Criminal Finances Bill

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 28th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)]

My Lords, the Bill was welcomed by all sides of the House at Second Reading. Unexplained wealth orders are a device to give law enforcement agencies powers to require a person suspected of involvement in or association with serious criminality to explain the origin or source of assets which appear disproportionate to their income.

Amendment 1, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, seeks to insert the words, “beyond reasonable doubt” after the word “satisfied”, when requiring a person to comply with an order. This raises an important point, but I am not convinced that introducing this higher test is needed here. It would make it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to get permission to seek the source of the wealth which has led them to suspect that the person’s lawfully obtained income would be insufficient for the purposes of obtaining their assets. I agree with the remarks made about this amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who said that the higher evidential test would not be welcome in this regard. I also agree with the comments made by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Phillips. I also agree with the comments by the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, on the investigatory role—the test and procedure would be difficult there as well.

Amendments 2 and 7, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, give a better definition in relation to a person’s connection to a property, and the Government should reflect carefully on this during the passage of the Bill and possibly bring an amendment forward on Report.

Amendment 5, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, would provide an additional power to require a person to answer questions under oath. Again, that seems a reasonable additional power to take, which could be used at the discretion of the court. I very much take the point that the noble Lord made about the William Hill defence in terms of how one acquires assets and wealth. We need to look at that important point.

On Amendments 8 and 9, I thought that the £100,000 value in respect of a property was about right, that the £50,000 figure proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, was too low, and that the figure proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was far too high. However, having sought advice from law enforcement agencies, I understand the motivation behind the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, and I am content that the figure she proposes may well be right.

There is a whole series of government amendments in this group which I am content with, as they seek to prevent a person subject to one of these orders seeking to circumvent it through complicated financial means and transactions.

This has been a very useful debate, with some well-informed contributions that posed a number of questions for the noble Baroness. I am sure that she will reflect on those as we may want to come back to some of those points on Report.

The noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, made important points about property and the problems associated with it. I think that we shall debate an amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in the next group which concerns property.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this excellent debate. We have had some very good contributions from noble Lords from around the Committee on the significant new powers of the unexplained wealth order. I will do my best to respond to all the points that were made. I apologise in advance if I take some time to do so.

As noble Lords will know, the measures in this Bill are largely focused on serious and organised crime, but it also provides important new powers to tackle terrorist financing. Last week’s horrific attack reminds us all of the very real nature of this threat. I would like to take a moment to pause and think about the families of those who have been killed and those who still lie injured in hospital. I again pay tribute to the men and women of the police and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies who are so committed to keeping us safe—to PC Keith Palmer, but also to his many colleagues who work in Parliament and across the country. We must ensure that they have the powers they need to investigate and disrupt terrorists and terrorist groups. The powers in Part 2 of the Bill, which we will come to later, will do just that.

I return to the amendments in this group on unexplained wealth orders—or UWOs. The UK is a world leader in the fight against global corruption and the UWO is a substantial new power that will assist UK law enforcement agencies to do so. I welcome the continued cross-party support for these measures. I remind noble Lords that a UWO is a court order that requires a person to provide information which shows that they obtained identified property legitimately. If the person provides information in response to a UWO, the enforcement authority can then decide whether to investigate further, take recovery action under POCA or, if they are satisfied, take no further action. If the person does not comply with a UWO, either by not responding or not responding fully to the terms of the order, the property identified in the order is presumed to be recoverable under any subsequent civil recovery proceedings.

There are a number of government amendments in this group and I turn to them first. These are, by and large, technical changes to the provisions to help them function most effectively, but I will highlight a few for the benefit of noble Lords. As regards trusts, we have tabled government Amendments 3, 4, 6, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 30 to 32, 36, 38 to 40, 52, 53, 174 and 175. Perhaps the biggest addition to the provisions made by the government amendments are the measures to ensure that a UWO can be served in situations where property of interest is held in trust or involves corporate structures. This, I believe, picks up some of the concerns raised by my noble friend Lord Faulks. The amendments will also allow subsequent UWOs to be obtained on additional individuals such as trustees in complex cases where this is necessary. The amendments are not a silver bullet in cases where trusts and corporate entities are involved. However, they are a significant improvement and will close a potential gap.

UWO thresholds are addressed by government Amendments 8 and 33, which would reduce the threshold for a UWO to be obtained from £100,000 to £50,000. Noble Lords rightly questioned how we settled on the balance. It followed representations from authorities in Scotland—including from the SNP during Commons consideration of the Bill—and Northern Ireland. It reflects the fact that the higher threshold could disadvantage law enforcement agencies in certain parts of the country where financial returns may not be as high or may be spread more evenly across criminal groups, and where property, in particular, has a lower value.

The threshold, however, is still an important safeguard, together with the other qualifying criteria that must be met before a UWO can be made by the court. It remains our view that the orders should be used in the most complex cases, where obtaining evidence has proved difficult, and this will be reflected in the supporting guidance.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, tabled a related amendment to push the threshold up rather than down. She helped us to reflect on the balance that must be struck in circumscribing the new power. However, based on our consultation with law enforcement agencies, I suggest that her proposed threshold of £500,000 would be prohibitive. It would stop the agencies using this power in significant cases involving serious and organised crime, and noble Lords have been clear that they want to see the most effective use of UWOs. I hope that the noble Baroness will be satisfied that our approach strikes the appropriate balance.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I could repeat my question about the temptation to get at the low-hanging fruit and not use the orders to deal with grand corruption, as I understand it.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Baroness is right that both ends of the scale should be tackled, so I hope that law enforcement agencies will use the orders in a proportionate way to tackle criminal activity at both ends of the scale. I hope that that will satisfy the noble Baroness. She looks satisfied.

