Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Patel Excerpts(12 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Newton of Braintree
My Lords, I wonder if I might come in on the side of the “sympathy but” brigade, which makes me a member of the same club as all those who have spoken before me. I have a lot of sympathy with the purpose of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Emerton, but I worry about the rigidity of their terms in relation to specifying ratios and a maximum number of people that any nurse can deal with. It seems to me that this is a prescription for a degree of inflexibility that could end up closing wards for reasons that would not be sensible.
I am scarred by something that happened at Birmingham Children’s Hospital in my period as Minister for Health; it arose from a shortage of paediatric intensive care nurses. I do not know whether they are still in short supply but that is the kind of problem that would be exaggerated by this kind of rigidity. Nevertheless, the basic thrust of the amendment must be right.
There is only one other point I really want to make. As I understand it, my noble friend is likely to say that this is not something for the health Commissioning Board, but for the Care Quality Commission. I do not accept that. The Care Quality Commission will be doing snapshots, perhaps a bit more vigorously than it has done in the past, sometimes unannounced and so forth, but nevertheless more often than not there will be a snapshot of the situation at a particular time. I cannot see that the Commissioning Board can commission services without specifying something about the standard at which it expects that service to be provided, and that is relevant to this question of staffing levels in a general sense. So while I believe that it would be wrong to say this is all a matter for the Care Quality Commission, equally I do not believe it would be right to be as rigid as some parts of the amendments are at present.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I have my name to this amendment and I support it. I agree with all the comments that the noble Baroness, Lady Emerton, has made. I have only two brief comments. One is based on the evidence and the strength of that evidence. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, mentioned California, which passed a law based on the evidence. So what is the strength of this evidence? I have looked at the literature, particularly at meta-analysis of all the literature that is produced relating to staffing levels and patient outcomes, including mortality. Meta-analysis involves looking at all the published literature and its methodology, and only those publications with a methodology that is felt to be good are included in the meta-analysis. The meta-analysis clearly shows that if you look at mortality, infection rates, response to arrest and serious episodes, the staffing ratios of registered, trained nurses to patients—I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, that training is important—are important in delivering good outcomes.
The second issue is related to whose responsibility it might be to produce the guidance. If it is not the national Commissioning Board, then it ought to be the commissioners of services—the commissioning groups—that should be asked to consider the staffing ratios of each and every department in the provider’s unit before making contracts with them.
Baroness Pitkeathley
My Lords, we shall have extensive debates about regulation at a later stage of the Bill, but it is important to remind the Committee that the ability to regulate healthcare assistants and quality assure them already exists for employers without the need for further statutory regulation. Perhaps in my role as chair of the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence it might be convenient for the Committee and perhaps save the Minister a little time if I respond to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Alderdice and Lord Walton of Detchant.
The Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence, in its new guise as the Professional Standards Authority, will be given the role of quality-assuring voluntary registers. Talks with psychotherapists are already under way and are going very well. The General Social Care Council is going to become part of the HPC, which will in turn change its name and be overseen by what will then become the Professional Standards Authority. That is just for the clarification of the Committee.
Baroness Murphy
I do not disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Warner. It is absolutely true that there is a balance and that size is important. Nevertheless, at the moment we are going back to a size that is approximately the same as the old district health authorities that we had between 1983 and 1992. They survived for quite a long time—
Baroness Murphy
I agree; they were too small. However, if you want to get that balance and that advantage of the clinical commissioning, it seems that, with a different sort of central support, it would be possible. With some local responses and reconfiguring of commissioning groups and the old PCTs, it can work. I do not feel quite as depressed about the clinical commissioning groups as other people.
Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Patel Excerpts(12 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Alderdice
My Lords, I addressed one specific proposal, not the whole world and the whole conduct of the Bill. I addressed one specific proposal, and the noble Lord comes back and tells me, “Has a patient no right to express a view?”. Of course the patient has a right to express a view. There will be public consultation. That is not the issue. The issue is that the noble Lord produced a specific proposal. One of my colleagues found it novel and interesting. I find it novel, but I am not at all persuaded that it has been well thought through, and I am interested that the noble Lord jumped so immediately to defend not the proposal but his posture.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I thought that I might get up to say one sentence to stop this conversation from going further. My name is on several amendments, particularly those proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, about competency. I have a simple question, which I am sure the Minister will be able to answer easily. What competencies do the commissioners have to demonstrate before they are authorised to become commissioners? I know that there will be guidance, but what competencies will be looked at that demonstrate that they can be commissioners? I am being very brief today because of being chastised for talking too long; but now I have evidence that suggests that I was not the worst, so I will carry on another time.
Lord Greaves
My Lords, I want to say one or two things about the consultation and go back to what I was saying before dinner. The question of patients is a bit of a red herring. To that extent, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, was asking to be tripped up over it. Everybody is a patient to some extent, but the important thing is that the residents of an area, or citizens—whatever they are called nowadays—should know what is going on and that there should be an opportunity for a public debate to take place in the normal places—local newspapers, local radio, public meetings—about the future, structure and organisation of the health services in their area.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was absolutely right when he said that there is a huge amount going on at the moment. It is not going on in complete secrecy; people involved in it know what is happening and are telling other people, and people in local authorities and others are having some discussions. However, by and large, there is not a proper process for providing people with open and full—or even partial—information about the proposals that are taking place. I do not think that it is a question of patients being able to tell their doctors which CCG they want to be part of, because the CCGs will be area-based, as we all know, and the doctors will be part of the CCG in their area. The questions are: what area is that going to cover, where is the CCG going to be, and how is it going to fit in to the health service? That is a fundamental question. So to that extent the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is absolutely right. I think that the question of patients is a red herring.
Whenever I go to see my doctor, I consult him about what is happening in the health service, he consults me about that and all sorts of other things, and occasionally we get around to talking about my health; but I do not suppose that I am a very typical patient. That is a fact of life. However, it is a fundamental problem, and the source of a huge amount of the mistrust about what is going on at the moment is that people simply cannot find out what is going on. That is not in the amendments to this Bill. The Minister and his colleagues simply need to tell the health service to be a lot more open and transparent about what is going on and allow local debate on it.
Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Patel Excerpts(12 years, 12 months ago)
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Lord Newton of Braintree
As this is Committee stage, I hope my noble friends will forgive me if I play Oliver Twist and seek a small second bite. I promise to be brief and make only three points. The first picks up on maternity and the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, about consultants versus patients, if I may put it that way. I remember, in the far-off days when I used to sign 18th birthday cards to prospective or actual constituents, noticing a remarkable bunching. If you checked back 18 years you would find a correlation with Fridays and particularly the period in the run-up to a bank holiday. Secondly, nobody else has followed up the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, about specialist nurses. I have an interest to declare here as—there are probably other things as well—president of the Braintree Parkinson’s Disease Society and the Braintree Multiple Sclerosis Society. The importance of specialist nurses in some of these areas is both extremely great and underestimated. I hope that we will therefore not lose sight of the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, in her amendment, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton.
Thirdly, to assure the noble Lord, Lord Walton—who I thought was at one stage going to accuse me of being a wimp for not pressing this to a vote—I do not rule out returning to the matter on Report, unless the Minister is really nice to me.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I shall speak to several amendments to which I have put my name, but I shall start with the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, to which I have also put my name. The noble Baroness is well placed to talk about maternity services. She has championed their cause, particularly regarding choice, for nearly two decades. It is she who should be credited for getting us to where we are now, whereby choice of where to have their babies is available to all would-be mothers.
The noble Baroness covered most points, and I support them all. The one on which I should like to expand relates to maternity networks. It appears that both the Prime Minister and the Department of Health have accepted that maternity networks are the way to improve maternity services, and I agree. Maternity networks have the potential to increase clinician involvement and service-user engagement in the planning, delivery and, where necessary, reorganisation of services. They also have the advantage of being able to scrutinise the performance and outcomes of all maternity providers within the network, thereby helping to drive up standards and reduce unwarranted variations in outcomes. This will help to develop shared services across the network. Thus a home birth service provided by a modern maternity unit could be made available to maternity units in areas where the home birth rate is very low.
I know that a current review of clinical networks is being undertaken for the Commissioning Board, and is due to report soon. Perhaps the noble Earl can tell us more about it. I hope that the review recommends that maternity networks be established to cover all maternity services in England. The concern is that if providers are expected to self-fund networks, there is a risk that some providers, especially foundation trusts, will not engage in networks, thereby reducing their effectiveness. For this reason, I hope that the Government will accept the case for providing some funding and support for maternity networks in the same way as neonatal networks and cancer networks have been able to access central funding and support.
One other issue that will improve the quality of maternity services, no matter where that care is delivered, is the establishment of maternity dashboards. They are a good way of auditing the outcomes on a daily basis and establishing whether the clinical guidelines have been achieved. I therefore strongly support the noble Baroness’s amendment.
The amendment in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Newton of Braintree and Lord Butler of Brockwell, is saying “comply or explain”, whereby if you do not comply with NICE guidelines you must explain why. I agree. Not all standards should be complied with, because there may be reasons why they are not. If you do not comply, you have to explain why. However, you also have to explain why the outcome for patients will be the same or better, because if the outcomes through not complying are not the same or better, you should not be allowed to fail to comply.
I understand that there might be good reasons why certain NHS bodies do not comply. Another way could be the establishment of an alternative compliance system in which organisations and clinicians are required to justify why they have not complied with the standards or, for that matter, innovations that will aid delivery of the best clinical practice. The Commissioning Board, in conjunction with senates and by way of patient pathways, could develop a compliance regime that measures, monitors and incentivises the use of innovation or compliance where these will improve standards of care. So I support the proposal, and I know that we might return later to the issue that my noble friend Lord Walton raised about innovation, tariffs and the innovation tariff. That is the other side of the coin regarding non-compliance and going beyond the standard of care laid down by NICE.
Lord Patel
My Lords, the amendments in my name are about patient and public involvement, and accountability to patients and the public. They would amend new Sections 13H, “Duty to promote involvement of each patient”; 13I, “Duty as to patient choice”; and 13J, “Duty to obtain appropriate advice” by the Commissioning Board, in the 2006 Act. I shall also speak to Amendments 141A and 206A. The latter is in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, who unfortunately had to leave for another engagement but will return later.
All these amendments are about the requirement for the NHS Commissioning Board and all clinical commissioning groups to engage in meaningful and substantial consultation with users of services, particularly with regard to ensuring that commissioners commission services and pathways that are navigable and coherent.
The current requirement to be placed on the board and the clinical commissioning groups is that they must make arrangements to secure that individuals to whom the services are being provided are involved. It is not enough for the suggested means of doing this to be quite as open-ended as the Bill suggests. The Bill implies that this consultation is really aimed at representatives of patient groups, and I would like clarification from the Minister that both individuals and groups of patients should be able to make representation. It is quite easy to conceive of a situation in which a patient is consulted or provided with information and yet is none the wiser and no more involved in the services that they receive.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 127B and 197B. As they relate to pharmacy, I declare an interest as the chairman of the Council of the School of Pharmacy, University of London. The intention of these amendments is to ensure that all relevant healthcare providers, including community pharmacists, are consulted when the NHS Commissioning Board and commissioning groups are discharging their functions and developing their business and communications plans. The essence of these amendments is to retain the long-standing arrangement whereby, under the 2006 Act, commissioning bodies have to consult widely and in good time with all relevant stakeholders, including local service providers or their representatives.
Under the current system, primary care trusts are required to consult widely in relation to their commissioning duties. There is concern in the pharmacy profession that the current provisions under Clause 20, new Section 13J, for the board, and Clause 23, new Section 14V, for clinical commissioning groups, to obtain appropriate advice are too vague. It is important that consultation with all local healthcare providers should be done via local representative bodies as well as directly with providers. Clinical commissioning groups should consult pharmacy professionals when making decisions in relation to the commissioning of relevant services in order that the professional skills, knowledge and expertise of pharmacists are used in planning, commissioning, delivering and evaluating NHS services. They should also demonstrate arrangements systematically to seek the views of all appropriate local clinical groups throughout the commissioning process, in general and for particular services. This would include ensuring that all local representative committees are fully engaged in the commissioning process and signed up to the outcomes agreed.
As part of their local leadership role, clinical commissioning groups also need open and transparent processes for reconciling different professional perspectives and contingency arrangements for seeking the agreement of non-GP professional groups in the case of urgent service change. These processes should be clearly set out as part of the CCG’s governance procedures for commissioning decision-making. The above will be of particular importance in the immediate term, given the influx of new commissioners into the market, to ensure commissioners commission services effectively. Without relevant healthcare providers being consulted, the different contributions that such providers, including pharmacy, can make to local healthcare could be lost.
