Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I tabled the amendment to which my noble friend referred, Amendment 5 to government Amendment 4, because I did not believe that the government Amendment, helpful though it is, fully satisfied the clear intention set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, that somebody who feels that they can only engage with this process on paper should be able to do so without the creation of a parallel procedure or there being two different processes. What we have is one simplified procedure in which documentation is held online but to which people can make submissions by paper, not only initially but at any necessary subsequent stages. For that to be a reality, they must also be able to receive the relevant documentation on paper through the work and assistance of the Courts Service. I think that some ambiguity has been created.

I note that the Minister wrote to us about the requirement to initiate proceedings by electronic means, which requires rules to be made to enable documents submitted in paper to be treated as if they were initiated by electronic means. The wording of government Amendment 4 appears to refer to the initiation of the proceedings, rather than the initiation of subsequent documents, and is silent on the entitlement to receive documents on paper. The simple issue, which some of us may have faced in dealing with other organisations, is that you cannot have a situation in which you make a submission on paper and have no clue what will happen afterwards because you are relying on the paper process. The Government’s intention was clear in everything the noble and learned Lord said, but it is not clear in the amendment. My addition to the Government’s wording would make it clear, although I fully accept that this could be dealt with in words in a different way or at a different point in the parent amendment. My noble friend is confident that the Government have got the point and are going to do something about it, but I would like the noble and learned Lord to make that clear.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their very positive response to the concerns expressed around the House in Committee. I agree with all the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, and I support their amendments. I am particularly concerned about government Amendment 4 for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, indicated. It is expressly confined to the initiation of proceedings and does not in terms cover, as it must, the right to submit further paper documents and to receive paper documents if the litigant so elects. I very much look forward to the Minister confirming what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, indicated—that the Minister intends to address this point at Third Reading.

I much prefer the solutions offered in the various amendments to which the Minister and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, have spoken, to Amendment 7 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, with all due respect to him. As I understand it, his amendment would allow for regulations, under which the party bringing proceedings could choose whether proceedings are under the Online Procedure Rules or the standard rules. I can see no justification, particularly if the other amendments are agreed, for allowing people to choose which rules apply, especially if paper documents can be fed in and received under the Online Procedure Rules. Such an amendment would, I fear, damage the whole purpose of the Bill. It would give litigants an option as to which rules apply and benefit no one other than those who wish to make a simple claim subject to a more complex and more expensive procedure as, for example, a negotiating tactic.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I shall say just a word or two in support of these amendments. Amendment 2, by adding the two words “providing for”, and Amendment 3, by removing the one word “technical”, would rather improve the clause. Amendment 5 improves government Amendment 4, which itself was an improvement. If I may, I will paraphrase how I understand Amendment 5 would work: if you are not digitally educated and you would prefer to use paper you may do so, and if you do your papers will be incorporated into the electronic system. The amendment would provide that you are entitled to continue to use your own paper and your own paper system because the electronic system would be perfectly well able to provide you with all the paper you need. There should be no difficulty about it at all.

Amendment 5 is consistent with Amendment 18 to Clause 7, which has the interest of those who require technical support to be protected. It also, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, effectively makes Amendment 7 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, to Clause 3 redundant because the paper user would then not be at any disadvantage. For the reasons he has given, the idea of having two systems running side by side would, among other things, be a recipe for those who do not want justice to be done and who want to confuse and to avoid getting the system to court for a hearing.

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[Lord Judge]

My Lords, the Government have come a long way and I am now addressing not only the amendments put forward by the Government but Amendments 22 and 23. I begin by thanking the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for kindly listening to what we had to say and for acting on it, and the Bill team for helping him get the wording right. It means that the Government have come a long way towards understanding the implications of the constitutional changes in 2005, which changed the relationship between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice and placed on the Lord Chief Justice responsibilities that once attached to the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chief Justice now has personal responsibility for the arrangements by which litigation is conducted. To the extent that this relates to tribunals, the Senior President of Tribunals has the same responsibility. I welcome Amendment 12 and government Amendments 6, 8, 25, 26, 27 and 28, and shall welcome government Amendments 10 and 15 in the next group.

The difference between being consulted and requiring concurrence needs no emphasis. If you are consulted, what you say can be totally disregarded; concurrence means what it says. Despite all that I have said, I am sad to say that although the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has taken his car a long way down the road of logic and constitutional sense, his vehicle has run out of fuel and failed to reach its logical conclusion.

The position can be summarised very briefly. Amendments 22 and 23 to Clauses 8 and 9, respectively, concern two clauses which, as drafted, give exceptionally wide powers to a Minister. Indeed, Clauses 8 and 9, I am afraid, are in the sadly standard form of donating, handing over or retaining power to the Executive which we now find in just about every Bill that comes before us.

The first six clauses, whatever other comments may be made about them, recognise that the government amendments in group three address the constitutional responsibilities. That is fine. Clause 7(3) gives the Minister an unconditional power to,

“allow or disallow Online Procedure Rules made by the Committee”,

provided that written reasons are given for doing so. In other words, he does not have to consult the Lord Chief Justice if he thinks that the rules put forward are not sensible or appropriate, or that they would cost too much money. That prevents the committee going off on a frolic of its own—or, indeed, putting forward rules with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice which, for example, involve unreasonable expenditure. That is very sensible. I do not cavil at the idea incorporated in Clause 7(3) and the individual responsibility of the Lord Chancellor in that regard.

However, taken together, Clauses 8 and 9 unbalance the relationship. The Lord Chief Justice falls out of Clause 8 altogether—he does not get a mention. He is reduced or left to the consultation process in Clause 9, which is entirely inconsistent with the provisions in the Bill that the Government amended to allow for concurrence rather than consultation. Under Clause 8, the Minister has power to direct that the rule committee shall include provisions to achieve the Minister’s purposes and that, when such a direction is given, the committee has no option but to comply within a reasonable time. It is that stark; the power is vested directly in the Minister.

