(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have amendments to this Bill—I think they are in the last group—but I will not address them. I will keep to the amendments in this group, which has strayed into some wider areas. Since the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not seeking the guidance of the Companion, which discourages changing groupings that have already been agreed, we will no doubt discuss all the amendments in detail as we go. I tabled my principal amendment but no others because I chose to respect the work of the International Relations and Defence Committee, which may well have considerations in advance of Report for us to consider.
I will make some short remarks on the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan. I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, presented any different, additional arguments in introducing his amendments from those he presented at Second Reading. Therefore, we have heard them before. Other noble Lords agreed with his argument.
If the noble Lord regards the amendments clearly, he will see that the difference is that I am saying, “Suck it and see”. If you believe there is a possibility of a court coming up with these judgments—they say it will be within weeks—then let us see.
I understand that argument, which the noble Lord alluded to at Second Reading, but it is a curious one when a treaty has been agreed. If he had presented this argument under the previous Administration post 2022, during the negotiations, that may have held a degree of credibility, but I did not hear him at any stage ask the previous Government to abort those negotiations. This is important because he and others who agree with him are suggesting that the previous Government perhaps did not enter in good faith into negotiations based on ceding sovereignty to resolve legal considerations. That was the Statement that the Foreign Secretary made in November 2022. As I said at Second Reading, I assume—the noble Lord may be able to correct me—that the Government would not have made that policy choice in November 2022 without advice from the Attorney-General at the time.
Since the noble Lord is famous for his pernicketiness, I remind him that the Statement in November 2022 referred to the “exercise of sovereignty”, not the ceding of sovereignty.
I see. Presumably he is arguing that it would be joint sovereignty. How would you enter into negotiations with another sovereign state on the exercise of sovereignty if we were going to retain it? I do not understand. This is interesting. Is he now saying that the previous Government entered into those negotiations without the intent to cede sovereignty?
I promise the noble Lord and the Committee that this will be my last intervention. I had no insider knowledge and was not in any way involved, but the possibility, from reading the Statement, was that the negotiations would consider the possibility either of joint sovereignty, as has existed in certain parts of the world, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, said—on a much better informed basis—of retaining sovereignty of Diego Garcia but ceding it elsewhere. There are all sorts of possibilities, and none of us knew at the time. That is why I certainly did not want those negotiations to take place, but I was not involved at all.
Part of the noble Lord’s lack of involvement was in not raising his objections in Parliament at the time. If those negotiations were entered into to resolve the legal considerations then the Statement in 2022 undermines his quite novel argument now.
It is the case that the previous Government entered into those negotiations. I believe that they entered into them in good faith and they knew what the conclusions would be. The argument of the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, is of course correct with regard to the 2017 declaration by the United Kingdom Government that they would be able to choose not to adhere to any rulings by the ICJ on the basis of a Commonwealth country, if that dispute started after 1987. It is a moot point whether this dispute started before then; there remain many arguments that it had. However, even if he is right, I am certain that the former Attorney-General—one of potentially three in 2022—would have advised the previous Administration that, regardless of that 2017 UK declaration, the ICJ would, as under its statute, refer to the General Assembly, because that is its purpose, and that there would be a resolution at the General Assembly. That was the entire point of the ICJ considering it, because it was referred to the ICJ by the General Assembly. I understand the noble Lord’s argument, but we would not be in a different place now even if his argument was very robust.
On the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and our little to and fro on the treaty, we have been told on many occasions by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and his colleagues in the previous Administration that treaty-making is a prerogative power. We do not have that short a memory in this House; we recall the Rwanda Bill and the Rwanda treaty. I recall the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, telling us that it was not our role to interfere in the prerogative power of Governments making, implementing or changing treaties. I quote:
“My Lords, we are not aware of any precedent for Parliament mandating the Government in international negotiations conducted under the royal prerogative. The Government were not prepared to accept such a significant … shift”.—[Official Report, 24/7/18; col. 1598.]
That is ultimately what the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, puts forward. That quote from Hansard is from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. He was insistent that it was not Parliament’s role to interfere or mandate a Government in the negotiation of treaties under the royal prerogative. He was either wrong then and right now, or he was right then and wrong now. I am sure he will be able to say which when he sums up the debate.
It is not my fault if the Liberal Democrats do not want to be consistent on this.
The point is that colleagues of the noble Lords to my left have argued in the other place for a referendum, but the Liberal Democrats in your Lordships’ House have done nothing. The noble Lord has tabled just two amendments, only one of which is consequential. When we debated ratification, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, withdrew his amendments to the Motion without a Division. I think that speaks a thousand volumes. It seems that it falls to my noble friends on these Benches to stand up for the Chagossians and ask for the referendum that they rightly deserve. I beg to move.