If used effectively, pharmacy has the potential to deliver a great deal more both to patients and commissioners. For example, it is estimated that some 57 million GP consultations each year involve minor ailments which could be dealt with at a pharmacy. If these patients could be moved to a pharmacy, more than £812 million could be saved annually, and GP capacity could be freed up to deal with more complex cases.
In summary, it is critical that there is a duty on commissioning groups, when developing their commissioning plans, to consult primary care providers such as pharmacists as there is a danger under the proposed legislation that some groups may not do so, leading to ineffective commissioning of services. At the Royal Pharmaceutical Society Conference in September, the Minister said that pharmacists are pivotal to every aspect of the Government’s plans to modernise the NHS. I find those words very encouraging and hope that he can give further encouragement in the course of this debate.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, on patients holding their own records. Speaking from personal experience, I know that it was not uncommon in maternity services years and years ago for patients to be given their old, shared maternity card. The difference was that that card was extra to the actual notes, so what doctors and midwives wrote in those cards was probably an abbreviation.
For 25 years of my life, I allowed patients to carry their complete set of records, thus avoiding having to write another card. That meant that what you wrote and what you told the patient had to be precise, and clear thought had to be given to the purpose of writing it down. It also taught people not to use abbreviations that do not mean anything, or that might be misconstrued. It is not uncommon for doctors to use abbreviations such as SOB or NAD. They do not mean what you think they might mean. SOB stands for “Shortness of breath”, and NAD stands for “No abnormality discovered”. This also meant that when you were putting the results of diagnostic tests into the notes you were forced to explain to the patient what those results meant. If the results were ambiguous, then you had to explain to the patient what that ambiguity was. That improved the quality of record keeping, communication with the patient and the quality of care given to the patient. In 25 years of allowing thousands of my patients to carry their own notes—and some of the noble Lords sitting today are well aware of my habits—I lost only two notes. One was eaten by a dog in the patient’s house and the other was torn up after being left by the mother-to-be on a bus. Apart from that, there was no loss of notes, while in hospitals usually you can hardly find any notes.
There is a double issue here. How do we make notes that are compatible—easy to write and yet which communicate with the patient. An electronic version is better, but even a hand-written version works. I am convinced that allowing patients to carry notes is not a problem.
Earl Howe
I am. The intention is that no clinical commissioning group will be authorised in the first instance unless it can demonstrate to the board that it can fulfil the legal duties that the Bill places on it. That is key to our thinking. Indeed, as time goes on, it will be under a continuous duty to show it is abiding by those duties. In the first instance, it is very important that clinical commissioning groups demonstrate they are fit for purpose in that sense.
I also appreciate the concern to ensure that the board and CCGs benefit from as wide a range of advice as possible. The Government have been clear that everyone with a role to play in securing the best possible services for local people should be able to do so. The definition used in the duties to obtain advice is that used to define the comprehensive health service. It would encompass the areas covered by Amendment 127C. Indeed, I do not think it would be possible to cast it in broader terms. These duties will apply to every function the board or a clinical commissioning group will exercise. Again, within those broad parameters it is important to retain some discretion for the board and CCGs to determine how best to exercise this duty.
The board and CCGs will certainly have to work closely and effectively with all the providers with which they contract as Amendments 127B and 197B suggest. I would say to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones that that most certainly would include pharmacists. I also agree as to the expertise and the unique perspective that patients and their representative bodies can bring not just to the commissioning process but also to the way the board and clinical commissioning groups approach many of their functions. The same would apply to many other groups, including academic institutions, as the noble Lords, Lord Kakkar and Lord Walton, have highlighted.
The noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, spoke powerfully in favour of academic health partnerships. Academic health science centres have been successful at developing these partnerships within their local areas but understandably have been less successful in spreading innovation across the NHS. As the noble Lord set out, the NHS chief executive’s innovation review is due to be published next month. That will set out how we can accelerate the adoption and diffusion of innovations across the NHS. It will include a mix of bottom-up, horizontal and top-down incentives and pressures that will drive adoption and diffusion of innovation and behaviour change. The role of academic health partnerships may or may not feature in this review. I hope the noble Lord will forgive me if I do not at this stage anticipate or pre-empt what the report will say by elaborating any further. However, I counsel noble Lords to play close attention to what the noble Lord said in his speech.
While these duties refer to obtaining advice from people with expertise in relation to the health service, that is not confined to clinical expertise. Indeed, in fulfilling these duties we envisage a role for clinical senates, as we have already discussed, in providing not just clinical advice but multidisciplinary advice from professionals in health, public health and social care backgrounds alongside patient and public representation and other groups as appropriate.
I am sure we all share a desire that these duties are effective. However, I am not convinced that imposing specific duties as to where the advice should come from, including through the membership of governing bodies, or how the advice should be acted on is the right way to proceed. If we become too prescriptive we risk overburdening CCGs with so many duties and obligations that they could never be sure whether they were doing enough and in reality we must trust them to build these relationships themselves and judge them on the outcomes they achieve.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked me about the secondary-care doctor role on CCGs and whether it had to be somebody from outside the area or retired or whether it could be a local person. We are looking carefully at that question. The secondary-care doctors on CCG governing bodies will not be able to have a conflict of interest in the decision-making process of the CCGs. That is where the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, was absolutely correct. We will use regulations to set out more detail about this and we will work with stakeholders, including pathfinders, to develop these proposals. The noble Baroness referred to the secondary-care doctor coming from either outside the CCG area or being retired. Those are two ways in which a conflict of interest could be avoided but they are only examples and do not represent an exhaustive list.
I want to finish by returning to a point raised earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Warner. We too are aware of the very good work of National Voices, as well as a range of other organisations, on how patient and public involvement could be strengthened in the Bill. While I have explained why I think these specific amendments are not necessary, I am happy to go on listening. I feel that the Bill is already strong in this area but we are always open to new ideas and I look forward to further discussions on this general topic. It is for those reasons that, while sympathetic to the intention behind the amendments, I am unable to accept them and I hope noble Lords will agree not to press them.
Lord Patel
My Lords, on behalf of all noble Lords who took part in the debate I thank the Minister for his comments. He excited us all by first saying that the only thing he would not be able to accept would be the death penalty. He finished by saying he could not accept most of what we were saying, partly because it was already in the Bill, which most of us did not think was the case. He demonstrates a commitment that patients’ voices and public involvement will be paramount and that all the commissioning boards and commissioners will be expected to demonstrate that they listen to the voices of patients and the public. We will watch and see how they are made accountable.
The Minister referred to innovation. Of course, the next group of amendments focuses on innovation, so we may come back to it and also the involvement of the academic health centres. We have had a good debate and maybe after reading Hansard some of us can decide whether we will come back to some of these issues. In the mean time, reluctantly, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendments 129 and 129A in the group. First, I will take up the point made by my noble friend Lady Thornton about the long-standing problem of the slowness of the NHS to take up innovative ideas, and the frustration often felt by people in this country who have invented new approaches and created new innovations, only to find that they have had to go abroad to get them projected, promoted and sold, with the NHS being one of the last to take up the innovation, which was often funded in one form or another with public money by the British taxpayer. It is a long-standing problem and not a party-political issue; it has been a challenge for successive Governments. One of the most embarrassing moments one has as a Minister is when one meets foreign delegations or travels abroad to back Britain and is asked, “Has this innovation been taken up in the NHS?”, whereupon one has to shuffle one’s feet and think of a suitably weaselly form of words to avoid answering the question directly. It is a very long-standing and difficult issue.
Amendment 129 draws attention to the importance of the procurement of goods and services in the promotion of innovation, and to the duty that that places on the national Commissioning Board. There are many reports about the importance of public procurement in advancing innovation and in ensuring the take-up of UK inventions and innovative practices. The latest one was by the Science and Technology Committee of your Lordships' House, of which I was a member. The report brought out some of the dilemmas around using procurement to take forward innovation. Yet again it cast doubt on central government's use of their purchasing power and muscle to drive the take-up of UK innovations in public services.
The NHS is not alone in having this problem, but it is part of the problem and it is a big part of the public sector. A major and long-standing problem is that too many purchasing decisions are taken too far down the organisational food chain, with too little intervention at senior level and too little willingness to use large-scale purchasing to spread the use of innovative approaches. Whatever else the national Commissioning Board has, it has a lot of financial muscle. It must use that, through the NHS’s purchasing capacity, to drive innovation, which often comes from publicly funded research. I hope that the Minister, who is well aware of the issue, will see the sense in putting something like Amendment 129 in the Bill. We cannot say too often that public procurement is a way of helping to establish and drive innovation in the NHS.
Amendment 129A seeks to add the idea of an innovation fund to the board's armoury on innovation in new Section 13K. There is nothing novel in this. The amendment continues and builds on the proposals of my noble friend Lord Darzi, which led to regional innovation funds that strategic health authorities currently manage. Again, we need to strengthen the mechanisms in the Bill for driving innovation in an NHS that historically has been slow to take up innovations and apply them to scale for the benefit of patients. We are not talking about huge sums of money in the innovation fund, but relatively modest amounts in relation to the scale of NHS expenditure. However, an amendment of this kind would ensure the continuance of the useful work that has been started by the strategic health authorities following the promptings of my noble friend Lord Darzi.
It is typical of what we sometimes do in this country. We start an initiative with a fund at strategic health authority level and then shuffle the cards so that somehow, along the way, some of the initiatives and their benefits get lost. I hope that we can get some reassurance from the Minister that some kind of innovation fund will be available so that we can continue the work that my noble friend Lord Darzi so ably started to ensure that patients can secure the benefits of UK innovations.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I support the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, to which I have added my name.
First, I will speak very briefly about innovation and procurement. I also contributed to the report by the Science and Technology Committee on procurement. The public sector could learn a lot from the private sector about using procurement to drive innovation. Perhaps the Minister can comment on this. The NHS is a huge organisation that uses about £20 billion-worth of procurement a year and if that was done in a co-ordinated way, it could drive an immense amount of innovation within the NHS.
My second point is about how to drive innovation into clinical care. There are lots of examples I could give, but I will give one from my own specialty. It took us 20 years to take the learning from research into the kind of treatment to be given to the mother in premature labour that would considerably reduce the incidence of respiratory distress syndrome, which causes a lot of harm and death in neonates, and embed that into practice. There are lots of examples of such innovations not being embedded into the NHS and we need to look at ways of doing that faster.
My third point is how to use tariffs to drive innovation. If I as a provider will not be given a higher tariff if I drive innovation or innovate a different way of providing the service, and all that will happen is that the tariff for procuring my services as a provider will be less the following year, there is less incentive for me to use innovation in clinical care to improve patient care and also to make it cheaper.
The fourth issue is about an innovation fund, which I support. Together with the Wellcome Trust, the Government have an innovation challenge fund that asks for tenders in particular areas of innovation. The one I know about is in reducing infection rates. Innovation funds of this kind will drive further innovation; for example, in the United States Medicaid and Medicare have a joint innovation fund to drive improvements in healthcare. So I support that amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I rise to speak briefly to Amendment 129ZA, which is really a probing amendment. I hope that the Minister will be able to explain what these “prizes” are that are referred to in the Bill. The Explanatory Notes do not really help. They talk about the Bill providing for,
“the NHS Commissioning Board to make payments as prizes in order to promote innovation in the provision of health services”,
and that:
“Innovation will originate primarily from the actions of commissioners and providers but it is intended that the NHS Commissioning Board will take a lead role in promoting it”.
The changes should bring about continuous improvement and innovation often happens outside the main NHS. Indeed, in my own discipline, end-of-life care, the innovations have happened by and large in the third sector, particularly in care in the last 48 hours of life. In some ways, this is where these organisations, the different hospices and those working with them, have felt freed up to pilot different ways of doing things which have subsequently been adopted within the NHS.
There is a huge need for more health services research and for good, qualitative methodology. My only anxiety about the word “prizes” being in the Bill is not that I do not want innovation to happen—I desperately want innovation to improve services for patients—but that I want to make sure that innovations are also properly evaluated; that they are piloted, evaluated and audited in the long term. It is terribly easy for people to have great flashes of inspiration and great ideas but they might not necessarily roll out appropriately across all aspects of the health service. Many of us have seen innovations that seem to be excellent in one setting but when they are rolled out without adequate support and training, mistakes are made and problems arise.
