Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

With respect to the noble Baroness, we are dealing with two very different situations. It is not the business of Sir John Chilcot to comment on issues of that kind. Indeed, there is an opportunity for the noble Baroness to make points of that sort during the debate that is continuing later today. I shall have to reflect on what she said but I do not have a ready answer at the moment.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, as a member of the then Cabinet, along with my noble friends, I first express my condolences, with everyone else, to the Armed Forces and congratulate them, as my noble friend Lord West said, on carrying out their duty to the country. When I say that, I mean every member of the Armed Forces, up to and including the Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of the Defence Staff, who have committed their lives to this country and to doing their duty. We should accord that. They are people who have risked their lives themselves.

I do not like commenting on a report that I have not read in full and I freely admit that I have not had time to do that—it has not stopped others, of course, in the other place. I simply urge one thing on the Government: in congratulating John Chilcot and his team on the report they have produced, can we make a judicial distinction—I do not mean in a legal sense—between legitimate criticism of processes or other failures and what are political judgments? There is a danger that the Government will get themselves into a position regarding political judgments, which is what are exercised on intelligence and what are exercised, for instance, on the question of whether something was the last resort. Whether sanctions could have worked, or whether there were other diplomatic means, was very much in the minds of the Cabinet. Our political judgment was that they would not be sufficient to deter what we believed was the spread of chemical and biological weapons over there, not under democratic control, while over here, the other element of threat—intention—had been shown to be absolutely constrained at 9/11.

I welcome the report, I will study it carefully and we will learn the lessons, but at the end of the day it is elected Ministers who must exercise the judgment on some of these questions.

[Earl Howe]

First, I express my agreement with what the noble Lord has rightly said about the Chiefs of the Defence Staff and the Chiefs of Staff generally during the Iraq war and immediately afterward. They are all men of the highest ability and we owe them our gratitude, as much as we owe to the men and women in the field. I also agree that there is a distinction to be drawn between the processes of decision-making and the political judgments that are made. I simply point out that, in my view at least, the strength and integrity of the process underpins the reliability of the political judgments.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger]

I have no idea, is the answer to that question.

My point is that, contrary to what some people assert, the risk of death from terrorism is not as high as it was 30 or 40 years ago, so we must take care not to surrender the freedoms that our parents and grandparents fought to protect in the Second World War on the basis of alleged unprecedented threats.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

Since the noble Lord has no idea, I will give just one example, occurring and culminating on 6 August 2006: the attempt to bring down seven airliners—which, were it not for the powers in the Bill, would have resulted in 2,300 deaths on one day alone.

[Lord Strasburger]

Thank you.

Sometimes, possibly well-meant attempts to improve our safety by treating every citizen as a suspect and collecting everyone’s private data could have the unintended consequence of making us less safe. I am thinking of bulk surveillance powers, which some experts say risk hiding data about the bad guys under a tsunami of personal and private data about the 99% of us who will never be terrorists or paedophiles. Furthermore, by storing 12 months of our internet activity at our service providers to derive a debatable security benefit, we would be exposing all internet users to the entirely new and self-inflicted risk of the theft of that very revealing data by thieves, blackmailers and foreign spooks. There is plenty of experience of cyberthefts to tell us that our personal data will be stolen, whatever bland assurances we get from the Government that they will not.

So the Bill has the potential to be a good one, but it is not yet there and we have much work to do to get it there. I look forward to working with my colleagues on these Benches to achieve that—and, importantly, I hope also to work with noble Lords on the Labour, Cross-Bench and Government Benches to make the Bill fit for purpose and the best it can be.

Counter-Daesh: Quarterly Update

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend has strayed slightly from the anti-Daesh theme of the Statement, but I can tell him that we are concerned that al-Qaeda is regaining some of its former footholds in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Taliban has made recent gains as well, particularly in Helmand. This is something that we and our allies are looking at very closely. The Afghan armed forces have risen to the challenge that has faced them, but we are in no doubt that that challenge is increasing.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned that the Government had received criticism for their proactive countering of the Daesh and jihadist narrative and ideology. My own view is that the Government are absolutely right and deserve the support of this House. This phenomenon will not be defeated by force of arms alone: countering both the narrative and the underpinning ideology of the jihadists is an essential component in countering radicalisation, recruitment and ultimately their operational effectiveness.

