Afghanistan: Interpreters

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, we take care to welcome staff and their families and ease their arrival and integration into this country. Before they leave, we give staff an information pack on living in the UK and offer a question-and-answer session. On arrival, local authorities provide them with support for the first four months. They help them settle into their new neighbourhood and access the benefits and services to which they are entitled, including schools and healthcare.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for what he has said today and for keeping informed those of us who take an interest in this by communicating from the MoD. Obviously I pay my condolences to our late Afghan colleague and the G4S employee. I suggest to the Minister that this process will not be speeded up if he leaves it to the Home Office. Has he thought of volunteering assistance from the Ministry of Defence to the hard-working people in the Home Office to expedite what everyone in this House knows is an essential prerequisite, not only as a debt of honour but, as my noble friend and colleague said, to assure British troops that they will get local support in the future?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord that we have a debt of honour. I can assure him that we have formal fortnightly meetings with the Home Office and we are in daily telephone contact. In Afghanistan, LESs are helped with applications by a member of the MoD staff, Edmund, who was formerly my assistant private secretary. He reassures them about the progress on their cases and liaises with the relevant authorities in the UK and Afghanistan to ensure that there are no unreasonable delays.

Asylum: Afghanistan Interpreters

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 24th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I assure the noble Baroness that we keep this matter under serious review the whole time. There are no plans at the moment to review the date. This is not a judgment on the value of any individual staff member’s contribution. We recognise that there are staff who made a valuable contribution but who chose to leave our employment before that date. This is an ex gratia scheme linked to the draw-down from Afghanistan and redundancy on or after 19 December 2012. It is not a retrospective process. When a concern about personal safety exists, our intimidation policy applies.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, if the Home Office is able to do this, it raises a simple question—why has it not been done? Will the Minister bring this to the attention of the Home Secretary? While we all support a robust, rational and sensitive set of rules for immigration, there is an overriding principle here. This is a debt of honour, and when there is a debt of honour, you should honour the debt. Not to do so not only leaves people’s lives in danger but leaves the reputation of this country tarnished.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

The noble Lord makes a very good point. Applications are being processed, and I assure the noble Lord that this is well advanced. It is a very complicated process requiring health and security checks. Apart from the need to verify immediate family members, we also have to find local authorities that will agree to take individuals. However, we recognise the commitment that we have given to these people, and we are committed to achieving relocation as quickly as possible.

Defence: Nuclear Submarines

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My noble friend has asked a very good question. Rolls-Royce is the MoD’s technical authority for the design of reactors and the manufacture of the cores. It has delivered reactor cores for UK submarines for more than 50 years. We are confident that it will deliver the cores we require in the future. There is no effect on jobs at the Rolls-Royce facility in Derby.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

The operational questions arising have largely have been covered by my noble friend Lord West and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce. In more immediate terms, the concern obviously will be the safety of personnel at Dounreay and on the submarines. Although it has been deemed that there is no risk and that the reactor, with all its accoutrements, has been restarted, will he confirm, first, that there will be continuous monitoring of a specific nature at Dounreay? Secondly, even though there is no risk discerned in the test reactor at Dounreay, will he confirm that there is even less risk on the submarines themselves; and that there has been no evidence that the same phenomena have occurred on any submarines, and that that will be monitored? Thirdly, will he confirm that the refuelling will take place at Devonport rather than anywhere else?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, it will take place at Devonport in Plymouth, yes. There is no risk, I can assure the noble Lord, to the workers or the local community up at Dounreay. The naval reactor test establishment remains a very safe and low-risk site. Workers remain safe and the local community and environment is not at risk. There has been a very small increase in the radioactivity of the coolant in the sealed reactor circuit. This has not gone outside the sealed unit and it has certainly not gone into the atmosphere. This refuelling is a prudent, pre-emptive and purely precautionary measure and it has been carried out to manage risk to the operational submarine programme and not to mitigate any safety issue.

As far as any risk to the submarine crews is concerned, the safety of our nuclear submarines is not in doubt and we have not identified any issues with our operational submarines. The refuelling of HMS “Vanguard” will begin in late 2015 as a precautionary measure during her scheduled deep maintenance period. If a leak occurred on a submarine, it would be detected immediately.