I had the privilege of chairing the commission into medical generalism, and our report noted the shortfall in both funding in primary care and in researching ways of delivering primary care to common conditions. We welcomed the National School of Primary Care Research and the recognition that more funding was needed, but we urged the MRC and other funders to create a dedicated funding stream for clinical research in primary care as it is difficult to secure funding. I hope the Minister will explain what these “prizes” are and say that they will in no way detract from the much needed research funding to really evaluate innovations and innovative ideas, particularly in primary care.
Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Patel Excerpts(12 years, 12 months ago)
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Lord Patel
“13L1 Duty in respect of education and training
(1) The Board must promote education and training of the health care workforce, having taken note of the responsibilities of the regulatory authorities, academic and professional organisations, and consulted Health Education England.
(2) In exercising its functions, Health Education England must take steps to ensure that providers of health services in England have due regard to any minimum numbers of training placements that it may specify.”
Lord Patel
My Lords, we return yet again to education and training. There is so much anxiety about the issue of education and training and workforce planning that I have had several representations, in particular one from the Royal College of General Practitioners.
Government Amendment 43 places a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that there is an effective system for the planning and delivery of education and training of the healthcare workforce. In order for this to be an effective system, a duty must be placed on the NHS Commissioning Board to promote education and training. This amendment seeks to do exactly that. As the board is nationally accountable for the outcomes achieved in the NHS and is also tasked with providing,
“the support and direction necessary to improve quality and patient outcomes and safeguard the core values of the NHS”,
it is only right that this duty to promote education and training is included as part of the core responsibilities of the NHS Commissioning Board alongside the existing duties in respect of research, variation in the provision of health services, and so on.
We must try to get education and training structures right so that the long-term sustainability of the health service is maintained with patient care continually improving. This must be reflected in the approach taken to commissioning, with the NHS Commissioning Board taking note of the needs identified by regulatory authorities and academic and professional organisations so that plans are in line with national strategies. In carrying out this important role the board should consult Health Education England as it has a vital role in providing sector-wide leadership and oversight of workforce planning, education and training in the NHS.
The second part of my amendment deals explicitly with the role of Health Education England, as it will oversee the current system for providing education and training via a levy set on providers, and aims to make sure that there is adequate capacity in training to meet the needs of the health service. Under the current proposals, healthcare providers are to work together in provider-led networks to manage the planning and commissioning of education and training. However, if there is no specification of the minimum number of placements—the minimum number of trainees that should be provided in each sector—providers, especially those such as alternative or private providers that might work to make profit, with shareholders to answer to and an increasing range of competitors, will have little impetus to provide adequate numbers in the long term. The future of the NHS depends on having sufficient numbers of trainees in all specialties, including general practice, and the training of the next generation of doctors and other healthcare professionals will be put at risk if these plans are not strengthened. Furthermore, with the likely greater specialisation of some providers, and the non-requirement for all providers to provide educational opportunities, there is a risk that the overall quality of postgraduate generalist medical education will be affected due to reduced opportunities to widen the range of disease types and treatments that the students will see.
The policy of any qualified provider, alongside the pressures of the Nicholson challenge, should not be allowed to affect the provision of education and training by providers, whether they are new or old. Health Education England should therefore be tasked with taking steps to set a minimum number of trainee placements for each sector within the health service and to hold providers to account where necessary.
The amendment demonstrates the anxiety felt by a whole range of people in different parts of training and education. I know that the chairman of the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, the medical school deans and the postgraduate deans have recently sent a letter to the Secretary of State expressing their concerns. I hope that it will be possible to get this right with a solution that is acceptable to all sides, including the Government, so that we have in the Bill something which does not affect government policy but demonstrates that the Government are serious about making sure that the education and training of the healthcare workforce will be a priority.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)
My Lords, it may assist the Committee if I indicate at this early point in the debate that the Government are extremely sympathetic to this group of amendments. As noble Lords will know, I have already committed to publishing, prior to Report, a much more detailed set of proposals for health education and training in the light of the forthcoming recommendations of the NHS Future Forum, and I hope that this will prove helpful. However, I can now go further.
These amendments focus on how commissioners in the new system will foster high-quality education and training in the health sector and on the potential role of regulators and Health Education England in supporting the education and training system. The Government have listened carefully and we are persuaded by the intent behind these proposals. I therefore now commit to taking away the amendments, considering them in a constructive spirit and bringing forward our own proposals on Report aimed at addressing the issues raised by the amendments. I hope that the Committee will welcome this undertaking. I am of course willing to meet noble Lords between now and Report to discuss the underlying issues further.
Lord Patel
I am grateful to the Minister for those comments and am greatly encouraged.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I add my thanks for the Minister’s remarks. I look forward to seeing amendments which thread education and training through all parts of the Bill with duties on everybody at every level.
Health: Flu Vaccine Research
Lord Patel Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Earl Howe
My noble friend is extremely well informed. I have not seen the report that she mentioned. The only licensed vaccines currently supplied to the UK are inactivated trivalent influenza vaccines, but it is expected that within the next few years others will become available, including a live attenuated trivalent intranasal vaccine next year. In the future, an adjuvanted vaccine and a quadrivalent vaccine may also become available. The JCVI—the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation—has looked at some of these new vaccines and believes that they present exciting prospects for greater efficacy.
Lord Patel
Does the Minister agree that it is currently the task of the Health Protection Agency to track these infections globally and to do research to make sure that we are prepared if there is a pandemic of a different flu virus? Does he therefore agree that any proposals that lead to the Health Protection Agency—which is recognised worldwide for research and expertise —not being allowed to carry out research as it currently does are flawed?
Earl Howe
My Lords, we are very clear that the Health Protection Agency performs a major public service and we have no intention of disrupting the work that it does, least of all by interfering with its research. As the noble Lord knows, the proposals are to shift the Health Protection Agency into the new, larger government agency, Public Health England. The World Health Organisation is actually the body that monitors the strains of flu worldwide and issues twice-yearly warnings to countries about the strains that are emerging so that countries can prepare for their forthcoming winter flu season.
Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Patel Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, this is one of the most important groups of amendments that we are going to discuss, because, in a sense, it sets the whole relationship between the Secretary of State and the NHS Commissioning Board.
I have considerable sympathy with my noble friend Lord Warner’s Amendment 96, which seeks to avoid the Secretary of State essentially putting in a huge shopping list of demands by limiting the mandate to a maximum of five obligatory and five desirable functions.
I come back to the recent interventions by the Government in the affairs of the National Health Service. The most recent have been around waiting times, both in terms of what happens to patients who have passed the 18-week target and of the activities of some primary care trusts, which, in order to contain their expenditure, have set arbitrary waits for patients even though they are ultimately treated within the 18-week limit. I have said to the Minister that I have no complaint about the intervention of Secretary of State, which I thought was quite proper, but it is very difficult to see how this will happen under the new system. We have yet to receive a satisfactory answer to it. What in the new system will suddenly obviate the need for the Secretary of State to make such interventions?
The question then comes to the mandate. Is it, as my noble friend Lord Warner hopes, a high-level document which will focus on a very limited number of objectives, or will it be a shopping list? The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, expressed it very well as in a sense legitimising “recent ministerial enthusiasms”. We were rather given the lie to this when we debated this matter last week, because the Minister suggested that if there was an issue such as primary care trusts lengthening waiting in order to meet the budget, the mandate could be used to prevent it. Indeed, that is the risk—that the Secretary of State will, quite properly, come under pressure to intervene in the health service. The Bill weakens the legal powers of the Secretary of State to do so. The risk is clearly that the mandate will be used instead, and it would be used retrospectively if it does not satisfy the intervention power. I believe that there is great reservation among noble Lords as to whether the intervention power is sufficient, because there has basically to be a failure by the NHS Commissioning Board to carry out the objective. If it is not sufficient for an intervention to take place during the year, my goodness me the shopping list will grow when the new mandate is written. So, there are some very important issues on which we have yet to receive any answer from the Minister.
There are, however, a number of other important amendments in this group. Perhaps I may ask the Minister to clarify three points. The first point is how long the mandate will last. My assumption, from what Ministers have said and what is in the Bill, is that it will last for a year. The Minister will be aware that the chairman of the NHS Commissioning Board expressed a wish to the Health Select Committee, which was vetting his appointment, that the mandate should last for three years. I wonder if the Minister could clear up that matter for your Lordships.
Will the Minister also clarify the intention behind the provision in proposed new Section 223D(7)(b), on page 27, which allows changes to total capital and revenue resource use after parliamentary general election takes place? I take it that this is simply to allow for a change of Government but I would be grateful if he could spell that out.
However, my substantive amendment, Amendment 100A, is concerned with parliamentary scrutiny. In Clause 20, proposed new Section 13A states:
“Before the start of each financial year, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a document to be known as ‘the mandate’”.
Surely Parliament is entitled to a little more involvement than merely receiving the mandate as a fait accompli. My noble friend Lord Warner has already pushed the Government in their amendment to give Parliament information about any reservations the board may have expressed about meeting the mandate. I would certainly support that in the interests of transparency. There is also, in Amendment 100, reference to the requirement on the Secretary of State to consult the board, HealthWatch England and other persons, with the results of any consultation on the mandate to be published. That too seems reasonable.
However, I wonder if we ought not to go further in terms of parliamentary scrutiny. If we take Ministers at face value—and the Secretary of State has expressed a wish to step back from day-to-day involvement in the National Health Service—it is clear that the mandate assumes special importance. Why is Parliament not being given a proper opportunity to scrutinise the mandate before the Secretary of State finally sets it for the NHS Commissioning Board? If the Secretary of State is really going to tell Members of Parliament in particular that he is not going to intervene in a particular question because he considers that now to be the responsibility of the NHS Commissioning Board, in accordance with the mandate that the Secretary of State has set, then I think that Parliament should be entitled to some involvement in scrutiny of that mandate. My Amendment 100A suggests how that might be done. It is built on the system of scrutiny for national policy statements.
The House will be aware that the Planning Act 2008 introduced a new planning system for applications to build nationally significant infrastructure projects. They cover applications for major energy generation, railways, ports, roads, airports, water and hazardous waste infrastructure. Under this system, national policy on national infrastructure is set out in a series of national policy statements. Under Section 92 of the Planning Act 2008, each proposal for a national policy statement must be laid before Parliament. In so doing, the Secretary of State specifies a relevant period for parliamentary scrutiny.
If during that scrutiny period either House passes a resolution with regard to the proposal, or if a committee of either House makes recommendations regarding the proposal, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a Statement setting out his response to the resolution or recommendations. Following completion of parliamentary scrutiny, the Secretary of State may formally designate the proposal as a national policy statement. The final national policy statement is also laid before Parliament.
In the House of Lords, national policy statements are normally debated in Grand Committee, but that does not restrict the freedom of committees of the House or individual Members to make use of the statutory procedures. In the event of a Motion for resolution being tabled, the usual channels have undertaken to provide time for a debate in the Chamber within the scrutiny period.
When I was energy Minister, I had to bring through four energy policy statements. We had three four-hour debates in Grand Committee. They were very thorough. The Government took note of what took place in those debates. In the end, it is up to the Government to make the statement because it is a matter for the Executive. I do not challenge that the mandate, which I regard as important as a national policy statement, is ultimately for Ministers to make. It is rightfully an Executive responsibility. However, the process that I am suggesting in my Amendment 100A would allow Parliament to have much more involvement in the scrutiny. It would allow Ministers to take account of that and then make their minds up in relation to the mandate.
If the Government are determined to hand over such responsibility to a quango—and I remind the House that in this Bill the National Health Service Commissioning Board is given concurrent powers with the Secretary of State in relation to the crucial responsibility in Clause 1—there has to be a great parliamentary scrutiny of that mandate.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I added my name to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner. They were prompted by the lack of clarity in the nature of the mandate that the Secretary of State will issue to the Commissioning Board. There is also a lack of clarity in how he will consult the public, although the provision does say that the Secretary of State will consult HealthWatch England prior to issuing a mandate. Who else will be able to scrutinise the mandate?
On the basis that the Secretary of State will use the mandate to performance-manage the Commissioning Board, what will be the nature of the mandate that will allow him to do that? Will it have measurable outcomes against which the Secretary of State can performance-manage the Commissioning Board? What happens if the Commissioning Board does not agree with the mandate? How is that dispute settled? Will the financial aspects be a major part of it or will it be better outcomes for patients?
Lord Patel
“(b) Healthwatch England, and”
Lord Patel
My Lords, I apologise to the Minister and to the noble Baroness, Lady Northover. Yesterday afternoon I told them that I was degrouping these amendments to be taken at a later stage of the Committee. That was, however, before I got beaten up later in the day and lost my normal aggression. I had to retable them and I apologise for that. I hope that it is possible to take them today.
