Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Roborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 28th October 2024 Lords Chamber

I am asking the Government to ensure that the dividends cannot be paid without a disclosure of the distributable reserves by these companies. These dividends need to be approved not just by the regulator but by other stakeholders. We need to have customers sitting on these companies’ boards, and they must vote on this. We need to have employees sitting on these companies’ boards, and they must also approve these things. At the moment the authority does absolutely nothing. If the Government are really interested in improving the financial resilience of companies, I hope they will accept this amendment towards that purpose.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for moving the lead amendment in this group. I will speak to Amendment 27 in my name.

Amendment 27 seeks to set a timeframe of six months within which the authority must publish rules regarding remuneration and governance, and it ensures that these rules are scrutinised by both Houses of Parliament through the affirmative procedure for secondary legislation. This amendment is necessary to ensure that water companies are able to review the rules that Ofwat intends to implement within six months of the Act coming into effect. The amendment will also ensure that there are mechanisms for raising any concerns within which Ministers and Parliament can scrutinise them fully.

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[The Duke of Wellington (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, which simply deletes new subsection (5)(c) on page 2. It seems to me that we cannot allow the authority—whatever it may be in the future, after the review, or even from now on—to start getting involved in the remuneration of those below board level. That really becomes too much intrusion into the way a company is run.

The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, is entirely correct that, in the end, a director of a company is a director, whether executive or non-executive, as covered by the Bill; it mentions “a director” of the company. It seems to me that, while senior role remuneration should have some guidance from the authority, that should be restricted to the chief executive and other executive board members. There is no point entering into a discussion about non-executive directors, who clearly do not participate in performance-related pay or bonuses or anything like that. I think the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, is right; it would be appropriate to delete new subsection (5)(c) and include in this clause only the chief executive and any other executive director.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for moving Amendment 4. It is right that the Government should take steps to put appropriate pressure on water and sewage companies to reduce the frequency and scale of water pollution incidents, and imposing financial penalties on board-level executives is a powerful way of disincentivising unwanted behaviours in the sector. But if we are to have financial penalties targeted at water executives who do not meet the standards expected of them, we must ensure that these are appropriate. As we discussed in the last debate, it is crucial that Parliament gets the opportunity to scrutinise the rules that Ofwat will be implementing.

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[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 13 in my name. As this is my first contribution on an amendment of my own, I thank the Minister for meeting me, for the fact sheets and the letter, and for the good news that the commission and the review are taking place. We all appreciate that. I support the Bill and welcome the commission review to come.

I turn to the amendment. As touched on by other speakers, including the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, in the debates on the second and third groups of amendments, company employees require appropriate remuneration, just as investors need a return. But the financial engineering introduced previously by investors and company directors—for example, debt levels, transfers to parent companies and other practices that were forensically set out earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka —has enabled opaque enrichment, and has subsequently brought some water companies close to bankruptcy. That is not what monopoly water companies are for, and I believe it lies at the very heart of the current problems of the water companies.

The amendment enables the authority to include rules or guidance, as we may decide, with regard to a company’s structuring and its transparent reporting. It is deliberately left as “may” rather than “must” because the authority may want some flexibility here. Nevertheless, the amendment would act as an overt reference to the responsibility of the authority and water company employees to evaluate clearly the company’s financial structures and changes to them, and how those would impact on the distribution of financial benefits across investors, employees, directors and, indeed, consumers.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 17 in my name. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, yet again for introducing this group and raising these matters for consideration when the Government are establishing the regulations surrounding performance, pay and bonuses.

Amendment 17 seeks to clarify the definition of what constitutes performance-related pay. There are many ways in which companies can create performance-based incentive schemes. That can include multiyear programmes containing cash bonuses, share awards, restricted stock units, share options and pension contributions. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, it rarely includes chauffeur-driven cars, private schooling or any other benefits in kind, which tend to be part of the base package.

