National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Polak Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza.

I was not entirely persuaded that this Bill was strictly necessary. I remind the House that Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese Government, and for many years that fact was cited as a reason not to proscribe the organisation in its entirety. Yet in 2019, Hezbollah was fully proscribed without the need for new primary legislation. However, I accept that the threats posed by hostile threats and their proxies are real, and for that reason I support the Bill.

For years, hostile states have sought to undermine our democracy and intimidate and threaten communities within the United Kingdom. The Jewish community has lived with this reality for decades. Synagogues, schools and community centres have required extraordinary levels of security. Families have become accustomed to armed protection outside places of worship. My own grandchildren are growing up believing that security barriers and guards are simply part of Jewish life in Britain. That is not normal, nor should it ever be accepted as normal. Allow me to thank the police, the security services, the CST and Shomrim, which have protected and protect the community—but they should all be doing other things.

The Iranian regime has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use intimidation, proxies, surveillance and violence against those it regards as its enemies. It has exported instability, extremism and fear far beyond its borders. These threats are real, persistent and increasingly visible on our streets. The fact that many of these threats have been directed at the Jewish community and members of the Iranian community should never have led us to regard them as matters affecting only one particular group. The principle at stake is far broader. A hostile state willing to target one group of British citizens is a hostile state willing to challenge the security of our country as a whole. When it seeks to spread fear within our communities, it is attacking the fabric of our society, and that is why I welcome the Bill.

As the Minister said, because the legislation is so important, it is equally important that we get it right. The Iranian regime has consistently demonstrated an ability to adapt its methods, operate through proxies, exploit legal ambiguities and maintain plausible deniability. The challenge we face is, therefore, not simply one of identifying a hostile state but of ensuring that our legislative response is capable of addressing the full range of methods through which that state seeks to advance its interests. For that reason, I am concerned that there are areas in the Bill that do not go far enough.

As drafted, there appears to be a higher threshold for prosecution of designated state threat than exists under terrorism legislation. There are also legitimate questions about whether activities planned in the United Kingdom but carried out overseas would always be captured by the offences contained in the Bill. Likewise, as hostile states increasingly rely on propaganda, online influence and indirect encouragement, we must ensure that those who act in furtherance of a hostile state’s objectives cannot escape accountability simply because they were inspired rather than directly tasked.

Iran’s activities are not confined to formal state actors or uniformed operatives. They encompass proxies, criminal networks, online radicalisation, covert influence and individuals recruited or encouraged to act at arm’s length from the regime itself. If our legislation does not truly reflect that reality, we risk creating opportunities for hostile actors to exploit the very gaps we are trying to close.

Nor should we view these issues solely through the lens of Iran. The purpose of the Bill is not merely to respond to one hostile state, however pressing that may be; it is to establish a framework capable of protecting the United Kingdom from future hostile states whose methods may differ, evolve and become more sophisticated over time. As others have said, legislation that is drafted too narrowly may address today’s threats while leaving us exposed to tomorrow’s.

In that regard, I pay tribute to the work of the honourable Member for Rutland and Stamford, Alicia Kearns MP, who tabled a number of constructive amendments in the other place. I would be grateful if the Minister could address just two of them. Following on from the words of my noble friend Lord Davies, on the question of uniforms, insignia and propaganda, if a state-backed organisation such as the IRGC were to be designated under this regime, why would it not be an offence to display its insignia on Britain’s streets and to glorify it online, mirroring the provisions in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000? If we recognise that such organisations seek not only to operate abroad but to cultivate support networks here at home, we must address the propaganda that sustains them.

Secondly, on travel document seizure powers, Jonathan Hall KC supported in his review the case for allowing the police to seize the passports and other travel documents of those who are suspected of assisting designated organisations. If the Government accept the threat posed by individuals facilitating or supporting hostile state activity, why will they not provide the police with these powers now? Why defer such an important safeguard to future legislation when the opportunity exists now? There is always a temptation to prioritise speed over scrutiny when confronted with an urgent threat—although we have been calling this matter “urgent” for many years—but the effectiveness of the Bill will be judged not by how quickly it passes through Parliament but by whether it gives our security services and law enforcement the tools needed to confront the threats that exist.

If there are areas where the Bill can be strengthened, we should strengthen it. If there are provisions that fall short of the standards Parliament has previously deemed necessary in the fields of counterterrorism and national security, we should examine them carefully. If amendments are needed to ensure that hostile state activity is met with the full force of law, we should not hesitate to make them. I suggest that the choice before us is not whether to support or scrutinise the Bill. We must now do both. For that reason, I support the Bill and look forward to ensuring that it emerges from this House stronger than it arrived.