Identity Documentation

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Thursday 14th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for initiating this debate. However, I am going to break the cosy coalition of those who believe that the state is the sole, and safe, guardian of my identity. I say that because I have listened to the debate and am still not clear what the problem is. It is not for me, as somebody who does not believe in ID cards, to defend the status quo; it is for those who want a change to prove that there is a problem and that ID cards are the effective solution.

Let us look at the real world outside this cosy Chamber and see what is happening in the countries that have ID cards. Many noble Lords have mentioned different countries, such as Germany, Spain, Italy and France, in talking about crime. Can any of those noble Lords or those yet to speak who wish to have ID cards point to a direct correlation between a reduction in crime levels and the citizens having ID cards? We need proof, not general statements. Those who suggest that ID cards will reduce the incidence of crime should give the statistics that show a correlation between ID cards and a reduction in crime in Germany, Spain and France.

It is also said that ID cards will somehow be effective in reducing terrorism. I remind noble Lords of the horrific attack and terrorist atrocities in Jakarta this morning and the appalling attacks that we have seen just across the water in France. Indonesian citizens carry ID cards, as do the citizens of France. Have those cards made them any safer? If noble Lords can show me a correlation between identity cards and a reduction in terrorism in those countries, I will support them.

We also hear about identity fraud. Again, I would like to see statistical evidence that there is more identity fraud in this country than in countries that have ID cards. I ask noble Lords to show me the facts. Most identity fraud now occurs online, and in the countries that I have just talked about national ID cards are not used to prove your identity in commercial transactions.

Benefit fraud and taxation fraud, which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, talked about, have been given as reasons for bringing in ID cards. Most people do not lie about their identity in such cases; they lie about their financial circumstances. So, again, I ask noble Lords who support the introduction of ID cards to give me the facts which show that in countries with ID cards there is less taxation fraud and less benefit fraud.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Perhaps I may put it to the noble Lord that, if the nature of the population of a particular country changes for whatever reason, his argument falls apart because one is not comparing like with like.

[Lord Scriven]

My Lords, I am comparing like with like, because those who argue that ID cards work are suggesting that somehow the problems that they have suggested will be reduced. The noble Lord next to me made it very clear that he did not believe that they would wipe out these problems, but I am asking for the evidence that shows that they will reduce them: that is all I am asking for. I accept that they will not wipe them out or get rid of them, but I wish to know whether there is scientific evidence in those countries that shows that these problems have been reduced—because if there is not, we do not have a problem and our system works in a comparable way to that of other nations.

The last thing I will say on this issue, because I do not have time to go into the civil liberties argument, is that it is really important for British civil liberties and freedom. Part of what makes us British—the British values that some go on about—is freedom, and the state not having overall control of our identity. In dealing with this issue—and particularly crime and terrorism, where recently this debate has come up most—we would be undermining the very British values of freedom and civil liberty, and the criminals and terrorists would have won, if we were forced to have compulsory ID cards.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for introducing this debate. I take the view that ID cards are an idea whose time has come and I support exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said about an increasing number of people—a more and more rapidly increasing number of people—living a lot of their lives online and being quite prepared to give up information freely online. ID cards—state ID cards—are a natural extension of this process. My expertise, such as it is, is in security, and it will be on that aspect in the main that I will talk briefly.

False identities are an absolutely staple terrorist tactic. In answer to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, in these troubled times it is not so much about the prevention of terrorism but its investigation. The police and the security services have an increasingly desperate concern in long-term inquiries, and sometimes in emergency inquiries, to establish the identity of individuals.

[Lord Scriven]

Is it not the case that, following the two major terrorist attacks in the UK, particularly the one in London, of the 99 recommendations given, quite a lot of those were about people already known and the security forces not acting on the data that they knew? It was not about a lack of data.

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

I am sure there were some recommendations like that, but perhaps when I have finished the noble Lord might see the opposite side of the coin.

It is this search for identity that lies behind the troubled development of the DNA database. The same reason lies behind the coming forward of the investigatory powers Bill and the question of ID cards.

I remind the House of two names: Kamel Bourgass and Manfo Asiedu. Bourgass was convicted in 2003 of the murder of Detective Constable Stephen Oake in Manchester. He was sentenced for that and other terrorist offences to 25 years in prison. Manfo Asiedu was the fifth bomber in the failed London attacks of 21 July 2005. He ran off across Wormwood Scrubs, throwing his device to the ground. He received 33 years’ imprisonment as a sentence. The thing that connects these two men is that at the time of their conviction we did not know who they were. As far as I can accept, we still do not know who they are. We know that the names they have given are not their right names. This is simply absurd. The links that we might have been able to establish to other plots and other people had a system of ID cards been in place are pretty obvious.