I will concentrate mainly on HealthWatch England. The purpose of this amendment is simple—to make both HealthWatch England and local healthwatch organisations independent bodies and, in doing so, to give patients and public a truly independent voice. It does not change the broad thrust of the policy in any way, nor does it have any more resource implications.
In the Government’s list of intentions for HealthWatch England, the Minister recognised the need for it to maintain independence; to set its own work programme; to publish its own annual report to Parliament; and to have independent membership. He also said that regulation would be brought forward by the Secretary of State in relation to this. It would also provide advice directly to the Secretary of State, the NHS Commissioning Board, Monitor and local authorities. At the same time, the list also suggests that HealthWatch England will be able to advise the Care Quality Commission on the views of people who use the service; that it will be a committee of the CQC; and that the CQC will respond in writing to HealthWatch England’s advice.
HealthWatch England’s operating plan, which was discussed by the CQC board, suggests that its main focus will be local; it will be small and strategic; its accounting officer will be the CEO of the CQC; its staff will be employed by the CQC; and service-level agreement on its functions will be put in place. The plan also suggests that HealthWatch England’s committee will be appointed by the CQC; that its chair will be subject to CQC board governance; and that conflicts of interest will be decided by the board. HealthWatch England will publish reports on a “no surprise” basis. This is quite contrary to the suggestion that HealthWatch England should be independent of the CQC. The CQC clearly sees itself having a close relationship with HealthWatch England, with the latter relying on it for significant analytical intelligence and other analytics and data. Joint data collection will not be appropriate for the diverse functions of the two organisations. The relationship between the two has not had a good start either, with LINks and others feeling that they have not been fully consulted by the CQC in developing the plan.
The proposed duties of HealthWatch England are intended to provide local healthwatch organisations with advice and assistance in relation to promoting and supporting the involvement of people in the commissioning, provision and scrutiny of local care services. Under the duties, people will be able to monitor local health and social care services; their views will be obtained on the standard of local services; and information will be gathered on local need for and experiences of care services. Recommendations will be made to commissioners and providers of services about how local care services could or should be improved.
The relationship between HealthWatch England and local healthwatch organisations is important. The Bill establishes HealthWatch England as a statutory committee. Ministers say that the relationship between HealthWatch England and local healthwatch organisations must be an open dialogue so that critical knowledge of the views and experiences of patients and local service users will have a real influence on the delivery of health and social care. The aspiration is that local healthwatch organisations and HealthWatch England will collaborate with local authorities and clinical commissioning groups. However, the Bill does not give local healthwatch organisations any specific role in relation to clinical commissioning groups. They have no direct role in influencing the commissioning arrangements of CCGs in relation to the needs of local people, nor do they have any say in it.
In my view, therefore, HealthWatch England should be established as an independent body outside the CQC; be the guarantor of an independent local community voice; have clear accountability to local healthwatch organisations; and have adequate resourcing—there are concerns that the CQC will not adequately fund HealthWatch England. It should provide an expert team that has the knowledge and experience to build HealthWatch; and support the transition of LINks into healthwatch organisations and the development of local healthwatch’s ability to carry out its five statutory functions. It should provide local healthwatch organisations with support, training, advice, resources and expertise on health and social care policy, legal processes and myriad other issues if local healthwatch is to take off quickly. On the basis of current and previous experiences, I feel that the CQC’s belief that local healthwatch can be built and become operational quickly is misplaced—that is the experience of LINks, too.
HealthWatch England should have a capacity to carry out research that is needed by local healthwatch organisations to support their work. HealthWatch England should support the development of local expertise to gather information and data from all sources—public, patients, complaints and serious incident investigations—so that it has a well developed and informed view of the state of local health and social care services. It should support the development of regional healthwatch organisations so that a powerful regional voice on services and commissioning can be developed. It should provide the capacity to elevate local and regional demands for better health and social care to the NHS Commissioning Board, the Secretary of State, Monitor and the CQC. It should support the co-ordination of major demands for changes to health and social care policy and commissioning, integrating local healthwatch.
It was pointed out to the CQC that a research capability was essential for HealthWatch to function. If a potential service problem is suspected, it is necessary to check how widespread it is. Beyond this, the organisation must be able to carry out original research on consumer needs in order to improve services. No research capability had been placed in the plan that the CQC develops. It appeared in meetings with LINks that the CQC might commission research, but we know from examples that research at a local level is important—staff being the classic example.
Diverse and inclusive healthwatch organisations could substantially increase the power and influence of local people to monitor services more effectively, improve safety, influence commissioning and provide a voice that will be heard in the local, regional and national development of health and care policies. To be effective, HealthWatch, nationally and locally, must be fully independent and democratic. Others with experience have informed me that the dependent relationship that HealthWatch is intended to have in relation to local authorities is deeply flawed. They believe the proposed system will be expensive and difficult to establish. The decision not to ring-fence funding will make these bodies weak and vulnerable.
The way forward is for HealthWatch England to be an independent body helping the local healthwatch organisations, which should also be independent of the local authority. If the Government are serious about what they say—that the Bill is about putting patients and the public at the centre and the slogan, “no decision about me without me”,is what they wish to follow—then the way to create public confidence is to have HealthWatch England as an independent body. I beg to move.
Baroness Wheeler
My Lords, I start by saying that I was not one of the ones who beat up the noble Lord, Lord Patel, over grouping issues, although it was extremely frustrating to have them appear and disappear all the time. Anyway, we now have our list and I am speaking to that.
I am pleased to support the amendments in the group, which have two important aims: first, to ensure that HealthWatch England and local healthwatch organisations are truly involved and consulted where decisions are made about the development and planning of commissioning services and on reconfiguration or changes to services; secondly, to ensure that it is an independent statutory body and not a subcommittee of the Care Quality Commission.
The Government’s far-reaching proposed changes to the NHS, with the emphasis on competition and regulation, make the need for HealthWatch England to be given robust and independent scrutiny powers even more important. Amendment 305 from my noble friend Lord Harris and myself is a probing amendment with the intention of ensuring that HealthWatch England and local healthwatch organisations have the strengthened power and functions they need. It establishes HealthWatch England as an independent body responsible for providing the Secretary of State, the NHS Commissioning Board, the Care Quality Commission, Monitor and local authorities with information and advice on the views, needs and experiences of users of health and social services, and the views of local healthwatch organisations on care standards and how they can be improved.
Under Amendment 305, HealthWatch England is responsible for providing local healthwatch organisations with resources, advice and assistance. The amendments of my noble friend Lord Whitty, Amendments 318C and 318D, set out similar and additional powers and functions for HealthWatch England to those proposed in Amendment 305. We fully support these, which include powers of investigation into complaints and powers to seek disclosure of information from health and social care providers, the NHS Commissioning Board, CQC and others. Important functions also include information, research and representation functions.
The independence of HealthWatch England from the Care Quality Commission is vital if it is to be the national service users watchdog and champion. It must be able to hold regulators in the whole of the health and social care system to account and be the independent guarantor of the rights, duties and independence of local healthwatch organisations. Given the uncertainties still surrounding how Monitor and the CQC will work together, and the current trials and tribulations facing the CQC, how realistic is it to expect the CQC to undertake this role or for HealthWatch England to function properly as a CQC committee?
Does the Minister acknowledge these problems? Will he—or she—consider working with NLAM and other interested stakeholders to produce an alternative model for HealthWatch England that will secure the Government’s stated policy for a powerful and independent system of public involvement in health and social care? To be effective, local healthwatch must be able to scrutinise how consortia and health and well-being boards undertake public engagement and transparency and are ensuing that the public voice is embedded in the care pathway design. They should also be given the right to comment on tenders and commissioning contracts before release.
LINks organisations currently have significant powers to enter and view the premises of all health and social care providers regulated by the CQC—another potential conflict of interest if the CQC relationship is not changed. These powers are often little used by local LINks organisations and we hope that their retention in the Bill and robust guidance to local healthwatch organisations on how they can be applied to the benefit of improved patient care and treatment will lead to these important powers being more frequently used. I would welcome the Minister's endorsement of that.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I am sorry to intervene again on the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. It is probably because we know each other too well that I feel able to interrupt at regular intervals. The examples she has just cited are examples of bodies that are there specifically to advise the organisation concerned. The consumer panels that NICE set up are about advising NICE about particular issues in terms of clinical effectiveness and what patients in that area are concerned about. They are not representing patients more generally and they are certainly not representing patients in terms of the statutory obligations of NICE and where there might be a disagreement about what NICE is doing. They are there to inform. That is the distinction.
Lord Patel
In response to the amount of funding, as I understand it—I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, will correct me if I am wrong—the Bill suggests that the funding for HealthWatch England will be a grant in aid provided by the department to the CQC.
Baroness Jolly
My Lords, they say that too many cooks spoil the broth, but I think this is an occasion where that probably has not happened. Many hands might make light work. I ask the Minister to take these amendments away because there is an awful lot of good to be found in each of them, but not in each together, as it were.
Amendment 318C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, inserts a new clause and subsection (2)(a) of the new clause is about complaints. It is a nice idea that complaints could be taken to HealthWatch England. Complaints are a big issue to which we will be returning on Amendment 108.
The noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, raised the relationship between local and national healthwatches. It is critical. We would support the election of local healthwatch representatives to the national body.
Finally, on independence and finance, I believe very strongly that it is very difficult to criticise and challenge an organisation if you sit within it. I understand the point about the benefits, but if you are local, and you sit within your local health authority or nationally you sit within the CQC, generally the feeling that you are monitoring the organisation that is your host is never a good place to start. Similarly, I, too, have had letters from people who were CHIPs and then LINks about budgets being not just cut a little bit but absolutely hacked away. I would be really uncomfortable if, for example, locally the healthwatch was going to be located within the principal local authority that held the budget. We have had it already today. Intentions will be good and then somebody will come along and say, “We really need a bit more just for this”. It will happen in a meeting where they are not present and, all of a sudden, there will be another slice taken. We have seen it before with lots of other things. You could look at it from a negative point of view and say these are like curate’s eggs and bad in parts or good in parts, but I think too many cooks will not spoil this broth. Many hands will make light work. I ask my noble friend to take this away and have a look at it.
Lord Patel
I did not have in mind the scientific meaning of “research”. This is research of what is going on in individual hospitals. I use the example of Mid Staffordshire, where it was the research following initial incidents that made everybody aware of the extent to which bad practices were going on. That is the kind of research that local healthwatch should be involved in.
Baroness Northover
I take on board what the noble Lord says, and indeed he is absolutely right. There are various ways in which such problems should be picked up, but it is exceedingly important that that happens, and we certainly hope that local healthwatch will be part of that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, talked about engagement with stakeholders. I can assure her that there is ongoing engagement with stakeholders through a HealthWatch advisory group. The National Association of LINks Members and others are members of this group, and there are others. The noble Baroness also asked about the funding for transition. The Government continue to make funding available to LINks— £27 million during the transition—and as part of the HealthWatch development programme we will make £3.2 million available for start-up costs for local healthwatch organisations.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris, asked about conflicts between the CQC and HealthWatch England. We disagree that the Bill does not already provide sufficient safeguards to ensure the independence of HealthWatch England within the CQC. Obviously, in extreme cases, the Secretary of State has the ability to intervene if HealthWatch England is significantly failing. However, both the CQC and HealthWatch England have responsibilities that they must deliver.
The noble Lord also spoke about the relationship between LINks and local authorities, and expressed some concern about that. LINks have been funded by the local authorities and it is right that so too will the local healthwatch. The relationship of local health authorities and LINks overall has been a successful one—although I take the point that he makes—that has encouraged collaborative working between LINk and the local authority. The Government believe that if local healthwatch organisations are to play a full part in their local communities, it is appropriate for them to be accountable to directly elected local bodies that are better able to assess the needs of the local population. It would not be appropriate for them to be funded nationally, but I hear what the noble Lord said.
My noble friend Lady Cumberlege spoke strongly in support of many of these developments from her knowledge of the history of the past few years. She showed how we are trying to build on the experience of previous Governments to take this forward. However, she will not be surprised to know that I have some concerns about some of her amendments. Her Amendments 307A and 308A would prescribe certain aspects of the membership of the HealthWatch England committee. For example, Amendment 307A proposes that:
“The majority of the members of the Healthwatch England committee shall not be members of the Commission”.
The debate that we have just had illustrates why this is important. Certainly, we have sympathy with that point of view. However, we do not think that it should be in the Bill. It is best to put these in regulations, which would enable flexibility. Clearly, rules about the membership and procedure need to be consulted on and that will be taken forward when we engage over those regulations.
