Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Remnant Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 20th November 2024 Lords Chamber

That is basically my proposition in this group. I have other amendments in other groups, to which I will return later. I thank the House for hearing my arguments, which I hope will gather support from all sides.

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as having been a non-executive director of Severn Trent, the largest of the listed water companies, for eight years between 2014 and 2022. I chaired the board’s remuneration committee for that time.

I thank the Minister for taking the time to meet me last week to discuss my concerns about key aspects of this Bill. I am only sorry that her apparent sympathy for at least some of my arguments has not translated into accepting any of my amendments. I have three amendments in this first group. I will be as brief as I can, but each addresses a completely separate issue.

I will take them in order. My first is Amendment 4. New Section 35B(2)(a) addresses performance-related pay. The rules will set standards that companies will have to meet in a financial year in order to be able to make awards of performance-related pay to chief executives and directors for that year. However, the Bill extends the scope of this section, in new subsection (5)(c), to holders of such other description of role with the water company as Ofwat may specify.

My Amendment 4 would remove this extended application to individuals below board level. This extension will be difficult to implement in practice, as different water companies will have individuals described differently by title and role. Nor would such an extension be consistent with general remuneration under the corporate governance rules for listed companies, which do not extend to individuals below board level. If we wish to attract and support the next generation of leaders in this vital industry from middle management, this will not be achieved by extending these restrictive remuneration practices to them.

As the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, has just said, those in this House are better qualified than Ofwat in certain aspects, and this is one of them: to decide on how far down the management chain these rules should apply. My amendment draws the appropriate and proportionate line in balancing the objectives of the Bill with the interests of those most directly impacted by it.

I appreciate that Ofwat is consulting on the scope of the Bill and its application to individuals. It asserts that it is minded to apply the rule to any executive director who is a member of the regulated company board in receipt of performance-related pay, because that is where ultimate accountability and leadership responsibilities lie. I look forward to the Minister’s response to my concerns in tabling this amendment. In particular, I would be interested to know whether she agrees with Ofwat’s current stance that only executive directors should be brought within the scope of the performance-related pay prohibition, and, if so, whether she will communicate that view to Ofwat.

Amendment 7 is my second amendment and very much relates to what the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, has just been talking about: the duty for water companies to have arrangements in place to involve consumers in decisions. New subsection (6) in Clause 1 allows this in regard for

“persons representing the views of consumers to be members of a board, committee or panel”,

as we have heard. My amendment adds a sentence which ensures that it is for the boards of water companies, not Ofwat—for very much the reasons that the noble Duke raised—to decide on which of those three forums best suits their own requirements. I am grateful to him for adding his name to this amendment, and I agree with all his arguments in support of it and his own amendment. The Minister commented at Second Reading that it always pains her to disagree with him on anything, so I am working on the assumption that she will wish to spare herself further agony by accepting this amendment. I fully support strengthening the voice of consumers. This can be achieved in a number of different ways, as the Bill accepts, but each company in the sector is best placed to judge what is most appropriate for its own circumstances.

I was surprised to read in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, in the overview prepared by Defra, that one of its provisions is to

“ensure consumer representation on water company boards”.

I should be grateful, when the Minister responds, if she could confirm that this is not indeed the position of the Government, irrespective of the choices which this Bill purports to give and the consultation exercise to be conducted by Ofwat.

There should be no highly prescriptive one-size-fits-all approach. Those best equipped to represent consumer interest may not wish to, or be equipped to, sit on corporate boards, with all the responsibilities and liabilities that entails. For Ofwat even to be given the option of this route risks alienating such experts and losing completely their valuable contribution. Nowhere in its consultation document does Ofwat point to the disadvantages of consumers sitting on boards, to which I have drawn your Lordships’ attention. I am therefore concerned that prospective respondents to the consultation may be being given an unbalanced view of the options.

We should not give Ofwat the power to require companies to appoint representatives of the consumer interest to their boards. Maybe some companies would opt for this route, but equally they may feel that stakeholder interest would be better served through the mechanism of panels or committees. My amendment would ensure that it was the boards of water companies which made that decision, not Ofwat. It would be helpful if the Minister, in her reply, could confirm not only that all identified options are, in reality, properly on the table, but that she recognises the disadvantages of board representation in this regard, which would represent a very suboptimal solution.

My final amendment in this group is Amendment 10. Clause 1(4) provides that the rules about performance-related pay can be applied in respect of the financial year beginning 1 April 2024 and for subsequent years. In effect, they can be applied retroactively. My amendment would change that date from 2024 to 2025 so that they would first be applied from the financial year beginning 1 April 2025. If we do something today, we believe that the law applying to it should be the law enforced today, not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it. I would argue that the application of these rules retroactively is even more egregious.

One might at least expect your Lordships to know precisely what it is that they are passing and the resultant retrospective impact, but that is not the case. We are delegating the power to make such rules under this legislation to a third party, Ofwat, and I have already expressed severe reservations about its expertise in doing so, given that this is outside the core competence of an economic regulator. We know not what the rules will be, how they will be applied and what impact they will have. Further, it is not intended that they be subject to further scrutiny by this House before being brought into force, as I say, with retrospective effect.

The retroactive application of rules yet to be drafted will undermine investment and increase the cost of capital, raising prices for consumers. Over the next five years, the sector needs to raise £20 billion of new finance, much of it equity, to deliver the largest investment programme in the sector’s history. Investors are already nervous and can earn better returns in other sectors and in other countries. We need to provide confidence that the UK is open for business. Retrospective action destroys that by creating uncertainty about how their investments will be treated.

It will undermine new talent and the sector clearly needs talented individuals to deliver the amount of improvement we all want. Retroactive changes of this sort will undermine employees’ trust in a career. Why choose water when other sectors do not face this risk? If we cannot attract the best people into the water sector, we will not see best performance.

This Water (Special Measures) Bill is designed to drive better future performance. It is too late to change performance by applying rules to a year when two-thirds of it is already over. The water sector is characterised by assets, with 100-year asset lives and performance challenges that require multiyear investment programmes. That is what we should be concentrating on and incentivising management to achieve, not changing the rules of the game retrospectively as punishment for perceived failings. Many noble Lords, including the Minister herself, have made the point that not all water companies are the same—there are good ones and bad ones. I am concerned that the effect of these rules, when drawn up, will draw no such distinction.