I need to make one issue clear, and here I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham: nobody I know in the police or security services who has considered this seriously sees a need for people compulsorily to carry identity papers in the street. This is not a question of a police officer demanding papers from somebody walking down the road. However, in the case of serious crime and terrorism, the police need, as soon as possible, to establish identity. These days, it would not be difficult to create a system that would not be intrusive but would be of huge assistance in those inquiries.

As the Foreign Secretary said today, speaking about Jakarta, these are troubled times. These troubled times are on our very doorstep. I speak now to the Minister: I never understood why, as far back as the 2005 general election, the Conservative Party resisted the idea of ID cards. After Paris, after Istanbul, after Jakarta, I do not think the public will understand why the Conservative Party is still resisting the idea. It is an idea whose time has come.

Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [HL]

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Tuesday 12th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

Will the noble Lord give way? I am a former leader of Sheffield City Council and a resident of the city. Has the noble Lord spoken to the leaders of Chesterfield and Bassetlaw councils, where people may have a different view to the one he has just expressed?

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

I have not spoken to the leaders of Chesterfield or Bassetlaw councils but I have spoken to the leaders of Derbyshire County Council and Nottinghamshire County Council. It is an area I know quite well, but I accept we are not going to agree on all our points.

This is also an area of considerable natural beauty with a thriving tourism industry. I would be grateful if the noble Baroness could talk about the devolution deal for Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. Discussions are taking place with those councils, but there are concerns. They are worried that any deal there will be potentially undermined by having further discussions about other councils leaving that area. This is not a good way of going forward.

Asylum: Sexual Orientation

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Monday 20th July 2015 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Scriven]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they plan to implement the recommendations in the report by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration of March–June 2014 regarding the handling of asylum claims made on the grounds of sexual orientation, and if so, when.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, the Home Office has been actively working to implement the recommendations. An updated asylum instruction considering sexual identity issues in the asylum claim has been issued. Approved training for staff is under development. These will ensure the sensitive and effective exploration of asylum claims based on sexuality. The Home Office is conducting “second pair of eyes” checks on all such claims to ensure the consistent recording of cases and more accurate data.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I thank the Minister for that Answer. He may be aware that an action plan has been agreed with third sector organisations that has become more “plan” than “action”. Can he say when the action plan will be implemented and, if not, will he write to me giving a date? Also, could the person overseeing the action plan be someone equivalent to the director of asylum, rather than a junior policy officer, as is presently the case?

[Lord Bates]

I am aware of the action plan; it has been drawn up in consultation with the national asylum stakeholders group, which includes groups that work specifically with lesbian, gay and bisexual organisations. He will be aware of the report of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration: we have accepted all its recommendations and they are in the process of being implemented. I do not have a final date for when that will be concluded, but I shall certainly speak with officials about that and write to him.

Surveillance Legislation

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Thursday 16th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

Absolutely, and I think we are all grateful to the business managers for having arranged time for that very important debate before the report from RUSI had actually been received. There were many helpful contributions in that debate, including those from the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who shared incredible insights from their practical experience of the dilemmas that are faced. On the issue of judicial authorisation of warrants, judgment was split: RUSI and the ISC were in favour of the status quo whereas David Anderson wanted to look at it. That will be work for the pre-legislative scrutiny committee whose deliberations will, of course, be published.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, can the Minister explain to the House how, if the Government decide not to go for a judicial signature on the warrant, the country will get information from communications service providers abroad, which hold most of the data that would be sought, when they have said that they are highly unlikely to give over information based on a political signature but are likely to co-operate with us based on a judicial signature?

[Lord Bates]

As Sir Nigel Sheinwald, the Prime Minister’s envoy to the communications service providers on this issue, pointed out, our system is not entirely politically based. There is judicial oversight of the process in the shape of the commissioner, who can look into this and review the decisions taken. I hope that that would satisfy. I have to say—although the noble Lord is leading me down that road—that we have reached no conclusions on that, and it will be thoroughly debated publicly before any decision is taken.

