Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 25th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Soley]

My Lords, as a member of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, I confirm that the Minister is right that we said that the super-affirmative procedure had been used before in similar cases and, in principle, could be used. However, that is not a key question. The key question has already been put and I do not wish to elaborate on it too much. Is it appropriate to use that procedure or would it in fact be better for quality-of-legislation purposes to have new legislation in the situation described in the proposed new clause? I tend to the view that if you are going to make a decision of that type, then new legislation would be better.

I asked myself whether it might become urgent to do that and whether we would then need urgent legislation, given that it deals with terrorism. I find it difficult to see the circumstances in which that might happen, but if it did then both Houses are quite capable of urgent legislation. However, that does not seem to be on the agenda. The real question is whether we would get the legislation right. In those circumstances, particularly given the nature of the cross-party consensus that one is usually able to build when you are looking for ways of dealing with terrorism, I would be surprised if it were not possible for a new Bill to be dealt with relatively expeditiously. The scrutiny given in both Houses, particularly this one, might be better than using the super-affirmative procedure, which I agree is an accepted practice, as we discussed at some length in the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, but whether it is best practice is a different question.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, I approached this issue with an open mind and attempted to ask myself what benefits might be gained from doing this particular thing in this particular fashion. I do not think that I have ever been accused of being soft on terrorism. I genuinely believe that the first obligation of a Government is to protect their citizens. I therefore sought to discover, in asking myself and in listening to others, what might be the huge advantage and efficacy, first, of transferring from the Metropolitan Police to the NCA and, secondly, of doing it in this fashion. I am afraid that I failed to persuade myself that there is such a case.

Unlike my noble friend Lord Harris and the noble Lord, Lord Condon, I have no particular interest in the Metropolitan Police, although obviously I have an interest as a former Home Secretary. However, the points that they made about the nature of the fight against terrorism were very well made. This is not just a mechanistic operational question. It covers far more than investigations and intelligence. It covers community relations, counter-radicalisation, relationships in the community, and so on. I fully accept that there is a degree of resistance, sometimes unspoken, from police services throughout the country as the Met has the lead on this. However, I think that it has discharged that responsibility very well indeed. In the absence of any problem to be solved, we have to ask why a solution of this nature has been proffered.

My second point concerns the emerging nature of the National Crime Agency. Every time I read about the NCA, which has not yet been formally established, as my noble friend Lord Harris pointed out, it seems to have inflated its own powers and scope. I am not quite sure who now controls the fight against illegal immigration as the UK Border Agency has been split off into a different agency and there is a second agency that comes under the Home Office. I understand that there are thoughts about the NCA having responsibility for controlling our borders as well and now counterterrorism is being envisaged. My third point is that we cannot start this from scratch. The fight against terrorism relies on a reservoir of experience, a culture, an operational expertise, knowledge within the system and so on.

My final point is about the nature of doing this. If it was absolutely essential to transfer such powers immediately, in a very short period or without obstacle or difficulty, I could see the Government’s case, but I have not yet been able to envisage such circumstances. Indeed, if I envisage sudden emergencies arising, I would have thought that that was precisely the time you do not want to change the agency handling them. You would want to carry out such a profound change in such an important area over a period of time with a great deal of thought being given to the transition. If that is the case, why are we looking for some immediate expedient to transfer it with the minimum of parliamentary scrutiny?

Having approached this with an open mind, I have found what I have heard so far entirely unpersuasive. I have listened to everything that has been said but I do not think that adding parliamentary scrutiny to a questionable transfer would in any way impede the fight against terrorism. In fact, it would assist it.

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

My Lords, I am sorry that the House is going to hear a series of commissioners being referred to and speaking. I have cut my speech right down because there was nothing that I disagreed with in the speeches that followed the Minister’s speech.

I shall emphasise one thing and ask one question. I gather that in the other place it was said that this is a procedural matter. It is not a procedural matter, but a matter of national security. The deputy national co-ordinator of counterterrorism, a Metropolitan Police officer acting under the command of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, said in public this week that the terrorist threat is rising. As my noble friend Lord Condon said, and I can vouch for it from my time as commissioner, there has not been a single plot that did not arise in, pass through or aim at London. When the bombs go off, whether in London or Glasgow, only the Metropolitan Police can put thousands of officers on the road or fly people in Chinook helicopters to Scotland. That is because the Metropolitan Police is the size it is. The NCA will never be that size. That is one other aspect of why the Met is the right beast to do this job of enormous national importance.

I echo the points being made to the Minister. Has there been any evidence of failures in counterterrorism by the Metropolitan Police? There is no evidence that anybody seems to be aware of. Is there any evidence that having counterterrorism policing in a separate agency from territorial police forces is a good idea? No, there is not, and there is exactly the opposite if you look across the Atlantic with the divisions between the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the CIA, the New York Police Department, and so on. The person who first began to mention the idea that counterterrorism should be taken from the Metropolitan Police is one Boris Johnson. He made that point in 2008 at the Conservative Party conference. I would like reassurance from the Minister that the sectional interests of London Conservatives are not being put in front of national security because the reason that Boris gives for this is that it would allow the Mayor of London alone to choose the Metropolitan Police Commissioner without the influence of the Home Secretary. That is a very poor argument for imperilling national security.

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[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, this has been a good and useful debate. I thank noble Lords for presenting their arguments, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. Perhaps I can reassure her that this is not about the Metropolitan Police any more than it is about any other of the territorial police forces in this country. This is about a procedure whereby we can use or consider using the National Crime Agency as a co-ordinating body within any future counterterrorism measures. That decision has not been made; it is subject to review. Many noble Lords have made speeches that are quite valid and contain valid points regarding that review. I listened to noble Lords in that regard.

I referred to our disappointment at our inability to gain a legislative consent Motion from the Northern Ireland Executive. It is a matter of disappointment but it does not remove the opportunity, as we will find when we discuss the next series of amendments, for the National Crime Agency to operate in Northern Ireland. That is not the point at issue. It has always been recognised that in counterterrorism matters the Police Service of Northern Ireland has a particular role of its own, and this legislation respects that role. We are not making a decision about the future of counterterrorism. We are putting in place an opportunity for Parliament —my noble friend Lady Hamwee is quite right about this—to put the conclusion of a future review in place without undue delay so that there is an opportunity, perhaps for the first time, to consider fully the implications of how counterterrorism is co-ordinated on a national base. It would not be understood by people outside this place if, having conducted a review, and that review having been announced to Parliament, we had to wait as long as a year for a suitable legislative vehicle to hitch primary legislation to. We all know that secondary legislation is a more efficient way of presenting issues to Parliament; it is not a method by which Parliament is bypassed.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked about the timing of the Commons amendments. At Second Reading my right honourable friend the Home Secretary announced to the House that she was proposing to extend the commitment to reinstate this clause. At that point we were considering the debate in the House itself, and were also in discussion about seeking legislative consent in Northern Ireland. It was only at the conclusion of those elements that we were in a position to present it on Report in the Commons where, as the noble Baroness herself said, two and a half hours were devoted on the Floor of the House to considering this issue.