Amendment 10 is about as simple as it gets. It requires the replacement of the number 4 with the number 5 so that the performance-related pay provisions come into effect for the beginning of the next financial year, 1 April 2025, and not the beginning of the current financial year, 1 April 2024. Can the noble Baroness confirm whether these rules are intended to apply to three-year LTIPs, not only those beginning in 2024 but also those beginning as far back as 2022 and 2023, of which 2024 is a part? Her reply on this will be important to me. I urge the Minister to accept this amendment. If she does not, I am minded to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

I will speak to Amendment 2 in my name, and I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Roborough and Lord Sikka, for adding their names to it. I will speak also to Amendment 8 in my name, and again I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for adding her name to this amendment. Finally, I am sincerely thankful to the Minister and her officials for discussing with me these amendments and the two other amendments in my name, which will come up later.

Probably the most fundamental failure in our water industry is that the regulator either did not understand or was unwilling to investigate sufficiently the financial structuring of the water companies: how these structures and indebtedness were altered over time beyond all recognition from the original enterprises, and what the risks and impacts would be. If anyone is in any doubt about the results, they need only look at Thames Water, which is now all but drowning in fetid pools of ever more expensive debt, adding to its existing £16 billion of net debt so as to limp along from day to day and racking up huge future interest liabilities in addition to the principal £3 billion it is seeking.

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[Lord Remnant (Con)]

I apologise for interrupting the Minister; I do not mean any discourtesy. I thank her for clarifying that the provisions relate to the time from 1 April 2024. Despite what she has said, I am still concerned about the retrospective element. My understanding is that that would affect the bonus arrangements for the year from 1 April 2024 to 1 April 2025 and would also impact the three-year LTIP arrangements entered into on 1 April 2024 for the following three years. But it will not impact LTIP arrangements entered into as long ago as 2022 or 2023 but which still have the financial year beginning in 2024 as part of those three years. From what the Minister has said, my understanding is that the retrospective element will not go so far back as to apply to LTIP arrangements entered into in 2022 and 2023. If she could confirm that, I would be much happier.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

Just to reiterate, Ofwat will look closely at the impact this will have on long-term incentive plans. I cannot give the noble Lord any firm detail on the specific question he asks, because Ofwat is currently looking at this. Perhaps this is something we could pick up so that I can understand his specific concerns in more detail, and we can feed those into Ofwat’s current discussions. At the moment I cannot give him any more firm information than I have already given. If the noble Lord wants to continue this discussion so that I can feed it back to Ofwat, I shall be happy to do so. I do not know what else I can offer at the moment, because I cannot give the noble Lord a firm answer.

I am going over time, but I shall look quickly at what else I need to say. Amendment 11, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, would ensure that Ofwat’s rules on remuneration and governance came into force within six months of Royal Assent. Ofwat will be responsible for developing and implementing those rules but, as the Secretary of State will already be consulted through the process, we do not believe there is a need for a statutory instrument to be laid to bring the rules into effect.

We think that allowing Ofwat to set rules in this way, rather than through legislation, will enable those standards to be more easily amended where it is appropriate to do so in the future. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord. Ofwat does intend to implement the first set of rules following its statutory consultation, so this is not something that is going to drag on. We are keen for the rules to be in place as soon as possible after Royal Assent.

Amendment 57, in the name of my noble friend Lord Sikka, is about involvement in Ofwat’s board. We believe that it is the responsibility of Ofwat to determine who is on its board and who has voting rights for board meetings. There are already a number of ways in which consumers can feed into Ofwat’s regulatory work.

Finally, Amendment 58, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, is about water company borrowing. At sensible levels, debt can be an appropriate way to fund investment for essential infrastructure in the longer term. Ofwat is already taking steps to monitor debt levels as part of its report on financial resilience. Companies will need to access additional debt and equity to support the price review 2024 investment programme. I do, however, agree with the noble Lord that more can be done to ensure that debt levels are more closely monitored in future, and I would like to reassure him that, as he expected, that the independent commission will look at this.

Following our meeting, I also know that the noble Lord understands that this is a critical point in time for the water industry and its investors, and we have previously discussed the importance of ensuring that we do not jeopardise water companies’ ability to secure investment before Ofwat’s final determinations are made at the end of this year. Today, Barclays reported in the Times on the deterioration in investor sentiment following the publication of the draft determinations.

I therefore trust that the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, is reassured that the Government take this issue very seriously, and that he and other noble Lords understand that introducing further rules on borrowing through this Bill is not appropriate for the water industry at this time. That is what I want to stress—“at this time”.

I have run out of time, but I thank noble Lords. This has been a long group and a lot has been discussed. I hope that they will feel able not to press their amendments.

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Moved by

[Lord Remnant]

10: Clause 1, page 4, line 25, leave out “2024” and insert “2025”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the provisions about performance-related pay do not have retroactive effect.

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I heard what the Minister had to say, but I have to say that I believe that the retrospective effect of this legislation is not appropriate —all the more so if it is going to impact on remuneration arrangements that were put in place as long ago as 2022-23. I would like to test the House’s opinion.

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Moved by

[Lord Remnant]

50: Clause 10, page 14, leave out lines 7 to 9
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that compliant companies in the sector are not required to render financial assistance to recover SAO losses caused by another company under special administration.

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, under the special administration orders part of the Bill, relating to the insolvency of water companies, Clause 10 gives the Secretary of State the power to modify the licence of a water company in administration or solvency to recover from its customers any shortfall in costs incurred by the Government in such a situation.

My amendment addresses subsection (4) of the new section to be inserted by this clause, which allows the Government also to recover those costs not just from the company in administration but from any other compliant company, and its consumers, in the sector. My amendment would simply remove this extended unjustifiable right of recourse.

This subsection surely cannot be fair. It would force good companies and their blameless customers to bail out failed companies. Would anybody seriously suggest that, if Sainsbury’s got into financial difficulties, it should be bailed out by Tesco’s customers and shareholders? I think not.

To take a potential live example, were Thames Water to find itself in special administration, if you require customers of Northumbrian Water, at the other end of the country, and other companies to fund SAR losses, the Government are protecting hedge funds and other speculators who are now buying Thames debt at big discounts. It is the debt and equity investors in Thames who should pay for these losses in the form of lower proceeds from any eventual sale. Why should a retired police officer in Yorkshire or a hard-working nurse in Cornwall lose out to a hedge fund owner in New York trying to make a quick return?