Is the intention to capture all forms of performance-based rewards within the powers of the Bill? If so, would it not be better to be exhaustive in defining them in the Bill? It is vital that such a definition be as clear as possible to ensure that the Bill achieves its intent to punish senior executives who are not fulfilling their obligations to us all in cleaning up our rivers, lakes and beaches.

In the Bill as drafted, the rules are not clear enough as to what financial components could make up the bonus of a senior water company employee in a given financial year. The amendment is therefore necessary to prevent water companies redesigning performance-based awards to take them outside the scope of the Bill. This is not to suggest any nefarious activity, but anyone currently captured by the Bill would choose not to be if they were able. It would then become impossible for a water company not to offer schemes outside the scope of the Bill if they wanted to attract the best talent.

I understand the intention of Amendment 5 from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. It is indeed important that we ensure that water companies have no incentives to continue polluting our rivers. We have looked at this issue in our own amendments. Amendment 27 would ensure that any rules relating to pay and governance will be suitably scrutinised, so I believe the issue could be solved without the inclusion of Amendment 5.

Additionally, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, whether he has considered the impact that this amendment would have on the hiring process of water companies. I think it unlikely that many people would respond to a job advert indicating that you may have a salary but that there is a chance that by the end of the year it could be taken away from you. If the total remuneration of senior roles is included in the Bill, it is inevitable that water companies will lose people with relevant skills and experience in the sector. That will worsen the leadership and perhaps lead to more serious issues within the sector.

It is also possible that the water companies would be forced to delegate their own management to third-party consultants outside the scope of the Bill entirely, in order to find the necessary expertise to run the companies. Have the Government given thought to how to cope with the possibility of such third-party consultants not captured by the Bill?

On Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, I agree that both legal and illegal dumping of sewage lead to undesirable outcomes. As such, I agree with the sentiment of the amendment. In 2022 we published the Storm Overflows Discharge Reduction Plan, which put in place targets to reduce the release of the overflow of sewage and in fact to stop it, except in situations with unusually heavy rainfall, by 2050. So we recognise that the issue is a pressing one and that action must be taken to ensure our rivers are kept clean. However, in order to stop the legal release of sewage, a substantial investment of money and time is necessary, and the amendment does not allow for such provision of time.

Our sewerage systems are a result of Victorian infrastructure design, and the increasing population and heavier, more frequent storms have led to increased pressure on this system. The suggested penalty will make it even less desirable to hold a senior role in a water company. As such, it will further decrease the number of people with skills and expertise at senior levels. This is unlikely to lead to an improvement in the water system for consumers, which is ultimately the aim we share across these Benches. I fail to see how we can support the noble Baroness’s amendment, despite the case put forward by the noble Earl, Lord Russell.

The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, would require executives to take personal liability through their performance-related pay for unspecified structuring or restructuring that may put companies at financial risk. This would appear to us to be too vague to have much bite. It also potentially means that executives’ performance-related pay would be contingent on issues over which they might not have responsibility because they could be overridden by shareholders.

As I mentioned earlier, in response to an amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, I encourage noble Lords to support Amendment 92 in my name in a later group, which would be a clear-cut prevention of payments to shareholders where there are potential issues of financial distress.

I look forward to the Minister’s response and hope that the Government will tighten up the definition of performance-related pay in line with our amendment.

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[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 100. The water authorities in Berlin and Paris are publicly owned and have stakeholder-elected directors. In most European countries, large companies have stakeholder-elected directors in them, as either a substantial proportion of the unitary board or a German-style two-tier board where one board is supervisory, and the other is executive. On the supervisory board, directors are directly elected. There are plenty of precedents for stakeholder-elected directors on company boards, and in many ways the UK is an outlier.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for moving the amendment. I want to speak in support of Amendment 22, from my noble friend Lord Remnant, as well as Amendments 21 and 23 tabled by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington.

