European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

My Lords, I move this amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Adonis. He apologises for his absence this morning. I assure noble Lords that he is not having the well-deserved lie-in that many of us feel that we are entitled to; he is on a trip to Dublin with the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, and Sir Nick Clegg to see what can be done about the question of the Irish border and how to resolve that particular trilemma.

The purpose of the amendment is to draw the Committee’s attention to what is written in Clause 17. We hear lots of soporific, mellifluous legalese in these discussions, but I draw the Committee’s attention to what Clause 17(1) of the Bill actually says. The Minister can perhaps then give me a little tutorial on why it is necessary and not as dangerous as it appears to be to my eye. The clause states:

“A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Minister considers appropriate in consequence of this Act”.


That is a sweeping enabling power for the Executive. The aim of the amendment is to establish from the Government the purpose of their having this sweeping power. This Bill is about Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union. It covers, as we have seen in the debate about Brexit since the referendum, many different aspects of our national life, so what is meant by this clause?

To the extent that we have any bedtime these days, for my bedtime reading I am trying to read books that explain the rise of populism in Europe. In a way, Brexit is a general phenomenon of a rise of populism in Europe and the United States. One book that I am reading at the moment is Professor Richard J Evans’s first volume on the rise of the Third Reich. One moment that makes me proud to be a social democrat is that it was the Social Democrats alone who voted against the enabling Act that set up Hitler’s dictatorship. I am not for one moment of course suggesting that there is a parallel, but why do we as a House have to grant the Government this sweeping legislative power? Can the Minister please explain? I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, at the risk of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, thinking that I am adding to the soporific legalese, I support what he said. It is not just the noble Lord who is concerned about Clause 17. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee addressed Clause 17 at paragraph 206 of its report on the Bill:

“We agree that the Government may require a power to make ‘transitional, transitory and saving provisions’. However, we are concerned that the Bill creates a power to make ‘consequential provisions’ which is potentially very broad in scope, has the capacity to go well beyond what are ordinarily understood to be consequential matters and includes a Henry VIII power. If Parliament has approved, subject to detailed and appropriate circumscription, other broad delegated powers for ministers, it would be constitutionally unacceptable to undo these restrictions and protections by conferring a general power on ministers to make ‘consequential provisions’ to alter other enactments. We recommend that the power to make ‘consequential provisions’ in clause 17 is removed”.


The concern is that this Bill will confer enormous powers on Ministers under, for example, Clauses 7 and 9 to make delegated legislation. It is difficult, in the context of such powers, however amended, to see why it is also necessary for Ministers to enjoy this broad power, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, described it, to make consequential provisions. The concern is that the restrictions that Parliament will impose on the other powers that Ministers will enjoy under Clauses 7 and 9 may be evaded by Ministers by the use of this consequential power.

I am particularly concerned about the risk of that, because if your Lordships focus on paragraph 17 of Schedule 7 to the Bill, on page 51, you see a quite extraordinary provision, which states the following:

“The fact that a power to make regulations is conferred by this Act does not affect the extent of any other power to make regulations under this Act”.


Therefore, it seems to me, as a matter of law, that the fact that we spend hours—it seems like days—looking at particular provisions as we seek to restrict the power that Ministers will enjoy under Clause 7 will have no effect, by reason of paragraph 17 of Schedule 7, on the scope of the power that Ministers also enjoy under Clause 17.

I would welcome some reassurance from the Government that they are thinking about the Constitution Committee’s recommendation. I would welcome some explanation of why Ministers need these consequential powers to make delegated legislation and some assurance from the Minister that he is thinking about whether it is also necessary to include paragraph 17 of Schedule 7, or whether the Bill could make it absolutely clear that any power in Clause 17 must be interpreted consistently with the restrictions that will be contained elsewhere in the Bill.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, with apologies to the Committee, I should have made it clear when the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, moved his amendment that, if it is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 253 to 256, by reasons of pre-emption.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, when I say that we will give consideration to these matters, I mean that I am making more work for myself in that context. Of course we are going to discuss with officials how best to structure this legislation to meet the concerns that have been expressed. That may lead to amendments, in which case they will be available before Report, and it may not, in which case I will be happy to indicate at Report why such amendments have not been brought forward.

[Lord Pannick]

Will the Minister address the concern I expressed that the breadth of Clause 17(1) is such that it could be used by Ministers to evade the restrictions that will be contained in the other powers that Ministers enjoy under Clauses 7 to 9, particularly in the light of paragraph 17 of Schedule 7? Will he consider that point?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I will certainly give consideration to that point, but it is not immediately clear to me that the clause could be used to evade those limitations. I will address it in due course.

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment. It is essential that the status of retained EU law in our law should be determined by Parliament as part of this Bill. I supported an amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, moved earlier to say that retained EU law should be treated as primary legislation. It is so treated by the Bill for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. It is highly desirable that this should be fixed definitely as part of the arrangements and not left to be decided, as it were, ad hoc from time to time by the use of the power to which the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, has drawn attention.

Originally, the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, proposed covered the whole of this law. I am inclined to think that the Clause 2 provisions, which are already in our law, have the status given by our law already. Some of them are statutes and some are subordinate legislation. Having considered this a little further since we discussed this some long time ago, I am inclined to think it might be wise to restrict the provision that this should be regarded as primary legislation to the Clause 3 provisions.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, in the previous debate the Committee deliberated on the vice of Clause 17(1). The amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, identifies a specific reason why Clause 17 (1) is so objectionable. When the Constitution Committee put to Ministers our concern, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has just referred, that the Bill should identify the legal status of retained EU law, the answer from Ministers was that if necessary or appropriate they could use the powers conferred by Clause 17(1) to designate what legal status retained EU law would have, and designate different parts of retained EU law for different purposes. The Constitution Committee made its view very clear in paragraph 69 of its report:

“It is constitutionally unacceptable for Ministers to have the power to determine something as fundamental as whether a part of our law should be treated as primary or secondary legislation”.


We debated what legal status should be given to retained EU law earlier in Committee. I respectfully agree with the observations made just now by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I emphasise, however, that it is the width of Clause 17 (1) that is so objectionable as it enables Ministers to assert that they could use it to make changes of such constitutional enormity to our legislation. I agree, therefore, with the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, has expressed.

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, I will briefly add my support. I point out to my noble and learned friend, who gave a very sensitive reply to the previous debate, that a culture has grown up in Parliament in recent years: the proliferation of so-called “Christmas tree Bills”, which include very few specific proposals, allowing Ministers to hang whatever baubles they like on them. Together with the deep suspicion, that we all have, of Henry VIII provisions, I hope that that explains to my noble and learned friend why, with all the far-reaching consequences of this Bill, we are most anxious that the prerogative should remain with Parliament and that it should not be for Ministers to determine what is primary and what is secondary. I hope that building on his sensitive and—I do not want to sound patronising—sensible remarks at the end of the last debate, he will take on board what has been, and is being, said on this point.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

55: Clause 6, page 3, line 34, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) A court or tribunal may regard the decisions of the European Court made on or after exit day to be persuasive.”

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the two amendments in this group address the important question of the weight, if any, to be given to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union which are delivered after exit day. Amendment 55 is in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock and Lord Adonis. Amendment 56 is in my name and those of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Goldsmith and Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham.

Amendment 56 would implement the recommendation of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee at paragraph 142 of our report on the Bill. After exit day, there is no dispute that our courts will make their own judgments on retained EU law. They will not be bound by judgments given by the court of justice after exit day. While judgments given before exit day will bind our courts up to the level of the Supreme Court, those given after exit day will not be binding. But our judges will wish to look at the judgments of the court of justice in Luxembourg delivered after exit day. That is not just because our judges are always interested, and rightly so, in seeing how courts in other jurisdictions address the same or similar issues. The connection here is much stronger. The retained EU law, which our courts will be interpreting, owes its origins to the institutions of the EU and there may be very good reasons for our courts looking carefully at how the court of justice has interpreted after exit day the same or a similar provision.

There are three problems with Clause 6(2) as currently drafted. First, it begins in a negative way by stating that a domestic court “need not have regard” to judgments delivered by the court of justice after exit day. That default position is unhelpful because it may be understood to suggest that our judges should not normally have any regard to post-exit day judgments of the court of justice.

Secondly, the end of Clause 6(2) allows the courts here to have regard to post-exit day judgments of the European court only if our courts consider it “appropriate to do so”. But judges do not look at foreign judgments because it is appropriate to do so; they look abroad for assistance because the foreign judgment is relevant to the issue that they are deciding. The terminology matters here. The use of “appropriate” wrongly suggests that our court will be making a policy choice to have regard to a post-exit day judgment from Luxembourg. Senior members of the judiciary have understandably expressed concern that if Clause 6(2) is left in its current form, the courts will inevitably be criticised for making a policy choice in this context.

I should make it clear that of course I do not speak for the judiciary, but I do speak to them. I can tell the Committee that many senior judges are very concerned about the content of Clause 6(2). Paragraphs 134 and 135 of the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee record the evidence that was given by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, the President of the Supreme Court, and her predecessor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, who I am pleased to see in his place today. The concern of the senior judiciary is not that judges should be shielded from criticism or that they are not tough enough to withstand it. The point is that confidence in the rule of law is undermined if judges are seen to be taking sensitive policy decisions that are for Parliament to make. Clause 6 therefore needs to make it much clearer that although our judges are certainly not going to be bound by Luxembourg judgments handed down after exit day, Parliament does intend our judges to have regard to judgments of that court given after exit day where they consider that those judgments are relevant to the issues before our courts.

The third defect of Clause 6(2) as currently drafted is that it suggests that the same principles apply to decisions of “another EU entity or the EU” itself. I am doubtful that there is any need to mention other EU entities or the EU itself, or certainly to compare them with the European court itself.

Amendment 56 seeks to address the issues in a manner which gives much clearer guidance to our courts. It would make it clear that our judges must have regard to a post-exit day judgment of the European court if the domestic court considers it relevant to do so. It would also add that in deciding the significance of any such post-exit day European court judgment, the domestic court should have regard to the terms of any agreement that is reached between the UK and the EU which it considers to be relevant. The terms of the withdrawal agreement, if and when approved by Parliament, will identify the relationship between the UK and the EU post exit day, and that will give considerable guidance to the courts.

