Lord Sandhurst
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Lord Sandhurst
“Whole life order: murder of a police or prison officer(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph 2 of Schedule 21 (Determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc), in sub-paragraph (2)(c), after “duty,”, insert “or if the motivation for the murder was connected to the police officer or prison officer’s current or former duties,”.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would expand the circumstances in which it is appropriate to apply a whole life order for murdering a prison or police officer, to include murder motivated by the victim’s current or former duties.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to introduce the second day of Committee on the Sentencing Bill. Amendment 51, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, proposes a targeted and necessary change to Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act, dealing with the Sentencing Code. Its purpose is straightforward: to ensure that, where a police or prison officer is murdered because of or in retaliation for their current or former duties, that murder automatically falls within the highest sentencing category—that is, one where a whole-life order is available and, ordinarily, appropriate.
At present, Schedule 21 refers to murders committed “in the course of” the victim’s duty. Those words are too narrow. We suggest that the provision was intended to capture the most egregious attacks on those who serve the public in roles that inherently expose them to danger. However, the phrase
“in the course of … duty”
in the statute has, in practice, been interpreted by the courts in a restrictive manner, excluding cases where an officer is murdered because of, in retaliation for or in consequence of their earlier performance of their official duties—for example, when a murder takes place a while later, after service has ended.
This amendment would correct that anomaly by inserting the essential clarification that, where the motivation for the murder is connected to the officer’s current or former duties, the case will fall within the highest sentencing category. That is legally coherent and morally necessary. Motive is already a well-recognised component of sentencing. It is taken into account in terrorism offences, hate crimes, witness intimidation and organised crime retaliation. It is therefore entirely consistent with the existing principle that the deliberate targeting of an officer because he or she carried out their duty should be regarded as an aggravating feature of the utmost severity.
This amendment would not create a new offence. It would not broaden the law on homicide or interfere with the Law Commission’s wider review. With precision and exclusively, it would ensure that the statutory scheme reflects Parliament’s clear and settled understanding that to murder a police officer or prison officer simply for having done their job is among the gravest crimes known to our law.
Let me speak plainly. We have seen the consequences of the existing drafting. The tragic case of former prison officer Lenny Scott revealed the gap starkly. Lenny Scott, whose widow and father I and others met last week, carried out his duties with integrity in HM Prison Altcourse, Liverpool. In March 2020, he discovered an illegal phone in the hands of a prisoner. He was offered but refused a bribe to turn a blind eye. He duly reported it, and, as a result, not only was the prisoner discovered to have had a phone but it was discovered that he had been having an affair with a woman prison officer—which was pretty serious, if you think about it. For that simple act of professionalism, Lenny received explicit threats at the time that he would be seen to. Those threats were graphic. They contained details about the appearance of his twin boys, who were no older than six years old.
Some years later, on 8 February 2024, after Lenny had left the Prison Service, those threats were put into practice. He was hunted down and murdered—shot as he left a gym class, in a planned act of revenge. It was a murder directly and unequivocally connected to the past performance of his duties. This was a gangland execution intended to punish Lenny for doing his duty and not giving way to what had been asked of him, and to terrify and intimidate other prison officers into doing gangsters’ bidding in the future. Because this crime did not occur in the course of his duty but a couple of years later, the statutory framework failed to treat it as the kind of murder for which Parliament provides the highest penalty and the judge therefore did not pass a whole-life order. This is a clear loophole in the legislation, and I look to the Minister to put it right. How many more Lennies will there be?
Serving officers in prisons and in the police force must know that there is the added protection of whole-life-order deterrence after they have left as well as when they are in active service. How many serving or former officers walk our streets knowing that they will remain potential targets long after they take off the uniform, and knowing that under the law as presently interpreted, their killers may not face the penalty that Parliament intended for those who attack innocent public servants?
We cannot undo the tragedy that happened to Lenny Scott and his family, nor repair the pain, but we can ensure that the law is changed. We can ensure that the sentencing framework recognises that the risks to officers do not end when their shift finishes and certainly do not disappear when they have left the force. When a murder is motivated and driven by the officer’s service, the seriousness, risk and moral culpability are exactly the same. This is a plain gap in the legislation as currently drafted, and it must be closed immediately.
It is very disappointing that this amendment was opposed by the Government on Report in the other place. The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats together were in rare agreement on this amendment. I urge the Minister not to oppose it.