I tabled the same amendment in Committee and felt it necessary to bring it forward again because the Minister did not address my concerns at that stage. She covered the circumstances surrounding the introduction of the special administration regime itself rather than justifying the extended right of recourse to other compliant companies in the sector. She said there was a high bar for the introduction of such a regime, that the Government do not expect to have to use this power and that any intervention would be considered very seriously and as a last resort.

As we speak, there are two companies in the sector renegotiating their debts: Thames Water and Southern Water. In theory, either could result in administration or insolvency, which may or may not involve the provision of financial assistance by the Secretary of State and the recovery of any shortfall under Clause 10. The Minister will be much better appraised of these situations than I am, so I derive some comfort from her assurance, armed with that knowledge, that the Government do not expect to have to use this power to recover losses from companies affected. Can she not, however, be more categorical than that, by saying that, even if the powers afforded to the Secretary of State under Clause 10 were to be invoked, they would not be used to recover cost shortfalls from other, blameless companies in the sector, and their customers?

Far more straightforward, however, would be for the Government to accept that any suggestion of collective punishment for the financial ways of others should be rejected, and for the Government to accept my amendment and remove this wide and, I argue, unjustified recourse across the sector. I look forward to listening to my noble friend Lord Roborough on his Amendment 51, which immediately follows. Clearly, if Clause 10 is removed in its entirety, that would satisfy my concerns. I beg to move.

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[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, the hour is late, so I will be brief. I thank everybody who has participated in our discussion of this group of amendments, and in particular my noble friend Lord Roborough for his support. There is clearly a lot of interest in the special administration regime and the costs arising from it, particularly in the allocation of those costs, and I compliment the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, who have spoken with their normal passion and dogged determination on these issues.

I thank the Minister for her patience and considered response on all these issues. I do not necessarily agree with all the points she has made, particularly on the cost of capital. I am not sure that it would be raised more in instances that she is referring to, rather than the industry having this spectre of having costs allocated to the compliant companies in respect of losses incurred elsewhere. But I thank her anyhow. I am sorry that she has not been able to accept my amendment, but I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment 50 withdrawn.

Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Remnant Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 30th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, a thread that runs through many of these amendments is the divergence between the environmental objectives and the clean water consumption objectives. A number of times, we on these Benches have raised the issue that there are two regulators with those responsibilities separated between them. That is something with which the Minister is going to have to grapple in her reply. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, who made the point that time is of the essence, and that waiting for the review may be too late. There is a choice to be made about giving Ofwat these objectives now or making a more fundamental structural change about who regulates the whole environmental question around water.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, may be pleased to note in the Budget the increase in tax on people flying on private jets, which she referred to. Apart from that, I agree that there was not much coverage of the environment.

This thread keeps coming up and it needs to be addressed. Is it going to go into the Bill now or will it become part of the review later?

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I was not intending to speak to this group of amendments, but I have been so impressed, not for the first time, by the ability of the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, to speak fluently without notes that I thought I would try to emulate her on this occasion.

I merely make an observation on Amendment 29 from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, because it is very widely drawn. Clearly, there are no individuals working at any of the regulators who, at the same time, are taking employment from water companies. I assume the amendment is intended to address not that but people moving from the regulator into water companies thereafter. I am not sure whether that in itself produces an appearance of a conflict of interest but, if it does, we have to be careful about constraining people’s ability to earn employment and move from one job to another. Indeed, it may stop experienced and competent people working for regulators in the first place, which is something for us to avoid if we can.

It also has much wider implications. The amendment would apply to this sector but there are lots of other regulated sectors, not least the financial services sector, where I believe this prohibition does not exist. Certainly, many people move from the PRA and the FCA into financial companies, banks, insurance companies and so on. We need to be careful when we consider the implications of this amendment.

Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Remnant Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 28th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 3 in my name and I apologise for the typo. I had noticed it, but only recently, and only a moment or two before the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, brought it to the Committee’s notice.

As we know, Clause 1 contains rules about remuneration and governance. Most importantly, it contains provisions giving Ofwat the power to block the payment of bonuses to senior executives of water companies. My amendment clarifies that Ofwat’s powers under this clause cannot be exercised in a way which conflicts with its general duties with respect to the water industry and emphasises that the industry’s capital and human resources needs are of critical importance. I declare an interest as having been a non-executive director of Severn Trent, the largest of the listed water companies, for eight years, between 2014 and 2022, chairing the board’s remuneration committee for that time.

Why is it that these clarifications are required? Essentially, it is because we are giving extremely wide powers to Ofwat to draft rules in a very complex area, seemingly at its discretion and without further scrutiny by this House, which may have many unintended and harmful consequences. There is no clarity in the Bill on the appropriate targets and performance standards, how they will be measured, when relevant triggers occur and which remuneration, in which year, will be affected. This will all be for Ofwat to determine—yes, Ofwat.

I have huge sympathy for regulators—I was one myself for a period, running the Takeover Panel—and know that they attract only criticism and never praise. Having said that, I thought the mood of your Lordships at Second Reading was especially stark in expressing views about Ofwat’s past performance, and some of those views have already been reiterated in the short time we have had today. That was as regards its role as an economic regulator—its core competence. We are now effectively extending Ofwat’s remit into difficult areas of fine judgment best left to company boards and for which Ofwat is totally unsuited. Can we be so reassured by the integrity of the ensuing process and the safeguards built in that my concerns can be assuaged by leaving this clause unamended? I fear not.

First, it offends the principles of natural justice, as there is no distinction between the legislative process and the judicial one. The powers will lie with one body, Ofwat. It will make the rules and then judge companies and individuals under them. Secondly, the Minister may refer me to the consultation process which Ofwat will undertake, to which she drew the attention of your Lordships in her helpful letter dated 25 October. I welcome that, although it would be a heroic achievement for Ofwat to decide definitively on such a wide range of questions and responsibilities that this Bill, if enacted, will impose on it. Yet we all know that consultation is no panacea. The responses will contain many conflicting views and the conclusions that Ofwat will reach will be influenced by the weight it gives to particular views and to some preconceived ideas that it will inevitably hold.