The noble Lord, Lord Condon, doubted whether it was proper for a change of this type to be considered in anything other than primary legislation. Much of what the noble Lord said covered the sorts of issues that will be relevant to a future review, of the type that we have not had before, into the way in which we co-ordinate CT and might involve the National Crime Agency. I hope that such a review would consider the very points that the noble Lord made.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, mentioned the complexity of the issue. Of course it is complex. This is about trying to find a mechanism for making a decision. In effect, all chief constables are responsible for ensuring appropriate and effective counterterrorism in their force areas. All force areas maintain a Special Branch, for example. There is already considerable activity at every force level. This enables the review to consider whether there is a role for the National Crime Agency in co-ordinating the activity at national level. It does not question the fact that the role of the Metropolitan Police, for reasons that have been stated in the debate, will be very important before, during and after the review.

I think that it was the noble Lord, Lord Harris, who asked me what problem I was trying to fix. It is clear that we already have in place very effective structures for counterterrorism policing. This is about reviewing those structures in the context of the National Crime Agency. We do not have a National Crime Agency at present but we will have one in place. We are considering what if any role the National Crime Agency should have in further enhancing our response to terrorism. To seek continuous improvement does not suggest that there is a problem. Until there is a review, we cannot say whether there should be a role for the National Crime Agency to play.

The noble Lord, Lord Reid, emphasised that the fight against terrorism is complex. I hope that nothing I said suggested that I believed otherwise. I hope also that I did not say anything with which he fundamentally disagrees about the nature of terrorism and the resources that need to be devoted to countering it. It is right that Parliament should have in place a review mechanism for considering how it implements these things.

The noble Lord, Lord Soley, took the view that there should be primary legislation. I disagree with him. One thing that we have all learnt is that much of the decision-making on an issue such as this will be quite detailed. It is almost bound to be dealt with in secondary legislation, because if there is to be a transfer of resources, funds or whatever, it will be based on a secondary legislation-type activity.

The noble Lord, Lord Blair, asked a very pointed question about whether there was party-political consideration in this, and whether it was a measure to appease the Mayor of London and gain some party advantage. I admire the noble Lord and I think that the question was unworthy of him. That is not what we are considering here. We are considering a proper mechanism whereby a national force designed to co-ordinate the fight against crime might also at some future date be asked by Parliament to have a role in counterterrorism. That is what we are considering today, and the question is about the procedure that we offer.

There are two legitimate points of view. It can be said that this is such an important thing that primary legislation is the only way to bring it about. I would say the most effective way of bringing it about is through the super-affirmative process following a review, which is precisely why I am arguing the Government’s case here.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee perhaps summed it up as well as anyone: no decision has yet been made or will be made until after review, and there will be no review until the NCA is up and running. This is about future-proofing national policing through the NCA, about a future role for the NCA with the additional flexibility made through the order-making power, and about what the NCA might be able to bring to enhance the counterterrorism response in the future if such a decision is made.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I am very grateful to the Minister. Indeed, he is right that there is almost nothing I disagree with in what he said, with one exception: his lack of explanation as to why one could not have legislation following a review. It is quite possible to have consultation in a review and then parliamentary scrutiny. He is presenting it as if one can only have a review and consultation if one is going to the affirmative procedure. What he has not explained is the need for that mechanism and the avoidance of further parliamentary scrutiny, not in the detail but on the major issue, should it arise, of the transfer of the lead on counterterrorism. That is a substantial issue.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am certain it is the nature of these things that following the review, Parliament would have an opportunity to debate the issue before the super-affirmative proposal is laid. I made the point earlier that any party affected by this secondary legislation has the right to be consulted. Parliament itself is likely to express a view when that decision of a review is made, before a super-affirmative procedure is even tabled. I cannot imagine an issue of this importance passing noble Lords’ attention and not being brought to the attention of the Minister in this House to account for what was being proposed. I cannot see that being a realistic scenario. I would expect to have to answer to this House for a decision of that nature. Indeed, the super-affirmative procedure provides for an opportunity for full consideration of the detail, as the noble Lord has said, of what is going to be required in the transfer of these powers.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked about tasking powers in the NCA because they apply to police forces in England and Wales and they would apply to the functions of the NCA. For the moment, that is limited to serious and organised crime, but in future it could include counterterrorism if such functions were confirmed through secondary legislation, or the super-affirmative procedure, in the future.

This has been a useful debate. I do not waver from my conviction that the House has a role to play in debating the issues, but I think that the provisions of the Bill, as amended by the Commons, provide the right mechanism for doing so.

Crime: Detection Rates

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 14th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Indeed, it has. At the moment, we are evaluating a consultation that we have had on a new code of practice for CCTV and its use. It is an extremely useful tool when properly used, and it is very important that we recognise that it needs to be properly used in our communities.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

With respect to a previous answer on the costs of international travel, will the Minister please recognise that crime is no longer local? It is international and, indeed, transnational, and that trend is being accelerated by cybercrime. When he looks with a sceptical eye at these costs, will he make sure that he does not debilitate the police in carrying out their job of tackling international crime?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The noble Lord makes a very good point. Indeed, we have police officers embedded in and working in overseas countries because of the international nature of many crime networks. It is greatly to the advantage of this country’s fight against crime in this country that we have intelligence about these things. On the other hand, I think my noble friend was right to challenge expenditure. It is right that all public bodies are challenged on costs, because it is up to them to evidence why it is important that this money is spent.

Ibrahim Magag: Disappearance

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Tuesday 8th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

We can, of course, always review the circumstances of this particular incident in the light of experience, but we know that the resources available to deal with people such as Magag are considerable, and that they have been designed to prevent things like this from happening. As I said, it is very difficult to prevent people from absconding. We know that it happened under the old regime; this is the first—unfortunate—case under a TPIM.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Does the Minister not understand that he misses the point? We all understand and accept that control orders and TPIMs are extraordinary measures. We understand that the ideal is to have a trial in a court of law with sufficient evidence. That is agreed. Nevertheless, the point is that, although control orders were inadequate—the Minister pointed to some absconding under them—the power to relocate was the biggest weapon in that inadequate arsenal. After the use of that no one, to my knowledge, absconded. However, the point is that the Government removed that one effective vehicle in the control orders when they brought in TPIMs. Will he now bear that in mind and at least assure the House that he will review the operations of TPIMs to see whether what I am saying is correct?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I cannot accept what the noble Lord says, but I accept that he speaks from considerable experience in this area. Governments would be very foolish not to learn from experience. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the fact that Magag was here in London particularly assisted his absconding on this occasion. I accept, as the noble Lord said, that incidents like this should be reviewed, and they will be.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 19th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

The noble Lord would not expect me to agree with him, and I do not. However, in our forthcoming discussion on Report, both today and on Wednesday, he will have the opportunity to consider further whether it is not now high time that we accept a greater degree of accountability—one that has to carry with it an ability to limit, in extreme cases, people who would be wholly unsuitable as members of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Perhaps I might respond to those two very rational and articulate contributions promoting the idea of a popular vote, as it were, in the House of Commons. I can see the benefits of that and those of ownership. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, mentioned stakeholding in the House of Commons. However, it seems that at least four problems need to be thought through.