This amendment is modest in drafting but deep in its importance. It transcends political fault lines. I suggest that there is no reason why any noble Lords should oppose it. It simply makes no sense that a whole-life order can be imposed for the murder of a prison officer while he is a serving prison officer and while he is at work, but not if he is killed on the weekend with his family. This amendment would restore coherence to the statutory scheme and protects those who seek to protect us. I commend it to the Committee.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, it is a great honour to have the opportunity to speak for the Government during the second day in Committee on the Sentencing Bill. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for drawing attention to this important topic, which I have carefully considered.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
What happened to Lenny Scott is absolutely appalling, and we need to ensure that we do all we can so that no other prison officers, or previously serving prison officers, have the same fate. We want to work with the Law Commission and to take away the points raised by the noble Lord to discuss them with colleagues. What is important is that we ensure that the public are protected from the people who commit these terrible crimes.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I shall be reasonably brief. Amendment 51 is simple, precise and entirely consistent with established principles of sentencing. It does not create a new offence and, with respect, it does not pre-empt the Law Commission’s broader review. Instead, it addresses a real gap—and, with respect, we do not need the Law Commission to decide whether there is a gap here. Prison officers in particular need this protection. We have seen the tragic consequences, and this is the sort of threat that we are likely to see more of, not less.
We look to the Minister for assurances on this. Otherwise, it will come back on Report. It must be accepted that murdering a police officer or prison officer because of or in the course of their duty is one of the gravest crimes imaginable. The law should reflect this, not simply to punish but to deter. It must deal with and deter against calculated acts of revenge against former officers. Gangland people will learn about this. It will get about in prison. They will know. It will go down the network.
This amendment is significant for the men and women who carry out with integrity the difficult and demanding work of protecting our streets and looking after—I use that phrase advisedly—the prisoners under their care. It is important that we reassure and encourage them. We want the best people to serve in our prisons. We do not want recruitment to be handicapped. What message will it send out if the Government say, “Oh well, if you’re shot down two years later, that doesn’t count. We’ve got to hope that the judge gets it right”? We must provide the right protections throughout the careers of these officers and beyond. We have the opportunity today to close that gap.
I beg leave to withdraw the amendment for now, but it remains very much on the table.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 52 would provide for the Secretary of State to make an assessment of the benefits of mandatory rehabilitative programmes regarding healthy relationships for individuals sentenced for offences when the victim is a woman or girl and to lay a copy of that assessment before Parliament. I declare an interest as a trustee of Safer London, a charity which works with young Londoners affected by, or at risk of, violence and exploitation. Among these are young Londoners who display harmful sexual behaviours. Often, they may not have a full understanding of their actions, where their behaviours may stem from or that they themselves need support.
I am under no illusion that an intervention is likely to be quick or easy. These are young or not so young people who have had no role model or a bad role model, who may be neurodiverse, who may be resistant to relevant specialist treatment and support. They may not understand what a healthy relationship is like. They may believe that what is harmful is what a girl or woman wants. The picture over recent years has become further confused by what they see online or on social media. I am under no illusion that this is easy, but it is important. A Bill seeking to reduce reoffending is just the place where this kind of action should be taken. I am not asking for such programmes immediately, though it is good if there are some that can be accessed. However, I would like to see put into the public domain an assessment of the benefits of programmes such as this.
The other amendments in this group are in the name of the Conservative Front Bench. They seem to focus largely on the number of rehabilitation activity days. The number of days is a factor, but it is neither the first factor nor the only one; the content of rehabilitative activity and the reasons for that are more important. In other words, the approach should be more reasoned and nuanced than these amendments might suggest.
I beg to move.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, these amendments, many of which are in my name—Amendments 53, 54 and so on—address the Government’s proposal to transfer a significant element of sentencing discretion from the courts to probation practitioners: determining the number of rehabilitation activity days under community orders and suspended sentence orders. The amendments seek not to frustrate reform, although, as we made clear on our first day in Committee, we oppose the changes. They are intended to ensure that, if such powers are to be reallocated to the probation officer or practitioner from the judges, they are supported and buttressed by the same principled framework of accountability, transparency and procedural safeguards that have underpinned judicial discretion through the years.
The constitutional architecture of this country has long rested on the independence and authority of our judiciary. Sentencing is a judicial function and the product of reasoned evaluation of seriousness, culpability, risk and proportionality. Judges exercise that responsibility transparently, in open court and subject to appellate review. These protections exist because sentencing is a public act in which legitimacy rests on visible fairness. Society, represented by the third limb of the constitution—the judiciary—is passing sentence on outlaws and criminal offenders.