I support my noble friend Lord Callanan’s amendment. My own amendment also calls for a referendum. The Government have given priority to the Mauritians—and, indeed, to some extent, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice—maintaining what they think of as territorial integrity over the right to self-determination. That should not be the case. Under international law, the right of a group within a decolonised area to self-determination has priority over so-called territorial integrity. It is very regrettable that that has not yet been conceded.
When we come to vote on this subject on Report, as no doubt we will, I very much hope that this will be an area where there is widespread support across the House. I very much hope that the Liberal Democrats will support a vote requiring a referendum among the Chagossian people over the right to self-determination. We are told that they did so in the Commons. In fact, they were so moved by it and thought it such an important issue that they voted against the whole Bill at Third Reading.
So far, the amendments the Liberal Democrats have tabled cannot be said to be amendments that would require a referendum. Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, would require that
“a Minister of the Crown must engage with the Government of the Republic of Mauritius with a view to establishing a Joint Parliamentary Commission”.
We are getting “could”, “may” and “might” added together.
I will speak to the noble Lord’s amendment first, because I am informing the House about it, and then he can tell me where I am wrong.
Amendment 80 would require that, having engaged with the Mauritian authorities to set up this joint commission, and having perhaps persuaded them to do so:
“The Minister of the Crown must further propose that the Commission’s responsibilities include … evaluating the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, including … the right of return”
and
“the right to self-determination”.
We would therefore have to seek the Mauritians’ agreement on setting up a commission and then propose to that commission that it does something to evaluate the recognition and protection of Chagossian rights, which would include the right of return and to self-determination. However, this amendment, if we were to accept it, contains absolutely no requirement for the House to support a referendum. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that this convoluted chain of events would lead to such a recommendation.
The final sentence of the amendment reads:
“If the Commission described in subsection (1) is established, within five years of the commencement of the Treaty”,
et cetera. The commission is not envisioned to even get going for several years, and the amendment is probably realistic to recognise this. I am looking forward to a serious Liberal amendment, or their support for serious amendments from me and my noble friend that would require a referendum. I give way to the noble Lord, now that he knows more about what his amendment says.
I first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for intervening when he was moving his amendment. I am flattered by being so courted by the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Lilley. Historians will be aware that the Rough Wooing was not entirely successful in my Border area. I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that I am sure he will be able to clarify. He is aware that the House of Commons voted on Amendment 9 for a referendum. Tabled by my colleagues, it would have required the Government to seek to
“undertake negotiations with Mauritius on a Chagossian right of return and on a referendum”
for Chagossians on self-determination. Parliament has voted on this already. The Division was 319 votes against and 83 in favour. The Conservatives did not support it. Why?
I am afraid I cannot tell the noble Lord that. I read the debate and it was not clear that there was much focus on the Liberal amendment. He has read out part of it; it covered lots of other things and they probably thought it was a bit wishy-washy.
I do not think that is quite acceptable. Amendment 9 was voted on, and it included everything that the noble Lord asked of me. Why did the Conservatives not support it?
I do not know. I am not an official representative of the Conservative Party. I am flattered that the noble Lord thinks I control the Conservative Party in the Commons and in this place. I do not do either. I have not had any ministerial role since about 2000. I may give the impression of having power and influence beyond that which I really do, and I am flattered that he should think so.
I would like to see the Liberal Democrats support us. We know that, if they do, we will win, but they seem unlikely to do so. It is clear that they have done a deal with the Government. They will never defeat the Government on issues of substance because, if they do, they will not get as many peerages as they want next time. Let us be quite clear about this. It is as shoddy as that underneath this, I suspect. I hope I am wrong—I may well be. I often am.
It would be a wonderful thing, and we may be able to achieve something for the Chagossians in the shape of getting an amendment on Report—not now, because we are in Committee—which has the support of a majority in this House. If we carry it out, the odds are that the Chagossian people will declare that they do not want to be incorporated in Mauritius and would prefer to remain citizens of the British Indian Ocean Territory and British subjects. In that case, we should honour and support their decision when it is taken. I look forward to a Damascene conversion by the Liberal party to this amendment.
(2 weeks, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the powerful speech by my noble friend Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee. I am tempted just to say “ditto” and sit down, but that is not the practice in this place, so I will focus on some aspects that differ from the focus that she gave. The importance she attached to the Chagossians enables me to be a bit briefer than I would otherwise have been.
I want to return to a powerful assertion that was made the first time this House considered a Statement on this subject, which was diluted a bit today in the defence put forward by the noble Minister. The original Statement by the Defence Secretary said
“without this deal—within weeks we could face losing legal rulings, and within just a few years the base would become inoperable”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]
What is the likelihood of us facing a legally binding ruling? If so, I ask the Minister, from which court is it likely to come?