Defence: Aircraft Carriers and UK Shipbuilding

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Wednesday 6th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I cannot answer the noble Lord’s question about apprentices—it was not in my brief—but we have been assured by the company that it will do everything in its power to find alternative work for those made redundant, both on the Clyde and in Portsmouth. As the Statement said, we are investing a lot of money in Portsmouth and we hope that there will be jobs in the support bases for some of those being made redundant. This is an area that the Government, BAE Systems and the trade unions are all talking about very seriously.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the three offshore patrol vessels. This is exactly what was envisaged when the carrier contract was first negotiated, in order to ensure the continuity of a strategic asset for this country. Thereafter, I cannot be so generous. May I correct the misapprehension that has been put about that the carrier cost doubled? The original cost was more than £4 billion when the contract was signed. There was an additional £1.8 billion because, quite correctly, the Government decided, when the recession hit us, that it should be delayed for two years. So when the coalition Government came in, the cost was actually £5.9 billion. That has now risen to £6.2 billion, part of which was due to the Government’s mistaken belief, under the last Secretary of State, that they could somehow fit “cats and traps” over the weekend by some welder doing a “homer” and getting it cheaply. Of course, it cost £60 million.

Secondly, and finally, the Statement is curiously bereft of any strategic sense of what this country needs. The contract was signed to give continuity and retention of skills so that this country would have not only jobs but a major industrial and defence strategic asset. All I have to say is, if the Government believe that they can constitute a future strategic basis purely on the basis of the intrinsic contractual cost of any given contract, I fear for the long term. If the Government continue in that way we may well end up sending our carriers—if they are built—to repair in Korea. You can win the minutes in all of these things and disastrously lose the hours. I hope that the tenor of this Statement is not one that permeates the whole of the Government’s thinking on strategic defence issues.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, that is not the case at all. We have secured a great many jobs upon the Clyde, and the future of the British shipbuilding industry is very secure. As regards the costs, we could debate this all afternoon, but the delays added considerably to the cost of the carriers. The decision to have the “cats and traps” was not made over the weekend; we gave a great deal of consideration to it, but then made the decision to revert to the stowable version, which the previous Government had decided on.

Defence: Better Defence Acquisition

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 10th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, my noble friend and I have had a number of discussions about GOCO and I am well aware of his concerns. I look forward to continuing discussions in the future and to hearing any positive suggestions that he has. I agree that something has to change. We cannot carry on with the existing situation.

The noble Lord asked me about national security protection, a point also made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which I should have answered. Our national security interests are a primary responsibility of the Government. The better delivery of our acquisition support needs will be of real benefit. We will ensure that DE&S will be suitably constructed to ensure the protection of UK national interests. In order to safeguard UK national security, the contracting entity and the operating company must be UK registered and the overwhelming majority of the contract shall be performed in the United Kingdom. In addition, there will be restrictions on passing information to parent companies. Potential contracting entities will need to satisfy the Ministry of Defence that they can meet the national security restrictions, which will include a number of areas where only UK nationals can have access to the information.

I hope that reassures my noble friend. I have several other pages of information on this issue. I do not want to labour the House with it but I am quite happy to discuss it with my noble friend in private.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, I join in the tributes paid and the condolences offered to the servicemen and servicewomen who have made the ultimate sacrifice for this country.

I welcome the publication of the White Paper, not least because it addresses in an open and discussive fashion a problem which, let us be honest, has bedevilled Government after Government of both political persuasions, although I suppose we must say now “all” political persuasions. I have one specific question only. It is not about the structure of the GOCO proposals, on which I am open minded, but about the underlying analysis. In doing so, I declare my interests, as registered, in the parliamentary, private and academic spheres.

