quite welcome if the Government were to take a more holistic approach, perhaps using this Bill to address that problem as well as considering other solutions, outwith this legislation, including penal rates for dormant properties owned by overseas people. None the less, the UWOs are likely to make a significant change in helping our law enforcement agencies to investigate money laundering in the London property market and, in particular, recovering proceeds of crime.
My Lords, Amendment 108 seeks to help the FCA to ensure meaningful compliance and right behaviour in the banking sector, which has not been entirely a stranger to money laundering. Work done by the New City Agenda think tank, of which I am a director, has shown some progress in changing the culture within banks—but has also shown that there is still a need for much more change.
Last week's report by the Banking Standards Board also had interesting things to say about banks acting in an honest and ethical way. For example, its very comprehensive survey found that 12% of employees had seen instances where unethical behaviour had been rewarded; 13% saw it as difficult to get ahead in their careers without flexing ethical standards; and 18% had seen people in their organisation turning a blind eye to inappropriate behaviour.
Since the FCA under its previous chief executive abandoned its promised inquiry into the culture within banks, it has relied heavily on financial penalties to punish misbehaviour and as a control mechanism. Since 2013, the FCA has levied an absolutely staggering £3 billion in penalties on firms. The latest, which the Minister mentioned, was a settlement in January with Deutsche Bank. The proposed penalty was £230 million, which was discounted to £163 million. This was a settlement. In fact, almost all the penalties imposed have been settlements. Typically, the FCA proposes a financial penalty and then agrees a discount if the firm settles—as almost all do. The discount is normally 30%. Since 2013, that amounts to a total of £1.2 billion awarded in discounts.
My amendment proposes to put this gigantic discount mechanism to better use. It would enable the FCA to have direct sight of the improvements in process and behaviour agreed in any settlement. It would enable it to see that appropriate disciplinary action had been taken against those responsible for the transgressions. It would give the settling firms a powerful incentive to fulfil any settlement conditions. It would do this by making part of any discount withholdable until the settling firm had satisfied the FCA that all appropriate disciplinary actions had been taken. Only then would the full discount be realised.
This is a simple proposal. It would give the FCA more power, more say and more insight into how transgressors had modified their behaviour and addressed individual and structural culpability. It would give the firms involved a powerful incentive to take proper remedial action—which, unfortunately, still seems to be needed.
My Lords, I have Amendments 126 and 127 in this group. They impose duties on the National Crime Agency regarding the performance of its duties and the way it supervises the bodies that report to it. I tabled the amendments to address my concern that the country’s anti-money laundering regulations, which were and remain a critical part of the fight against financial crime, are not as effective as they should or could be.
There are three related issues. The first is that the regulations lack focus. Far too much unnecessary information is collected, which serves to distract rather than to illuminate the task of the regulator. We have heard tonight from my noble friends Lord Deben and Lord Leigh, and every Member of your Lordships’ House could produce evidence of the collection of superfluous information. They also lack effectiveness and follow-through. I was astonished to read in the debate on Second Reading in the House of Commons that Sir Edward Garnier, experienced lawyer that he is, said that many certification orders, having been granted, are never enforced. I therefore put down a Parliamentary Question—which is due for answer the day after tomorrow, sadly, but I am sure that my noble friend can chase up her officials—in which I asked,
“in each of the last three years for which figures are available, how many confiscation orders were … authorised by the courts … put into effect; and how much money was recovered”.
I hope that my noble friend will be able to give us those figures when she winds up.
However, it is not just about confiscation orders. My noble friend Lord Faulks talked about the report in the Times last week, according to which between 2007—when we introduced the last set of money-laundering regulations—and 2012, there were no convictions at all:
“There have been four convictions since and five more proceedings, according to a freedom of information request by the London law firm Howard Kennedy”.
Of course, as I said at Second Reading, the asset recovery by the NCA can only be described as trivial: £26.9 million for an agency that costs some half a billion pounds to run, and which tells us that billions of pounds of illegal money passes through London every year.
Lastly, and most importantly, the regulations do not enjoy general public confidence. Too many members of the public regard them as a paper-pushing exercise. As a result, they do not feel committed to their success or to ensuring that they work well. In my experience, having from time to time chaired risk and compliance committees, attempts to get the regulators to explain how valuable their work is are not greeted with great approval; they tend to say, “This is our business—you mind yours”. That is very different from the approach of the security services, which have publicly praised the public for their help.