It is one thing—and perfectly sensible—to protect the Lord Chancellor from some wild or absurd rule committee proposal. It is, with great respect, quite another for him to have an unconstrained power to give it directions: in effect, to tell it what to do. The Minister may, by Clause 9(2), also don the tarnished crown of King Henry VIII, who is not, of course, King Henry VIII to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen; I am not sure what he is to Scottish history—probably nothing. Would it not be wonderful to have a history in which Henry VIII counted for nothing? It would certainly be a convenience to this House if he did not count for very much.

So, if he wishes, the Minister may don this tarnished crown if he considers it necessary or desirable to facilitate the making of the rules. On closer examination, if you put these two clauses together, this arguably means that the Minister may overrule the very rules which were made with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice or his predecessor.

The Bill should be logical. The Lord Chief Justice’s concurrence to the exercise of these powers is elementary. The Bill and the government amendments now recognise it; the Minister has his safeguards in Clause 7(3); Amendments 22 and 23 make similar safeguards available to the Lord Chief Justice. I invite the Minister to refuel his car and keep right on to the end of the road.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a practising barrister. I too thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the important amendments which he has tabled, which will ensure that the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice is required under Clauses 2 and 3. However, I have added my name to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—in particular, Amendments 22 and 23—similarly to require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of the powers being conferred on the Minister under Clauses 8 and 9.

Clause 8 is an extraordinary clause. It would confer power on the Minister to require the committee to include a specified provision if the Minister thinks it is “expedient” to do so, and if the committee were to be so required, it would have a legal duty to comply. “Expedient” is the broadest possible word to define the scope of such a power. If Clause 8 is enacted as drafted, the requirement for the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice under Clauses 2 and 3, which we all agree is necessary, would be rendered pointless. The Minister could simply override the views of the Lord Chief Justice in relation to any relevant matter under Clauses 2 and 3. I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, does not share that view, and I look forward to him explaining why there is a limitation on what appears to be, and indeed is, the broadest possible drafting in the language of Clause 8. It contains no express limitation, and it seems very difficult to argue that there is an implied limitation that would prevent the Minister rendering pointless what is in Clauses 2 and 3 when the very purpose of Clause 8 is to give the broadest possible discretion to the Minister to give directions to the committee with which it must comply. Since the Minister has rightly accepted that, in the context of provisions about access to justice—which is what we are talking about—it is necessary for the provisions to require the concurrence of both the Minister and the Lord Chief Justice, there can nevertheless be no justification for conferring on the Minister by Clause 8 a power to override the views of the Lord Chief Justice on these important matters.

Clause 9 confers, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, a broad Henry VIII power on the Lord Chancellor to amend, repeal and revoke other legislative provisions whenever the Lord Chancellor considers it “necessary or desirable” in consequence of the Online Procedure Rules or to facilitate the making of Online Procedure Rules. Again, these are exceptionally broad powers, touching centrally on access to justice. For the same reasons that require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of powers under Clauses 2 and 3, it is necessary to require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of powers under Clause 9.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I do not know what answer the Minister will give to the pertinent question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the Clause 8 powers. The Lord Chief Justice might in some cases exercise the Clauses 2 and 3 powers to defy what the Lord Chancellor had asked the rule committee to do—which it had gone on to do at waste of time and expense and which he would not then agree to. However, that would apply to only some of the powers that the Minister would have in these circumstances; for example, extending into an area which the Lord Chief Justice did not think appropriate for the use of online procedure. But there are other things that the Lord Chancellor might direct the committee to do, such as shortening the notice period for various stages in the process or reducing in one way or another the rights of people engaged in the process, which could then be an obligation on the committee. If its members did not then resign, they would be required to produce rules which the Lord Chief Justice did not have a protective power to veto. The Clause 8 powers are worrying, and I do not recall at any stage in our amicable discussion any explanation why they are necessary and why, if any power is needed in this area, it cannot be much more narrowly defined.

One can make a similar point about Clause 9 in relation to Henry VIII powers, but it is a point that we have made so often that we risk becoming tired of making it. Thank goodness that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, never ceases to make it in every circumstance in which it is appropriate.

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I took some part in previous discussions of these matters in relation to the powers of the Lord Chief Justice and the fact that he—or she, if it happens to be so—is now the head of the judiciary and the Lord Chancellor is not. I am inclined to remember—I may be wrong, and I hope that my noble and learned friend will correct me if I am—that a provision of exactly this type was made in relation to the other procedural committees that currently exist. It is a considerable time since that provision was made, and as far as I know, no trouble has emerged. That is because I would expect the Minister to exercise great care in this matter. I think I am right in saying that that was not altered in the Constitutional Reform Act, as it is called, which changed the responsibility of head of the judiciary.

I am therefore inclined to want to hear a bit more about this before we come to a decision. When so much agreement has been reached, it is a pity if we fall from agreement at the last minute, particularly if to do so would produce a very strange anomaly between the existing law relating to either of the other procedural committees and this rather more technical committee.

I do not think Clause 9 has to do with the procedure rules. It has to do with the possible obstruction to those rules which may exist in legislation already passed as part of our law. The Lord Chancellor is entitled to make regulations to amend the Acts of Parliament which interfere with the proposals being accepted as Online Procedure Rules. The rules may well have an impact on old statutory provisions—for example, those which have an impact on whether or not you can have online procedures—most of which, I imagine, did not envisage that. It may be that they can be interpreted to include considerations of that kind, but that is the nature of the problem in relation to Clause 9.

After thinking this through as best I can, I would not care for the Lord Chief Justice to have to be involved in the regulation-making aspect of this business. If regulations are required, they should be made by the person with the appropriate political responsibility. I therefore have doubts about the relevance of the rules in relation to Clause 9.

As to Clause 8, as far as I know, existing law was left unchanged by the Constitutional Reform Act. As to Clause 9, I wonder whether it is appropriate for the Lord Chief Justice to get himself involved in the nitty-gritty of political regulation.