Thirdly, there will be no opportunity for your Lordships to scrutinise the rules promulgated by Ofwat. For this reason, I support the thrust of Amendment 27 in the names of my noble friends Lord Roborough and Lord Blencathra and Amendment 25 from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, which are designed to achieve such scrutiny. I will leave those noble Lords to talk to them in more detail.

But is this enough? I suggest not, because the scrutiny so achieved would be after the rules had been made by Ofwat. There is a need to influence Ofwat’s thinking much earlier in the process. That is what my amendment is designed to achieve. It is drafted with an eye to the wider objectives to which this Bill should aim: the need for more innovation, the recruitment of new talent and, above all else, the greater investment required to raise standards.

The amendment is in two parts. First, it is designed to ensure that Ofwat does not exercise its powers in a way that conflicts with its general duties under Section 2 of the Water Industry Act 1991. Such duties include a consumer objective, a duty to have regard to principles of best regulatory practice and a growth duty. Indeed, Ofwat refers to such duties in its consultation document when it says that one of its desired outcomes is that the rules should be proportionate. That is to be welcomed.

The Minister may be tempted to say that existing duties in the Water Industry Act and Ofwat’s acknowledgement of them should satisfy me and render this part of my amendment redundant. Were she to do so, I would say that that might hold good if the Bill imposed some constraints on Ofwat rather than adopting a blanket “Over to you, Ofwat” line. In the same section of its consultation document, it appears to qualify its commitment to proportionality by saying that

“we will be bound by statute”—

presumably as a result of this Bill—

“to introduce rules with the requisite effect”.

It is therefore critical that there is not just implicit recognition of Ofwat’s duties under the Water Industry Act of over 30 years ago but explicit recognition of those obligations on the face of the Bill, linked directly to this new and additional power that we will be giving to the regulator.

The second part of my amendment requires Ofwat to have regard to two further considerations in exercising its powers under this clause: namely,

“the need for a relevant undertaker”—

the water company—

“to … attract the investment required for its capital programme, and … attract, motivate and retain persons holding senior roles”.

I can find no reference to these considerations in Ofwat’s consultation document generally, nor in the specific questions it proposes, yet the scale of the investment in the industry that is required is such that we cannot afford to deter that investment, or experienced executives from working in it. Unlike in the past, much of that investment will have to come from equity investors, who assume a higher level of risk than debt investors and have more of a vested interest in, and so take a more critical attitude to, the prospects of a company, its financial plans and, importantly, the quality of the management tasked with delivery.

There is a limited number of appropriately qualified and skilled candidates to take on the most senior roles in water companies, and one of the successes of privatisation has been the ability of such companies to attract successful individuals from outside the utilities sector. In a competitive world for talent, Ofwat should not introduce rules that put water companies at a significant disadvantage when recruiting and seeking to retain such staff.

When launching the independent review of the water sector last week, the Secretary of State was at pains to stress the importance of attracting the investment needed to clean up our waterways and rebuild our broken water infrastructure—and, specifically, facilitating a regulatory environment that attracts investment. The least we can do is play our part in supporting the Secretary of State in this noble endeavour. I should have thought that this amendment would be music to the Minister’s ears, so I look forward to her response with a great deal of hope and expectation, and indeed no little optimism.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I will speak to Amendment 25. This amendment seeks to strengthen Parliament’s role in crafting and approving regulations for the water industry. The Bill as it stands asks people and Parliament to trust regulators, which the Bill calls “authority”—currently they include Ofwat and the Environment Agency—to make rules. Well, that trust has already been severely eroded.

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[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 4 seeks clarity as to what the Bill is getting at. The Bill’s intention appears to apply penalties to only selected directors and not the entire board of directors, even though decisions are made collectively. The Explanatory Notes say it commits to

“ban bonuses for persons holding senior roles”,

and the Bill defines a “senior role” as a person who

“is a chief executive of the undertaker”—

a somewhat unfortunate phrase—

“is a director of the undertaker, or … holds such other description of role with the undertaker”.

The tone of the Bill suggests that references may all be to executive directors, but we know that water companies also have non-executive directors, and under the Companies Act non-executive directors have exactly the same liability and responsibility as executive directors. The Bill does not mention non-executive directors.

Amendment 4 seeks clarity and asks the Minister to confirm that the prohibitions and penalties will apply to not only non-executive directors but legal persons who may be acting as directors, because natural persons can be directors as well as legal persons. I beg to move.

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I must admit to having experienced a degree of trepidation on discovering that I was to share a group of amendments with the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and with him alone. Having listened to his views on the Bill in general, so eloquently expressed at Second Reading, I feared that we would find little common ground when debating particular aspects of it. Imagine my surprise, therefore, when I compared his Amendment 4, to which he has just spoken, with my Amendment 18, to which I am about to speak, to discover that we might have more in common than I had thought.

I think that some of the rationale behind Amendment 4 is misplaced. While I agree with the noble Lord that all members of the board under company law are held to account, performance-related pay is in practice paid only to executives, while non-executives are remunerated by way of fixed fee. Given that the provision to which Amendment 4 relates is in respect of performance-related pay, the inclusion of non-executive directors is of no practical importance. Notwithstanding this, Amendments 4 and 18 effectively would achieve the same practical impact in respect of the individuals to whom these remuneration rules apply. Amendment 4 would remove the reference to senior roles and replace it with a reference to directors of the company, while Amendment 18 would retain the concept of senior roles but effectively define them as directors of the company.

I do not believe that it is right for Ofwat to extend the rules to

“such other description of role”

as it specifies. Not only would such an extension be wider in scope than the current disclosure requirements of Section 35A of the Water Industry Act 1991 but it would be difficult to implement in practice, as different water companies will have individuals described differently by title and role. Nor would such an extension be consistent with the general remuneration and corporate governance rules for listed companies, which do not extend to individuals below board level.

I hope the Minister agrees that, through the adoption of my amendment, this additional power conferred on Ofwat by the Bill should be removed. If we wish to attract and support the next generation of leaders in this vital industry from middle management, this will not be achieved by extending these restrictive remuneration practices to them.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, I start by reminding the Committee that I have an experience, rather than an interest, as I was a non-executive director for a number of years on the board of Yorkshire Water. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that I never had a bonus during that time, for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, has explained.

