First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026
Lord Sandhurst Excerpts(6 days, 23 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, for the first time we start to consider some of the practical effects of this controversial Act. I will make no comments on its merits; the Act has been passed, as was the will of Parliament, and now we have to deal with the consequences.
The schedule of fees here provides for the cost of enforcement of the judicial tribunal framework for the provision. We see a large expansion, consequent to the Act, of the number of things that can spawn a complaint. I am thinking particularly about the appeal for a rent increase. The lowest level, at £47, provides no disincentive to bringing a claim. In fact, a single month’s delay can pay for itself. I understand that it is important that we have open justice, but this is creating a perverse fiscal incentive to have a go, especially, as we heard just a few moments ago, as any rent increase that might happen following the appeal would not be backdated to the point at which the appeal was made.
Landlords are already waiting a year to gain possession, for example, in the case of non-payment of rent. It occurred to me to wonder whether the Government have made an assessment. What assessment has been made of the likely consequential number of cases and any additional timescale and further delay as a result of these fees passing into the regulations? Will we see an avalanche of claims that will gum up the tribunal system and give further incentives for claims to be made which provide an asymmetry between the rights of the landlord and the rights of the tenant?
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing this order. It forms part of a wider programme of reform to the Property Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal following the passage of the Renters’ Rights Act 2025. We recognise the Government’s objective: to move towards a more sustainable system of cost recovery while maintaining access to justice. Where fees do not fully reflect the cost of the service provided, there must be a legitimate discussion as to how that gap should be addressed.
This instrument would introduce fees for new categories of cases, including financial penalty appeals and rent appeals. The decision to set the fee for rent increase appeals at £47, with no associated hearing fee, reflects concerns raised by stakeholders about affordability. While it is right that the Government have listened to those concerns and adjusted their approach accordingly, there must remain important questions about the broader context in which these changes are being made, not least the valid concerns raised by my noble friend Lord Fuller.
These reforms sit alongside significant changes to the private rented sector, including the abolition of Section 21. As has been raised previously from these Benches, there is a risk that reforms to tenants’ rights proceed ahead of necessary improvements to the capacity and efficiency of the courts and the tribunal system. There is a balance to be struck. While fees must not become a barrier to justice for tenants seeking to challenge rent increases or enforcement decisions, we on these Benches are concerned that the structure of the system could create unintended incentives; we have heard that from my noble friend Lord Fuller. For example, where an appeal delays the implementation of a rent increase, even where that appeal is ultimately unsuccessful, that may create uncertainty for landlords and have an adverse impact on the functioning of the market.
Further, while the Help with Fees scheme will remain in place, the Government have not produced a full impact assessment of these changes. Given that this is the first stage of a wider reform programme, the Committee would benefit from greater clarity on the cumulative impact of these measures, particularly on access to justice for lower-income applicants and how that is to be balanced.
We do not oppose the principle of these changes. A fair and sustainable tribunal system is in the interests of all parties. However, it is essential that, as the Government proceed with the later stages of reform, they do so in a way that carefully balances cost recovery with genuine access to justice and does not build in unreasonable deterrents for landlords. The Government must ensure that the system is properly resourced to deal with the demands being placed upon it. I look forward to the Minister’s response to these points.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sandhurst and Lord Fuller, for their helpful and constructive contributions. A point that they both made, with which I agree, is that this is always a balancing exercise. As I made clear in my opening remarks, there is no question of trying to recoup the entirety of the cost of running the system. This is merely about seeking a contribution because it is right to do so.
The setting of the lowest level of fee, particularly in relation to rent increases, was not intended to try to dampen demand; rather, it is a small contribution designed to be fixed at a level that does not hamper access to justice. I remind noble Lords that some of those who are subject to rent increases are some of our most vulnerable citizens. While £47 may seem a modest amount to us, to some people it can seem an almost insuperable burden, which is why I have sought to reassure that there is help there for those who cannot afford it at all.
In relation to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, about the amount of demand, I hope to be able to reassure him by saying that we are ready for Friday. Friday is when all of this will begin. We have a centralised operational hub and have recruited extra staff, which is why we are bringing in all these reforms in tranches, to ensure that the system is not overwhelmed.
This draft instrument is a necessary step that strengthens the sustainability and fairness of the Property Chamber. It delivers, as I said, the first phase of the new fees framework. It is one that strengthens fairness and consistency, supports greater levels of cost recovery and protects access to justice. Our reforms ensure that users of the Property Chamber contribute to its cost where they can afford to do so, while ensuring that vulnerable renters are able to benefit from the protections contained in the Renters’ Rights Act.
Victims and Courts Bill
Lord Sandhurst ExcerptsThursday 23rd April 2026
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Act 2026 View all Victims and Courts Act 2026 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 190-I Marshalled list for Consideration of Commons Amendment - (22 Apr 2026)
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I repeat and echo all the thanks that my noble friend Lady Brinton has just made to the Minister, her officials and all the others who have helped with this Bill. I was going to say this at the end, but I shall say it now—I am also enormously grateful to and in awe of the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, during the course of this Bill. Her dedication and thoroughness on issues that have concerned her and on which she has worked for many years has been awe-inspiring. Principally, I echo her thanks to the Minister for meeting us and, in particular, for meeting me after the first round of ping-pong last week to discuss our concerns. Notable has been the way in which she has recognised the risk of deterring private prosecutions by introducing inappropriate regulation of costs, and the way she and her officials have framed government Amendment 4D to Clause 12, laid in the Commons, which government Motion A today addresses.
Last Wednesday, we sought consultation on the regulations proposed by Clause 12 and an impact assessment and, as the noble Baroness rightly points out, a response to that impact assessment was also sought. On consideration, and after the discussions we have had, we are completely content that the consultations proposed involving the Law Society, the Bar Council and anyone else the Lord Chancellor believes should be consulted, meet the need for consultation on the regulations proposed.
Importantly, the Government have agreed to publish an impact assessment, and I accept the assurances that that will be thorough and worked-through. The fact that we originally sought a response to an impact assessment may have reflected a procedural misunderstanding. I take the Minister’s point, however, that the response will be apparent when the regulations, such as they are proposed, are in fact made and the response to the impact assessment will be reflected by the Government’s laying of the regulations.
I also take the point—as do the Government—made last Wednesday by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that there may be some urgency to the introduction of such regulations, and that insisting on a government response to an impact assessment beyond publication of the proposed regulations may delay them. So we are quite content with the steps taken, or to be taken, by the Government. Crucially, however, no regulations will be made before the consultation and the impact assessment are complete. That is the most important point. This is going to be a meaningful exercise in consideration of what needs to be done.
Granted, the Government have not conceded the affirmative resolution but, following a favourable consultation and a positive impact assessment, I accept that that is a secondary consideration. I also accept the points made by the Minister on proportionality. We are content that the Government have met our concerns and we will support Motion A.
Having mentioned my thanks to my noble friend Lady Brinton, I also extend my thanks to others in this Chamber, including those on the Conservative Front Bench, who have been helpful in achieving what is now a much better Bill than the Bill that came to this House.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her Amendment 4D. This is likely my last appearance on the Front Bench though not, I anticipate, my last speech in this Chamber. I shall simply say that I have greatly enjoyed debating Home Office and justice issues, of which I have had practical experience both as a barrister and as a recorder and deputy judge. I have enjoyed sparring with the Minister, who some 20-plus years ago was a member of the Bar Council’s legal services committee when I chaired it. I continue to respect her ability and expertise, as demonstrated in all aspects of her portfolio in this House. It has been a pleasure to do friendly battle with her.
Moving on, private prosecutions are a vital safeguard within our justice system. They ensure that when the state cannot or does not act, victims, particularly charities, are not left without recourse. For charities, this mechanism is especially important. Fraud and theft—crimes that can often become cumulatively significant—divert funds from vital causes. They then erode public trust in those charities. With limited police and Crown Prosecution Service capacity, many such cases would, I fear, otherwise go unaddressed. Private prosecutions are therefore an essential backstop. They secure convictions and compensation without burdening public resources.
Crucially, the costs recovered from central funds are modest, and typically only partial. They represent a small proportion of overall public expenditure—just 0.18% of the overall legal aid budget. Yet recovery of the costs of private prosecutions enables charities to pursue recoveries that would otherwise be financially out of reach. If charities cannot rely on private prosecutions as a shield against theft and fraud, then we fear that the public will be unwilling to donate towards their causes.
Due to the importance of private prosecutions for access to justice, we tabled an amendment that Clause 12 do not stand part of the Bill on Report. Unfortunately, the Government cited financial privilege as a reason for rejecting the Conservative amendment.
My noble and learned friend Lord Keen instead tabled an amendment in lieu. That amendment would have achieved the following. First, it would have ensured that an impact assessment was launched on the potential effect of Clause 12, with particular regard to its consequences for charities and victims’ access to justice. Secondly, it would have constrained the Government in exercising their regulation-making powers until after a response had been published to the impact assessment. Thirdly, it would have required such regulation to be subject to the affirmative procedure of both Houses.
The amendment in lieu offered by the Government today partially fulfils at least the first two of those aims. It would require the Lord Chancellor to consult the Law Society, the General Council of the Bar and other bodies considered appropriate before publishing an impact assessment. I suggest that charities as well as private prosecutors themselves would fall under this final category. There is no reason why not.
I thank the Minister in the other place for confirming that the Government will publish a full response to the impact assessment before setting any rates. That assurance is most welcome. Unfortunately, however, there is no provision that regulations made under Clause 12 will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The Minister in the other place said that, given that it is unclear how complex the structure of the rates will be,
“it would be disproportionate to mandate a process that risks lengthy debate”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/4/26; col. 88.]
We argue that precisely because of the novel and complex nature of these regulations, the affirmative procedure is all the more important and in no way disproportionate. To reject it is to undermine proper transparency and accountability. However, I recognise that the Government have moved some real way on the issue of private prosecutions, so we will not oppose their amendment in lieu today.
The Conservative Party will always champion access to justice and the rule of law. We therefore keenly await the publication and findings of the impact assessment. We are also grateful for the co-operation and discussions that we have had with representatives of the Liberal party in this place and the impact that has had on the whole Bill and on the particular aspect of private prosecutions. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, it has been a pleasure to bring the Victims and Courts Bill through this House; it is now another step closer to becoming law. The Bill will deliver on our manifesto commitment to support and protect victims, restore confidence in our justice system and implement swifter and fairer justice.
I cannot leave the Bill without taking the opportunity to thank all the officials in my department who have worked so hard to bring this legislation forward. I wanted to thank them all by name, but I was told I was not allowed to, so I shall have to settle with doing a group thanks. They worked late into the night, tirelessly and always good-humouredly, which is quite something.
In closing, I urge noble Lords to support the Government’s amendments related to private prosecutions, and I look forward to working with your Lordships in this House as we take forward the implementation of the Bill.
Burial Provision in England and Wales
Lord Sandhurst Excerpts(1 week, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The Law Commission report, which we welcome, was published on 18 March this year and is the first part of a wider project that will also consider the legal framework for new funerary methods and the rights and obligations in relation to funerals and the deceased. That last sub-project is expected to conclude by the end of 2027 and, as the noble Lord rightly says, the Law Commission will publish draft legislation in mid-2028.
There is also a separate Law Commission project looking at offences against the deceased. All these things are interrelated. We will consider all the recommendations issued recently by the Law Commission and the various workstreams to see what is the most practical approach to publishing our response, including timing, to make sure that we do not do things piecemeal in a way that, in the end, makes things worse rather than better.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, the Law Commission has identified that an estimated 250,000 sets of ashes have not been collected from funeral directors, leaving them either unburied or unscattered. What consideration has the Minister given, or will she give, to following other countries such as Germany that mandate a final resting place for cremated ashes?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
As with all matters relating to what happens at the end of life, these are sensitive, difficult and complicated matters. The Law Commission identifies that there can be many reasons why ashes remain uncollected, including people who simply cannot face going to pick them up. However, that does not solve the problem of them sitting on shelves, which is not an appropriate way to treat human remains. We will consider this matter carefully as part of our response to the Law Commission’s helpful and sensitive report.
Victims and Courts Bill
Lord Sandhurst ExcerptsTuesday 17th March 2026
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Act 2026 View all Victims and Courts Act 2026 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 176-I Marshalled list for Third Reading - (16 Mar 2026)
Lord Sandhurst
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a cross-reference in the commencement provisions to a clause which was removed by an amendment in Lord Keen of Elie’s name at report stage.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their constructive engagement with this important Bill at every stage of its passage. On behalf of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, I thank noble Lords for their contributions both in Committee and on Report. Although there were several areas of disagreement, we on these Benches believe that the Bill, as amended on Report, leaves this House as better legislation than when it entered.
I am particularly pleased that noble Lords across this House voted in favour of Amendments 16 and 20. Open and transparent justice is a fundamental principle: it underpins democracy and the rule of law. It is therefore only right that sentencing remarks, which explain judges’ reasoning for the sentences they impose, be made available to members of the public who are not present in court.
Equally, private prosecutions are an integral part of our justice system. Where the CPS is unwilling or unable to act, private prosecutions are a vital avenue for parties to get access to justice. In particular, many charities use private prosecutions to recover losses by theft and fraud. The removal of Clause 12 preserves the current system. Clause 12 would have created a state of uncertainty in the legal market. It would have had a detrimental effect on the availability of private prosecutions for those who need that service. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his support on these points.
Amendment 1, in my name and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, will remove a cross-reference to a clause that no longer stands part of the Bill.
I also commend the Liberal Democrats on their engagement with the Bill. It was pleasing to find areas of agreement during the Bill’s passage. I am grateful for their amendments on both notification and exceptional circumstances for unduly lenient sentence applications. I strongly urge the Government in the other place to recognise the importance of these reforms and to support all the amendments that passed on Report. Both of the amendments before us have the support of the Conservatives and of the Victims’ Commissioner.