[Lord Pannick]

The noble and learned Lord says that it is not appropriate for the Lord Chief Justice to be involved in Clause 9 matters—that he is not relevant to that—but the clause makes him involved. It gives him a role because he has to be consulted, so he is not irrelevant at all.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Exactly. He is doing exactly what I think is required. If the person who has the responsibility finds out that it is okay with the Lord Chief Justice—at least that is what I hope would happen—that person then goes on and does it. Therefore, consultation is probably the right balance at that stage. I am rather against the idea of involving the Lord Chief Justice in any form of political work. I thought the Constitutional Reform Act sought to achieve separation between the judiciary and the legislature, so that the acting judiciary were no longer part of the legislature.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin with two general observations. First, I am not conscious of having run out of fuel, but I leave that to others to judge. Secondly, it occurs to me that the Henrician view of executive power does not differ in any practical respect from the Stuart view of the divine right of kings.

Perhaps I should begin by making this point. Under the structure of the Bill, it will be necessary, pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3, to identify proceedings of a specified kind that may be subject to the Online Procedure Rules. In the light of the Government’s amendments, that can be done only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, as indicated, and subject to the affirmative procedure.

It is not open to the Online Procedure Rule Committee to make Online Procedure Rules in respect of procedures that are not of a specified kind—that would simply be ultra vires. There is scope the other way, for the Online Procedure Rule Committee to provide that certain proceedings that are of a specified kind are not to be governed by the rules; that is pursuant to Clause 1(6). So the point I seek to emphasise at the outset is that the definition of specified procedures—the specified kind of procedures—sets out the framework within which the Online Procedure Rule Committee can operate. If the Minister were at any time to direct the Online Procedure Rule Committee, pursuant to Clause 8, to make rules in respect of proceedings that were not of a specified kind, that would be ultra vires; that is quite clear. He can direct them to make rules only in respect of proceedings of a specified kind pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3.

It is not possible to utilise the Clause 8 power in order to run roughshod over the provisions in Clauses 2 and 3, which clearly set out the need for the Lord Chief Justice to give concurrence to the proceedings that will be subject to the rules. Perhaps I am stating the obvious, but it occurred to me that one or two observations made in the course of this debate were inclined to suggest otherwise. I do not accept that. One has to look at the entire structure of the Bill and have proper regard to the way in which Clauses 2 and 3 will operate in that respect.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. It may be obvious to him, but not necessarily to others, that there is this implied limitation in what appears a very broad power being conferred on Clause 8. I suggest to him that a possible way forward would be for him to introduce at Third Reading an amendment to Clause 8 that makes it clear in the Bill that it has the limitation that he tells the House it has.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With great respect to the noble Lord, I do not consider that I am dealing with an implied limitation. If one construes the Bill as a whole, one begins with Clauses 2 and 3, which set out the framework within which the Online Procedure Rule Committee will be able to operate. That framework is subject to the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice; that is quite clear. To read Clause 8 as though it stands entirely alone and independently of the rest of the Bill is not, I submit, at all appropriate. The circumstances in which Clause 8 directions may be given clearly apply to the rule-making power of the committee. The committee has no rule-making power except in respect of proceedings of a specified kind as provided for by Clauses 2 and 3. I do not suggest that an implication is necessary there; it is simply a matter of statutory construction. I hear what the noble Lord says and will give further consideration to the point he makes in light of it, but that is my position at present.

Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 10th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I can easily follow my noble friend because he has said much of what needs to be said. With Amendment 4, I am trying to explore what the circumstances are in which it would be possible for people to revert to the traditional procedure rather than the online one. I am in favour of the Bill being introduced—I have called for it on many occasions and strongly support it—but the Constitution Committee has pointed out that it raises some issues that need to be clarified and sorted out, and this is one of them.

What are we trying to do here? Are we trying to create an online system that is advantageous, beneficial to the parties and much less cumbersome as well as saving time for the judicial system? Are we then going to encourage people to make use of it in the expectation that they will? The piloting of more limited projects in this area indicates that we have good reason to be optimistic. So is that what we are doing, or are we setting up a system in which it will be almost impossible to insist on conventional court proceedings even in circumstances where both parties think that is right? The question then arises whether you could have circumstances where one party to a dispute could insist, even when it was to the detriment of the other, that the more cumbersome procedure was used. I would be interested in the Minister’s comments on that question. Where both parties are quite clear that there are good reasons for a hearing in court, why should they be precluded from having one if our assumption is that this is a system that would be attractive to users and make the court system function more effectively, particularly in large numbers of money claims of relatively modest size?

One of the ambiguities that surrounds this Bill is what it is really for—whether it is the route to a very wide use of online systems or whether it will be confined in this way. Different statements at different stages of the Bill’s progress have had both a narrow and a wide interpretation. Although Briggs referred to money claims, I think there are wider expectations that make these general issues rather important.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith. I declare an interest as a barrister practising in offline courts. That was the reason I did not participate at Second Reading.

The Briggs report has been referred to, which said at paragraph 6.13 that there are persons,

“living mainly in rural areas with no access to broadband, those who cannot afford a lap-top or desk-top computer, and those who for a variety of understandable reasons regard moving to computer after a life spent communicating on paper a step too far”.

I agree with previous speakers that it is unacceptable that the Bill says nothing about such potential litigants. The Minister accepts that their interests must be accommodated—they need to be accommodated in the Bill.

That is the view of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, on which I served with the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. Our report said at paragraph 16 that, against the background of what was said by Briggs,

“forcing people to choose between online proceedings or not pursuing legal claims at all risks excluding large numbers of people from the justice system”.

For that reason, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee has recommended that the Bill must place duties on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that adequate provision is made to enable access for the sorts of people I have mentioned.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 10 in my name gives the right to respond, in addition to the person initiating the claim, to choose whether the new procedure applies. Amendment 11 then provides that, in the event of disagreement between the parties, the relevant court or tribunal will determine which course to follow—the matter just referred to by the noble Lord. Indeed, I concur with all the issues raised by the three Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken already in this debate.