I emphasise, however, that at all times under Amendment 56 and indeed under Amendment 55, it will be for the domestic court to decide on the significance, if any, of the Luxembourg judgment. There is no dispute over the fact that our judges will remain in charge in relation to post-exit day judgments. However, Amendment 56 would provide the guidance that they are seeking and which, I suggest, they are entitled to expect. I beg to move.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, there is little to add to the excellent introduction made to these amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, except to say that decisions of the other courts which currently have persuasive authority include those of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, decisions of higher-level foreign courts, especially in the Commonwealth and other similar jurisdictions, and one that I have a particular interest in, being a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; namely, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which under the Human Rights Act 1998 must be taken into account by UK courts. It is right that the European Court of Justice should have a similar role and persuasive powers.

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[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Foulkes and I are basking in the judicial praise we have received this afternoon for Amendment 55. We put our pen to paper on it with no legal training whatever. Perhaps we should offer advice, which no doubt will be very expensively provided after this Bill becomes law, because we are able to cut through the issues with such great clarity. I note also that Amendment 55 is by far the shorter of those we are currently debating, so clearly we were able to summarise these matters succinctly.

I have listened to the debate and I am still none the wiser about the real difference, in plain English, between “relevant” and “appropriate”. I simply cannot understand it. I was astonished at the vehemence of the statement from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, about the impact that this would have on the judiciary where a court is expected to decide that something is relevant rather than appropriate. It seems to me that in plain English these words have precisely the same meaning. They both require a court to exercise discretion and, to me, they look to require it to exercise precisely the same discretion. Unless the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, can lay out for us some compelling arguments, as he always does with such lucidity, it looks as if it does not matter one way or the other what we do here. It is a straightforward matter of whether or not courts are prepared to be robust in reaching their decisions.

[Lord Pannick]

There is no doubt that there has to be judicial discretion, the question is the extent to which guidance is given to the court. To suggest to the court that it should exercise its discretion by reference to whether something is appropriate suggests, does it not, that it is to make a policy decision? The question is whether something is relevant, meaning legally relevant by reference to the particular issue that arises before the court in its legal context.

[Lord Adonis]

The word “relevant” does not, in any normal meaning of the word, mean legally relevant, any more than the word “appropriate” means legally inappropriate.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not going to elaborate at this stage because, as I say, the Government are going to go away and consider the proposals for an amendment to Clause 6(2).

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the Minister for that encouraging response, and I am grateful to the noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have spoken in this debate.

On a matter of detail, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, asked about new subsection (2B) in Amendment 56, giving guidance to the judges to look to the relevance of an EU agreement. The noble Lord asked how that would work. I shall give him an example. If the judge is seeking to interpret a provision of retained EU law, relating to, say, medicinal products; if the Court of Justice after exit day pronounces on a regulation which has become part of retained EU law, and if the withdrawal agreement has said that there will be close regulatory alignment between the EU and the United Kingdom in that particular area, then the judge would be encouraged to pay close regard to what the Court of Justice had said about the meaning of the regulation. Our court would still be in control but it would pay particular regard—that is the whole point of new subsection (2B).

There is widespread agreement around the House that the wording of Clause 6(2) is unsatisfactory and that Parliament needs to give as much guidance as possible to judges in this context to protect them from being seen to be required to take policy decisions, which would undermine confidence in the rule of law. The Government and Parliament would be very unwise to reject, in particular, the concerns expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. It is much more difficult to identify precisely what should be put in place of Clause 6(2). I am encouraged by what the Minister said—that the Government are listening and considering this matter. I am sure that all noble Lords who have spoken would be happy to contribute to the discussions that will take place before Report. I hope that, on Report, the Government will bring forward amendments to Clause 6(2).

[Lord Goldsmith]

Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, as I suspect he is going to do, can I ask him to clarify one point? He talked a moment ago about the need to protect the judges. Would he agree that it is a question not of protecting the judges from attack, but of protecting the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law?

[Lord Pannick]

I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord. I think I said in opening this debate that it is not that the judges cannot withstand criticism of their judgments, it is rather that we are all concerned about confidence in the rule of law. As the noble and learned Lord said, if the judges are left to take policy decisions in a very sensitive context, where a decision will have to be made as to the weight—if any—to give to Court of Justice judgments handed down after Brexit, there is no doubt that they will be exposed. They will be the subject of criticism which will undermine the rule of law unless we do our job and give very clear guidance on what Parliament thinks should be the appropriate approach.

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 55 withdrawn.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord True]

The noble Lord has spoken a great deal in the past few days; I would like to continue my remarks, if I may.

The important issue that is raised here is a perfectly good issue on which to have a debate in the Moses Room or on an Unstarred Question. These are matters of great importance. I strongly disagree with the noble Baroness who said that we had not made progress in this country: we have made a great deal of progress in this country. The performance of this country on gender equality, work/life balance and carers has been transformed in my lifetime. It needs to go further, but I cannot accept—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Does the noble Lord accept that a great deal of the progress that we have made—for example, on gender equality—has been because of the judgments of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, which has imposed standards that our Parliament has not imposed?

[Lord True]

I do not necessarily accept that at all. I do not think that the progress of—

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, also subscribed to by my noble friend Lady Bowles. The amendment is primarily a probing one, to seek clarification from the Government on what they are seeking to do here. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 states:

“No general principle of EU law is part of domestic law on or after exit day if it was not recognised as a general principle of EU law by the European Court in a case decided before exit day”.


So if one allows for the double negative, it rather suggests that, if it was a general principle of EU law that had been determined by the European Court in a case before exit day, it will continue to be part of domestic law. Having reached that point, the following paragraph says:

“There is no right of action in domestic law on or after exit day based on a failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law”,


and that no,

“court or tribunal or other public authority may, on or after exit day … disapply or quash”—

and so forth.

I am intrigued about why, having apparently established that there is a general principle of EU law that becomes part of our domestic law, when what is given away with one hand is taken away with another, one is not allowed a remedy based on that general principle of EU law. It would be helpful if the Government could clarify that.

The matter was raised in the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, which at paragraph 117 of its report quotes Professor Alison Young, who wrote:

“Schedule 1 to the Bill makes it clear that ‘there is no right of action in domestic law on or after exit day based on failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law’ … This prevents claims of the nature found in Benkharbouche, where the Charter was used independently from other provisions of EU law. … But claimants will still be able to rely on general principles of EU law, which protect fundamental rights. They will not be able to use these general principles on their own, but they will still be used to interpret EU-derived law, which then in turn could be used to disapply legislation. For the claimants in Benkharbouche, the stronger remedy currently found under EU law for the protection of fundamental rights will disappear”.


Again, I seek clarification from the Government as to why they believe that these protections should disappear as currently found in EU law. Indeed, the committee in paragraph 120 concludes:

“The effects of excluding the Charter rights, retaining the ‘general principles’, but excluding rights of action based on them, are unclear … We recommend that the Government provides greater clarity on how the Bill deals with the general principles and how they will operate post-Brexit”.


I sincerely hope that the noble and learned Lord will take the opportunity when replying to the debate to respond to that recommendation from the Constitution Committee and give us a clarification.

There was also one specific point, on which I would ask for a view from the Government Front Bench. The provision in paragraph 3 is:

“No court or tribunal … may, on or after exit day … disapply or quash any enactment … because it is incompatible with any of the general principles of EU law”.


I assume that that would mean to any enactment pre exit, which could of course include an Act of the Scottish Parliament. Therefore, would the provision in paragraph 3 prevent any challenge being made to an Act of the Scottish Parliament passed before the exit day on the grounds that it was outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament because it was incompatible with those general principles, but not on the grounds that it was incompatible with any other pre-exit European Union law?

In other words, if other EU law had been satisfied but there was still a problem or it was still not compatible with EU principles, would an action that had been raised before exit day on the grounds that it was incompetent have to fall because no court could make a determination of it because of this paragraph? Some clarification on this point would be welcome. It would appear that a principle is established, but not the remedy that might go with it.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I have a similar question for the Minister. In paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1, we are told:

“There is no right in domestic law on or after exit day to challenge any retained EU law on the basis that, immediately before exit day, an EU instrument was invalid”.


I understand why that should be so, by reference to EU law principles, because at the moment you cannot challenge, in our courts, the validity of an EU instrument; you have to go to the Court of Justice. I am not sure whether the provision in paragraph 1(1) prevents, after exit day, a challenge to a provision of retained EU law brought by reference not to EU law but to common law principles. For example, are challenges on the grounds of legal certainty, the presumption against retrospectivity, or proportionality, which has already been mentioned, prevented by paragraph 1(1)?

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

Would the noble Lord agree that proportionality now seems to be part of UK law, notwithstanding what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said?

[Lord Pannick]

I do not think that the courts have accepted that proportionality can be a challenge by way of judicial review where you are not raising an issue of EU law or convention law—but we have come a very long way towards recognising proportionality as a principle of the common law. That is one reason why I am asking this very important question. I simply do not know whether you can challenge retained EU law after exit day by reference to traditional common law principles.

One reason why this matters is that the Supreme Court, in the HS2 case, suggested that this might be possible under existing law. As was raised in the debate last Monday, we should also bear in mind that, under Clause 2, retained EU law includes statutory instruments that do not owe their legal basis to the European Communities Act. They include statutory instruments enacted through other mechanisms, albeit that they are linked to EU law. At present, one can challenge those instruments by reference to traditional common law principles. Therefore, if Clause 1(1) were intended to prevent such a challenge after exit day, it would be a significant change in the law.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

Are these questions affected by the proposal to make this particular branch of law statutory? In that case, certain principles of our constitution might cause some difficulty.

[Lord Pannick]

The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right. If retained EU law were to be categorised as primary legislation, such challenges could not be brought. But the Minister resisted that suggestion in our earlier debate. I am concerned with the Bill as it is at the moment. What is the Government’s intention in this respect?

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, that short exchange has demonstrated how complicated this area is and how important the general principles of EU law are in it. It is, perhaps, late at night to be discussing this but it is extremely important because of both the principles and the way they operate. If one looks at it in this way, and takes the Government’s intention not to take away rights as a part of this process, one has to recognise that the architecture which provides rights at the moment is quite complicated. As a commentator has said, there is no single, simple answer to restoring the position in the light of what the Government propose to do.

Amendment 41, which stands in my name, follows the principle the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, initiated by saying that the general principles of EU law should continue to be capable of giving rise to rights which can be enforced by our courts. The point has already been made that there is a difference between these general rights existing as a way of interpreting other rights—as an interpretive technique—and giving rise to freestanding rights themselves. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 prevents any action being founded in contravention of one of the general principles or rendering any Executive act unlawful or disapplying any legislation, including secondary legislation, on the grounds that it offends these general principles.