Turning briefly to Amendment 29, it was disappointing that the Minister spoke against our opposition to the automatic release of sexual offenders and domestic abusers at the one-third point of their custodial sentences. If the Government are still committed to their manifesto pledge of halving violence against women and girls, the amendment deserves serious consideration. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her expression of support on this point. We, in turn, intend to return to this issue at a later date.
I remain grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions during the various stages of the Bill. I urge the Government to reflect carefully on the amendments relating to the publication of sentencing remarks, private prosecutions and the unduly lenient sentence scheme. I have no doubt that these issues will return to your Lordships’ House in due course. I beg to move Amendment 1.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, this is a minor and technical amendment following Report, and the Government will not oppose it today.
Victims and Courts Bill
Lord Sandhurst ExcerptsTuesday 10th March 2026
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Act 2026 View all Victims and Courts Act 2026 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 141-R-I(Rev) Revised marshalled list for Report - (9 Mar 2026)
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her Amendment 1, which addresses the thresholds proposed in the Bill. As she knows, we on these Benches have similarly expressed concern about the proposed threshold. This restricts the effect of Clause 3 to offenders sentenced to four years or more. Given the evident consensus against the current threshold, we on this side look forward to the Minister’s response.
Amendments 2 and 3, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, raise interesting and entirely reasonable points, revealing potential gaps in the present legislation, so again I look forward to what the Minister will say.
This brings me to Amendment 4, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. It seeks to extend the safeguarding framework in Clause 3 so that it applies to those convicted of the most serious child cruelty offences—and I emphasise “cruelty”, as it is not just about sexual offences. It should be noted that in respect of the Crime and Policing Bill we understand that the Government have tabled a new schedule, which lists child cruelty offences, taking the step of treating sex offenders and child cruelty offenders analogously. Our amendment uses the very same definition of child cruelty, so it is wholly consistent with the Government’s thinking.
Our amendment asks the Government only to take the same stance in this Bill to ensure that the parental responsibility of offenders is restricted when serious child cruelty has been committed. If the Government are not inclined to support this, we ask why. I ask the House again, regarding parental responsibility, why should our response to a child who has suffered cruelty differ from cases where a child has been sexually assaulted? I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, the Government appreciate that this group of amendments is driven by a desire to safeguard the children who are, quite rightly, at the centre of these difficult and sensitive cases. As I said in Committee, this aim is one I share.
Amendment 2, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to apply our proposed parental responsibility measures to as yet unborn children. There are complexities to this, because there are three distinct groups of as yet unborn children who would be caught by this measure. These are as follows: first, a child who has been conceived as a result of the rape of the victim by the defendant, but who is as yet unborn at the date of sentence; secondly, a child who has been conceived but is as yet unborn when their father is sentenced to four years’ or more imprisonment for a child sex offence; and, thirdly, a child who will be conceived at some point in the future but has not yet been conceived. Different considerations apply in relation to each.
We thank the noble Lords and the noble Baroness for their amendment because, in the course of our consideration of it, we have realised that an unborn child who has been conceived as a result of rape is not covered by Clause 4, as currently drafted, to which the noble Lord, Lord Russell, referred. As my honourable friend Minister Davies-Jones said in the other place, safeguards are in place through the family courts which could restrict parental responsibility in these cases, but it is a serious gap in Clause 4, and I have asked my officials to look further at this and consider how we can best protect this group of children. This is complex, and I cannot address it today, here and now, but I will write to your Lordships with an update on this as soon as I can.
The second group, to which I have already referred in outline, consists of women who are pregnant by a man at the time he is sentenced to four or more years’ imprisonment for a child sex offence. I appreciate that these children are likely to be at the same risk as the living children for whom he already holds parental responsibility. Again, in relation to that category, I have asked my officials to consider what approach may be possible in these cases.
It is the third group covered by this amendment that causes us difficulties. It refers to any or all future children of someone who has received a four-year sentence for a child sex offence, in perpetuity. This would cover a child conceived, say, 50 years after that sentence had been imposed and served. It is this last cohort of children that is the reason the Government cannot accept this amendment. We cannot know what the circumstances of each case will be for future children, particularly when decades may have passed between the sentence and their birth. We cannot, therefore, be sure that we are acting in the best interests of a child who may not be conceived for many decades hence by automatically preventing the offender acquiring parental responsibility.
It is important that I restate what has already been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton: these measures are not an additional punishment for the offender. The point of them is to offer rapid protection to the offender’s existing children who are deemed to be at an immediate risk, right then and right there, in the Crown Court. That is why under the Government’s proposals, the restriction can and should happen automatically, at the point of sentence—but a child conceived many years later is a much more complicated and challenging proposition. In general terms, the proper place to make decisions about the welfare of future children is in the family court, so in most cases it is the family court where these applications should be determined.
As I have said before, criminal court judges do not have the training, the experience or, frankly, the time to consider, in each individual case, whether the restriction of parental responsibility is in the best interests of that particular child. That kind of consideration should be made by the expert and experienced judges of the family court—judges such as the much-respected noble Lord, Lord Meston—who will have the benefit of reports from, for example, expert social workers. It is self-evident that this kind of determination cannot be made in advance of the child’s birth, possibly many decades in advance.
Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and probably other noble Lords are aware, parental responsibility can be acquired in multiple ways, and while it may be the noble Lord’s intention that this amendment should apply only to parents who automatically acquire parental responsibility, it would not prevent an unmarried father obtaining parental responsibility for future children by being named on the birth certificate if the mother wished to do so. It is a fact that not all mothers accept the guilt of their partners, even post-conviction and sentence. This would create a situation in which some offenders could never acquire parental responsibility for a future child without a separate order being made, while others could. That would be a significant inconsistency in the law which we cannot accept. For these reasons, we cannot accept this amendment, but again I thank your Lordships for bringing to my attention cases where the mother is pregnant at the time of sentencing. Those unborn children require protection, and we will look at how best to provide it.
I turn to Amendment 3, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, but spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Russell. This amendment seeks to create mandatory bail conditions preventing defendants contacting children for whom they hold parental responsibility while they are under investigation or awaiting trial on bail. We all want to ensure that children are protected when a parent has been accused of a serious sexual offence, but the Government cannot accept this amendment. Existing legislation already provides the police and courts with powers to impose robust bail conditions, which can include requirements not to have any unsupervised access to children and not to live and sleep at an address where children are living, and it is absolutely standard for there to be a condition not to contact prosecution witnesses, including children, in a case where those children are giving evidence. If there is a real danger to witnesses or to children, it is very likely that bail will be refused. However, in the real world, there will be some cases in which there is plainly no risk to the suspect’s children, so to remove the judge’s discretion would probably be incompatible with Article 8.
As the law stands, there are no mandatory bail conditions of any kind for any type of offence. To start introducing them would restrict the important discretion of the police and courts to apply conditions on a case-by-case basis to address real risks. It would also interfere with the presumption of innocence and the presumption of entitlement to bail, both of which underpin our whole criminal justice system. The amendment also seeks to impose a condition which would require the accused to disclose the nature of any bail conditions imposed to the family court while they are under investigation or on trial if there are existing children proceedings. The joint protocol on the disclosure of information between family and criminal agencies and jurisdictions already provides a clear framework for the sharing of information, so there is no need for such a statutory provision. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.
I now turn to Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I have had a number of very useful conversations with the noble Baroness, whom I greatly admire, and I understand the aim of this amendment. I think and hope that she understands that I share her wish to protect as many children as possible, but Clause 3 is not a marker for when parental responsibility should be restricted; it is about when such a restriction should happen automatically at the point of sentence—that is to say, without the usual consideration by the family court. Any individual who poses a serious risk to children should not be able to exercise parental responsibility, but to restrict it automatically, we must be certain that the restriction is in that child’s best interests. The seriousness of the offences in scope of our measure, marked by a sentence of four years or more, ensures that we can be confident, in those cases, that that is the case.
That is not to say that an offender who has committed sexual offences against children but has received a sentence of less than four years’ imprisonment cannot or should not have their parental responsibility restricted; in some cases, that will be exactly what should happen, but an application to restrict parental responsibility can then be made to the family courts in exactly the same way as it can be now. They will consider all the circumstances of the case and make a decision in the child’s best interests.
Amendment 4 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to introduce an automatic restriction on the exercise of parental responsibility for offenders convicted of child cruelty and sentenced to imprisonment of four years or more. The Government believe the aim of this amendment is sound and principled; child cruelty offences are heinous, and we all wish to protect as many children as possible, so we understand why the noble and learned Lord seeks to extend the Government’s measures.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, this group is titled simply “victim support”, but in the debate so far we have heard strikingly different issues in victim support, none of which can really be put together. But what they say generally—I hope to reflect this when I speak to my three amendments in this group—is that, although there is progress in victim support, some of it can be patchy, not well embedded and inconsistent. I know that this Government, at their heart, particularly through their VAWG strategy, are determined to do something about that. I think the Minister is finding that there is pressure from all around the House, saying, “Could you speed that up a bit, please?”
I have three amendments in this group: Amendment 11, on the provision of support for parents and carers of victims of sexual or violent offences, and Amendments 12 and 13 on restorative justice, which I will speak to in a minute.
I have raised the problems that face the parents and carers of some victims of sexual or violent offences on a number of occasions. The problem is that there is a fault line in the current victims framework, which does not understand the role of a parent—it is usually a parent—or carer of a victim of sexual or violent offences who has been traumatised by what has happened to their child. Too often, the distraught victim returns to the family and, not infrequently, family members provide essential support. Sometimes, the trauma is so great that at least one parent has to give up work to look after their adult child. These family members provide an essential safeguarding and recovery role. Research has shown that many carers experience significant psychological, practical and financial difficulties, with no support or redress at all for themselves.
The victims’ code allows parents, guardians or carers to receive rights where the victim is a child, and it provides more limited recognition in cases involving vulnerable adults. In practice, these rights are framed primarily around acting on behalf of the victim, but the code does not establish a clear stand-alone entitlement to support for the parent’s or carer’s own trauma, well- being or capacity to sustain safeguarding. Unfortunately, delivery can be discretionary and inconsistent.
Therefore, this amendment recognises that some parents or carers of adult victims may require some proportionate support as a consequence of the offence and the justice process, and it would require relevant authorities to commission and make that support available, while distinguishing caregiving support from evidential witness support. It does not create new victim categories for sentencing or compensation; nor does it dilute the primacy of the effect on the victim or expand the ISVA role. I am grateful for the conversation I had with the Minister, and I hope she will agree to meet Restitute, the small self-help group trying to help parents and carers navigate a world in which their child has been severely traumatised. The loophole in the law about not qualifying because they are witnesses is very real to them.
Amendment 12 sets out the rights for a victim of an offence to make a referral to restorative justice services. Note that it is only the victim, not the offender—the Minister and I had a debate about that. The amendment is very clear: this would not put the victim at risk of being approached by the offender.
Amendment 13 would give the Secretary of State a duty to report on the use of restorative justice services and to lay the report before Parliament. In Committee, I set out the experience of my honourable friend Paul Kohler MP, who was brutally attacked in his own home, witnessed by his wife and daughters. Somewhat reluctantly, they all went through a restorative justice process, which they actually found helped them all. These amendments are not general, which is why it is important that offenders would not be able to request restorative justice under them. But we know that this helps a number of offenders. There is evidence to show that, when offenders engage in good faith, it can be transformative for them too and can reduce the rate of recidivism.
The final benefit is to society as a whole. Restorative justice works. Not only can it reduce reoffending by up to 27% but it can save society money in future, in reduced costs for the police, courts, prisons and probation services. We Liberal Democrats have championed restorative justice for many years; it has been in our manifesto for as many elections as I can remember, and we support the work of Why Me and the Common Ground Justice Project. We recognise that the criminal justice system is under considerable pressure at the moment, which is why we will not test the opinion of the House on any of these three amendments, but I hope that the Ministry of Justice might look at running a restorative justice pilot to assess the benefit to society, as well as to victims and offenders.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, the important amendments in this group address real issues for victims and victim support. Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, seeks to introduce independent victim navigators on a national basis to act as a liaison between the police and victims of modern slavery and human trafficking. The principle behind this amendment has force. Victims of these offences often face complex barriers to accessing support. To navigate the criminal justice system can be daunting for those who have experienced exploitation or coercion. This specific service is needed. The amendment reflects recommendations made by your Lordships’ Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee. We on these Benches therefore hope that the Government will give careful consideration to the proposal, and we look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Amendment 7 in the name of my noble friend Lord Polak, introduced so eloquently by him and echoed by my noble friend Lord Farmer and others, likewise focuses on strengthening the framework of support available to victims. It places a duty on relevant authorities to commission sufficient and specific services for victims of domestic abuse, sexual violence and child criminal exploitation. The principle that victims should have access to appropriate and specialised services is widely shared across this House. To ensure that support provision responds to the varied needs of victims, including children and those with particular vulnerabilities, is an important objective. My noble friend’s Amendment 7 also draws on the recommendations made by the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee. It seeks to translate those recommendations into a more structured system of support. These are serious matters that deserve careful reflection. We hope that the Government will consider the intent behind this amendment with that in mind.
Amendments 11 to 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, address different but no less important aspects of victim support. They include support for caregivers of victims, access to restorative justice services, and the assessment of their use. Each of these raises serious issues about how the criminal justice system supports victims and those adversely affected by crime. It is important to do something in this direction. They highlight questions around the availability of services, the role of restorative justice and the broader framework through which victims are to be assisted. They all deserve serious consideration. Again, I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 6, in the names of my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would require the Government to implement independent modern slavery victim navigators in every police force in England and Wales, and would also define their functions.
The Government welcome the interest shown in modern slavery and in providing assistance to survivors. I am grateful to my noble friend for meeting me to discuss the issue, and I was pleased to meet Eleanor Lyons, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. I have also been extended an invitation irresistibly put by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I hope that I can respond in an equally irresistible manner by saying that of course I will make a commitment to meeting, particularly since I think that I am committing my noble friend Lord Hanson to doing so, rather than myself. If, however, it is me, I shall be delighted to meet Restitute and, indeed, would be genuinely interested to do so.