I told myself that we would write to the noble Lord, Lord Walton, about his organisation. However, it turns out that I am aware of a number of other organisations that use the name HealthWatch. The Government’s proposals mean that the HealthWatch we envisage will be unique as the champion of the patient and the public voice. I am not sure whether that totally answers the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Walton. Perhaps I had better write to him after all.
My noble friend Lady Jolly flagged up concerns about complaints. Perhaps I may reiterate that HealthWatch England’s role is that of a national champion of the consumer voice. Its purpose will be to bring that voice to the attention of regulators and others. Giving HealthWatch England powers of investigation of complaints could compromise its primary role in that regard. One of the developments introduced by the previous Government was to bring in a statutory framework for an investigation of NHS and adult social care complaints. It remains the Government’s view that complaints are best dealt with in the existing framework and initially at the local level. This provides a better opportunity for local organisations to learn from their mistakes and to improve services as a result. Where resolution is not possible locally a complainant is able to complain further to the Health Service Commissioner, the ombudsman or the local government ombudsman, as appropriate. The ombudsman’s functions of investigation are statutory. Therefore, we see no reason to duplicate. The structure set in place by the previous Government will stay in place and acts in that way.
As ever in this House there is a wide range of experience, particularly perhaps in this instance on what has not worked in the past. It is a great challenge to enlist patients and the public in making sure that standards are driven up. We believe that devolving to the local level with clinicians and patients more in the driving seat should help. I welcome the support of noble Lords who feel that these changes are a move forward, but I hear them when they say that there are areas that still need to be addressed. For that reason, we would certainly like to continue discussions with those who wish to feed in on this issue in order to make it as good as we can: namely, a system that more effectively brings to bear the voice of patients and the public, which has so far proved to be a difficult challenge not only to the previous Government but to Governments before that.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I was hoping that at the end the noble Baroness would be able to say more strongly how the Government intend to take forward today’s debate, but I am afraid that she did not do that, which is a pity. There was strong support for HealthWatch England and local healthwatch to have more independence. Her argument about a synergy between the CQC and HealthWatch England is not absolutely correct. Yes, there is a degree of synergy, but not in all areas, including: commissioning, as mentioned by the Minister; community care, where the CQC is not involved; advice to the Secretary of State on the mandate; and social care as it develops to more home-based care where the CQC will not be involved. HealthWatch England has a much wider remit than the CQC.
I have a rule in life never to oppose anything that the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, says or does and I will not break that rule now. She is always well researched and communicates her research well, but I have to say that her well researched argument supports the Government more and I am surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, did not feel able to accept some of her amendments. None the less, it is a halfway house that would give more independence to HealthWatch England within the CQC. If we are serious about giving HealthWatch England independence, it should be truly independent. It should have its own powerful voice for the public and patients. It should not be answerable to another body that will control it, fund it and employ its members. That is the great weakness.
The outside voice of the people involved in this work is strong. They would like to test their work in an independent way. Previously, they have failed because they have not been given that independence. Let us be serious about giving a strong voice to the public and patients. Let us give them independence and see whether they can stand up to the challenge.
There was a lot of support today but I am willing to continue talking, particularly with the outside organisations, if that commitment can be made by the Government. We will always have an opportunity to come back. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I apologise as I seem to have a series of amendments to this part of the Bill with my name on them. Amendment 103 is the first amendment in this group in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. It brings us to the first of what I suspect will be a number of debates on the complex and difficult issue of a national tariff and the need to use that tariff to ensure the most appropriate forms of care and care pathways for patients.
This is a time for confessions. The current tariff system, which I am afraid I was deeply involved in implementing to scale seven years ago, was designed for a different era when there was considerable financial growth and we were trying to drive acute hospitals to increase capacity to dramatically reduce waiting times for treatment. Those long waiting times, which had been a feature of the NHS for a long period, were the part of the NHS that led to the most complaints being made. They were the issue to which any Government needed to pay attention. The tariff was one of the ways of helping to progress that. The other was, of course, the much maligned targets, which we need not go into at this point.
In some ways, the current tariff has been too successful. It has helped to create overcapacity in in-patient hospital provision and has propped up poor and unsustainable hospital provision in some parts of the country. The current tariff does not promote well co-ordinated, integrated care for people with long-term conditions, which is the bulk of the NHS’s workload, given our demographic profile and some of our lifestyle choices. A significant proportion of services, particularly mental health and community services, are simply not covered by the national tariff and are often still dealt with on the basis of block grants. In 2012-13, the plan is to focus mainly on developing currencies rather than mandatory tariffs. This means that the majority of non-acute services will remain outside the national tariff. What is more worrying is the fact that the continuation of an acute hospital-dominated tariff based on episodes of care without any counterbalance risks these hospital trusts sucking in a disproportionately large amount of our NHS budget, which is shrinking in real terms. This is not a jibe at the Government except to say that they should stop pretending that the NHS can continue with real-terms growth and deliver the Nicholson challenge, as should any political party, including my own.
Tariff-setting is a technically complex business. There are plans to expand it into fields such as mental health where there is no international track record of success in doing that. There are no quick fixes, particularly if there are insufficient people working on a new tariff system. Tariff-setting relies totally on a good understanding of costs, an area where the NHS does not have great strengths, as I think we have just discussed. The current reference cost system has considerable shortcomings and excludes independent sector providers. Most of the rhetoric on price competition is just that—rhetoric—because reliable data to make price competition work effectively within the NHS are usually absent, so we are having a row about something that we probably could not deliver anyway.
The best that this Bill can do is to try to set a direction for future tariff design. The elements of that design should be fourfold. First, it should enable integrated care, not just within the NHS but across the health/social care boundary. This almost certainly means moving away from the tariff based on episodes of care to a year-of-care approach for long-term conditions, or a bundling of the services across care pathways. Secondly, a future tariff system should not be based on average cost, as now, but on best practice for particular conditions. Thirdly, the currencies in a new national tariff should cover the full range of services, not just acute care, which needs to diminish its dominance of the tariff. Fourthly, it should cover unavoidable costs and avoid windfall profits to providers. Unless we start designing a tariff system around those ideas, we will not progress towards a new NHS.
It will take at least three or four years at best to complete a national tariff covering a full range of services. However, I believe that we should set a clear direction of travel for the national Commissioning Board in the Bill. Given the responsibility of commissioners for demand management, it is right that if we are to have a national Commissioning Board it should set the currencies for a new tariff system. That is why Amendment 103 seeks to place the duty on the board to progress this work and to create some momentum by securing annual increments of progress. We can discuss later whether the board should also price the currencies rather than Monitor, but that is a subject for a debate on another day.
In the mean time, I wish to speak in support of Amendment 290 in my name and others in this group of amendments. This amendment would enable whoever is setting the prices in the tariff—currently Monitor in the Bill—to pay incentives to providers to integrate the delivery of health and social care services to individuals. It seems to me that we use the word “integration” without realising that it probably requires someone to do a bit more work than they are doing now to integrate the services, and that has a cost. This should be recognised in setting the tariff for the future so that service providers can be encouraged to take on the difficult job of integration without losing money in doing so. I hope that the Minister will see merit in these amendments and, indeed, others in the group, which move in a similar direction to mine. We need to set the agenda for the board in taking this difficult area of tariff work forward. I beg to move.
Lord Patel
My Lords, my name is added to Amendment 103 and other amendments in the group. Amendment 197E, which is a new amendment relating to commissioning, also stands in my name. Some of the points that I will make are similar to those made by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, but I have a slightly different way of looking at tariffs. I see them more from a clinical or patient care pathway point of view than that of integrating services. It is true that tackling the financial physiology of the NHS is critical to enabling the more influential and focused commissioning of integrated care. The payment by results tariff was designed by the previous Government to support the introduction of choice and competition, and specifically to create incentives for providers to increase elective activity to bring down waiting times for treatment and reward them for work undertaken. As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has just said, that has been a bonanza for some of the acute trusts.
The tariff has played its part in that process with the consequence that access to planned care has improved significantly. Progress in elective care has enabled—or should enable—attention to turn to other priorities, such as providing high-quality care for people with long-term conditions where continuity and co-ordination are key objectives alongside access. This includes shifting unplanned care from secondary to primary care settings, where this will help deliver improvements in efficiency.
As currently designed and operated, payment by results does not appear to be well suited to support the implementation of these priorities, and there is a need to develop incentives that will facilitate integrated care for people with long-term conditions and for other services where this approach is likely to bring benefits. Experience in the United States offers valuable learning in this regard, but it is not the only place, particularly in the development of new forms of payment that go beyond fee for service and case-based reimbursement.
The idea behind episode-based payments—something that my noble friend Lord Warner also referred to—is to remove incentives to deliver increasing volumes of care by bundling together payments for a range of services relating to a particular episode of treatment. One example from the United States is the ProvenCare programme of the Geisinger health system under which a global fee covers the entire cost of cardiac care from pre-admission and surgery to follow-up for up to 90 days after surgery. Episode-based payments are designed in part to improve the quality of care by placing the responsibility on providers for avoiding and correcting errors. You do not get paid if you make a mistake and it takes the patient longer to recover. This encourages care to be done right the first time, and hence offers a more co-ordinated and positive experience for patients.
Capitation payments on the other hand go much further than episode-based payments in potentially covering all the costs of care for a defined population over a certain time period—a year, for example. Integrated healthcare systems such as Kaiser Permanente in California have pioneered the use of capitation funding—or pre-paid group practice as it was originally known—as a way of creating incentives to support prevention and primary care and to avoid the inappropriate use of specialist care. Kaiser Permanente sees acute care as a cost centre, but it sees community care and primary care, particularly for long-term conditions, as where the costs should be maintained and the quality driven. It monitors the performance of the providers of that care more intensively on a one-to-one basis than it does for acute care.
Although capitation funding has a long history, there has been renewed interest in it. In the NHS, various options could be pursued. These include combining payments to cover an episode of care or a care pathway, taking forward the idea of the year of care that has been tested in three national pilots for diabetes—I say this to the noble Baroness, Lady Young—and exploring how it might support integrated care; contracting with local clinical networks of primary and secondary care clinicians or foundation trusts to deliver integrated care for a specific population—some of the foundation trusts are experimenting with this and are quite innovative; and, lastly, accelerating work on personal health budgets to enable patients to commission care packages for themselves, with support from carers and families.
In practice, it is likely that all these options, and others, will have to play a part, and a period of active experimentation and evaluation is now needed to work through the consequences. All healthcare systems use a mix of payment systems related to the service that is provided, such as episodic or long-term, and where care is provided, such as primary or secondary care. The NHS is no exception and attention is needed for the way in which financial incentives can be developed to support integrated care where it will bring benefits to patients. The prospect of four years in which the NHS budget will only increase in line with inflation underlines the urgency associated with this work and the need to focus on improving the quality of care and not simply incentivising extra activity at a time when resources are not available to do this. As my noble friend Lord Warner said, it will require tariff flexibility, even tariff bonuses for providing care quicker and of a higher quality. What is needed is system leadership and innovation, which we expect the NHS Commission to deliver boldly, in tariffs for integrated care, with the explicit promotion of systems of integrated care.
Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Patel Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Baroness Williams of Crosby
My Lords, one of the most interesting aspects of the proposals in this Bill is the greater status to be given to public health. I think we all recognise that for some years public health has been something of a Cinderella in the medical establishment. To have public health lifted, as it should be, on to board representation seems to me absolutely central in our attempt to put greater accent on prevention, education and information; there are future amendments by some of my noble friends on some of those issues. I wish to say very briefly that I think that this amendment is absolutely right. It is crucial that public health recognition is given at board level, and I hope we can echo that in having it also represented in the clinical commissioning groups as they emerge.
One other question to raise in relation to public health, which we have been considering very carefully, is how we deal with chronic illness. Chronic illness is obviously not unrelated to lifestyles and life behaviour, so here again, raising the influence of public health in the attempt to bring about a healthier lifestyle among our fellow citizens and ourselves is absolutely essential. I therefore completely agree with what has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, in moving this amendment: that it is vital that public health be represented at the highest level.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment, and I strongly support it. It is absolutely crucial that a public health specialist is a member of the NHS Commissioning Board. I note that protection and improvement of public health is one of the two crucial functions imposed upon the Secretary of State for Health by the Bill, and in several places. Three different bodies will be involved in discharging this function: the board, the commissioning groups, and local authorities. It is therefore essential that each has a public health physician at board level to do so. Effective commissioning requires expert understanding of populations and the diseases they might get, as well as their health needs and how these can best be met.
