Health and Social Care Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Williams of Crosby
Main Page: Baroness Williams of Crosby (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Williams of Crosby's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would like to ask the Minister what the potential relationship is between clinical senates and an expansion of academic health science networks, or academic health partnerships, that may be proposed from the ongoing chief executive of the NHS review of innovation. It is suggested that that review may endorse an expansion of the current academic health sciences network. I must remind noble Lords of my own declaration and involvement in University College London Partners academic health science centre.
As I understand it, the purpose of clinical senates is to provide support in helping clinical commissioning groups to draw on expertise available from a broader group of clinicians and disciplines within their region to help inform ultimate clinical commissioning decisions. However, if the proposal that the current network of five academic health science centres is expanded into a network of broader academic health partnerships, serving a population of about 3 million to 4 million for each partnership, within those partnerships there would be a broad range of academic and other disciplines. They would be represented in a health partnership or network fashioned on the current academic health science centres to be able to deliver expertise and advice on commissioning and provide the opportunity to aid in a transformation of health practice pathways of care, to provide a potential home for the education and training functions that will need to be rolled out at a sub-national level, and also promote interest with regard to research and innovation.
Under the circumstances, if academic health partnerships were to be expanded and promoted as a result of the ongoing innovation review, could not the responsibility suggested for clinical senates be undertaken by the academic health partnerships and current academic health science centres? This would avoid the need for yet another grouping or layer of bureaucracy to be created within the systems responsible for the commissioning and provision of health services.
My Lords, if I may, I will pursue what has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, and also, in some ways, by the point made by the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York. I could not help thinking that perhaps protesters count among the networks and the people responsible for running St Paul’s count as part of the commissioning group. With that in mind, I will pursue also what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. If you look at his Amendment 224A(6), he helpfully refers to the clinical senate having,
“the function of establishing and maintaining a system of clinical networks”,
in the area. I think that should be applauded. I am very impressed by the way in which networks at their best not only extend information very widely among patients with a chronic condition but bring the patients into the discussions about what should be done in their situation. It becomes a huge educational and, indeed, morale-boosting process. So on subsection (6) I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has put his finger on something that could be very important and where the clinical senate would give clinical backbone to the deliberations and thoughts of the clinical network. That is almost, I suppose, what we are all trying to achieve.
I am not so clear about subsection (8) of Amendment 224A, where the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has effectively given the clinical senate something of a veto over the commissioning group. I am not sure that that is wise, as that plays right into what the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Kakkar, were saying about creating yet another layer of bureaucracy. I think that would be unhelpful and might indeed feed into a certain self-importance on the part of people who call themselves senators, whether clinical or merely political.
I would like to ask the Minister, bouncing off the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, whether, looking through that amendment, he does not find parts of it that are helpful, useful and constructive. It would make a clinical senator a significant part of the whole structure of the relationship between patients and clinicians. Whether he needs to press ahead with provisions that would bring in the senate as a requirement of the decision-making process of the commission is much more questionable. I am playing a kind of ping-pong, in which the ping of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has to go to the pong of the noble Earl, Lord Howe.
Can I accept the invitation to come back on this? The reason why I am interested in the other bit of my amendment is that it is essentially about the strategic leadership that needs to be given to reconfiguration issues. When we debated the powers of the Secretary of State, a number of noble Lords complained that Ministers intervened in reconfiguration, which usually means the closure of services, perhaps emergency services, and their concentration around specialist hospitals. They are very contentious. As noble Lords have observed, MPs seek ministerial intervention, which is perfectly normal and democratic. In the new structure, there is no one to really lead this at a semi-national or regional level. The CCGs are far too small; they will not be able to come together to sort out how regional services should be operated, or the number of A&E departments you need within a region. The national Commissioning Board is far too big; it is national. That is why I think that there is room for some regional mechanism. The clinical senates seem the nearest that we can get to that. I do not see them as being like the old-style regional medical advisory committees; I see it as being a rather more dynamic process than that.
I thank the noble Lord for his typically articulate and thoughtful response. The idea of clusters coming together in what one might call semi-regional groupings is a better way forward than bringing regional senates in as a way to resolve the problem that he rightly talks about of bodies being too small or too large.
