Baroness Smith of Basildon
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Justice and Security Bill [HL]
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Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, this has been an extremely interesting debate, as was the debate we had in Committee. I am at something of a disadvantage—or perhaps it is an advantage—as the Minister and I are the only speakers in this debate who have not been members or indeed esteemed chairs of the ISC. I think I heard the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, say, “Good”—I hope it is.
I support the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, and I will explain the reasons why. I join the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, in paying tribute to my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours because the way that he has brought forward this argument today does the House a great service.
In Committee, many Members of your Lordships’ House, who have had a lifetime’s experience of these matters, proposed a number of different ideas for reform of the Intelligence and Security Committee, ranging from the designation of parliamentary privilege through to issues such as public hearings. What was striking in that debate—and is again today—was that there was an overwhelming consensus on all sides of the House that the Bill could be significantly bolder. It has been evident throughout the debate that there is some dissatisfaction with the Government’s approach. Your Lordships’ House does not feel that what is before it today adequately addresses some of the concerns raised in Committee.
We fully support the Government’s stated aim, which is, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said at Second Reading,
“improved parliamentary and independent oversight of the security and intelligence agencies”.—[Official Report, 19/6/12; col. 1661.]
What we have in Part 1 of the Bill, as illustrated by this and the next group of amendments, is a missed opportunity. In Committee, we discussed a range of different options for strengthening the independence of the ISC beyond what is proposed in the Bill. What emerged were two different blueprints for achieving pretty much the same aims and objectives. First, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, two distinguished members of the committee, proposed an arrangement along the lines of existing parliamentary committees established by statute, such as the Ecclesiastical Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, the Speaker’s Committee for the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, and the House of Commons Commission. The committee as envisaged would have the independence and powers afforded by being a creature of Parliament rather than the Executive, but would retain the security of checks and balances provided for in statute. The second way forward, proposed by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, seeks to establish the Intelligence and Security Committee as a fully fledged Select Committee of Parliament, having all the privileges attached to that arrangement, but with safeguards or restrictions provided through resolutions of Parliament rather than statute. I think my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours used the phrase “hermetically sealed”.
However, both these blueprints are seeking to achieve the same end point. They are both seeking a concept of the ISC as a creature of Parliament rather than the Executive; independence that is recognised by the public but still guarantees the absolute security of sensitive information disclosed to the committee; and maintaining the good relations and trust that have been established with the agencies. It seems that the choice between the two concepts is one less of principle and more of practicality: which proposal will best achieve this end? My noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours and the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, have both confirmed that they are seeking to achieve the same ends.
As my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours has already stated, chief among the advantages gained by being a parliamentary Select Committee is parliamentary privilege. This would grant the ISC, among other things, protection of members and witnesses by parliamentary privilege, which encourages free disclosure within the secure confines of the committee; the power to take evidence under oath; and the power to hold witnesses in contempt for deliberately misleading the committee.
I have listened carefully to my noble friend’s arguments about the designation of parliamentary privilege, and in Committee we debated and supported amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, to grant the ISC parliamentary privilege by amending the Bill of Rights. Indeed, I have attached my name to similar amendments in the next group, because I fully support the ISC obtaining parliamentary privilege. However, if, as my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, has compellingly argued today, there are serious problems with seeking to designate privilege in this way, it would appear that a Select Committee arrangement is the only option that would satisfactorily guarantee the committee these powers. The notion that privilege, if gained in the way that has been proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, may be struck down by the courts, which I am absolutely clear is not what they are seeking, is hugely concerning. If witnesses and members of the committee had given evidence to that committee under the assumption that they had immunity, only later to have that immunity revoked, it would have huge implications for the work of the committee. The absolute and total guarantee of parliamentary privilege is therefore a compelling reason to support the ISC’s move to full Select Committee status.
The question then rests on whether a Select Committee arrangement could be relied on to act in a way that absolutely guaranteed, without qualification, the protection of our national security. The Opposition would support the establishment of the ISC as a Select Committee only where such a guarantee could be satisfied. Under no circumstances should any change in the structure of the ISC result in sensitive information being disclosed that could put at risk our national security or the safety of intelligence sources or operations. Restrictions or safeguards on the committee’s powers could include a number of areas—we have heard of some of them today—and others that may be agreed by Parliament. For example, the Prime Minister could veto the publication of material by the committee for reasons of national security; proceedings of the committee could be closed to the public unless agreed by the Executive and/or provided for under its own terms of reference, such as annual public hearings of the heads of the agencies; there could be an executive prerogative to instruct the Leader of the House to dissolve the committee or to remove one of its members by a resolution of Parliament; or there could be a veto or agreement of a nomination to the committee. I use those just as examples— there will be others that I am sure will occur to your Lordships, particularly those who have been members of the ISC—but providing for such safeguards in legislation, as in the Bill before us, is perhaps the clearest way of ensuring that they are met.