There are major public health roles for the NHS Commissioning Board, including the direct commissioning of services, for which public health specialists’ expertise needs to be embedded in the board’s management structure. The NHS Commissioning Board will continue to manage primary care contractors, hold the population registers which make screening programmes possible—as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, mentioned—set the policy direction and operating framework of the NHS, and oversee major commissioning decisions and plan commissioning groups.
Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Patel Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Lord Patel
“(c) must exercise its functions by overseeing sub-national clinical senates and networks”
Lord Patel
My Lords, in the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, I am very pleased to move the amendment on his behalf. I wish I had a better idea of what his purpose might have been in tabling the amendment. None the less, it is a good opportunity to explore the Government’s thinking in establishing the clinical senate.
It is easier to understand the purpose of the professional networks, which I have spoken about before. I think they are a good idea, and there should be more clinical and professional networks embedded in the health system. The cancer and cardiac networks are two good examples. However, when it comes to the senate, I am less clear about the Government’s intentions. I know that the NHS Future Forum: Clinical Advice and Leadership report said that commissioning consortia—now called commissioning groups—and the NHS Commissioning Board,
“should establish multi-specialty clinical senates to provide ongoing advice and support for their respective commissioning functions”.
It also said that independent advice from public health professionals should be available at every level of the system, but that is by the way.
Therefore, we have a situation where the Future Forum suggested that clinical senates should be a way of getting advice to all the different new structures. In response to the Future Forum, the Government said that clinical senates will give advice to CCGs which they must follow in each area of the country. At the same time, Dr Kathy McLean, who led on the project, is leading another project and has issued a consultation letter to develop the role of clinical senates and clinical networks. Obviously the Government do not have a clear idea of what the clinical senates are for, otherwise why is Dr Kathy McLean leading the project and issuing a consultation letter?
It is proposed that 15 senates will be housed by the NHS Commissioning Board. They will feed their advice back to the NHS Commissioning Board, although about what is not clear. In his two amendments my noble friend Lord Walton of Detchant wonders whether they might be useful in feeding the Commissioning Board and the commissioners advice about specialist commissioning. The senates will have a major say in advising CCGs on their commissioning plans, but their advice will be exactly that—advisory. Membership will consist of doctors, nurses and other health professionals, so it will be a large group. The senates are to be involved in quality aspects of clinical commissioning and an annual assessment of CCGs, and they will report on their annual reports and performance. They have serious work to do in monitoring CCGs, yet they are only advisory for CCGs.
Future Forum suggested that clinical senates should provide advice and support for a range of bodies, including CCGs, the NHS Commissioning Board, health and well-being boards and others. Are senates not likely to end up as just another layer of bureaucracy? Therefore, what is the real role of all 15 clinical senates? Will they be involved in advising the NHS Commissioning Board in its commissioning role? Are they to be advisory for CCGs and check on the quality of their commissioning? Why are the professionals on the senate going to be from outside the commissioning groups’ area of commissioning? The amendments are tabled to explore whether they will really have a role in commissioning specialist services.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I also have an amendment in this group. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Patel, that he anticipated the remarks of his noble friend Lord Walton remarkably well.
Having argued against bureaucracy in the previous group of amendments, I am now about to argue in favour of putting senates on a statutory basis. I shall explain why. First, this was a very good outcome of the listening exercise. I think that because I am concerned at the Government’s decision to abolish the strategic health authorities. It is what I call the Hagley Road issue. In 1948, the Birmingham Regional Hospital Board was established; its offices were in Hagley Road and throughout 60 years there has always been something there. It may have been a regional health authority, a regional hospital board, a strategic health authority—call it what you will—but there has always been a regional outpost of the department acting essentially as a leader, with a positive role in looking at the region as a whole, ensuring that its services were cohesive and had proper direction and that, by and large, it was self-sufficient. That is to be removed and we are going to get large SHA clusters which will cover a much larger part of the country. Although we do not know the size of the clinical commissioning groups, they will clearly cover much smaller population areas.
I believe that there is still a need for a mechanism whereby strategic leadership can be given over a region, and I see the clinical senates as being the best approach to that. Noble Lords have spent at least two days debating reconfiguration and are concerned that these difficult decisions often have intervention from the centre. Clinical commissioning groups will be too small to take on the kind of strategic leadership that is required. When you are trying to establish in a region where the super specialty and tertiary services should be and trying to come to a view about how many A&E and emergency departments you need, you require a body that can take a strategic overview. The clinical commissioning groups are too small to do that. They could, of course, possibly come together in a kind of federated meeting to try to resolve those kinds of issues, but that could prove to be very difficult. Therefore, the senates could have an important role in setting some of the parameters and giving strategic leadership to a region.
However, as the Government intend them at the moment, these will be informal groups of people who could easily be ignored by the clinical commissioning groups, by the health and well-being boards, by the deaneries and by all the organisations that have an influence on the way in which the health service is going. My amendment is designed to set out a more structured approach to ensure that clinical senates are created as bodies corporate, that they are properly accountable to the national Commissioning Board and that they have the ability to give strategic leadership and have some oversight of the work of clinical commissioning groups.
I suspect that my amendment will not find favour with the noble Earl but the point about the need for strategic leadership in a region is important. I fear that the super SHA clusters will be too large to do that and the clinical commissioning groups will be too small.
Baroness Murphy
My Lords, I must confess that when I first read about clinical senates, I thought, “This is a great solution”. But what is the question? The problem came home to me very much when visiting the New York mental health commissioning services and seeing the great difference in their approach. Mental health is commissioned by the public purse for a largely public service everywhere in the world, so it is a good way of looking at how people commission differently in different places. The big difference between New York’s system of commissioning mental health services and ours was that they had clinical specialists involved on a day-to-day basis who could never be second-guessed by the provider system. That is because they were recognised experts who usually had run a service themselves and were very respected nationally or locally. They were incorporated into the commissioning group. The same was true of public surgical services, public health services, and so on. That was very impressive.
Therefore, when I heard about clinical senates, I thought that this could be the way to provide that kind of serious expertise from a region to clinical commissioning groups. However, it does not seem to be developing quite that way. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, is very optimistic, with a slightly grandiose idea of what these clinical senates might do. I would love to share his optimism but I remember those dreadful regional medical advisory groups. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Emerton, will remember them, because we dealt with the same clinical regional advisory group for the south-east Thames. They were dire; they were the lowest common denominator of time-serving BMA—No, I am going to be very careful now. I do not want to be too rude, but on the whole, they were not the edifying cutting edge of specialties.
Baroness Murphy
Even the psychiatrists were not. I can remember this group of people being pretty darn useless. You would send up a proposal; they would look at it; they did not like it because it was not in their best interests as a specialty and they would send it back again. I can see that my colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Emerton, agrees with my every word.
I am a little concerned about what these people are going to do. Will they provide cutting-edge, evidence-based expertise of the best kind to local commissioners? Will they be a talking shop? Will they be a regional medical advisory group?
Earl Howe
I will talk in a moment about specialised commissioning and I hope the answer to the noble Lord’s question will emerge. Amendment 84, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, would require the board to commission highly specialised services, in collaboration with the sub-national clinical senates that are accountable to it.
I will not rehash my arguments around Amendments 51 and 224A, but many of the same points will apply to this amendment. Specialised services are challenging to commission; they involve complex care pathways, small numbers of providers and very small numbers of patients with rare conditions. The new NHS Commissioning Board authority will be considering options as to how it does this, including the best form for its substructures. There will be the freedom to adapt these over time and, to ensure that progress is not lost, the board will be required under existing provisions to maintain the necessary focus of clinical expertise in these highly specialised areas.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked how we ensure that clinical senates are not ignored; this is precisely why we do not want to prescribe their role in the Bill. We want senates to be enabling bodies, which is why we are inviting views on the type of advice they could provide to identify the functions of the board and CCGs where they would add value.
The noble Lord, Lord Patel, indicated that he thought the clinicians on the senate would have to come from outside the clinical commissioning group area. That is not the case; he is not correct in that assumption. There may be slight confusion with the rules we set for secondary care doctors on CCG governing bodies, who must avoid conflicts of interest, hence the need for area restrictions in that context. Experts on clinical senates can come from, in theory, all or any areas of the country. The difference between the senates and regional specialist commissioning is that the latter focuses on specialised services and nothing else. The senates could, in theory, work across all services; the two are not designed to do the same thing. The senates will be quite high level. It is expected they will be about only 15 in number, and while they may be established in a certain form they can evolve over the years to conform to the requirements that are placed upon them.
My noble friend Lady Jolly pressed me on the role of the board with regard to specialised commissioning, and I have already indicated in outline part of that role. The key point is that the board will maintain the necessary focus of clinical expertise and it will be under specific duties to obtain professional advice in the exercise of its functions. Under the regulations, the types of service the board will be required to commission will be kept under regular review. Work is going on at the moment to define what those services should be in the first instance, and I fully expect them to conform broadly to the specialised services national definition set. As my noble friend knows, the list of those services has historically changed over time and I expect the same will apply in the future.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked about the long promised organigram. In fact, our fact sheet on the overall health and care system does have an organigram in it. It includes the NHS Commissioning Board and describes how senates and networks will be hosted by the board. I refer the noble Baroness to that sheet. The noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, asked how senates will be different to academic health science centres in their focus. In short, AHSCs are partnerships of local academic and health bodies to support innovation and excellence in that area. However, they will not be impartial; they are by definition a vested interest. Therefore, they would not be the right bodies to offer the broader perspective on how services should best be configured across a region.
I hope that noble Lords will be at least somewhat enlightened by the details I have been able to give about clinical networks and senates. As I say, this is work in progress. I make no apology for that. This was very much a recommendation that emerged from the Future Forum report. We have got on with the work needed to flesh out what these bodies should be, but we have a broad and, I hope, helpful idea of their role across the wider NHS system. I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his extensive reply. When I moved this amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, I did not think there would be such enthusiasm to join in. I was surprised by the enthusiasm generated by his amendment, and I thank noble Lords who joined in. The most reverend Primate said this amendment was not necessary. I hope that he was not referring to the amendments that I had tabled, or I would say to him that my amendments were “zuri sana”—for those of you who do not understand, that means they were very good. He understands that.
The noble Earl has, to a degree, clarified the Government’s thinking on what the role of these senates will be. As he said, it is work in progress. Of course, we will need to wait and see what the details are. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Patel
Before the Minister sits down, will he please confirm that the primary care doctors and the primary care team will also be obliged to report patient safety incidents?
Earl Howe
My understanding is that that is the intention. The clinical commissioning group will wish to monitor the quality of service provided by its member practices and the outcomes that those practices achieve. As part of that monitoring we fully expect that safety will be a core component.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, clinical commissioning groups are, of course, one of the main building blocks of the Government’s proposed changes to the National Health Service and I support my noble friend Lord Whitty when he argues for the need for population-based bodies at that essential local level. However, I will follow the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, in looking at issues to do with corporate governance in clinical commissioning groups. I am concerned whether the corporate governance structure will be sufficiently robust. Will clinical commissioning groups be sufficiently accountable to the public? What safeguards will be put in place to ensure that clinical commissioning groups operate in the public interest?
Schedule 2 sets out the details of the governance structure. Clinical commissioning groups will be bodies corporate with a constitution and a procedure for decision-making; an accountable officer and audit and remuneration committees are to be appointed. That is fine as far as it goes but I hope the noble Earl will use this opportunity to clarify what effective corporate governance structure is to operate. My Amendments 175CA and 175CB seek to do just that.
On Amendment 175CB, I seek guidance and reassurance about the composition of the boards of clinical commissioning groups. On every other board in the NHS the non-executives are in a majority. Will the noble Earl confirm that that will be the case with clinical commissioning groups? If not, why not? I follow what the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar said: surely, by any definition, GPs are the least experienced in any form of corporate governance in the health service? Therefore, given that they are the least experienced, is it right that they should be subject to so much less scrutiny and challenge than those other organisations in the National Health Service which are hugely well versed in corporate governance? At the very least the chair and vice-chair of the clinical commissioning groups should surely be lay people to ensure that the public interest is represented.
There would be considerable merit in ensuring an external appointments process. I have suggested here the NHS Commissioning Board but there may be other suggestions. All experience with public bodies shows that if boards are responsible for deciding on their membership you will often run into trouble. We have seen this in the education sector, with corporations of colleges simply deciding themselves who should be appointed and who should replace those who retire. Simply leaving clinical commissioning groups to decide on their membership is a recipe for deep trouble, particularly when the temptation for CCGs will be to spend resources on themselves, on their constituent GPs. The issue around public interest and conflict of interest will become a keen problem and, without strong, effective corporate governance, we may well run into great difficulty in the future.