I am sorry to disappoint noble Lords, but the Government cannot accept this amendment because it would duplicate existing services, so statutory funding is not an effective use of taxpayers’ money. We are not saying that victim navigators, who are widely valued, cannot or should not be used. They are already successfully funded through police and crime commissioners, through central government grants such as the Ministry of Justice’s victims fund and through charitable donations. Of course local areas can continue to use them: it is right that each local area should determine their value and provide funding if it is appropriate to do so. Each police force, and other law enforcement bodies, such as the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, has the autonomy to fund a victim navigator if it is considered a necessary resource to help it carry out its functions.
Lord Polak (Con)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 14 and there is not much to add, other than to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for all the work she has done over many years in this area and to support the noble Lord, Lord Russell.
To make it very clear, this amendment is not trying to radically expand the compensation scheme. Instead, it is asking the Secretary of State to assess whether certain forms of online child sexual abuse should be recognised as crimes of violence when they involve coercion or threats, domination or control, or the compelled creation and sharing of sexual images and sexual acts directed by an offender.
The amendment is therefore targeted, proportionate and legally defensible. It recognises that violence is not always physical. As we have heard, the reality of online coercion is that, when a child is threatened with the exposure of images, blackmailed into producing further images or directed in real time to perform sexual acts online, the child is not acting freely. They are acting under coercion, fear and domination. The absence of physical proximity does not make the abuse any less real, nor does it lessen the psychological injuries suffered by the child. Therefore, I suggest that it is our duty to protect children who are subjected to such abuse, and this amendment represents an important step towards strengthening those protections.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I will start first with Amendment 8, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier but introduced so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. The amendment seeks to insert a new clause. It would require a review of how domestic and overseas victims of fraud, bribery and money laundering offences could be better compensated. Crucially, such a review must look into how this can be done without the need for civil proceedings, which we all know would be drawn-out, expensive and not always fruitful. I have supported this concept since my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier first started arguing for it: certainly as long as I have been in the House and since I was a member of the Select Committee inquiry into fraud four years ago. Something must be done.
We hope that the Government have given this serious consideration since Committee and I look forward to hearing from the Minister what steps the Government are taking to address the issue and whether conclusions will be reported to Parliament. Warm words—which we have heard—butter no parsnips. We on this side want to hear that something will be done. If it is true that a review has been offered that will report in 2028, that is far too long. As Mr McEnroe would say, “You cannot be serious”.
Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, also addresses an important issue that we should not overlook. The amendment creates a clarification to support recognition of certain forms of online-only child abuse. It would bring them into the scope of recognition of the criminal injuries compensation scheme. We can only ask, “Why on earth not?” As I said in Committee, the scheme must keep pace with the way in which and the places in which criminal activity now takes place. We look forward to hearing an update from the Minister.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 8, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lords, Lord Murray and Lord Marks, has been spoken to most persuasively, as ever, by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I too join him in thanking the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for his ongoing commitment to this matter. I am sorry he is not in his place today, but he and I met recently with my noble friend Lord Hanson to talk about this in more detail.
There is a review and it is a priority for all of us, and I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for his continued drive to champion victims and his expertise in this matter. The Government take the compensation of victims of economic crime very seriously. We are committed to ensuring that, wherever possible, funds are taken from criminals and returned to victims. As I have said on several other occasions and will not repeat now, there are several existing mechanisms that enable compensation for victims of economic crime. We accept that they are either not used sufficiently or they do not go far enough.
The Government have an existing public commitment through the UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025 to review UK policies and procedures for compensating victims of foreign bribery. There is a review; it is comprehensive and I have happy news for the noble Lord, Lord Murray: it is not 2028 but 2027—and that is next year. I understand the desire of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, to see this matter addressed as soon as possible and I completely understand his frustration, which he has expressed both in this Chamber and privately when we met, but given the existing review and the other current and future measures, the Government do not believe that it is appropriate for a legislatively required review to be introduced at this time.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill
Lord Sandhurst ExcerptsFriday 27th February 2026
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill 2024-26 View all Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 112-X Tenth marshalled list for Committee - (25 Feb 2026)
Lord Deben (Con)
I think it perfectly right for the noble Baroness to have intervened because I referred to her, and I apologise.
I want the noble and learned Lord proposing the Bill to face three issues that are centred around these amendments—which I am dealing with, I say to the Whip. These amendments are trying to meet the genuine concerns of people who are not necessarily opposed to the Bill. They want to make sure that this key person knows what his or her job is, is appointed in a way the public can have confidence in, and is not the harbinger of what has been called mission creep. Those are three very simple things to ask for.
This is the thing that really worries me. I say this directly to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. I cannot understand why, at the beginning of the Bill’s passage, he did not say, “First, we know that there is a problem that it used to be thought this Bill had a judicial element to it and it does not now, and I am prepared to look at how to change that. Secondly, we know that the professional bodies have real concerns, and I am going to present my answers to those. Thirdly, I know that there is much in this Bill that is not specific enough, which is why the Select Committees have said it is inappropriate and unacceptable in its present form, and I will put those things right”. Had he said those three things, we would have been a long way forward with the Bill.
Therefore, the Bill is being held up not by filibustering but by the fact that the people who have put it forward are so determined that it will pass that they are not willing, it seems to me, to listen to reasonable comments—even from people who have restrained themselves from entering into the bear garden they have managed to stir up in the media.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 430 and 434 in my name go to the practice in operation. I will introduce them by making this point. I was one of the seven people fortunate enough to be identified in the Observer a couple of weeks ago as having tabled a lot of amendments. Contrary to what the Observer—and the quite numerous hostile messages I have received by letter or email—suggested, these amendments, together with all the others I have tabled, except for two relating to the victims of industrial disease, were put forward by the Law Society of England and Wales and by the CLADD group at King’s College London. The latter, for those who were not here the other week, is a group of a distinguished psychiatrist, psychologist, social scientist and lawyer with a particular interest in this and related issues. They and the Law Society are neutral on the principle of the Bill but want to see a safe and effective Bill. Amendments 430 and 434, together with others I have tabled, are aimed at that.
Amendment 430, some will be pleased to see—others will not—is for a streamlined, non-panel basis. It would insert a new clause saying:
“This section applies where the Commissioner receives … a first declaration … a report about the first assessment … which contains a statement indicating that the coordinating professional is satisfied as to all of the matters … a report about the second assessment of the person which contains a statement indicating that the independent professional is satisfied as to all of the matters … The Commissioner must, as soon as reasonably practicable, consider the person’s eligibility to be provided with assistance”.
He or she may then
“consider the person’s eligibility personally … refer the person’s case to a person qualified to sit on the Assisted Dying Review Panel”,
or
“refer the person’s case to a multidisciplinary panel”.
In practice, this means that it would be a modified procedure where there is agreement between the co-ordinating and independent professionals. The commissioner could then consider the application alone or refer it to the panel, so it would not necessarily have to go to the panel. A full panel would be mandated only if the independent professional is not in agreement with the co-ordinating professional that the criteria are met, or if it becomes clear during the modified procedure that further evidence is needed.
Some of those who are not in favour of the Bill may be concerned that this amendment could potentially weaken the process. I remind the Committee that Dame Caroline Swift, latterly a High Court judge but formerly lead counsel in the Shipman Inquiry, has said she is afraid that safeguards on assisted dying are likely to be eroded. We have to be very careful, because Dame Caroline Swift was right at the sharp end of looking at this. That is important, as she has seen what happens with a rogue doctor. She said:
“Those safeguards may seem adequate now but they are likely to be eroded over time. As Leading Counsel to the Shipman Inquiry, I saw how this had happened with the safeguards for the issuing of cremation certificates … Over the years, the second doctor’s role became diluted, they were seldom independent of the first, rarely examined the body and the signing of the second form became little more than a ‘tick box exercise’”.
My Amendment 430 might later be at risk of leading to dilution, but I hope it is an indication that there might—in clear cases, where everyone is agreed early on—be a way of moving it on swiftly, to the advantage of someone who is really anxious to go down this course and has capacity and all the other requirements. I hope that will be seen as a positive move and not a wrecker’s move. I am surprised that no one has come to me since this was tabled and said, “That’s a good idea; we’ll stick it in the Bill”.
Amendment 434 would amend Clause 16 and is simply intended to make it clear beyond doubt that referral to the panel is mandatory wherever the independent professional is not satisfied that all the requirements are met. The Law Society believes, and I agree, that as it stands it is not necessarily mandatory, and it should be. So, I ask rhetorically, why not? Are these not both jolly good amendments?
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
I will speak to Amendment 146, tabled in my name and the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, but before I do so, in the interests of brevity, I say that I support all that has been said in the context of the appointment of the commissioner. This cannot be a personal prime ministerial appointment; it cannot be a matter of patronage. The role must be insulated from day-to-day politics, especially given the risk of damage to trust in nurses, doctors, the judiciary and in this new process by which the state enables the taking of life. I agree, too, with the amendments which seek to introduce some process to the actual appointment of the commissioner, and I agree with the amendments in relation to conflicts of interest and registers of interests.
Through Amendment 132, the noble Baroness, Lady Cass, seeks to establish conclusively that the commissioner’s principal functions are monitoring and reporting on the assisted dying process. Her Amendment 122 would introduce a new role, that of director, who will put the assisted dying regime into action, selecting and overseeing panels, receiving applications, and deciding on appeals and the other duties in Clause 44. Both the British Association of Social Workers and the Law Society gave evidence that an independent regulator for VAD was essential. In Amendment 128, the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, who is not able to be with us today, identifies necessary duties which would provide additional safeguards, ensuring compliance, identifying risk and identifying the circumstances in which things may go wrong with possible tragic consequences.
I want to speak to Amendment 146—the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, is unable to be with us today—which is about the very specific risk to people in care and nursing homes, the majority of whom are vulnerable for one reason or another. The situation of care homes is a matter which the noble Baroness and I have raised repeatedly during the course of the Bill. This amendment develops an obligation which would be imposed by the noble Baroness’s Amendment 128, requiring identification and mitigation of risk. It imposes a duty on the commissioner to monitor and identify emerging risk in the operation of assisted dying in registered care or nursing homes, and to take reasonable and proportionate steps to prevent or mitigate that risk. Where such risk appears systemic, the commissioner must notify the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, so that appropriate remedial action can be taken.
The issues of vulnerability and capacity, the risk of coercion and the risk of abuse are all particularly relevant to care and nursing homes. Can the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, assure the Committee that these matters really have been properly considered and provided for? I have some difficulty, because the scope of the issue is massive. In 2023, the year for which there are the latest official figures, nearly 400,000 people lived in some 15,000 care and nursing homes in England and Wales. Some 85.7% of the total number of beds in care homes were occupied at the time of the survey. Some 70% of all care home residents have dementia or severe memory problems. The average period of residence in a care home is about two and a half years, and most of them die in the homes. Those figures will have increased in the three years since they became available. Some 120,000 people a year over 75 are diagnosed with cancer. There will therefore be a significant number, possibly the largest cohort in England and Wales, with a terminal illness—however you define it—who will have a prognosis of six months or less to live, and who live in our care homes. On the basis of these figures, it is possible to extrapolate that tens of thousands of people living in care homes will be eligible for assisted dying.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
I could not agree more with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. That is why, in addressing these issues, we have been very specific about what the voluntary assisted dying commissioner can do in both Clause 4 and the schedule. What is more, that is why we have such a limited panel that can be made for the voluntary assisted dying commissioner. It has to work, and that is why it has been drafted in this way. The noble Baroness is absolutely right that judicial review is an expensive process, and it provides a guardrail, but ultimately there must be sufficient detail in the Bill to give the public confidence that the system will work. That is why we have, for example, restricted it to a Supreme Court judge, a Court of Appeal judge or a High Court judge. We are absolutely on the same page on that.
I turn to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. My understanding of his Amendment 430—although I may not be correct—is that, where the two doctors agree, the assisted dying commissioner, if he or she agrees, can then short-circuit the need to go to the panel. That is my understanding of the amendment, which is interesting. However, my anxiety is that we would then, in every single case, almost, be getting rid of the panel. The position would be that you only ever get to the panel if both doctors have agreed. The sponsors presented the Bill to this House on the basis that, in every case, the safeguard is—to shorten it—two doctors and a panel. So I respect the thinking, because it is trying to streamline the process, but I do not think that it is appropriate, and it would undermine the safeguards.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
The noble and learned Lord is right. When I introduced the amendment, I did say that there might be problems with it, but I thought it was something that should be looked at.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I shall try not to repeat what my noble friends Lord Moylan and Lady Fraser said. My amendment asks the Secretary of State to make regulations providing for
“the circumstances in which a fee is payable in relation to any of the steps set out at sections 15 to 18”.
I remind noble Lords that those are: replacing the co-ordinating or independent doctor, references to the panel, determination by the panel and reconsideration by the commissioner.
My reading is that it is not clear what is to happen. The Commons sponsor has said that the service should be free at the point of use as regards the NHS. That is laid down by Clause 41(5), but it is not clear whether that refers to the panel’s activities and ancillary services relating to that. It is possible that, given the strain on public services caused by the Bill, fees will be needed to off-set some of the costs. We need to be clear about this. The way forward is for the Secretary of State to make regulations explaining what is to be charged for, when and on what basis.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I added my name in support of Amendment 827, although I also support the amendments that make it clear that the delivery of the service must not be provided by the NHS, an NHS trust or any body or any agency holding itself out to be part of the NHS, as in Amendment 835 from the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie.
The amendment to which I added my name would allow a collaborative funding model for the service to be developed, based on a means-tested formula, for those who are able to pay adequately and would otherwise have paid the fees charged by Dignitas in Switzerland, whose accounts are not open for examination. The collaborative funding model could be based in part on the principles behind co-operatives. The accounts of a collaborative scheme would need to be completely open to public scrutiny. Co-operative funding models leverage shared ownership, democratic control and member investment to finance enterprises, prioritising community benefit over profit maximisation. The shared ownership would relate to those who use the service, with levels set depending on the aspects that they access, because some might access information only and others might access the whole process.