Can I also ask the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about his amendment, in which he proposes setting up another very strong bureaucracy? It is a corporate body, known as a clinical senate; I presume, because it has a proper officer, that it will have a range of officials. It is suggested that it should revalidate doctors within the area, but I am wondering how that would work with the GMC and others. It will maintain a whole system of clinical governance within clinical commissioning groups and also authorise some of the clinical commissioning groups.
I can understand the noble Lord’s wish for some strategic leadership. I have been a regional chairman—and I have to say that our medical advisory groups were really excellent compared to those of south-east Thames. We had really good ones. But I am anxious about this matter. I sense that this is simply a probing amendment, because the membership of what the noble Lord proposes would be extremely bureaucratic. I understood that these were advisory boards, and that it was to try to get some of the clinical input from the acute centre into the commissioning groups so that they understood perhaps more clearly what they were commissioning in terms of acute services.
I very much look forward to what my noble friend is going to tell us as to how he sees this issue. But I must say to the most right reverend Primate—I think I have got that right—that if he can manage the Anglican Church he really could manage the National Health Service.
I have a quick initial question. If a CCG happens to be in the area of, say, a university medical school or medical hospital, how would the process of picking who would be on the clinical senate be handled?
As I have mentioned, the senates will come under the wing, so to speak, of the NHS Commissioning Board. They will effectively be part of the board. While we have yet to receive details of how the board will configure itself sub-nationally, it will clearly have to do so in ways that make sense of the local commissioning and provider architecture in an area so, where you have a university, it might well be that medical experts from that university will be part of the senate. It is too early to say, but I look forward to updating my noble friend as and when I have further particulars.
My Lords, I will be brief in supporting the amendment of my noble friend Lord Kakkar. I also support the comments just made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. I think it vital that local commissioning groups are accountable and conduct themselves according to the highest principles of public life. CCGs are legally responsible for the quality of their decision-making processes. Therefore, they need to be able to stand up to judicial review. The individuals making those decisions should be required to adhere to the highest standards of conduct for public officials.
I know that, to a degree, the Government recognise this by raising the structures of CCGs—namely, the inclusion of lay and other professional members on governing bodies, the requirement for compliance, the principles of good governance and the pledges about public access to documents and meetings. While this work is being carried out, however, we need clarification about the methods of identifying and selecting lay and professional members of governing boards.
The Bill also states that CCGs may pay members of the governing body such remuneration and allowances as it considers appropriate. Full autonomy may not be appropriate as it might undermine public confidence in the ability of members of CCG governing bodies to act in the public interest. Some degree of national guidance about fee scales might also be valuable.
I will speak to Amendment 101A, in my name and that of other noble Lords. Before I do, I will say one word about the amendment spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Kakkar and Lord Patel. I was pleased to hear what they both said because in a way it reflected the crucial nature of trust in the medical experience, the relationship between the patient and the doctor. That is at the centre of the ability to create a successful health service. They were absolutely right to emphasise that. Without going into detail, it is fair to say that the Nolan principles are becoming a kind of gold standard of the behaviour of people in public life. It is eminently suitable that that gold standard should be openly applied to those who are members of clinical commissioning groups at the local level. That will go some way to retaining the level of trust that exists between the medical profession and citizens.
Turning to Amendment 101A, we do not want to go over the ground again about membership of the board. This is, in a sense, the board in a miniature—the membership of the clinical commissioning groups. It is crucial that clinical commissioning groups are very close to their communities. The reason that my amendment refers in particular to a representative of the nursing profession is because almost nobody is ever closer to a local community than nurses. The information and knowledge that he or she carries can be vital to the working of the local clinical commissioning board. Also, nurses tend to be the recipients of any complaints there may be, so again it acts as a two-way channel. I also hope that we can bear in mind the importance of somebody with public health experience on a clinical commissioning board.
I make one other, final remark. As evinced by amendments later on that we will come to discuss, the major guarantee of the behaviour of a clinical commissioning group will be transparency. I hope that when we come to look at the extent to which members of boards should declare any interests that they may have, and should be recused from any decision which might bear upon that interest, we will recognise that this is one of the most important elements in dealing with the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, legitimately raised. The real concern is about the interests of individual GPs or groups of GPs in their own particular business—so to speak—and the way that that must be made absolutely plain before the clinical commissioning group takes a decision that can have any bearing upon the individual interests of individual members of the board.