There are probing amendments around membership but, in relation to Amendment 175CA, I would like to know whether the noble Earl feels it is appropriate that local authorities should have some kind of representation on the boards of clinical commissioning groups. Amendment 175CA in particular draws attention to the role of district councils in two-tier areas. That is because clearly the principal local authority will be the host of the health and well-being boards. There will be concern, particularly in rural areas, if the non-metropolitan district councils do not have some involvement. I at least pose the question as to whether they may have some involvement at the clinical commissioning group level.
My principal amendment is Amendment 175D which concerns the accountability of clinical commissioning groups. I do not understand how those groups will account to their patients. As a patient, what do I do if I do not agree with the decisions of the clinical commissioning group? What if I think the decisions made by my clinical commissioning group put me at a disadvantage compared to the decisions made by a clinical commissioning group in a nearby area? What if I think my clinical commissioning group, by its decisions, might affect the viability of my local general hospital? What if I think it is putting too many contracts with itself, bringing up this issue of conflict of interest? There is real concern about the conflict of interest issues around placing contracts with the GPs who form the constituent members of the clinical commissioning groups.
How do members of the public hold the clinical commissioning groups to account? As far as I can see, the Bill is completely silent on that. The noble Earl may say that it is contained in the doctor-patient relationship, but I do not think that is true at all. My relationship with the GP is not about commissioning: it is about essential care. Frankly, there is already a risk that, because GPs are collectively going to commission, the doctor-patient relationship might be undermined in any case. That is because the moment we place commissioning decisions with GPs, there will always be a suspicion among patients that decisions they are making clinically will be governed by the needs of the clinical commissioning group and the need to ration resources. Clearly, the Secretary of State has said, and has been saying consistently, that the reason the budget has been put with GPs is to give control over the budget overall.
I have put forward a model essentially based on the foundation trust model, which says that the members of clinical commissioning groups should be the patients who are on the lists of the GPs within that group. The membership should then vote for a governing body and the governing body should then appoint the non-executives on a clinical commissioning group. I am not completely wedded to that model: I just lifted a model that is currently in operation in the health service. My main point is that I do not believe that it is right and proper that a public body should simply be composed of one profession that is given enormous power—if you are lucky, there may be one or two non-execs on the board as well—accountable to nobody at all at the local level. There is no mechanism at all whereby I as an individual patient have any way of challenging the commissioning decisions of those clinical commissioning groups. This is a very important issue to which I am sure we will return. We have to make CCGs properly accountable.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I will be brief in supporting the amendment of my noble friend Lord Kakkar. I also support the comments just made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. I think it vital that local commissioning groups are accountable and conduct themselves according to the highest principles of public life. CCGs are legally responsible for the quality of their decision-making processes. Therefore, they need to be able to stand up to judicial review. The individuals making those decisions should be required to adhere to the highest standards of conduct for public officials.
I know that, to a degree, the Government recognise this by raising the structures of CCGs—namely, the inclusion of lay and other professional members on governing bodies, the requirement for compliance, the principles of good governance and the pledges about public access to documents and meetings. While this work is being carried out, however, we need clarification about the methods of identifying and selecting lay and professional members of governing boards.
The Bill also states that CCGs may pay members of the governing body such remuneration and allowances as it considers appropriate. Full autonomy may not be appropriate as it might undermine public confidence in the ability of members of CCG governing bodies to act in the public interest. Some degree of national guidance about fee scales might also be valuable.
Baroness Williams of Crosby
I will speak to Amendment 101A, in my name and that of other noble Lords. Before I do, I will say one word about the amendment spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Kakkar and Lord Patel. I was pleased to hear what they both said because in a way it reflected the crucial nature of trust in the medical experience, the relationship between the patient and the doctor. That is at the centre of the ability to create a successful health service. They were absolutely right to emphasise that. Without going into detail, it is fair to say that the Nolan principles are becoming a kind of gold standard of the behaviour of people in public life. It is eminently suitable that that gold standard should be openly applied to those who are members of clinical commissioning groups at the local level. That will go some way to retaining the level of trust that exists between the medical profession and citizens.
Turning to Amendment 101A, we do not want to go over the ground again about membership of the board. This is, in a sense, the board in a miniature—the membership of the clinical commissioning groups. It is crucial that clinical commissioning groups are very close to their communities. The reason that my amendment refers in particular to a representative of the nursing profession is because almost nobody is ever closer to a local community than nurses. The information and knowledge that he or she carries can be vital to the working of the local clinical commissioning board. Also, nurses tend to be the recipients of any complaints there may be, so again it acts as a two-way channel. I also hope that we can bear in mind the importance of somebody with public health experience on a clinical commissioning board.
I make one other, final remark. As evinced by amendments later on that we will come to discuss, the major guarantee of the behaviour of a clinical commissioning group will be transparency. I hope that when we come to look at the extent to which members of boards should declare any interests that they may have, and should be recused from any decision which might bear upon that interest, we will recognise that this is one of the most important elements in dealing with the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, legitimately raised. The real concern is about the interests of individual GPs or groups of GPs in their own particular business—so to speak—and the way that that must be made absolutely plain before the clinical commissioning group takes a decision that can have any bearing upon the individual interests of individual members of the board.
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Lord Warner
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that intervention. The more the merrier, I say, on this theme and I hope that noble Lords will speak out about this issue in our debate today.
As I was saying, I am completely supportive of reducing or stopping ministerial and Department of Health micromanagement of the NHS, which, as I understand it, is the Government’s purpose in framing Clause 4. However, I struggle with reconciling the clause in its present form with the other duties and powers that the Secretary of State has taken unto himself in the Bill. I do not mean just the relationship between Clauses 1 and 4, which itself seems to have produced a hefty dose of confusion and uncertainty, not to mention, in the case of Clause 1, many attempts at drafting alternatives. How will Clause 4, for example, fit with Clause 3, which most of us in the previous session in Committee—except, perhaps the Minister—seemed to favour strengthening in terms of the duty on inequalities? How will it fit with Clauses 16 and 17, with their very extensive regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State, or indeed Clause 18 or Clause 20, which gives the Secretary of State extensive mandating powers, which seem to me to be rather stronger than the new chairman of the NHS Commissioning Board seems to think?
Many people who have looked at the Bill do not understand what the Secretary of State is trying to do in relation to the issue of central control, central powers and autonomy and delegation. Is he trying to let go or to tighten his grip? I do not see, at present, how the Government can retain in the Bill a clause as loosely drafted as Clause 4 and, at the same time, retain all the other powers of the Secretary of State that we will be discussing later. Apart from anything else, this is a recipe for confusion in the minds of many local decision-makers.
Are people to take Clause 4 as drafted at face value? If they do, will they not be wondering whether the Secretary of State or his henchmen and henchwomen in the Department of Health or the NHS Commissioning Board will come down on them like a ton of bricks using other powers in the Bill if they think that they are not acting in the interests of the NHS? What will the courts make of all this? If people do not like a decision taken higher up the line, as the Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Foundation Trust is demonstrating now over paediatric surgery changes, do they seek judicial review of the central decisions, praying in aid Clause 4 as drafted? Will not Clause 4 in its present form simply encourage legal challenge and create local uncertainty?
I turn to the wording of the clause and why Amendment 37 is at least an improvement. It is an attempt to improve what is a highly defective clause. As I read Clause 4, it seems to place little inhibition on local decision-makers,
“exercising functions … or providing services”,
in any manner that they consider appropriate. If that means what it says in the dictionary, if people want, for example, to provide a wide range of alternative therapies for which there is no scientific evidence of clinical benefit, they can do so, praying in aid the powers under Clause 4. If they want to remove tattoos or do a bit of cosmetic surgery, I cannot see that there is very much to stop them. Under the clause as drafted, the Secretary of State can intervene only after the event. If he finds out what has been going on, he can, in effect, try to stop it happening again, but that is ex post facto. He cannot intervene earlier, as I understand the drafting of the clause. I am happy to be corrected by the noble Earl, but I am not the only one who thinks that these powers will have that effect.
Amendment 37 is an attempt to require those behaving autonomously locally to apply the test that their actions are in the interests of the NHS before they take their decisions rather than relying on the Secretary of State deciding that they were not in the interests of the NHS after the event. I see that my colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, is now with us. I suspect that we both agree that it is a far from perfect solution, but it is better than the way that the clause is currently drafted. I know that some noble Lords are very attached to the clause—like me, they are attached to the idea of autonomy—but I hope that they will consider whether in its present form it is really in the best interests of the NHS. I suggest that the Government rethink the form of Clause 4 if they want to proceed with it. As I see it, what would get nearer to their intentions but not create some of the loopholes that I have identified is a kind of drafting that gives a commitment that the Secretary of State would not exceed the powers provided elsewhere in the Bill, would impose only burdens that are totally consistent with those powers and would maximise operational freedoms for those delivering NHS services consistent with public accountability. That seems to me to be the direction in which the Government are trying to go, but the way the clause is drafted does not do that.
I would prefer the Minister to accept that the clause is seriously deficient and either abandon it altogether or take it away for a serious makeover. In the mean time, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and myself, I move Amendment 37, which goes a modest way to improve the shape and drafting of the clause. I beg to move.
Lord Patel
My Lords, first, I offer my sincere apologies to the House for being delayed. I was also thrown by the fact that that the first two amendments were not moved. I am sorry about that. I am grateful to my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Warner, for moving the amendment in my absence, and I join absolutely in his comments. I shall try to cover some other points. My name is also on the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and I support that too.
As I interpret it, under the clause, as long as the Secretary of State does not think that it is inconsistent with the interests of the NHS, he or she must act positively to allow any other person exercising health service functions to do so in a way that that person thinks appropriate. Although the Secretary of State keeps some form of oversight, it is the views of other persons and bodies delivering health services on how those services are to be delivered that are important.
This duty would therefore require the Secretary of State, when considering whether to place requirements on the NHS, to make a judgment. The challenge for the Secretary of State would be to justify why these requirements were necessary. Does this mean that the Secretary of State has the power to act only when the steps to be taken are really needed or essential, rather than because he or she thinks that something is desirable or appropriate? He or she would have to demonstrate why no other course of action will be followed. Is that a high test to meet on the part of the Secretary of State?
Lord Ribeiro
I rather suspected that the noble Lord did. That is why I felt able to make that reference. None the less, I launched a big campaign at the time because here was a budget—part of the NPEC budget—for nurses, doctors and so on that was being raided. It should have been a ring-fenced budget for training, yet the money was taken out of that budget to meet the NHS deficit. There is a real danger for the present Government if a situation should occur whereby the £1 billion budget—and there is no reason why it should be more than that—that has been set aside for research, particularly as the Secretary of State has taken responsibility to promote research, was found to come under the auspices of the chief executive of the NHS Commissioning Board, and that at times of trouble and trial that that money could be used.
I wanted to speak in line with what I said yesterday, although some noble Lords may doubt that I have spoken briefly. However, I speak in strong support of Amendments 40 and 42.
Lord Patel
My Lords, my brief is brief—and I shall be brief. First, I congratulate the Government on putting the need to promote medical research at the centre stage of the Bill. We have criticised a lot of things and we may criticise some more, but the recognition that medical research is important to improve healthcare has been stated throughout the Bill.
It would be surprising if I said that I do not support these amendments—I support every one of them. By the way, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Ribeiro, that he was lucky that the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, was not in his place when he said that surgeons do not do research. He might have given the noble Lord, Lord Ribeiro, a tour around his department.
Lord Ribeiro
I gave a historical perspective. We started research in the 18th century. We may not have done it as well as the physicians, but that is when we started.
Lord Patel
I should also tell the noble Lord that his laparoscopic training is also historical because robots are used now.
I have brief comments, but I shall focus particularly on the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that refers to the need for informatics to be properly established to promote research in healthcare. One of the key areas in biomedical and clinical research in the UK is focused on translational research, as other noble Lords have said, to try to get research into clinical care.
Informatics plays a key role in our ability to do translational research. There are three domains of informatics in biomedical research—biomedical informatics, medical informatics and translational research informatics. Translational research informatics is about getting multidisciplinary research into clinical practice, with clinical trials being the first step to it. As we have heard, we have notable successes from our medical research into clinical translation. I say with hesitation that we think we are leaders in the world, but we are not quite the leaders—although we come pretty close. However, we can do better, and to do so we have to have what is required to promote research and its use into translation. Therefore, we will have to develop all three domains and incorporate what we already have—health information involving the medical records to which the noble Lord, Lord Warner, referred, and the development of electronic medical records. I know that other amendments address that issue. We should also be able to carry out statistical analysis.