Investigatory Powers

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I note that I was not mentioned by the Minister at the beginning because I am not an expert on this matter. However, I am a citizen of this country and I want a safe country, but I also want to live in a country where my privacy and civil liberties are balanced with that security. That is vital. I do not think that anyone would disagree with the tone of the debate that we have had today but the crux of the matter is to ask how we can achieve that balance in the most effective way. That is why talking about technology and the balance between security and civil liberties is really important. When we discuss these issues it is also important to ask what type of country we want to live in and how we want our country to be perceived. Those questions are at the front of my mind when I address this matter. As I said, I am not a technical expert but a citizen asking those questions.

One of the key issues in getting the right balance between security and civil liberties and privacy is to judge not just what we do to the civil liberties of those who wish to harm us, but how we protect the civil liberties of 99% of the population who are law-abiding and wish to live in a secure country. The Anderson report talks about why we need to make changes, and we need to think very carefully about that balance. In particular, the report says that in its present form RIPA 2000 is undemocratic, unnecessary and, in the long term, intolerable. If that is the case, we need to think very carefully about what kind of country we want to live in, what kind of country we want to be perceived as and how we balance security with civil liberties.

That is really important because some people talk about this issue as being about—I would not use these words but they have been used in the other place by the Prime Minister—protecting our values. Is it part of our values in the face of this type of terrorism to say that everyone is under suspicion? That is the signal given out by blanket and mass surveillance. Is it part of our values to say that we are not such a developed country that we can be smart and effective in targeting that surveillance and getting round some of the technological problems by working internationally? The kind of country that I want to live in is one which is smart and effective, and which does not say that, because of this threat, we are all potential suspects. This has to be targeted and proportionate: the two words that everybody—whether expert or, like me, a layperson—should keep at the forefront of their mind.

This debate is not understood by the vast majority of parliamentarians or the public—it is complex. I see myself as being relatively young in this place. I go on Twitter, Facebook, Periscope and WhatsApp. However, I do not necessarily always understand the technology behind them. Let us place this in a way that the public would understand and think about what the response would be. To deal with this threat, a copy of every letter and package sent via the Royal Mail would have to be retained. Every address would have to be retained. Further, at the stroke of the Home Secretary’s pen, everything in a particular Royal Mail sorting office would be opened. That is the paper equivalent of what this says. The public would understand that, but would they see it as targeted and proportionate to the challenge that we face? I think probably not. I asked the general public that question in a number of ways, and they do not see that as targeted and proportionate. On some of these issues we are looking for a needle in a haystack, and we are making the haystack bigger to find that particular needle. By trying to deal with this technology by widening the net, are we making it harder to target the people we so rightly need to target?

I believe that politicians and parliamentarians need to understand this a little better. Parliament must assert its function to set clear limits on the use of intrusive powers and must prohibit the use of them on a blanket and mass scale, because I do not believe that such use balances security, privacy and civil liberties in a way that most people would want and, to use the Prime Minister’s words, that would protect our values. It seems to me that we are in a rather strange fight, as some people call it, when to protect our values we undermine the very things that we see as important in a liberal democracy.

Be under no illusion—I am not making this up:

“The inadequacy of our surveillance laws and the need for both online and offline reform has been laid bare in some of the rare instances in which surveillance has come to light”.

For example, as my noble friend has already said:

“In recent years, the Metropolitan Police circumvented PACE safeguards to access the phone records of journalists, spied on a grieving Baroness Lawrence and her family and infiltrated social and environmental justice groups to the extent that women were tricked into serious and long-term romantic relationships—one even giving birth to a child with an undercover officer”.

We already have powers that are circumvented and we need to think very carefully about whether we are using, offline and online, targeted and proportionate responses to the threats that we face.

I turn to the issue of whether judicial process is needed. We are an outlier in the “Five Eyes” countries: the other four all use judicial signature for the warrant. All the issues that have been raised in the House, those four countries seem able to deal with. Importantly, the international communication service providers, who hold offshore a lot of the data and intelligence we are going to target, have made it very clear that they would have more confidence and be more likely to work with us if it was a judge-signed warrant rather than a political warrant. So we should listen to what the experts and the people who are controlling those data offshore are saying and work with them. When was the last time that the Minister or his officials sat down with the communication service providers to get their input on how we move this forward? When was the last time that the Minister sat down with an international body, in the US or in Ireland, where a lot of such data are held, to work out whether a judge’s or the Home Secretary’s signature would be more likely to get us to the data held offshore that we need on a targeted basis? We need to think about this very carefully. What might seem to us to be a wide net and to be sensible might be seen not to work when we start talking to the people with whom we need to co-operate on an international level, and we may be making ourselves less safe.