First, the amendment would explicitly exclude anyone from the House of Lords ever chairing this committee. In the previous debate, while not seeking it for this House, we envisaged the possibility that at some stage there might be someone appropriate in this House to chair it. As I read it, the amendment would effectively preclude anyone from the House of Lords—unless it is envisaged that there be a nomination process for this House but that nobody in this House has a vote; only the House of Commons has a vote. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, may have been about to suggest that that was possible. It would be a peculiarly quaint electoral procedure for those who were nominating candidates to be precluded from voting on them.

Secondly, it would almost inevitably undermine the possibility of another envisaged benefit of convention: of the place going to the Opposition. It would not preclude it but would make it much less likely that the tradition of the position going to a member of the Opposition would be carried through, if for no other reason than the Opposition being, by definition, a minority in the House of Commons. Anyone from the majority party would therefore have an enhanced ability to achieve the post.

Thirdly, I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert. As someone who has held relatively recent ministerial experience, I can tell your Lordships that there is no way that the Prime Minister could veto a nomination for the chairmanship of this committee without it becoming a major issue—not least because the person thus vetoed would make it a major issue. Once that was out, there would be all sorts of demands, in terms of natural justice and fairness, to put into the public domain the reasons why a Prime Minister should think them so serious that he or she should veto a Member of Parliament—an honourable Member—who was considered unworthy or somehow deficient in integrity or in other skills from being chairman of this committee.

The fourth reason is that, having known the House of Commons relatively recently, I am not sure that this is a position on which we should envisage political campaigning, but I assure noble Lords that that is what we will get if this position is put up for a 100% franchise in the Commons. Therefore, having listened to what has been said, and appreciating what lies beneath the suggestion that there be an electoral college for this composed of the whole House of Commons, I think that before going down this road we would have to think very carefully about the consequences that would arise in the dynamism of real politics from such a decision.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I want to argue both ways on this issue because I am of a very mixed mind. I shall start by taking on the case put by my noble friend Lord Reid, who said that it would become controversial and difficulties would arise if it were to be subsequently known by the wider public that there had been some dispute over whether the Prime Minister had been prepared to endorse the candidature of a particular candidate. I would have thought that these matters would be dealt with by the usual channels. The amendment refers to seeking,

“in advance of the ballot the formal consent of the Prime Minister”.

In other words, the Prime Minister would be asked discreetly through the usual channels whether he or she might be minded to endorse the candidature of a particular candidate or candidates, and in the event that there were to be a refusal I would not have thought that the candidate who had been refused would want it generally known that the Prime Minister of the day had turned down their prospective nomination for chairman.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I entirely disagree with my noble friend. Not only would the candidate want it to be known, they might well have a particular reason for wanting to be chairman of the intelligence committee and indeed might even, in a rather covert fashion, be pleased to have been refused the endorsement of the Prime Minister. I do not want to mention any particular such candidates in the House of Commons, but off the top of my head I can think of half a dozen.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

If we go back to the speech of the noble Lord who moved the amendment, he never said that any Member of the House of Commons could stand. I had to disappear outside the Chamber for medical reasons, but I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, argued that any Member of the Commons should be able to stand. However, I do not think that that was the noble Lord’s suggestion. I am presuming that he was moving the amendment on the basis that there would be a membership of the committee that was put to the House on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and from those members there would then be a person who, with the endorsement of the Prime Minister, could be chairman of the committee. We may be speaking at cross purposes and I stand to be corrected. If the noble Lord is indeed suggesting that any Member of the House could stand to be chairman of the ISC, then I would completely oppose that.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate. I think I am probably the only person who has not served on the ISC. I think all the other speakers have served on it, so I am probably slightly blind-sided on some of this. The noble Lord, Lord Reid of Cardowan, said that the problem is that it would exclude Members of the House of Lords. It may possibly do so, but not necessarily. Secondly, he said that it would prevent the chairmanship going to a member of the Opposition. Again, it may possibly do so, but not necessarily. Both he and the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, talked about the political fallout. Yes, but this is a very important committee, and it will be even more significant when we pass the rest of the provisions of the Bill. If the price of that is a little political disturbance, I do not think that is necessarily a bad thing. I understand his fourth argument, which was about political campaigning. At this end of the Palace, the arrangements for electing chairmen of Select Committees have gone pretty well. They have been shared out and fought over, and both parties have ended up with some chairmanships, but not all of them.

The issues are answerable. I am not saying that they are not challenging. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn—

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Just to set the record straight, I have never been a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, although I have been at the end of some of its pertinent inquiries.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am happy to withdraw that allegation, if allegation it is. As for what the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, said about heavy weather, I ask the House to consider that the committee will play an increasingly important role. The Justice and Security Bill, when it becomes an Act, takes us into new territory with closed material procedures in courts. The chairman of the ISC will have a very important determinant role in this. Having a chairman who is selected from a narrow body of people pre-selected by the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition is perhaps just a little too cosy. I leave that thought with the House, perhaps for reflection when the Bill continues its passage through the other place. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, I have made a mental note never to tut tut silently in future, especially since that silent tut tutting can be observed by noble Baronesses even about 10 yards away. So I will be careful. The reason why I asked whether the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, had been able to attend the debates that we have had in the Moses Room is because, when I served, as I did for four years, on the Intelligence and Security Committee, I had the privilege of introducing and replying to those debates. We had great difficulty in encouraging people to attend and participate. If more Members of the House had attended and participated, it might have added to the information available in the debates that we have had at different stages.

A few years ago, when we had a Labour Government, before the Conservative Government came in, the Intelligence and Security Committee reported to the House on almost all, if not all, the issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has raised—on diversity and all the other points that she raised. We had indications and reports about it, and people raised it during the course of the debate. Even all those years ago, we discussed holding hearings in public; we discussed that in the debate in the Moses Room, along with the problems and opportunities that might be available if we held them in public. I hope that I am not giving any secrets away in saying this, but I was in favour of moving towards holding a meeting or two in public if we could do that. It is the right thing to do.