I confess that my drafting is somewhat less than elegant, but this is an important issue, given the difficulty that many will have with an online process, stemming from unfamiliarity with the process or medical or mental health issues. The report of the Constitution Committee of 7 June, to which reference has just been made, raises serious concerns about the process that go beyond the matters referred to in these amendments but are most apposite to them.

The committee declares:

“It is unsatisfactory for legislation to be drafted in a way that fails to acknowledge the fundamental right to a fair hearing, both at common law and under the European Convention on Human Rights. While ministers may have no intention of using the powers provided by the Bill to undermine the right to an oral hearing, it is incumbent on Parliament to frame the powers it confers in a way that acknowledges and respects fundamental constitutional principles”.


The committee expresses its concern that,

“the Bill confers broad powers on ministers to limit oral hearings in a much wider range of cases than is currently envisaged”,

and suggests:

“One way to secure appropriate control over this power would be to require not just consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, or the Senior President of Tribunals where appropriate, but their concurrence”,


in those proposals. In other words, consultation has to be taken seriously in these circumstances—perhaps more seriously than in most, given what is at stake here for the workings of our legal system.

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[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 1, 3, 4, 6, 10 and 11, which relate to the operation of the online procedure and how we can ensure that people using it are not disadvantaged. I intend to turn first to Amendment 3, which covers whether a user can choose between digital and paper channels. Then I will move on to Amendments 1, 4, 6, 10 and 11, pertaining to the online procedure and the matter of choice.

Amendment 3 suggests that claimants and respondents should have the choice of whether to use paper or digital channels when engaged in the simplified online procedure. I can confirm that the Government agree with this point, and indeed there is provision for this already. Essentially, where the online procedure comes into place, it will be possible to access it either by way of the digital portal or by way of a written document of claim. Other written documents may also be used when employing the simplified online procedure. The intention, which already applies to some of the digital procedures we have in place for small debt, is that the document will be scanned into the system and will therefore be part of the process. The idea is to ensure that parties are not excluded from the simplified procedure that will be brought in under this online procedure simply because they feel unable to employ, or are incapable of employing, the digital process itself. However, there is a distinction between that and the situation in which, when dealing with debt claims of under £25,000 for example, a claimant or any other party would be allowed to opt either for the simplified procedure that will be promulgated under the online procedure or to have recourse to the existing Civil Procedure Rules and the more complex procedure that pertains there. It is not intended under the Bill that claimants should have an option between the simplified procedure and the more complex procedure. I shall come on to develop that a little more in a moment.

Perhaps I may take this opportunity to confirm that we have no plans to remove the availability of paper channels for citizens under the remit of the Online Procedure Rule Committee. Of course, it is our intention to create a digital service that will be easy to access and use—indeed, so easy to access and use that it becomes the default choice for the majority of users. We recognise, however, that not everyone will be able to use it, or wish to proceed with that digital choice without support. For that reason, a paper route will remain open.

We want to be clear that users can expect an equity of service, regardless of whether they proceed with a digital approach or a written claim. Where different parties choose different channels, we will seamlessly join them together by means of a scanning and printing service, so users who want to send and receive papers will still have that choice—they will not need to resort to the online portal. To that extent, I offer my assurance that paper channels are still available and will be available under the Online Procedure Rules. The Bill will do nothing to remove them.

[Lord Pannick]

Does the Minister accept that nothing in the Bill guarantees that? He gives us an assurance, but surely it would be better to write that into the Bill.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

If every time we legislated we decided to guarantee everything from A to Z, we would end up with very long Bills. The position is this: there is the ability to proceed by way of the paper process. Nothing prohibits it, there is no inhibition on that process, and there is no intention to introduce such an inhibition.

Turning to Amendments 10 and 11—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

No, I do not accept the amendment. What I say is that there are existing means by which we can assure people that they can proceed by way of a digital portal or by way of a written claim, which will be scanned and taken into the online procedure process once it is up and running.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way again, but I must press him. We are dealing here with fundamental issues of access to justice. Surely if the Minister recognises that paper procedures must always be available to litigants, it is absolutely vital that the Bill says so.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am afraid I cannot accept that. There is nothing in the Bill that would prohibit the employment of such a paper process once the online procedure is up and running. Indeed, the noble Lord will appreciate that, when it comes to the making of rules by the relevant committee, the process will involve the judiciary as well as the Executive.

We have heard reference already to the idea of consultation, and we will in due course look at amendments to the Bill that seek to shift the question of consultation to one of concurrence. Therefore, we will be in a position to rely on not only any decision-making on the part of the Executive but also the contribution of the judiciary to how it sees that these processes should best be applied in the interest of all litigants. I emphasise “all litigants” because, when we seek to simplify the court process and reduce its potential cost, we are doing so for the benefit of litigants in general. We will come to concurrence and consultation later.

We must bear in mind that this is not a case of Ministers dictating what the relevant rules will be. It is a case of the Executive setting out the machinery by which a rule committee can come into place and set out appropriate rules and regulations for the online procedure, in consultation with the judiciary and with its input, and potentially with its concurrence.

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[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I share the concerns behind these amendments. There are plainly specific types of proceedings which it is wholly inappropriate to determine online. Perhaps the strongest example is any proceedings relating to the welfare of children. In my view, it is inconceivable that it would ever be appropriate for such matters to be so determined. Yet the powers under the Bill are quite sufficient to allow that to happen, because Clause 1(1)(b) allows for rules which may authorise or require proceedings,

“to be conducted, progressed or disposed of by electronic means”.

This is just one of the many examples of the Bill, which is wholly desirable, failing to include sufficient limitations to preclude the use of these powers in ways that we would all accept are inappropriate.