My noble friend is right to note that the decision whether to be on a board, panel or committee is the job of the company rather than any kind of external regulator. By allowing the company to make that decision, it can decide based on its own business needs. If this was left to Ofwat, not only could it lead to a situation where the board, panel or committee did not fit well into the company structure but it might harm relationships between those forums and the board of the company.

It seems unlikely that a regulator would ever have access to all the information needed to make decisions on how a company’s decision-making systems should be structured, and it is surely the responsibility of the company itself to ensure that it has the right processes in place to make the correct decisions according to its needs. Indeed, as we have heard from many noble Lords, it is clear that the regulator has failed to get important decisions right in the past, to the detriment not only of companies but of the environment. Yes, of course, the regulator should have its role in holding companies to account for their decisions, but the moment regulators are involved in decision-making, it surely takes some responsibility for those choices too.

We are concerned that having consumer representatives on the board or their being involved in any decision-making within the company creates a blurring of responsibility. There is already the risk of some confusion, given the role of regulators, but they are at least experts in the industry and well informed about their roles, acting within well-defined parameters.

I agree with the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, on sectional interests and the effective working of a board. Consumer representatives on a board lay themselves open to the responsibilities of being a company director and in some cases a director of a listed company. Do the Government really want such consumer directors to be open to fines or prosecution for failing to deliver accounts on time, trading while insolvent or even insider dealing? It is not clear to me as the Bill is drafted that those consumer representatives could not also be subject to fines or prosecution by the regulator. If a consumer representative proposed an action that led to penalties from the regulator, how could they not be responsible?

Turning this around to the perspective of the existing board and management, if consumers are part of decision-making, then it is conceivable that they could cause or prevent an action by the company that created regulatory breaches and punitive action. How would this coexist with the responsibilities and liabilities of professional managers and board directors? How could this not create liability for the consumer representative?

My comments about consumer representation apply equally, if not more, to the environmental experts proposed in Amendment 9 by the noble Earl, Lord Russell. I understand and applaud the sentiment behind the amendment, of environmental representatives representing the stakeholder that has no natural voice, the environment. However, environmental campaigners already have a strong voice. There are obligations already present for companies, and others may be imposed through amendments to the Bill. I also agree with the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, that environmental representatives, alongside consumer representatives, should be limited to panels.

Allowing the company to decide the forum in which such representatives take part would benefit both sides of the agreement. If the company has taken this decision, then it becomes clear that the company, its managers and employees remain jointly responsible for decisions. I am not clear from the Bill exactly how the Government intend that its proposals should work. Both my noble friend Lord Remnant’s Amendment 22 and Amendments 21 and 23 from the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, have considerable merit. While there is a contradiction inherent between them, both are good solutions to creating the involvement of consumers that the Government want.

I thank all noble Lords for their involvement in this spirited debate. I ask the Minister to explain exactly how she sees consumer involvement working in practice under the Bill. I also ask that she give serious thought before Report to the amendments that I have addressed.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has come across clearly that there is no agreement about who should sit on the boards. We want to rebuild trust in the water sector, and to do that we are giving Ofwat new powers to issue new rules on remuneration and governance.

I turn first to Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and Amendment 21 in the name of the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington. The powers on remuneration and governance outline a requirement for Ofwat to set rules on companies for including consumers in decision-making. We feel that it is appropriate for Ofwat, as the independent regulator, to determine how this is implemented. Water companies have a range of legal environmental obligations that they are required to meet, and actions related to these obligations will already be informed by specialists in the company.

We believe that introducing requirements to include environmental experts on company boards would take the focus away from involving consumers in water company decisions, which do not have the same level of legal requirements as the environment does. Environmental issues should already be a key consideration in water company decision-making. Importantly, my officials in Defra have worked to secure agreement with companies to update their articles of association, to place both customers and the environment at the heart of business decisions. I hope that this clarifies to noble Lords that the Bill ensures the prioritisation of consumer representation on company boards and that they feel able not to press their amendments.