This group of amendments follows on neatly from the previous discussion about performance-related pay and the remuneration of senior directors of water and wastewater companies, so I thought it was worthwhile to draw out a bit more of the debate around this issue. The fundamental problem lies in the fact that water and wastewater companies are regulated by a number of different institutions. Ofwat is the economic regulator and, because of the way that the water Act was written, is primarily looking at the financial performance of the water companies. That inevitably leads to a disregard for the environmental outcomes of water companies as a priority. Consumers, who see that their rivers, lakes and coasts are being heavily polluted by these water companies, are astounded to see the same water companies giving huge bonuses to their directors. That is because the two issues are not related in the mind of Ofwat. That is why my party wants a single regulator for water companies, so that all the issues that are the responsibility of water and wastewater companies are taken into account. Part of that debate was reflected in the first group of amendments, discussed earlier.

We need to remind ourselves that remuneration in companies is decided by boards of directors. They will look at the financial objectives of the company and the outcome of the price review agreed by Ofwat and come to conclusions, whether or not objectives have been achieved or considerable benefit to the company accrued by the actions of directors.

That is part of the problem. As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has attempted to describe, the price review is a tussle of words and figures between the companies on the one hand and Ofwat on the other. I remember the discussions. If you are in a company and you want to make sure there is a good outcome for your owners and shareholders, you make sure that the submissions you make in a price review to Ofwat enable profits to be made. That is the whole purpose of a private company. It is at the heart of all the discussions we are having about water companies, their performance and their remuneration and bonuses. The 1991 Act was designed for them to be private companies with shareholders, who were going to receive dividends as a consequence. If that is the prime duty, and the main regulator oversees that prime duty, the other issues that water companies ought to be taking into account—the environmental issues in particular, as we heard earlier—become less important.

I hope that, when we come to Report and discuss these issues more closely, the Minister will think about a government amendment that strengthens the duties of water companies, and of Ofwat as the regulator, to take into account these other issues. For me, that is at the heart of the discussions we have had on this group and the previous group. I agree with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Remnant. You cannot try to control pay awards further down the company; those often very talented people need to be attracted into water companies if we are to improve what is a sad state of affairs.

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[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Earl, Lord Russell, indicated, this group of amendments deals with a common theme of representation on water company boards but has several different facets.

Amendment 22 in my name would ensure that it is for the boards of water companies, rather than Ofwat, to decide in which forum—board, committee or panel—the views of consumers should be represented. As we have heard, Clause 1 includes provisions intended to establish consumer involvement in corporate decision-making. New subsection (6) provides that this

“may include a requirement for persons representing the views of consumers to be members of a board, committee or panel of”

the water company. While I support the principle of strengthening the voice of consumers, this should not be through a highly prescriptive, one-size-fits-all approach.

In this country we do not have different categories of director, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, reminded us earlier. Non-executive directors may have specialisations, but they are chosen for their wider skills and ability to make a comprehensive contribution. The noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, just made a similar point. Those representing consumer interests may not wish or be equipped to sit on corporate boards, with all the responsibilities and liabilities that entails. It should not be for Ofwat to require that such people sit on the boards of water companies but should be left to the companies to decide which forum best suits their requirements, whether that be board, committee or panel.

Providing similar flexibility was effective when companies enacted the workforce engagement mechanism under the UK Corporate Governance Code’s requirements. A very small number of companies appointed a director from the workforce, largely for the considerations I have mentioned. Some established a formal workforce advisory panel, and a greater number appointed a designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. Each company chose the mechanism best suited to its circumstances, and the system has worked well.

Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and Amendment 21 in the name of the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, extend the provisions of this clause to environmental experts. It will be for your Lordships to decide how widely to draw the categories of relevant interest, however represented, but the principle in the latter amendment of representation other than at board level is very much in line with the rationale behind my amendment. I shall listen with interest to the arguments put by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for their Amendments 82 and 100 respectively. However, they would represent a radical departure from accepted standards of corporate governance and company law, so I would hesitate to support them.

My earlier dose of optimism is becoming somewhat jaded. A recurring theme seems to be emerging in the Minister’s replies: everything is for Ofwat to decide. That displays a touching and, if I may venture, possibly naive belief in Ofwat deciding wisely on many matters that are not within its competence as an economic regulator. Concerns have been expressed on all sides about its past record. Surely it should be the role of this House to take more responsibility on itself and give much more direction and guidance to Ofwat on how it should exercise the significant additional powers this Bill gives it—or, as in this case, remove the key choice from Ofwat and give it to the companies, within a defined framework imposed by us.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 82 addresses a major question that the Bill does not address: why do water regulators fail? After all, they have been at it for many years—at least 35 years, some of them—yet they continue to fail. No proposal in the Bill addresses that. They continue to fail because they are isolated from the lives of the people affected by sewage spills, high customer bills, low investment and water simply leaking away.

The regulatory bodies are generally made up of former Ministers and executives. Someone who has done a stint at a water company disappears to Ofwat; Ofwat’s former chief executive is now director of a water company. There is a revolving door. These people have a world of their own which does not connect with that of the people directly affected by their activities. For any regulatory system to be effective, it must represent a plurality of interests, but our regulatory system and bodies are closely aligned with corporate interests. They are, in essence, captured. If this capture is not there—and is not the reason for their failures—then someone will have to explain why the water industry is in a mess and why the guiding hand of regulators has not been able to put it on a path to recovery, good practices or good behaviour.

The Bill seems to propose consumer panels, which are, in essence, toothless: they have no social constituency to report to because they are not really elected by anyone but simply co-opted on the basis that someone knows somebody and brings them in; they are not required to report to any constituencies; they cannot easily object to the practices of the regulatory bodies; and they can simply be bludgeoned into silence and just go along because that is the norm. We have heard that these amendments somehow propose something unusual and therefore we have to be bludgeoned into silence and simply go along, because tradition is oppressive and that is what we have to do.

My amendment calls for direct representation of elected representatives of employees and stakeholders on the board of the regulatory authority and to give them power to vote on executive remuneration. That would be the ultimate sanction when they disapprove of how the regulatory body is safeguarding or protecting the public interest. If they cannot vote on executive remuneration, they will simply be a shadow. The amendment seeks, in essence, to democratise regulation. I know that democracy is not very fashionable these days, so if the Minister opposes this democratisation of regulation, it would be helpful to know how the Government will check cognitive capture of regulatory bodies, because no other solution is being offered by anybody. If we were to expand on this, in the next group I could lay out a complete framework of what else needs to be done, but this is simply to test and, I hope, elicit a response from the Government.

Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Remnant Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 28th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

Amendment 10 in my name and Amendment 13, which we discussed earlier, seek to address the problem that lies at the heart of what went wrong with our water industry; the regulators were simply outsmarted by PE financial engineering, either because they were not paying sufficient attention to what was going on or because they just did not understand it. Regulators have either lacked or failed to deploy the skills needed to assess the impact and purposes of financial engineering introduced by corporate investors.

Amendment 10 addresses that shortcoming directly by requiring water companies to report regularly, not only on any financial restructuring or structuring but on the strategy lying behind it and any associated risks. This will ensure that such activities have to be made overt rather than, as hitherto, taking place under the regulators’ noses but apparently below their radar. I beg to move.

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted that Clause 10 does not appear to envisage a role for Ofwat. The amendments in this group are not really related to each other. As such, I shall confine my remarks to Amendment 86 in my name and I shall be brief.

Under the “Special administration orders” section of the Bill relating to the insolvency of water companies, Clause 10 gives the Secretary of State the power to modify a water company licence in order to recover any shortfall in costs for the Government from its consumers. New subsection (4) extends this recourse to all other companies in the sector.

I hope the Minister will tell me that I am mistaken in my interpretation of what this new subsection is designed to achieve. Does it not force good companies and their blameless customers to bail out failed companies? Can this possibly be justified? It has been a recurring theme of this debate, supported by the comments of many noble Lords, that the sector is in critical need of substantial investment to raise standards across the board and deliver the service that consumers and the general public so rightly expect. Any suggestion of collective punishment for the financial woes of others is to be resisted.

The consequence of imposing an unquantified and unquantifiable potential liability on the sector will at best push up the returns required by investors to inject capital into the water companies, inevitably increasing costs to consumers. At worst, it risks making the sector uninvestable. That is surely not the intention of new subsection (4), but it may be the consequence. My amendment would remove that risk, and I hope the Minister will support it.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, I will address my comments to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. I agree with him that financial restructuring of companies has led us to where we are now, with Thames Water potentially on the brink of collapse—who knows who is going to have to fund the huge injection of capital that has apparently now been agreed. Other water companies are heavily indebted. Ofwat, which is after all the economic regulator, did not query, question or challenge those decisions made in the early years of water company privatisation.

The consequence is that anything the Government now attempt to do is basically closing the stable door after the horse has bolted—and raced to the other side of the world—because the companies are where they are. Although I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, that any future restructuring ought to be put under the microscope of the economic regulator, the current situation is leading us to a potentially very grave position, which the Government are trying to address with the other financial clauses in the Bill. I read the clause referenced by the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, as being directed pointedly at a particular water company.

I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. I suppose it is better to change the situation now than leave it as it is, but what has happened already is unfortunate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 14, I will speak also to my Amendment 15.

As I mentioned in an earlier debate this evening, there are a number of areas in this Bill where its effects are retroactive on existing agreements, but the Bill fails to set out the exact limits of these powers. On these Benches, we have been clear at every stage in the passage of the Bill that we want to see tougher measures to hold water companies to account and to ensure that we have better outcomes for consumers and our environment. However, it would not be right for us to approve this Bill because it has a worthy goal, without scrutinising those areas where it is deficient. We have already spoken about Ofwat’s failures, and noble Lords across the Committee will surely admit that there are improvements to be made to the way that Ofwat itself works. Giving unclear levels of retroactive powers to the regulator is not something that should be accepted by Parliament, and we will scrutinise the Bill very closely on its retroactive impacts.

My Amendment 14 seeks to remove the lines from Clause 1 that seek to empower Ofwat to void existing agreements, including employment contracts. The Bill gives Ofwat the power to issue these rules without proper scrutiny, and in this part of the Bill we see how powerful those rules can be. Retroactively overriding employment contracts may be necessary for the Government’s objective to implement a blanket set of rules on remuneration for senior officers of water companies, but it is surely not an acceptable way to go about regulating the sector. I ask the Minister: what message does it send to a talented person working in the water sector today, as they build their career, to see measures such as this retroactively changing the rules of the game? We on these Benches fear that many talented people may choose to pursue a career outside the sector, for fear that the Government may yet again move the goalposts retrospectively.

I have intentionally tabled my related Amendment 15 separately, to probe whether the Government are willing to move at all on the retroactive impacts of the Bill. Amendment 15 seeks to remove the part of Clause 1 that enables the retroactive deprivation of performance-related pay under the rules. It is surely not right to implement rules now that have effect from the beginning of the year. Our concern is that the lines in the Bill that we seek to remove allow the Government to renegotiate unilaterally an employment contract that has been freely entered into between a third-party employer and a third-party employee. While it is customary that employment legislation often does just such a thing, there is very limited precedent for picking on one class of employees in one particular sector.

This is a very unfortunate precedent to set, which opens the door to a Government inserting themselves into employment contracts across other sectors to achieve the outcomes they want. That smacks of overreach. Should we seek to remove performance-related pay from software company managers if their software crashes; from insurance industry executives if we do not like their handling of claims; or from airline executives if their flights are late? I am sure that there may be some noble Lords across the Chamber nodding their heads that the Government should be doing just that; however, that is completely against the Government’s claims of being business-friendly. No competent executive would ever want to work for a UK-based company were these kinds of rules to be brought in.

Our amendment does not suggest a better alternative but simply suggests that the current method is unacceptable, and that the employed and the employer also need to be cognisant of the law and agree that these contracts be amended or replaced with agreement to reflect the intent of the Bill.

There is also the issue, which my noble friend Lord Remnant may address in greater detail in his comments, of interference in multiyear contracts, where portions of that payment may already have been earned and yet could potentially be prohibited under the Bill. I draw the Committee’s attention to the Explanatory Notes provided to the House by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Paragraph 79, under “Compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights”, says:

“Provision relating to remuneration of water company executives is also not considered to result in ‘deprivation’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention, as the provision relates to future income. Such income will only constitute a possession once it has been earned”.