Clauses 11 and 12 would shift this discretion from judges to probation practitioners. Probation professionals are dedicated and skilled, of course, but they were never intended to assume quasi-judicial responsibilities. The Government may describe this as flexibility, but flexibility cannot become a veil for judicial discretion exercised behind closed doors without consistency or oversight. If probation offices are to take on direct decision-making powers that influence the substance of a sentence, proper safeguards must apply; the Bill, we submit, contains none.
Amendment 53 would therefore require the Secretary of State to establish, by regulation, clear national criteria governing how rehabilitation activity days are to be determined. Decisions of such consequence must not depend on local practice, staffing pressures or administrative expediency; in these straitened financial times, I emphasise “staffing pressures or administrative expediency”. Judges operate within well-established frameworks. Probation practitioners should not be left to improvise.
Amendment 54 would require written reasons for the determination of rehabilitation days. Giving reasons is a cornerstone of fairness. Offenders must personally understand what is required of them. Victims must be able to trust the process, and the courts must be able to review what is being done in their name.
Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)
My Lords, I was not intending to intervene at all in this group, but could I just try to inject an element of reality into Amendment 86A, which the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, proposes? It requires the courts service to record and retain, in respect of all offenders convicted and sentenced in the Crown Court and magistrates’ court, the details that have been referred to: country of birth, nationality, ethnicity, immigration status, and the offences themselves.
It is important to remind the Committee that, in the magistrates’ courts, hundreds of thousands of minor offences are dealt with every year. For example, there are hundreds of thousands of motoring offences such as speeding, careless driving, not having insurance and matters of that sort, as well as tens or hundreds of thousands of failures to pay a TV licence. The vast majority of those cases do not trouble a court in the normal sense, in that there is no hearing in a court. They are dealt with under the single justice procedure. Almost all of them, save those that are contested, are dealt with, essentially, on the papers.
The information identified in the proposed amendment is not available at the moment, and it is difficult to see how it might be made available. I cannot, for the moment, think of a way that it could be done without exponentially increasing the burden on the system generally and imposing huge burdens on those who have been prosecuted for speeding or not having a TV licence, and so forth. Unless there were compulsion of some sort for this information to be given, nothing could sensibly happen. I do not seek to express a view on the merits of collecting such information, or at least parts of it, for some cases; that already happens, as in the Crown Court, to some extent. However, the breadth of this amendment travels into the area of unreality, I regret to say.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have tabled amendments and spoken on the topic of transparency. It is an important aspect of the criminal justice system that it is accountable and instils trust in the public, who rely on it.
Beginning with Amendment 58A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we on these Benches broadly support the aim of this measure. Knowing the affordability and accessibility of treatments and activities is an important part of ensuring that the probation system is working. Such matters are vital to persons on probation, and they can make a real contribution to those who complete their probation periods. Regional inequalities should be known and addressed, so that all who are subject to such orders have the same means with which to complete their sentence. That may be an ideal, but it is what we should be aiming for.
I offer support from these Benches for the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough. There may indeed be real practical issues and objections, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, has reminded us of, with all his experience. He is right to draw our attention to the practical difficulties in identifying and recording ethnicity and other information—that may well be for another day. That is a fundamental objection; none the less, we would argue that the Government should certainly be looking at what information can be sensibly obtained in this area.
I was somewhat surprised to hear the noble Lord, Lord Marks, say “yes” to the collection of data in principle but “no” to its publication. That is what I think he said. Who will see it, then? Just civil servants and Ministers? Not Members of Parliament? Not Members of this House? If collected, it will certainly leak. Maybe I misunderstood him.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I think the noble Lord did misunderstand me. I did not oppose publication in any broad way; I simply said it was a matter of discretion as to what should be published and what should be kept private. The issue of universal publication is the danger that I expressed. It is a matter of discretion, relevance and importance, and those are decisions to be taken by those who collect the information.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
I think there are problems with that as to how the discretion would be exercised and who would set what rules. I will not spend any longer on this, but I suggest that my noble friend Lord Young of Acton was right when he drew attention to the interim guidance supported by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. We really have to think about this. We need information—we need some sunlight—and if we do not have accurate information, the wrong information will be put out there, will be used by populists and will be dangerous.