At that point, some people may be tempted to say, “He works in the City, so he is a tainted witness”. However, I was interested to read the briefing from Transparency International—an NGO about which I know very little. It said:
“At the heart of the problem is the fact that”,
there are,
“27 Supervisory Bodies in relevant sectors … This leads to a fragmented approach:
...Failure to identify where the risks are and mitigate against those risks…The approach to enforcement is inconsistent and not transparent or effective…Many of the supervisors have serious conflicts of interest”—
we have already discussed that this evening—
“which we believe prohibits the bodies from doing a good job”.
I could hardly have put it better myself.
Compliance remains the great growth industry. Noel Coward may have said to Mrs Worthington,
“Don’t put your daughter on the stage”,
but you could do a great deal worse than putting her into compliance. Regulators seek more powers, so more returns are needed, compliance officers see a chance to build their empires, professional firms seek commercial opportunities in checking and rechecking the records, and Ministers can attend conferences and refer to all the efforts being made and the money being spent.
While the money being spent is considerable, both directly in maintaining the supervisory bodies, and by the firms who have to comply with their requirements, there is another cost which is much less frequently referred to: reputational cost, which arises from a process known as “de-risking”. When you de-risk, you remove from a group of people or a set of companies their financial ability to transact. Noble Lords will be aware of my interest in the charity and voluntary sector. Charities which operate in “difficult”—sensitive—areas find it almost impossible to get the financial services of British banks; it is not worth their time or trouble. It is not about borrowing money but just checking facilities—day-to-day operations—and the smaller the charity, the more difficult they find it. It affects not just organisations but individuals as well. Thirty years ago I worked in the City with a Pakistani who has a British passport and who is as Anglophile as you would like him to be. He worked in Hong Kong, and now lives in Lahore. He has just been told that all his bank accounts have been closed. Is there anything wrong with the accounts? There is nothing wrong with them—it has just been done. It is clear that the pressure on the banks to close down these accounts is coming from the regulators.
My Lords, the amendments in this group have raised some important points around regulation and supervision of the regulated sector. I am also pleased to able to update noble Lords on some of the recent developments in this area.
Amendment 108, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, would require the FCA to withhold a proportion of any discount to a penalty applied to a financial firm until that firm has completed any internal disciplinary actions agreed in the settlement. We agree with the principle that such firms should be held accountable for their actions, or lack of them. The Government already have in place, through the FCA, powers to increase a penalty that it would otherwise impose on a firm in light of a range of potentially aggravating factors, including,
“disciplinary action against staff involved”.
A firm that had, by the time the FCA imposed its relevant penalty, failed to take such appropriate action, could therefore already have that penalty increased as a result.
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 allows the FCA to impose requirements on such firms. If the FCA considers that a firm needs to take disciplinary action—if appropriate and following all due employment process—after a penalty is imposed, the FCA can require that the firm properly and fully considers doing so. If the firm then fails to do so, that would become misconduct in respect of which the FCA could, subject to all other relevant factors, impose an additional penalty. Therefore, we believe that we already have in place powers to take action in the way the proposed amendment suggests.
Does the Minister accept that there is a big difference between having the powers to do something in addition and having an automatic system of withholding, which makes it directly in the interests of the firms to take the action that they are supposed to take, rather than have the FCA make an assessment later and come back to discuss whether it ought to impose an additional penalty? One is automatic, giving an immediate incentive for the firms to do something, while the other requires additional supervision.
I take the noble Lord’s point that one is perhaps much simpler, but of course each case is different. One firm might be a lot more compliant and it might not take much effort; another might take a lot more effort. However, I take his point.
I move on to Amendments 126 and 127 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. These relate to the role of the NCA. The NCA leads, co-ordinates and supports the national law enforcement response to money laundering. The prosperity command of the NCA houses the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, or UKFIU, and receives suspicious activity reports, or SARs, from the regulated sector. The intelligence gathered from these is used to support investigations into both money laundering and the predicate offences.
The amendments seek to require the NCA to act in a regulatory manner by ensuring that the provisions of the Money Laundering Regulations, such as customer due diligence and monitoring of transactions, are implemented effectively, and to ensure that the NCA acts with regard to the principles of regulatory best practice. The NCA can and will act where there is criminal activity relating to money laundering. However, it does not have a regulatory remit, and to require it to have one would deflect it from its purpose of tackling serious and organised crime.
My noble friend also asked me for some figures on the moneys recovered. I can tell him that in 2015-16 £255 million was recovered under the Proceeds of Crime Act, of which £208 million was in confiscation. However, I will write to him with further details on that.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 70, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and Amendment 73, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.