I suggest that income in prior years in multiyear contracts has already been earned, just not yet paid. Therefore, I question the Minister on how compliance with the ECHR can be guaranteed in this case.

My amendments are, by their nature, probing. Given that they address an election manifesto commitment, they are designed to produce convincing answers from the Government on how these issues can be addressed. I look forward to the Minister’s reply. I beg to move.

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted that Amendment 26 in my name falls into the same grouping as those in the name of my noble friends Lord Roborough and Lord Blencathra. Although I very much regret that your Lordships’ time is having to be spent on potentially amending proposed legislation that has retrospective effect, it gives me the opportunity very much to support the arguments advanced by my noble friend Lord Roborough in support of Amendments 14 and 15.

It cannot be right retrospectively to override contract law with respect to employment contracts freely entered into by company and individual in line with relevant legislation and regulations in force at the time. Similarly, to the extent that, today, pay can be recovered from senior individuals under malus and clawback provisions in listed companies’ remuneration policies, such a draconian power can rightly be exercised only in extremely limited circumstances known in advance by the individual. The proposed exercise of the pay prohibition in the Bill retroactively goes way beyond accepted remuneration practice, and unacceptably so.

On my own amendment, I will not repeat the general arguments made by my noble friend against the principle of retroactive or retrospective legislation. I am no lawyer, so I hope that your Lordships will forgive me if I perhaps erroneously use the terms interchangeably. The offending principle, though, remains the same. The general rule in this country, and indeed in most modern legal systems, is that legislative changes apply prospectively. If we do something today, we feel that the law applying to it should be the law in force today, not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it.

The Bill proposes that the provisions about performance-related pay apply from the financial year beginning 1 April 2024. We are currently some seven months into that financial year, and the Bill will not be enacted for some months hence. In effect we are talking about backdating the provisions for the best part of a year. The remuneration arrangements entered into between senior individuals and their employer will have been agreed under remuneration policies agreed by shareholders well before April for them to take effect from 1 April 2024. It surely cannot be right, whatever the merits of the Bill, for its provisions subsequently to alter those arrangements and the remuneration paid, or to be paid, under them.

Few things concern investors more than retrospective legislation, and listed companies will need to consult with and seek approval from shareholders on changes to remuneration policies at their AGM. Requiring retrospective changes risks companies breaching shareholder-approved remuneration policies. More fundamentally, it will undermine investor confidence at a time when they are being asked to fund a record investment programme.

My amendment would simply change the date from which the performance-related pay provisions come into effect from a historic 1 April 2024 to a mildly prospective 1 April 2025. Is that really too much to ask, to avoid breaching a fundamental legal principle? I do not think so and I hope that the Minister will agree with me.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have stuck with us this evening and carried on the debate. We know that the public have been clear that they want to see change and that where performance is poor, executives should not receive large salaries or bonuses.

I will start with Amendments 14 and 15, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Roborough. The conditions of existing employment contracts may not align with Ofwat’s new rules. Our concern is that Amendment 14 may prevent Ofwat being able to apply its rules even when performance has not met the required standards. On Amendment 15, it is also right that where companies breach Ofwat’s rules on performance-related pay, Ofwat should be able, if it considers it appropriate, to require the company to recover any payment made in breach of the rules. Linking pay to performance should incentivise decision-making, resulting in improved outcomes for customers in the environment. I reiterate what I said earlier: should companies meet their performance expectations, executives can still be rewarded. So I hope that the noble Lord will understand why we will not accept his amendments.

I turn to Amendment 26, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Remnant. This legislation will ensure that Ofwat is able to implement rules on performance-related pay in the current financial year. However, I listened really carefully to the speech that the noble Lord just made introducing his amendment. I would really like to understand his concerns better, so I wonder whether he would welcome further discussion on this matter so that we can look at it in more detail. I would very much appreciate it if the noble Lord was prepared to do that. But currently we are not going to accept the amendments as we feel that they would prevent meaningful implementation of the rules.

Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Remnant Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 9th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as having been a non-executive director of Severn Trent, the largest of the listed water companies, for eight years between 2014 and 2022, chairing the board’s remuneration committee for that time.

Last month, the Secretary of State said that the Government planned to carry out a full review of the way in which the water industry is regulated and that this would shape future legislation. It is a shame, then, that this piecemeal Bill cannot be assessed in the context of more fundamental reforms to the way in which the water industry operates. Worthy of debate would be the plethora of sector regulators and the frequency of Ofwat’s periodic price reviews. Successive Governments and regulatory price reviews have prioritised lower customer bills over the industry’s investment needs. Now, however, in addition to greater accountability, we should be focusing on the need for more innovation, the recruitment of new talent and, above all else, greater investment to raise standards. My concern is that there are aspects of the Bill that run contrary to these objectives and where scrutiny of the rules set by Ofwat under the Bill’s general provisions, and of the powers exercisable by statutory instruments, will be limited.

I turn to the specific provisions of the Bill. Although I would normally view the stiffening of penalties in the form of automatic penalties, lowering the standard of proof and imposing custodial sentences as less of an effective deterrent than the consequence of a failure of the underlying regulations themselves and/or their oversight, it will be underperforming companies which have the most to fear from this. Clarification on the scope of offences to be covered and the potential value and proportionality of fines will be required, and I leave it to others to comment on whether imprisonment for impeding regulatory investigations is really the most effective utilisation of our apparently scarce prison capacity.

My principal area of concern relates to the rules for remuneration and governance. Clause 1 contains provisions giving Ofwat the power to block the payment of bonuses to the chief executives and directors of water companies. While sensible in principle, the devil will be in the detail, which may lead to unintended consequences. How best to remunerate senior individuals is complex. It involves alignment with the business’s strategic goals, balancing short- and long-term considerations, fixed versus variable pay, and attracting and motivating talent. Decisions are best made by the boards of companies, which take account of the views of all stakeholders, particularly shareholders and regulators, in assessing matters requiring fine judgments. This is not within the core competence of an economic regulator.