The general principles of EU law have been critical to a number of legal decisions relating to people’s rights. One of those often cited is the case of John Walker, who brought a case for equal protection in pension rights for his same-sex partner, a claim upheld by the Supreme Court which recognised that prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was a key principle of EU law. As I apprehend it, without that the case would not have succeeded.

The principle of effectiveness of remedies has also been relied upon. When the Supreme Court struck down employment tribunal fees that disproportionately affected disadvantaged women and low-paid workers, the principle of effectiveness of remedies was relied upon. Cases concerning caps on compensation and equal pay cases have depended upon the general principle that we find in the EU principles. The amendment standing in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to enable those general principles to continue to have that effect in our law. It is important that they do for a couple of other reasons. Take, for example, something that was raised in the other place. What if there is a principle of EU retained law which is deficient, defective, does not operate properly or is disproportionate? Without being able to rely upon the general principles of EU law, it may be that all the court could do if faced with that would be to say that either that principle or that particular Act or that particular piece of law, though deficient or defective, has to continue to operate because there is no principle by which it can be struck down, and that would be a loss.

The other reason goes back, I am afraid, to the debate that we had last week on the charter and the Government’s assertion that the charter is not necessary because all the rights are otherwise protected under our law. Of course, at the time the charter was drawn up we were still a member and, in many people’s minds at least, were expected to continue to remain a member of the European Union with all that that implied, including the continued application of general principles. But if one looks—

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it is a precautionary power and it is intended that, where the circumstances arise, the Minister will address himself to those circumstances and contemplate the making of appropriate regulations.

[Lord Pannick]

Perhaps I may suggest to the Minister a circumstance in which this might arise. The day after exit day the Court of Justice gives a judgment saying that a provision of EU law is invalid. Nevertheless, that provision will be part of retained EU law—it will be part of our law even though it has been abolished in the EU. That might be a circumstance in which the Minister wishes to act.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I fully acknowledge that that is most certainly a circumstance that could arise. Of course, one might address that circumstance by Parliament legislating to reflect the outcome of that post-Brexit decision. However, I fully acknowledge that, depending on the way in which one constructs the departure on exit day, one might find that what one has retained as EU law ceases to be EU law almost immediately after one has left the EU. I believe that that has been acknowledged on a number of occasions. Indeed, it could lead to the development of two parallel jurisprudences—one for retained EU law and one for EU law. That is an inevitable outcome of our decision to leave the EU but to retain in our domestic law that which was EU law at the point of our departure. I fully acknowledge that, but it might also be a circumstance in which potentially one would seek to exercise the exceptional regulatory power that is referred to.

Reference was made to Amendments 41 and 42, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, which seek to retain indefinitely in domestic law rights of challenge based on the general principles of EU law. If agreed to, these amendments would empower domestic courts to quash administrative actions or secondary legislation or, indeed, even go as far as disapplying an Act of Parliament on the ground that it breaches one or more of the retained general principles of EU law—that could take place long after we have left the EU. That is why we have to have a point in time at which we have certainty as to the scope for such challenges, and that is reflected in the schedule.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, acknowledged, Amendment 41 would go even further. It seeks to set out an ostensibly broader definition of which general principles are to be retained under the Bill. In that context, he alluded to Article 191 of the TFEU, which deals with environmental issues. I take issue with him as to whether the polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle are both now accepted as general principles of EU law. I would suggest that there is considerable doubt as to whether the former, in particular, constitutes what is recognised in EU law as a general principle, so I have some difficulty with that amendment.

I come now to Amendment 63, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It is, I apprehend, intended to retain this right of challenge but solely for the principle of proportionality, as she indicated, and specifically including where retained EU law is to be treated as primary legislation. It would also appear to permit the possibility of a challenge on the basis of invalidity of EU law, as well as judicial review of such legislation. It is our position that the general principles of EU law, such as proportionality, non-retroactivity and fundamental rights, will be kept in our domestic law, but in order to assist in interpreting retained EU law and not to give rise to additional stand-alone rights. Whereas some general principles are now set out expressly in EU treaties, the general principles were those that were first recognised by the European Court of Justice. They are essentially judge-made and determined as principles on the basis of case law. It is those principles that we are dealing with.

I come back for a moment to Amendment 41, which goes beyond just the issue of proportionality. It would undermine the approach that we are seeking to take if we were to pursue it. In particular the inclusion of Article 191 in the amendment risks going further than the existing principles that are, as I say, set out in EU law and consequently in UK law today.

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[Lord Foster of Bath (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 43, and I support Amendments 44 and 45. I begin by disagreeing slightly with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I suspect that I am in a minority: those of us who are not lawyers.

However, I am very conscious that during our deliberations so far we have heard many times that the Bill is intended to ensure that,

“as a general rule, the same rules and laws will apply after we leave the EU as they did before”.

About an hour ago we heard a very powerful reiteration of that from the noble Lord, Lord Duncan, who made it very clear that he believes what the Government seek to achieve. Yet that has to be put alongside the continuing concern in the other place and in many parts of your Lordships’ House that somehow or other Schedule 1 provides the Government with a get out of jail free card—an opportunity to have a series of measures which appear at least to curtail some of the legal rights and remedies we have enjoyed as a result of our membership of the European Union. A glaring example of that was well illustrated by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Carlile, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and is contained in paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 in relation to Francovich.

As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, rightly pointed out, Francovich is not just some right whereby anybody who feels slightly aggrieved by their Government not properly implementing some piece of EU legislation can immediately start action. Three clear criteria have to be met and have already been laid out: that there are rights conferred on an individual, that the breach was sufficiently serious, and that there is a clear causal connection between the breach and the damage sustained by the individual.

It seems clear, at least to me as a non-lawyer, that if paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 remains in the Bill, no retrospective claims under Francovich will be permitted, and certainly not if the proceedings have not been started before exit. In those cases, individuals will lose their ability to claim damages against the state for failure to implement EU laws and directives issued pre-exit. This would mean that the victim of a government failure to correctly implement an EU law must have started action before exit day, but that will not always have been possible and would seem contrary to natural justice. Access to justice, including the ability to challenge the actions of the state before a court of law, is central to the rule of law. If paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 remains as it stands, it seems that access to justice for some people will be denied.

I was in your Lordships’ House some 10 days ago when we heard during exchanges on the Statement on air quality that the High Court had ruled that the Government’s air quality plan, designed to tackle nitrogen dioxide in the air, was unlawful. The Court ruling said:

“It is now eight years since compliance with the 2008 Directive should have been achieved. This is the third, unsuccessful, attempt the Government has made at devising”,


an air quality plan,

“which complies with the Directive and the domestic Regulations."

The judge, Mr Justice Garnham, added,

“In the meanwhile, UK citizens have been exposed to significant health risks”.


It may be that some individuals will wish to argue, under the rule of Francovich, that they have suffered damage and deserve compensation because of the Government’s failure to implement the 2008 directive. Without Amendment 43, or some similar measure, such individuals will be prevented from seeking justice unless they submit their claim and have their case under way before exit day.

In the other place, many other examples of potential loss of access to justice under Francovich were raised. Initially the Minister there, Dominic Raab, offered assurances that:

“Individuals will not lose their ability to vindicate their rights in court after exit”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/11/17; col. 290.]


It may be—I have no way of knowing—that he believes that to be the case because of Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978, which provides that,

“where an Act repeals an enactment, the repeal does not, unless the contrary intention appears ... affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability … accrued or incurred under that enactment”.

So the right to claim under the rule of Francovich post-exit would seem to depend on whether the Bill before us provides an effective and clear contrary intention. Can the Minister tell us clearly whether the Government believe that paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 provides a clear contrary intention, within the meaning of Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978?

Certainly, there are some other lawyers who appear very uncertain about that point. For example, the very helpful briefing from James Segan of Blackstone Chambers leads me to conclude that seeking justice by arguing that there was no contrary intention or that it had been introduced ineffectively would lead litigants into a legal quagmire, so I was slightly heartened when in the other place a little later in the deliberations the Minister changed his tune when pressed by, among others, Conservative MPs Robert Neill, Dame Cheryl Gillan and Sir Oliver Letwin. He told them that he acknowledged the importance of legitimate expectations and agreed to see whether these concerns could be addressed, at least transitorily, by regulation rather than in the Bill. I hope that the Minister can update us on progress on that thinking. He has already said in relation to other aspects of Schedule 1 that the Government are willing to do that.

I would have thought that by far the better route to securing the continuation of the rights under Francovich would be to accept Amendment 43 or something like it, and ensure that the Bill makes it clear that when the Government say that the same rules and laws will apply after we leave the EU, they really mean it.

[Lord Pannick]

I have two questions for the Minister. First, will he accept that the right to damages under the Francovich principle is more generous to claimants than the common law principle of judicial review under which you very rarely have a right to claim damages as you need to prove misfeasance in public office or something similar? Does he accept that Francovich is more generous? Secondly, does he accept that it therefore follows that paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Bill conflicts with the Government’s purpose in bringing forward this Bill, which is to read across all existing rights that are enjoyed under EU law? If he accepts that, what is the justification for making an exception for Francovich damages?

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, it seems to me that if the Government break the law, they should be judged on the basis of the law at the time that they break it and that this is not a Bill in which the Government should seek to advantage themselves by averting that principle.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it is not. I have to say to the noble Lord that Francovich damages are a rare remedy, as I have already indicated. Damages in the context of judicial review are not so uncommon as the noble Lord was suggesting. They are available as a remedy, albeit in limited circumstances.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Perhaps I can continue just for a moment. I would begin by looking at the Bill against that background. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 is perfectly clear in saying the right to Francovich damages is removed, because of course it is related to a breach of European Union law, and it would not be appropriate to continue—in accordance with Amendment 43—after we have left the European Union. The Bill is quite clear in saying that there is,

“no right in domestic law on or after exit day to damages in accordance with the rule in Francovich”.

To that extent, it does deal with the issue raised in the context of Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord. As I say, we are addressing that issue, which we recognise, and therefore in time for Report we will be determining what our position is. I cannot go further at this stage and I am not going to commit to an amendment, but I make it perfectly clear that we recognise that there is a potential lacuna arising from the fact that while, where a claim has been made before Brexit date it is continued, where the claim has accrued but no claim has actually been made it would be lost by this process. We recognise that there is room for criticism of the legislation on that basis; I am absolutely clear about that.

