Immigration Bill

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Ramsbotham]

Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 84”.

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, immediately before I sought to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 84 on Report, I said that any suggestion that administrative detention—that is, detention ordered not by a court of law but by Home Office officials—should not be subject to judicial oversight had to stop. Even at the late hour of 7.49 pm the House agreed with me. The Government’s alternative, accepted last night in the Commons and proposed just now by the Minister, demonstrates acceptance of the principle of judicial oversight, but only after a person has been administratively detained for six months from their first entry into detention. That seems virtually no change. Such a long period without judicial oversight seems precious little different from the present situation, which, as was described on Report, is frankly an affront to the national reputation for claiming to be a civilised society.

I am interested that the Government thought it appropriate to introduce automatic bail hearings. They were introduced into the Immigration Act in 1999, allowing for automatic hearings after eight days of detention and then after 36, but this never came into force and was eventually repealed. So, having repealed automatic bail hearings, how on earth have they now suddenly reappeared?

My concern is that the Minister in the other place claimed that all detainees were told that they had a right to seek a bail hearing, a judicial review, or a writ of habeas corpus. In actual fact, many of them are suffering from mental health problems that prevent instruction of a solicitor, let alone making a bail application. Many are legally unrepresented and speak little or no English. They do not understand the system that locked them up and many are too confused or distressed to avail themselves of the right to apply for bail. You have only to speak to some of those who have been through it to realise the realities of the system. It is not the fairyland presented by officials as possible.

On the question of mental health, there is absolutely no doubt that being held in immigration detention increases stress and gives rise to increased mental health problems. The noble Lord, Lord Bates, told us that there was an inquiry into mental health in immigration removal centres being conducted by the Centre for Mental Health. I declare an interest as a vice-president of the Centre for Mental Health. I followed up what that inquiry meant. Far from being initiated by the Home Office, it was initiated by NHS England when it was given responsibility for commissioning mental health treatment in detention centres. The Home Office officials then delayed any start by the Centre for Mental Health. Then they appeared to panic and asked for the report to be put in by the end of March, but they limited the number of immigration removal centres that the Centre for Mental Health people could visit. This does not seem to me to be either a proper examination of the system as it is actually working, or taking advantage of the Centre for Mental Health’s reputation for very detailed research, which it has established over many years. I would be very interested to know exactly why the Home Office officials behaved like that.

In his report, Stephen Shaw found substantial cause for alarm over detention policy, particularly as regards the treatment of those with mental illnesses, which he said,

“does not and cannot equate to good psychiatric practice”.

He described the situation as being,

“an affront to civilised values”.

My concern is that the keeping of people in administrative detention for six months before they allegedly have automatic bail hearings is too long. The House has already decided that the detention should be kept as short as possible, and voted for 28 days. That is why I suggest that we return to what we voted on at Report. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Dear) (CB)]

I should inform the House that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment C2 by reason of pre-emption.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

How prescient I have been, it would appear.

In those circumstances, I respectfully suggest to this House that the Government have responded in a reasoned, reasonable and proportionate way to the issues that have been raised, and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his response and to all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate.

Referring first to the Minister’s comments I would say yes, of course it is open to a person to ask for bail. What I sought to illustrate was that although that may be so in theory, in practice many of them simply do not know what to do. I accept that there have been many applications for bail. However, just out of interest, I would like to know at what period in their detention those people made the bail application and how long they had been there. In report after report of inspections of immigration detention centres, both the Chief Inspector of Prisons and the chief inspector of immigration have pointed out the absence of interpreters and legal advice and the fact that they were approached by many detainees asking how they could get help. We will not resolve this situation in this House tonight, but it is clearly unsatisfactory as seen through the eyes of the people on the ground, who are making the applications. I absolutely accept that the 1999 automatic bail provision was repealed because it was unworkable, but I am just interested that automatic bail should be substituted for it.

If I might refer to the comments of my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I never said that immigration detention should be limited to 28 days. What I said was that nobody should be submitted to administrative detention—that is, detention ordered by civil servants—without judicial oversight of that detention within the shortest time possible. A period of 28 days is entirely reasonable. It was the decision taken by the commission which the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister, and I, were on, and which was agreed to by the other place in a debate last September. Bringing in judicial oversight of immigration detention as quickly as possible must be the aim of any system. Yes, it is said the expert advice is available, but it is not in fact, as I have tried to illustrate.

My contention is that a principle is at stake here. If we wish to remain a civilised country, we cannot go on with a system in which civil servants are allowed to put people in immigration detention for unspecified periods which, as we all know, have stretched to months and even years. Anything longer than a month, in circumstances which I inspected for a long time—I think I know a little bit about them—is not successful. Therefore, without more ado, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Thursday 11th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure and privilege to be the first to thank the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, and to congratulate him on his outstanding maiden speech. It is very appropriate that he should have made it during the processing of the Armed Forces Bill because of the many years of outstanding service that he gave to the Royal British Legion. As he mentioned, I have particular reason to be grateful to him for his tireless and comprehensive briefing of those of us who were fighting for the retention of the post of chief coroner because, as he said, that retention has been responsible for an improvement in the conduct of military inquests. As the noble Lord has proved today, he has a deep understanding of veteran affairs, from which I am sure the whole House will benefit in future, as will the veterans whom he has served so well.