We need accurate information. If it is limited to serious and Crown Court cases, that would at least be an important start. We do not need to know the ethnicity of every driving offender—that is clearly unnecessary—but why not for offences of violence and everything else in the Crown Court? If it can be done, let us just look at it.
Lord Bach (Lab)
My Lords, forgive me for interrupting the noble Lord. I am grateful to him for giving way. Why do we need to know anyone’s ethnicity? Why is that relevant at the stage that we are talking about? I am afraid I just do not get this argument. Why is ethnicity relevant and to whom is it relevant?
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
It is only one of the factors included. I did not mean to select just that. I was using it as shorthand for what is in my noble friend Lord Jackson’s amendment, which includes country of birth—which I suggest is relevant—and nationality.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I beg the indulgence of the Committee to specifically answer the reasonable point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bach. There is and has been for many years significant concern about the overpolicing of some communities. That has given rise to a number of key initiatives, including the police action plan, which the noble Lord with his great expertise is well aware of. That is based on the collection and collation of data around ethnicity. You cannot have one without the other, I am afraid.
Therefore, to keep the faith and trust that taxpayers have in the criminal justice system, one has to collect as much data as possible. If one collects it to prevent overpolicing, one should also collect it for other reasons, so that you have a clear, transparent system.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
There is quite a lot to cover in this group. My noble friend has made the point. We never suffer from having too much information. If it is collected in bits and pieces, there is the danger of distortion.
The report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, exposed a decade-long data collapse and made it clear that this should not carry on any longer. This is an area in which we have dragged our feet for too long. The majority of OECD countries have mandatory reporting statutes. The fact is that the United Kingdom does not do the same, and that is no help to anyone other than the offenders.
We need to do something to implement the recommendations from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. The amendment would give forces the necessary data to record, analyse and respond to different dynamics in different communities. Publishing data would prove to the public that the Government are not concerned with accusations of bigotry but focused on outcomes. These are clear benefits in this amendment for noble Lords’ efforts to tackle crime and reduce reoffending. I hope the Minister has considered it carefully.
Lord Sandhurst
“(3A) Where a court imposes a driving prohibition requirement under subsection (3) the court must be satisfied that suitable arrangements exist for the practical monitoring of compliance with the requirement.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would add a general practicability condition to the imposition of driving prohibition requirement, ensuring they may only be imposed where compliance can realistically be monitored.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. We on these Benches welcome the underlying principle of Clauses 13 to 16, which relate to new community order requirements that can be imposed on offenders as part of their suspended sentences and community orders that can be imposed on offenders as part of their sentences. However, as I asked at Second Reading, the big question is: how are these going to be made a practical reality?
There is a commendable aim here: to equip the courts with additional tools that will both enhance public protection and steer offenders towards genuine rehabilitation. It may surprise noble Lords to hear that we on these Benches do not oppose suspended sentences as a concept or in application. It has been abundantly clear, I hope, that we take issue with Clauses 1 and 2 as they are currently drafted because we believe that there should not be such an indiscriminate provision for criminals to serve their sentences in the community. However, for those offenders who should serve their sentences on a suspended basis, these clauses are a welcome measure. They will improve the regime—or, at least, they have the potential to improve the regime, if properly drafted.
Many noble Lords have spoken of their support for suspended sentences in favour of short-term custodial ones, arguing that the short-term benefits of serving such sentences in prison are largely outweighed, if not entirely negated, by the effects of custody. Although we recognise this argument and, in many cases, agree with it, I would respectfully point out that this is just one side of the coin. Of course, the outcomes for prisoners themselves are an important consideration in this debate—because, if successful, the Bill will prevent or reduce the rate of recidivism—but we must recognise the wider public. They also have an interest in recidivism—namely, that it does not occur—as well as a legitimate interest in seeing the right people be positively punished.
If we are to give support to the broader aim of this Bill, it will hinge entirely on the Government’s ability to ensure—in fact, to guarantee—that those on suspended sentences will be managed in a manner that drives towards public safety, not just the term of the sentence. If it cannot be shown that those being released into the community cannot be managed in a safe and effective way, we will fail the public by allowing this Bill to pass into statute. Noble Lords may wish to point to statistics that claim that reoffending rates are lower for those on suspended sentences, but the reality is that the statistic is not nothing. If we are to allow offenders on to the streets, we must do so in a way that does not increase the danger to citizens going about their lives and does not increase the crime rate.