In Committee, the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, argued against a Select Committee structure on the basis that it would necessitate public evidence sessions. He rightly said that,
“there are many occasions when to attempt to take evidence in public would create an even less high regard for the committee that it maybe has at the moment, because questions would be answered by the agency heads with the words, ‘We cannot answer that question’”.—[Official Report, 9/7/12; col. 923.]
I completely agree with the noble Marquess on that point. In the majority of cases, the committee must sit in private. To do otherwise would not only damage the reputation of the committee, as I have said, but, most seriously, undermine its core function of effective oversight over the intelligence services. However, as has been argued by my noble friend, the mechanism by which Select Committee powers and terms of reference are constituted are sufficiently flexible conceivably to provide for any one of those concerns.
I understand from my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours that he has it on the authority of clerks of both this House and the other place that Parliament may, either through the committee’s order of reference or by instruction, specify the terms under which the committee may sit, may take evidence and report, including requiring the consent of another body including the Government. Indeed, there are already known precedents for such restrictions. The Defence Select Committee already holds evidence sessions in private in order to hear classified and national security-sensitive information. For its recent report on maritime surveillance, published in September this year, it held part of its first evidence session in private. As my noble friend has indicated, there have been instances in the past where the House has resolved that a committee report to the Prime Minister and it may even be precluded from publishing certain material on the grounds of national security. Given those assurances, a Select Committee arrangement would both guarantee the ISC parliamentary privilege and ensure the necessary safeguards for our national security.
My understanding is that, if the House were today to pass my noble friend’s amendment and the Government accepted the will of your Lordships’ House, the Government could seek to withdraw Clauses 1 to 4 of the Bill in the Commons and then issue a statement that they would seek agreement through a resolution of the House to establish the ISC as a Select Committee of Parliament. If the Government and the Opposition were unable to reach agreement over the terms of such a resolution—including all the necessary safeguards that I have referred to and others—then presumably the ISC would continue under its present arrangements.
We have heard a compelling argument from my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours that it is not possible to designate a body of parliamentary privilege such as the ISC simply by amending the Bill of Rights or by other statutory means. If this is indeed correct, it is undeniably a compelling reason for pursuing the Select Committee route rather than the statutory one. However, even if it were possible to do so, there is a further reason why we believe that the Select Committee should be the model that we aim for. That reason was expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I am sorry that he is not here today as his contribution in Committee was valuable. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was supported by the noble Lord, Lord King, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, when he asked:
“Is it not better to use the strength of the Select Committee process and procedure and, above all, of public understanding rather than to try to create something special”?—[Official Report, 9/7/12; col. 926.]
This is more than just a cosmetic change. The parliamentary Select Committee structure is one widely recognised as being capable of serious and robust scrutiny. It is a concept that is familiar to the public and one that they understand as being independent. While I agree with the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, about public confidence in the committee I do not think that most of the public know of the existence of the ISC, whereas they are aware of the structure and work of Select Committees. Even if it were possible to guarantee the committee watertight parliamentary privilege, as I now seriously doubt, it would still ultimately be a hybrid committee. A halfway house would undeniably be better than what we have in the Bill but it would still be a peculiar body. If we are to go to all the effort of dressing up the ISC to look and sound like a parliamentary Select Committee, although with question marks over parliamentary privilege, why not simply have a Select Committee to do the job fully?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for presenting his amendments in such a typically articulate way. He draws to our attention the challenge that faces us in achieving confidence—the word that was used by many noble Lords and spoken of by my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater. In a nutshell, this is about the scrutiny of Parliament and the responsibility of government, and how those two can be reconciled. Although the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, talked about not wishing to create a special committee, this is a special committee because it deals with matters that are self-evidently outside normal public scrutiny.
This group of amendments, which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and others for bringing to the House, concern the status of the ISC and, although we have not talked about it much, the remit of the Intelligence Services Commissioner. As my noble friend Lord Henley previously noted, the Bill proposes a number of important changes to the ISC’s status. Members of the ISC would be appointed by Parliament, rather than as at present by the Prime Minister, and those members would be free to choose their own chair. The ISC is created by statute to ensure that there are safeguards in place to protect against the disclosure of sensitive information and therefore the Government do not consider it appropriate for the ISC to be a full Joint Committee established under the Standing Orders of each House, as other Joint Committees are. I hope that noble Lords will find it useful for me to expand on this reasoning.