It would help and inform the debates that we have on legislation if Members came along to the annual debate. I presume that either the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, and the noble Lord, Lord Butler, will introduce the report and reply to the debate. Noble Lords would find it a very interesting and educational experience.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, there are two issues covered in this group of amendments. The first is the process of appointment of the heads of the intelligence services and agencies and, secondly, the degree to which their proceedings are held in public. Amendment 9 refers to the possibility of the ISC—enshrined in the word “may”—considering,

“the proposed appointment of the following, including … the Head of the Security Service … the Head of the Secret Intelligence Service”,

and so on. I find that an attractive idea; I see no reason why it should impede, and many reasons why it might enhance, the appointment. It would be useful for the Prime Minister, before final ratification, to know the views of the ISC. It would be useful for Parliament to know that the proposed appointee had the endorsement, as it were, of the ISC, given that it will be elected on a wider franchise than Parliament and it contributes towards the ownership by Parliament itself.

The vagueness as to what happens with regard to the committee’s deliberations when such a discussion or questioning of the prospective appointee has taken place is an advantage and a serious disadvantage. I am not quite sure whether the proposal is permissive of communicating negative views on any appointment to the Prime Minister. Does it amount in effect to a de facto veto? It is delightfully vague on those issues.

There is another issue to consider. At the moment there is a relative independence of the heads of the security service and the ISC. If the ISC is being sought as an endorser of the appointment of a particular head of a particular service, in future it may feel more inclined to defend the action of the person that it has appointed. That is not a major concern; it would certainly not undermine the perceived benefits of such a system, which is used elsewhere in the democratic world to no apparent disadvantage—and to advantage with regard to the solidity of the appointment.

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[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Unfortunately, the noble Lord has given me anything but reassurance. To argue partly on bureaucratic grounds, partly on the grounds of process and partly on the one substantive contention that there is no difference between a Permanent Secretary and the head of MI5, MI6 or GCHQ, is to me entirely unpersuasive. I have known, I think, 14 Permanent Secretaries in my relatively brief ministerial career, all of whom were excellent and very able Permanent Secretaries. They fulfilled a role, had a function and an importance in the life of this nation which was not the same as that of the heads of MI5, MI6 or GCHQ, on whom the very security of the nation depends. I hope that the Government will at least say that they will go away and reflect on this matter because, if there is a political will, all the apparent obstacles to procedure can be overcome. However, if the Government are saying that there are insurmountable bureaucratic obstacles to the ISC carrying out pre-appointment interviews, which are carried out in many countries of the world, I am afraid that they will be seen to be hiding behind process and lacking a real understanding of how substantial these positions are.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I thank the noble Lord for that intervention but, as I have explained, the reality is that these posts are special and important. They are exactly as a Permanent Secretary’s post is in terms of the continuity of Government over changes of Government. There is nothing bureaucratic about this. This is the way in which public servants are appointed. I hope that what I am describing is clarifying the Government’s argument—namely, that these posts, important though they are, are Civil Service posts occupied by servants of the Crown performing the duties of particular posts. Procedures are in place for making sure that those appointments are made on merit. They are not political appointments subject to political scrutiny. I hope noble Lords will accept that argument.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I note my noble friend’s guidance and assistance. However, I do not flinch from presenting the Government’s position in this respect. These are not conventional public appointments. They are Civil Service appointments which provide for political impartiality and, indeed, are outside the scope of Parliament. Once we start to argue for public scrutiny of an appointment, we argue for a political process. However, we have always sought to avoid such a political process in Civil Service appointments.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. He devoted almost all his argument against my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, to stressing the uniqueness of these particular positions and organisations and explaining why, because of that uniqueness, you could not involve a Select Committee, as was being suggested, and that his argument had many benefits. Now, in order to defend the status quo, he is stressing not the uniqueness of these posts but their similarity with other departments and departmental heads. However, this is not a matter of what we have done in the past but of what we might do in the future. If the Government had the will to see the benefits in the suggestions of the noble Lord, Lord King, and in what I have said, a way could be found in the future to allow the ISC, at least in a permissive sense, to interview appointees prior to final ratification. That would have enormous benefits for everyone involved in the process. The uniqueness of these positions has been recognised in a previous debate. However, that is now apparently being put aside and they are being compared with other appointments in the Civil Service.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I do not wish to prevent the noble Lord intervening but we are on Report. Therefore, I remind noble Lords—

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[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I understand what the noble Baroness is saying but if the information concerns the Foreign Secretary, who is responsible for SIS and GCHQ, or the Home Secretary, who is responsible for the Security Service, or, in certain circumstances, the Secretary of State for Defence, who is responsible for the DIS and so on, and if by chance that Secretary of State is not available to deal with an urgent matter on which a reply is requested, it would be much better that the Minister of State in that department deals with it and that we do not have the Secretary of State from Defra or from some other department shifted in merely because he is of equal seniority and that meets the requirement.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Perhaps I may help. This is not a new problem—it happens with intercepts. The only people allowed to authorise an intercept are Secretaries of State and, if the Secretary of State is not available or is not in London, his officials will get it to him—and these are far more urgent than anything envisaged here. The point that is being made is that the refusal to supply information to the ISC is such an important decision, given the confidence we are placing in the ISC, that the level at which that decision should be taken is Secretary of State level or equivalent. The Government are envisaging extending not only to a Minister inside the Home Office when the Secretary of State is not available but to any Minister of the Crown, on any refusal, the power so to refuse. My noble friend is saying that this is such an important decision that it ought to be taken only at the level of Secretary of State or equivalent. That is an entirely reasonable suggestion and is looser than the intercept provision which applies to only four Secretaries of State.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, as ever, my noble friend Lord Reid has summed up the point I was making. The Minister did not refer to an emergency situation but to departments that would not have a Secretary of State and therefore it would be downgraded. It is entirely appropriate to ask that a decision as serious as to withhold information from the ISC should be taken only at the highest levels in government, and that means the level of Secretary of State.

Passports

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, there is a cost. That is why we made changes to the number of interview offices. As a result of that restructuring, we are achieving a saving of some £7.81 million a year. As I said in answer to the original Question, they are a very important part of the authentication process.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

In view of some of the comments that have been made, can the Minister confirm that one of the fastest-growing crimes in this country is based on identity theft and that, in the midst of identity theft, one of the largest areas is the theft of people’s passports as an entry to identity, which then leads to further crimes, running from intervention in personal details through to bank accounts and right up to terrorism? While we are reminding ourselves of the costs of this, let us remind ourselves of its benefits as well.

[Lord Henley]

The noble Lord makes a very valid point, and I suspect that he was Home Secretary at the time these changes were made in 2006. We support those changes, we stick by them and we have no plans to make any further changes.