In these circumstances, I recognise the force of the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in order to address that issue. I would take issue with the scope of the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which goes well beyond that and would maintain some sort of claim for Francovich damages in a context quite unrelated to our departure from the EU. I underline that this would not be appropriate.

I mentioned earlier the limited number of cases in which Francovich damages have arisen. That in itself suggests that it might be a proportionate response to the amendments made by the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to allow for claims that have accrued because they are potentially very few indeed. I recognise that entirely. I am not committing to an amendment at this stage but I will make the position clear by the time we reach Report. In the circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

Before the Minister sits down and we all go to bed, I am very puzzled by his suggestion that there is currently a right to damages in judicial review such that Francovich damages do not add anything. In what circumstances is the Minister suggesting there is a right to damages in judicial review, other than in the very rare cases where you can prove misfeasance in public office?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is one example of where a claim for damages would arise in the context of a judicial review. There are distinct circumstances in which Francovich damages will arise. The noble Lord will himself recognise that the circumstances in which you can actually establish a basis of claim for Francovich damages are even rarer than those instances in which you can establish one in domestic judicial review.

[Lord Pannick]

I do not accept that. It is quite clear, I suggest, that damages under Francovich are provided in circumstances where you would not otherwise get damages because you cannot prove misfeasance but you can prove that the breach is sufficiently serious and that the law was intended to confer a right to damages. That is why I suggest to the Minister that paragraph 4 is taking away something of value.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

31: Clause 5, page 3, line 11, leave out subsections (1) to (3)

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Amendments 31 and 33 arise again out of a report from your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. They are in the names of four members of that committee, the others being the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, and the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Beith. In the same group I have tabled Amendment 31A.

These amendments address the inclusion in the Bill of the principle of the supremacy of EU law. Noble Lords will know that under the European Communities Act 1972, EU law takes priority over any inconsistent domestic legislation or rule of law. That is why the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 was disapplied in the Factortame case to the extent that it was inconsistent with the EU law rights of Spanish fishermen.

Since the purpose of the Bill is to read across the substance of EU law as at exit day and so secure continuity, the Constitution Committee recognises the need to maintain the priority of retained EU law over laws that were enacted or made prior to exit day. The scheme of the Act is that any future Act of Parliament will take priority over retained EU law. Our objection is to the Bill using the term, the “supremacy of EU law”. We point out in Chapter 5 of our report:

“The ‘supremacy principle’ is alien to the UK constitutional system”,


not only in its origin but also in its content. In our constitutional law, Parliament has supremacy and we think that it is very unsatisfactory that the Bill chooses to implement legal continuity by maintaining a legal concept, the supremacy of EU law, which leaving the EU is designed to abolish. If it is possible to avoid the use of the concept of supremacy for the application of our law after exit day, that would be preferable.

It is also difficult to see how Clause 5(3) advances the objective of legal certainty. To make the application of the concept of supremacy dependent on,

“the intention of the modification”,

seems to the Constitution Committee to invite uncertainty. I would be grateful if the Minister can explain how subsection (3) is intended to apply in practice. Amendment 31 would simply remove the provisions relating to supremacy and it needs to be read with Amendment 33, to which I will turn in a moment.

Another approach is offered by Amendment 32A. It would be much more consistent with British legal principles for Parliament simply to enact, as Amendment 32A suggests and as Professor Paul Craig of Oxford University has suggested—I gratefully adopt his scholarship—a provision that if, on or after exit day there is any inconsistency between retained EU law and an enactment made or a rule of law enforced before then, priority shall be given to the retained EU law.

Whether Clause 5 should use the concept of the supremacy of EU law is linked to another fundamental issue raised by this group of amendments. The Constitution Committee has advised your Lordships that one of the defects of the Bill is that it fails to accord a defined legal status to retained EU law. That is the focus of Amendment 33. The Bill as currently drafted does not say whether the retained EU law is to be treated as primary legislation, as secondary legislation or as something else; and if so, what? The Bill ignores the problem save in paragraph 19 of Schedule 8 which tells us:

“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, any retained direct EU legislation is to be treated as primary legislation”,


meaning that it cannot be disapplied by the courts but can be made the subject of a declaration of incompatibility. Our objection to paragraph 19 is that it begs a question: if retained direct EU legislation does have the status of primary legislation for the purpose of the Human Rights Act, does that mean that it does not have that status for any other legal purpose? The Constitution Committee advised in paragraph 51 of its report that the Bill will give rise to confusion and uncertainty about the legal status of retained EU law by failing to address this issue clearly and consistently.

The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has agreed with our concern that the Bill should confer a defined legal status on retained EU law. The centre has explained that individuals and businesses need to know about the status of one rule relative to another because the question of hierarchy is determinative of a number of legal questions. Which rule takes priority if there is a conflict between them? On what grounds may the content of a legal rule be challenged? What remedies are available if the legal challenge is successful, and what process must be followed if the rule is to be repealed or amended? Even worse, in the opinion of the Constitution Committee, the Solicitor-General told us in his helpful evidence that the Government would, if necessary, use the powers conferred in Clause 17 to make provision themselves to determine the legal status of particular retained EU laws for specified purposes. The report is very clear about that in paragraph 69:

“It is constitutionally unacceptable for ministers to have the power to determine something as fundamental as whether a part of our law should be treated as primary or secondary legislation”.


We added that for the Bill to say nothing about legal status but to allow Ministers to determine the status of particular retained EU law for particular purposes is,

“a recipe for confusion and legal uncertainty”.

Amendment 33 would implement the recommendation of the Constitution Committee by conferring on retained EU law the status of primary legislation enacted on exit day. The simplicity of that approach is that it would ensure, by a means entirely conventional on domestic legal principles, that retained EU law would take priority over previously enacted legislation, as the Government intend, but it would give way to legislation enacted after exit day—again as the Government intend. Another advantage of treating all retained EU law as primary legislation is that it would not be capable of amendment under existing delegated powers which are not Henry VIII powers. Ministers would be able to amend the retained EU law only by using existing Henry VIII powers where applicable or by using the powers conferred under this Bill. I should add that although the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law does agree that the failure of this Bill to address the legal status of retained EU law is a serious defect, it does not agree with the remedy proposed by the Constitution Committee. The centre has expressed concerns that to treat all retained EU law as primary legislation risks devaluing its currency as well as running the risk that we will become inured to the use of Henry VIII powers to amend primary legislation.

The Bingham centre, like Professor Paul Craig, would prefer the Bill to accord a legal status to retained EU law that depends on the status which the norm had in EU law pre-exit day. There is an opinion from Mr Pushpinder Saini, the Queen’s Counsel for ClientEarth, which makes a similar proposal. I would be content with such a solution to this complex problem on which different views may reasonably be taken as to the solution, but I emphasise that the Constitution Committee and the Bingham centre agree that there is a serious deficiency in this Bill since it fails to accord a defined legal status to the retained EU law. I therefore look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to all three of the problems in the Bill raised by this group of amendments. First, the inclusion in Clause 5 of the concept of the “supremacy of EU law”; secondly, the failure of the Bill to confer a domestic legal status on retained EU law: is it primary legislation, is it secondary legislation; what is it?; and thirdly, the lack of clarity in Clause 5(3) with its reference to,

“the intention of the modification”.

I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 31, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would remove references to the principle of supremacy from the Bill entirely. Amendment 32B would ensure that retained EU law continues to have precedence over pre-exit domestic law in the event of any inconsistency between the two. Amendment 33 would assign a single status for all purposes to all retained EU law. As I understand it, the noble Lord is therefore arguing that it is unnecessary to retain the principle of supremacy if we are to treat all retained EU law as though it is domestic primary legislation enacted on exit day and make clear that, in a conflict between retained EU law and pre-exit domestic law, retained EU law has priority.

[Lord Pannick]

It is more fundamental than that. The difficulty is, why use the concept of the supremacy of EU at all? It is surely inappropriate in a Bill of this nature.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Not necessarily in the context of retained EU law, which comes over with that principle of supremacy standing behind it. I will come on to deal with that in more detail. I understand that, as the noble Lord indicated, his amendments draw on the recommendations made in the Constitution Committee report on the Bill—although I was interested to note that Amendment 33 appears to go further than the recommendations put forward by the committee, in that it extends the status of primary legislation to all retained EU law, rather than just to law being preserved by Clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill. So there is that difference between Amendment 33 and the recommendations of the Constitution Committee.

I understand entirely the concerns here and the attraction that these amendments have as a result. It is only right, however, that we should examine fully the consequences of dealing with status in a one-size-fits-all way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness for that observation. Obviously, that is something that we would take into account. It perhaps touches on a question I did not answer from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with regard to Clause 5(3), where he queried the reference to the “intention of the modification”. Of course, what that makes clear is that this will need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

[Lord Pannick]

Of course, “case-by-case basis” suggests lots of work for lawyers and a lot of legal uncertainty. I am grateful to the Minister and all those who spoke in the debate. There was, I think, widespread agreement in the debate—apart from the Minister—and from expert commentators that a legal status does need to be conferred in the Bill on retained EU law. How one confers the legal status is much more difficult than what legal status one confers. I would say that there is more than one way to skin a cat—but that may upset those who spoke in the previous debate.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Goldsmith, for supporting the approach recommended by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. But I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that there is also great force in the suggestion made by Professor Paul Craig that the Bill should confer a status of either primary or secondary legislation, dependent on the category of EU law from which the retained EU law derives. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, who asked about this, that Professor Craig is not advocating a process of allocation on a case-by-case basis; he is advocating that legal status should depend on the article of the EU treaty from which the retained EU law derives—a much more objective approach.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

Did my noble friend hear Paul Craig say at a seminar, as I did, that it would take four competent EU lawyers four days in Brussels to classify, consistently with the classification both pre and post Lisbon, all this legislation? Four lawyers, four days—that is perhaps the answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis.

[Lord Pannick]

Well, it depends. How long is a piece of string—how long does it take EU lawyers to allocate? But it is an objective approach. There may be difficulties, but they would be far fewer than the problems that would be posed by not addressing this problem at all in the Bill or by leaving it to Ministers to determine the matter. The other suggestion was that made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. She may have the right answer. She spoke of various baskets—I think it was “baskets” rather than the word used by Sir John Major as Prime Minister in relation to opponents of the Maastricht treaty.

The core point is that it is unacceptable for the Bill to ignore the question of legal status. It is a problem that needs to be addressed if the Bill is to achieve its objective of securing legal certainty. Therefore, I hope that the Government will, as the Minister indicated, reflect on these issues before Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 31 withdrawn.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

15: Clause 2, page 1, line 12, leave out paragraphs (b) to (d)

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 15 arises out of the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee published on 29 January which I commend to the Committee. The amendment has been tabled in the names of four members of the Constitution Committee, myself and the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Beith, and our much respected chairman, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton.