The noble Lords, Lord Willis and Lord Warner, referred to the rapid sequencing of the genome—whole-genome sequencing—that will impact on the whole of medicine. Recent rapid developments in DNA sequencing technologies have dramatically cut the cost and the time required to sequence a human genome to a point that it will soon be easier and cheaper to sequence each patient’s genome and keep it in their notes. Every time they are diagnosed with or treated for a disease, a genome will be used to extract information. By combining that with our advancing understanding of genes and diseases, whole-genome sequencing is set to change the current clinical and public health practice by enabling more accurate, sophisticated and cost-effective genome testing.
Understanding the health impact of individual genomic variance presents a considerable challenge for analysis, interpretation and management of data. Managing that data will require bioinformatics to be established. The NHS should urgently develop clinical bioinformatics expertise and infrastructure to ensure clinical technical support for medical analysis and interpretation of genomic data. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that includes informatics is crucial in identifying that. If we are to succeed in applying the results of our research to patient care, we need to establish all these issues.
I should briefly mention Amendment 74 in my name. The noble Lord, Lord Willis, mentioned research in public health, as did the noble Lord, Lord Turnberg. My amendment relates to Clause 9 on,
“Duties as to improvement of public health”,
and the functions of local authorities and the Secretary of State as to improvement of public health. The amendment merely tries to,
“establish promotional research, and acting on research evidence into the causes of ill health”.
It is important that local authorities recognise that public health directors should be involved in research in the agenda that is being developed in the prevention of disease. Those are my brief comments.
Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe
My Lords, I was really pleased to see Clause 5 extend the duties of the Secretary of State with regard to research and its use. Clause 5 is a necessary acknowledgement of the extremely important role of medical and scientific research in ensuring that we deliver high-quality healthcare. The noble Lord, Lord Willis, and other noble Lords have spelt out graphically the dependence of improvements in treatments on research.
In his response to questions raised at Second Reading, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, repeated the Government’s assurance that a culture of research and innovation would be embedded in the structural changes to the NHS proposed in the Bill. It is a fine promise, but I am concerned as to whether the Bill in its current form is able to deliver this in practice. The lack of detail or clarity across the Bill about the role of and commitment to research in the reformed NHS has been noted by a number of noble Lords. For this reason, Clause 5 needs to be stronger and more explicit.
Embedding research across the complex NHS system requires proactive, top-down, leadership. Clause 5, as it currently stands, does not define how the Secretary of State would provide such leadership. Acknowledging that such research needs to be promoted stops short of an active commitment to promote research, or indeed of saying what that action would look like.
Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Patel Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Lord Patel
Lord Patel
My Lords, I shall speak to all the amendments tabled in my name, but before I do so I should like to thank all noble Lords who have joined their names to these amendments—and of course there are amendments tabled in their names as well. Given the size and complexity of the Bill and what it covers, my amendments may well appear to address minor issues, but on reading the Bill in detail—I have read it line by line—it occurred to me that there are some fundamental omissions, even if they concern only a single word. I must ask why, when the Bill is supposed to implement a reorganisation of the health service that will deliver world-class health outcomes, such important issues have been missed out.
I shall address each amendment tabled in my name, and take Amendment 15 first. Clause 2 will insert a new clause covering the Secretary of State’s, “Duty as to improvement in quality of services”. New subsection (2) states:
“In discharging the duty under subsection (1) the Secretary of State must, in particular, act with a view to securing continuous improvement in the outcomes”.
It makes no sense to me if the word “health” is not inserted before the word “outcomes”. We are talking about the health outcomes that are achieved from the provision of services. Equally, new subsection (4) states:
“In discharging the duty under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to the quality standards prepared by NICE”.
I wonder why the word “clinical” is not before “quality standards” so as to emphasise that these have to be clinical quality standards. I am well aware that NICE produces technology assessments that are often referred to as technology standards, and that it writes standards in other areas, but they are all for the purpose of refining clinical care or developing eventual clinical quality standards that deliver clinical care.
Perhaps I may say with some humility that I am aware of what clinical quality standards are all about, having for five years had the job of writing them. I am also familiar with some of the clinical quality standards written by organisations that we would regard as being the best in the world, such as the MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, Harvard, the Mayo Clinic and others, including some Australian institutions. They all refer to quality standards as being clinical quality standards, because they are what matter in the delivery of care. Apart from that, those are the standards that the Commissioning Board will use to build packages of currency that Monitor will then use to produce tariffs, so if they are not clinical standards, what are they? In my view, it is clinical standards that will deliver the outcomes we seek, so why not call them clinical standards?
Amendment 107 refers to Clause 20, which covers the duties and functions of the Commissioning Board. Proposed new Section 13E is entitled, “Duty as to improvement in quality of services”. Subsection (3), which I seek to amend, states:
“The outcomes relevant for the purposes of subsection (2) include, in particular, outcomes which show—
(a) the effectiveness of the services,
(b) the safety of the services, and
(c) the quality of the experience undergone by patients”.
That is the definition of quality standards that we are using, but it does not mention delivering better outcomes for patients. Why are these quality standards that will deliver better outcomes for patients not the standards that we want? If we do, why do we not put them in the Bill? It will alter the culture of people who work in the health service when they read language and words such as “clinical standards” and “health outcomes” for individuals or in practice. My noble friend Lord Warner tabled a similar amendment to which he will no doubt speak.
Lord Patel
My Lords, there is no conflict when I use the word “clinical” in recognising that it would encompass the totality of clinical and social care. The problem will arise that while the evidence exists to be able to write clinical quality standards, the evidence to write social standards is lacking, and we may have to develop those. That is why a distinction is made between the two. In terms of immediate outcomes for patients that are seen for medical care, the clinical quality standards will make the difference. That does not mean that I do not recognise clinical and well-being together—and I think that all doctors would recognise that. It is not medicalisation that I am after by using the term “clinically”.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, this has been an interesting series of amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Patel, made a very important point about the influence that legislators can have in drafting legislation on the culture of the NHS. He speaks with great experience because of his work in Scotland on the development of clinical standards, and I am sure he is right to emphasise the words “health” and “clinical” in adding to our understanding of what we seek from the National Health Service.
The point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is very interesting. This is meant to be a health and social care Bill, although there is very little about social care in it. Indeed, the only provisions ranging around social care are bad provisions. Remarkably, we are proposing to abolish the General Social Care Council, which ought to be an uplifter of standards among social workers. I give notice that I intend to thoroughly oppose these provisions and place the regulation of social workers into a health body. I look forward to the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, on that when we come to it. I would have thought that the way through is either to add well-being to this part of the Bill or to say “health, clinical and other outcomes” to meet the valid point raised by noble Baroness.
My noble friend Lady Bakewell is very keen in her Amendment 18B to ensure that in securing the outcomes set out in the Bill, we,
“should not exclude sections of the population”,
on grounds of age. We look to the Minister to give us some reassurance on my noble friend’s point about the overarching indicators used extensively in the department and the health service, which go up to only the age of 75. It is not good enough to say that the data are still under development and therefore we will not worry about statistics on the over-75s. One would like to think that those indicators will be revised to embrace people over 75.
Amendment 16A, which is my own amendment, relates to the efficiency of the service. It seeks to add “efficiency” to the criteria that need to be considered. I would be interested to know from the noble Earl why efficiency is not mentioned in line 23 on page 2 of the Bill. My argument would be that a measurement of a service’s effectiveness may be of only limited value. One example might be the fraught question of new drugs and treatment being developed by industry and marketed indirectly to patients, for example through the sponsorship of charities that promote the case for the provision of new treatments in the NHS, and there is a strong case to make those treatments improve the effectiveness, safety and quality of experience. However, if you do not also have to consider efficiency, is there not a risk that you will not look at value for money or productivity and, in the end, not give a rounded analysis of a particular new treatment or technology?
Amendment 19, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, deals with the standards prepared by NICE under Clause 231. I hope that the noble Earl can clarify the status of NICE standards and guidelines. I have a later amendment on this matter, as do my noble friend Lord Warner and the noble Lord, Lord Patel. We have been concerned by suggestions that the Government are seeking to downplay the role of NICE and the statutory nature of its guidance on technology appraisals. I would be very grateful if the noble Earl could reassure me on that.
I remind the noble Earl that NICE was established because of the traditional delay in the health service when a treatment has been proven to be cost-efficient and effective. There was always reckoned to be a long delay from the time when it was proven to be cost-effective, efficient and clinically effective to the time when it generally available in the National Health Service. NICE guidance was designed to speed up the adoption of such proven new treatments, technologies and drugs. I am concerned about any suggestion of returning to the bad old ways when it was up to each clinical commissioning group simply to decide on a new technology and the group not having to follow the guidance set out in the NICE technology appraisals—if that is what they are called; I think we have probably moved on from that terminology. We will of course return to that later on in the Bill, but some assurance would be welcome.
I turn to my noble friend Lord Warner’s Amendment 109. I never understood the Opposition’s opposition to waiting time targets in the NHS. I remind the Minister that when his Government last left office they had the patients’ charter, which had a waiting time target of 18 months that they did not achieve. We got it down to 18 weeks, which had a hugely beneficial impact on patients. There is no doubt, if you look at regular polling, that the NHS was in very good condition in 2010 because to all intents and purposes the dreadful waiting that had been such a product of the NHS over many decades had been radically reduced.
We know that there is a sense in the health service that the Government are no longer worried about waiting times. I have no doubt whatever that if the pressure is taken off, waiting times will start to rise again. That might suit the Government because of the funding issues that they are confronting the NHS with, and it would certainly suit the private sector, which we know does well out of long NHS waiting times, but it will do patients no good at all. I do not know how far my noble friend Lord Warner intends to take this, either now or at a later stage, but it is important that we say in the Bill that we are concerned about the speed of access to services.
Earl Howe
Of course there is, and I am grateful to the noble Lord. We are anxious to ensure, however, that any measures that we put in place in the outcomes framework are robust in terms of their verifiability. As I have said, I completely agree with the need for good data that have to underpin any system of accountability. I strongly feel that the Bill takes a significant step in the right direction. The NHS Information Centre will be the powerhouse for improving data in the NHS. It will look at how we can improve data for all age groups, not just the over-75s. I take on board what the noble Lord said. If I can add to what I have said, I should be happy to do so in writing.
I shall cover briefly the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about NICE. NICE is a body for which we have the highest regard. In the Bill, we are widening its duties and placing it on a much firmer statutory footing. I hope that that in itself will indicate to the noble Lord that, far from downplaying the role of NICE, we want to do the opposite. We are giving it responsibility for defining excellence in social care and for producing a library of quality standards, which it has already started to do. In connection with technology appraisals, we see it continuing to have a very important role. What the noble Lord may have heard on the grapevine, if I can put it that way, related to our plans for value-based pricing of medicines. If we succeed in defining a good system—a good framework—for value-based pricing, the role of NICE will inevitably shift somewhat, because it will be asked a slightly different question from that which it is asked at the moment, but it will retain an absolutely central role, particularly in the pharmacoeconomic evaluation of new medicines.
The noble Lord asked me about the concern that clinical commissioning groups would, as it were, be able to take their own decisions and perhaps disregard NICE guidance. We have made absolutely clear that the funding direction associated with NICE-approved medicines will continue, not only up to the end of 2013, which is when the current pharmaceutical price regulation scheme comes to an end, but thereafter in the new world of value-based pricing.
I agree with the spirit of all the amendments, but I hope that noble Lords will accept from me that they are either not needed or would have an unintended and retrograde effect, which I have tried to outline. I hope that, with that, noble Lords will feel able not to press the amendments.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his detailed comments and all noble Lords who took part, although some of them did not quite understand the meaning of my amendments. None the less, it was never my intention to have a narrow definition of “clinical”, and I accept what the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said: that it might give the impression that this is narrowly defined to medical standards. It is not; it takes into account both the well-being of the patient and, beyond that, rehabilitation and even social care, if we can define the standard.
My intention was never to press the amendments, but to try to highlight the issue that standards that are written are important if they are written with a view to focusing on patient outcomes. The phrase “clinical standards” tends to do that, and other standards have to incorporate that. If there was one benefit of this debate, it was that the noble Earl had to define the quality standards that NICE would be expected to write, which incorporates the patient journey of care from access to rehabilitation. That is exactly what I was hoping to achieve. By the way, I am familiar with NICE, having been involved at its inception and having written the paper that established it. Standards, whether they are quality standards of access or others, must focus on what gives a better outcome to the patient. On that basis, I am pleased to withdraw the amendment.