[Lord Faulks]

When questions were raised at Second Reading about the scope of the orders and how many might be issued, I referred to an assessment that was provided—with some difficulty—by the Government that only about 20 might be sought during the year. The Minister understandably said that that was only an estimate, based on general experience of civil recovery. However, does it not indicate that, rather than grasping low-hanging fruit, if anything this will be considerably resource-heavy and will probably be directed only at cases where the amount of wealth is significant enough to make the expenditure of time and money worth while?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My noble friend and the noble Baroness have made the case for both ends of the threshold. My noble friend talked about resources generally. One thing that came from the law enforcement agencies was that the issue was not resources but the tools to be able to tackle criminals. Also, law enforcement agencies do benefit from a proportion of the money recovered, so they are incentivised at both ends of the scale—and it will be up to legislators in this House and the other place to decide on the right balance to strike. But that was our rationale for the lower amount—and I know that the Government originally suggested £100,000.

The point about compensation is covered in government Amendments 28 and 56, and Amendments 29 and 57, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendments 28 and 56 introduce a compensation scheme in relation to the interim freezing orders that can support a UWO. Other powers to freeze property in POCA have connected compensation provisions. It is absolutely right that a person who has genuinely suffered a loss should have the ability to seek compensation where there has been serious default on the part of the enforcement agency. The “serious default” test is already used in POCA and is applicable here too. I hope that on that basis, the noble Baroness will agree that her amendments probably are superfluous in this instance.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

In support of my noble friend, the experience of POCA has been that the amount recovered has been very little more than the cost, so that the question of resources is very germane. In practice, both sides are anxious to come to an agreement early on to avoid the expense of a lengthy hearing, never mind the lengthy investigation. Therefore, setting the level at a high point is a very sensible thing to do and will ensure that resources are properly used.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Is the noble Lord talking about the high point with regard to the UWO triggering point? The Government have considered all options; they have suggested £100,000. The point was made that £50,000 was more appropriate, particularly in some of the devolved Administration areas, where property prices are generally lower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has made an argument for setting the bar higher. However, my noble friend also made the point that by setting the bar lower we might end up having more success, reaching not only the low-hanging fruit but the high-hanging fruit as well. I therefore hope that the noble Lord accepts that explanation. It is an objective consideration, but there are obviously many views about where the threshold should be set.

On Amendments 2, 5, 7, 16 and 18, tabled by my noble friend Lord Faulks, Amendments 2 and 7 seek to replace the term “holds” with “has a financial interest in” as the test for the High Court to consider. It is only fair that in serving a UWO the respondent must have some direct connection with the property that is of interest. “Holds” is a well-established concept in civil law, including in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and we believe that requiring a person to “hold” property is a proportionate approach. It is also our view that “holding” property includes holding an interest in that property. I hope that noble Lords are reassured by that assessment.

[Lord Faulks]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. I thought that the answer to this point was provided by the Government’s Amendment 21, therefore there is no need to refer to the provisions of POCA, because there is an internal reference to what “holding” means.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That is correct, but I thought I might go through it. I am just being thorough.

Amendment 5 seeks to add the ability to interview a person “under oath” as a possible requirement of a UWO. It would already be a criminal offence for the respondent to knowingly or recklessly provide false or misleading information. We must also remember that this is only an investigative power; if the case leads to criminal proceedings, it would be subject to the usual rules of giving evidence and allow for interviews “under caution”.

Amendments 16 and 18 address the issue of “purported compliance”. If a person does not comply with a UWO, their property is presumed to be recoverable under civil recovery proceedings. Given the severe consequences of not complying, it is right that this rebuttable presumption should not apply to a person who purports to provide a response. This avoids any legal ambiguity as to when the presumption will apply. However, where that individual provides responses that do not satisfy the enforcement agency, he or she then runs the risk that the poor quality of the responses will encourage the agency to take further action, and in those circumstances the burden of proof switches back to law enforcement, as is normal.

Purported compliance applies to a scenario where all the requirements of a UWO have been met but where the response is less than satisfactory. The agency is able to tailor the request for information very specifically, so will have some control over this. We do not want to get into arguments before the courts as to whether the presumption should apply and whether the individual has complied.

Finally, the UWO provisions will allow the enforcement authority to make very specific requests for information, reducing the risk of a low-value response being provided. I hope that my noble friend will feel that this addresses the point he has so expertly raised. He also raised a point about gambling. With regard to the Ladbrokes test or the William Hill defence, we would expect a high level of evidence to prove that, and we would expect it to meet the requirements of the UWO. The UWO will have achieved its purpose by flushing out information.

My noble friend also asked whether we would publish the code of practice before Report. The answer is yes. I undertook to discuss publication of the update to the relevant code of practice with my officials and ministerial colleagues, and it is my intention that the draft code will be available to noble Lords prior to Report.

I now turn to Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. This would require the High Court to be satisfied “beyond reasonable doubt” with regard to each of the requirements before issuing a UWO. This is an investigative power, as the noble Lord, Lord Blair, said, so the test of “reasonable suspicion” is quite normal and consistent with existing law, including Part 8 of POCA. The balance of probabilities applies here, as the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and my noble friend Lord Faulks said, and I hope that my noble friend will agree that it would not be appropriate to impose a criminal law standard in such cases.

My noble friend Lord Hodgson asked about the reversal of the burden of proof. We accept that there is a reversal of the burden of proof but it is in very specific and narrow circumstances. There has to be a link to a PEP or a serious criminal. This is a proportionate use of operational need. As an investigation power, there is the opportunity to address this issue in any subsequent proceedings. As my noble friend said, Transparency International has approved this approach.

My noble friend also asked about the use of legal advisers if a client is subject to a UWO, but we do not consider that an amendment is required to the laws on legal privilege. The lawyer role is unchanged, and the lawyer has the same responsibility to file a SAR if he has a relevant suspicion. It will be a question of the facts in each case.