There are five interconnected component parts to a co-operative model. First, the policy and regulatory framework defined by government would give proportionate oversight and regulation. Secondly, it would ensure adequate training across the whole system. Thirdly, the clearly defined market environment would be restricted to the provision of an assisted death service. Fourthly, the culture of the co-operative collaborative would be shaped by those wishing to avail themselves of an assisted death without jeopardising their ability to access clinical care and without jeopardising the clinical care of others through the diversion of NHS funds. This could involve crowdfunding and allow specific donations in memoriam and so on.
The fifth component relates to networks of knowledge exchange to inform the criteria used in the financial assessment, based on needs. The Bill is based on the principle of choice, and that principle could run to the funding as well. People may choose to have a slightly less extravagant funeral and pay into a collaborative system, allowing others who would not be able to afford a fancy funeral to still access the service even if they could not pay for the components of the service. After all, we have people who pay high rates of tax, such as council tax, to fund our public services, equally benefiting those who are in a much lower financial bracket.
Overall, these amendments are important because they would ensure that NHS funding is not eroded. We hear consistently about NHS deficits in all parts of the system. The palliative care and hospice sector is withering under extreme financial pressures since it has no secure rolling contracts for the services it delivers. Pressures on commissioners are already resulting in difficult decisions. There is no spare money to pay for an assisted death service.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has tabled amendments that would require ICBs to commission this service, but the Minister has admitted that the funding will come from reprioritisation of existing budgets. How will the ICB balance its legal obligation to meet the palliative care needs of its population with the provision of an assisted death service? The noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 749B would mandate the provision of assisted deaths by ICBs, meaning that they will be fully funded by the NHS—in contrast to hospices, which are heavily reliant on donations for a major portion of their funding.
I hate to suggest it, but sometimes this looks like a way to save money. Each assisted death has been estimated to cost around £2,000 yet would save about £13,000, four months of healthcare costs, giving a net saving of £11,000 overall. The money has to be found from somewhere. At the moment, there is a serious risk of clinical services being eroded to fund the multiple payments that will need to be made to the different professionals involved; that will become particularly important when we looked at funding it in a devolved model.
Lord McColl of Dulwich (Con)
My Lords, I wish to speak to my Amendment 941. As a medical professional, I know only too well that medical interventions can be driven by financial motives; organ harvesting for a profit is one such example. When medical interventions are financially motivated, the best interests of the patient may be compromised. This amendment would help to prevent such compromise. It would deter the sort of financial abuse that could happen during the course of the assisted suicide process and would protect, in particular, the most vulnerable. I commend it to the Committee.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I wish to speak to 21 amendments in this group. It is my misfortune that they have all been shoved together, giving me around 30 seconds on each one.
It is really important that the powers of the panel are clearly defined and that what we end up with is in accordance with what Parliament wants and intends. Each of the amendments that I have put down comes from either the Law Society or the CLADD group; to this extent, I endorse entirely what my noble friends Lord Murray and Lord McColl just said. The management of evidence gathering in the process is vital. My amendments aim to try to put that into some sort of proper regime that is set out on paper before the Bill becomes statute.
Amendment 929A is aimed simply at panels being able to consider cases with expertise appropriate to the particular nature of the case. It says that
“the Commissioner must have regard to the nature of the expertise required to determine the particular circumstances of the person”
in question. We know that there is a lack of psychiatrists in this country—it is in the public press all the time—so it is important that, when this process kicks off, there are sufficient psychiatrists who are willing and able to sit on these panels and to devote the necessary time, because they will have to make assessments. There is a risk that the commissioner may struggle to find enough of them.
Amendments 922 and 923A ask that there be sufficient people and say that they must be specified in regulations. In particular, they must have expertise in relevant matters as set out in regulations, so the Secretary of State would have to identify what expertise will be required and who is to address it.
Amendment 927A asks that one of the panel’s members
“must be a legal member”.
We cannot possibly have panels that do not have a lawyer on them. There must be a legal member with the expertise to deal with the particular case. Indeed, I note that, in giving evidence to the Select Committee, Sarah Hughes of Mind said that
“it is really clear that the safeguards described in the current Bill are not adequate”.
The British Association of Social Workers has also said that the current safeguards are not enough. Those are disinterested, important bodies with expertise in this area.
Amendment 928 aims at the target of medical expertise. There must be someone on the panel who can take a properly informed view of the diagnosis being given to the applicant.
The point of Amendment 473 is to insert the word “evidence”, which is very important, because it is not clear what the status of these panels and of the material given to them will be. The word “evidence” means that, or will have the effect that, the panel will clearly operate as a formal body. It would not make it a tribunal, but it would make the process formal and the panel act properly.
Amendment 479 would enable the panel to
“require a local authority or an NHS body to arrange for a report to be made dealing with such matters relating to the person as the panel may direct … or … such other person as the authority, or the NHS body, considers appropriate”.
There is more to it. This is the equivalent of Section 49 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which gives the power to the Court of Protection to get reports from the NHS or local authorities in order to allow it to discharge its inquisitorial powers. We need something similar here. It would reinforce the seriousness of the panel.
There are other provisions in this amendment to make it plain that the panel can appoint an expert to test evidence if it does not have its own expertise. It needs to have that power. In an appropriate case, the panel may hear evidence on oath, but it will be under no obligation to. That is in my proposed new paragraph (h). There may be cases where it is very anxious about some of the things it has heard, and it may think that putting someone on oath makes them think very seriously about telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
I will move on. I am trying to take this at a gallop.
Amendment 465 is another Law Society amendment. It would show that, although the panel is not a court, it is a formal body by using the word “evidence” in the provisions. That word will make the panel take it seriously. I am not suggesting that the people on it will be lightweight people, but the process is important. Those of us who are lawyers in particular will know that process is important, and it affects how panels and tribunals conduct themselves. If it is not to be called evidence, it will not have that same effect. The Law Society suggests that it is currently unclear precisely what status the information being received will have. It will not be a court, but it will be a formal body, and that provision occurs in some other amendments—Amendments 470 and 476, and possibly elsewhere.
How does the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, understand the panel’s evidence-gathering powers? Will it be exempt from the normal rules of medical confidentiality and data protection? Will it be able to gather evidence from witnesses even if the patient does not want details to be shared? Will it be an executive public authority, subject to the limits that apply to the Government, or will it be a judicial body with unique powers? To say it is quasi-judicial does not answer the question; it is either one or the other. We need to know what powers it will have. Will it be those of an independent tribunal or not? This picks up the observation made by my noble friend Lord Murray.
Amendment 494 would mean that the panel would have to notify relevant bodies if it considers that the person meets the criteria but the request was made because the service provisions had failed in the past. This would be important in monitoring the Bill’s impact on health and social services. It would show whether someone has come for this because provision has not been made. That would be important in looking forward and seeing how we can improve the delivery of health services to the public. It is not a barrier, but it will provide valuable information.
Amendment 934, another Law Society amendment, would require the Secretary of State by regulations to make provision for how the chair of a panel is to decide whether to grant a person’s request that the panel sit in private, including the factors to be taken into account and the processes to be followed. Will it be sitting in private? Will it be sitting in public? How is this to be addressed? These are important practical questions that are bound to arise on the ground.
Amendment 934A, another Law Society amendment, states:
“For purposes of the law of contempt, where a panel determines a referral in public, then unless the panel provides to the contrary, publication of information about the person to whom the referral relates shall be treated as contempt of court, as if (in any relevant legislation) for the word ‘court’ were substituted ‘panel’”.
The panel will not be a court, but it will be hearing very sensitive information in public hearings by default. These amendments seek to ensure that such information about a person is not made public. The late and, I would suggest, great Sir James Munby remarked that
“judges are kept up to the mark by two things—having to comply with proper procedure and being exposed to the public gaze”.
He said that the same thing should apply to panels.
The Law Society told the Select Committee:
“What is unclear at the moment is where the panels will be held and how people would know about them”.
Obviously, consideration about whether the panels are private or public, and then where the powers would come from potentially to restrict the information and then being able to be made—
Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Wheeler) (Lab)
Will the noble Lord please wind up? He is over his time.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
I hope the Committee will indulge me a little. All I will say is that I ask noble Lords to read carefully my amendments, which all come from the Law Society or CLADD. I will say one thing. I hope noble Lords will forgive me, but it is clear that this group will go beyond today, I would have thought, looking at the number of amendments there and the fact that we only have two hours left. If I need to leave—
Lord Rooker (Lab)
The noble Lord should sit down now and come back, still on this debate.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I rise to speak to two amendments in my name in this group, Amendments 496A and 496F. At the outset, I want to give an apology to the sponsor and to the Committee as a whole, in line with the Chief Whip’s procedural recommendations. Given that I suspect that this will carry on at least until 6 pm, I will unfortunately have to leave almost certainly before the end of this debate to catch the last flight home to Northern Ireland.
Both these amendments, like a number of the amendments that I have submitted, deal with concerns that have been raised with me by disability groups. We are aware, again without reiterating the detail of this, that a wide range of concerns has been raised by a large number of groups representing the disabled, which vary between having some concerns and total opposition to the Bill. As we know, no disabled group has expressed support for the Bill. Where concerns are being raised, it is important and incumbent that, where we can try to improve the Bill by trying to take on those concerns, we listen to them.
I will deal with the two amendments briefly, Amendment 496A would add an additional ground to the grounds for reconsideration: failure to adequately consider or to be inconsistent with evidence of disability-related vulnerabilities. I suppose the aim of this is to provoke an examination of the extent to which reconsideration focuses on the particular needs of the disabled. It may not necessarily be the route that I would pursue on Report, but the purpose of this is to ensure that the commissioner, when looking at this, focuses explicitly on the impact on disability and vulnerability.
Public Office (Accountability) Bill: Exclusion
Lord Sandhurst Excerpts(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for providing the opportunity for noble Lords to raise a matter of deep and real public interest. The exclusion of Members of this House and the House of Commons from Clause 11 of the Public Office (Accountability) Bill is a topic which touches on constitutional issues and those which relate to public trust. The Bill engages long-standing concerns about transparency in public life. It will impose a duty on public authorities and public officials to act with candour, transparency and frankness, and to maintain ethical conduct within all parts of their authority. It creates offences for those who, in that capacity—and I emphasise the phrase “in that capacity”—mislead the public and, in relation to the misconduct of persons, who hold public office.
The Hillsborough families’ campaign for accountability has been one of the most powerful calls for reform in recent decades; it is right that we act on their concerns. Here, I declare an interest: I acted in some civil claims on behalf of South Yorkshire Police and, at a later date, for victims who sued their solicitors who had settled their original claims for too little. I have also represented a health authority in a public inquiry against a dishonest consultant, so I know and have practical experience of what dishonesty and cover-ups can mean for the victims.
The new offences will apply when a public authority or official acting with intention or reckless disregard commits improper acts that mislead in respect of matters of significant public concern. But MPs and Peers do not, by virtue of that status alone, act as officials—we must remember that. By Schedule 2 to the Bill, “public authority” means a government department, a Minister of the Crown, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, or a Northern Ireland devolved authority. So individual officeholders and their departments, when acting, are within scope. It is only when acting personally, in a purely parliamentary capacity, that an MP or a Peer will be immune.
This debate raises the interesting and difficult question: when, if ever, should MPs and Peers be guilty of the criminal offences contained in the Bill? Neither House of Parliament will for that purpose be a public authority. This reflects long-standing constitutional conventions of Parliament’s self-regulation and independence. Parliamentary privilege and constitutional autonomy are vital; they must not be compromised. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 remains a cornerstone of our constitutional settlement. It provides that freedom of speech and debate in Parliament
“ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament”.
Article 9 safeguards the core functions of this House and the other place in debating and scrutinising the Government without fear of legal sanction. Those who abuse parliamentary privilege are susceptible to punishment and expulsion by Parliament.
The problems with the Hillsborough and infected blood scandals stem from cover-ups by those acting in official positions, whether as Ministers or officials. I am not suggesting anyone in particular here, but they were in positions of authority. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, explained some of the hazards that might arise from going beyond the Bill and the significance of the Representation of the People Act, for example. My noble friend Lord Young of Acton explained other risks. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, rightly highlighted the danger of the mere threat of proceedings to what people may then be prepared to say in either House of Parliament.
Article 9 rightly protects proceedings in Parliament. It does not protect conduct by individuals outside those parameters, those formal proceedings, nor does it provide immunity from the criminal law for conduct outside parliamentary debate—see the expenses scandal, where at least one MP attempted to run the argument but failed in the courts. The scope of parliamentary privilege is carefully constrained, and rightly so.
Parliament should be very cautious lest any words spoken on the Floors of either House, or in its committees, are put at risk of being caught by criminal offences or civil actions. The threat of prosecution would have a chilling effect on robust debate, which is the essence of parliamentary democracy. An authoritarian Government with majorities in both Houses, any mischief-maker in either House or any outsider might raise specious allegations for bad motives, or just out of ignorance. The fact that the Member in question might ultimately be acquitted of wrongdoing, whether in the criminal or civil courts, will not have prevented exposure to frightening pressures. Our legislators must not be so exposed. The Bill of Rights is a bulwark. History is on its side.
As we have heard, some Members in the other place have suggested that extending the offence to MPs and Peers might improve public trust and perception, and amendments have been tabled from some MPs to bring Members of Parliament within the scope of the offence. That would be a grave error. MPs and Peers acting as such do not make decisions on behalf of the state. They are not Ministers or officials. Their misconduct, if and when it occurs, will be addressed by Parliament—we have had examples in the recent past. Parliament does and will police its Members; no one else should when it acts within the bounds which I have set out.