The Minister mentioned the flow of jihadist recruiters to Syria. He did not say anything about the returnees. Will he say a quick word about what action is being taken to ensure the protection of the United Kingdom from those returning from Syria and, in particular, surveillance or deradicalisation programmes?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord about the Prevent strategy. Currently, the greatest threat comes from terrorist recruiters inspired by Daesh. Our Prevent programme will necessarily reflect that by prioritising support for vulnerable Muslims and working in partnership with British Muslim communities and civil society groups. I do not have up-to-date information about the extent to which we have been able to intercept and assist—in the right sense—those returning from the Middle East, but I shall gain data from the Home Office, if I may, and write to the noble Lord about that.

Warships

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 11th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the programme has already been announced in the SDSR but, broadly, the “Queen Elizabeth” aircraft carrier itself will be in service by the early 2020s and we will have a number of F35s deployed on that ship. Indeed, we have accelerated the procurement programme for those aircraft.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, what strategic assessment has been made of the UK’s capacity for warship building with the potential closure of Port Talbot steel? If no such assessment has been made, does that mean that we intend to rely on other, friendly nations such as China to supply the steel for British warships?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the capacity of British industry to service our warship building requirements will be very much centre stage in Sir John Parker’s work on the shipbuilding strategy. As regards Port Talbot, I am sure that the noble Lord will know that the Government are committed to doing all they can to work with Tata to explore how we can support the company to secure a buyer for the plant and put in train a turnaround plan. We are working with the Welsh Government to do that. There is good news today on Tata’s plant in Scunthorpe, where a deal has been secured, but I assure the noble Lord that we regard British steel manufacturing as of vital importance to this programme.

Armed Forces: Future Force 2020

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 25th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, there are a number of pinch points in the armed services, but, broadly speaking, they are in areas where there are skills shortages in the wider economy. Medical expertise is one of those skills, but there are also areas specific to military organisations, such as logistics and intelligence. We are taking a multifaceted approach to tackling those shortages—for example, financial retention incentives, extensions and continuance of service, targeted recruitment incentives and a direct entry scheme—but there is no single bullet. I am aware that medical services represent a challenge, but one that I think we are slowly winning.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, it no doubt makes sense to leverage the private sector, especially in a fast-changing environment such as cyber, as the Minister said, but it raises a question, does it not? If we are relying on reservists, who by definition are not always available, to provide essential skills, who is providing the skills for the skills gap when they are not available?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as I am sure the noble Lord will know, the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines have an approach whereby they tend to train those already in regular service, but there is also a reliance on reserves. It is a question of getting the balance right in each discipline.

National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend puts his finger on a central issue that we have been wrestling with over these past months. It is impossible to predict the threats that we will face in 10 or 15 years. We know that there are many uncertainties. The national security strategy sets out a quite different threat picture from that of 2010. In particular, the threat from terrorism has increased substantially and aggressive Russian behaviour means that state-based threats are more prominent. As the Statement said, we cannot choose between conventional defences against state-based threats and the need to counter threats that do not recognise national borders. We have to tackle both. We have attempted in this document, I hope successfully, not just to address the threats in order of priority but to plan for an array of capabilities that will make us much nimbler on our feet, more flexible and able to respond globally to any threat that materialises. My noble friend is right to put his finger on cyber and drones as new elements of this strategy. We must invest in these things but we must also ensure that the skilled manpower is there so that the equipment can be utilised to its best effect.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement as being better than the 2010 so-called strategic defence review. My welcome is therefore conditional. I have scanned through the document and much of it is filling in the gaps that were left some years ago, for instance, on the maritime patrol aircraft. May I ask the Minister a couple of questions? First, what is the difference between the rapid deployment brigades—I use “rapid” advisedly, because they will not be at full capability for 10 years—and 16 Air Assault Brigade, which was formed in 1999 after the last and only genuine strategic defence review, which was conducted by my noble friend Lord Robertson? If there is no substantial difference, why has it taken all this time over the last five or six years to decide to get the capabilities and to put them in effect for the future?