I now turn to Amendments 10, 13, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 35 and 37, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. I think that these broadly separate out into two topics: first, the application of UWOs to PEPs, and, secondly, the court process in Northern Ireland. UWOs can be made either where there is suspicion of involvement in serious crime or in relation to non-EEA politically exposed persons. In that sense, I want to make it clear that politicians and senior officials in the UK and the EEA are covered by the first element of this power where they are suspected of being involved in serious criminality.

The reason for the second limb is to plug a gap experienced by law enforcement agencies when they investigate politically exposed persons. The issue arises in cases where critical evidence is available only in the PEP’s home country, which lacks the capabilities necessary to gather it itself. Conversely, in relation to UK PEPs and those across the European Economic Area, if the evidence exists it will be obtainable, so the same issues do not arise. There is no gap in these cases. That means it should be possible to evidence suspicion of involvement in serious crime.

On the noble Lord’s point about the FCA guidelines, these relate to the regulatory obligations of banks and other institutions. UWOs are not to do with the regulatory burden and responsibilities of the financial industry, so reference to the FCA is not strictly relevant here.

On increasing the sentence on summary conviction in Northern Ireland to 12 months, the current provisions reflect the approach taken to sentencing for other “either way” offences in the Bill, and which also correspond to offences in POCA already. The 12-month point for England and Wales arises from an amendment to the approach to sentencing in the magistrates’ courts which derives from Sections 281 and 282 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Those amendments did not extend to Northern Ireland. In relation to the ability to make rules of court and other procedures in the High Court, including the variation or discharge of a UWO, specific provisions are not required in the Bill for England and Wales. However, express provision is required for the High Court in Northern Ireland to put them on the same footing.

The noble Lord also asked about Scotland. There is a constitutional division of powers between Scottish Ministers and the Lord Advocate, which is obviously specific to Scotland. We need to be certain that there is an ability of the Scottish Minister to disclose information onwards. The provisions presume that if a response is made to a UWO, this information could be disclosed onwards for consideration of a criminal investigation and/or prosecution. Therefore, in the Scottish context, Scottish Ministers apply for UWOs so that they will receive any information in response to such. If they consider that this information suggests that a criminal investigation and proceeding may be appropriate, they would need to refer the material to the Lord Advocate. The amendments provide that Scottish Ministers can disclose the information to the Lord Advocate for this very purpose. They also make certain that there is no suggestion that Scottish Ministers are tasking the Lord Advocate, merely that the material can be referred for independent consideration by the Lord Advocate. That is important due to the constitutional structure in Scotland.

Amendment 24 provides for any person affected by a UWO to apply for its variation or discharge, and not just the applicant and respondent. As a specifically focused investigation order, only the applicant and respondent are directly affected by the UWO. This is because the UWO requires the respondent to provide information, but does not itself affect any other interests in the property.

Finally, we reach the other amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendments 26 and 54 would provide that the application to freeze property need not be made at the same time as the application for a UWO. It is right that all matters relating to the person and property should be dealt with in one hearing. This also gives certainty to the respondent. Should the enforcement agency wish to freeze the property at any other time, it will be able to do so under the main freezing order provisions in POCA, provided that the relevant test can be met.

With reference to UWOs, the noble Baroness asked about the need for the ownership register. Open source material that already exists can be of assistance; for example, the Land Registry, public accounts and records at Companies House. Other countries may already have public registers of ownership and income. In these circumstances, our law enforcement agencies would have access to them. We should also note that the UK has public registers of beneficial ownership.

I turn finally to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. He talked about altering the threshold but still having the safeguards. On the threshold, it must be remembered that the High Court has to be satisfied that there is still a link to serious crime or that someone is a PEP. That is a significant test. It focuses the use of the power in relation to the amount, and that is dropped by our amendments. The court has to show not only the value of the property but that the respondent does not have any obvious legitimate income.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, on that last point, I was not clear whether the Minister was saying that defendants’ living expenses were covered or not. I would be happy to discuss that with her after today. I raised it because I was aware that they are specifically referred to in other legislation.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Baroness is right: they are provided for because they are in line with existing powers in POCA.

[Baroness Hamwee]

The Minister said that it would be right to have everything dealt with in the same hearing. I questioned whether “proceedings” meant “hearing” because to me they are not the same thing. Did the Minister say “hearing”? That might require a tweak.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I did say “hearing”.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, we began with my modest amendment an hour and 40 minutes ago, and we have obviously ranged pretty widely. That is not surprising with nearly 60 amendments in this group. I asked in my opening remarks for reassurance that the government amendment,

“that there is reasonable cause to believe”,

provided adequate protection and we did not need “beyond reasonable doubt”. I asked for more experienced legal expertise than I have to provide me with that reassurance. I got not one but two noble and learned Lords to provide that in the shape of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, for which I am very grateful.

I was slightly surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Blair, was dismissive of what I put in my amendment but will, I imagine, accept government Amendment 6, which provides a slightly lower level of inhibition to police activity, but that is as it may be. I was grateful to my noble friend on the Front Bench for her reassurance that there was no change to the issue of legal privilege. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

3: Clause 1, page 2, line 10, at end insert—
“(c) where the property is held by the trustees of a settlement, setting out such details of the settlement as may be specified in the order, and(d) setting out such other information in connection with the property as may be so specified.”

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

6: Clause 1, page 2, line 35, after “satisfied” insert “that there is reasonable cause to believe”

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

8: Clause 1, page 2, line 37, leave out “£100,000” and insert “£50,000”

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. I am grateful for their contributions. As we have already covered, the court may issue a UWO in cases where either there is a link to serious criminality or the respondent is a politically exposed person from outside the European Economic Area. Amendment 11 seeks to add a third limb to those covered by UWOs. This amendment would mean that a UWO could also be served on a person who has a financial interest in land or property which is registered in the name of an overseas company. This would be quite a significant step, and I encourage noble Lords to consider it carefully. The UWO has been specifically designed as a reaction to the real operational difficulties that law enforcement agencies have had in individual cases.