I want to come on to some of the practicalities, be it about subscriber data, blanket retention of web logs and third-party data or the creation of request filters. As I have already said, the people whom we need to talk to are the communication services providers. That is really important. I, as just an ordinary boy from Sheffield, have spoken to them and I get a greater understanding of what is needed to protect not only my civil liberties but the security of the country that I love and want to see safe.

If we understand those technological developments, we will understand the issues relating to encryption that the noble Lord, Lord King, mentioned. We can have this mass surveillance; we can have the net spread widely; but if the people abroad are not going to work with us on the encryption key, then it is a waste of time keeping it. It is like going back to the Royal Mail’s suggestion. It is like saying, “You can have a copy of the envelope. You can’t see what’s in the envelope because we’ve got nothing to open this new material that the envelope’s made of”. That is the equivalent. So we need to work on an international basis. We are looking and focusing in the wrong direction. This is about working internationally with Governments and with the providers. We need to think about encryption and about how we use targeted third-party data when they are needed.

Therefore, I suggest that we need to be very clear. We need to look particularly at mutual legal assistance treaties—MLATs. What work are the Home Office or other government departments doing to tackle this issue through stronger and smarter MLATs on encryption and data sharing internationally? If we work with Governments or providers internationally who want to help us with this, they will say that they will do it only if we are targeted and smarter. They will say, “We will only do it if a judge is brought in”. So let us start talking to our international colleagues who want to work with us and see what needs to be part of such MLATs and where we need to focus.

I agree that this is not a zero-sum game: this is not about wanting civil liberties over security, or security over civil liberties. As I said, I want my privacy and my civil liberties, but I also want the country that I live in to be safe. I understand that, to achieve that, we may need to improve or strengthen some of our security capabilities. But we will not do that by getting it wrong by looking in the wrong place or doing the wrong thing. Nor do we get it right by undermining the very values that we are fighting for for our security—the privacy and civil liberties that actually make us a strong nation, not a weak one.

Immigration: Detention

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Thursday 26th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for bringing this debate to the Chamber today. As a new boy, I look on his swan-song and think, if only I could achieve a small fraction of some of the things that he has achieved and have the effect that he has had in this House and in the country, I will have done an extremely good job. I say with all honesty that I will definitely look round on the Tube and use his seat test as an indication of when I need to leave this House.

Like other speakers, I would like to thank the all-party parliamentary group, which has done an extremely good report on this, and my honourable friend Sarah Teather for chairing it.

I want to focus on one group within the report and that is lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex asylum seekers. It is illegal to be gay in 78 countries, punishable by prison and, in some cases, death. People seeking asylum on LGBTI grounds are in many cases very vulnerable and scared about speaking to the authorities about their sexual identity. It is a complex and deeply personal area of asylum that needs to be dealt with in a most sensitive, professional and consistent way. I have to say that that is not the case. Some LGBTI asylum detainees feel shame and a sense of secrecy about who they are. In many cases they lack support from the community that they are fleeing because of the views that that community has about being gay and lesbian. They need support, space and time in the asylum system.

This is especially clear in the light of the recent Court of Appeal decision in JB Jamaica v the Secretary of State for the Home Office. The case concerned the detention of a man from Jamaica who had claimed asylum on the basis of his sexual identity. Although eventually granted asylum upon appeal, he commenced judicial review proceedings arguing that his claim for asylum as a gay man was not capable of being determined quickly. Lord Justice Moore-Bick found that, given the nature of the applicant’s claim:

“Homosexuality is a characteristic that cannot be reliably established without evidence from sources external to the claimant himself. On the face of it, therefore, the appellant did need additional evidence to support his claim and since some of that evidence was likely to be available only in Jamaica or elsewhere abroad, it was likely that he would need additional time in order to obtain it. A failure to allow him that time was likely to lead (as in the event it did) to a decision that was neither fair nor sustainable”.

Therefore, we need to ask this question: why do we have the fast-track detention of people seeking asylum on LGBTI grounds?

As Johnson—not his real name—from Jamaica described his time in detention:

“The whole place is vile, it is homophobic, one of the guards called me a poof and then there were the Jamaicans who kept hurling some abuse at some Iranian guys—calling them batty men. I was terrified thinking oh my God, I hope they don’t know I am one of them. There was always fights they would provoke then when the guys would fight back. Eventually the gay guys had to be taken out. So it was very scary. It was awful. You can’t risk being open about being gay in there”.

So people go from vulnerability, fear and prejudice to being locked up with vulnerability, fear and prejudice. It is time that we looked at this in a very different way.