As the Minister said in his introduction, this is a very modest Bill and I propose to concentrate on three subjects that I hoped it would contain and on which I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments. The first concerns the Armed Forces covenant, which was made statutory in the 2011 Act. History suggests that now that our Armed Forces are no longer on active service in Iraq and Afghanistan, they will fade from the public eye, which will result in the plight of veterans, particularly gravely injured veterans, becoming less and less a matter of immediate public concern.

When the covenant was first proposed, I wrote twice to the Prime Minister, as well as repeating the plea that I made to him during the processing of the Act; namely, that the Minister for Veteran Affairs be removed from the Ministry of Defence and placed in the Cabinet Office. My reasoning for that was that no junior Minister operating from the MoD silo, responsible for the day-to-day affairs of those currently serving in the Armed Forces, cuts any clout in ministries such as the Department of Health, the Department for Work and Pensions, the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, which have day-to-day responsibility for matters affecting veterans. However, if the Minister operated from the Cabinet Office, where the Armed Forces Covenant Committee is based, he or she could speak to them with the authority of that office, and oversee the focus on veteran affairs.

I appealed also that the statutory annual statement on the covenant required of the Secretary of State for Defence should include statements from all ministries involved in veteran affairs, listing what they had done for veterans during that year. I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, when he was the MoD Minister in this House, hoping that this annual statement would be made verbally in both Houses so that Members could have an annual opportunity to check on progress by asking specific questions. My motive for that was and remains my fear that unless there is a regular opportunity to ensure that momentum is being maintained, undertakings, however well intentioned when made, risk being dropped and forgotten. I have two areas of particular concern.

First, there is no doubt that in future years an increasing number of veterans will suffer from mental health problems, including PTSD. For example, it is most important that anyone involved in an IED incident should have that fact recorded on their medical documents because history proves that they may well suffer flashbacks, which doctors can deal with appropriately if they know what a person has been through. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson of Abinger, I am not convinced that all that could be done to ensure that veterans’ mental health problems are being looked after in the same way as physical health problems is being done, and would like an annual opportunity to keep pressure on the authorities responsible for provision and improvement.

Secondly, too many veterans come into the hands of the criminal justice system, unfortunately. Times without number since I first became aware of the problem in 1996, I have appealed, first to the Home Office and then to the Ministry of Justice, for someone to be made responsible and accountable for veteran affairs in prisons. But that plea includes both police and probation, and there have been calls for the establishment of special veteran courts, as exist in America.

There have been numerous studies and reports on veterans in the criminal justice system by bodies such as the Centre for Mental Health, the Howard League for Penal Reform and, most recently, a commission sponsored by Lord Ashcroft, of which I was a commissioner. But despite the report of our commission receiving an official response from the previous Secretary of State for Justice, nothing has happened. We called for everyone entering the criminal justice system, initially via the police but later prison or probation, to be asked whether they had served in the Armed Forces so that appropriate action could be taken to help them both while serving their sentence and, most particularly, on release. Admittedly a number make bogus claims to have served, but the validity of such claims can soon be checked, as was proved by the police in Kent. What I am concerned about is the treatment of the depressingly large number of genuine veterans who are sentenced to either imprisonment or supervision in the community, with whose rehabilitation service charities and other ex-service organisations could be involved, if only they were alerted. This is, again, something that Parliament could and should chase up, which is why I appeal to the Minister that the annual statement on the Armed Forces covenant should be made verbally, by statute.

My second concern may seem like a small matter, but I think that it has a wider significance. At present, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales formally inspects—as he does every other prison—the Military Corrective Training Centre in Colchester every five years, but by invitation only. At a recent seminar, attended by the Secretary of State for Justice, the recently retired chief inspector said publicly that the MCTC was the best prison in the country, and a living example of how prisons should be run. This is partly due to the experience of its staff, no one being allowed to join the Military Provost Staff Corps until they have proved themselves to be capable soldiers. The remit of the Chief Inspector of Prisons includes both police and court cells but, now that the MPSC is to be responsible for running regional detention centres, which will replace the old regimental guard rooms, I believe that they too should be added to his list. Therefore I appeal to the Minister that this requirement should be made statutory in this Bill.