First, there are those who are known to have a link to serious criminality, such as there being known links to organised criminal groups. The senior criminal, if I can call them that, is often able to keep themselves distant from any actual individual instance of criminality. The UWO will force them to explain their wealth. Secondly, there are non-EEA PEPs. PEPs are targeted in this way because they are widely acknowledged to be a high corruption risk. The ability to get evidence from certain countries—

[Lord Lea of Crondall (Lab)]

I hesitate to intervene, but this is a point of general relevance to the Bill. The Minister referred to us being a member of the European Economic Area. I take it that nothing will happen to this Bill when it goes on to the statute book, but this question is germane and substantive. The Bill refers to the European Economic Area, of which we are a member. Would we require legislation to stop being a member? Does that bear on the substantive issues in the Bill?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do not entirely understand what the noble Lord said.

[Lord Lea of Crondall]

Will the Minister make sure that this question is looked at? Otherwise, we will have on the statute book something that depends upon us being a member of the European Economic Area.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am much clearer about this. Obviously negotiations will be conducted as the Brexit negotiations go on. I did a debate the other week about the co-operation around law enforcement; we are absolutely committed to continue that co-operation—if that gives comfort to the noble Lord—in fighting crime, corruption, fraud, slavery, people trafficking and all that sort of thing. We are a world leader at this point in time.

I did not initially get where the noble Lord was coming from, so I apologise. I was talking about the non-EEA PEPs—those outside the European Economic Area at the moment—who are targeted in this way because they are widely acknowledged to be a high corruption risk. The inability to get evidence from certain countries has rendered action against those persons almost impossible in some cases, even though they have obvious unexplained wealth and there are other suspicions relating to them. In both cases, there are clear reasons to justify the use of this novel investigative power. Based on clear evidence, we judge it to be proportionate in these cases to reverse the burden of proof, which is a major departure from the normal operation of our law, and to put their property at risk of recovery purely on the basis that they do not respond to a UWO.

I fully recognise that those in the third grouping proposed by noble Lords—those with a financial interest in property owned by an overseas company—have given rise to concerns relating to corruption. However, very importantly, it must be remembered that the vast majority of people with a financial interest in an overseas company are law-abiding. Many of them are British citizens, for whom there will, if relevant, be other avenues to progress an investigation. I am not satisfied that the situation relating to this third suggested group of persons is so stark, or that a real operational need has been identified. As I said earlier, there is nothing inherently suspicious about having a financial interest in an overseas company.

Despite that, I take on board the points that noble Lords have made and am very grateful for the amendment, which highlights a very important area. My officials will, of course, liaise with law enforcement colleagues to ensure that they have the tools that they need to investigate cases of this type, but I assure noble Lords that they have not indicated a gap in their existing powers that would justify extending UWOs in the way that is proposed.

I will go through some other points that noble Lords have made. My noble friend Lord Faulks—I thought he was noble and learned, and it has quite shattered my illusions to learn that he is not—talked about the “envelope tax”, which he also brought up at Second Reading. I undertake to discuss it with colleagues at the Treasury and come back with a response, either on Report or by letter to him. He also talked about UWOs and the London property market, and what they will do to help with empty properties—which I see every night on my way back to my small flat in north London. In terms of how a UWO will be used against property held by foreign companies, it must be noted that the UWO provisions can be used against legal persons—companies—wherever they are located, subject to international law on service. In addition, it will be possible to focus on the individual if he holds an interest. Our new amendments will mean that foreign-owned property is not excluded from the UWO provisions.

My noble friend also talked about the supervisory regime and the obligations of regulated bodies with respect to the London property market. The Government consulted on reforms to the anti-money laundering supervisory regime in the autumn and have considered the responses. The Treasury published the outcome of that review on 22 March and is currently conducting further consultation on the creation of a new office for professional body anti-money laundering supervision, which will be overseen by the FCA and is expected to be fully operational by the start of 2018.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, asked about the latest available data on prosecutions, convictions and sentencing, broken down by offence from 2015. In 2015, 2,307 defendants were proceeded against for money laundering offences in the magistrates’ court; 1,336 defendants were found guilty at all courts for money laundering offences; and 1,300 were sentenced. Where a bank’s anti-money laundering regime is found to have failed, significant fines can be, and have been, applied. I think that is the chart that he was referring to. Banks are also required to fix their regimes, and banks operating in the UK have been fined for failures in their anti-money laundering regimes.

[Lord Rooker]

The Minister is missing the point, although I am sure she is not doing so deliberately. No bank has been prosecuted. That is the background to the question I asked. I did not ask about cosy deals with the Financial Conduct Authority—like those reported today with Tesco and the one with Rolls-Royce, which I referred to at Second Reading—to have deferred prosecutions, so that they pay but do not get prosecuted. I asked about banks being prosecuted. The one way to stop or curtail this, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, is to get them where it hurts, not with cosy deals. These fines are not the result of prosecutions. If she is implying that, she is wrong, and is close to misleading the Committee. I am not asking about deals; I am asking about prosecutions which take place in court, not through cosy deals and a fine from the Financial Conduct Authority.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I hope the noble Lord does not think that I have ever tried to mislead the House. I talked about fines, but where a bank was found to have committed a criminal offence, a prosecution could be undertaken. Investigations and prosecutions are a matter for law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. I take the point that he is making, but this is open to law enforcement. Last month, a £163 million fine was issued to Deutsche Bank, and I would suggest that hitting them where it hurts probably involves hitting them in their pockets. It is open to law enforcement to prosecute banks, but I take the noble Lord’s point in that, today, I know of no prosecutions of banks. But the fines regime is in place.