I know that the Minister has given answers to my questions about the review, which needs to consider those issues, but a review was done only last year by John Vine into LGBTI asylum. An action plan was offered and agreed to by the Home Office. On 16 March, only a few days ago, the Home Office said that it had not been started. What is the point of another review when a review has already stated the actions that need to be taken? Review after review is not the way forward. People who are held or detained for any period need action from the Government now.

On the anniversary of Magna Carta, if we really want to be seen internationally to be upholding the principles enshrined in Magna Carta, as a matter of urgency, we need action to deal with detention of some of the most vulnerable people who have fled here looking for those principles to free them, not enslave them in detention for unlimited periods.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

I will need to double check on that, but I think that, under Article 5 and the rules governing when people have been subject to sexual violence or torture, that is the subject of the medical examination when they are brought into the system and therefore they should never be in the system. I will look at that— I will not look at the Box, because I will get a shake of the head, probably—and include it in my letter to Stephen Shaw today.

I could address other matters, but time has probably run out and so I am not able to.

[Lord Scriven]

Under the John Vine report on detention and sexuality, there is meant to be an action plan. Clearly, the recommendations are sitting in the Home Office. When will the action plan come forward so that issues to do with sexuality in detention can be addressed? We know what the issues are. The Home Office has accepted the recommendations and we are just waiting for the action plan.

[Lord Bates]

I do not have the details of when the action plan will be released. As the noble Lord said, we have accepted the recommendations and we will release it at some point. I shall get an answer for him today. My officials will have the answer and if he meets me at the back of the Chamber I shall quickly be able to give it to him.

I undertake to deal with the particular point raised by the noble Baroness. I recognise that this is an extremely sensitive issue and that we are talking about very vulnerable people. We are deeply concerned about it and are aware of our international obligations. It is that sense and that thought that I hope, in paying tribute again to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, is an example of his chairmanship, which he referred to, where he would take people who were a long way apart and then, step by step, bring them a little closer together. That is his legacy.

Police: Complaints

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd March 2015 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Scriven]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking in the light of the number of complaints against police forces in England and Wales as reported by the Independent Police Complaints Commission.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government see the effective handling of complaints as a cornerstone to trust in the police. We have undertaken significant policing reform, including reforming the IPCC to handle all serious and sensitive cases. We have consulted on reform to make the complaints and disciplinary systems independent, customer-focused and transparent. These major reforms will improve the public’s experience and the process. The Government will respond to the consultation during this Parliament.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I thank my noble friend the Minister for that Answer. However, will the Government, as a matter of urgency, set up an independent inquiry into South Yorkshire Police over its systematic failings and slow and inadequate responses and improvements in cases of child exploitation, particularly its handling of the Rotherham cases?

[Lord Bates]

My noble friend is absolutely right to highlight the appalling situation that has been uncovered in Rotherham and South Yorkshire. That aspect of the South Yorkshire Police is, of course, subject to review by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, which undertook one review in 2013 and two in 2014. Reviews are now being undertaken by the National Crime Agency and Operation Stovewood. At this stage, we do not feel there is a need for a further independent inquiry but I would be very happy to meet my noble friend, as a very senior member of the community in that area, to see what more can be done to learn the lessons from that dreadful experience.

Independent Panel Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

That will be very important, and of course your Lordships can routinely hold the Executive to account through the provision of reports. Given that this inquiry is independent of government, it will also be important that systems and processes are in place by which both Houses of Parliament can be regularly informed about progress.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned the Rotherham report. The report out today finds that Rotherham Borough Council has been involved in covering up information and suppressing whistleblowers, and it concludes that those closely associated with past failures need to let others make a fresh start. Does the Minister agree that any officer or councillor who is implicated in that report, or who stood back and did nothing, should resign immediately from Rotherham Borough Council?

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this brief debate. There have been some excellent contributions. First, I want to clarify something I said earlier which might have sent people down the wrong track. I talked about 42 responses which my noble friend Lord Phillips rightly pulled me up on as being a paltry number. That was the number of academic institutions which responded. In fact, the consultation produced 1,792 responses. Five consultation events were held—in Manchester, Cardiff, Birmingham, London and Edinburgh—that reached a further 300 delegates from specified authorities, including representatives of higher education. So there have been some additional responses. Of course, it would be excellent to see more contributions.