The question is this: to what extent was the Government’s motivation based on the recognition that one of the key problems in procurement, giving rise to over-costs and over-runs in time, is the rapidity of cyclical innovation in cyber-related equipment? Put simply, 50 years ago, when we were dealing with the purchase of a platform, whether an armoured vehicle, an aeroplane or a battleship, the cycle of innovation of transformative and new products was 10, 15, 20 or 30 years. Now we are more concerned with what is on those platforms, not only the kinetics but the communication and the real-time analysis of situational awareness, and the cycle of innovation in that cyber-related procurement is something like 14 months. In other words, there is a cycle which occurs three times during the period of the normal procurement process. That on its own will not be solved by structural, managerial or contractual reformation. It would be interesting to know to what extent that was considered in the background thinking to the Government’s proposals.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I cannot answer that question relating to cyber, although I am sure that it was a contributory factor.

We have set out clearly in the White Paper the reasons for how we got here. The noble Lord and his colleagues who have had responsibility for procurement in the past are well aware of the problems. He makes a good point about cyber and the complexities and cost of it now. It is very relevant to the subject.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, we are talking about two things. We are talking about the GOCO but also a single-source regulation situation. We feel that the disciplines that we would place on the GOCO would ensure that there is not a monopoly.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, could I add to my previous contribution lest noble Lords were confused by it? The innovation cycle of 14 months for digitally related equipment over a contract that may last, in the case of aircraft carriers, up to 14 years, means the constant demand for respecification of the initial contract to keep up with the latest and best. That, in my view, has contributed more than anything else to overruns and overcosts because they are a natural product of continual respecification.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes a very good point. This is an area that the GOCO will have to struggle with—or if it is not GOCO, Civil Service-plus. I take on board everything the noble Lord said.

Armed Forces: Local Overseas Allowance

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 25th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, Operation Kipion replaced Operations Telic and Calash. It covers operations in the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Somalia and in Iraq. The latter is a defence section at the embassy, where we have a number of service personnel.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I thank the Minister for his willingness to have his officials investigate the alleged anomalies. When he does so, I am sure he will bear in mind that although, of course, in a time of austerity, all the sacrifices and cutbacks must be shared, the Armed Forces are unique because very few of those who have a contract with the country or the Government have a contract stating that their service will be accomplished even until death. Will he bear that in mind when he looks at some of these matters affecting morale in the Armed Forces?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

The noble Lord makes a very good point. I have looked very carefully at all the rates that the noble Baroness brought to my attention, and I think there is an issue. The amounts are very small, but it is very important to sailors, soldiers and airmen who are out there, and it is very important that we look at it again.

Defence: Carrier Strike Capability

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 10th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

I can assure my noble friend that we are doing quite a lot of work on this issue. Previous studies have shown that this decision may offer great flexibility in the employment of the carriers in other roles, particularly amphibious roles. The carriers are central to our amphibious assault capability and are a leading example of the expeditionary forces that underpin the core principles of the SDSR. I can assure my noble friend that there is plenty of room on the carriers to embark a good number of Royal Marines and to operate helicopters to support them. The B-variant can land on austere runways on land in support of ground troops.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, the Minister rather led with his chin on occasions in his Statement when defending his predecessor’s decision. I am going to resist the temptation and keep my hand rather firmly in my pocket. I very much welcome the Statement made today by the Secretary of State, not least because it has reverted to a decision that was taken by the last Government on perfectly rational grounds and in which I played a minor role at the beginning. My colleague the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, who is here today, played a much more major part.

The truth of the matter is that it is the easiest thing in the world for a new Minister, in a fresh dawn, to overturn the recommendations and decisions of their predecessor. A lot of political kudos can be attracted to that—a degree of bravura, a sense of decisiveness, ruthless leadership and so on. It is much more difficult for a Minister in a Government to overturn completely the decision of their immediate predecessor, and it takes a great deal of courage to do that. There is no political kudos—all that can be anticipated is criticism, “egg on face” quotes, and so on.