It is not as easy to be so specific about my third concern. Many other noble and noble and gallant Lords have already referred to the clash between human rights legislation and those involved in armed conflict. I personally despise the actions of British lawyers who have gone out to Iraq and Afghanistan touting for business that seeks to undermine the credibility and reputation of their Armed Forces. I agree with all those who have called for this to be urgently looked at, and I shall inform the Minister of one experience when I was Adjutant-General. The Second Permanent Under-Secretary came to the three officers who were responsible for personnel in their services and told them that they had to work out how industrial tribunals would be included in service discipline chains. When we asked whether such industrial tribunals came before or after the Queen, we were told that that was totally irrelevant because the Bill including this requirement had already had its First Reading in the House. We had not seen the Bill and when we sent for it we found that there were such ridiculous things in it as, if a person were ordered by his employer into a place of danger, he could seek an industrial tribunal. I wondered whether the OC B Company could take his commanding officer to an industrial tribunal if he were told to capture a hill. We discovered that this followed an instruction from Brussels—at least that was what was alleged. When we asked what our NATO allies—the Germans, French and Italians—had done about it, they said that their Governments had sought dispensation from this ruling. Our Government had not.

To what has already been said to the Minister, I add my hope that the assault on the clash between human rights legislation and those involved in armed conflict will not be conducted in isolation just in this country but will include our NATO allies, all of which have armed forces involved in the same dilemma. I hope very much that, rather than the modest Bill that the Minister has announced, the opportunity can be taken to include in it the very real action that is needed to solve what my noble and gallant friend Lord Boyce described as the lawfare question, which is one that I know worries the minds of every serving member of the Armed Forces at present.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

That is a very pertinent point to make and the Government are fully aware of the need to make speed as far as we can.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth, my noble friends Lady Hodgson and Lady Scott, and the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Judd, all referred to the importance of service families. The families of our Armed Forces personnel play a vital role in enabling them to do the job that they do, for which the Government are extremely grateful. We have already taken a number of important steps to that end, but, following feedback, we have started to develop a new UK Armed Forces family strategy to review and improve the support we provide to families. That will be launched by the end of 2016. I could say a huge amount on the topics covered by my noble friend Lady Hodgson, especially on housing and veterans’ mental health, but the key question she posed, which I will briefly address, is how well we think the covenant is working.

At the start of the year, we consulted all three single services to understand how they perceived they were disadvantaged. The result has been a comprehensive assessment of delivery in the five key areas of healthcare, local services, spouse employment, education and commercial support. We have also undertaken a challenging package of work to check that our processes and procedures are working. The results were clear: the covenant is working but we need to make it clearer and easier for members of the Armed Forces community to access the support that is available, and delivery is not uniform. We are also aware that we need a mechanism to identify and address localised problems. Better metrics will help and for the first time the Armed Forces covenant annual report includes assessments of our performance in a number of areas. But we also need to be able to measure how the covenant is working at a local level, so the Ministry of Defence will continue to work with other government departments and the devolved Administrations and relevant charities to identify and develop relevant data.

I hope the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, will forgive me for not addressing the points they made about the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme. As time is short, I will write to them on that. I would, however, like to make two points in response to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, who indicated that the MoD has no clout with other departments and that the covenant is in danger of fading from the public eye. First, this year the Prime Minister will personally take the helm of the Home Affairs (Armed Forces Covenant) Sub-Committee and ensure that departments work together effectively. Secondly, the Government have committed to a £10 million annual fund in perpetuity to support delivery of the covenant. The existence of that fund will surely keep it in the public eye.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

I thank the Minister for that. My main point was that if the statement is made verbally then we will have a chance every year to maintain momentum and make certain that all these issues are pursued.

[Earl Howe]

I will reflect on that point in the customary way and write to the noble Lord about that suggestion.

National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

The right reverend Prelate reminds us of a very important point of principle. As I hope he will find when he reads this document, running through it is a thread or theme that makes clear that government has to be joined up in all of this—much more joined up than it ever has been in the past. The way in which countries abroad are assessed as friendly, non-friendly or something in between is absolutely essential in our long-term planning. Having said that, we are very clear that we have our prime allies with whom we wish to collaborate, specifically when it comes to defence—not least the United States, France and, increasingly, Germany. However, it is possible for countries around the world to unite around a common objective, as we saw recently with the United Nations Security Council resolution, where all the members of the Security Council voted in one direction. That was a remarkable event in itself, and we should take our cue from that in deciding how to proceed further in the context of the Middle East conflict.

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, one of the problems of SDSR 2010 was that so much depended on financial provision in 2015, which of course has not materialised. Could the Minister say how much of the £178 billion provision for buying and maintaining equipment over the next decade is guaranteed? Presumably, that includes the military equipment which is required for the two strike brigades which the noble Lord, Lord Reid, mentioned earlier.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the figure of £178 billion is £12 billion more than we previously announced and is over 10 years, as the noble Lord rightly said. It will embrace a whole range of equipment, including equipment needed for the Army. It is not possible for me to define some of that equipment at this juncture, because we wish to leave our options open. But I hope he will take heart from the section in the report about equipping the Army with, for example, the new Ajax vehicle and the new MIV, as it is called. These highly flexible, speedy and capable vehicles will ensure that the strike brigades are supported, as they need to be, with the right equipment so that they can be deployed swiftly and effectively—sometimes, if necessary, at long range.