It is essential that the ISC operates within a framework that protects the highly sensitive material to which it has access. In particular, the Government must be able to prevent the publication of sensitive material by the ISC. They must be able to withhold the most sensitive material from the committee—albeit that those powers are rarely used currently and can be expected to be rarely used in future—and must have some role in the appointment of members of the ISC. Without guarantees in those three areas, the risk of disclosure of information that might damage national security would be increased. That might, in turn, lead to a situation where agency heads found it hard to reconcile their statutory duties to protect information with their duty to facilitate oversight. That could therefore lead to the sharing of less sensitive information and a corresponding reduction in the effectiveness and credibility of oversight.
The Bill provides the necessary guarantees in each of those three areas. The Prime Minister would be able to require matters be excluded from the ISC’s reports if the matter would be prejudicial to the discharge of the functions of the agencies or the wider intelligence community. Ministers would be able to withhold information from the ISC in the limited circumstances provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule 1. A Member of this House or of another place would not be eligible to become a member of the ISC unless they had first been nominated for membership by the Prime Minister.
Although it may be possible to replicate those safeguards in Standing Orders of this House and another place, Standing Orders can be amended at any time, as noble Lords will know, and can be suspended for a specific period, or dispensed with for a specific purpose, by a Motion in the relevant House. Standing Orders do not therefore have the same permanence, or provide the same level of protection to sensitive information, as statutory provisions to the same effect.
It seems to me that we can divide the noble Lord’s amendments into two sets. Both are concerned with the same aim—that the new ISC should be a Select Committee—but they get there by different routes and with different consequences. It is not absolutely clear what the effect of the noble Lord’s first two amendments would be. If we were to accept them and the amendment that he proposes to Schedule 2, the ISC would still be created by statute in the Bill and safeguards would still exist to protect national security in the three areas that I have listed. My noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater drew attention to the inconsistency of the amendments, but we accept the noble Lord’s wish to draw the issue to the attention of the House in the way that he has by tabling Amendment 1.
The noble Lord’s amendment would not create a full Joint Committee, because that can be done only by the Standing Orders of each House. It would create an entirely novel body—a Select Committee established by statute. To what extent would such a body share the characteristics of other Select Committees? The Bill makes clear, even were it amended in other respects according to the noble Lord’s wishes, that the ISC is quite different from other Select Committees in fundamental respects—for instance, in relation to appointments and reporting. That being so, it is unclear whether or to what extent changing the ISC in this way would give it the other characteristics of a Select Committee. Indeed, the risk is that describing the ISC as a Select Committee when it has characteristics that are not shared by such committees could mislead as to the ISC’s true character. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw his amendment and that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, will reconsider her position on it.
The noble Lord’s next four amendments would, together, remove the first four clauses, which deal with the ISC. It is to be assumed that the noble Lord’s intention with those amendments is that a new ISC should be created solely by the Standing Orders of each House. Indeed, the noble Lord said so in his speech introducing his amendment. I have already listed the vital safeguards relating to appointments, reporting and provision of information contained in the Bill. Without these safeguards, we will increase the risk of unauthorised disclosure of the sensitive information to which the committee has access. As I have already said, Standing Orders cannot adequately replicate the safeguards against disclosure of information that might damage national security contained in the Bill. It is only by enshrining these safeguards in statute that we can ensure that they are sufficiently robust and enduring.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, much of the debate regarding this amendment was covered in the debate on the previous group of amendments. I will therefore keep my comments brief. We put our names to the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian. We considered that the arrangements that they are proposing for the ISC, which is a variation of a statutory parliamentary committee, to be the next best option were the Select Committee option to fail.