A higher number will receive suspended sentences than do at the moment. It must be common sense that, when imposing suspended sentences, judges have striven, at least to date, to impose them on those for whom they think there is a lower risk of breach. But if it is to be, in effect, for everybody, inevitably there will be those for whom there is a higher risk of breach.
On day one in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, spoke in opposition to exemptions we suggested from the suspended sentence provision in Clause 1. She said she had thought:
“If there is a real danger to the general public, we probably wouldn’t be looking at a sentence of less than 12 months”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1342.]
The reality is that there is a range of crimes for which offenders are routinely sentenced to immediate custodial terms of 12 months or less. It is a matter of fact that certain sex offenders come within that category. The noble Baroness may not consider such people a real danger to the public, but we on these Benches do. Further, the Minister has confirmed that, in reality, this presumption will extend to sentences up to 18 months once guilty pleas are accounted for; in other words, 18 months discounted to 12 because of a prompt and early guilty plea, and then suspended.
We must be very clear about this: sentences of up to 18 months’ imprisonment apply to categories of people who are certainly violent and certainly dangerous. They may not be dangerous to a particular identified individual, meaning that the exemptions in the statute will not apply. Instead, we are at the mercy of court orders to keep the public safe.
The amendment proposed on day one to exempt those involved in terrorist or associated offences from the suspended sentence provision was also met with resistance. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked:
“If an offender commits a terrorist act, is he looking at 12 months or less?”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1350.]
Under the Terrorism Act 2000, a person who wears an item of clothing or displays an article related to a proscribed organisation will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment “not exceeding six months”. This means that an offender wishing to fly an al-Qaeda or a Nazi flag on the street will, in this case, now receive a suspended sentence. They are not putting a particular individual at significant risk of harm, but I am sure noble Lords will agree that they are a risk to the public and the behaviour of the public generally. Such behaviour winds people up. Yet will they not be exempt from this presumption, as currently drafted?
We will never support this measure, but if we must resign ourselves to the possibility that this will soon be the reality, we on these Benches will strive to do everything we can to lessen the risk to the public. That is why the amendments in this group have been tabled, and I will now briefly outline the practical aims of each.
Amendments 59, 64, 69 and 72 would add a general practicality condition to the imposition of the new community order requirements. This has been suggested to ensure that they may be imposed only where compliance with such requirements can realistically be monitored. Imposing these new orders will be meaningless if we cannot ensure that they can and will be enforced in practice. It is of no practical benefit to ban an offender from a particular type of public event if there is no meaningful way of ensuring that he or she will in fact not attend such events when released into the community. Likewise, there is little value in placing a driving prohibition on an offender who feels no deterrent from getting back on the road as a result of an order that he knows is fruitless in practice.
These amendments touch on a point of the utmost importance. If the Government oppose them, they are saying that they are willing to allow the courts to impose orders which they know will not be upheld in practice. This was the exact justification for the removal of the rehabilitative activity days in Clause 12; namely, that the maximum thresholds are rarely upheld in practice and so they needed reform. Will the Government follow the same logic for the new powers they are giving the courts, or will they allow conditions of suspended sentence to be given out in the full knowledge that they are just token gestures?
We make this point not only to expose the inconsistent arguments that the Government have set out in the Bill. This is not simply a matter of an ineffective law that is likely to waste the already stretched resources of our judiciary; failure to get this right will lead to more crime. It will result in more sexual offences, assaults, thefts and knives on our streets. If offenders cannot be practically managed under the new community requirement conditions, they should not be allowed to return straight to society.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness. That is very interesting, and I will take it back to the department.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the explanation given by the Minister, but the issues at stake here are not theoretical; they are practical questions about how these conditions will actually work. Will they be real, meaningful and enforceable? The Government have repeatedly asserted confidence in suspended sentences and the expanded use of community-based requirements. If that confidence is well placed, these amendments should be entirely uncontroversial; they do nothing more than ensure that what is ordered by a judge can be delivered in reality.
We are not seeking to impose obligations to enforce on the licensee of a public house, for example, but they should know so that they are then free to pass the information on to the police or the Probation Service, because they will not want someone there who is the subject of an order. It will be a public house order, for example, because the offender has a particular issue with behaviour in such places—so too with football grounds or other specified events. The host, if that is the right word, should be informed and should know that a particular individual, if recognised, should not be on his premises and can be turned away.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, with her usual acuity, pointed to the civil liberty aspects of this as well. I will not embark on those, but she also identified practical and policy issues underlying these provisions in Clauses 13 to 16. We on these Benches suggest that these amendments insert a simple and reasonable test. They do not impose a condition unless compliance can realistically be monitored in practice by the Probation Service, and the Probation Service will need help from the hosts. It is not radical to say that orders issued by a court should carry weight. A prohibition that in practice cannot and will not be checked is not a deterrent. A restriction that cannot and will not be enforced is not a restriction. Without these safeguards, we will create orders that are performative rather than protective. They will offer only the illusion of safety to communities and to victims.