It may be that the proper answer to this concern is for the Government to support the amendment we are coming to in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. That would ensure that these powers cannot be used without the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. I respectfully suggest that the Minister needs to recognise that there is a problem here. The Bill is so broadly drafted that it will allow the exercise of powers in ways that we would all accept are inappropriate.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

I have one question for the Minister. There is an outstanding consultation paper on the housing court, looking at whether we should bring together all the various complicated forms of housing legislation before one tribunal. How will taking out one of the parts of what would be a housing court matter affect it, when what we are dealing with is the procedural system to be applied rather than detailed means of service and hearings, which is what this is about? It would be helpful to have that explained.

We would be rash to assume that paper service of proceedings comes to people’s attention more readily. Certainly, we have found that if you want to get people to attend jury service, or some other things, it is much better to send them a text rather than a brown envelope; they normally respond to texts. That is modern thinking. I think noble Lords will find that people more readily respond in that way. This is much more a detailed matter of procedure.

[Lord Pannick]

Does the noble and learned Lord accept that the powers in this Bill cover far more than process? As I have indicated, Clause 1(1)(b) is concerned with rules as to how proceedings are,

“conducted, progressed or disposed of”.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

I accept that, but I think it is part of the terminology used. That is why, in the intervention I made earlier, I said that it is important to appreciate the difference between a simplified procedure and the way the court works. Unfortunately, despite everything the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, did to try to simplify civil procedure, the White Book has grown from 2,000 to 3,000 pages.

We need to go back. It is an unfortunate tendency of lawyers to ossify everything. This is an attempt, using electronic means, to make access to justice easier and to simplify it, but we plainly need safeguards. I am sure the best safeguard of all is the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, which I am sure would solve most of these problems yet allow access to justice to use 21st-century methods to make it cheaper and—if I may, with some trepidation, say so in this House—to conduct litigation without the need to deploy expensive lawyers.

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Ever since that change, we have had to try to maintain the wall which keeps the Lord Chief Justice safe from being drawn into political decisions and, perhaps even more importantly, have had to try to keep the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice on his or her side of it. There have been a number of instances—including, paradoxically, television in courts—which have shown that, to put it at its lightest, the system has not properly bedded down in the way that was intended so that decisions about the fair operation of the courts clearly cannot not be made without the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. The case which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has made is very powerful, and I hope the Minister will recognise that this is about not political decisions but the proper role of the Lord Chief Justice.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Beith, I have added my name to the amendment tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge to ensure that the powers which are being conferred on the Lord Chancellor can be exercised only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. My reason for doing so is essentially the same as that of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and my noble and learned friend Lord Judge: the powers conferred by the Bill are exceptionally broad and there need to be adequate controls.

The Minister’s response before this afternoon essentially amount to, “Don’t worry—there are sufficient means through committees that will ensure that these powers are never used inappropriately, far less abused”, but as my noble and learned friend Lord Judge mentioned, the Lord Chancellor has the power to appoint the majority of the committee. The most effective means of ensuring that these powers are used only in an appropriate manner is to ensure that they may be exercised only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. As the Minister indicated during one of our earlier debates this afternoon, to amend the Bill in this way would considerably help to resolve many of the other defects in it which we have been debating.

My noble and learned friend Lord Judge made a point that is so important that it needs to be repeated: there is nothing novel about legislation requiring the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor. This very Bill, at Clause 6(2), states that the Lord Chancellor’s powers to make regulations relating to the committee may be exercised only,

“with the concurrence of … the Lord Chief Justice and … the Senior President of Tribunals”.

Therefore, I suggest to the Committee that the question is not whether in principle ministerial powers should ever be constrained by a need to obtain the concurrence of the Lord Chief justice but whether that restriction is appropriate in relation to these powers. In my view, such is the breadth of the powers that we are conferring and so intimately do they address the fair administration of justice, which is after all the business of the Lord Chief Justice, that his or her agreement should be needed for their exercise.

Whether it was a blandishment or otherwise, I was very pleased earlier to hear the Minister give a commitment to consider this issue actively before Report. I very much hope that, on Report, the Minister will feel able to table an amendment or amendments to address this issue or, at the very least, to support amendments in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Having had the honour of holding the office of Lord Chancellor when the Lord Chancellor was the head of the judiciary, I think it is right for me to say a word or two about the present position.

It is very important to remember that our constitution recognises three arms: the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary. The judiciary is a distinct arm from the Executive. The Executive have responsibilities in relation to the judiciary, and of course the judiciary has responsibilities in relation to the people of this country in a way that is unique. If somebody else is entitled to say, without getting the ultimate agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, “We’re going to alter your procedures in the court. We’ll tell you about it and we’ll consult you but, if you don’t like it, we’ll do it all the same”, that seems to subvert the idea that the Lord Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary. The judiciary must act according to procedures and, if you alter the rules or procedures without his agreement, it seems to me that you subvert his position as the head of the judiciary as distinct from the Executive and the legislature.

Incidentally, I cannot help remarking at this stage that the judiciary has been silenced from having any part in the legislature. I regard that as an extraordinarily retrograde step. I hope that some day it will be put right by a responsible Government and that we will have the very great advantage of hearing in the House of Lords not just all past Lord Chief Justices but the present one as well.

The Lord Chief Justice’s agreement seems to me absolutely essential. Indeed, I would like to feel that he would be the initiator of changes in procedure as a result of committee recommendations. His responsibilities will be encroached upon if these procedures do not work.

My only other remark is that the reference to the Secretary of State in Clause 6(2) is probably to the Secretary of States for Wales, the language of Wales being important in this connection.

Assisted Suicide

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 14th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, it is for the CPS to apply the law, not to make the law. Every case has to turn on its own facts and circumstances. Where matters are drawn to the attention of the police relating to an assisted suicide or potential assisted suicide, they will investigate. They are bound to investigate what is potentially criminal conduct in terms of Section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. I therefore see no reason why they should pause those investigations, given the current state of the law.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Does the Minister recall that the CPS policy was adopted after the decision of the Appellate Committee of this House in 2009 in the Debbie Purdy case—I declare an interest as her counsel. The Appellate Committee required a policy because of the uncertainty of the law. Does the Minister accept that there continues to be considerable uncertainty in this area, as indicated by the Question of the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, which is causing enormous distress to those at the end of their lives and their families?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Lord is quite right that a consultation was prompted by a decision of the courts in England and Wales. That led to a consultation exercise that commenced in September 2009, to which there were more than 5,000 responses, and resulted in the publication of the CPS policy document in 2010. I consider that that policy is working well at the present time.