I am very grateful for the amendment but hope that my noble friend has been assured that there is not a gap in existing powers that would justify extending UWOs in the way proposed. I hope he will feel content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who took part in the debate and for the general support for what lay behind this amendment, which is a widespread concern about the London property market in particular and the degree to which it is clear that corrupt money has entered it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made a number of important points—particularly that I am not learned. He was also correct to say that the word “or” was missing from the amendment, and made some other drafting suggestions. He was also right to suggest that this is not a panacea, but it was not designed to be. The amendment was intended to provoke the sort of debate we have had and to ask the Government whether they are truly satisfied that the evil we have identified is being answered, and in particular whether anything in the Bill can be used to deal with the problem.

My noble friend the Minister has said that the provision covers those who are PEPs within the definition of the Bill or those suspected of serious criminality. But what, I ask, about those who may not easily be defined as being “suspected of serious criminality” but are in fact gangsters? What of those who have high office but do not come within the definition of PEPs? With many of the properties, it will be difficult to determine precisely who owns them. All that we ask for is an unexplained wealth order—it is not a criminal offence; it is a civil procedure which results, if there is no adequate explanation, in civil recovery. That, I suggest, will help deter the incursion of corrupt money. The provisions contain safeguards on self-incrimination and compensation. Let us not be too pusillanimous about this. My noble friend said that she had received my request for information about the envelope tax at Second Reading and she has again, but she has not yet replied. On the face of it, that is in stark contradiction to the policy that underlies the UWOs.

We will miss a legislative opportunity if we do not do something through the Bill to sort out the problem we have identified. I hope that my noble friend will speak to her officials and be satisfied that there is no gap, no lacuna, in this approach.

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

12: Clause 1, page 3, line 23, at end insert—
“(e) where the property is an interest in other property comprised in a settlement, the reference to the respondent obtaining the property is to be taken as if it were a reference to the respondent obtaining direct ownership of such share in the settled property as relates to, or is fairly represented by, that interest.”

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

14: Clause 1, page 3, line 30, at end insert—
“(d) otherwise connected with a person within that paragraph.”

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

17: Clause 1, page 4, line 29, at end insert—
“(5A) Subsections (5B) and (5C) apply in determining the respondent’s interest for the purposes of subsection (3) in a case where the respondent to the unexplained wealth order—(a) is connected with another person who is, or has been, involved in serious crime (see subsection (4)(b)(ii) of section 362B), or(b) is a politically exposed person of a kind mentioned in paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of subsection (7) of that section (family member, known close associates etc of individual entrusted with prominent public functions).(5B) In a case within subsection (5A)(a), the respondent’s interest is to be taken to include any interest in the property of the person involved in serious crime with whom the respondent is connected.(5C) In a case within subsection (5A)(b), the respondent’s interest is to be taken to include any interest in the property of the person mentioned in subsection (7)(a) of section 362B.”

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

19: Clause 1, page 5, line 35, leave out “other provisions of”

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

21: Clause 1, page 7, line 1, at end insert—
“362GA Holding of property: trusts arrangements etc(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 362A and 362B.(2) The cases in which a person (P) is to be taken to “hold” property include those where—(a) P has effective control over the property;(b) P is the trustee of a settlement in which the property is comprised;(c) P is a beneficiary (whether actual or potential) in relation to such a settlement.(3) A person is to be taken to have “effective control” over property if, from all the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the person— (a) exercises,(b) is able to exercise, or(c) is entitled to acquire,direct or indirect control over the property.(4) Where a person holds property by virtue of subsection (2) references to the person obtaining the property are to be read accordingly.(5) For further provision about how to construe references to the holding of property, see section 414.”

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

28: Clause 2, page 12, line 34, at end insert—
“362PA Compensation(1) Where an interim freezing order in respect of any property is discharged, the person to whom the property belongs may make an application to the High Court for the payment of compensation.(2) The application must be made within the period of three months beginning with the discharge of the interim freezing order.(3) The court may order compensation to be paid to the applicant only if satisfied that—(a) the applicant has suffered loss as a result of the making of the interim freezing order,(b) there has been a serious default on the part of the enforcement authority that applied for the order, and(c) the order would not have been made had the default not occurred.(4) Where the court orders the payment of compensation—(a) the compensation is payable by the enforcement authority that applied for the interim freezing order, and(b) the amount of compensation to be paid is the amount that the court thinks reasonable, having regard to the loss suffered and any other relevant circumstances.”

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

30: Clause 4, page 14, line 15, at end insert—
“(c) where the property is held by the trustees of a settlement, setting out such details of the settlement as may be specified in the order, and (d) setting out such other information in connection with the property as may be so specified.”

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

36: Clause 4, page 15, line 20, at end insert—
“( ) where the property is an interest in other property comprised in a settlement, the reference to the respondent obtaining the property is to be taken as if it were a reference to the respondent obtaining direct ownership of such share in the settled property as relates to, or is fairly represented by, that interest.”

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

38: Clause 4, page 15, line 27, at end insert—
“(d) otherwise connected with a person within that paragraph.”

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

56: Clause 5, page 24, line 32, at end insert—
“396QA Compensation(1) Where an interim freezing order in respect of any property is recalled, the person to whom the property belongs may make an application to the Court of Session for the payment of compensation.(2) The application must be made within the period of three months beginning with the recall of the interim freezing order.(3) The court may order compensation to be paid to the applicant only if satisfied that—(a) the applicant has suffered loss as a result of the making of the interim freezing order,(b) there has been a serious default on the part of the Scottish Ministers in applying for the order, and(c) the order would not have been made had the default not occurred.(4) Where the court orders the payment of compensation—(a) the compensation is payable by the Scottish Ministers, and(b) the amount of compensation to be paid is the amount that the court thinks reasonable, having regard to the loss suffered and any other relevant circumstances.”