Stephen Lawrence

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I totally agree with my noble friend about understanding the importance of victims and their needs, which is something that I hope we always manage to do. I also endorse what she said about the frustration of what she described as the vast majority of officers. I should like to make it clear to the House at this stage that there is no evidence from the two inquiries we have had. So I should like to refer to the frustration of all officers, on the basis of the basic presumption in English law that all are innocent until shown to be otherwise. However, I accept what she means about the frustration of those who feel that they have been tarnished by the actions of what we hope is not even a tiny minority—we hope that it does not exist at all.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I also thank the Minister for his Statement. I have both a personal and a previous interest in this as I was Home Secretary when the IPCC established its inquiry into this question of corruption. As a former Home Secretary—other former Home Secretaries will no doubt verify this—I understand the difficult and dangerous job that the police do and the general debt of gratitude that we owe them for our security and safety. That is all the more reason why when there are allegations or prima facie indications of corruption within the police force it is not only a source of frustration, it tarnishes the reputation of British policing.

As the Minister will know, on this occasion not only is there recurrently a swirl of allegations around this case, but it is happening in the context, as my noble friend Lord Hunt said, of other allegations of racism. There is also at present an inquiry into at least allegations that the police did not judiciously and as assiduously as possible follow up investigations into wider issues connected with the press. That is all the more reason, in addition to the concerns of the family itself, that the Minister should be able to answer two questions. First, can he assure us that when the internal police inquiry is finished—and it is proper that the Home Secretary waits until that operation is finished, as it is an operational matter for the police—the Home Secretary or another government representative will report back to the House within a reasonable time on their considerations? Secondly, will the Government not rule out the possibility of conducting a public inquiry into this matter in order to allay the concerns and fears of the wider public should those remain following the internal police inquiry?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I think that I made it pretty clear when repeating the Statement that my right honourable friend has made it quite clear that she is not ruling out an inquiry, and I repeat that assurance to the noble Lord. I also make it clear that she has promised to keep the House updated as a matter of course. I cannot promise precisely how and when she will do that or whether she will do something before the internal inquiry ends, but there might be other occasions. The precise timing and method by which she keeps the House updated obviously will be a matter for her.

I thank the noble Lord—who I think is the only former Home Secretary in the Chamber at the moment—for his intervention, and particularly for what he said about the police and the debt that we owe them. Let us hope that all these allegations prove to be unfounded as far as possible.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Wednesday 5th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dubs]

My Lords, I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Henley, as the Minister and pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning. I hope that she will get better soon and will be with us again before too long. I was talking to her only yesterday to commiserate on her health. She said that she really enjoyed the job, and the fact that she did so was obvious in how she dealt with the business of the House. It was a pleasure for us all, even if we disagreed with her.

I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and I want to develop one or two arguments. At the outset, however, I should say that if I were speaking later in the debate, I would probably be saying to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, that I agreed with him on intercept evidence and to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, that I agreed with the thrust of his arguments. But given that I have not yet heard them speak, I shall have to say a word about that.

The noble Lord, Lord Howard, mentioned intercept evidence and the committee on which he serves. Those of us not privy to the sort of information that he now is—as presumably he also was when in the Cabinet—are not as aware as he is of the difficulties involved in the use of intercept evidence. It is a difficult point which affects the whole debate on terrorism that most of us do not have access to the information which determines how decisions are ultimately made by Ministers. We have to take it as an act of faith and there are limits to the amount of faith we can always have. I am very keen on the use of intercept evidence and would like to hear—I am not going to because it is all secret, of course—the arguments against the use of it, given that it is now normally used in many other countries which presumably have the same difficulties that the noble Lord referred to.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Briefly, my noble friend raises a good point that he does not have access to the information on which sometimes the judgment is based. I merely commend to him a study: can he name one British Home Secretary who does not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Howard, in his estimate of the dangers and disadvantages of introducing what my noble friend proposes?

[Lord Dubs]

Of course, all Home Secretaries had access to this information which we do not have, so I cannot name a single Home Secretary in that regard. That does not mean that all Home Secretaries in history have always been right about everything. I say that with as much modesty as I can muster. Why is it that in many other countries intercept evidence is used when the same difficulties surely apply?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

The main reason people could abscond during control orders was not as a result of what the Home Secretaries wanted, which was 24-hour-a-day confinement; it was that, under the Human Rights Act and European Convention on Human Rights, the Home Secretaries were not allowed to authorise such confinement, but had to leave people eight hours to go about their normal business, whatever that was. That was an open invitation to undermine the very essence of the confinement under control and surveillance that was the essential requirement for control orders. It may be right or it may be wrong, but it was the main factor that allowed those under control orders to abscond.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

I entirely accept what the noble Lord says, and I am sure he is right about that. Of course, if the controlees had been confined for 24 hours in Belmarsh or even in their homes, it would have been far more difficult for them to abscond, but the control order system that we had existed largely as a result of decisions made by the courts. My point is that this control order system, as it came to be, may not in a serious sense have been protective of the public because it was so easy to abscond and because so many controlees did just that. My more substantial point is that I think that only one was ever prosecuted with a substantive terrorist offence so if the Home Secretaries were right that these people had been involved in terrorist activity, that would appear to be a failure of public policy in that terrorists in those circumstances were escaping justice.

My view is that, given the nature of the control order regime, this was not surprising. One clear finding of the review, accepted by all sides so far as I could tell, was that the control order regime was inimical to prosecution. That resulted from the reality of control orders, which amounted to the warehousing of suspects under the aegis of the Security Service and the consequent destruction of the normal routes and possibilities of evidence gathering. This was not the intention of the control order regime but it was one of its effects, and it was absolutely clear to me from material that I examined during the review that the process of building prosecutions against controlees was weak and had low priority. In fact, it almost never occurred.

For very understandable reasons, when a man was put under a control order the police would simply move on to other cases, satisfied that that individual was adequately quarantined under watchful eyes. That low prioritisation of prosecutions will always be evident so long as the system of restrictions is positioned outside criminal justice. If I am right about that—I shall expand a little in a moment—it means that to situate TPIMs outside criminal justice is not only possibly offensive to principle; it is also, finally, offensive to public safety because it lets people get away with terrorism and escape justice.

Let me say straight away that TPIMs appear to represent an improvement on what went before. The most offensive features of the previous regime from my perspective—those closest to house arrest—have gone. Relocation and long curfews will be a thing of the past. Individuals will be permitted to use electronic communications, including computers and phones, and the orders themselves will be time-limited to two years. Yet in my view the Government have failed to grapple with the central issue: the nature of the orders themselves and the appropriate space for them to occupy within our constitutional arrangements. In my report on the review, presented to Parliament alongside the review, I called for TPIMs to be attached quite explicitly to criminal investigations. That would facilitate the prosecution of serious criminals and deal with the constitutional objections that have bedevilled control orders and will, I am sure, continue to bedevil TPIMs. This stance has since been supported by the JCHR and noted by the Constitution Committee of this House. It deserves more serious consideration than the Government have so far shown it.