Central Courts IT System

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I thank the noble Lord for his question. I do not believe that it is for me to gainsay the Home Secretary’s evidence before the Justice Sub-Committee, so I am afraid I am not in a position to commit to any alternative approach on the matter at present.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, in preparing this Statement, have Ministers and their officials spoken to judges and lawyers, or only to IT consultants?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I was not involved directly in the preparation of this Statement. I was invited to repeat it in this House on the basis of information given to me. I cannot directly answer the question of who was consulted in the preparation of the Statement itself. If the noble Lord wishes I will write to him on the point—but if he has no desire for me to do so I will not.

Non-Contentious Probate (Fees) Order 2018

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2018 Lords Chamber

As a Conservative, I find this appalling, because these are not Conservative policies. This is not what Conservative Governments across decades have encouraged people to do: to save hard, to work hard, to buy their own homes, to put money aside for their retirement only to find that by sleight of hand, an enhanced fee is going to knock another £2,500 off their estate. For that reason, I will not be in the Government Lobby tonight.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, there are two aspects to this debate. There is the suggestion that these regulations are unconstitutional, which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has argued, and there is the argument as to whether this is fair, the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.

When the noble Lord, Lord Marks, tells the House that something is of constitutional importance, I normally get excited and follow him eagerly into the Division Lobby—but I cannot do so today. These regulations are not ultra vires but plainly valid and within the scope of what the House approved in Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The point of that provision was to confer power on the Lord Chancellor to charge fees which are higher than the cost of the services being provided.

Section 180(1) states the Lord Chancellor may,

“prescribe a fee of an amount which is intended to exceed the cost of anything in respect of which the fee is charged”.


It could not be clearer. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, then says that one part of the courts system cannot be used, even under that provision, to act as a cross-subsidy for another part of the courts system. My answer is look at Section 180(3), which says that the Lord Chancellor, when he sets these charges, must have regard to,

“the financial position of the courts and tribunals for which the Lord Chancellor is responsible”—


in the plural. It is general, not specific. And if there is any doubt about that, look at Section 180(6), which adds what the purpose of the fees must be. The fees,

“must be used to finance an efficient and effective system of courts and tribunals”.


The whole purpose of these provisions as I understand them is to confer a power on the Lord Chancellor to charge a fee higher than the cost of a service, in order precisely to provide funds that will enable the courts and tribunals system in general to be financed. There is no question of a lack of validity in these regulations.

It is then said that this is unfair; the noble Baroness made a powerful speech. But let us be realistic. Lawyers—and non-lawyers as well—have been complaining with increasing power and force in recent years that the legal system is in desperate need of additional resources. We need more money for legal aid, for improvements to the courts estate—which is in a disgraceful condition—and for improved judicial salaries to ensure that the high quality of our judiciary is retained. That money has to come from somewhere—and the choice is very simple.

Of course you could raise general taxation, but the same people about whom the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, is rightly concerned would equally complain if their taxes were raised. The money is needed; the legal system—the courts and tribunals which the Lord Chancellor has to protect—are in a desperate position. The money is desperately needed. I am no more enthusiastic about these regulations than other noble Lords, but it seems to me that, given the problems we face, these regulations do impose a charge which is reasonable in its content and is a reasonable means of raising some of the revenue required to fund the courts and tribunals system of this country.

[Baroness Hamwee]

The noble Lord has construed parts of Section 180; I think he has got it in front of him because he has been reading from it. My question about Section 180(3)(b) was addressed to the Minister, but the House respects the noble Lord and I wonder whether he has views about the Lord Chancellor having to have regard to the competitiveness of the legal services market in this situation.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her observation. My answer to the noble Baroness is that, yes, the Lord Chancellor is obliged to have regard to,

“the competitiveness of the legal services market”,


but I understand that to apply only in a context where there is a competitive market. Of course, in many contexts there is. But, like the noble Baroness, I do not understand there to be a competitive market for probate, and in my judgment that provision does not require the Lord Chancellor to have regard to a factor which is simply not relevant to the topic we are discussing.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I am not a lawyer. I have never applied for probate, I know nothing about the operation of the probate service and I come at this as a babe in the legal wood. But having read the paperwork that was put down and heard this afternoon’s discussion, I see four things. I see us helping the poorest in our society by eliminating any charge for estates between £5,000 and £50,000. I see us ensuring that the maximum charge is never more than 0.5%, and sometimes less than that. I see a maximum of £6,000 on even the largest estate, and I see this providing a degree of cross-subsidy to ensure that we have an efficient courts and tribunals system—a point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just made. So I say to my noble friend Lady Browning, with the very greatest respect, that those seem to be perfectly good Conservative principles, and I therefore support what the Government are trying to achieve here.

If we chase down the vires point which the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, focused on, surely any amount of return above cost is not allowable in his argument. We are about to have a reduction in the cost, as I read the papers, of £9.30—the estimated reduction in the average unit cost of applying for probate—as a result of the new system. I am not clear—perhaps the noble Lord can enlighten me when he concludes—about whether his proposal is now to reduce the fees, because of course they will be above the cost of providing the service.

I have been involved in the charity and voluntary sectors. I have worked on their behalf, written reports to the Government, supported them and fought their corner in third-party campaigning and other areas. The reports have been well received by the sector, and sufficiently well received that the Government immediately banned any idea of bringing them in—but never mind about that. The point is that they have made a great case about the impact on charities and charitable donations of the imposition of these particular charges. I must say that, however I work the maths and however I try to work through the ideas, I do not see the logic of the more extreme and indeed scaremongering issues that have been raised by many parts of the sector.