We on these Benches believe that creating a criminal offence would be wrong, but we also recognise that the exclusion of Parliament from the offence risks sending the wrong message if it is not properly explained to the public. It is not an easy topic to explain in plain and simple terms to a wider public. Accountability and integrity in public life must be strengthened and supported, and public trust in our institutions is, frankly, fragile at present. But the way to hell is paved with good intentions, so beware: the remedy will be worse than the disease.
Given these considerations, I ask the Minister the following questions. What consideration have the Government given to alternative models to ensure meaningful accountability without infringing on this privilege? Do the Government believe that the current system of parliamentary sanctions alone is sufficient and effective? What further parliamentary sanctions might be of value? What steps will the Government take during the currency of the Bill to explain these important principles of our constitution?
Prisons: Education
Lord Sandhurst Excerpts(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Timpson (Lab)
There are some good reasons why we do not want internet everywhere in prisons, but 90% of the English estate now has digital learning in its cells in various ways: Launchpad or Coracle. My vision is that we need to go much further with that, as well as offering a much wider curriculum on iPads or computers in cells, because that is an increasingly popular way for prisoners to educate themselves.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, as we have heard, today is my noble friend Lord Attlee’s penultimate day as a Member of this House, so I take this opportunity to thank him for all his hard work and wish him well.
The manifesto pledged the Government to work with prisons to improve offenders’ access to purposeful activity. Last week the Minister informed the House that access to in-prison education can reduce offending by up to nine percentage points. Why then has the Minister approved a prison education settlement that will cut core national education in prisons by 25%?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
The noble Lord is correct that it cuts the actual provision: the budget we have has gone up, but you just get less value for money. This comes back to my aeroplane theory: I want the aeroplane—that is, the classrooms—to be full. However, we are doing more than that. We have a working-week trial in five prisons, where prisoners will be out of their cells for most of the day. This comes back to the point that we need to run stable regimes in our prisons, so we can have a regular drumbeat of education and purposeful activity. That can make the difference between people getting the skills they need and them leaving prison with no skills—and, when they leave with no skills, it is pretty obvious what happens.
Better Prisons: Less Crime (Justice and Home Affairs Committee Report)
Lord Sandhurst Excerpts(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, this has been an illuminating debate on a most important report. I will come to the report shortly, but first I will address the five compelling and varied maiden speeches.
First, the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, comes with an exceptional career in the law behind her, and no doubt still ahead. I am sure she will, from what I have heard and read, give voice not just to the important interests of the City of London but to the interests of the vulnerable and of the arts.
Secondly, my noble friend Lord Redwood is an eminent parliamentarian of 36 years’ standing. He was astute to identify that failures in productivity in public service are a central issue today, as they have been for many years, not just in the field of prisons but across our society. He was right to stress the importance of quality and efficiency. We will all benefit from his experience and insight.
Thirdly, we had the noble Lord, Lord Babudu. He is the executive director of Impact on Urban Health, which works to develop the potential for cities to be healthier. His experience in that, and more particularly at the sharp end of knife crime, of which he told us a little, will give the House valuable insights, and we should listen to him.
Fourthly, we had the noble Baroness, Lady Davies of Devonport. She was a remarkable athlete and an Olympian of great distinction. She has built on that platform to campaign on and highlight, based on her own experience, the misuse and particular dangers of hormonal drugs, both in sport and for teenage health. Further, she understands the importance of a level playing field in all respects and the need to provide decent facilities for women prisoners. We will surely benefit from her experience and wisdom.
Last but not least, we had the noble Baroness, Lady Neate. She is the newest of our Cross-Bench people’s Peers. She will be a valuable addition, not least because she was the chief executive officer of Shelter, a charity of which I am a long-standing supporter. Her expertise in the important field of delivering legal services for social welfare will be valuable to this House, as will her work with Women’s Aid.
I turn to the report. I welcome the opportunity to speak on the Motion and acknowledge the hard work of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee in producing the Better Prisons: Less Crime report. I declare that I was a member of this committee until December 2024, and that I took part in the first stages of its evidence gathering. I congratulate its chair, the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, on not only his truly compelling speech today but his work as chair of that committee when I served on it.
The report—noble Lords will be glad to hear that I shall not attempt to address every facet of it—provides a stark account of a system under acute pressure and engaged too often in firefighting. I am grateful to the committee for laying out their recommendations so clearly. The consequences of doing nothing are real for us all: offenders, staff and the public. Something must be done.
Our prisons are now at a critical point—we all know that; we hear it too often, but they are strained to the point where their core missions of public protection and rehabilitation are compromised. Those conclusions mirror what has been reported by HM Inspectorate of Prisons. At times they go further. Overcrowding and violence are persistent realities and too many prisons are quite unable to provide regimes capable of reducing reoffending. Apart from locking people up to keep them away from us and keep us safe, prevention of reoffending is what prisons should be about. As my noble friend Lady Buscombe, in her elegant speech, showed by reference to what she had said over 20 years ago, in 2005, the political class in this country has failed to address the issues that this report brings to light.
I turn to the newish issue of Islamic extremism in prisons. Last year, the Conservative Party raised concerns about the threat posed by Islamist extremist inmates. We were not the only ones to do so, but it is an important issue. This followed violent attacks on staff by high-profile extremist offenders and evidence of organised radicalisation within the estate. Indeed, I myself asked a Question on this in this House. Islamist gangs inside prisons have held makeshift sharia-style trials and groomed vulnerable inmates. Some prisoners apparently seized power in certain wings.
That problem sits alongside other well-recognised safety problems, and these have to be tackled robustly. The Government and His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service must work better together as a united team. They must ensure that effective specialist counter-extremism units exist, and staff must be trained to identify and respond to radicalisation threats before they metastasise into actual violence. The attack in April 2025 at a separation centre, where extremist inmates used hot oil and improvised weapons against officers, was horrifying and underlines the urgency of this issue.
On reoffending and purposeful activity, the committee’s analysis of these issues—and we have heard other speeches from noble Lords on this—cannot be faulted. As for purposeful activity, the report is spot on. It rightly identifies and links lack of work, education and training with higher levels of self-harm, unrest and, most importantly for all of us, reoffending. The Government appear to recognise this. In their manifesto for the last election they pledged to
“work with prisons to improve offenders’ access to purposeful activity, such as learning, and ensure they create pre-release plans for those leaving custody”.
Much has to be done. There is a worrying new dimension. The Chief Inspector of Prisons recently stated that, in Manchester, 35% of prisoners were locked up all day. That is absolutely staggering and terrible.
On education, I was disappointed to read that independent watchdogs and monitoring boards, to which we should listen, have described seismic cuts to prison education provision. Some 300 education staff were recently made redundant—that is not the way forward. Reports indicate reductions in core classroom education of 25% across the country; in some prisons, the drop is as much as 60%. Governors have had to make teaching roles redundant and to slash the number of courses available, yet this Government have acknowledged that education is one of the most effective tools to break the cycle of offending. Something must be done; this must be put right. The noble Lord, Lord Farmer, was right to stress this and to draw on his own experience and expertise in this field. We want to stop reoffending—we all do.
The cuts here undermine the principles that we all support. Prisons should not be a revolving door into further criminality, as noble Lords have explained. Reduced education opportunities reinforce boredom and frustration, and they do not put people on the road to improvement. Too many people in prison have low or non-existent literacy and numeracy; that has to be addressed. It should be a core aim in prisons. It also, as we all know, makes violence more likely. People who cannot articulate in words turn to physical means. Cuts have left offenders without the skills to reintegrate into society. If our aim is to reduce reoffending then cutting education is at odds with that aim. The noble Lord, Lord Timpson, himself told the committee that he had walked past too many classrooms and workshops with no one sitting in them.
To turn to the issue of staffing, the Justice and Home Affairs Committee has underlined its alarm at the reductions. It has warned that they could jeopardise rehabilitation efforts and make reoffending levels harder to change. My noble friend Lady Bertin was absolutely right to stress the importance of recruitment and getting it right—recruiting enough of the right people in the right way and then keeping them. On staffing the evidence is unambiguous. Morale is low and experience is thin in key areas. Officers spend their shifts just trying to maintain order, with no time for purposeful engagement with prisoners—which is what we all want. Training reform must be accompanied by career progression improvements which recognise the professionalism of the job. Here I should mention the observations of my noble friend Lord Lucas. In his valuable contribution, he highlighted the importance of having the right governors in the right place for long enough, but not for overlong. From his experience in education, he stressed the value of mentoring. To conclude on the issue of staffing, we welcome the proposals for a Prison Service medal. I urge the Government to give this serious consideration.
Finally, I turn to accountability. The current independent inspection framework lacks effective enforcement powers when standards slip. Too many good recommendations from the Inspectorate of Prisons and independent monitoring boards are acknowledged but not then implemented. They lie in the shadows. The committee’s call for enhanced powers for inspectors and formalised collaboration between inspectorates must be taken seriously.
What matters now is for implementation reforms to work. We must prioritise education and training programmes, not cut them. We must support prison staff and not see them leave for better-resourced jobs. We must bolster the security and rehabilitation framework to deal with extremist threats concretely, consistently and effectively. We want a system that protects the public and gives those who can be reformed a genuine chance to go on to live a crime-free life.
This experienced committee’s report contains many wise recommendations—I can touch on only a few core points. The Government must now act on them. They have accepted the recommendations and we want action. I urge members of the committee to check on delivery. I hope that, in a year’s time, they will be asking questions in the House if this has not happened.
Victims and Courts Bill
Lord Sandhurst ExcerptsWednesday 11th February 2026
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Act 2026 View all Victims and Courts Act 2026 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 141-II Second marshalled list for Committee - (10 Feb 2026)
Lord Sandhurst
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment broadens the cohort to whom Section 35 (victims’ rights to make representations and receive information) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 applies to include any victims listed in Schedule 6A. It also probes the rationale behind the three part categorisation of crimes in Schedule 6A.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 48 to 54, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, concern the operation of the victim contact scheme and the new helpline provisions introduced by the Bill, and in particular the Government’s decision to structure eligibility around the three-part categorisation of offences in new Schedule 6A. We welcome the Government’s intention to expand access to information for victims. The extension of the victim contact scheme and the creation of a statutory helpline represent important recognition that the victim should not be left in the dark about the progress, release or supervision of those who have harmed them. But the detail matters, and it is the detail of Schedule 6 that these amendments probe.
Amendments 48 and 49 address the decision to confine the statutory rights under Section 35 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 to victims of offences listed in Parts 1 and 2 of new Schedule 6A and subject, in the case of Part 1, to a specified custodial threshold. Amendment 48 would align Section 35 more broadly with new Schedule 6A as a whole, and Amendment 49 probes why the current drafting draws the line where it does. Noble Lords will have seen that new Schedule 6A divides offences into three parts. Victims of Part 1 offences qualify when the offender receives
“a sentence of imprisonment … for a term of at least the specified … length”.
Victims of Part 2 offences qualify without that same threshold. Other offences are treated differently still.
The question before us today is: what is the principled basis for this threefold division? For example, Part 1 includes crimes such as wounding with intent to cause GBH, rape, aggravated burglary, abduction and child sex offences. Part 2 includes crimes such as stalking, coercive behaviour and putting people in fear of violence. It seems to us wrong that the latter list of offences does not include a custodial threshold for eligibility for the victim contact scheme, but the first list of offences does include such a threshold. The Minister said on Monday that use of the victim contact scheme is available for the “most serious cases”. Why, then, should the victim of, say, child sexual offences or abduction whose offender did not receive a sentence of imprisonment for a term of at least the specified sentence length be ineligible for the victim contact scheme? Following the Sentencing Act and subsequent reforms that were debated in this House, we have seen, and will continue to see, a marked shift in the sentencing landscape. Fewer people will receive immediate sentences of imprisonment, and sentences will be shorter.
First, the automatic presumption for suspended sentences will mean that many offenders guilty of crimes under Part 1 of the new schedule—wounding with intent, rape and so on—may receive suspended sentences. That will make their victims ineligible for the victim contact scheme. This, frankly, is an insult to victims and the public. Part 1 is a shopping list of serious crimes for which there should be no restrictions on victims’ eligibility for the victim contact scheme.
Secondly, under the Sentencing Act, the majority of offenders will be released after just one-third of their sentence. The practical consequence is that far more offenders than now are to be subject to supervision outside custody. That shift makes the victim contact scheme more, not less, important. The scheme is not a mere information line. It allows victims to make representations regarding licence conditions and, where they apply, parole decisions. In a world in which release and supervision decisions affect more and more cases, the ability of victims to engage meaningfully with those processes becomes essential to maintaining confidence in the system.
The noble Lord, Lord Timpson, stated that the Sentencing Act will more or less double the number of people being tagged. That will mean that at least double the number of victims will want to engage with the victim contact scheme. Faced with these facts, it is difficult to see why eligibility should depend so rigidly on whether an offence falls into Part 1 or Part 2, or whether a custodial sentence crosses a certain line.
From the perspective of the victim, the impact of the offence is not measured in statutory parts or sentencing thresholds. If the offender is subject to release conditions or to supervision in the community, the victim may well have legitimate concerns about notification, exclusion zones or contact restrictions. Those concerns do not disappear simply because the sentence imposed fell just a little below the specified sentence length.
Amendment 50 turns to the new helpline. The Government have rightly recognised that some victims fall outside the formal victim contact scheme but nevertheless need access to information. The helpline is intended to fill that gap. However, as the Bill is drafted, it is still limited by reference to the categorisation in new Schedule 6A. If the purpose of the helpline is to provide a route for victims to obtain basic information about the offender’s custodial or supervisory status, why should it not extend to all victims of offences listed in new Schedule 6A? If Parliament has already determined that those offences merit inclusion in new Schedule 6A, what is gained by further subdividing access to information within that list?