I understand that it will not always suit the Security Service, for which I have the greatest respect, to have law enforcement authorities crawling all over suspects under its control. That no doubt explains in part the strong support that the Security Service has given to the control order regime but it is nothing to the point. The public interest is not always and inevitably to be equated with the policy of the Security Service. Sometimes, Governments need to stand back. It is patently absurd that individuals certified by the most senior figures in government to be active terrorists are not constantly and relentlessly under criminal investigation. I do not accept for one moment that because the material against an individual is presently inadmissible for one reason or another—many identified by my noble friend Lord Howard—the investigation should stop. On the contrary, it should be redoubled and have TPIM conditions attached to it for its duration. Let there be relentless investigation into people who are suspected of terrorist activity but let it be criminal investigation and let TPIMs be tied to that investigation—to facilitate and assist it so that no opportunity is lost to bring violent extremists to justice—in a manner consistent with our rule of law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

If the noble Lord does not mind my saying so, that is a somewhat complacent view. There is wide public concern. Obviously there are different views around the country and in different communities, but it would be complacent for the noble Lord to come to the conclusion that there is and has been no broader public concern about control orders.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Would the noble Lord give us one piece of evidence to substantiate that?

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

The level of public debate and discussion is pretty clear evidence. The review itself contains evidence of public meetings and discussions with people who are concerned about the control order regime. I caution noble Lords from the view that there is no concern in the country outside these Houses about these arrangements; I believe that there is.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

May I help the noble Lord? I was a Member of Parliament for 23 years. I held a surgery at least once a month and sometimes four times a month. I never had one person come to me and make representations for or against a control order. There is published concern and there are certainly lobby groups, but public concern is entirely different. All the evidence is that the public feel reasonably comfortable with this system as a matter of ensuring their security.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

I respect the noble Lord’s experience. I am sure from my own experience, conversations and discussions with many people in different parts of the country and different communities when I was DPP that there is and was concern about the control order regime, as there was concern about the pre-charge detention regime. Frankly, noble Lords delude themselves if they seriously suggest that there was no broader concern about measures of this sort; I am sure that there was. Maybe we will not agree about this but, with great respect to noble Lords, I find that view somewhat complacent.

When this subject is debated, everybody agrees that the most important result of any investigation into terrorism is prosecution. If one is considering protecting the public, they are best protected by people being sent to prison for long terms. This is something that we became and are extremely good at in this jurisdiction. We have extremely skilled and able specialist counterterrorism police and prosecutors, and an outstanding record of putting people in prison.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, we are debating the Bill at a particularly depressing time for civil liberties in this country. This country has long prided itself on the protection of fundamental freedoms, both here and in other parts of the world. However, we apparently now have a Home Secretary who believes that debate about human rights—an important and serious debate on complex issues—should be so debased that the right to family life can seriously and usefully be addressed by a fable about a cat rather than by any serious analysis of the issues of law and policy. That is a matter of grave regret. I very much hope that the noble Lord, Lord Henley, who I welcome to his responsibilities, will be able to persuade the Home Secretary to take a more informed, reasonable and reasoned approach to the issues raised by the Bill, issues that, as he rightly said in opening the debate, depend on securing a correct balance between state powers and civil liberties.

The regime proposed by the Bill, like the regime under the control orders legislation, raises concerns about the rule of law in four respects, which we will need to address in Committee. I share the concerns already expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. First, we must accept that the Bill allows for sanctions against alleged wrongdoers by an administrative procedure that is wholly outside the criminal process, which is the point that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, has just addressed. My response to the interventions is that, regrettably, one finds that constituents up and down the country do not share concerns about civil liberties when they relate not just to alleged terrorists but to alleged murderers and rapists. Nevertheless, they are important aspects of a civilised society which it is our responsibility to seek to protect. Let us remember that the fact that these matters are being addressed outside the criminal process—I understand why they need to be so addressed—arises in the context that over the past 10 years we have enacted a vast number of new criminal offences to deal with terrorist activity, many of them concerned with preparatory acts, such as possession of material for criminal purposes.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

It is important to clarify this. I do not think anyone was suggesting that the public view was right or wrong; what we were trying to ascertain was the public view. That was the matter of disagreement with the previous speaker: the contention that the public view was that these were very troublesome and difficult issues and that we should get rid of control orders. That was what was in dispute, not whether the public view was right or wrong.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful. If the noble Lord accepts—I hope he does—that the public view on these issues is not determinative, although plainly it is important, we will not differ much, save that I suspect that in some sections of the community there is particularly grave concern about control orders. My concern is that that may well be undermining the extent to which those communities are prepared to co-operate with the police and the prosecution authorities in bringing forward evidence that is vital to secure the conviction of terrorists and information that can be used to implement the administrative process. That is my concern, and it is why I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, that we must not be complacent about these matters.

The noble Lord, Lord Henley, said in opening the debate that it is necessary to have the TPIM regime in those cases where prosecution is not possible. The noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, eloquently supported that approach. I, of course, understand the force of that point, but we must surely accept that it is nevertheless difficult to reconcile this approach with the rule of law. It is an exception to the rule of law. Because it is an exception—perhaps a justifiable exception—it is vital that we ensure that the detailed implementing provisions in the Bill satisfy the test which the noble Lord, Lord Henley, stated at the end of his speech, and which I was very pleased to hear from him. As I understood him, the test is that the provisions must go no further than is absolutely necessary. I commend that test to the House as the right one to adopt in testing the provisions of the Bill. That is the first concern.

The second rule of law concern is that the Bill allows for the sanctions—that is what they are—to be imposed by a Minister and not by a court, albeit that the court has a reviewing role. If a TPIM procedure is appropriate outside the criminal process—I understand why it is—the rule of law surely requires that Ministers do not themselves make the initial decision on such matters as who a person may associate with and where they may stay overnight with the court confined, as it is under Clause 6(3), to determining whether the initial decision of the Minister is “obviously flawed”. Surely the role of the Minister should be to make an application to an independent judge. It should be for the Minister to produce the relevant evidence, perhaps in closed session with a special advocate, for the judge to assess. It should be for the court to decide whether the order should be made. In urgent cases, the court could no doubt apply a threshold test. We need to consider this seriously in Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Speaking in the gap, I have very few minutes, but I want to try to cover the context, the principle and the practicalities of this Bill. Perhaps I might make the point first, since there has been a distinction made between freedoms in law and politicians, that the freedoms we have in law were provided by politicians. They were implemented by judges and lawyers, but provided through the struggle of politicians. In the midst of all the many balls we had to juggle, I am sure that there was no higher responsibility and burden on our shoulders and no more concentrated effort from my predecessors and myself than the protection of the lives, liberties and livelihoods of the people of this country. I do not defer to lawyers as being the creators of our freedoms, I am afraid. I am sorry if that upsets them, but I am not a lawyer, as will be obvious. That is neither a boast nor a complaint but a matter of fact. I am an historian, and I want to say something about the historical context because to debate these measures without understanding the development of the threat is to debate them in a sterile vacuum and to miss the point that we have to see as politicians.