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I support Amendment 72, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. It has been common ground in our discussions this evening that the volume of SARs is rising all the time. There are now over 1,500 a working day and it slightly defies belief that those are all getting anything like the attention that they should. Those of us who have had experience of this find that the National Crime Agency is extremely reluctant to allow any inhibition on its ability to call for SARs at every level. It should be possible to have discussions about automatically asking for a time limit—not that the information could not be asked for subsequently—of 25 or 50 years. One of my most recent PEP inquiries involved events 53 years ago. I simply cannot believe that collecting that sort of information is a good use of my time or the bank’s. There would be a great deal of virtue in my noble friend trying to persuade the NCA that some focus was a good idea. Getting the focus that is badly needed, and things like time and a de minimis figure, would make the whole system much more effective. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is a first step towards that and is worthy of serious consideration.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, these amendments cover measures in Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the Bill. I thank noble Lords who have taken part in the debate. As the Action Plan for Anti-money Laundering and Counter-terrorist Finance set out, the Government see public/private partnership as central to tackling money laundering and terrorist financing. A major part of this approach is to provide support for the effective exchange of information, both within the private sector, and between the public and private sectors, to increase our collective knowledge of threats and vulnerabilities; to help the regulated sector to protect itself, and to improve the quality of the UK’s financial intelligence. The provisions in Chapter 2 assist this approach, and our amendments will enhance their ability to do so.

I hope noble Lords will agree that the government amendments in this group are technical and uncontroversial. Clause 11 permits the UK Financial Intelligence Unit—or UKFIU—hosted in the National Crime Agency, to request further information in relation to a suspicious activity report, or following a request from a foreign authority, from any member of the regulated sector. Clause 35 allows the police to do the same in relation to terrorist finance. At present, the clause will allow the NCA and police to direct that further information is provided through issuing a further information notice. If the information is not provided in accordance with the direction, the NCA will be able to apply to a court for a further information order to require the person to provide the information requested. However, following further consultations with operational partners, we have concluded that a further information notice is not required, as the NCA can already request information to be provided voluntarily under existing powers. Government Amendments 64 to 69, 130 to 137 and 173 will therefore remove further information notices. If the regulated sector entity declines to provide information on a voluntary basis, the NCA or police can still apply to a magistrates’ court for a further information order.

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[Lord Rosser]

Is the noble Baroness satisfied that this matter has been dealt with as expeditiously as possible bearing in mind that the review was in 2015 and we now have a Bill in front of us to which the SARs regime is directly relevant? However, when we put forward proposals to try to make the regime more effective by prioritising matters, we were told that the Government were still considering the situation. The difficulties in finding space for legislation over the next couple of years have already been raised, so could the noble Baroness address that point and reflect further that we are four weeks away from Report? If the Government really put their mind to it, surely they could come forward with an amendment of their own on this issue.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I recognise that the issue was considered in 2015. It is now 2017. I totally take on board what the noble Lord says. This issue is complex but I will go back to the department to see what is in the art of the possible before Report. I cannot promise anything at this stage other than that I will try to expedite it if possible.

Prioritisation and the allocation of resources are operational matters. The NCA already has processes in place to take tasking decisions and allocate its resources. It is very unlikely that a SAR would be the only factor taken into account when deciding whether to open an investigation. Putting this matter into legislation could, if anything, impose additional restrictions on law enforcement agencies, which already have the type of flexibility to prioritise cases that the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to achieve.

I hope that he is at least partly satisfied with my explanation. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, as regards the bad things in subsection (5), I would feel more comfortable if these were a matter of discretion for the court. However, if a court has to be satisfied about something, the provision goes against my instincts—of course, I do not have the experience of other noble Lords in this area—as it would not be in a position to hear arguments on the other side. I specifically mentioned there being no alternative provisions because, in another part of the landscape, we are accustomed to there being special advocates, although that may not be a perfect system and I am not sure that I want to go down that route.

I will have to read the Minister’s response on legal professional privilege. It did not immediately answer my questions. Clearly, we are not going to make further progress on that today but it may well be something that I would like to come back to on Report, which, as I understand it from the provisional arrangements, will be very inconveniently held on the day after the day that we return from the Easter Recess. Therefore, I may disturb somebody’s holiday. I am sorry about that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

62: Clause 10, page 36, line 4, at end insert—
“(3A) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the conditions in section 339ZB were met in respect of the disclosure if the person making the disclosure did so in the reasonable belief that the conditions were met.”

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

64: Clause 11, page 37, line 4, leave out from beginning to end of line 35 on page 39 and insert—
“Further information orders339ZH Further information orders(1) A magistrates’ court or (in Scotland) the sheriff may, on an application made by a relevant person, make a further information order if satisfied that either condition 1 or condition 2 is met.(2) The application must—(a) specify or describe the information sought under the order, and(b) specify the person from whom the information is sought (“the respondent”).(3) A further information order is an order requiring the respondent to provide—(a) the information specified or described in the application for the order, or(b) such other information as the court or sheriff making the order thinks appropriate,so far as the information is in the possession, or under the control, of the respondent.(4) Condition 1 for the making of a further information order is met if—(a) the information required to be given under the order would relate to a matter arising from a disclosure made under this Part,(b) the respondent is the person who made the disclosure or is otherwise carrying on a business in the regulated sector,(c) the information would assist in investigating whether a person is engaged in money laundering or in determining whether an investigation of that kind should be started, and(d) it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the information to be provided.(5) Condition 2 for the making of a further information order is met if—(a) the information required to be given under the order would relate to a matter arising from a disclosure made under a corresponding disclosure requirement,(b) an external request has been made to the National Crime Agency for the provision of information in connection with that disclosure,(c) the respondent is carrying on a business in the regulated sector,(d) the information is likely to be of substantial value to the authority that made the external request in determining any matter in connection with the disclosure, and(e) it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the information to be provided.(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), “external request” means a request made by an authority of a foreign country which has responsibility in that country for carrying out investigations into whether a corresponding money laundering offence has been committed.(7) A further information order must specify—(a) how the information required under the order is to be provided, and(b) the date by which it is to be provided.”