The point that was made eloquently by the noble Baronesses, Lady Williams and Lady Smith of Newnham, on the importance of engaging young people is absolutely right. It would seem perfectly within the spirit and letter of both the guidance and of what we are putting forward here for academic institutions to engage with student bodies and societies; in fact, they should. They should ask, “What is the best way of implementing this within our institution?”. This would be entirely in keeping with the type of approach that we want. We are not talking about the European Society at Cambridge—unless there are instances there in which people could possibly be drawn into acts of terrorism. That would be unexpected and a surprise. We are talking about how to prevent people being drawn into terrorism—so a wider debate, crucially one involving young people, is very important.

Another element, which relates to what my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury had to say in moving his amendment, is the impact of this. We have produced an impact statement on the Bill. My noble friend said that he does not accept what it says on page 7, but it does make some estimates as to the cost of implementing this across 2,000 higher and further education institutions in the UK. This is standard practice. For illustrative purposes, we assume that each institution requires one week of a junior officer’s time—a BIS liaison officer, working with the university—at a cost of £573. Also, it is not—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

The Minister has given those figures, but it also says clearly in the impact assessment that there are some areas where the risk has not been assessed for Prevent requirement purposes. It is not possible to estimate accurately how much will be required for additional Prevent activities. So the figures in the impact assessment are completely irrelevant because, in many areas, the assessment as to what Prevent activity will be needed has not been done.

[Lord Bates]

That is a fair observation. We are in unknown territory, but in order to have an impact assessment, some basic assumptions have to be made. Those are the assumptions we are using to understand how this guidance would be implemented on the ground. Academic institutions might be able to undertake particular research about its effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have referred previously to the cost of the statutory duties—in relation not just to the substance, but to the infrastructure built by the Bill. This amendment refers both to,

“local authorities and other specified authorities”,

but I particularly had in mind local authorities. I am not sure that I have yet done so, but I declare an interest in that I am joint president of London Councils.

I have previously mentioned the “new burdens” principle, which might be expected to apply to these activities, and I have previously referred to some of the costs which have been estimated by the Government. London Councils is unconvinced by these.

My noble friend Lord Scriven will speak to this amendment, so I shall simply explain that, as a way of drawing attention to the costs, the amendment proposes an annual report to Parliament by the Secretary of State. The matter could be included in a report dealing with other matters. Maybe there should be some prospective reporting of the costs anticipated to be incurred.

On the first day of Report, I think it was, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, referred to the refusals to disclose money allocated to the Metropolitan Police for counterterrorism for security reasons, though, as he observed, some detail of that budget eventually comes into the public domain as it is scrutinised by the London Assembly. I used to chair the Assembly’s budget committee, so I remember all that.

There should be as much transparency in this area as possible. There is a lot of concern about the costs and, in any event, what money is spent on what is a matter of public interest. I beg to move.

[Lord Scriven]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and I thank the Minister for guiding the Bill so ably and patiently through the House. I am aware of the time, so I will try not to keep the House too long.

Until now, the debate has been about putting on to a statutory footing the powers that some specified organisations will have and some that they will not. The Minister, along with others who support this going on to a statutory footing, has indicated that this is to bring the rest up to the standard of the best. I know, as I am sure do many people who have had responsibility for public service and budgets, that bringing things up to the best does not necessarily mean being able to do it on the cheap; there is a cost associated with it.

Evidence has come from a number of organisations. In my former life as leader of a council, I was not one who participated in the Oliver Twist-type approach to budgeting by always asking for “more, please”; that is not the approach. However, when new burdens or new statutory responsibilities are being put on an organisation, it is only fair that it is adequately funded for those. As I say, evidence has come from a number of sources in the past couple of months about putting this on to a statutory footing—for example, from the Quilliam Foundation, the Local Government Association and a number of local authorities. More revealingly, the Audit Commission, when it did a report on Prevent in 2008-09, made it clear that resources were needed if this was going to be done effectively and efficiently. I assume that the Minister and the Government want to see this being done in that way.

It would be worth looking at the fact that historically something in the region of £140 million per year, or even more, was previously allocated to Prevent, and large cities were getting somewhere in the region of £600,000 per annum to deal with Prevent issues. I always go to impact assessments because they are very revealing, and I notice that in this one the Department for Communities and Local Government indicates that authorities will need somewhere between £4,000 and £40,000. Past evidence suggests that to do this to the best, large authorities need somewhere in the region of £600,000. It is telling that the impact assessment says that we do not have complete data on all the specified authorities that will be affected, and that is why there may be a discrepancy.