The first point about the threat is that it is not just a crime, as my noble friend Lord Judd said. It is a crime, but one with a political objective: the imposition of the will and the political desires of a group of people, not only in this country but internationally, which would undermine the very freedoms that we want and purport to defend in this House.

Secondly, it is not the same threat as 30 or 40 years ago. Intention and capability, the two elements of threat, are both now unconstrained because anyone who was willing to kill thousands of people in a terrorist attack in New York and Washington will be prepared to kill hundreds of thousands of people towards their political objective. That is the intention that is unconstrained by any morality or legality, or by the Geneva Convention or by anything else. The capability is now also unconstrained. The Nazis may have wanted to commit genocide but were constrained by Zyklon B canisters. Radiological, biological and dirty nuclear bombs now make it absolutely necessary for us to recognise that if that intention and capability ever come together, there will be a massacre of our people.

Thirdly, the threat has changed because it is now in the hands of individuals. My noble friend Lord Judd asked what has changed since 1945. It is not a lack of respect for rights; it is that the European Convention on Human Rights was based on the historical experience, of the fascist states in particular, and the recognition that the state was always the oppressor and the individual always the victim. That is no longer the case. Small groups of individuals, with the intention and capability that they have, can now be the perpetrators of the type of massacre that we previously said only states could perpetrate. That is the context that has been missing from some of this debate.

My other point is about the principle of the Bill. It has been conceded that extraordinary measures are necessary. The objection which many of our legal friends had against the control orders, and which I understood, was that they were extraordinary measures. They are; but the problem is that the Government have taken a step to breach the principle but diminished the effectiveness. I have no problem with more accountability to Parliament or with many of the measures in this Bill, but I have a fundamental problem, as has the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, with taking away the right of relocation.

Finally, I have deep suspicions that the Government have also conceded that the practical measures in the Bill are almost unnecessary because they have drafted another Bill in case it is needed. I am sure that I, along with many other Ministers and Governments, closed the door after the horse had bolted. I am sure that lack of foresight caused that and that sometimes, even when we had foresight, we closed the door after the horse had bolted. However, I genuinely have never known a Government who planned in advance to close the door after the horse had bolted, and this horse is the potential murder and massacre of so many of our citizens. Your Lordships know that the threat level is at “substantial”. It is still huge, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, but that is less than it has been. For 10 years, it has been at “severe”. God forbid that it should go to “critical”. If it does, I want the Government to know that I hope that they have got this right. This is not a matter of party politics. I genuinely hope that, but I fear that they have got it wrong, and I fear the consequences because all of us in this House will have to bear them if by diminishing the operational capability to counter terrorism and increasing the risk, something terrible were to happen—say, in the next year. I hope that it does not, and I wish the Government well, despite my reservations.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I associate myself with the words of welcome already expressed to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, and with the words of appreciation and the expression of good wishes already expressed to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning.

This has been a passionate debate at times, with strongly held and widely differing views being expressed about the Bill. The reason why the Bill is before us is the statement in the coalition agreement that there would be a review of control orders. There is an objection in some parts of the coalition to the current control orders, and the Bill is an attempt to pretend that the coalition is making a significant change to the current arrangements. In reality, with regard to the continuation of control orders, the Government are tinkering at the edges and it fools no one. The difficulty is that the tinkering being undertaken through the Bill is potentially damaging and dangerous, as well as potentially costly.

The tinkering with the current arrangements includes the renaming of control orders to terrorism prevention and investigation measures notices; a change in the threshold from reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism-related activity to reasonable belief; a lengthy list of prescribed powers removing the ability of the Secretary of State also to impose any further obligations needed to prevent or restrict an individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity; an overnight residence measure instead of curfew orders, which averaged just under 12 hours in 2010; and the TPIM regime being reviewed every five years instead of the annual renewal in Parliament required for control orders.

Unlike control orders, the Bill does not include a power of relocation to another part of the country without consent. Despite the interventions earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, I do not think that this was done on the basis that there were other provisions in the Bill that could achieve the same objectives.

The Government have clearly had second thoughts about the wisdom of that last matter; shortly before the Third Reading of the Bill in the other place they published the Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, which provides powers for the Home Secretary to impose enhanced TPIM notices. The powers available under such enhanced notices would include relocation without consent, which the Bill before us omits, and a ban on using communication devices, which the Bill before us restricts.

In reality the Government are revising the Bill before it has even been passed but, presumably because of the political embarrassment involved in having to put back provisions of the current control order arrangements in the interests of national security, they are seeking to do so not by putting the change in this Bill but by producing another draft Bill that can be debated and voted on by Parliament when needed at a later date. Clearly, the Government now accept that there is a requirement for a continuation of these additional powers in the interests of national security, otherwise they would not be trying to retain them in the somewhat back-door fashion they are proposing. In other words, the Government recognise that the coalition politicking involved in the Bill before us has put national security at risk.

However, the Government's proposed way of rectifying their error of judgment gives rise to further concerns. If for their own political reasons the Government are not going to include those powers in the Bill before us, that means that they could not be activated quickly when needed, since if Parliament was in recess at the time it would require the recall of Parliament and thus a period of some days at least before the Bill could be debated and passed and receive Royal Assent. Neither is it clear, as has been said, exactly how meaningful any parliamentary debate could be. Presumably, the Government would not be disclosing the intelligence information that had led to the Bill being brought forward.

The Government now recognise that the powers provided for in the draft Bill are needed, but because they will not include them in this Bill they are going to create a situation, particularly when Parliament is in recess, where the powers may be needed urgently in the interests of national security but cannot be exercised immediately when the need for them has become pressing. Quite a thought with the Olympic and Paralympic Games just around the corner. That would also mean that if the draft Bill were passed it would run alongside the current Bill, creating two separate control order regimes, expiring at different times, with different levels of power and possible court challenges.

There is a further concern. When Parliament is dissolved, or in the period between the appointment of a new Parliament and the first Queens's Speech, the Secretary of State would be able to apply the provisions of the draft Bill effectively by decree, if Parliament had not debated and passed the legislation and the legislation were still effective. Is that the way we want to go on this issue, either now or in the future? All because the Government will not put the provisions of the draft Bill into this Bill. There is certainly a real price to pay for the coalition Government’s political fudge.