One of the matters about which we expressed concern is whether the Bill as currently drafted will ensure, as the Government intend, the clarity and certainty that is required of the law as from exit day. I should emphasise that the amendments to the Bill which derive from the Constitution Committee’s report are being moved as probing amendments. We believe that we have identified problems that require debate and consideration by the Government, but we are not suggesting that our proposed solutions to these difficult problems are the last word.

Amendment 15 addresses what we believe to be the first fundamental difficulty with the approach adopted in the Bill. Clause 2 includes within the scope of the concept of EU-derived domestic legislation not merely those regulations which have been made under powers contained in the European Communities Act 1972 that Clause 1 is of course going to repeal, it also purports to include within the scope of EU-derived domestic legislation other primary or secondary legislation which has been enacted by normal procedures—that is, not using the powers in the 1972 Act but legislation that was enacted for the purpose of implementing our EU obligations or which relate to them. A good example is the Equality Act 2010. For the purposes of this Bill, Acts of Parliament such as the Equality Act are to be treated as EU-derived domestic legislation even though they would continue to be part of domestic legislation without the Bill. As I understand it, that is the purpose of Clause 14(6).

The scope of Clause 2 matters for two reasons. First, if an enactment falls within Clause 2 and it is therefore by reason of Clause 6(7) retained EU law, the delegated powers which Ministers will have under Clause 7 will apply. The Committee will come to consider those delegated powers in due course because they are very extensive. A number of amendments have been tabled in relation to them. The other reason this matters is that the consequence of a provision being retained EU law is that the supremacy principle under Clause 5, which again we will come to, also applies, so the retained EU law such as the Equality Act will take priority over other laws which are enacted up until exit day. Clause 2 therefore poses real problems for legal certainty because some of the provisions of the Equality Act, for example, will have been enacted for the purpose of implementing EU law obligations while some will have been enacted for other purposes. Some of the sections of the Equality Act relate to our EU law obligations while others do not.

Given that, perhaps I may ask the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, who I believe is going to respond for the Government on this, whether Clause 2 means that if any part of the Equality Act, as an example, was passed in order to implement an EU law obligation or relates to one, the whole of the Equality Act is within the scope of Clause 2 as retained EU law, or does Clause 2 mean that only those provisions of the Equality Act which implement an EU law obligation or are related to it are within Clause 2? I ask this because the language of Clause 2 focuses on the enactment, which suggests a statute by statute approach. If that is right, Ministers will be conferring upon themselves through Clause 7 a very wide power to amend by delegated legislation provisions of the Equality Act or other Acts in which provisions were enacted for other purposes. Indeed, if Clause 2 applies to the whole of the Equality Act then the supremacy principle will give priority to the whole of the Equality Act over other legislation enacted up until exit day. We need to know the answer to that question.

The Constitution Committee’s view is that the concept of EU-derived domestic legislation in Clause 2 ought to be confined to those enactments made under the powers conferred in the European Communities Act, which is what the Bill is all about—powers that the Bill would repeal. That would have the virtue of clarity and certainty. It would cut down the scope of the delegated powers that Ministers will enjoy under Clause 7 and limit the supremacy principle. The Constitution Committee respectfully suggests that that approach accords with constitutional principle. It said at paragraph 22 of its report:

“It is not constitutionally necessary or appropriate for primary legislation, which will continue in force in any event, to be treated as ‘retained EU law’ by clause 2 and subject to the powers of amendment in clause 7”.


The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, which has made very valuable observations on these issues, has pointed out, and I agree, that if the Committee were to amend Clause 2 in this respect, consequential changes would be needed to Clause 6 to ensure that provisions in the Equality Act, for example, that implement EU law will continue to be interpreted by reference to judgments of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg delivered before exit day.

These are difficult issues but the Constitution Committee suggests that they are important. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[The Lord Speaker (Lord Fowler)]

My Lords, I should notify the Committee that if Amendment 15 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 16 by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord Pannick, is a great expert in these matters. Could he give the Committee the benefit of his advice on whether he believes that converted law under Clause 2 has the status of primary or secondary legislation?

[Lord Pannick]

That is a very important question that we are coming to in later amendments. The Constitution Committee addressed that question. It has advised the House that one of the defects of the Bill, it respectfully suggests, is that it does not address that vital question and that legal uncertainty will be caused without it being addressed. The Constitution Committee suggested that retained EU law should be given the status of primary legislation, but there is a variety of views on this. The committee advised—I do not speak for the committee, but I am reporting what its report said—that this issue has to be addressed in the Bill. We are coming to it in later amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is indeed my reading. The noble Baroness alluded to this earlier in her contribution. That is why I sought to emphasise the term “EU-derived” domestic legislation. It is the derivation of that aspect of a particular Act which is to be brought within the ambit of retained EU law for these purposes.

[Lord Pannick]

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to what has been a valuable debate, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, in whatever capacity he was speaking to the House. The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, emphasised the need for legal certainty not just in this clause but throughout the Bill, even though that harms the interests of the legal profession. I should have declared my interest as a barrister who may benefit from legal uncertainty. A number of barristers are present in Committee: the noble Lords, Lord Faulks, Lord Carlile and Lord Thomas of Gresford. There may be others, all of us no doubt thinking that this is the reverse of Thomas Erskine’s comment when he was asked how he had the courage to stand up in the court of Lord Mansfield. He replied that he thought of his children pulling at his robe and begging him, “Now, father, is the time to get us bread”.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said that Clause 2 applies only to those sections of the Equality Act, for example, which were enacted for a specified EU purpose or have a relevant EU law connection. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, gave an explanation of that, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, agreed with that approach. That is very helpful in limiting the scope of Clause 2. However, it raises a problem, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, alluded. If Clause 2 applies only in relation to those parts of the statute which were enacted for a relevant EU purpose, there is still a problem of legal certainty, because there will be disputes as to which parts of the Equality Act—or other legislation—satisfy those criteria. I must say that the criteria in Clause 2 are far from clear. They operate by reference to the purpose of the legislation or whether the legislation relates to EU material. So there may still be a problem here.

I have two suggestions for the noble and learned Lord. First, if as he said, and I entirely accept what he said, Clause 2 is intended to apply only to those parts of the enactment—the Equality Act, or whichever Act—that are linked to EU law or have an EU purpose, the Government might wish to bring forward an amendment to Clause 2 on Report to make that clear on the face of the Bill. The second suggestion is that the noble and learned Lord might wish to consider whether any further clarity can be provided as to how the courts are supposed to apply this section-by-section approach and identify the purpose of the relevant section or whether it relates to EU law.

I noted the very helpful comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, on the status of retained EU law and on the supremacy of retained EU law. As he said, we will come to those matters next week, and there are amendments addressing them. I associate myself with the comments of the noble and learned Lord on the valuable contributions by Professor Paul Craig of the University of Oxford.

This has been a helpful debate in illuminating the Government’s intention. I will reflect, and I am sure the Constitution Committee will want to reflect, on what the Minister has said and on the other contributions. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 15 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

I support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, which seeks to clarify the status of EU directives which will be “adopted, but not implemented” on the day we exit the EU. The Government have repeatedly stressed that the purpose of the Bill is to provide legal certainty. Whichever side of the Brexit debate we take, clearly, that is a worthy and necessary objective. That being so, I am truly baffled that in this instance the Bill totally fails to give that clarity. Everyone affected or potentially affected by EU legislation that has been adopted but not implemented needs to have absolute certainty as to where they stand.

Amendment 18, if passed, would allow Ministers to treat EU directives adopted before exit day to stand, for those purposes, as if the UK had not left the EU. I understand from a House of Commons briefing that no fewer than 23 directives have already been published with implementation deadlines which fall after 29 March 2019. Several of these would enhance the lives of UK citizens. For example, one is aimed at strengthening restrictions on firearms, which are currently permitted to move freely within the European single market. If the Bill stands unamended, can the Minister clarify whether firearms will be controlled when they cross the north-south border in Ireland, for example? Another such directive aims at limiting the exposure of employees to dangerous substances in the workplace, such as carcinogens and mutagens. I will not elaborate but clearly there is an arguable case for saying that such safeguards should be part of UK law. Even more so, there is a crying imperative that people know where they stand on such matters.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am doubtful about this amendment for two reasons. The first is that the whole purpose of the Bill is to ensure that a snapshot of our obligations under EU law is transposed into domestic law as at exit day. If, as the amendment suggests, retained EU law contains the directives which are not yet in force, the purpose of the Bill will not be accomplished—something more will be read into EU law. However, it is not simply a technical matter; it is also a question of uncertainty. If the amendment is included in the Bill, one will not know at exit day the scope of retained EU law, as that will depend on what happens in Brussels thereafter. A directive which has been adopted but has not yet come into force might be amended before it comes into force, or it might never come into force. Therefore, I am very doubtful that legal certainty is accomplished by this amendment or that it is consistent with the objectives of the Bill. I entirely understand that it may be desirable to include within English law matters of this sort but it is certainly not consistent with the objects of the Bill.

[Lord Lea of Crondall (Lab)]

My Lords, perhaps I might check that, in interpreting the clause as it now stands, it is not possible for there to be a freeze on implementation by a particular exit day, whereby Ministers can cherry-pick the pieces of legislation they want to take through. That was not the intention. Can the Minister comment on that possible consequence of the exit date?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I draw the attention of the House to my declaration of interests. I declare an interest in the question of waste and I would like to follow on from the noble Baroness.

I am inclined to follow the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in dealing with this amendment. My problem with the snapshot concept—although it is the concept—is that it is rather fuzzy at the edges. Unless we think carefully through this, we will find that if we leave the European Union we may have signed up to obligations which we have not had time to carry through but which we intended to carry through. We may also sign up to obligations which, perhaps in retrospect we did not intend to carry through. However, that is unlikely. We may also have signed up to obligations where we had not worked out how we were going to carry them through. So there is bound to be uncertainty at this stage.

I emphasise what the noble Baroness has said: we have worked extremely hard across the board on a number of packages, particularly those concerned with the environment. Her Majesty’s Government have been enthusiastic about most of the elements that that contains. The noble and learned Lord who has replied to the previous two debates has been extremely helpful, not only in explaining to the House where the Government are but in giving us real hope that they will look carefully at the real questions we have raised. It is not a question of whether or not you are in favour of Brexit but of how we get this right. As the Minister has been kind and generous in that way, I hope he will help us to see what we should do. I say to my noble and learned friend that I do not think we should do this, but it is clearly something we have got to do if people are to know where they will stand.

