Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 15th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

The Secretary of State would have an independent review of the decision and would make a decision taking all that into account.

We are also keen, as I say, to make sure that those combined authorities and combined county authorities operate in the same way to ensure this consistent approach to devolving these functions to mayors, whether they are leading a combined authority or a combined county authority. This clause achieves that for the exercise of fire and rescue functions by replicating the existing provisions in the 2009 Act.

I turn to issues raised by the noble Baroness regarding Clause 33. The single-employer model is just one option available to combined county authority mayors with both police and crime and fire and rescue authority functions, allowing the area’s chief constable to run both operational services. A mayor of a CCA could seek to utilise the model if they felt that doing so would deliver a more effective service. To go back to the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, if we are talking about fire and rescue and police and crime, an effective service is one that keeps people safe; that is their job and I suggest that, if it is effective, that is exactly what they are doing.

As far as York and North Yorkshire are concerned, the fire and rescue service and the police and crime functions are, as the noble Baroness said, already adjoined, but without the use of a single employer. That has not been taken into account in York and North Yorkshire, and there is no reason to think that the mayor will do that. At the moment, the combined authority still has to go through parliamentary approval, so that will be something for local people in the future.

Clause 33 sets out the process required for the mayor of a combined county authority to request fire and rescue functions. The clause is an important part of the procedure to be followed when fire and rescue functions have been conferred on a combined county authority mayor as part of the single-employer model. It ensures that there is sufficient scrutiny from both constituent councils of the CCA and the public because it requires the mayor to provide a report setting out an assessment of the benefits of the conferral and a summary of the public consultation carried out, along with a specific summary of representations from the constituent members of the CCA and the mayoral response to them.

This clause also contains further scrutiny to make sure that any proposal will deliver more effective services for an area. The Secretary of State has to obtain and publish an independent assessment of a proposal from a combined county authority mayor if two-thirds or more of the constituent members of the CCA oppose the transfer. The Secretary of State will then agree to transfer the functions only if they consider that doing so is in the interests of public safety for that area.

Removing the clause would remove key conditions for fire and rescue functions to be transferred to the mayor of a combined county authority and could therefore potentially lead to proposals going forward that have not been subject to either sufficient consultation or robust assessment. This in turn could lead to an ineffective implementation of the model and inconsistent application of it between areas.

I move on to issues the noble Baroness raised regarding Clause 34. This clause enables the Secretary of State to make provisions relating to the administrative operation of fire and rescue services, should a combined county authority mayor request these functions and transfer them to their chief constable to carry out on their behalf under the single-employer model. The clause is necessary because it enables there to be a scheme to transfer property, rights and liabilities as part of implementing the single-employer model. It also allows the chief constable to appoint staff as part of delegating their fire and rescue functions, subject to the necessary and important restrictions on who can carry out these responsibilities so that operational independence between policing and fire is maintained.

Removing this clause would make it very difficult for the chief constable to carry out their functions under the single-employer model, because they would not have access to key assets or be able to effectively resource their delivery. This would therefore lead to an ineffective implementation of the model and would hinder its day-to-day operation in a way that could ultimately impact on the successful delivery of these public safety functions for the area concerned.

On the issues raised by the noble Baroness on Clause 35, this clause sets out safeguards governing the exercise of fire and rescue functions where the single-employer model is being operated. These include a requirement on the chief constable to make sure that they secure good value for money, and an obligation on the CCA mayor to hold those exercising functions under the model to account. This clause is another important part of the process and procedure to be followed when these functions have been conferred on the mayor as part of the single-employer model. Where possible, the processes for handling the functions available to be conferred on combined county authority mayors are the same as those for combined authority mayors and subject to the same requirements.

Removing the clause would mean that the single-employer model would work less well in practice because important safeguards on the exercise of fire and rescue functions under the model would be lost. This in turn would lead to ineffective implementation of the model and inconsistent application of it between areas.

I turn to issues raised by the noble Baroness in relation to Clause 36. This clause enables the Secretary of State by regulation to make provisions corresponding to Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 dealing with complaints and conduct matters. This clause is an optional power to be used when these functions have been conferred on a combined county authority mayor as part of implementing the single-employer model. It specifically relates to complaint and conduct matters for members of a police force and their civilian staff or members of staff transferred to a chief constable or appointed by them where they are exercising functions under the single-employer model.

Removing the clause would mean that the methods for dealing with complaints and conduct matters could not be specified for those carrying out functions under the single-employer model where a combined county authority mayor has decided to use it to exercise their police and crime and fire and rescue functions. Without this clause, it would be much more difficult for any complaints and conduct matters to be handled consistently and efficiently, thereby hindering the effective implementation and day-to-day operation of the single-employer model.

Clause 37 allows the Secretary of State to transfer the application of fire and rescue provisions under Section 32 to specified persons where regulations have transferred these functions to the chief constable of the area. Removing this clause would mean that the Secretary of State would not be able to make further provisions applying a fire and rescue enactment or new corresponding provisions in relation to chief constables to whom fire and rescue functions have been delegated as part of the use of the single-employer model. As such, removing this clause would hinder the effective implementation of the single-employer model.