The Role and Capabilities of the UK Armed Forces, in the Light of Global and Domestic Threats to Stability and Security

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Tuesday 15th September 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for initiating this debate. I am very glad that it is taking place in the period before we have the SDSR because that definitely did not happen in 2010. If lessons are to be learned, it is very important that there is as wide a consultation as possible on an SDSR before it is initiated. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth mentioned this. I have to declare an interest as a member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy.

The Minister confirmed that the Government have not just begun work on the national security strategy and the defence review but that they are due to report by the end of the year. As I listened to the contributions of noble Lords around the Room today, I began to wonder whether that was not too rushed. The last defence review was to be financed by what was promised to be there in 2015. At the time, we said, “We are not quite certain that that finance is likely to be there”, as indeed has proved to be the case. I therefore wonder whether, as a result of the consultations by the various Select Committees, plus those in this House, the Government might wish to think again before rushing ahead with something that they may not have considered.

I am very glad that there are two words in the Motion which I want to say something about. First, on “capabilities”, I would add “sustainability” at that stage because, as the noble Lord, Lord King, will remember from the Options for Change exercise, our key concern—certainly in the Army—was whether what was to be produced would be sustainable. Sustainability includes the maintenance of operations over a period of time. For example, when we sent help to Rwanda, the only thing we could do was to send a composite administrative force for six months, which mended roads, repaired vehicles and provided communications and medical support. There simply were not the replacements in the order of battle for us to continue with an operation that we had started. I fear that sustainability has been absent from many of the reviews I have seen in the recent past. It is a word that should be there.

However, I am very glad that “domestic” is in the Motion because it is often forgotten just how much the Army, for instance, is doing to underpin the domestic life of this nation. When I was commanding my battalion, I sent my soldiers off to a dustmen’s strike in Glasgow. When I was commanding the brigade in Belfast, we had a tanker drivers’ strike. When I was Adjutant-General, we had an ambulance drivers’ strike. In recent times, the Army have not only had strike preparation but underpinned the floods, the foot and mouth disease outbreak and the security at the Olympic Games. They have also gone off because of Ebola. In fact, the Army is underpinning quite a lot of the life of the nation. If it is all to be deployed only on operations—if only operations are being thought of—something will be lost which we cannot afford to lose. As your Lordships will understand, that is a plea not to reduce the Army to anything below the 82,000 it has now been forced down to. I do not think we can afford to do without that domestic role.

What is the actual aim and role of the Armed Forces? It was put very clearly in NSS 2010: to protect the nation’s,

“security in an age of uncertainty”.

Uncertainty, as many noble Lords have said, is of course impossible to plan for. Above all, what is missing from a lot of the consideration that has been happening is what the military refer to as the critical mass needed to carry out the tasks identified or, as the noble Lord, Lord King, said, the minimum strength needed. It is exactly the same thing.

In the Ministry of Defence there used to be what was called a basket-weaving exercise, which happened every year. A White Paper or some other document would be produced which laid down what the services were to do. They then worked out how much it would cost to do what had to be done, and that was then compared with the money that had been made available. Inevitably, there would not be enough money. Then there would be a basket-weaving exercise where every aspect of what was required was costed and put into categories known as “essential”, “desirable” and “nice to have”. That basket was put to Ministers for them to make the decisions and say, “We know perfectly well that we are not going to get any more money, and we accept what you say, and therefore this is not to be done because we cannot afford it”. I do not think there is much evidence of basket weaving in some of the things that have happened. The equipment budget, which my noble friend Lord Dannatt particularly mentioned, raises questions about what should and should not be done, but I am not absolutely certain that that exercise has been carried out in full.

Mention has been made of the financial direction of all this and the role of the Treasury. Of course, since SDSR 2010 we have had Army 2020, which we all know was an entirely financially driven exercise. The Chief of the General Staff was told by the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Defence how much money he could have, and therefore the Army as it is structured today is designed to fit a financial envelope. I do not believe that that is correct in terms of meeting the challenges of an emerging world. The role and the capabilities of the Armed Forces need to be looked at in relation to the challenges they are facing. If you end up with a financial envelope that results in 17 fewer major units, you have not necessarily got something which can meet what had been decided would be the minimum only two years previously. I am concerned about the financial direction of much of this, and I agree strongly with the noble Lord, Lord King, that the strategic defence and security review should not be just an MoD exercise. It must include all the other connected ministries.

I have not mentioned soft power, but we should remember that of the 0.7% of GDP spent on aid, much of that is actually included in the military budget, so why not look at what the military are contributing as part of that 0.7%? It means that DfID and others must be brought in.