Secondly, is it not the case that the addition of 1,900 intelligence professionals at the centre will unfortunately be off-set if we reduce police numbers in the community, since the police act as a bridge between central intelligence—SIGINT and communications intelligence—and human intelligence, which is gained from trust by being in the neighbourhood? Finally, why does “innovation” not appear at any stage, particularly as regards cyber? Cyber now permeates everything from our weapon systems through our critical national infrastructure to central finance in London. The chief characteristic of cyber is constant entrepreneurial innovation and if we do not instil that at the centre of our processes, in procurement as well as in operations, we will fall behind in cyber. We are spending just under £2 billion there; the Chinese are spending $180 billion over the coming period.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the noble Lord asked me three questions. The first was about the rapid deployment strike capability. The Army is able to deploy a division now with sufficient notice and has been able to for some while. During the time of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, as Defence Secretary, he was instrumental in ensuring that capability. This division could consist of an armoured infantry brigade, 3 Commando brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade as well as forces from other nations. This SDR is investing in improving the readiness level and upgrading the capabilities of the division, so that by 2025 we will be able to deploy a division comprising two armoured infantry brigades and a strike brigade, in addition to our high-readiness forces of 3 Commando Brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade.

The noble Lord, Lord Reid, also mentioned intelligence and expressed a fear that this capability might be off-set by reductions in numbers in community policing. The SDSR document does not cover community policing, which is a matter for local forces, as he knows. We will no doubt be hearing news of that as the effects of the SR are made known. I cannot comment on that today but I can say that we will protect absolutely the counterterrorist police we need to ensure national security and that the funding for that will be ring-fenced. He also said that innovation was not mentioned. I will just refer him to part B of chapter 6 of the document, which is entitled “Innovation”, and is on page 73 and the following.

Syria and Iraq: Airspace

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 22nd October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

I have already referred to the memorandum of understanding, which, as I have said, is a major step forward in terms of avoiding unwanted incidents over Syrian airspace. The protocols to which I referred include maintaining professional airmanship at all times, the use of specific communication frequencies, and the establishment of a communication line on the ground. But it is worth noting that, by and large, the reconnaissance effort that the coalition is putting in is directed to the east of Syria, whereas the Russian action is largely in the west of that country.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, I join with the condolences that the Minister extended to the families and the loved ones of those who have died in our services and others.

Some three months ago, when I asked the Minister whether the Government considered ISIL or Assad the greatest threat, he unhesitatingly responded that the greatest threat was ISIL—a view with which I agree. Does it not make sense to shoot the wolf nearest the sledge first? In other words, whatever the controversy of wider discussions with Russia and Iran and whatever our differences with them, will he bear in mind when considering this question the wise words of Winston Churchill when criticised for a working alliance with Josef Stalin and the Soviet Union: “I dare say that if Herr Hitler invaded hell, I would have a good word to say for the devil”? In other words, can we maximise those forces that share our view about the greatest threat being ISIL?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, in considering that question we need to remember that Assad is a man who has barrel-bombed his own civilians and caused untold suffering among the Syrian population. He cannot form part of any eventual permanent solution to the conflict, and for that reason we cannot countenance taking any action which might serve to strengthen the current Syrian regime.