Amendment 122A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, relates to powers under Clause 38.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I have listened very carefully both to the speeches that were made regarding the power of fire and rescue and police being together and the noble Baroness’s answers. I assume the purpose of this is not just an administrative difference but actually to improve the services of fire and police to people where this merger happens. Has the Minister looked at the four areas where this has happened, and His Majesty’s inspector of fire and police? Do those areas actually have a better service, an average service or a worse service than the national average?

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I cannot answer the noble Lord in detail, but I will look into it and make sure he has those comparisons and knows what they are.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I can help the noble Baroness: having looked at the comparisons, I can say that they are actually below the national average. So, what is the purpose of going through this huge administrative issue if it does not improve the services to people on the ground?

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

Because this is localism. If local areas want to take on those responsibilities, the Government have been listening to local authorities and combined authorities and listening to the fact that they want to take these on. The fact that there are only a few of these combined police and crime responsibilities and fire and rescue responsibilities—at the moment, there are not very many—means that it is quite difficult to tell, but we need to keep an eye on it, obviously, and I will come back to that in a minute under Amendment 122A.

The Secretary of State has power under this clause, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, to apply legislation relating to police and crime commissioners in relation to combined county authority mayors where the single-employer model—that is, the ability to make the chief constable the single operational head of both the police force and the fire and rescue service—has been engaged. Clause 38(4) provides a power to amend, revoke or repeal legislation consequential on that power. This is important because of exactly what the noble Lord opposite said: this is the power that could be used if any area has implemented the single-employer model but the chief constable is failing to manage the F&RS effectively. The Secretary of State may wish to revoke the implementation of the single-employer model and use this provision to do so. I think this is the power we have put in to ensure that exactly what the noble Lord opposite says need not happen.

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Moved by

[Lord Scriven]

128: Clause 48, page 43, line 18, at end insert–
“(3A) A CCA may, with the consent of its constituent authorities, request that the Chancellor of the Exchequer devolve further fiscal powers to that CCA to help its regeneration powers, and those fiscal powers may not be unreasonably withheld.”Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment to assess the Government's willingness to empower a CCA to drive its regeneration plans forward using enhanced fiscal powers.

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[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the only amendment in this group, Amendment 128 in my name and signed by my noble friend Lord Shipley. This is a probing amendment to tease out the Government’s thinking on this issue. It was a deliberate decision to have this amendment in a group on its own because this really is the elephant in the room: fiscal devolution. We can talk about structures and systems but, without the proper levers of finance and autonomy at a local level, the structures and the systems will achieve very little and will not deliver the equalling up of areas and regions across the country.

I think we need to be clear about what this amendment is not about. This is not about handing down moneys raised by national taxation to areas so they have a little extra leeway on how that money can be spent. As welcome as this is, it is a small step that is not going to solve the regional inequalities that exist in the country. This is what the Conservative Mayor of the West Midlands authority calls the “begging bowl approach”. It is nothing more than spending decentralisation. It was quite amusing, listening to the Chancellor earlier today talk about a pothole fund. The very notion that a Chancellor of the Exchequer stands up in the national Parliament to deal with potholes is ludicrous. A predetermined pot of money handed down, usually with strings from Whitehall, to have local areas determine key projects in areas to spend that money is not fiscal devolution.

It was also telling that the Chancellor today, in announcing that the West Midlands and Greater Manchester combined authorities will have departmental-type arrangements, sees these arrangements as nothing more than decentralisation of central government departmental spending. It is even more telling, as has been reported in the Financial Times, I think it was, that even when the areas get this extra leeway on how the money is spent, there may be a committee set up here in Westminster to oversee how that money is prioritised and then spent. Other parts of the world that understand and implement devolution will be laughing in disbelief at this ridiculous notion of local autonomy.

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I hope that the explanation I have given reassures noble Lords that the Bill already captures the amendment’s intent, and that the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has shown that this is not a party-political issue, but an issue for those of us who believe that you cannot deal with levelling up unless you give real fiscal powers to local areas that require them, to be able to make autonomous decisions in the locality on where to invest and where to make the biggest changes. It is also about stopping this particular view in England that local areas have to look to Westminster to be able to make decisions that many local areas across the vast majority of the western world, whether they are federal or not, can take.

I reiterate what my noble friend Lord Shipley said: we are not a unitary state. In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, fiscal devolution exists. We are talking predominantly about 56 million people in England, where fiscal devolution is totally off the table at the moment. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, was quite right to point out that, in itself, the Bill does not bring about fiscal devolution; it brings about departmental decentralisation, with predetermined spending limits being able to be made a little differently at the local level. Everything that the Minister said reinforces that view. Nothing in the Bill significantly gives further fiscal devolution to local areas if they so wish. In fact, she made the same mistake again: she talked about the trail-blazers in the West Midlands and Greater Manchester that have been announced today. As welcome as they are, they are not fiscal devolution. They are the decentralisation of departmental spending decisions; that is the fundamental issue.

This debate, on all sides of the Chamber, has stipulated that the Government are not going far enough and the Bill does not go far enough. We may have to return to this on Report, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 128 withdrawn.