I come to my conclusions about all this, and why I think that the question of timing is so important. My late boss, Field-Marshal Lord Carver, used to say that there were two definitions of the word “affordability”: can you afford it or can you afford to give up what you have to give up in order to afford it? I worry that a lot of things in the defence budget would benefit from scrupulous examination under the terms of the second question. My noble and gallant friend Lord Craig mentioned the nuclear deterrent. I am not going to say anything more—other than that, in order to satisfy the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord King, about the inadequacy of 2% of GDP, consideration ought possibly to be given to whether a political weapon should be removed from the defence budget so that defence planning can be done based on the critical mass needed to meet our challenges, which would produce a conventional element that is capable of underpinning the deterrent. It is, after all, a political weapon and there is no doubt that it is unhinging the defence budget.

Commonwealth War Graves Commission

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Monday 22nd June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, as a former ex officio commissioner of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, for obtaining this debate and enabling me and many other noble Lords to pay tribute to a jewel in the nation’s crown.

The tireless work of the commission’s gardeners in cemeteries all over the world is rightly admired by all who see it, and greatly appreciated by the relatives of those whose graves and memorials they maintain so devotedly. Although all different, every commission cemetery I have seen has the same air of dignified simplicity, honouring its motto: “I will make you a name”. Every nation has its own way of burying its war dead but for me the Imperial, now the Commonwealth, War Graves Commission way is supreme: everyone, whatever their rank or service, has the same headstone to which relatives are able to add some words of their own.

My assessment of the work of the commission can be summed up in two words, captured in two anecdotes. As a commissioner, I was invited to a showing of the film the commission made about its work following World War II, appropriately called “I Will Make You a Name”. When it ended, there was total silence, broken by the chairman, who asked if anyone wanted to say anything. Sue Ryder, another invitee, said, “Gosh”, immediately followed by her husband, Leonard Cheshire, who said, “No, more than that: gosh, gosh”.

My personal “gosh, gosh” commission grave is not in a cemetery but in its garden just north of Anzac Cove at Gallipoli. When our troops were withdrawn in January 1916, they were told to kill all the animals they could not evacuate. Some could not bring themselves to do that and turned their charges loose on a peninsula that remained unattended until 1919, when the Imperial War Graves Commission and its French and Turkish opposite numbers returned to bury their respective dead. Amazingly, some of the animals survived and were taken back into service by the commission. One pony, called Billy, eventually retired and when he died was buried in a marked grave where he once grazed.

I hope the Minister will agree that whatever the pressures on the Government, in the spirit of “gosh, gosh”, they will do nothing to diminish the ability of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission to honour and care for those who gave their all on behalf of our great country.

Defence: Budget

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Wednesday 17th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, in preparation for this debate, I looked again at the book that is regarded as the foundation of English common law, published by Henry II’s Justiciar in 1189, called The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England. I realised that it was an extremely good definition of smart power, as well. It states:

“Not only must royal power be furnished with arms against rebels and nations which rise up against the king and the realm, but it is also fitting that it should be adorned with laws for the governance of subject and peaceful peoples; so that in time of both peace and war, our glorious king may so successfully perform his office that, by crushing the pride of the unbridled and ungovernable with the right hand of strength and tempering justice for the humble and the meek with the rod of equity, he may both be always victorious in wars with his enemies and also show himself continually impartial in dealing with his subjects”.

I find that one of the saddest things about this debate, for which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sterling, is the frequent mention of the decline of this country and the frequent reports of less than adequate forces to defend the realm. I found the same as a member of the Joint Committee on the national security strategy, because one of the things that worried me—and, I think, other members—was that when we looked for a national security strategy on which an SDSR could be based we found no evidence of any, and nor did we find any evidence of national strategic thinking in the Government which might give rise to a national security strategy. I take the description “long-term foreign policy” in this debate to include the national security strategy.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Howell, I deplore targets in this because I believe that it is only sensible to base defence spending on what the defence of the realm requires. Without having a national security strategy on which an SDSR can be based, you have no idea when you are going into these sums whether you have what is required. I am very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Selkirk, mentioned the word “affordable”. I, too, think that when you are thinking “Can we afford it?”, you also have to ask whether you can afford to give up what you have to give up in order to afford what you say you want. I think that great swathes of government spending come into that second category when we are considering the all-important defence of the realm.

Gurkhas: Anniversary

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Wednesday 10th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, has said, it is a great privilege to take part in this debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, for obtaining it on this important anniversary.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, I completed a jungle warfare course in Kota Tinggi in 1965. I was fortunate to have the 6th Gurkhas beside me in Borneo. We used to keep Gurkha rations there so that platoons could come along the border ridge and into our base, and we could go to theirs. I shall always remember seeing a platoon going out of my base. The Gurkha sergeant in charge tapped his pack and said, “Gurkha rations”. Then he patted the magazine of his rifle and said, “Indonesian rations”, and with a grin he went out of the gate.