The Government themselves use this precise standard when justifying reforms elsewhere in the Bill—for example, removing rehabilitative activity days because the system “did not operate effectively in practice”. The provisions in Clauses 13 to 16, if they are to be enforced, must be enforceable in practice and must be effective. If a condition is imposed but nobody has a duty to enforce it, it is not a condition at all. The Probation Service is not going to have time to run around the pubs, football grounds and so on; it is going to have to rely on information from other people.
These amendments would simply ensure that the supervising authority has responsibility for enforcement and is given the means to do so, rather than the vague hope that somebody may intervene if they happen to notice a breach. Without this duty, we repeat here that the failures seen with criminal behaviour orders and football banning orders, where thousands of breaches each year go unpursued and offenders learn that compliance is optional, will be repeated. Public confidence will not be restored by rhetoric; in fact, it will be damaged. It will be damaged by visible consequences, namely failures to enforce.
The Government propose to release more offenders into the community under suspended and community-based regimes. That is a political choice. Having chosen that path, they must choose the responsibility to ensure that it works and that it is safe. We should not be asking the British Government to accept greater risk while refusing the safeguards that would mitigate that risk. Ministers who believe that this strategy will reduce reoffending should have no objection to tests of practicability, enforcement duties and notification requirements. To oppose these amendments, they must be justified as to why they will be unenforceable, unmonitored, unaccountable conditions. That is a hard case to make to the victims, to police officers on the street or to the public whose safety is being traded away.
The amendments we put forward are not obstructive but supportive. They would help, indeed allow, the Government’s policy to function in the real world, not just on the printed page. If we are to put offenders back in the community who might not otherwise have been there—indeed, probably would not have been—the very least we owe the public is confidence that these conditions will be monitored and enforced, so I urge the Government to look again at these amendments and to reflect. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, for moving his amendment. Providing care for individuals with addictions, gambling in particular, should be a fundamental role of a national health service, and we support his aims.
As the noble Lord explained, gambling addiction is a chronic issue across this country. Roughly 2.8% of all adults are engaged in at-risk or problem gambling—a huge number of people either in need of, or at risk of needing, support services. His amendments highlight this issue and the need for our services properly to address gambling addiction.
We support the sentiment behind the approach to general addiction recovery services of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe. Often, individuals with addiction either cannot or do not want to accept recovery services. To introduce a requirement to engage with services would serve those people. This is particularly the case in prisons. Last year, there were almost 50,000 adults in recovery in alcohol and drug treatment centres in prison and secure settings. Almost 60% of those individuals were undergoing treatment for crack or opiates. That 60% comprises vulnerable individuals being treated for misuse of the hardest substances.
The principle behind Amendments 131 to 133, from the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, clearly reflects the reality of the situation. We heard an interesting proposal from the noble Lord, which merits consideration. We also heard an interesting speech from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, who of course has great experience as a Minister in this field. We remain, however, not fully convinced that this group of amendments would have the desired effect.
There is a large question mark hovering over the whole Bill: the general enforceability of the new orders it introduces. We have explained that we do not agree with the decision to suspend sentences under 18 months—that is, 18 months because the Government have opposed our guilty plea amendment—but if the Government are to make this all work, the new orders they impose have to be effective. As I have said before, we are not convinced that they will be.
As I have already argued, the Government’s new drinking establishment entry prohibition requirement realistically is unenforceable. Public event attendance is too vague and too broad. The Government’s approach to new orders is largely deficient. We do not think they should be taking on new responsibilities, even if there is a need for them, as is the case with gambling addiction, when they have demonstrated an incapacity to plan for the existing responsibilities that are being imposed.
The onus, therefore, is on the Government to demonstrate that the noble Lord’s well-intentioned amendments can be accepted, if possible, and then implemented. We would like this to be the case, but only if possible. Gambling addiction and addiction in general require attention from our state, but the state must first prove itself competent. We look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for sharing their views and tabling these amendments, which raise important issues around tackling gambling harms and the harms caused by other addictions. Just last week I met a prisoner at HMP Wormwood Scrubs whose life have been devastated by gambling harm. Although the data on gambling is limited, I understand that this is an important issue impacting the lives of offenders and their families.