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I conclude as I began. I wholeheartedly support attempts to root out and punish financial crime. However, we need to strip this system down and re-engineer and refocus it to ensure that it is properly effective. The present approach, which piles yet more regulatory responsibilities on a flawed system, is not working well enough.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the amendments in this group have raised some important points around regulation and supervision of the regulated sector. I am also pleased to able to update noble Lords on some of the recent developments in this area.

Amendment 108, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, would require the FCA to withhold a proportion of any discount to a penalty applied to a financial firm until that firm has completed any internal disciplinary actions agreed in the settlement. We agree with the principle that such firms should be held accountable for their actions, or lack of them. The Government already have in place, through the FCA, powers to increase a penalty that it would otherwise impose on a firm in light of a range of potentially aggravating factors, including,

“disciplinary action against staff involved”.

A firm that had, by the time the FCA imposed its relevant penalty, failed to take such appropriate action, could therefore already have that penalty increased as a result.

The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 allows the FCA to impose requirements on such firms. If the FCA considers that a firm needs to take disciplinary action—if appropriate and following all due employment process—after a penalty is imposed, the FCA can require that the firm properly and fully considers doing so. If the firm then fails to do so, that would become misconduct in respect of which the FCA could, subject to all other relevant factors, impose an additional penalty. Therefore, we believe that we already have in place powers to take action in the way the proposed amendment suggests.

[Lord Sharkey]

Does the Minister accept that there is a big difference between having the powers to do something in addition and having an automatic system of withholding, which makes it directly in the interests of the firms to take the action that they are supposed to take, rather than have the FCA make an assessment later and come back to discuss whether it ought to impose an additional penalty? One is automatic, giving an immediate incentive for the firms to do something, while the other requires additional supervision.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I take the noble Lord’s point that one is perhaps much simpler, but of course each case is different. One firm might be a lot more compliant and it might not take much effort; another might take a lot more effort. However, I take his point.

I move on to Amendments 126 and 127 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. These relate to the role of the NCA. The NCA leads, co-ordinates and supports the national law enforcement response to money laundering. The prosperity command of the NCA houses the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, or UKFIU, and receives suspicious activity reports, or SARs, from the regulated sector. The intelligence gathered from these is used to support investigations into both money laundering and the predicate offences.

The amendments seek to require the NCA to act in a regulatory manner by ensuring that the provisions of the Money Laundering Regulations, such as customer due diligence and monitoring of transactions, are implemented effectively, and to ensure that the NCA acts with regard to the principles of regulatory best practice. The NCA can and will act where there is criminal activity relating to money laundering. However, it does not have a regulatory remit, and to require it to have one would deflect it from its purpose of tackling serious and organised crime.

My noble friend also asked me for some figures on the moneys recovered. I can tell him that in 2015-16 £255 million was recovered under the Proceeds of Crime Act, of which £208 million was in confiscation. However, I will write to him with further details on that.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 70, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and Amendment 73, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I thought I heard the Minister say that the NCA is not a regulator, but I do not understand why it cannot abide by regulatory principles in executing its duty as an enforcer on money laundering regulations. I do not understand why the two are mutually exclusive. If I heard my noble friend aright, she appeared to say that it could not abide by regulatory principles because it is an enforcer.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That is correct.

I now turn to Amendment 70, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and Amendment 73 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I can update the Committee on the significant action that the Government are taking to improve the effectiveness of anti-money laundering regulation by strengthening the obligations on all supervisors through the new Money Laundering Regulations 2017. The Treasury published a consultation on these regulations shortly after Second Reading and it is open until 12 April.

The Government set out in a Treasury publication earlier this month their proposals for the new office for professional body anti-money laundering supervision. However, it would not be right for the Government simply to legislate without proper public consultation on the detail of this proposal, and I hope the noble Lord will recognise that that is the appropriate way forward.

We have also recognised the need for more co-ordination between regulators and supervisors of the regulated sector in relation to tackling money laundering. The new office for professional body anti-money laundering supervision will therefore work with professional bodies to help, and ensure, compliance with the regulations. The office will be hosted by the FCA and will liaise with other bodies across the regime to discuss and share best practice to help ensure consistent high standards across supervisors—especially where statutory and professional body anti-money laundering supervisors monitor the same sectors—and to strengthen collaboration between professional body anti-money laundering supervisors, statutory supervisors and law enforcement agencies.

The Government will consult on the draft regulations that will underpin the office over the summer, and they will be finalised and laid before Parliament in the autumn. The Government expect the office to be fully operational by the start of 2018.

The new arrangements will also support the enforcement capability of the supervisors. The supervisors can take a range of actions in relation to failings identified in the areas they supervise. Professional bodies have sanctions specific to their supervisory population—for example, the ability to expel firms from membership. The removal of professional accreditation in this way can incentivise compliance.

HMRC and the FCA have powers under the regulations to require information, enter and inspect premises, and administer monetary civil penalties to their supervised population. The UK is leading the way in improving transparency and accountability in anti-money laundering supervision by publishing an annual report on money laundering supervision on GOV.UK.

The Treasury’s annual report, which is now in its fifth year, sets out how the UK’s supervisors are contributing to the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. The most recent report shows that supervisors are increasingly focusing on educating businesses on how to meet their anti-money laundering obligations, and ensuring that systems and controls are effective and proportionate to the risks. The actions that supervisors are reporting help to ensure that the UK’s financial system is a hostile environment for illicit finance.

The report shows the positive collaboration between the Treasury and the supervisory authorities, which include the FCA, HMRC, the Gambling Commission and the professional bodies. As set out in the Government’s response to the review of the supervisory regime, the annual report will be strengthened with a new requirement for supervisors to provide relevant information to inform the annual report. This will be expanded to include two new questions on enforcement activity.