My own regiment, The Rifles, has been very close to the Gurkhas throughout its history. Indeed, it is a great pleasure to us that the Gurkhas wear the green and black buttons of The Rifles. For years, until the Royal Gurkha Rifles itself was formed, the two Queen’s Gurkha orderly officers who become her ADCs for a year used to be based with us at Winchester. That was a great link. It is very important to remember that this relationship with the Gurkhas carries many links with many regiments over many years.

I am very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, also mentioned the Indian connection. When I was adjutant-general I was privileged to go out to Nepal to do, among other things, something that has remained in my memory for ever: I took the attestation parade early in the morning in Pokhara. With the Himalayas behind them, these young Gurkhas came forward, put their hands on a Union Jack on a table and looked me in the eye as they took the oath. That was something tremendous; it has stayed with them and with me.

At that time we were concerned because we had closed our British military hospital in Dharan. I was therefore trying to negotiate with the Indians that our Gurkhas, on retirement to Nepal, could qualify to get medical support from the Indian Army, which had arrangements in Nepal; it meant buying into an insurance policy. The whole question of the employment of the Nepalese soldier, the Gurkha, was a tripartite agreement between Nepal, India and this country, and woe betide us if we ever forget that there are three employers of these wonderful people. All three benefit from them and have done so for a long time.

I am very glad that there was the event yesterday, which I did not attend. At least it gave the public an opportunity to recognise the support and help that the Gurkhas have given us. It reminded me of an experience during the Falklands War, when the Gurkhas came back from there, having had a miserable journey in the “Queen Elizabeth”—they did not like being on the sea. They were picked up and taken by train to Aldershot, and then they got out and marched to their barracks at Crookham. The streets were lined with people cheering them. Suddenly these people, who had been looking rather sad and down in the mouth, started beaming. Immediately there was good will and good spirit, and it lifted them. The British public ought to be given opportunities to show something back to the Gurkhas.

I am very glad that the contribution to aid in Nepal has been given but I for one have questioned why, immediately after the earthquake happened, the whole of the Brigade of Gurkhas was not flown out at once to Nepal, with all its troops, signallers, engineers and logistics people. That should have been the instant reaction in return for all the wonderful help that the Gurkhas have given to this country over so long. Anything less than full commitment to them is less than generous in return for what we have had.

Yes, I am pleased that the Gurkha Welfare Trust is remembered at the same time, and I am pleased that we should go on thinking about the future of the Gurkhas who retire here, but let us never forget that for 200 years we have had marvellous, brave, loyal and selfless service from some wonderful people, and we should be eternally grateful for what we have had.

Armed Forces

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Monday 23rd June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, I begin by paying tribute to the Minister for the wonderful series of briefings that he arranges for Members of this House, which I know are widely appreciated.

I realise that at this stage of such an important debate, in which there have been so many remarkable and well informed speeches, there is little new that I can add. In disclosing an interest as a member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, I have to admit that, although that committee has a far wider-ranging remit, I will be speaking mainly about the Army and, in particular, Army 2020. I will not repeat all that has been said about the role and purpose of our Armed Forces in general, particularly as regards their future should the Prime Minister’s promised budget increase not be realised, and about the gypsy’s warnings on that given by my noble and gallant friends Lord Stirrup and Lord Richards, including in the latter’s outstanding maiden speech.

In its first review of the National Security Strategy 2010, published on 8 March 2012, the Joint Committee commented that it had been produced to a very tight timetable, and hoped that the production of the next one in 2015 would include a much wider public debate and an attempt at political consensus. The security strategy had been used to guide capability decisions in the 2020 strategic defence and security review, but the committee was unable to find any evidence that it had influenced decisions made since then. It called on the Government to develop an overarching strategy, a common understanding about the United Kingdom’s interests and objectives, that could guide choices on investment across government departments as well as operational priorities and crises responses, based on a realistic vision of the United Kingdom’s future role in the world.

In its report on its work in 2013-14, published on 30 April this year, the committee repeated concerns about the way in which the National Security Council operated, including: focusing on short-term imperatives and operational matters, and showing little sign of considering long-term and blue skies topics; not making the contribution it should to enable the Government to work as a co-ordinated whole; and individual departments, notably the Ministry of Defence, making major policy decisions without discussion at the National Security Council. The committee urged the Prime Minister to reconsider his approach to the next national security strategy in 2015, and to give a clear steer to his officials that they were expected to produce a radically different one that tackled the big and politically difficult questions which would guide future decision-making.

I mention this as background to the ninth report of the House of Commons Defence Committee produced this year, entitled Future Army 2020, in which it expressed its surprise that such a radical change to the Army’s structure, reflecting a reduction of 12,000 personnel from that announced in the 2010 security and defence review, was not discussed at the National Security Council, and that it was the Ministry of Defence’s Permanent Secretary who told the Chief of the General Staff the future size of the Army under the Army 2020 plan, which I hope is not a portent of things to come when there is only one uniformed member of the Defence Council. It noted that the Secretary of State for Defence had subsequently accepted that Army 2020 was designed to fit a financial envelope and it called on the Ministry of Defence to explain the apparent lack of consultation with the Chief of the General Staff in the decision-making process that has affected his service so fundamentally.