Amendments 70 and 78 would introduce new community order requirements: one prohibiting an offender from entering a gambling establishment, and one introducing a mandatory treatment requirement. I wholeheartedly share the commitment of the noble Lord, Lord Foster, to supporting offenders whose lives are impacted by gambling. I assure noble Lords that courts already have the power to prohibit offenders serving a community or suspended sentence from entering gambling premises. They can do this through a prohibited activity requirement.
However, I reassure the noble Lord that we will continue to keep the menu of community requirements under close review. Clause 17 introduces a power to add or amend community requirements using secondary legislation. This will provide further flexibility to ensure that the framework is kept relevant to the offending behaviour.
The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foster, and my noble friend Lord Brooke, and supported by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, speak to the wider issue of how the criminal justice system can support and treat those whose offending is driven by addiction or mental health needs. I know this issue is close to noble Lords’ hearts and I agree completely that alongside effective punishment we have a duty to rehabilitate offenders with gambling addictions and other needs. We must provide them with the right support throughout the criminal justice system to rebuild their lives. I hope it will help your Lordships for me to set out the ways in which we are already doing so.
Pre-sentence reports help the court identify underlying issues such as harmful gambling, mental ill-health and addiction, which may influence offending behaviour. Mental health conditions and addictions can be considered at sentencing where they are relevant to the offence or the offender’s culpability. Courts are encouraged to take an individualised approach, particularly where the condition contributes to someone’s offending. Where appropriate, courts may consider mental health treatment requirements, funded by NHS England as part of a community or suspended sentence order, where mental health has been identified as an underlying factor. The use of these requirements has increased significantly in recent years.
Alongside this, HMPPS delivers a broad range of rehabilitative interventions through probation, which can help address wider gambling-related harms. This includes support with thinking and behaviour, homelessness or unemployment. We also work closely with health partners to ensure that pathways to treatment and recovery services are accessible for offenders and aligned with prison and probation services. This includes increasing the use and effectiveness of mental health, alcohol and drug treatment requirements as part of community and suspended sentences.
For those in prison, there is already a statutory duty for prison governors to provide health services in custody, with our approach guided by the principle of equivalence of care to patients in the community. We are ensuring that prison leavers remain in treatment on release by strengthening links to prison, probation and treatment providers.
Finally, support for those with gambling-related harms in the criminal justice system will be bolstered by funding from the statutory gambling levy. The Government have committed to publishing an annual report on the progress of this. I will also reach out to representatives in the gambling industry and will look to host a round table with them next year to better understand the impacts of gambling harm and what more we can do.
The noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, also tabled Amendment 108, which would give new powers to set licence conditions prohibiting offenders from entering a gambling establishment. I want to be clear that the provisions in Clause 24 will support our aim to give practitioners a full range of tools to manage and support offenders. Existing powers enable probation to set additional licence conditions related to gambling, including prohibiting offenders on licence from gambling or making payments for other games of chance.
Probation also has an existing power to request an additional licence condition, directing offenders to undertake activities to address their gambling activities, where necessary and proportionate to their risk. HMPPS delivers a broad range of rehabilitative interventions through probation, which can help address wider gambling-related harms. We will be looking at issuing operational guidance to practitioners on effective usage of gambling-related licence conditions, alongside implementation of the new conditions set out in Clause 24. I would very much like to harness the considerable expertise of the noble Lord, Lord Foster, on this topic. I hope that he will be keen to work with me and my officials as this work develop0s.
Finally, I thank my noble friend Lord Bach for his Amendment 101. I reassure him that probation practitioners carefully consider what licence conditions to recommend as part of their supervision and management of an offender. They can tailor conditions to the specific needs of the offender, in line with managing public protection.
Although there is no formal process for representations, this is not considered to be necessary. Probation practitioners draw on a range of information when applying licence conditions and discuss conditions with offenders as part of release planning. They must ensure that licence conditions are necessary and proportionate, and they can grant necessary exemptions to licence conditions for rehabilitative purposes. This will be the same for the new conditions.
I repeat my thanks to noble Lords for allowing the Committee to debate these important subjects, but I hope I have explained why the Government do not agree that these amendments are necessary. I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.