First, as even the Foreign Office recognises, the opinion of the International Court of Justice was purely advisory, not binding. Secondly, it was based on UN General Assembly resolutions. Such resolutions are not legally binding, especially as they have not been endorsed by the Security Council. Thirdly, when the UK signed up to the International Court of Justice, our declaration specifically said that the Government of the UK excluded the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on
“any dispute with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”,
as is Mauritius. Hence, the opinion of the ICJ was triply non-binding, and no future ruling of the ICJ on this dispute could be binding on us.
Ministers never mention these facts; either they are unaware of them, or they do not want us to know. Instead, they segue on to discussing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, as the noble Baroness did today, since that also has a tribunal. However, Article 298 of that treaty provides that states may “at any time” exclude “disputes concerning military activities”. Therefore, it is hard to see how the UNCLOS tribunal could reach a binding ruling which would impede our use of the base, still less do so in ways that the Defence Minister originally spelled out when he said:
“Rulings against us would mean we could not prevent hostile nations from setting up installations … on the outer islands … we could not guarantee the safe berth of our subs, patrol the waters around the base, control the airspace directly above or protect the integrity of our communications systems”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]
All that seems impossible to come from a tribunal which excludes, or where we can exclude, military matters.
These are not the only issues which the Government refuse to address. They never mention—even the Explanatory Memorandum on the agreement ignores it—the Pelindaba treaty, to which Mauritius is a signatory. It is signed by all countries counted as in the African region—and Mauritius is one—making Africa a nuclear-free zone. The treaty allows no reservations, at the time or subsequently, so it will apply to Diego Garcia, and it cannot be overridden by our treaty unless Mauritius resiles from the Pelindaba treaty. Do the Americans accept that that will mean that no nuclear weapons-carrying vessels or planes can use the base?
The agreement with Mauritius purportedly relates to completing the decolonisation of Mauritius. There are two relevant principles that have a bearing on the process of decolonisation. The first is the right to self-determination, and the second is the principle of territorial integrity. This agreement elevates the principle of territorial integrity above that of the right to self-determination.
It is bizarre that boundaries laid, and former administrative arrangements imposed on an area, by the colonial power should be treated as so sacrosanct, whereas the rights of the people who were displaced—many of whom would like to return or have the right to return—are to be ignored. It is even more bizarre given, as my noble friend Lord Callanan pointed out, the promise in the Labour Party manifesto that it would support the sovereignty, integrity and right to self-determination of peoples in the British Overseas Territories. I wait in the summing up to hear how the Government reconcile their promise made to the British people, and to the peoples of those territories, with what they are doing today.
Why are the Government ploughing ahead? Of course, they refer to the fact that negotiations began under the previous Government, although they were paused by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. At the time they were paused, I found myself discussing this with a Foreign Office official, who I heard mention the agreement. I said, “Isn’t it good that these negotiations have been paused?” He obviously did not approve of the negotiations. He said, “Oh, it’ll make no difference; they’ll continue. It is the settled policy of the Foreign Office, whichever Government are in power, that we shall continue with this process to give away the sovereignty of them”.
All the legal considerations that the noble Lord has outlined to the House, including those in the latter part of his remarks, pre-date November 2022, when the previous Government started negotiations to cede sovereignty. They took all his remarks into consideration, so why did they start negotiations to cede sovereignty?
The noble Lord is making a party-political point, as the Lib Dems always do. I am accepting that both parties are allowing themselves to be driven by the settled policy of the Foreign Office. We have to recognise that.
Whenever it started, the settled policy of the Foreign Office will probably continue for another 22 years. Anyone who has been a Minister knows that every department has a settled policy that continues unless Ministers come along and determine to overthrow it.
Earlier in 2022, the then Government’s view was that there would be no change to the sovereignty of Chagos. That was a Statement given to Parliament in early 2022. The policy changed under Liz Truss as Prime Minister and James Cleverly as Foreign Secretary to start negotiations to cede sovereignty. If there had been a settled will, it had been the one before the Government changed policy. It was the noble Lord’s Government who changed the policy.
Of course it was, but they allowed it to be changed from pressure from the Foreign Office. We can go into the archaeology of when this surfaced in the form of government policy and when it was internal, but I have no doubt that it was. Whenever I have spoken to Foreign Office officials, they have acknowledged that we are not bound by rulings of the court, nor are we likely to be, and nor are we bound by the obligations of any treaty, but they argue that Britain must none the less abide by even non-binding advisory opinions, since if we do not, how can we tell other countries that they must abide by international law? That is precisely the argument that was forwarded just now by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay.
It is touching that our diplomats believe that countries that might otherwise flout international obligations and rulings will change their ways and become law-abiding if they see us obeying rulings that we do not have to abide by and being purer than pure. I believe that the policy of the Foreign Office, and, above all, the policy of elected officials in charge of the Foreign Office, should be to pursue British interests and not to set about setting examples to other countries and virtue signalling. That is what this is doing, and it is weak for that reason. I hope that the House will in the weeks to come persuade the Government to abandon it.