I congratulate the Government and the Secretary of State on having made the right decisions for the right reasons this time. This is right for the Armed Forces, for the security of the country, for the Navy and above all for the people who serve in the Armed Forces. In passing this commendation to the Secretary of State, will the Minister urge him to apply the same scrutiny and rationale to various other aspects of the SDSR, which, on the evidence of today’s decision, have been taken more in haste and in the pursuit of kudos than in the interests of national security of the country?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his welcome. This was a very difficult decision but it was right for the Royal Navy and for the country. In taking this decision, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State made no criticism of his predecessor’s decision. Things have dramatically changed over the cats and traps, and obviously with the B-variant. I will take the noble Lord’s other point, on bringing the same scrutiny to other aspects of the SDSR, back to the department.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Tuesday 4th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, as I understand it, this is a one-off arrangement that will not be repeated.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I want to follow up on the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Newton, a couple of moments ago. When the Minister confirms that representations to the Parliamentary Ombudsman must come via an MP, will he recognise that, although it would create a special category for the Armed Forces, members of those forces already give up their right to lobby and to act politically in a public fashion pursuing such a case, as is the natural right of all British citizens? That does not necessarily disengage them from party-political membership but it does disengage them from party-political or public-political activity. They are therefore caught between a demand that they go via a route that could be interpreted as lobbying an MP and, on the other hand, the necessity for representations to the Parliamentary Ombudsman to be via that very route. Will the Minister bear that in mind and keep an open mind on it so that, if he finds that they are thus disadvantaged, a special category can be made available for members of the Armed Forces to go directly to the Parliamentary Ombudsman?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

The noble Lord, and indeed my noble friend, raise a very important point. I assure the noble Lord that the letter that my noble friend receives will be a very thorough and well thought-out response.

I have spoken at length both to set out the Government’s new commitments and to respond carefully to a wide variety of amendments. I hope that I have indicated our determination that the annual report on the Armed Forces covenant should be comprehensive yet flexible, based on consultation but with ultimate responsibility left where it belongs with Ministers. On this basis, I ask the noble and gallant Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Armed Forces: Resources

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords—

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, I join the Minister in his tributes to the fallen and the wounded. Some three months ago, in the first week of the no-fly zone over Libya, I asked the noble Lord the Leader of the House whether the Government had both the resolve and the resources to maintain the zone as long as was necessary, especially in light of the fact that in Iraq the no-fly zones had lasted some 12 years. Obviously it is important that Gaddafi understands that we have such resolve and resource but, in view of some of the comments that have been attributed recently to some people in the military, would the Minister like to take the opportunity today to assure the House once again that not only the resolve but the resources to maintain that no-fly zone as long as possible are and will be made available?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

I agree entirely with the noble Lord. As the Chief of the Defence Staff has said, we can sustain this operation as long as we choose to. I am absolutely clear on that.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Friday 12th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, I declare an interest in various security matters, as registered and declared previously, including a partnership in the Chertoff Group. I join with other noble Lords in the tributes they have paid to the fallen who have served this country, including this week’s tributes to Senior Aircraftman Scott Hughes.

The Minister began his introduction by referring to the strategic and financial framework. Everyone recognises the financial constraints under which the Government have been operating and the question is not whether there is a cost element in the review—there always is—but whether the primary guidance of the review is strategically or cost based. One comparator is the review carried out by my noble friend Lord Robertson some years ago, in which I declare an interest as having played some part in it. During that review in 1997-98, we spent as long considering the foreign policy objectives and strategic framework which our military power was meant to pursue and accomplish as we spent on the whole of this strategic defence review.

This is singularly unfortunate for two reasons. First, it will leave the review more open to Treasury raids—which will come—because if it is not a strategically based review, starting from foreign policy objectives and working through to the military-operational means to accomplish them, it will be easier to get rid of the military-operational means because, after careful study and consensus building, the foreign policy objectives have not been clearly identified. Secondly, the strategic starting point is more important than ever because we are in the midst of huge changes and increasing danger, as was pointed out by my noble friend Lord Hutton in his maiden speech. The shift of power among sovereign states from west to east; the shift of distribution from corporate organisations and sovereign states to individual groups of non-state actors; the exponential growth of asymmetric warfare and ideologically driven conflict; and the proliferation of the means of mass destruction—radiological, chemical and biological weaponry—which are now attainable by the few rather than by states, all demand a strategic review. It is therefore a pity that the Government fell short and did not spend a little longer on this fundamental starting point.