However, what seems even more peculiar to me about this whole story is that the Government continue to claim that, despite the history of what has actually happened since 2010, their overall strategic vision, expressed in both the security strategy and the defence review, has not changed. The Defence Committee hopes that a concept of critical mass for the Armed Forces will be developed. Had this been in existence, and even in its absence, it would seem only common sense for the NSC to assess and confirm Army 2020 before issuing it to the Army, in relation not just to critical mass but to the MoD’s “fighting power” doctrine, both of which could arm it with a much better informed understanding of how well the Army will be able to fulfil its obligations and contribute to Future Force 2020. As many noble Lords have pointed out, there is in addition a danger that Army 2020 could unravel if there are any further Ministry of Defence budget reductions, in which case both the UK’s vision of its place in the world and the defence planning assumptions would have to be revised.

Army 2020 represents a radical vision for the future role and structure of the British Army, departing significantly from that which was published in SDSR 2010. I must admit that I share the Defence Committee’s doubts as to whether SDSR 2010 can meet the needs of the United Kingdom’s national security, not least in combating asymmetrical threats. Deterrence of asymmetrical threats is much more complex than deterrence of another state. Whether it is nuclear or conventional, there is great difficulty in identifying precisely what action can be threatened or taken against whom. If I have a particular concern, it is that Army 2020 appears insufficiently resourced to enable the Army to operate in the fourth environment in which services now have to operate in addition to land, sea and air—namely, the electromagnetic or cyberspace. If both attack and defence are to be conducted, Signals is currently at about half the strength required.

My other concern is the reserves, and here I admit that I speak as an Inspector General of the Territorial Army of 25 years ago. While conscious of the enormous contribution that the reserves have made to the hectic operational years, you cannot expect employers to go on releasing people without proper reward. You must also pay the volunteers sufficiently well to encourage them to turn out. There is another dimension to the reserves, which I am afraid receives less than due recognition, which is the representation of the Armed Forces throughout the United Kingdom now that they have been withdrawn from so many places. The whole reserves issue should be re-looked at in the context of SDSR 2015 and Future Force 2020, to confirm that plans exist to expand important requirements such as medical and cyber, identified in what I hope will be a better analysis of national security needs than was carried out in 2010.

Apart from Army 2020, I have one other plea on behalf of the Army. I well remember pleading with my military masters for a period of stability for my battalion, which I took to Gibraltar after two years on operations in Londonderry, a six-month unaccompanied tour in Belize, and a hectic six months during which we had to provide a national shooting team and train for a subsequent four unaccompanied months in Belfast. Having been able to catch our breath, get some basic skills training and allow children under four to have their fathers at home for Christmas for the first time in their lives, a rejuvenated battalion was able to deploy straight to South Armagh. The Army has had far worse than that, having been involved in continuous operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere for more than 10 years, with the result that national defence skills, including essentials such as all-arms training, are almost non-existent. The Army badly needs a period of stability, during which it can become accustomed to its Army 2020 posture, including the linkage between certain formations and certain parts of the world, which is resulting in 4 Brigade, with its Middle East responsibilities, training troops from Libya and Egypt.

The Ministry of Defence failed to communicate the rationale and strategy behind Army 2020 to the Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament and the public—the Government are saying that it has to work and there is no plan B. The Government owe it to both the nation and the Army to ensure that Army 2020 works. If the situation changes, they must be prepared to respond decisively by providing additional resources in order to guarantee the nation’s security. I therefore ask the Minister whether the Ministry of Defence accepts the Defence Committee’s request that the Government provide regular updates to Parliament on progress of all aspects of the Army 2020 plan, the first of which would be laid before Parliament in January 2015 to allow consideration and debate before the 2015 general election and the SDSR, and regular debates thereafter.

Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Bill [HL]

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Monday 23rd June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

I, too, welcome the Minister’s opening remarks about the paramountcy and importance of the chain of command. I also associate myself entirely with the remarks of my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig, including those on the importance of analysing why the Army and the Royal Air Force appear to be lagging behind the Navy in implementing the 2006 measures.

What I would like to contribute to the debate at this stage is stirred by the mention by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, of the problems of the ombudsman having statutory powers on occasion. If ever there is a clash between the chain of command and anything statutory, we have to remember that there are two conditions in which the Armed Forces find themselves—their normal day-to-day existence, when different circumstances can prevail, and active service, when there is no room for anything other than an operational chain of command if operations are to proceed correctly.