Manchester City Council, in a report that went to its cabinet only a few months ago, highlights specifically the financial burden that this is now having on a city such as Manchester, and says clearly that it cannot be sustained at its present level. So there is evidence historically; there are people who are not providers, or not public statutory bodies, such as the Quilliam Foundation, and existing providers of Prevent, who are saying that resources will be needed.

The London Borough of Sutton has done some work on the consultation and says that for such a borough, somewhere between £50,000 and £60,000 would be required for a Prevent co-ordinator—looking at local government, that is about the rate that such people are paid. Somewhere in the region of £250,000 would be required for new interventions, based on best practice from Wandsworth. Sutton also anticipates somewhere in the region of a £150,000 per annum increase in capacity for core safeguarding work, child protection and early work interventions.

This is not cheap. This is not work, if we are going to do it effectively, that can be done with existing resources; that is becoming very clear. The cost from Sutton does not include some of the extra work needed for administration and, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee suggested, some of the extra work needed for looking cross-border at a larger area.

Staff training is a full duty within the guidance. I quote from paragraph 37, which states:

“Local authorities will be expected to ensure that frontline staff have a good understanding of Prevent, are trained to recognise vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism and are aware of available programmes to deal with this issue”.

Staff training in itself will run into many hundreds of thousands of pounds for large authorities. Some of them have between 8,000 and 10,000 staff. The impact assessment states that it will cost £62 for 20 members of staff trained. For a local authority with between 8,000 and 10,000 front-line staff, as some of our large metropolitan authorities have, it will mean £31,000 to carry out just one section of the guidance. That is a significant cost.

I suggest that the duties placed on the public sector will be far more than the anticipated £10 million to £14 million per annum that the impact assessment suggests. I will give one example of why the figures are completely inadequate. Staff training is anticipated in the impact assessment to require an allocation by government of £300,000 per annum. There are 254,000 staff employed by the public sector in the north-east region. Assuming that only 50% of those are front-line staff, that is more than £300,000 per annum. Yet £300,000 per annum is being given for the whole country for staff training.

The amendment tries to get a commitment that, if we are going to go down the route of putting this onto a statutory footing and we want to make sure that local public bodies carry out best practice, adequate funding is provided. If not, the Government’s target of meeting best practice will not be achieved. Resources will not be available, particularly in the present climate in terms of public sector resources. So I ask the Minister the questions asked by my noble friend Lady Hamwee: will new burdens apply to the new duties that are to be put on the public sector, and will money be put forward annually, as the amendment says, before Parliament, so that local authorities and other public bodies locally will be compensated for the duties they will have under a statutory footing?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, in considering these amendments, I defer to the extensive and detailed local government expertise of my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Scriven. Before I respond to the specifics of the amendment, I repeat that in relation to the Channel guidance, we are consulting local authorities and specifically Channel panel chairs. We would be very happy to consult London Councils—Sutton was mentioned in particular—to take account of their views and concerns and to address them in any guidance that is issued. If other local authorities feel the same, that would be welcomed.

Amendment 15K concerns the costs of implementing the duties in Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 5. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the costs incurred by specified authorities and on the grant made to meet those costs. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister has already announced £130 million of extra resource over this year and next to meet the increased terrorist threat from Syria and Iraq. Some of this funding has been earmarked for the implementation of the duty in the chapter. I am not trying to suggest that it is all going there. The vast majority, I think, is heading towards the security services for technology capability.

Channel panels already exist in all areas of England and Wales. Under existing arrangements, which should not change in practice as a result of this legislation, the Home Office provides funding for Channel police practitioners who co-ordinate activity in organising cases and supporting panels. Each of the nine police regions receives funding to support the Channel programme. For national security reasons, we do not publicly provide a breakdown of police counterterrorism spend by individual projects, capabilities, work streams or police force areas. Disclosure could identify areas where the threat to the national security of the UK is greatest and where there are vulnerabilities in different regions and capabilities. I hope that that helps in some way to explain the reasons behind this.

The Home Office also funds theological and ideological interventions—so that which is not provided by the local authorities is provided by the Home Office. We therefore do not consider that local authorities should incur extra costs as a result of the implementation of this chapter. Any statutory services provided would be met through existing funding.

[Lord Scriven]

The impact assessment states that extra work will happen because of the statutory duty, so the Government have made very clear that extra costs, not just to local authorities but to other statutory bodies within local areas, will be brought about by the new statutory duties. I am not clear what to follow as the specific guidance: the answer that the Minister is helpfully trying to give or the Government’s impact assessment, which is very clear about extra costs being associated with these new statutory duties—not just for local authorities but for other statutory bodies as well.