It is perhaps overoptimistic of me to expect the Minister to excise Clause 1 from the Bill in its entirety. There may, however, be areas of common ground on which I would welcome her thoughts. The Bill is too widely drawn. It states that the rules will apply only to pay which is linked to

“the meeting of any targets or performance standards”

by the water company or the individual. There is no clarity on how the relevant standards will be measured, which will fall to Ofwat to determine, nor on when the relevant trigger occurs and which remuneration will be affected. For example, will the relevant remuneration be that payable in respect of the year in which the failure occurs or when the penalty is imposed? Where remuneration is based on multi-year performance and there is a failure in only one of the years, would the whole award be impacted or only a proportion?

The key elements will be the metrics which Ofwat applies to determine whether the standards have been met. A properly constructed system of metrics linked to objective measures, which seeks to eliminate reward for failure but which aligns with the company’s own key performance indicators and does not penalise those in the industry who are meeting or outperforming stringent targets, should be the aim. Should the rules, however, be punitive and have the effect of discouraging the best people from working in the industry and restrict water companies from rewarding performance when appropriate, the consequence will be damaging.

Do we really want companies to move away from bonuses and long-term incentive schemes linked to performance to compensating increases in fixed pay? There is a precedent within the financial services industry when mandatory bonus caps were imposed—since removed by the last Government, a move endorsed by the current Government. The experience was not a happy one because it removed incentivisation and increased fixed costs, to the detriment of consumers.

In terms of employees within the scope of these rules, they apply to the chief executive and other directors of the regulated water company. The Bill provides that Ofwat may extend the rules to

“such other description of role”

as it specifies. Not only would such an extension be wider in scope than the current disclosure requirements of the Water Industry Act 1991, but it would be difficult to implement in practice as different water companies will have individuals described differently by title and role. This additional power conferred on Ofwat by the Bill should surely be removed if we wish to attract and support the next generation of leaders in this vital industry from middle management. This will not be achieved by extending these restrictive remuneration practices to them.

Clause 1 also includes provisions intended to establish consumer involvement in corporate decision-making. Clause 1(6) provides that this may include a requirement for persons representing the views of consumers to be

“members of a board, committee or panel”

of the water company. While I support the principle of strengthening the voice of consumers, this should not be through a highly prescriptive, one-size-fits-all approach.

We do not have different categories of director in this country. Non-executive directors may have particular specialisations, but they are chosen for their wider skills and ability to make a comprehensive contribution. Those representing consumer interests may not wish, or be equipped, to sit on corporate boards, with all the responsibilities and liabilities that entails. It should not be for Ofwat to require that such people sit on the boards of the water companies; it should be left to the companies to decide which forum best suits their own requirements, whether it be board, committee or panel. Providing such flexibility was effective when companies enacted the workforce engagement mechanism for the purposes of the UK Corporate Governance Code.

Finally, I turn to the section on special administration orders, which relates to the insolvency of water companies. Clause 10 gives the Secretary of State the power to modify a water company licence in order to recover any shortfall in costs for the Government from its consumers, and new Section 12J(4) extends this recourse to all other companies in the sector. Forcing good companies and their blameless customers to bail out failed companies cannot be justified. This unquantifiable potential liability will serve only to deter much-needed external investment in the sector.

There are provisions of this Bill which will deter the investment that the industry so badly needs, and experienced executives from working in it. Let us not return to a pre-privatisation environment. In particular, the discretion given to Ofwat is too broad, but I look forward to the next stages of the Bill, which will give us opportunities to improve it.

Hunting Trophies (Import Prohibition) Bill

Lord Remnant Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 16th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, it is with some diffidence that I venture out of my natural habitat of the financial services jungle into the open savannas of this debate, especially following the erudite words of my noble friend Lord Swire. This is a debate not so much on the narrow topic of the importing of hunting trophies but on trophy hunting itself, as several noble Lords have indicated today. Any such ban will affect the practice of hunting abroad, which will in turn have a far-reaching impact on conservation efforts. I believe that this will be a profoundly negative impact. I am no supporter of trophy hunting in and of itself, in fact I find it distasteful, but we have to look beyond the narrow picture to the wider canvas.

I am concerned that if this Bill were to be enacted in its current form, it would represent a triumph of emotion over reason. We must respect the rights of countries and conservationists to determine for themselves how best to manage their own wildlife resources. All of them require significant funding to achieve their objectives. The challenges facing the people and wildlife in Africa are greater than ever. We are losing animals and indeed species much faster than the natural extinction rate, and this is caused almost entirely by human activity. This will only worsen as the human population continues to grow and consume ever more natural resources.

The poaching and illegal wildlife trade is the fourth most lucrative international crime after drugs, arms and human trafficking. As a result, the African elephant population, for example, has fallen by more than 30% in the past seven years largely due to poaching. Trophy hunting reduces this threat as the operators generally invest significantly in antipoaching activities which protect both hunted and non-hunted species. Habitat loss represents the greatest threat to the majority of wildlife. The survival of many African species is dependent on healthy habitat, and the demands on land will only intensify with the rapidly increasing population. Arguably, the ultimate conservation challenge is finding a solution that benefits both people and wildlife. The revenue from trophy hunting helps incentivise landowners to maintain land as wildlife habitat, rather than to convert it into agricultural use or for urban or industrial development.

It is simplistic to suggest that you can just replace this revenue by funding from other sources, such as photographic safaris, because in many cases this is simply not an option in places suitable for trophy hunting. Related to this is the conflict between humans and wildlife. The clearance of land for settlements and agriculture not only results in loss of habitat for wildlife but forces wild animals into close quarters with humans. Retaliatory, or even pre-emptive, killing of lions by the local population has become one of their greatest threats. However, because it generates income, trophy hunting increases the willingness of local people to tolerate dangerous and destructive animals. The income funds not only physical barriers and deterrence but enhances human understanding of the importance of wildlife and how to avoid conflict.

In summary, when local communities, conservationists and other stakeholders see economic benefits to co-existing with wildlife, conservation can, and indeed does, succeed. However, conservation in general is largely underfunded, and wildlife authorities in many countries have insufficient budgets to manage protected areas and the species within them. Whether we like it or not, trophy hunting makes significant contributions to those budgets. Any benefits accruing from the enactment of this Bill will be marginal compared with the serious harm it will do to conservation efforts worldwide. These damaging and doubtless unintended consequences must be avoided. As this Bill progresses, I hope that my noble friends Lady Fookes and the Minister, who always displays total mastery of his brief—possibly up until this morning—will recognise the concerns of many noble Lords and strongly support an approach to achieve this.