Amendments 51 to 53 similarly address the exclusion of victims whose offenders are serving suspended sentences. As matters stand, victims whose offenders are serving suspended sentences or community orders may not fall within the scope of the helpline in the same way as those whose offenders are in custody. Yet, arguably, it is precisely in such cases that victims will have acute and immediate concerns. An offender not in custody but serving a suspended sentence or community order remains in the community; the victim may live nearby. The potential for proximity, breach or renewed contact is real, not nugatory.
I once again point out that it is government policy that the presumption for most of the offenders for whom this clause is relevant will be to receive suspended sentences. This automatically means their victims will not be able to access the helpline. If the Government are going as far as to legislate for a helpline, it should reflect the realities of modern sentencing. The distinction between custody and community supervision is no longer as clear-cut in terms of risk or impact. This is the result of the Government’s own legislation. A victim whose offender is under probation supervision in the community has every bit as much interest in knowing the conditions imposed and the mechanisms for enforcement as one whose offender is in prison.
Finally, Amendment 54 probes the question of accountability. The Bill places duties on providers of probation services to take reasonable steps to provide information to victims about release, licence conditions and other relevant matters. That is welcome, but what is to happen if a victim believes that those reasonable steps have not been taken? It is not clear from the legislation what mechanism exists for review or appeal. Probation officers increasingly exercise functions that have a quasi-judicial character, particularly in relation to the formulation and management of licence conditions. This is once again due to the Sentencing Act.
Where discretion is exercised, there should be some form of oversight. Amendment 54 proposes a modest and practical solution: that where a victim is dissatisfied, there should be a route to seek reconsideration by a senior probation officer. The Government no doubt accept that the existence of an appeals process is important. Indeed, it is a fundamental element of our judicial process. It does not seem right, therefore, that probation officers, who are already subject to fewer checks and balances and less public scrutiny, should be shielded from an appeals process concerning their decisions.
These amendments ask the Government to explain the rationale behind the categorisation in new Schedule 6A, and to consider whether access to the victim contact scheme and helpline should better reflect the contemporary sentencing landscape. If we are serious about placing victims at the heart of the justice system, access to information and participation cannot depend on seemingly arbitrary distinctions. I beg to move.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)
My Lords, I should inform the House that, if Amendment 48 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 49 by reason of pre-emption. Also, if Amendment 50 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 51 to 53 by reason of pre-emption.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity of setting out the Government’s position. Our approach is carefully considered. I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to make party-political points out of this by using language such as “insult to victims”, particularly when, in relation to the principal part of his argument, he is just plain wrong.
The starting point is that we must prioritise public funds to ensure that they go where they are most needed. We have done this by providing proactive support to those victims where the court has imposed a longer sentence, because a longer sentence reflects the seriousness of the offence. Of course we recognise that all victims of crime will want information about the offender in their case. For that reason, we are introducing a new route for all victims—the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is quite right about this—to request information via a dedicated helpline.
This is why new Schedule 6A is in three parts. Part 1 ensures that the most serious cases, involving victims of violent, sexual, and terrorism offences where the defendant has been sentenced to a custodial sentence of 12 months or more, can receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.
Part 2 ensures support for victims of stalking and harassment offences, regardless of sentence length. We recognise that, even where there is a short sentence, this cohort of victims needs and will receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.
I am just trying to ensure that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, can hear the information I am giving him back, because we think that what the noble Lord said is not right, so I thought he might be interested in hearing what I have to say about it.
Part 3 ensures that victims of other sexual and violent offences, and breach offences linked to violence against women and girls, will be able to get information through the helpline should they request it, including for those offences in Part 1 where the sentence for the offence is less than 12 months. We consider that this is the right place to draw the line, but we will keep eligibility under review to make sure that we are reaching the right victims.
The Bill includes regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences, and the specified lengths of sentence of such offences, which determine eligibility for either service. The Bill also includes a discretionary power that enables victims of any offence, where the offender is serving a sentence of imprisonment, to be provided with either service, where they request it and probation deem it to be appropriate.
The victim contact scheme and the victim helpline will apply only where there is a custodial sentence. That is not only because of the consideration of public funds but because the information provided via these routes, such as the date of release on licence and conditions of licence, self-evidently does not apply unless there has been a custodial sentence. Where a suspended or community sentence is imposed by the court, under the victims’ code, the police witness care unit will explain the sentence to the victim.
Finally, regarding Amendment 54, I am pleased to reassure the noble Lord that there is already a route for victims to request a senior probation officer review of a decision about what information to provide, so this is already catered for. In the circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I addressed this at some length in opening. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the Minister for correcting my errors. I shall add nothing more. I am also grateful for the Minister’s explanation of how—she hopes, at least—this will work in practice. On that basis, I shall withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sandhurst
“Functions of Commissioner: protecting those assisting victims of crime(1) Section 49 (General functions of Commissioner) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (1)(a) insert—“(aa) take such steps as the Commissioner considers appropriate to support or protect individuals who act in good faith to assist victims of crime, where those doing so promote the interests of victims and witnesses or encourage good practice in the treatment of victims and witnesses.”(3) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (1)(aa), steps taken by the Commissioner may include reporting, making recommendations, or consulting with relevant authorities regarding individuals who assist victims to promote good practice and victim protection.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the Victims’ Commissioner may take discretionary steps to support individuals who assist victims of crime, as part of their statutory role promoting the interests of victims and witnesses.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 58, 59 and 60 are intended to strengthen the role of the Victims’ Commissioner. They would ensure that the commissioner can more effectively promote the interests of victims and witnesses and respond to cases that have wider public policy relevance.
Amendment 58 clarifies that
“the Victims’ Commissioner may take discretionary steps to support individuals who assist victims of crime”.
The amendment was brought about following the recent case of Mark Hehir, the bus driver who courageously intervened to prevent one of his passengers being the victim of theft. His actions were nothing short of heroic. He placed himself at real risk to protect passengers and members of the public. His decisiveness in a high-pressure situation should be applauded. Public recognition of his bravery has been strong. A petition in support of him gathered over 140,000 signatures. This demonstrates the widespread view that those who act courageously to protect others should be commended and supported, not left vulnerable to professional or personal consequences. The case highlighted the gaps in protections for citizens who step in to assist victims. Ordinary people who act responsibly should not face penalties or career repercussions for doing the right thing.
Amendment 58 would go some way to addressing that gap. By explicitly allowing the Victims’ Commissioner to support individuals who assist victims, the amendment would ensure that the commissioner can take discretionary action in cases of public significance, such as providing advice, engaging relevant agencies or highlighting best practice. The amendment represents a practical safeguard for citizens such as Mr Hehir and a clear statement that society values and protects bravery and civic responsibility. If individuals such as Mr Hehir do not deserve protection, it is difficult to see who does. This is about recognising heroism and ensuring that those who intervene to protect victims are not left unsupported.
Amendment 59 proposes the removal of the statutory restriction that currently prevents the Victims’ Commissioner exercising functions in relation to an individual victim or witness. We welcome the expansion of the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers in Clause 8, but would like to understand why the Government have included a restriction to the expansion. By removing the restriction entirely, the amendment would ensure that the commissioner can intervene in such cases without procedural or statutory impediment.
It is important to stress that this amendment does not seek to replace existing complaints mechanisms; nor does it transform the commissioner into a case-by- case complaints handler. Instead, it would empower the commissioner to identify and address systemic issues revealed through individual cases, providing a crucial bridge between personal experiences and broader improvements in policy or practice. In doing so, it would strengthen the commissioner’s statutory remit to promote the interests of victims and witnesses rather than limit it.
Amendment 60 takes a more targeted approach, should the Minister oppose Amendment 59. It seeks to limit the restriction on the Victims’ Commissioner exercising functions in individual cases to circumstances where there are ongoing criminal proceedings. This would strike a sensible balance, preserving the integrity and independence of live judicial proceedings while allowing greater engagement with victims and witnesses outside the live court processes. By doing so, it would ensure that the commissioner’s statutory role in promoting the interests of victims and witnesses is meaningful and practical rather than being constrained by overly rigid restrictions.
Amendment 60 seeks to allow the Victims’ Commissioner to request information from agencies, to monitor how individual cases are handled and to promote good practice where lessons from a single case could benefit other victims or witnesses. It would maintain the commissioner’s ability to drive improvements and to highlight systemic issues, without creating any conflict with ongoing judicial processes.
These amendments are designed to enhance the Victims’ Commissioner’s role in supporting victims and witnesses, to ensure that individual cases can inform systemic improvements, and to promote best practice. I look forward to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)
My Lords, I inform the Committee that if Amendment 59 is agreed to, I will not be able to call Amendment 60 by reason of pre-emption.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the Government firmly believe that the Victims’ Commissioner—I have known the current occupant of the role for many years and have the utmost regard for her—has a crucial strategic role in representing the interests of victims and the witnesses of crime and anti-social behaviour.
Amendment 58 would significantly widen the commissioner’s remit by requiring her to support and protect individuals who assist victims. Of course, we agree that the work of those who dedicate their efforts to supporting victims is crucial, but the proposed widening of the Victims’ Commissioner’s statutory functions would, in the Government’s view, dilute the fundamental purpose of the Victims’ Commissioner; that is, to promote the interests of victims and witnesses themselves. In fact, the commissioner’s statutory function of promoting the interests of victims and witnesses already allows her to work with and support those who themselves support victims, and she does not need an explicit statutory function to continue with that.
Since the definition of “those assisting victims” could be interpreted broadly, this amendment also risks heavily extending the casework burden that would be imposed by the two other amendments, to which I now turn.
The Government have already brought forward Clause 8, which proposes to amend the existing statutory limitation on the exercise of the commissioner’s functions in relation to individual cases to allow her to exercise her functions in relation to cases that indicate a wider systemic issue. But Amendments 59 and 60 would go further—either entirely removing or narrowing the existing limitation. We understand the amendments to be creating an alternative. We do not believe that this is the right approach and consider that our carefully designed Clause 8 achieves the right balance.
The Victims’ Commissioner is not a complaints body, and it is important to maintain this distinction. Her role is to advocate for victims as a group and to address system-wide issues—that is what Clause 8 does. It is up to her to decide which cases she believes create those system-wide issues.
Individual victims already have a clear escalation route through the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman if they are dissatisfied with their experience of the criminal justice system. Expanding the commissioner’s involvement in individual casework to this extent would shift his or her role towards handling complaints rather than overseeing the system as a whole.
It is also vital that decisions of the judiciary and other independent public bodies that support victims of crime remain free from external influence. The current legislative bar, and the amendment to it that we have proposed through Clause 8, safeguards that independence and avoids any uncertainty about the commissioner’s role in such processes. We do not believe that Amendments 59 or 60 achieve that.
The point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she has raised and discussed with me before on the many occasions on which we have now met—obviously, I look forward to many more—is a good point and one that we need to keep under review. Perhaps the noble Baroness and I can discuss it further the next time we meet. As I say, I very much look forward to that.
I hope the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, agrees that preserving the Victims’ Commissioner’s strategic function is essential to holding the system to account effectively, and I invite him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I listened with interest to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, had to say, and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I encourage the Minister to listen with care to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said and perhaps to move our way on certain aspects.
Dealing with Amendment 58, the law should not leave people such as Mr Hehir exposed to detriment for acting courageously. It may be that the Victims’ Commissioner is not the right person, but we put this forward in the hope that it would allow consideration of what to do in such situations. The amendment sends a clear message that civic responsibility and bravery should not be met with silence or indifference on the part of authority.
Amendment 59 would remove the restriction on individual cases. We appreciate that the commissioner has a strategic role to promote the interests of victims and witnesses generally, but that cannot be done effectively if individual cases are placed beyond reach. We accept that Clause 8 enables the commissioner to act in cases relevant to public policy, and we are grateful for that, but individual cases often reveal systemic failings. Removing the restriction entirely would enable oversight and the identification of patterns that will require reform. If we are serious about learning lessons, we suggest that the commissioner should be able to look at cases from which those lessons arise, but do so with discretion.
If the Minister considers that Amendment 59 is too broad, Amendment 60 would provide a possible balanced alternative. It would preserve the integrity of live criminal proceedings, it would allow engagement in individual cases once proceedings have concluded, and it would ensure that the commissioner can examine outcomes, seek information and promote improvements without interfering with the courts. It reflects a sensible constitutional boundary.
In summary, these amendments would not unduly expand the commissioner’s role but would clarify and strengthen it. They would ensure that individual experiences inform systemic reform and that statutory restrictions do not undermine the purpose of the office itself. A Victims’ Commissioner who cannot meaningfully engage where necessary with individual cases is constrained in fulfilling the commissioner’s core duty.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
The noble Lord seems to be suggesting that the Victims’ Commissioner does not now engage with individual cases. My understanding is that she very much does, but to feed towards her statutory role. That is quite different from getting involved in the minutiae of an individual case, supporting a victim or witness and promoting that individual’s interests.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, there is clearly a balance to be struck. I think we should, as we go forward, because we all have the same interests at heart here, look carefully at whether there will be occasions when the commissioner should look at individual cases, not so much to interfere but to draw on the information that can be gleaned from them and use them in setting policy. With that said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I oppose the Question that Clause 11 stand part of the Bill. This clause seeks to extend the right to prosecute to those with different qualifications from solicitors or barristers.
As my noble friend Lord Gove highlighted at Second Reading, the Crown Prosecution Service faces constraints in whom it can employ, and the criminal Bar is facing a retention crisis. Last year, a national survey by the Criminal Bar Association found that one in three criminal barristers intends to quit. It is obviously crucial that we have enough Crown prosecutors for cases, and we fully appreciate on this side the challenge that the Government face. However, I do not believe that this clause is an appropriate solution. Rather than carefully addressing the causes of those pressures and looking for proper solutions, this clause simply moves the goalposts. It redefines who is qualified to undertake what is highly serious work. That is not good enough.