[Lord Pannick]

The noble Lord is undoubtedly right that there will be instruments in Brussels to which we have contributed and which we would wish to incorporate into domestic law. This Bill does not prevent that. It is designed to provide the best snapshot possible, and Parliament is perfectly entitled to—and no doubt will—adopt many other later instruments and incorporate them in appropriate form into domestic legislation.

[Lord Deben]

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on that. However, the problem comes when an agreement is in Brussels and has been agreed by us but the implementation date comes later. That is the part I am particularly concerned with.

I am also concerned to take the opportunity to say to my noble and learned friend that one of the ways in which this Bill can be more readily acceptable is for the Government to be clear with the House. If there were such circumstances, would the Government be prepared to say now that they would seek to implement those things to which they had signed up in advance in a form they would choose? That is not an unreasonable thing to ask the Government to do. Otherwise we will go through this period—it seems as though it will go almost to the end before we know what is going to happen—of negotiating, discussing, agreeing and indeed voting on some of these matters, and no one will know whether, having voted for them, we were then willing to accept them into our own system and law and implement them, having signed up to them.

It would be helpful for all of us who are trying to work these things out and trying to run businesses to remove that uncertainty by committing the Government to say that they will implement what they have signed up to, in a form which they may choose, but under British law.

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There may also be directives that have been adopted which have not been the subject of implementation by the exit date because the transition period extends beyond the exit date. Those will not, therefore, have been taken into our domestic law and will not form part of retained EU law at the exit date. So, yes, there may be directives that have been adopted but not implemented by the exit date, and those directives will not form part of our domestic law. If, however, a directive contains matters that the Government consider appropriate to form part of our domestic law, there is no reason why the Government should not then proceed to enact appropriate domestic legislation to take into our domestic law those very matters.

[Lord Pannick]

Perhaps I might suggest to the Minister, and ask him to confirm, that there will also be directives that have passed their implementation date and have not yet been implemented in domestic law, but are sufficiently clear and precise that they confer individual rights under EU law and, therefore, to that extent they will be part of retained EU law.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, that is a slightly different point. First, the Government are committed to implementing in domestic law those directives which have a transition period that expires before the exit date. There are, however, circumstances in which a directive may have direct effect in a question between an individual and the state but has not been implemented in domestic law. That is subject to a determination by the Court of Justice of the European Union or, indeed, by our own courts. In circumstances where a directive has not been implemented by the end of the transition period and has direct effect as determined by the courts of justice, and that has been determined prior to the exit date, that will be brought into domestic law by way of Clause 4. That is the point of Clause 4 in that context.

Where a directive has been adopted before the exit date but has an implementation period which expires after the exit date, and has not been implemented in domestic law by the exit date, that will not form part of our domestic law and therefore it will not form part of EU retained law for the purposes of the Bill.

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[Lord Pannick]

This is the precise subject of Amendment 26, which arises out of a recommendation from the Constitution Committee. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is interested in this subject, we are going to debate it under Amendment 26.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord, but we have ranged rather widely in the context of the present debate—or, to use my noble friend Lord Deben’s term, we have got a little bit fuzzy as regards the precise terms of the amendment. I hope that, in light of the explanations that I have sought to give, including the reference to regulations and the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, to which we will return in due course, the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, on Amendment 21. I do not intend in my remarks to spend a lot of time with the actual list at the bottom of the amendment, because she put across very well the need to protect in particular certain things which do credit to this country and which will give us advantages in the future, whatever the status of this country is.

I certainly felt my optimism rising today as I heard the reactions of my noble and learned friend the Minister to the whole question of how EU retained law will be protected in future. He seemed to be suggesting at one point that there might be some sort of hybrid approach. I am not sure what that might result in, but in the meantime we are in a situation where, as I am sure noble Lords are aware, the law, however it is made, comes in various forms. It comes in various packages, some of which are packages of principle of law, while other parts of the packages are the levers or the actual technical means by which laws are implemented.

That is why the amendment specifically states that primary legislation should of course be the main means by which any modification could take place, but also that subordinate legislation would be appropriate in certain cases to deal with technical areas that are not appropriate for a primary approach. Indeed, it is very sensible that even subordinate legislation be dealt with in a manner that allows it to have the support and security afforded to the principal legislation itself. I think there are certain doubts—to say the least—about the list of retained EU law. We have had several debates today and previously about what is actually meant by retained EU law, and we need greater clarity as to precisely what components make up this category.

There was a debate in another place on a very similar area and amendment. It was a very strong debate, to which a considerable number of people contributed, and real concerns were expressed about the way in which retained EU law, however it is finally listed, could be supported. As I said, I will not spend any time on the main areas that have been listed, but the Government have given many assurances—which I welcome—that the main areas of retained law will be specially protected and that they regard them as terribly important. That is only being affected, in a negative sense, by remarks from legislators who in the main do not form part of our Government but who nevertheless have been making statements indicating that, almost with immediate effect from its arrival, the retained EU law will be either tampered with or destroyed. That has meant that a considerable number of people currently affected by the law are seriously worried about what might happen to those areas that are so important to our public and social life. The reasons for this amendment are to make sure that the Government are aware of the concerns and to ask them to do their best to put in place the security necessary to protect these areas on an ongoing basis. I support the amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I too support Amendments 21 and 22, which would restrict the powers of Ministers to modify retained EU law by secondary legislation in the contexts that have been mentioned: employment rights, equality rights, health and safety, consumer standards, environmental standards and human rights. All of those are vital areas. It is important in considering these amendments to recognise the breadth of the secondary legislation powers that are being conferred on Ministers under the Bill—and not just by Clause 7, to which we will come next week or the week after. The point is made by the organisation ClientEarth in a helpful opinion, which I commend to the Committee, written by Pushpinder Saini QC. He draws attention—and I draw the attention of the Committee—to some provisions that are tucked away in Schedule 8 to the Bill, on page 55. Paragraph 3(1) refers to existing powers in legislation to make subordinate legislation. It says:

“Any power to make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation which was conferred before exit day is to be read, on or after exit day and so far as the context permits or requires, as being capable of being exercised to modify … any retained direct EU legislation”.


That is a remarkably broad power. On page 56, at paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 8, there is a similar power for any future power to make subordinate legislation. Of course, the word “modify” has a very broad meaning, because it is defined in Clause 14(1), on page 10, to include amending, repealing or revoking.

That gives context to the importance of these two amendments. Can the Minister confirm that this really is the Government’s intention? Schedule 8 does not have the two-year limitation period that Clause 7 has. Clause 7 applies only for two years, which is bad enough, but at least it is time-limited, whereas Schedule 8 is not. Is it really the Government’s intention to confer power on Ministers to repeal by secondary legislation—with all the difficulties that poses for adequate scrutiny by Parliament—any employment rights and any of the other important protections mentioned in Amendment 21 and 22 in so far as they are part of retained EU law, which as we have heard covers the Equality Act and many other Acts in so far as they derive from, or are linked to, EU law obligations?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, the support of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, for the amendment will be welcome. It reflects what I have always thought was a considerable cross-party consensus in this country in favour of a reasonable amount of regulation. Of course there are fanatics. Professor Minford is a very good example of an intelligent man who believes if we got rid of all regulation it would be a very good thing, and he has made calculations of the economic benefits to the country if literally all regulations—health and safety, environment, consumer protection and employment protection and so on—were simply abolished. However, he is rightly regarded as a fanatic in his own profession and indeed in politics. There are a number of people on the right wing of the Conservative Party who have always been very close to that way of thinking, and it would be quite terrifying if the Government, under the camouflage of taking powers apparently needed to bring about Brexit, found themselves in possession of instruments that meant that without any real let or hindrance they could simply take an axe to the protective regulation that has emerged in this country over the decades.

All civilised countries have to have a reasonable amount of regulation in these fields or they very rapidly cease to be civilised. One of my great worries about leaving the EU is that we will probably end up with more regulation that in many cases will be much less rational: it will be the result of a campaign by the Daily Mail and weak Ministers giving in, saying, “Oh goodness, let them have what they want”, and regulating on this or that. There is a much greater chance of that happening when we are no longer part of a body of 28 countries that are forced to look at these issues in realistic terms and come to some agreement on the subject. That is very worrying.

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[Lord Faulks]

The Human Rights Act is expressly preserved as a result of the changes that the Bill is going to bring about. The charter is, of course, ruled out by the Bill at the moment; I suppose, from what the noble Lord says, this is a way in which to bring it back in under the rubric of “human rights protection”—but, of course, “human rights protection” is potentially a varied and wide description.

This amendment is an absolute recipe for confusion and litigation. Although I understand the feelings of insecurity about what a Government might have in mind, it is not consistent with the overall objective of this legislation, which is to provide clarity at the moment when we leave the European Union.

[Lord Pannick]

Given the noble Lord’s objections to the drafting of this amendment, does he sympathise, as I do, with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, with the idea that a way can be found to restrict powers of Ministers by subordinate legislation to change retained EU law? Will he express the hope that the Government will think very carefully about that and bring forward an amendment before Report?

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for that intervention. I am certainly receptive to the possibility of some restrictions on what the Government can do, but this is far too much of a restriction—it is a complete straitjacket.

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[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, may I elaborate on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick and invite the Minister to respond further? A key point in this debate is surely that powers conferred by Parliament should be exercised only as Parliament intended. A key point on paragraph 3 of Schedule 8, which the noble Lord referred us to, is that the power to make and approve subordinate legislation—which is conferred in primary legislation—was, in the case of retained direct EU legislation, originally conferred in the context of directives and legislation which derived from the European Union itself. So the context in which Parliament gave the power to make subordinate legislation was that it should achieve the purposes of the directive.

That being the case, allowing these powers to be used completely independently of those directives significantly enlarges the scope within which those powers can be exercised, which was not intended by Parliament when the powers to grant that subordinate legislation were first conferred. I am not sure that I am carrying the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with me, but that seems to me to be a crucial aspect of Schedule 8, and it would be good to get the Government’s comments on that.