In the previous debates, I referred to a committee being strengthened in its independence by the privileges and status afforded by being a creature of Parliament rather than a creature of the Executive, while retaining robust safeguards over the constitution and the work of the committee in the interests of national security. The idea of a security committee that is covered by parliamentary privilege and also bound by safeguards established by statute is of course attractive, as it would give the absolute guarantee needed on issues such as the disclosure of sensitive information and the appointment of members. However, my concerns lie—the noble Lord, Lord Butler, also acknowledged these deficiencies—with the argument raised by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours that parliamentary privilege conferred in this way would be suspect and potentially challengeable in the courts. That makes me nervous and I am sure that it makes other Members of the House nervous. If my noble friend is right that the present statutory committees of Parliament are not covered by privilege, it is difficult to see how statute can provide for it in this case, for the fundamental reason that the committee will not be a fully fledged body of Parliament.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Henley, said that discussions would take place. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, referred to that. I am very concerned that, if I understand correctly, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said that no discussions on the issue have taken place with the Government. There is an overwhelming desire on all sides of the House to get the issue right.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
Perhaps I may do justice to the Government. There have been discussions. My complaint is that they do not seem to have reached a conclusion.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
I do not know whether that is better or worse. It is disappointing that the Government have not been able to reach a conclusion, given the overwhelming desire on all sides of the House to get this right and to ensure that the committee has the privilege that it will need to do its job properly. I remain concerned about the process that is being used. I wait with interest to hear what the noble Lord will say about the consequences of pursuing parliamentary privilege in this way. Without assurances that the committee will have full privilege, I will have serious reservations about the viability of the proposed amendments, despite the fact that I fully support the aims behind them.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I was tempted to make a relatively short summary for this debate, but the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, give me the chance to elaborate on certain matters to which other noble Lords alluded. As we know, the proposal of the Government in the Bill is to change the ISC’s status. It will be appointed by Parliament and will report to Parliament as well as to the Prime Minister. The two amendments in this group concern the status of the ISC. The first would change the name of the Intelligence and Security Committee to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. The Government’s intention is that the ISC will be a committee of Parliament created by statute. It will not be a classic Select Committee that covers departmental bodies, but a statutory committee of Parliament.
The Government are in principle supportive of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, to change the name of the committee to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. While we are not in a position to support the amendment at this stage, we will be in a position to do so later. I hope that in what I say I will give the House reassurance that the time since July has not been totally wasted, and that the Government are quite a long way down the road of sorting out the particular issues to which noble Lords quite rightly drew the attention of the House. If the ISC becomes a committee of Parliament, it may even be necessary to make some consequential amendments. The amendment may bring the ISC within the ambit of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 by making it a part of the House of Commons and the House of Lords for the purposes of the Act, which was alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. It may change the ISC’s status under the Data Protection Act 1998, as Section 63A of that Act may become relevant, making the corporate officers of the House of Commons and the House of Lords the relevant data controllers for the ISC’s data-processing activities.
Lord King of Bridgwater
My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has just said—in the knowledge that there is no back pay in this world. It does seem very weird to be considering this. I am not sufficiently familiar with the remit of IPSA, but although we have been arguing about the extent to which this committee is or is not part of Parliament, in the area of pay and rations it appears to have been put right inside it.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rosser have been added to this amendment, as was the case in Committee. We argued then, and argue again now on Report, for the establishment of the ISC along lines similar to that of a Select Committee, and indeed preferably the same lines. It would therefore be inconsistent not to argue that the chair of this committee should be remunerated in much the same way as the chair of a Select Committee. The work that is undertaken is enormously serious and therefore the role should be recognised and fairly compensated on par with that of a chair of a Select Committee.
We have just heard comments about whether IPSA is the appropriate body for this role, and in Committee it was the Minister who said that it was. I have been involved in politics both in your Lordships’ House and in the other place for a good many years and I still enjoy irony, which is much underused in politics, so I find the argument of the Government rather ironic given the debate over Select Committee status which has underscored the difference between this committee and a committee of Parliament. Perhaps the Minister can change the Government’s position and we will accept the amendment.
The details of the committee’s arrangements are to be established in statute, but when it comes to discussing remuneration, it will be for IPSA to decide. It really does not seem appropriate for that body to do so, and the Government cannot have it both ways. If the ISC is to remain a body provided for in statute and ultimately accountable to the Executive, which is the case in this Bill, then regardless of any closer ties to Parliament it remains a creature of the Executive. It therefore seems completely illogical for IPSA to be the body which decides on the remuneration of the committee’s chair. I support the amendment. If the Government think that IPSA is the way forward, they have got it wrong, and I hope that the Minister will be able to accept the amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, we turn now to the remuneration of the ISC chairmanship. I have to say that the loyalty which members of that committee have shown to the chairmen and the work they undertake reflects the commitment that those who have held that office have demonstrated to the security services. I note the widespread view that this position should be properly remunerated in some way or another, and the Government support that view. There is no real consistency in the way that Select Committees are treated and no absolute rule that all Select Committee chairmen will be paid. In the Commons at present, not all Select Committee chairman receive a salary for those functions. In the Lords, there is only one such salaried chair, the chairman of the EU Select Committee, who is paid a salary—not by virtue of holding that position but by virtue of also being the Principal Deputy Chairman of Committees.