While it has been argued that allowing CILEX members to prosecute will help to increase diversity, this argument should not be used as a smokescreen for what could potentially dilute standards. I dare say that is not what those truly calling for diversity want either, on their part. Genuine diversity in the legal profession is not achieved by lowering thresholds or by altering qualifications to fill gaps. It is achieved by facilitating pathways and by supporting structures within the profession, so that people from all backgrounds can succeed on an equal footing. To suggest otherwise risks turning diversity into a box-ticking exercise. It does not demonstrate an authentic commitment to broadening access to the profession.
We cannot risk lowering the quality of prosecution. This would not be fair on the defendant, and certainly not on the victim, and it is definitely not in the long- term public interest. Victims and defendants rely on the competence of the prosecutor. A victim must have confidence that their case is being handled by someone who is suitably qualified. Those who prosecute murders today will some years ago have prosecuted in the magistrates’ courts; they start at the lower level and they move up, gaining their experience moving from level to level as proportionate to their skills.
A defendant whose liberty may be at stake is entitled to proper assurance. These are not minor concerns; they go to the heart of our justice system. More widely, any weakening of our standards risks undermining public confidence in the justice system as a whole and weakening the supply, I suggest, of future prosecutors of serious crime. Can the Minister please explain what assessments were undertaken previously of the impact of this proposed change?
If we are to expand the pool of prosecutors, we must be absolutely sure that this shift is backed by sufficient evidence of good quality, and that any necessary safeguards are in place to ensure that standards will not drift or diverge over time. The Committee deserves clear evidence that this reform will enhance, and not diminish, the quality of prosecutions. We have not been shown that evidence. Without it, this clause risks creating more problems than it solves. I urge the Minister please to reflect carefully on these concerns and to ensure that any change to the thresholds is supported by robust, transparent evidence and proper safeguards. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I will make one or two brief observations about this, if I may. First, I must declare an interest, in that about 10 years ago I was made an honorary vice-president of CILEX. In case it is thought that I am speaking with the interests of CILEX in mind, I wanted to make that absolutely clear.
My first observation is this: the transformation of the way in which the legal profession operates and its financial position has been enormous over the last 20 or so years. Sometimes, I think we forget the huge difference there is in remuneration for those who practise in areas such as commercial and administrative law and those who practise in the criminal sphere. This is having a very serious effect on the ability.
How that problem is solved is a matter for Her Majesty’s Government, not for me, but it seems to me that, in looking at what the state can afford, it is necessary to look at the way in which an organisation such as CILEX has transformed itself, the qualifications that are given and the reality of many cases. As a judge, one sometimes feels that the best experience for being a good prosecutor is having done a lot of prosecutions, not necessarily where they had a first-class degree from a great university or whether she had done extremely well in the solicitor’s or Bar finals; experience is important.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, it is vital to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service can recruit and retain a sufficient number of qualified Crown prosecutors. We suggest that Clause 11 supports this aim by increasing the CPS’s recruitment flexibility through the removal of an unnecessary legislative barrier. In turn, this will help increase the pool of eligible candidates for appointment as Crown prosecutors. It is axiomatic that a shortage of Crown prosecutors adds to the backlog because it cannot make decisions quite as quickly about prosecutions as it could if there were more of them.
Currently, the Crown Prosecution Service is restricted in who it can appoint as Crown prosecutors due to an unnecessary legal requirement. This is set out in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which provides that Crown prosecutors and those who prosecute cases on behalf of the CPS must hold what is known as the general qualification. The general qualification is a term of art, having a very specific meaning in this context. It means that a prospective Crown prosecutor must have
“a right of audience in relation to any class of proceedings in any part of the Senior Courts, or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates’ courts”,
even though most of those rights of audience—for example, before the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—are never going to be exercised by a Crown prosecutor in a million years.
This requirement can exclude certain qualified legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners—from the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives—who have relevant criminal practice rights but are prohibited from becoming Crown prosecutors. These legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners, often hold the right skills and specialist qualifications required to perform the Crown prosecutor role, including having rights of audience for the courts in which they will actually appear, as opposed to rights of audience for the courts in which they will not, but they do not meet the general qualification criteria. This restriction limits the DPP’s ability to consider a wider pool of legal talent and reduces the CPS’s flexibility in managing existing and future recruitment challenges.
The purpose of this clause is to remove the requirement for the general qualification and, in doing so, give the DPP the discretion to appoint appropriately qualified legal professionals, such as CILEX practitioners, as Crown prosecutors for the CPS. I can reassure the Committee that the removal of the general qualification requirement will not in any way dilute professional standards; there are appropriate safeguards to preserve standards.
Prospective professionals eligible to be a Crown prosecutor who do not at the moment hold the general qualification must still meet the authorisation requirements of the Legal Services Act 2007—they have to be appropriately qualified, authorised and regulated, and be able to exercise rights of audience and conduct litigation, both of which are reserved legal activities under the Act. It is a criminal offence under the Act to carry out reserved legal activities unless entitled to do so.
In addition, it is important to note that the measure does not require the CPS to appoint any specific type of legal professional. Instead, it gives it the flexibility to do so where appropriate and ensures that recruitment decisions remain firmly within the DPP’s control. The DPP will retain full discretion over appointments, ensuring that only suitably qualified and experienced individuals become Crown prosecutors. Newly eligible professionals must meet the same Crown prosecutor competency standards as those who qualify through more traditional routes. I also emphasise that those appointed following this change will, like all Crown prosecutors, be subject to performance monitoring by the CPS, including case strategy quality assessments focused on the application of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
This change reflects the modern legal services landscape, spoken to powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Alternative routes to qualification are increasingly common, where professionals from non-traditional backgrounds play a growing role in the justice system. By removing this unnecessary legislative barrier, the clause may also support the recruitment of a diverse and representative cohort of Crown prosecutors.
I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has ever met any CILEX practitioners; I certainly have, and they are an amazing cohort of people. I am sure he absolutely did not intend to suggest that somehow those who have qualified through an alternative route are, by very definition, less competent than those who have gone through the traditional route. If that is the suggestion, then it is not one this Government can support. I therefore hope that the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 11 to stand part of the Bill and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his opposition to it.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. At the heart of it lies the underfunded state of our criminal justice system—something which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has highlighted. Looking forward, the criminal justice system needs more money and the prosecution service needs proper funding, as of course do those who defend in the criminal courts; but Clause 11 does propose a significant shift, extending the right to prosecute to individuals who do not hold the long-standing qualifications of solicitors and barristers. I cast no aspersions on CILEX, but I make that observation. There is a difference in their training and educational background. This clause will expand capacity, there is no doubt about it—and there is no doubt that the system requires it, for the reasons that others have outlined in this debate—but it will not address the underlying cause of problems faced in the criminal courts. We must not go down a route which results in weakening of standards, undermining of public confidence, and unfairness to victims and witnesses involved in the criminal courts.
A central issue remains the absence of clear evidence in support of Clause 11. We have sought clarity from the Minister on what assessments were undertaken on the impact of this change, whether risks to standards were considered, and whether safeguards are in fact in place to maintain standards over time. Without clear evidence, Parliament cannot truly judge whether the proposed reform protects the quality of prosecutions. We must not embark on a position where there are unclear professional boundaries and variations in training and oversight.
We recognise the pressures facing the criminal justice system and the need for more good people to embark on careers in the criminal courts, whether in defence or in prosecution; in this case, we are talking about prosecutors. We share the desire for a stronger, more resilient system, but Clause 11 does not, we suggest, properly address the causes of these pressures. We urge the Minister to reflect carefully on the concerns which I have raised and to consider whether Clause 11 provides the assurance and evidence that this House, our justice system and, indeed, victims deserve. That said, I will not pursue my opposition.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Clause 12 is an exception to the many provisions of the Bill that we support. It concerns the recovery of costs in private prosecutions. On its face, it may seem a minor and rather technical amendment, but in substance Clause 12 represents a significant shift in long-established policy and practice. It has serious implications for access to justice, particularly for victims of fraud and economic crime.
Private prosecutions should be regarded as a safeguard, rather than an anomaly, in our criminal justice system. Such prosecutions exist precisely to ensure that, where the state cannot or does not act, victims are not left without recourse. Private prosecutions are conducted in the criminal courts and are subject to the same judicial oversight, obligations of disclosure and prosecutorial duties as any other prosecution. Judges retain full control throughout, and the Crown Prosecution Service retains its power to take over cases where it considers that to be appropriate. For many years, Parliament, Ministers and the courts have recognised that private prosecutions serve a public interest. That is why the current costs regime allows courts to order payment from central funds for reasonable sums properly incurred by private prosecutors. This payment is not a windfall. It is simply reasonable compensation for costs already borne, and even then recovery is typically partial and not complete.
It is our strong belief that Clause 12 would change that settlement fundamentally. It gives the Government power through regulations to cap the recoverable costs of private prosecutors. In so doing, it risks making many legitimate prosecutions financially unviable. That is particularly so for charities and other public interest bodies which pursue cases only after other routes have failed. This would represent a sharp departure from previous ministerial policy.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I listened with interest to the Minister. I remain of the view that private prosecutions are a constitutional safeguard for when the CPS is unable or unwilling to act. There remains the position of charities and there remains the position of corporations and other organisations trying to protect their intellectual property by exercising perfectly lawful prosecutions. The example given of the costs in a particular case is not really helpful, as we do not know the details. It is the sort of things that we would have had detail of had there been a proper consultation first, and we would not have one cherry-picked example given to us.
That said, I remind the Committee that what we are looking at here is £3.9 million—not a lot. It is not a small sum, of course, but it is not a large sum in the context of the criminal justice budget. My concerns have not been put to rest but, in the circumstances, I shall not occupy any more of the Committee’s time. I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her eminent supporters for bringing forward these amendments, and to all noble Lords for their contributions in respect of Amendments 61 and 62. I think I can deal with Amendment 61 quite shortly. We have had powerful and compelling speeches on the amendment from its proposers. It seeks to remove a presumption that a computer and software system on which a prosecution relies is working and reliable. We all know what has prompted this: the terrible Post Office scandal.
It is absolutely plain that prosecutors must no longer be able to rely on the systems being necessarily in working order as evidence for the purpose of criminal cases. The Government have had long enough now—and officials even longer than this Government—to look at this problem. If they have not, they have been prodded with a sharp stick by these amendments, and I am confident that, prodded with that sharp stick, they will come up with a solution. They will have to do so by Report, because otherwise I think this amendment will be carried then. I need not say any more.
Amendment 62 proposes a new clause to prevent an overreliance on a person’s musical taste as probative of criminal proclivity or intent. On this side we agree that a person’s creative or artistic taste should not result in them being treated prejudicially by the judicial system. We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, the noble Baronesses, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon and Lady Chakrabarti, and others in support of this amendment.
We have some reservations about this amendment as it is currently drafted. We accept the good intentions behind it. We understand the danger it is designed to meet, namely that people are treated prejudicially for their creative and artistic tastes, and it is undoubtedly the case that those from particular backgrounds are vulnerable to this and may in effect suffer, or risk suffering, mistreatment in our courts. Against that, we fear also that the amendment might create other difficulties, creating genre-specific shields for certain evidence and thereby treating some expressions differently from others—in other words, shifting the balance too far and creating another class that is not protected. While we are sympathetic to this amendment, for those reasons we cannot support it.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I get to my feet with some diffidence, given the range of eminent speakers, many of whom I have the most utmost respect for, who have spoken in favour of this group of amendments. I start with Amendment 61 in the names of my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lord Beamish, my other friend, who is in fact also noble—the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot—and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. This is a powerful group, and I entirely accept what they say about the difficulties created when there is a presumption that a computer is working properly unless the defendant is able to produce evidence that it is not. That can create an enormous obstacle for defendants. It is extremely difficult to prove that something is not working in those circumstances, so I accept that. I also understand that what is sought here is to reverse that position and to take it back to the position of Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.
I have already discussed this briefly with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. The difficulty I have with this amendment is that it is extremely broad, and the problem with that is that, since Section 69 was introduced, what constitutes digital material has evolved significantly. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says that it is no answer to say that computers are everywhere, but I am afraid we have to be realistic about this. The computer evidence that is adduced in the criminal courts is, for example, the extremely complicated accounting software that is relied on by banks. That is at one extreme. But there is also the routine evidence that comes into criminal courts every single day, which can include text messages from mobile telephones, email chains, social media posts, DVLA printouts, medical records from GP surgeries and even criminal records themselves from the police national computer.
There is a real risk that if the amendment in this broad form were introduced, it could bring the criminal courts to a standstill. I know that is obviously not the intention, but I am concerned about whether there is a way of finding that we can limit it so that it excludes the routine use of computers—often things that people would not even think of as computers at all; the law recognises that a mobile phone is a computer, but most people would not think of it that way—and is limited to the cases that have caused real concern to those in your Lordships’ House, where a conviction is often based solely or mainly on the evidence of a computer. I can see a very different case to be made for that kind of evidence as well.
I entirely understand the intention behind this amendment, and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Beamish and the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, for the work that they have done in relation to Horizon. It is humbling to stand here and talk about the Horizon victims and survivors and what happened to them, and I would not want anyone to think that the Government are not listening in relation to this.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I can be brief. I support Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. We have already spoken about the need for consistency across our justice system. That includes extending the powers to compel offenders to attend their sentencing in the Crown Court to magistrates’ courts. This amendment would also bring the periods in which a case can be discontinued into alignment; indeed, I am interested to see what justification exists for the difference between the two. We have heard a compelling speech also from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, with a particular example. I know that one should be wary of individual examples, but it is a compelling example and we should listen to it carefully.