I add two cautionary tales to explain why I am opposed to the commissioner being advanced to an ombudsman. In 1992, I was Adjutant-General, personnel director of the Army, and was sitting in the Principal Personnel Officers’ Committee with my opposite numbers from the Navy and the Air Force, when the Second Permanent Under-Secretary said to us, “You have got to decide where industrial tribunals figure in the service disciplinary chains”. Naively, I asked whether they came before or after Her Majesty the Queen, who is, of course, at the summit of it all. I was told that that was completely irrelevant because the Bill instructing that this should happen had already been given its First Reading in the House. “What Bill?”, we asked.

It eventually appeared that there was a Bill about industrial tribunals that had its origins in Brussels. When a copy came, I gave it to the director of Army Legal Services and said, “Run your eye over this, please, and come and tell me if there is anything difficult in it”. Within half an hour, he was back and he said, “This is absolutely disastrous. There is a clause in here which says that if an employee is ordered into a place of danger, he can take his employer to an industrial tribunal”. If carried to its logical conclusion, that would mean that a company could take its commanding officer to an industrial tribunal if ordered to, for example, capture a hill. I then asked the Second PUS what the offices of the German, French and Italian armies had done about the Bill. He said, “They claimed exemption for their armed forces”. I said, “Why on earth can we not do so, because all armed forces do the same thing?”. I say that merely because I suspect, having read the clauses in the Bill—many of which have been outlined, particularly by my noble and gallant friend—that the implications of the proposed powers of the ombudsman in relation to the chain of command may not have been properly thought through.

My second cautionary tale concerns coroners. We all welcome the fact that inquests will now happen more quickly, because there is nothing worse than a family having to wait for years and years before the full knowledge of the circumstances of the son’s, or whoever’s, death is known. Recently—in the past five years or more—there have been examples of coroners who, rather than just doing their job, have started to interfere with command decisions and question them in court. I submit that orders given by people on the battlefield should not be a matter for public questioning by coroners in a coroner’s court. There is a danger that the business of them doing that has undermined confidence in the whole coronial system in the Armed Forces, which is thoroughly unfortunate. I sincerely hope that the chief coroner will correct this.

I mention those examples because, while I am not opposed to there being a commissioner for complaints who is absolutely committed, first and foremost, to the rule of law in the Armed Forces—and those of us who operated on the streets of Northern Ireland, armed with our yellow cards, know how intrusive that can be—we must have a proper complaints system in which everyone has trust and which functions quickly and effectively. If that is not the case, then we must see why. I am most unhappy, however, at the thought of someone being introduced into the system with more powers than currently exist, because of the possible implications for the paramountcy of the chain of command, on which the Minister opened his address.

Defence Reform Bill

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Wednesday 26th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I have one very small comment. It would seem to be quite wrong to restrict such an annual report to the Army. It would be necessary, if such an approach were to be adopted, for the report to cover all three services in full.

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

I absolutely agree with my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig on that point. On reading the Defence Committee report, Future Army 2020, I was concerned to note two statements:

“We are surprised that such a radical change to the Army’s structure … was not discussed at the National Security Council”,

and,

“We note that the Secretary of State for Defence accepts that Army 2020 was designed to fit a financial envelope”.

The financial envelope includes not just the Army but the other two services. If we look at history, an annual debate was held in both Houses on the estimates for the Navy and the Army. We are therefore putting back history, as it were, if we have an annual estimate. Particularly in this case, I note the suggestion that the first discussion should be in January 2015 because, of course, when the strategic defence review 2010 was introduced it was clear that its achievement was dependent on the money that would be available in 2015. Looking around, it seems pretty obvious that that amount of money may not be available—in which case, all three services will have to face a review of the current plans.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I very much echo the sentiments of my noble friend Lord King. I think there is a general feeling that in the latest cutbacks in the forces the Army seems to have taken a rather greater cut than the other two services. Considering that the Army has been deployed almost continuously since the Troubles began in Northern Ireland in 1969, one has slightly to question the wisdom of the Army seemingly taking rather more punishment than the other two services.

However, I do think that the Opposition have a bit of nerve in tabling this amendment, which somewhat echoes the amendment withdrawn by the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, because, at the end of the day, we are paying now for the legacy that this Government inherited when they took power at the beginning of this Parliament. If you have £40 billion of procurement that has not been funded, you obviously at that stage have a serious problem. Something went badly wrong. When the aircraft carriers were ordered by the previous Government the roof had fallen in on the economy and there was clearly no money to pay for them. It does not matter whether they were a good idea, the money was not there and the Defence Council went ahead and ordered them. For some extraordinary reason, there was no ministerial override from the Permanent Secretary saying that the money was not there. That strikes me as a very serious shortcoming in the way in which our affairs are being run. Let us face it, there is always a temptation for politicians to order things that they cannot afford. On the other hand, we look to our civil servants to preserve the integrity of the finances of the department, and that did not seem to happen. I consider that the Army is suffering from some very bad decisions that were taken in the previous Parliament and the legacy of an overhang of unfunded procurement. Savings had to be found somewhere; and it is the Army. It is extremely regrettable that the Army has to take the punishment in this way.