Lord Gilbert
My Lords, the situation is considerably more complex than your Lordships have heard this afternoon. One has the impression from the debate that the only intelligence-gathering agencies are MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, and that is far from the case. We have the Defence Intelligence Agency and the intelligence work of the individual services, and a lot of other people in this country handle high-security intelligence by acquiring, analysing and distributing it. If we think that we have covered the waterfront just by approving the heads of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, we are deluding ourselves.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, we have had an interesting debate, and Amendments 9 and 11, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rosser, seem to have gained a significant degree of support from around your Lordships’ House. In response to the concern of the noble Lord, Lord King, about the televising of proceedings, I suspect that if this debate were being televised at 4.30 am it would not get a great deal of viewership. Having said that, we will probably now receive letters from those who watch TV at 4.30 am.
Amendment 9 would provide the committee with a remit to hold pre-appointment hearings for the heads of agencies. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, spotted my tabling of her amendment from Committee, when she convinced me that having a permissive amendment was a good way forward. She has now tabled a further amendment that would make the proposed hearings compulsory, but I do not think that that has found favour with your Lordships. We are very much in favour of pre-appointment hearings by Select Committees; indeed, the Labour Government in 2007 pioneered them. This Government have suggested that they are equally keen on pre-appointment hearings. The coalition agreement contains a specific plan to strengthen the powers of Select Committees to scrutinise major public appointments as part of improving government transparency. This seems to be one of those areas that would benefit from such hearings.
I take on board the wisdom, as usual, of the noble Lord, Lord Reid, on these matters and the concerns he raised. However, as to what he said about there being a veto on information, the committee would use its customary wisdom in passing on advice or information to the Prime Minister as it saw fit.
As regards Amendment 11 on annual public hearings, I must admit that I had not envisaged many separate hearings but perhaps one or two hearings a year at which heads of agencies could be questioned. There is an issue of public confidence, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller did a huge amount during her time as head of MI6 to open up the so-called secret services and increase public understanding of and trust in what the agency and other agencies do. She, more than anyone, understood how important it was that the public needs to have confidence in those at the head of organisations that have to, by necessity, operate outside the public view.
I also do not disagree with those who said in Committee or in this debate that the credibility of the ISC would be undermined by farcical staged hearings, as we have seen on TV elsewhere when the only answer to questions has been, “I’m sorry I can’t answer that or provide that information”. Obviously, we would want any hearings to be genuine, give confidence to the public and not have a block that would provide a lack of confidence.
As has been pointed out in Committee, the ISC already has the power to sit in public if it so chooses. Amendment 12, which proposes that there be a presumption that the ISC would meet in public unless it were to meet in private, could create the kind of difficulties that have already been outlined. A presumption that the ISC would meet in public would be difficult for that committee to manage, but hearings taking place in public from time to time are useful and have a large part to play. We have to recognise the sensitive nature of the committee’s work and information that cannot be made public.
When considering the amendments and the support for them, I hope that the Minister will accept Amendment 9. He has heard that it has significant support from around the House. If he is unable to accept that amendment, I will consider testing the view of the House.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, we have an opportunity to consider this group of five amendments. Although Amendments 9 and 10 are similar, the noble Baroness has pointed out the difference between them. Under Amendment 9, the ISC “may” consider the proposed appointment of individuals to the posts of director-general of the Security Service, the chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, the director of GCHQ and other such persons as the Prime Minister may direct. The committee would do this by questioning the prospective appointee at one of its meetings. Under Amendment 10, the ISC “must” consider the proposed appointments.
Pre-appointment hearings are a relatively new phenomenon in the United Kingdom. Since 2008, Select Committees have conducted pre-appointment hearings for a list of posts. There is guidance published by the Cabinet Office on the process followed for such pre-appointment hearings, which includes the list of posts. In general, this process has been a welcome development and gives departmental Select Committees a role in questioning proposed appointees. However, the important thing to note about the list of pre-appointment posts is that the posts concern public bodies—for example, the chairs of Ofcom and the Social Security Advisory Committee. The pre-appointments process has never been used concerning the appointment of civil servants. The heads of the intelligence and security agencies are civil servants at Permanent-Secretary level, and the recruitment process is therefore expected to follow the process for the appointment of civil servants of such seniority.