[Lord Bates]

I am happy to look at that. We are consulting on this. A little bit like the discussion we had on universities and higher education earlier on, it might be the case that there is some misunderstanding about the level of the duty which will be required as a result of this new law. That is the reason why the consultation will be very helpful. It is something that I will take away and reflect back on, and also feed back to colleagues in the Department for Communities and Local Government in relation to this, with whom we work closely. I will also perhaps write to the noble Lord with a little more information if I can. In the mean time, if the noble Baroness would be willing to withdraw her amendment, I would be grateful.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, my name is attached to Amendments 13A and 13B. I want to comment on my noble friend Lady Buscombe’s contribution a minute ago. I am not sure that it helped the Minister. I think it explained why we need Amendments 13A and 13B, because the most important thing about implementing Prevent is to recognise that each of our communities differs and that each community, area and specified authority should have due regard to the impact in order to understand it and to pass that message back to central government to understand the change in the nature of terrorism and radicalisation.

That is why I believe that Amendment 13B is valid. It is an extra tool in the box to make sure that we are monitoring what is happening, at whatever level and in whatever specified authority, to the range of people it is going to affect—including, interestingly, pupils who are under sixth form and under student age. What is happening is not consistent across the country. There may be young girls in one area talking about going to Syria; there are young Muslim British girls in other areas who are appalled by that. As a society we need to understand the nuances of that. The briefing that we have had from the Muslim Council of Britain sets that out very clearly. The one thing that we must do is to make sure that we do not have alienation on a grand scale. We need to understand that what is happening is not the same in every single community.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, support my noble friend in Amendment 13A. I want to share my experience as a former leader of Sheffield City Council to say how difficult this is. We make a grave mistake by talking about the Muslim community as though it is a homogenous group of people. They are people with many different beliefs, different processes and different understandings of what is happening worldwide. When I was leader of Sheffield City Council, very strict central guidelines came in with Prevent. That ended up setting not just community against community but different people of the same community against each other, because we were not allowed to have leeway to make judgments or to put in place policies and practices that were relevant to our local context.

What became clear to me, and to many other council leaders across the country, was that unless we got it right from a bottom-up approach, by working with and for those different people in the community, we would alienate more people than we brought in. One of the key findings of the Audit Commission report on the last Prevent programme back in 2008 was that there should be more of a bottom-up than a top-down approach. I have no doubt that the Government’s intentions are well meaning. I have no doubt that there is a view that if you have a set of guidelines from somebody in Whitehall, it is applicable across the country. However, my personal experience tells me that it is best to be more bottom-up than top-down on these issues, otherwise we will not just set community against community but cause tension because of the people within those communities who have different opinions.

I ask the Minister to consider this amendment very seriously. Past experience of my own and the Audit Commission report of 2008 make it very clear: a top-down approach which does not take this into consideration as a major part of implementing Prevent will have unintended consequences and will mean that we have good intentions but bad implementation of something that we all support.

[Lord Judd (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, commend this amendment for very serious consideration by the Government. We all have different experiences in life. As the House will know, I have spent a good deal of my life with the developing world, and have learnt a great deal from the experience. To put it as succinctly as I can, if I have learnt one overriding message above all, it is that if you are trying to strengthen communities you must not talk at them or about them but with them.

I may have mentioned this in the House before and, in that case, I do not apologise for repeating it. I remember the Bishop of San Cristobal making a brave stand for the Indians in Chiapas, in Mexico, who were being persecuted very badly. I said to him, “Have you got a message for us back in Britain?”. He said, “Yes, I have. What is important is solidarity. You speak about people, you talk to them, but how often do you really listen to them, work with them and build with them their strength and future?” We cannot overemphasise the danger and the urgency in this situation, but whatever we do, we must not inadvertently stereotype people and put them on the defensive, because that does not help. Even in the most normal times—if we can talk about normal times with all our recent experiences—successful policing always seems to me to be the policing that works with the community and not just in it. From that standpoint, this amendment touches on very important principles about building confidence and building upwards.

It strikes me, just from my experience as a citizen, like most other people in this House, that the great horror of terrorism is that it involves a very small number of people. Terrorism works most effectively when there is a climate of ambivalence around the people who do the terrible things. There are people who sometimes feel, “I could never do that, and it’s horrible, but I can understand people doing that because of how they find the reality of living in this situation”.