It must surely be perverse that under the present system we are charging the same fee to someone who has a £5,001 estate as to someone who has a £20 million estate. That must be perverse and the present system must not be right. This must be a way of improving it.

Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 16th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, it is very geeky to wonder whether secondary legislation amending a schedule should be affirmative or negative. It is rather like a storm in an egg-cup. But there is rather an important issue here. If I may for present purposes adopt what my noble and learned friend has recently said rather than repeat it, the issue that troubles me about this is in the Schedule itself. It makes very clear provision for the Lord Chief Justice to have various responsibilities. He may authorise a person to do this; he may do that; he may nominate the other, and so on. The whole Schedule contains a series of powers and responsibilities vested in the Lord Chief Justice.

The Schedule also includes a number of provisions which expressly say that the Lord Chancellor may not interfere in the exercise of these powers, for which, on page 11, new Section 67C provides a perfect example. I shall not burden the House by going through all the provisions. My concern is that it is not at all clear from the Bill that the Lord Chief Justice is to be consulted, let alone asked for his concurrence, with any of these proposed changes—and the proposed changes relate to issues over which the Lord Chancellor now has no statutory authority.

Since the changes—I shall use the word advisedly—in 2003, 2004 and 2005, the Lord Chancellor has ceased to be head of the judiciary. He no longer has any of the functions that former Lord Chancellors used to have. All those responsibilities are vested in the current Lord Chief Justice and, in relation to tribunals, the Senior President of Tribunals. Suddenly, there is a clear danger that, by exercising the powers given in Clause 3(3), the Lord Chancellor may seek at some stage in the future to transfer back to the Lord Chancellor powers that have been vested in the Lord Chief Justice.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, we are dealing here with a very sensitive subject: that of authorising court and tribunal staff to exercise judicial functions. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, emphasised that the question may well be the scope of the Clause 3(2) power to make consequential provision. I am still puzzled as to why the Minister says that it is a power only to amend subordinate legislation, because that is not what it says. It states:

“The Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor may, by regulations made by statutory instrument, make consequential … provision”—


that is the part that concerns me—

“in relation to the Schedule”.

I understand the Minister seeking to reassure the House, as he sought to reassure the Committee, that the power may be validly used only to amend subordinate legislation, but I would welcome an explanation as to why that is so.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions that have been made with regard to this matter. Your Lordships will be aware that the power in Clause 3 allows the Secretary of State to make consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions in relation to certain provisions for staff by way of regulations.

I say immediately that I am most obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, because it would appear that we are being briefed by the same Bill team. That is hardly a surprise, but I am in a position to say that he has eloquently and clearly expounded the rationale for these provisions being in the Bill. I accept his point about how they are intended to operate as set out between Clause 3 and the schedule.

The power that we are talking about is constructed narrowly, both in regard to the nature of the amendments that it provides for and being in respect only of secondary, rather than primary, legislation. However, there seems to be some confusion about the extent of the provision. Perhaps noble Lords will allow me briefly to explain the interaction between the substantive power in paragraph 32 of the schedule and the consequential power in Clause 3(2).

The key substantive power in paragraph 32 is that the rules of court may provide for the exercise of judicial functions by authorised court and tribunal staff. It will therefore be the procedure rules that set out the details of which functions authorised staff may exercise, the qualifications and experience that they may require and any specific right of reconsideration should the relevant rule committee consider that one is needed. Rules are made by independent committees to govern procedure within courts and tribunals. All rules are made by statutory instrument subject to negative resolution in Parliament.

However, the procedure rules cannot be used to make all the necessary amendments to other secondary legislation, such as consequential changes to remove references within existing secondary legislation—I take as an example those to “justices’ clerks”, which will become redundant once these provisions are in force. For that, we will use regulations under Clause 3(2), which will in turn be subject to the negative resolution procedure. We could not use this consequential power to make substantive provision in relation to judicial functions.

Further, I refer to the width of the provision itself. The concept of an amendment that is consequential, transitional, transitory or saving is well understood, with many precedents. I should note that these terms are construed strictly by the courts. The power in Clause 3 is a narrow power so, although the rules may provide for a wide variety of functions to be exercised by authorised staff, it does not follow that the consequential power has wide application. In our case, this power is needed principally, as I say, to amend references in secondary legislation from, for example, “justices’ clerk” to “authorised officer”. So far, I think that we have identified about 200 references in over 60 pieces of secondary legislation that would need amendment; there may be more.

I come to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as to which legislation may be amended. It is normal practice in legislation to say expressly when a power is to be used to amend primary legislation. The Government have no intention of using this power to amend primary legislation, so there is no express provision for such amendments in Clause 3. We have identified consequential amendments to primary legislation for these provisions, which are provided for in the schedule. We do not need, or seek, any further power to amend primary legislation in the Bill.

In drafting the Bill, we thought carefully about the extent of the power in Clause 3(2). The Prisons and Courts Bill, from which the clauses originated, included powers to make consequential provision and for such powers to be able to be used to amend primary as well as secondary legislation. As we have now identified the consequential changes needed, as I say, we do not intend to make any further changes to primary legislation. In drafting Clause 3, there was therefore no inclusion of the express provision to make such changes to primary legislation.

I am happy to give noble Lords an undertaking in Hansard that the power in the Bill will not be used to amend primary legislation. If a future Government attempted to do so, I would expect the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments to bring this to the attention of Members of both Houses. I am content to give that undertaking without qualification, for the purposes of Hansard.

[Lord Pannick]

Can the noble and learned Lord not merely give the House an assurance that the Government do not intend to use the power to amend primary legislation but also tell the House that the Government’s intention and understanding is that the scope of this power in Clause 3 is such that it could not validly be used for that purpose?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I endeavoured to set that point out in my previous observations, but I am happy to repeat them. If the Government’s intention had been to seek the power to amend primary legislation then, in accordance with precedent and court decisions on interpretation, they would have included the express power to do so in Clause 3, as they did in the Prisons and Courts Bill. There is no intention of doing that and they have not included that power. I do not consider that such a power is available to the Government, in light of the way in which Clause 3 is carefully framed, so I have no difficulty with that.