Noble Lords may find it helpful if I provide some detail on the present process for appointing the agency heads and their status. The agencies are excluded from the provisions of Part 1 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee mentioned. That legislation places the management of most of the Civil Service of the state on a statutory footing. Exclusion from the provisions of that Act merely reflects the specific nature of the agencies’ operations. The agencies’ staff, including their heads, are and always have been part of the Civil Service of the state. This is clear from the Act. If it were not so, the specific exemption for the agencies in Section 1(2) of that Act would not be necessary. Staff of the agencies are not, however, part of what is generally referred to as “the Civil Service”, with a capital C and a capital S—that is, the Home Civil Service—nor are they part of Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service. They form a separate category of civil servants, but civil servants they are. They are also “Crown servants”, but that is a wider term, covering, for example, members of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces and non-civilians in the service of the Crown.
While the agencies are not bound by the Civil Service recruitment principles, I can reassure noble Lords that they do, in practice, follow the spirit of the principles, and the Civil Service Commission is expected to be involved in the process. Pre-appointment scrutiny by Parliament is not appropriate given that these roles are Permanent-Secretary level roles, and in practice those who fill them will be recruited by a process involving a Civil Service commissioner to ensure that the appointment is made on merit. In particular, I see no reason why agency heads should be treated differently from any other Permanent Secretary appointment.
Certainly, the roles that the agency heads play are very important and the appointments must be the right ones, but all Permanent Secretaries in the UK Government play very important roles. There is thus no reason for singling out this particular group for special treatment. The fact that all these posts are posts within the Civil Service of the state, serving successive Administrations, means that the pre-appointment process is not appropriate.
I hope I have given the noble Lord and the noble Baroness reassurance that the process which presently exists—
“Pre-appointment hearings( ) The ISC may consider the proposed appointment of the following, including by questioning the prospective appointee at a meeting of the ISC—
(a) the Head of the Security Service;(b) the Head of the Secret Intelligence Service; (c) the Head of the Government Communication Headquarters; and(d) such other persons as the Prime Minister may direct.”
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I had hoped that the Minister would at least consider taking this away for reflection. However, the mood of the House is clear. I beg to move.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 9.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, it may be useful if I start by explaining why paragraph 3(3)(b) of Schedule 1 is necessary. There are a number of long-standing conventions that have developed in the relationship between Parliament—in the form of its Select Committees—and successive Governments. These conventions recognise that there are categories of information that in certain circumstances may be withheld from Select Committees on grounds of public policy. Noble Lords may know a good deal about this. Examples of this type of information are given in the Cabinet Office guide, Departmental Evidence and Response to Select Committees. Some noble Lords will know this by another name: the Osmotherly rules. The categories of information set out in the guide include information about matters that are sub judice, information that could be supplied only after carrying out substantial research or research that would incur excessive costs, and papers of a previous Administration.
The provision in the Bill is necessary to safeguard the long-standing conventions that are reflected in the Osmotherly rules in the context of the relationship between government and the ISC. It provides a basis for withholding from the ISC the sorts of categories of information described in the rules. As I explained, we intend the ISC created by the Bill to be a committee of Parliament and not simply a committee of parliamentarians, so there is all the more reason for the ISC that the Bill would create to be subject to these conventions.
The provision gives only a Minister of the Crown the discretion to withhold material. In exercising that discretion, the Minister would of course have regard to the provision that the ISC has for keeping material confidential. The Osmotherley rules state:
“If the problem lies with disclosing information in open evidence sessions or in memoranda submitted for publication, Departments will wish to consider whether the information requested could be provided on a confidential basis”.
For this reason, we would expect these powers to be used sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. As I said, the powers to withhold information from the ISC have been used only sparingly in the past, and we expect this to continue. However, it is important that the safeguards are retained.
In Committee, the debate focused in particular on the word “proper”. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who is not in his place, queried the use and meaning of the word. In addition, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, was concerned that paragraph 3(3)(b) lowered the threshold for information being withheld from the committee compared with that which currently applies under the Intelligence Services Act. I assure the noble Baroness that that is not the case. The Intelligence Services Act contains a provision equivalent to paragraph 3(3)(b). In fact, the categories of information that can be withheld from the ISC, and the thresholds for withholding information, will be the same under the Bill’s provisions as they are currently under the 1994 Act.
The noble Lord withdrew his amendment. I hope that Amendment 14 clarifies the situation and addresses his anxieties in this respect. I beg to move.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for seeking to clarify the matter. As he said, I raised my concern on this in Committee. Perhaps I may ask one question. If he is unable to answer today, perhaps he would write to me. I am not 100% convinced that Amendment 14 is sufficient to prevent paragraph 3(3)(b) being used as a justification, as the Minister claimed. Amendment 14 stipulates merely that the Minister “must have regard to” the Osmotherly guidance, as set out in sub-paragraph (3)(b). Will the Minister tell us whether, after considering the guidance he referred to, the Government could still use the conditions set out in sub-paragraph (3)(b) to refuse disclosure of information to the ISC even if the guidance was not relevant to the material in question?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am not in a position to answer that directly, but if the noble Baroness permits, I will write to her and place a copy of the letter in the Library of the House.