Apart from making the system more consistent in its procedures, this amendment would allow prosecutors in the Crown Court to discontinue a case at a late stage, preventing unnecessary, costly and time-consuming trials. In the context of a court backlog and the need for efficiency, allowing this more flexible mechanism for bringing prosecutions to an end appears to us to be a measured and sensible improvement. To be clear, Amendment 63 still allows the option to reopen a case following a successful victim’s right to review request, if it is concluded that the CPS has made an error in stopping the prosecution. This amendment would not do away with this important scheme which is available to victims. We thank the noble Lord for his efforts and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I will start with a little trip down memory lane. In either 2010 or 2011, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, when sitting in the Court of Appeal, heard a case called Killick. That was a case where prosecution had been restarted and, as part of his judgment in relation to it, the noble and learned Lord said that the Crown Prosecution Service needed to come up with a system that would allow victims to challenge a decision not to prosecute, without them having to bring judicial review proceedings. As he may remember, I was the prosecutor who remade the decision to charge in that case and, as a result, the Crown Prosecution Service—under a certain Director of Public Prosecutions, who may be known to your Lordships in another context at the moment, and I, working as his principal legal adviser—devised the victims’ right to review scheme.
I wrote much of the legal guidance, so the noble Lord, Lord Russell, is correct when he says I know quite a lot about it. I am a huge fan of the victims’ right to review scheme, because although the Crown Prosecution Service is in many ways a completely wonderful organisation, everybody is human and sometimes people get things wrong—and when we get it wrong, we want to put it right. Obviously, a right is not a right unless it has a remedy attached to it, and that is a real problem in some of these cases. The noble Lord knows, because I discussed this with him when we met, that my practice when I was dealing with reviews of cases was always that if I took the decision to offer no evidence, I would write to the victim and say, “In 14 days I am proposing to do this, unless you want to make representations to me as to why I should not, or seek judicial review proceedings”. I completely get the issue here.
The only note of caution I will sound is this. It would be a substantial change, with wide-ranging implications for both victims and defendants. For that reason, it needs to be considered carefully, because discontinuing a case is not simply putting a pause into proceedings. Restitution requires fresh proceedings, starting back in the magistrates’ court, which risks delay and uncertainty for both victims and defendants. It does not go straight back into the Crown Court as a restart. That is why robust safeguards and controls, which are not in this amendment, are essential when making these decisions.
For example, in the magistrates’ court procedure, which this amendment seeks to replicate, the defence can refuse to accept a discontinuance and insist on no evidence being offered, or insist that the Crown Prosecution Service makes a decision as to what it is going to do. We are anxious to ensure that discontinuance is not, for example, used in the Crown Court as a way of getting an adjournment that would not be got under other circumstances, as in saying: “We don’t have enough evidence here. We need another three months to get it, so we’re going to discontinue and then restart”. That could create awful uncertainty, both for victims and defendants, as to what is going on. There are, for example, cases where somebody is a youth at the time they are charged and, if the case is then discontinued, they may then be tried as an adult later on.
I am not saying that I do not understand the problem or that this may not be part of the solution, but it needs to be considered carefully. What we plan to do is to consider this proposal further in the context of the wider court reforms and Sir Brian Leveson’s most recent report, with his recommendations for improving efficiency. I also welcome the expansion of the CPS pilot, strengthening victims’ voices before final decisions to offer no evidence are made. The outcome of that pilot will also inform our thinking. For the time being, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst
“(aa) in that sub-paragraph for “28” substitute “56”;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment increases the window for applying to the Unduly Lenient Sentences Scheme from 28 days to 56 days.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments concerns the terms of the unduly lenient sentence scheme, which we consider has too narrow a window to effectively allow for victims to reflect upon and review the sentences given to their offenders. Amendments 64, 65 and 66 aim to increase the existing 28-day window for applying to the unduly lenient sentence scheme to one of 56 days.
Similarly, Amendment 69, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to allow the 28-day time limit to be extended in exceptional circumstances. We thank the noble Baroness for this amendment. We on these Benches are very receptive to the idea of including an “exceptional circumstances” clause in the unduly lenient sentence framework. It is a safeguard that recognises that victims may, for one reason or another, not always be able to act within the current timeframe. Currently, there exists an asymmetry between offenders and victims. Offenders might be able to seek extensions or have certain deadlines adjusted, whereas victims are rigidly bound by the 28-day window. This amendment helps to address that imbalance.
The process of applying for review of a sentence is not one that can always be readily undertaken within four weeks. It requires a knowledge of the law that often requires the instruction and subsequent direction of a lawyer, which in and of itself is a process that can often take up to, if not beyond, the 28-day window that victims are given in which to appeal. Crucial to this process is the availability of the sentencing remarks, a problem which we have partially solved in the Sentencing Act by requiring their release within 14 days, but that occupies, none the less, half the time the Government currently offer to appeal a lenient sentence.
Perhaps the most effective case for change is a human one. Victims must face and relive the most traumatic events of their lives in court. They have to re-encounter their offender in some cases—not due to the current drafting of Clause 1, I accept—and in the cases we are concerned with, they have to deal with what they believe to be an unjust sentence.
An increase to 56 days is not a drastic one; it simply increases the window to two months, and it allows slightly more time for the process to be completed. We on these Benches are also open to the idea of a longer window to apply specifically for victims and, where they are murdered in cases of extremely serious crime, their next of kin. That may be for another day.
I turn to Amendment 72, which seeks to place a clear statutory duty on the Crown Prosecution Service to notify victims or, in the case of a deceased victim, their next of kin, of their right to request a review under the unduly lenient sentence scheme. At present, whether a victim is informed of the scheme can depend upon practice rather than principle. In some cases, of course, victims are advised promptly and clearly. In others, awareness depends rather upon chance, whether it is mentioned to them by their legal advocate or at some other time during the court process, or whether they independently discover its existence. That is not a satisfactory basis on which to safeguard a right of such importance, and particularly one that is time limited within a strict statutory window.
A right that expires after 28 days, or indeed 56 if our earlier amendments are accepted, is meaningful only if the person entitled to exercise it is made aware of it in good time, and before time starts to run. Without notification, the right is illusory at best. Amendment 72 therefore proposes a straightforward and practical safeguard; namely, the CPS must write to the victim, or their next of kin, within 10 working days of a sentence being delivered, informing them of their ability to seek a review. This is not burdensome. The CPS is already engaged with victims throughout the prosecution process. Contact details are held; communication channels should exist. This amendment simply makes notification consistent and mandatory. Amendment 75, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has the same aim as our amendment, albeit with a marginally different mechanism. I hope that we can work together to achieve this reform.
If we are to maintain a short and strict time limit for challenging unduly lenient sentences, the least that we can do is to ensure that victims are properly informed of that right. Without such a duty, access to the scheme may depend less on justice and more on happenstance. We trust our judges, but we know that even they are not infallible. Some will be more sparing with their sentences; some will be more certain in their own judgment and not feel the need to alert victims to the scheme. Others will simply forget on occasions. This should not be the case. The Government are very well equipped to create a system in which a letter is sent out, within 10 days, alerting victims of their right to apply for a review of the sentencing. They do it endlessly in other departments; it should be a seamlessly transferable process. All are equal before the law. I beg to move.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, my two amendments in this group, Amendments 69 and 75, also make proposals for unduly lenient sentences, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has mentioned. From these Benches, we have been keen to improve the access that victims have to challenge what they believe is an unduly lenient sentence. I had amendments to try to achieve this in the Victims and Prisoners Bill in 2023-24.
It is worth pausing to review what has happened since 1988, when the ULS scheme started and victims were given the right to ask the Attorney-General to reconsider the sentence of their offender. One of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, concerns guaranteeing that victims are informed. Currently, the victims’ code places responsibility for informing victims about the ULS scheme on witness care units. For bereaved families entitled to the Crown Prosecution Service bereaved families scheme, the CPS should where possible, through the prosecutor and the trial advocate, meet the family at court following sentencing—if they attend the hearing—and inform them about the ULS scheme where appropriate. However, evidence from victims and bereaved families shows that this often does not happen, with many learning about the scheme only when it is too late to apply. By contrast, the offender and their legal representatives are present at sentencing and able to start planning any appeal against the sentence. In extenuating circumstances, the offender can also be given more than 28 days to launch their appeal. The offender also has post-sentence meetings with their legal representatives. It was clear then, and it remains so now, that the offender had and has more rights and support than the victim. This is not a level playing field.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. I am delighted that the Minister is in listening mode—I might win one at last.
Dealing with my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s points, I think the point is simply this: we certainly do not want to encourage victims down the road of hopeless applications which actually make things worse for them and make them more disappointed. Extending the time limit of itself does not do that; that is simply extending the time limit. Informing them properly does not do that, and the CPS could, I am quite sure, design a standard form letter which states the time limit for doing this but that the parameters —it would not use that word, obviously, but plain English —for an application are limited, so people should not raise their hopes. That would be the way forward.
I would be very happy to meet the Minister after the recess to discuss this. There is merit in the idea of guidance or guidelines—that seems attractive. We seem to be moving in the right direction, so that there might be an extension of time to 56 days and that the 28-day time limit on any basis might be extended where exceptional circumstances arise, and that on any basis there should be some mandatory obligation on the Crown Prosecution Service to notify victims of their right, and I hope that that would include next of kin in appropriate cases. I think that addresses everything. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted to be able to support my noble friend Lady Sater’s amendment. I have heard her express these views before, I heard her express them just now, and there is nothing more to be said. I urge this Committee to get on and agree with her.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sater, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for tabling Amendment 68. We agree with the principle that children who commit crimes should thus be charged as children, even if by the time of their court appearance they are above the age of 18. What matters is the mental state of the offender at the time the offence was committed, not the lottery of when he or she comes to court. The amendment seeks to ensure that there is no loophole preventing this being the case, and we therefore hope that the Government will agree with that aim.
Amendment 70 in my name concerns the collection and publication of data relating to offenders’ immigration history and status. This is a sensitive issue. Illegal immigration has long been a core political issue for voters and has become even more salient in recent years. There continues to be widespread misinformation and unfounded assertions, both in person and online. That is because empirical evidence concerning immigration has not always been readily available. People perceive changes occurring as a result of policy, but often operate under the assumption that the Government are shielding themselves from transparency. That is not the case, of course, but it must be dealt with.
Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than with crime rates. The public feel less safe, they see the demographic change and they link the two. This is problematic. It can lead to misguided opinions about certain parts of society. There is no available data to inform opinions of what the true position is. Non-governmental studies and disjointed data releases have repeatedly justified this connection, but the lack of clarification from the Government still leaves room for the general public to be decried as fearmongering or bigoted. It is not just policy: people deserve to know the impact that government policies are having on their everyday lives, especially when they can have immediate impacts on their safety.
We say that there is a clear case to publish crime data by immigration status. Accurate and comprehensive data allows for informed debate and evidence-based policy. At present the information is scarce, it is fragmented and it leaves the public, and indeed policymakers, reliant on conjecture. If transparency and open justice are priorities, to release offender data by foreign national status and immigration history would provide clarity, support public confidence and allow all sides to address the facts without speculation.
The Minister will be aware of the time we have previously spent on the topics in Amendments 71 and 74. Amendment 71 would exempt sex offenders and domestic abusers from being eligible for early release at the one-third point of their sentence, while Amendment 74 would reaffirm the Government’s policy of favouring suspended sentences but once again seeks to exclude sexual offences and domestic abuse from the presumption. Custodial sentences should of course by judged by the extent to which they deter reoffending. We accept the Government’s belief that short custodial sentences often do not serve this end, but reoffending cannot be the sole metric by which the nature of a punishment is decided. The prison system at least prevents individuals from offending while they are incarcerated.
For sexual offences and domestic abuse, these considerations are not abstract, certainly for the victims. Victims’ lives, safety, sense of security, the opportunity to reorganise their lives and perhaps move or otherwise change their way of living, are directly affected by whether an offender is at liberty or in custody. In 2019, the first year for which comparable data is available, there were 214,000 arrests for domestic abuse and 60,000 convictions, a conviction proportion of 28%. In 2025—six years later and under this Government—there were 360,000 arrests for domestic abuse but only 41,000 convictions, a drop from 60,000 and a conviction rate of just 11%. Something must be done.
The Government have highlighted the scale and seriousness of sexual offences and domestic abuse. They have described violence against women and girls as a “national emergency”. They have committed to strategies including specialist investigative teams and enhanced training for officers, and demonstrated recognition that these crimes demand careful handling. It would be inconsistent to promote such measures while making it easier for offenders of these crimes to avoid immediate custody.
This principle also extends to early release. It becomes a moral question rather than a purely empirical one when an offender has drastically altered the life of a victim by means of their crime. I do not think it reflects who we are as a society if we say that those who commit as invasive and exploitative a crime as sexual assault or domestic abuse should not serve the full extent of their sentences.
I end by saying I hope the Liberal Democrats will support these amendments. They have made it a point of principle, as have we, that victims of domestic violence deserve targeted measures to prevent them suffering further harm. Their justice spokesman in the other place, Josh Barbarinde, tabled a Bill last year to prevent domestic abusers from being released early under the Government’s SDS40 scheme. They now have a chance to put their principle into practice, as Amendment 71 would have exactly the same effect. I hope they will be able to offer their support.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start with Amendment 68 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sater. She spoke passionately about this issue during the passage of the Sentencing Act and I pay tribute to her wealth of experience on this topic. As a former youth magistrate and a member of the Youth Justice Board, I have a lot of sympathy for the issues raised.
However, this amendment would radically change the youth justice landscape. As the noble Baroness knows, sentencing guidelines already make it clear that, when an individual is dealt with as an adult for crimes that were committed when they were a youth, they are to be sentenced as though they were being sentenced at the time that they committed the offence and not when they appear before the court. They also state that the courts have got to consider not only the chronological age of the offenders but their maturity and other relevant factors that remind the court they are not just mini-adults and need to be treated differently. Our position is that we remain concerned about the operational and legal complexity associated with a proposal like this. We are worried that we may not be able to achieve this during the passage of the Bill. However, I would like to speak to the noble Baroness, if she is willing to meet with me, and let us see what we can do.
Amendment 70, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, aims to place statutory duties on the Crown Court, HMCTS and the Secretary of State in relation to collecting and publishing data on sentencing. This Government remain committed to developing the data we publish on foreign national offenders. The Ministry of Justice has already taken action to increase transparency on the data published and, notably, in July, for the first time the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group.