[Lord Pannick]

The only reason why the noble Lord is not carrying me with him is that I do not understand the purpose of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Schedule 8. It seems to me extraordinarily broad, which is why I am seeking an explanation from the Minister as to why we need these powers, given that we also have Clause 7 in the Bill, which is time limited.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords—

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

No, the treaty will be a separate piece of legislation when we negotiate it. I hope I have tackled most of noble Lords’ questions and they will be able to withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I just ask the Minister about his comments on the European Court of Justice? Is there anything in the case law of the ECJ that justifies the Government’s reluctance for it to continue to be the dispute resolution procedure for the matters we are discussing?

[Lord Callanan]

We have been clear that respecting the Brexit vote means delivering on having control of our own laws. Our Supreme Court will be the ultimate arbiter of our own laws and it would not be appropriate to submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of a foreign power.

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[Viscount Hailsham]

That would have to get through both Houses, which would be at least some check on the process. The point I am making is not quite the point that my noble friend has interpreted. I am saying that, if the charter is to be incorporated into domestic law, it has to be the subject of parliamentary scrutiny and amendment, and that is the only basis on which the charter should be incorporated into domestic law.

I accept the noble and learned Lord’s point that a number of aspects of the charter are entirely irrelevant and are hinged on our membership of the Union. Articles 44, 42, 43 and 39 are examples of that. There are also articles in the provision of the charter that many of us would disagree with. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has indicated that she does not like many of them, and I happen to agree with her. I heard my noble friends Lord Howard, Lord Lamont and Lord Blencathra chuntering away, and I agree with them: there are many things in the charter with which I disagree. But I am saying that if it is to be incorporated, it should be incorporated in such a way as to enable this House to scrutinise each and every one of its provisions and amend as appropriate.

I remind the Committee that one reason many noble Lords and others wish to withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights is that the judge-made interpretation of the text is incapable of amendment by Parliament. I wish to avoid that criticism being made of the charter if it is to be incorporated. The suggestion in my amendment to make the charter, if incorporated, subject to parliamentary scrutiny and amendment is perhaps the only example in this sorry business of being able to cherry pick, or to have your cake and eat it.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, may I respond to some of the objections that have been raised to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, with whose speech I agree entirely?

Many of the objections—those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, are typical—are to the content of the charter or to its implications. The Committee should appreciate that that is not the Government’s position. The Government’s position is not that they seek to exclude the charter because its contents or implications are objectionable. Their position is very clear indeed. If noble Lords read the debates in the House of Commons or look at the report of the Constitution Committee, they will see that the Government’s position is simply that we do not need the charter in this Bill because its contents and implications are already contained in the retained EU law that is being read across through this Bill. So many of the objections that the Committee is listening to are simply beside the point: they are not the Government’s objection to the charter. The Government’s objection to the charter—it is unnecessary because its contents are already part of retained EU law—is, I am afraid, simply unsustainable. I will not take up time on this, because the hour is late, but if any noble Lords are doubtful about it, I simply suggest they read the helpful opinion by Jason Coppel QC, in which he clearly sets out the equality and human rights position. That is the first point.

Turning to the second point, I am always reluctant to disagree with my noble friend Lady Deech, because she taught me law at Oxford, but I have to disagree with her on this occasion. Her objection, as she explained it, and I hope I do not misrepresent her, is that she is concerned that the charter will enable the courts to overturn legislation enacted by Parliament—she is nodding. But I am sure she appreciates that that is inherent in this Bill. The whole point of the Bill is to read across as retained EU law the content of existing EU law that is applicable to this country and to give it—see Clause 5—supremacy. Supremacy means that it takes priority, as in the Factortame case, over anything enacted by Parliament which is inconsistent. So the suggestion that we must oppose the charter because it gives courts that power is simply inconsistent with what the Bill does.

Turning to the third objection, my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood was concerned about whether the inclusion of the charter would, in some way, give a power that expands the role of the charter further than under EU law. My simple answer to that is no, of course it does not. The charter is being read across only because it is part of existing EU law, and it comes across as retained EU law. It will not have any greater force than it already has as part of EU law.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

In those circumstances, does my noble friend agree that the result of that is that we are henceforth, instead of treating retained EU law as part of domestic law—having discarded the separation and shed the notion that it is a distinct body of law—still going to have to wrestle with all the difficulties inherent in distinguishing operations or actions pursued in the ambit of EU law from those that are not? Will that problem continue into the distant future?

[Lord Pannick]

My answer is very simple: yes, of course. The whole point of the Bill is to read across the EU law which currently applies to this country and for it to continue to apply. That is the Government’s objective. It is their objective because they—very sensibly, in my view—wish to ensure legal certainty and clarity on exit day. That is exactly the legal position. It is not my idea; it is the Government’s intention in this Bill.

As to all the concerns about what the charter might or might not do, one should bear in mind that the charter has been applicable in the courts of this country for many years. No one has suggested that there is some case or principle which is so objectionable that we need now to make an exception for the charter, when the Government’s intention in the Bill is to read across all retained EU law to ensure a functioning statute book that preserves the legal position and ensures clarity, certainty and continuity. That is what this Bill is about.

[Lord True (Con)]

There is, I think, a fourth question. As a layman, I have been listening for 51 minutes to extensive legal argument on these questions—and who am I to judge, in a sense?—and I was persuaded by the distinguished arguments of two former Law Lords that I heard. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to three arguments but there is surely a fourth argument which has not been adduced by any of the noble and learned Lords who have spoken, and that is that 17.4 million British people voted to leave the European Union, and that means coming out from under the jurisdiction of entities which are not subject to the Crown, Parliament and UK law.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, smiles and laughs. All the arguments that we have heard in this Chamber over the past two days in Committee come from those who do not wish that to happen, but the fact is that the British people sought a future in which they and their Parliament will make UK laws, and UK judges, under the Crown, will judge those. We have no need of any charter which has been made outside, something that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, argued for repeatedly when he was Attorney-General.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. The reason I am smiling is that he clearly has not read this Bill. The Government’s Bill reads across the entire content of EU law that applies as at the exit date; it becomes part of our law. It is the whole point of the Bill.

[Lord True]

If I may—

[Lord Pannick]

I am sorry; let me complete the point. The noble Lord has made a point and he is simply wrong. The Government’s Bill reads across the whole of EU law. It removes the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice—I do not suggest to the contrary—and the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has absolutely nothing to do with the role of the European Court of Justice. It will be the role of our courts and our judges to decide from now on the meaning and effect of the retained EU law which this Bill reads across. It will then be in later legislation for Parliament, as it sees fit, to amend or repeal that law. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, indicated, the Prime Minister said that this Bill is not an occasion for changing the law, it is an occasion for ensuring that on exit day we have a workable, certain, continuing system of law. The real question is why this Bill should make an exception for one element of European Union law, the charter. There is no justification for that whatsoever.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, it does the opposite of what my brilliant former pupil the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said. The inclusion of the charter brings with it uncertainty. It is a Trojan horse because if you carry on applying it, its meaning depends on the evolving case law of the ECJ, which has an objective of bringing further integration and other objectives to do with Europe that are not our objectives. Our judges have said that they want certainty after Brexit, but to include the charter, which is evolving all the time, without our scrutiny will give our judges sleepless nights because they will have to follow the twists and turns in EU law. I come back to the fact that the nub of this is that it will plainly give our judges the right to set aside and invalidate UK law. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, mentioned with approval the Benkharbouche case, where part of our sovereign immunity law was set aside by the Supreme Court on the basis of charter supremacy. That was actually dangerous because if other countries start setting aside immunity law when dealing with our diplomats, we will be in a very difficult situation indeed. I would not assess the Supreme Court by the outcome of what it says; we assess courts by the way they are appointed and the integrity of our judges. The retention of the charter is a recipe for confusion, uncertainty and the setting aside of British law according to ECJ judgments.

[Lord Pannick]

I am sorry to say to the noble Baroness that that is exactly what this Bill achieves in relation to all other retained EU law which is read across. This will be under the control of British judges. Under the Bill it is entirely a matter for them what weight, if any, they choose to give to judgments of the European Court of Justice. The charter of rights is no different from any other provision of EU law in that respect. The noble Baroness mentioned certainty. What I think provokes uncertainty for judges is the approach in this Bill. It is not simply that the charter of rights is excluded by Clause 5; the clause goes on to say that undefined,

“fundamental rights or principles which exist irrespective of the Charter”,

are retained. There is a conflict in the approach taken on this issue. I suggest to noble Lords that the correct approach is that which has been recommended to the Committee and to the House by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee: that there is no justification whatever for distinguishing between the charter of rights and all other aspects of retained EU law. I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, in what he said.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 35 standing in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, which would leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert the words as set out in the amendment. The objective of Amendment 35 is to retain the charter rights in UK law and afford them the same level of protection as those in the Human Rights Act. It has similar objectives to some of the other amendments that have been proposed. I must admit that I address the House on these issues with some trepidation because I am not a lawyer, although I have taken the advice of lawyers in drafting this amendment.

The amendment provides for what I hope is a sensible and responsible approach to Brexit that respects the referendum decision but does not sacrifice rights and protections on the altar of ideology. Removing the European Charter of Fundamental Rights from EU retained law runs counter to the stated purpose of the Bill, which is to facilitate the wholesale transfer of EU law into the domestic statute book. It also contradicts the Government’s assurances that the same rules will apply on the day before exit as on the day after. The Government’s justification for this anomaly is to claim that the charter is unnecessary and that its omission will not result in any loss of substantive rights protections.

In an attempt to support their public assurances to that effect, the Government have since published a right-by-right analysis that they say demonstrates that each right can be found in domestic law. The analysis is unpersuasive. According to Liberty and Amnesty International, it is perfectly possible to retain the charter and deal with any redundant sections after exit just as with the rest of retained EU law, as has already been mentioned. The Equality and Human Rights Commission has obtained the opinion of senior counsel Jason Coppel QC on the Government’s analysis of the charter. His advice is that the loss of the charter will lead to a significant weakening of human rights protection in the UK. This is because, first, there will be gaps in protection, for example in relation to children’s rights, data protection and non-discrimination. Secondly, many rights will no longer be directly enforceable, leading to further gaps in protection. Thirdly, many remaining rights could be removed by Ministers exercising delegated powers.

A particular concern that I would like to highlight is that Brexit will remove any children’s rights and safeguards currently offered by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which imposes a constitutional obligation on member states to adhere to children’s rights standards when implementing EU law. The EU’s Court of Justice now routinely refers to the charter when adjudicating on cases involving children.

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[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Against the noble and learned Lord’s will. There was also an attempt to get an opt-out, which the European Court of Justice said was not valid. I see that the Minister is agreeing with me. I believe that is a correct account of what happened. It was struck down. The case in which it happened was, I think, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson.