On financial implications, we all understand the need for debt reductions and, in some ways, we should congratulate the Secretary of State for Defence on his courage in putting his principles above his career prospects by standing up to the Treasury. However, it did not seem to impede either my noble friend Lord Robertson or me afterwards, so that is perhaps happy guidance for him. But a number of ambiguities remain—I shall mention only one. While it is said that the cut in defence expenditure is much less than in other departments, this will apply only if the independent nuclear deterrent remains centrally funded. If it is added to the defence budget, the figures will change quite dramatically over the next few years. Can the Minister give an assurance on that?

I ask for that assurance because we all have a common cause here. The Treasury will come back. The pattern of defence reviews over the past few decades has been quite similar: analyse and identify the needs; agree on the operational and military needs; start to implement them; and then the Treasury refuses to fund them fully. That is the nature of the Minister’s implication that, “This is just the beginning”. It certainly is in respect of relationships with the Treasury.

On finance more generally, I make one simple point. The Government should resist the temptation to place all responsibility for the cuts and our financial plight on the previous Government. It may win the minutes but it will lose the hours. I say this not because of my personal interest in the previous Government but because there is a serious strategic danger in maintaining the illusion that it was caused by the choices of the previous Government: it would completely divert attention from the role of the banking and financial sectors in our economic catastrophe and, in turn, dangerously overlook the crucial interrelationship and interdependence between economic strength and security—or, to put it another way, economic weakness and insecurity and the lack of capacity to build military power. We would be better to honestly admit that element of the conundrum that we face. This has been identified by people such as Paul Kennedy in his book about the relationship between economic strength and the potency and capability of producing political and military power. If we do not admit it, then, rather than starting afresh, we will start again the same cycle of the illusion that we have the financial means on paper, write in the military means and then face the reality of never being able to deliver but rather push it to the right.

On procurement, again the party-political blame game hides the real problem—the procurement process. This is particularly exacerbated by the fast life cycle of technological innovation. If it is the case that the life cycle of a technology is now 18 months and yet we, like the Pentagon, take 84 months to apply even a technological specification to a product because we keep respecifying, at the end of the day, even if we get the product, it will be four generations too late because of the technological life cycle. The reality is that we probably will not get the product because continual respecification means never-ending redesign, which means the product never being delivered at the end of the process. That is not a party political matter; it is intrinsic to the present system. I urge the Minister to look carefully at the recommendations of Bernard Gray, whatever else comes out of the review.

I shall say little about the carriers—the most controversial aspect—as others have done but better than I can. All I do is ask the Minister if he will at least consider some means of retaining the skill of pilots to land on aircraft carriers—which is much different from other skills—either by retaining a small number of planes, or by assuring the House that our pilots will be seconded to the United States carrier fleet in order to do that.

On operations, the main thing in Afghanistan is to send out a clear message that we will stay the course and to introduce a campaign plan which integrates DfID, our public messaging and political and military surges. If we miss out any of those elements, we will not achieve what we should.

On contingency capacity, we should recognise that, however we plan, there will be a desperate need for a surge capacity at some stage which will mean that the reserves and the Territorial Army will become even more important than previously.

Let me say few words on wider security. On terrorism, the Home Secretary has said that al-Qaeda is weaker than ever. That is half true. However, it is also true that we now face four levels of terrorism: the al-Qaeda core; its affiliates in many national states, including in the Maghreb in North Africa; its associates, who now fight under the umbrella of al-Qaeda; and self-starters, including in our own country. Although the latter are less professional, less prepared and less centrally controlled, they are thereby all the more dangerous because they are often clean skins and there is no way to trace back their connections and so on. I would have liked to have seen more on the Office of Security and Counter-terrorism and a little less complacency over the fact that we have undoubtedly been successful there.

I welcome the Government’s extra money on cyber issues but, so far as I can see, one thing is missing from the review: the cyber infrastructure is still a growing part of the critical national infrastructure but it is not in government hands. So, where is the interface that will bring together the academic, private and public sectors in order to ensure that this most serious and growing of threats is countered?

This review is good in parts. Some of it is sensible, some of it is inevitable, some of it is missing and some of it is incomprehensible. Our task is therefore surely to accept the inevitable, welcome the sensible, augment its weaknesses and revisit the incomprehensible, and to do it together. We owe that to the Armed Forces and the nation.