“(a) the Secretary of State for that Department, or(b) in the case of a Department without a Secretary of State, a Minister of the equivalent level, identified in a memorandum of understanding.”
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, the amendment concerns the power to withhold information from the ISC and at what level the decision should be taken. The Bill states that the decision should be taken by a “Minister of the Crown”. The amendment proposes that it should be at the level of Secretary of State in the relevant department and not just a Minister of the Crown. The response I was given in Committee was that the Cabinet Office does not have a Secretary of State and therefore it would be the Minister of State. As somebody who was the Minister of State at the Cabinet Office, that did not seem appropriate. Every department has a Minister who sits in the Cabinet. The reason for putting the amendment before the House today is to propose that, as a minimum, it should be a Minister who is at the equivalent level of Secretary of State. That would be justified because the explanation given by the Minister in Committee for lowering the threshold was not adequate given such a change in power.
We have sought to tighten up the drafting to make it clear in the Bill that in all but exceptional circumstances the power to withhold information from the ISC should be exercised only by a Secretary of State unless there is no Secretary of State in that department. In that case, it should be exercised by a Minister of comparable rank such as the current Paymaster-General who is a member of the Cabinet as well as the most senior member in the Cabinet Office. The amendment is simply to specify that a reference to a Minister of the Crown should be interpreted as a Secretary of State for that department except where there is no Secretary of State where it should be someone of the equivalent rank.
I hope that that is clear and I hope that the Minister can accept or at least reflect on this because it would be a significant change if it was not the Secretary of State seeking to withhold information. I beg to move.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I hope in responding to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, that I can give her some assurance so that she feels able to withdraw her amendment.
The Bill provides that Ministers may decide that information should be withheld from the ISC on two grounds. First, the Minister may consider that it is “sensitive information” as defined in the Bill, which in the interests of national security should not be disclosed to the ISC, and secondly for the reasons that we just discussed.
Currently, under the provisions of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, information can be withheld from the ISC on the same grounds, but the decisions to withhold are taken, in part, by agency heads rather than Ministers. These powers to withhold information from the ISC have been used very rarely in the past, and we would expect the equivalent powers in the Bill to continue to be used sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances; however it is important that these safeguards are retained as there will continue to be material the nature of which is so sensitive that access to it must be very narrowly restricted in the interests of national security.
Where agencies’ material is concerned, the Bill provides that decisions to withhold information from the ISC must be taken by the Secretary of State. However, where the ISC requests information from another government department, a decision to withhold is taken by the,
“relevant Minister of the Crown”.
That means, for these purposes, such a Minister as is identified in the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC or, where no Minister is so identified, any Minister of the Crown.
The effect of the noble Baroness’s amendment would be that in circumstances where the Bill enables a Minister of the Crown to withhold information from the ISC, that power would rest with the Secretary of State for the department whose information is to be withheld, or for departments without a Secretary of State, a Minister of the equivalent level, identified in the memorandum of understanding.
The reason that we have included provision for the exercise of the power by a Minister of the Crown rather than a Secretary of State in respect of material held by government departments is that there may be some departments where there is no Secretary of State. The noble Baroness referred to this. For example, the post of Minister for the Cabinet Office is a Minister of State position rather than a Secretary of State position.
The current ISC has, over its history, taken evidence on, and made recommendations relating to, the Joint Intelligence Organisation and the central intelligence functions of the Cabinet Office. The Bill formalises the ISC’s oversight role for bodies such as the Joint Intelligence Organisation so the Cabinet Office can expect more requests from the ISC for disclosure of information in future. It is therefore important that a Minister of the Crown should be able to make decisions about when and what information should be withheld from the ISC. This may not just be about the Cabinet Office. It may be that, in the future, other government departments involved in security and intelligence functions will not have a Secretary of State. This provision would also cover those circumstances.
I appreciate the intention of the amendment, which is to ensure that the Minister of the Crown making the decision to withhold information from the ISC is of appropriate seniority. I hope that I can reassure the noble Baroness that that is also the Government’s intention. We hope to publish, before Third Reading, a document which sets out the areas that the Government expect the memorandum of understanding to cover, premised on the assumption that the ISC-related provisions in the Bill are enacted, substantially, in their current form.