[Lord Pannick]

Would the noble Lord accept that there are many areas of EU law which this country has opposed but which have nevertheless become part of EU law? This Bill seeks to exclude none of them from retained EU law, other than the charter. Why is that?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

That is very much my argument. For reasons that I wish to develop, I agree very much with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and what was said by my noble friend Lord Faulks about the confusion and conflict that this will cause between the role of the European Court of Justice and our own courts. The President of the Supreme Court has already called for further clarification of the relationship the Supreme Court will have with the European Court of Justice. It seems to me, for reasons I am about to give, that this would be made even worse if we incorporated the charter into the Bill and into UK law.

The retention of the charter would lead to real problems of uncertainty and confusion. Above all, retaining the charter would give the ECJ even more continued influence over our courts. I accept what the noble and learned Lord has said, that there is going to be a relationship for a while with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, but incorporating the charter will give much more opportunity for what people have called judicial adventurism from the European Court of Justice, as it continues to expand the interpretation of the charter. This is not an obsession of Conservatives. I draw the Committee’s attention to what the late Lord Bingham, I think, said in evidence to the House of Lords EU Committee in 2016. He said that although,

“the European Court of Human Rights is a very benign institution … the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg has predatory qualities to it that could be very inimical to some of our national practices”.

That is a reference to the expansionist activities of the ECJ. The charter, as many people know, is extremely loosely worded. The risk of leaving the charter in place is that it allows the ECJ, while it still has jurisdiction over us and our Supreme Court, to expand the charter into new areas. I am not suggesting that the rights we have are frozen for ever or should not be expanded, but merely that that is something that should be decided in this country by our Parliament.

I am also concerned, because of this and the expansion of activities of the ECJ, that if the charter were incorporated our courts would acquire the power to strike down statute on the basis of incompatibility with the charter, which is the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, was making. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to the Factortame case, which was a notorious example where an Act of Parliament was actually struck down. We do not want to create another situation in which domestic courts can strike down Acts of Parliament.

It is the European Court of Justice that interprets what the charter means within the European Union, so if the charter is incorporated into law, what relationship is then going to exist between the Supreme Court and the ECJ? As the ECJ continues to develop its interpretation of the charter, we would be on a road where we had to take it more and more into account. On the basis of what has been said, we must avoid that confusion.

If there are gaps in the rights, we have an opportunity to incorporate them with primary legislation. For example, people have been saying in some of the debates that there are various matters relating to the environment that are not covered. However, we will have a new environment Act and a new environment agency. That seems to me to be the way to cope with any rights that are not fully covered, and it is far better to avoid the confusion of incorporating the charter into UK law.

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[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I am being persistent this evening because I want to point out the glaring contradiction in the views that have been put forward in support of the Government and of the Bill as it currently stands. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, says the Charter of Fundamental Rights is a pernicious and dangerous document—“dangerous” was her word—that would lead to courts in this country setting aside laws that they did not like, which would be scandalously contrary to British traditions of constitution and law. On the other side, we have had people, and the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, is the latest example of this, saying the reason why we cannot have the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Bill and transferred into English law is that it is unnecessary and would be confusing because all the rights are there and some of the rights are already in the corpus of British law. Noble Lords must make up their minds: they cannot say something is a radical and pernicious measure with substantial negative consequences but at the same time say that it has no effect at all and is merely otiose. There is a fundamental contradiction there. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, noticed the same thing but was not quite so explicit about it as I have been.

[Lord Pannick]

I did my best.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

There is a confusion in this country that comes up quite frequently. We like to think—we are brought up to think it—that we do not have a written constitution in this country and we do not have constitutional laws. That is totally untrue: the Bill of Rights is a constitutional law; in my view the Bill that we are now trying to repeal, the European Communities Act, is a constitutional law; and the Human Rights Act is certainly a constitutional law. By “a constitutional law”, I mean a law that is generally regarded as foundational and is prayed in aid before the courts and referred to in court judgments across a whole range of subjects. Because of that contradiction, we do not really recognise what is going on and we get ourselves into a frightful confusion.

Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, I am not shocked and offended by the idea that a court could put aside a Bill that was contrary to existing law. The remedy, of course, is quite simple: Parliament can change either the existing law or the previous one. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, my Lincolnshire neighbour, came out with the right solution when he said that the check and the important constitutional protection against a Government with a parliamentary majority acting entirely irresponsibly or even tyrannically is that any Bills they put forward would have to go through both Houses. In that context, one hopes that the House of Lords would act as a guardian of the constitution and be prepared to stand up to the Government and wait for them, if necessary, to bring in the Parliament Act to override it. That would be a considerable check and balance, and it is a very important role of this House that we are there as a long-stop in such circumstances. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, came up with the right solution and I am sorry that I did not sign his amendment, but I certainly approve of it very much, and if he comes forward with something like it at Report, I shall be happy to support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We have considered that analysis, and that is why I indicated that we were still looking at this. As I said, if rights are identified which are not in fact going to be incorporated into our domestic law in the absence of the charter, we will look very carefully at ensuring that those are not lost.

Clause 5(5) makes it clear that, notwithstanding the non-incorporation of the charter, retained EU law will continue to be interpreted by UK courts in a way that is consistent with the underlying rights. I hope that addresses to some extent the issue raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, in that context. Interpretive provisions will retain a means by which we can look at these rights in the proper context.

With regard to those who have expressed concerns about this Bill resulting in a loss of substantive rights, I repeat—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has done, at least prior to his recent Pauline conversion—that it is not necessary to retain the charter to retain those fundamental rights. If we see that there is a potential loss of such fundamental rights, we will address that, and that is what we have indicated.

[Lord Pannick]

I put it to the noble and learned Lord that there is no other area of retained EU law where the Government have carried out this exercise or said that we do not need to read across a particular provision because it is already in domestic law. Why are they making an exception of the charter?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Because this is the only case in which we have identified that situation. There is no other reason for proceeding in this way except for that.

Transparency of the Parole Board and Victim Support

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 9th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not understand that any concern was expressed by the chairman of the Parole Board about resources or the standard of review that the board carried out before making this decision. The issue is whether or not it can disclose the reasoning behind its decision. As the law stands, it cannot do that, so the issue is one of transparency more than anything else. I reassure the right reverend Prelate that that is the position as I understand it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, are not the Government making a bit of a meal of this? Is it not clear beyond argument that the decision of the Parole Board to release Worboys cannot command the confidence of the public, and certainly not that of the victims, without the Parole Board being able to tell the public why it has taken that decision? Do we really need a review to establish that?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Lord, few issues are ever clear beyond argument, as he knows from his experience in the courts. In this instance, it is appropriate that we should review the matter before we take further steps.

CPS: Disclosure of Evidence

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 18th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, again, I am not going to anticipate the outcome of the review that will be undertaken jointly by the CPS and the police in respect of this case.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, why is it that the full detail of the internal review should not be published, given the public interest in the matter?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, at this stage it is anticipated that the conclusions of any review will be published, but it is not usual or normal for the full terms of an internal review to be put into the public domain.

Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2017

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 13th September 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I want to say one thing about this statutory instrument. It deals with a particular class of judicial review relating to the environment. It is special in this way: there are limitations of cost already in the system—of £5,000 where the claimant is claiming only as an individual, not as or on behalf of a business or other legal person, and £10,000 in all other cases. For a defendant, the amount is £35,000. In the previous arrangements that was fixed. It is certainly easy to think that, for a claimant, £5,000 might be a substantial amount in relation to his or her environmental interest.

These rules allow the court jurisdiction and discretion to alter these figures either up or down. It is important that the discretion is limited by this phrase:

“The court may vary such an amount or remove such a limit only if satisfied that … to do so would not make the costs of the proceedings prohibitively expensive for the claimant”—


that is the rule from the convention—and,

“in the case of a variation which would reduce a claimant’s maximum costs liability or increase that of a defendant, without the variation the costs of the proceedings would be prohibitively expensive for the claimant”.

The protection for the claimant is the jurisdiction and discretion of the court within the limits that that sets out. Is not in any way a damaging type of jurisdiction or discretion, but one that can help people who have a need for that. That must be taken into account in considering this instrument.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, my response to the noble and learned Lord is that these rules remove the certainty that potential claimants previously enjoyed. That is the vice as I see it. It is essential in these cases that a person considering starting proceedings knows at the outset the maximum liability they will incur. It is no answer to them, when they are thinking of bringing proceedings, that the cap may be reduced as well as increased. They want to know. If they do not know at the outset when considering bringing these proceedings what the maximum is, the likelihood is that many of them will be deterred from bringing these proceedings. That is the damage to access to justice.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

The second point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, concerned the variation in the cap. Much was made of the fact this would produce uncertainty and have a chilling effect. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that it removes certainty, suggesting that at any time a claimant could suddenly find that their liability for costs had materially altered without any change in circumstances. That is simply not the case. A good argument is never improved by being overstated. It is important to appreciate that while the court has the power—

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am mid-sentence but the noble Lord may come in in a moment.

It is important to appreciate that while the court has the power to review the cap on a claimant’s potential cost liability, it will be able to do so only on very limited grounds. Indeed, the only two grounds I am aware of are, first, that the claimant misled the court as to its financial position when the cap was originally fixed, which is hardly a sympathetic position, or secondly, that there has been such a material change in the claimant’s financial position that the cap should be reviewed, whether downwards or upwards. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, wanted to make an observation.

[Lord Pannick]

I do not want to overstate my case; I just want to be clear that I have understood the rules correctly. When considering bringing proceedings, the person concerned cannot know what the cap is and at any stage during the proceedings the cap can be increased, as the noble and learned Lord says, if the judge takes the view that circumstances have changed. That is my understanding.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Let us be absolutely clear about what the position is. When a claimant begins the proceedings, there is a default cap, but on seeing the schedule of means, the court may vary that cap, downwards or upwards—downwards to the benefit of the claimant, upwards to the benefit of the defendant, potentially. Therefore, that is appropriate.

Lay Magistrates

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Magistrate remains a sought after role, and competition for vacancies tends to be strong. Advisory committees employ a range of techniques to reach out into their communities for applications to the Bench. This can and does include advertising in public places such as libraries, community centres and the local press. At present, there are no plans to put forward further financial incentives.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, in light of the concern about the age of magistrates, will the Minister look again at the unreasonably low retirement age of 70 for magistrates?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I remind the noble Lord that the unreasonably low retirement age of 70 applies also to justices of the Supreme Court.