I hope that noble Lords will recognise and commend the considerable government activity in relation to the anti-money laundering regime. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

For clarification, the Minister referred to the Government’s intention to create a new office for professional body AML supervision, hosted by the FCA. If my memory serves me right, she said that it would be in existence in early 2018. That of course is still out for consultation, is it not? That is the document where responses were called for by 26 April. It may be that all the responses about the proposed body were negative, in which case presumably the Government may wish to think again. Does that mean that setting up this new office will not require any legislation and that there will not be a need for legislation, for example, to define its powers and responsibilities?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It may be helpful to the noble Lord if I reiterate the point that I made. The Treasury published the outcome of the review on 22 March and is now conducting further consultation on the creation of the new body, which will be overseen by the FCA and will be up and running by the start of 2018.

On his question of whether legislation—secondary or otherwise—will be required, perhaps I may write to him. I think that it will be secondary legislation but I cannot be certain.

[Lord Rosser]

Is the Minister saying that setting up a new body that will have powers over other bodies can be done through secondary legislation—by a statutory instrument?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do not know, which is why I will write to the noble Lord, if he is happy with that.

[Baroness Hamwee]

That will be helpful. As I understood it, the proposal was for regulations, and the further consultation has a limited number of questions to flesh out the earlier work. The Minister obviously has some more information.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I have just had an answer from the Box. It will in fact be secondary legislation that is laid before Parliament.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, perhaps I should accept that it will be up to us to ensure that transparency and accountability are included in those regulations. I will set myself some more homework. I am grateful for the Minister’s responses. The story is obviously not ending here but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised the issue of whistleblowing in her contribution at Second Reading and now proposes this new clause today with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. As we have heard, it would establish an office of the whistleblower. The purpose would be to offer much-needed protection to whistleblowers who expose criminality, corruption, fraud and other illegal activity. The price that whistleblowers often pay for alerting the authorities to illegal and criminal activity is to lose their jobs and have their careers ruined and destroyed.

The noble Baroness is right to highlight that we need to do more to offer protection and compensation to people who come forward and alert the authorities to the illegal activity. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, supported action and I agree. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that setting up an office may not be the right way to go about that. What is definitely needed is further protection in statute and regulation. It may not need an office to be established. I will be interested to hear the response from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, to this amendment. I entirely accept that it is a probing amendment and I think that we should take the opportunity that this Bill affords us to do something to address the issue of whistleblowers and the precarious position that they can find themselves in, which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has highlighted to the House today. I accept that whistleblowing goes across a variety of sectors, but we are dealing with the financial services sector and this would be a good place to start.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for allowing us to debate this important issue. Whistleblowers play a valuable role in society by bringing wrongdoing to light that could otherwise go unchallenged. Individuals should be able to report malpractice in the workplace without fear of reprisal; and employers should be prepared to work with staff to resolve concerns, particularly by means of effective internal procedures.

The Employment Rights Act 1996, as amended by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 and subsequently, provides employment protection for workers in all sectors who have blown the whistle. It enables them to seek redress if they are dismissed or suffer detriment at the hands of the employer because they have made a “protected disclosure” about wrongdoing that they have witnessed at work. To qualify for the protections, a worker must generally make their disclosure either to their employer or the relevant “prescribed person”. “Prescribed persons”’ are typically regulatory bodies for the sector in which the whistleblower works or the type of wrongdoing involved.

I assure noble Lords that, over recent years, the Government have taken steps to support a cultural change in relation to whistleblowing in all sectors, including financial services. A number of statutory and non-statutory improvements have been made. This includes guidance for whistleblowers on how in practice to make disclosures while preserving their employment protections; and guidance for employers including a non-statutory code of practice which we will review this year. We have fulfilled the commitment to keep the prescribed persons list up to date with annual reviews, and we now have guidance in place for prescribed persons. The next update will require prescribed persons to report annually on the number of whistleblowing disclosures they have received and broadly the action that resulted.

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

I agree with the Minister that the office is not the right way forward, but is she saying that everything is fine?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am saying that the Government looked at this in 2014, certainly in terms of the financial incentives, and there are various mechanisms in the different sectors for whistleblowers to come forward. The ultimate sanction for employers is unlimited compensation, depending on the type of wrongs that that employer engages in.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

I am sorry to come back on this, but I take it that the Government do not think that anything further needs to be done on this at the moment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The Government are never complacent in any area of law they introduce; I would never say that everything is perfect.

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, obviously I am going to withdraw the amendment, but I want first to make a couple of points. I am not going to give up on this issue. Let me point out that a moment ago the Minister talked about an office for money laundering to be set up within the FCA. As far as I am concerned, that is an ideal pattern to follow. The notion that this proposal would create an extraordinary and hefty bureaucracy is not credible because, frankly, the entire bureaucracy would probably be paid for by one whistleblower revealing one scandal on the scale that we have seen in recent years. I reject the idea that this is onerous. There are plenty of templates to follow that would allow us to do this sensibly.

On the financial incentive, I do not believe for a moment that whistleblowers do it for the money. The money is a recognition that they have destroyed their future. There may be some protection within the company they work for which ensures that they are not dismissed, but neither I nor anyone else can be persuaded that people do not look at whistleblowers and decide that they are not quite right for this promotion, that project or opportunity. If they try to change companies they go with what is almost a black spot on their hand, marking them out as someone it is perhaps better not to take a risk on. That is a reality which the Government have never faced up to.

When dealing with detriment, I would recommend the Minister and others who are interested to connect with the charity Whistleblower.co.uk, which would be delighted to provide them with a great deal of detail. I hesitate to mention individuals without their specific permission, but all the protections have turned out to be completely useless for them. People’s lives have been wrecked. Frankly, even the regulator would agree that despite all the systems that are in place, people’s lives have been wrecked, and there has only been some tinkering at the edges. Nothing has happened to bring about fundamental change. All this comes together in the poor statistics that I set out when moving the amendment. Very few people are coming forward and blowing the whistle on substantive issues that can affect our absolutely massive financial services sector. This allows the industry to be rather complacent, and that is exceedingly dangerous.

I hope that the Minister will recognise that while I will withdraw the amendment, we are nowhere near coming to the end of this issue.