In that document, we will state that it is the Government’s intention that the Minister making such decisions should be of appropriate seniority and should have sufficient knowledge of the work of the department in question. The document will state that it is the Government’s intention that, for the Home Office, the Minister making such decisions should be the Home Secretary, for the Foreign Office the Foreign Secretary, for the Ministry of Defence the Defence Secretary and for the Cabinet Office a Minister of State. As I said, I hope that that gives the noble Baroness enough assurance for her to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his assistance. That is absolutely right. If the committee requests the information, because the MoU will make it clear which Minister within a department is responsible for responding or deciding whether or not the department should provide that information, obviously the Minister has an obligation to respond to that request.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I am not sure that the noble Baroness has understood the central point that I am making and if she has, she has not answered it to my satisfaction. The query that I have with this amendment is the level of the Minister who can exercise a veto. I entirely agree that it is an exceptional measure that will be used only in exceptional circumstances. It takes the power from the agency’s head so that it rests with the elected representatives of the Government who are ultimately accountable to Parliament. But I have not heard from the noble Baroness an adequate justification from the Government as to why they have chosen to downgrade the level at which the veto is held from a Secretary of State to a Minister of State.
I mentioned the Cabinet Office because that was the department mentioned by the Minister previously. The noble Baroness responded and said that it could be another department that does not have a Secretary of State. The point being made is the level of Minister who can withhold information and exercise a veto against the ISC. It is entirely reasonable that it should be the Secretary of State or a Minister at the same level, not downgraded to a Minister of State level.
Lord King of Bridgwater
The answer my noble friend gave was extremely encouraging and recognised the importance of the seniority of the person. The only thing I do not understand is whether paragraph 3(5)(b) of Schedule 1, which reads,
“if no Minister of the Crown is so identified, any Minister of the Crown”,
will survive.
The noble Baroness appeared to be saying that if a particular Secretary of State is for some reason not available—which is perfectly possible, particularly if you are dealing with the Foreign Office—any other Secretary of State will do. Would it not be much better to have a Minister of State in the same department who is familiar with the matter to deal with it, rather than some other Secretary of State? Have I got the noble Baroness wrong?
Baroness Smith of Basildon
No. The noble Lord is absolutely right. At the moment it is a Secretary of State but the Bill proposes to downgrade that to any Minister of the Crown. I know the noble Baroness says that there will be a MoU that will identify certain Ministers of the Crown but these decisions should be taken at Cabinet level.
Lord King of Bridgwater
I understand what the noble Baroness is saying but if the information concerns the Foreign Secretary, who is responsible for SIS and GCHQ, or the Home Secretary, who is responsible for the Security Service, or, in certain circumstances, the Secretary of State for Defence, who is responsible for the DIS and so on, and if by chance that Secretary of State is not available to deal with an urgent matter on which a reply is requested, it would be much better that the Minister of State in that department deals with it and that we do not have the Secretary of State from Defra or from some other department shifted in merely because he is of equal seniority and that meets the requirement.
Lord Reid of Cardowan
Perhaps I may help. This is not a new problem—it happens with intercepts. The only people allowed to authorise an intercept are Secretaries of State and, if the Secretary of State is not available or is not in London, his officials will get it to him—and these are far more urgent than anything envisaged here. The point that is being made is that the refusal to supply information to the ISC is such an important decision, given the confidence we are placing in the ISC, that the level at which that decision should be taken is Secretary of State level or equivalent. The Government are envisaging extending not only to a Minister inside the Home Office when the Secretary of State is not available but to any Minister of the Crown, on any refusal, the power so to refuse. My noble friend is saying that this is such an important decision that it ought to be taken only at the level of Secretary of State or equivalent. That is an entirely reasonable suggestion and is looser than the intercept provision which applies to only four Secretaries of State.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, as ever, my noble friend Lord Reid has summed up the point I was making. The Minister did not refer to an emergency situation but to departments that would not have a Secretary of State and therefore it would be downgraded. It is entirely appropriate to ask that a decision as serious as to withhold information from the ISC should be taken only at the highest levels in government, and that means the level of Secretary of State.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
My Lords, I also support the amendment. It is no answer to say that if the information is held by the Cabinet Office, where there is not a Secretary of State, it should be at some other level. Any intelligence information held by the Cabinet Office will belong either to the Home Office, the Foreign Office or some other department where a Secretary of State is responsible. It is not the case that provision ought to be made for an exception where the Cabinet Office is involved. I support the amendment moved by the Opposition.