Syria

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 17th September 2015 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we are aware of reports that Russia may have deployed military personnel and equipment to Syria. We are monitoring those reports very closely. Any unilateral military support to the Assad regime, for any purpose, is, in our view, destabilising and counterproductive. This is, after all, the same regime that is causing a humanitarian crisis through aerial bombardment of its own people, forcing thousands of people to flee. They cannot be a partner against ISIL. Therefore, any attempt by the Russians to achieve that is, in our view, misguided. We are, however, in diplomatic contact with the Russians, and we make our views clear.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, before the Government come back to Parliament in a few weeks’ time with, as we understand, a proposal for military action, can the Minister make sure that they outline their grand strategy, by which I mean not only the purpose of military action but the diplomatic, financial, humanitarian, political and military aspects of the overriding grand strategy? One reason why the Government failed last time to get agreement on military action in Syria was that there was a belief in this House and elsewhere that it was not part of an overall grand strategy, or at least that it had not been explained to Members of Parliament.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I take fully on board the comments of the noble Lord, with his immense experience in this area. The Prime Minister has made it clear that in order to facilitate further action in Syria he will return to Parliament; but, as he has said, it would be better if there were consensus in the House supporting such action. His views have not changed on that. What has changed is the growing evidence that ISIL poses a threat to us here in Britain. It is right for parliamentarians to be thinking about these issues and what more we can do, but I recognise that it will be vital for the Government to present a coherent case for action in Syria if that is what we decide is best.

Syria: UK Military Involvement

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Tuesday 21st July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

I fully agree with my noble friend. In a nutshell, one could say that service personnel are either embedded or they are not. The value to our people from being embedded with the United States Navy is the key skills that they are acquiring to operate the Queen Elizabeth class carriers when those come into service later in the decade. The experience gained by flying and supporting US fixed-wing aircraft will allow the pilots to retain the suitably qualified and experienced person status needed to operate the F35B.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

My Lords—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Stowell of Beeston) (Con)]

My Lords, I am so sorry, but the House is calling for the noble Lord, Lord Reid. I suggest that, if we can be brief, we will be able to hear from the Lib Dem Benches as well.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Thank you. I will be very brief. In order that the House can understand the strategy, which do the Government consider the greatest threat to this country and its interests—Assad or ISIL?

Armed Forces: Airborne Maritime Patrol

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 4th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, we have been clear for some time that the right point to look again at the requirement for a maritime patrol aircraft is in the forthcoming strategic defence and security review, the SDSR. That decision will be informed by the latest threat assessments and the conclusions come to in recent years. We continue to embed around 30 former Nimrod air crew in the maritime patrol communities of allied air forces in order to reduce the time and risks associated with regenerating a capability.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

Steady on. Does the Minister not agree with me that one does not need a review to know that, as an island nation with a sea-borne nuclear deterrent capability, we are not even in a position to secure our own deterrent, because we do not have the capability to do so? I understand that all things have to be reviewed, but this is such a no-brainer. It is obviously of great concern if we cannot protect our own sea lanes against an increasingly aggressive Russian naval force. Will the Minister go back to his right honourable friend in the other place and say that we should be proceeding now to prepare the necessary facilities to ensure that we have adequate protection for our nuclear deterrent as well as for our shores?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I absolutely do not accept that we cannot protect our own sea lanes. We have acknowledged that we have a capability gap, following the decision not to bring the Nimrod MRA4 into service, but at the same time we made it clear that we chose to accept that gap because we knew that we could mitigate it through employment of other assets, as well as through co-operation with allies. Even taking operational activity into account, we remain of the view that the SDSR is the right context in which to take a decision of this significance.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, does the noble Earl accept that there is an ingenuity in the MoD in producing euphemisms? I was once told that something was being put not into mothballs, but into a “state of extended readiness”. When he mentions the capability gap, will he accept that the maritime patrol aircraft and its facilities is not an optional add-on for a nuclear deterrent but an essential component providing surveillance, security and secrecy of location? What is the point of having a continuous at-sea submarine-based nuclear deterrent if it does not have those features? This has all the hallmarks not of a minor housekeeping problem for the MoD but of a major strategic blunder.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I emphasise again that this matter will be looked at very closely in the context of the SDSR—indeed, some preparatory work has already been done. I do not accept the noble Lord’s contention that we are without protection in this important area. We have the use of other military assets, as I said, including Type 23 frigates, submarines and Merlin anti-submarine warfare helicopters, and we rely on the assistance that we get from our allies and partners.