We then come to the issue of resources. Perhaps the Minister will tell us what the additional cost of the extra surveillance for the TPIMs will be, and from where the additional funding will be met. As has been mentioned in this debate, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stuart Osborne gave evidence to the Bill Committee in June on the readiness of those involved to implement the new system and said:

“To get the resources that we anticipate we need will take more than a year, in terms of being able to get people trained and to get the right equipment. Until we have got that, we will not be able to start to bed things in and see how it works and how it transpires”.—[Official Report, Commons, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill Committee, 21/6/11; col. 9.]

So we have a situation where to date there appears to be silence on what the additional costs of the extra surveillance will be and where the money will come from, and a statement from a knowledgeable source that it will take more than a year to get the resources required in terms of people trained and the appropriate equipment. Where is the additional appropriately trained manpower going to come from at a time when numbers of police officers are being significantly reduced and police forces severely stretched?

Control orders are not ideal nor indeed desirable, but they are needed to deal with the situation that has arisen where a small number of people seek to pursue their own aims and objectives through acts of terrorism, and it is imperative that, when needed, we have the powers to stop them after the time their suspected intentions begin to emerge but before they can carry out their ghastly actions. Control orders have the support of the police, including the power to relocate; they have had the support of the courts, including the power to relocate; and they have been used by the current Home Secretary, including the power to relocate. I understand that some three-quarters of current controlees have relocation as part of their control order.

One of the prime responsibilities of a Government is the security of the nation and of our people. The Bill weakens counterterrorism protection by removing the power to relocate dangerous terror suspects, if needed, to prevent terrorist activity, and puts that provision in a draft Bill that it might not be possible to activate in time to deal with a security situation requiring the immediate use of the powers in the draft Bill. This Bill also weakens accountability since, unlike control orders, TPIMs will not require annual parliamentary votes to continue, and I am by no means the first to have drawn attention to this point. The Bill also fails to address the issue of the additional resources that the police and security services will need for the increased surveillance needed as a result of the changes that it introduces.

This Bill has nothing to do with improving national security; indeed it weakens it. It has nothing to do with human rights, since it is simply a classic example of a piece of legislation that has everything to do with internal coalition politics in which the protection of the people of this country from further acts of terrorism comes second behind the need to produce a political fudge on the question of control orders, which this Bill and the draft Bill retain, albeit under another name. This is not a change to “control order light”; it is a change to “control order risky”—and highly risky, at that. The Government should think again about some of the provisions of this Bill.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Before my noble friend sits down, will he allow me to declare my interests as registered? I meant to do this during my contribution but did not because of the brief time allotment.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2011

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 20th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Scott of Foscote]

My Lords, I have no doubt whatever that the House should support this order, and I rise simply to ask why it has taken so long for the order to be sought. It appears from the contents of the letter that the Minister sent to the noble Lord, Lord Goodlad, the chairman of the Merits Committee, in anticipation of the meeting that the committee had to peruse this document, that information has been in the hands of the authorities indicating that since 2007 the TTP has carried out mass-casualty attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, that it was implicated in an attempted Times Square car bomb attack in May 2010, and that there were other atrocities in the first half of 2010, as referred to by the noble Baroness. Although I thoroughly support the making of the order, I wonder why it has taken so long for it to be made.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, first, I apologise to the Minister as I was slightly late in coming into the Chamber for her opening speech. However, I welcome the order and I also welcome the fact that time has been taken over it. Noble Lords may be aware that when the now Prime Minister was asking us to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir, I said that it is absolutely essential that, when we take action to proscribe or ban, we have sufficient evidence to make sure that, however great our revulsion at what these people are doing, that action is taken under the letter of the UK law and that we have sufficient evidence of that law being breached; otherwise, when these people appealed, it would be a propaganda coup for them if we were to take action that failed. Therefore, I thank the Minister for her Statement today. I understand how difficult it often is to get concrete evidence to carry such measures forward, but I am sure that, even at this stage, we will all be relieved that the action has been taken, because these are very dangerous people.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I also support the order, but I have one or two questions about the process. It is a very difficult process and I would be grateful for guidance from the noble Baroness as to how it operates. The reference to Hizb ut-Tahrir that we have just heard from my noble friend Lord Reid is important. I know that, when he was leader of the Opposition, there was a desire by the now Prime Minister for that organisation to be proscribed forthwith and that did not happen. Therefore, I should be interested in knowing a little more about the decision-making process that has gone on in this case and the extent to which that provides us with lessons about the Hizb ut-Tahrir case. For example, was there a specific request from the Government of Pakistan or perhaps the Government of the United States in support of such a ban? What consideration has been given to whether a ban makes it easier or less easy to disrupt the activities of this group? It seems to me that banning a group under a particular name may simply mean that it re-emerges with a different name or in a different guise or simply disappears off the radar altogether. I would be interested in what considerations are given to such points.

Finally, it would be helpful if the Minister could give us an indication of the extent to which the guiding factor was this group being a threat in the UK or to British nationals overseas or whether other factors were the final motivation in taking this decision. However, I do not doubt that the Home Secretary has made the right decision in this case.

Police: Retirement

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 6th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the Government continuously assess the impact on policing of the measures that they take, but the matter that we are talking about is an operational one. I am sure that the police will wish to ensure that there is no discrimination in their recruitment policies.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, does the Minister accept that this is a matter not just of numbers but of quality? Notwithstanding the autonomy of local police services, will she prevail on them at least to consider the loss of experience and wisdom, not to mention the loss to the public purse, arising from arbitrary and enforced retirement after 30 years’ service? Will she ask them to give the fullest consideration to maximum flexibility when choosing retirement for any person?

Intellectual Assets: Crime

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

Yes, I can give several instances but two in particular. First, the UK is developing a vision for our handling of cyber issues in the future which we will share with close allies. Secondly, noble Lords may have observed that it was announced today that we and the Government of France are seeking to co-operate on cyber matters. I believe, as the noble Baroness says, that we will not succeed in producing a secure cyberrealm in the absence of international co-operation.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, the Minister and the Government were correct in identifying cyber as a major new priority in the strategic security review, but does she accept that if we are to counter the use of malware, industrial espionage, or, God forbid, cyberattacks from terrorists, possibly in our emergency systems or in the financial sector, we will require above all a new cadre of well-developed, trained and selected young people who are at the very frontiers of thinking in this direction? Can she tell the House what measures have been taken to encourage and identify such a cadre?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Lord puts his finger on a very important issue, and one that will be a concrete and identified part of the strategy that the Government are developing. Clearly we need to have proper competences in government and co-operation with the private sector, and to build skills in this country, which means enhancing the necessary studies at our universities. We must also encourage best practice and good behaviour among all cyberusers—individuals as well as companies.