The provisions that we have now made within the Bill for dealing with this by way of the negative procedure found approval with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which is of course charged with reporting on such provisions. It noted in its 29th report that there was nothing in the Bill to which it wished to draw the attention of the House. I am aware that in the past the Magistrates’ Association raised a point similar to that raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but I understand that once we—by which I mean the Bill managers—had explained the position, as they did to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, it withdrew its concerns because it appreciated the narrow scope of this provision. With that explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury (CB)]

My Lords, as has been said, the purpose of this part of the Bill is to introduce a degree of flexibility and take the pressure off serving judges who are under considerable pressure at the moment, as we all know. It is right and proper that the officers who are appointed to carry out these very low-level judicial functions—and the principle is accepted—should have appropriate qualifications. However, echoing what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, the qualifications will be determined either by regulations or rules set down by the rules committee, which have to be put before this House, and approved by the Lord Chief Justice. Given the large number of low-level decisions which will be involved in this case, rather than fettering either of those bodies by legislating on the sort of people who can do this job, why not leave it to the Lord Chief Justice and the rules committee or the regulations? Our minds in this House cannot cater for these circumstances because, as the noble Lord said, we do not know all the types of orders which these people might be expected to make. We will have the regulations and we will trust the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am all in favour of flexibility and entirely understand the argument, in relation to the exercise of judicial functions, that we should be careful not to prescribe conditions that are more appropriately left to the rules committee and the Lord Chief Justice. I have more difficulty with Amendment 3, which concerns the function of giving legal advice to judges. We are concerned here with paragraph 14 of the Schedule. As I understand it, Amendment 3 seeks to impose a minimum standard for those who perform the function of giving legal advice to judges. I have some difficulty in understanding how that function can appropriately be performed by someone who does not have at least the minimum qualification of three years’ experience post qualification as a solicitor, barrister, or chartered legal executive. Unless the Government are able to say that they envisage this function being performed by someone who does not have that minimum qualification, I see great force in Amendment 3.

Amendment 4 is slightly more difficult, as it is concerned with the same function—giving legal advice—but in relation to justices of the peace. It may be that that minimum standard is not appropriate to that function. I will listen carefully to what the Minister says about that. Amendment 6 is concerned with a different question: the function of actually performing relevant judicial functions, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, has spoken about. I am most troubled by the issue raised by Amendment 3.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, as a former judge of the family court, I wonder in what circumstances such judges—district judges, circuit judges or even possibly High Court judges—might need the advice of those who were not themselves qualified lawyers. I find that difficult. I see no difficulty with justices of the peace—that is perfectly obvious—but at the moment I cannot see how any family court judge, at any level, should be advised on legal issues by someone who is not legally qualified. I would be grateful to the noble and learned Lord for explaining what he sees this applying to, and in what circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 7, I shall speak also to Amendments 9, 10 and 13, which stand in my name. When the Bill was in Committee, there was a general desire to see more safeguards on the face of the Bill and greater transparency around the process of making court and tribunal procedure rules. The Government have listened to these concerns and, after further discussion, we have tabled these amendments.

The purpose of the amendments is to require the committees, when making any rules to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions, to consider whether the rules should include a right to judicial reconsideration of decisions made by authorised staff exercising those functions. This means that the rule committees would have to consider whether each judicial function should be subject to a right to reconsideration. Furthermore, the amendments require that, if a rule committee decides against the creation of such a right in the rules that it makes, it will have to inform the Lord Chancellor of its decision and the reasons for it.

The amendments should be read alongside existing statutory provisions relating to the making of court and tribunal rules. The committees are under a statutory obligation to,

“consult such persons as they consider appropriate”,

before making rules. If, following consultation, a rule committee chose not to include a right to reconsideration in its rules, it would have to inform the Lord Chancellor of this and, as I indicated, it would also have to give reasons for the decision. The Lord Chancellor would then have two options: either to ask the committee to reconsider its decision, as he has the power to ask the rule committees to make rules, or, if he agrees with the committee, to lay the rules in Parliament. In doing so, we would expect the Lord Chancellor to set out, in the Explanatory Memorandum to accompany the statutory instrument containing the rules, the committee’s rationale for not including a right to reconsideration. The amendments would therefore ensure much greater transparency in the decision-making process.

Our amendments would ensure that the jurisdictional rule committees continued to play a full part in determining the most appropriate mechanism for reviewing decisions by authorised persons. I hope that in the light of these amendments the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will consider her position with regard to her Amendments 8 and 11, which fall within this group, but perhaps I can defer that and allow her to state her position with regard to those amendments.

[Lord Pannick]

Before the Minister sits down, can he give the House a practical example of the exercise of relevant judicial functions by someone who is not a judge in respect of which it would not be appropriate to allow for a review by someone who is a judge?

Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 10th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, one issue that arises is that, if we are to require more judicial training, it will have to be funded. The second point is that the Lord Chief Justice is responsible for the organisation of judicial training and a report from the Lord Chancellor—if I may say so, with respect—is completely unnecessary. These issues can be addressed by the Lord Chief Justice in his annual report.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can the Minister say whether he thinks that Clause 1 of the Bill will make any significant contribution to resolving what the Lord Chief Justice has described as the unsustainable recruitment crisis that is facing the Bench?

[Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury (CB)]

My Lords, I will just add a footnote to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said. The Lord Chief Justice’s annual report is laid before Parliament, so the information about judicial training will be laid before Parliament in so far as the Lord Chief Justice considers it appropriate, he being responsible for training.

--- Later in debate ---

These solutions are not easy to achieve but they are perceptible and the goal is important. I hope my modest amendment to this limited Bill may play its part in moving us all towards that goal. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for managing to table an amendment to this anodyne Bill that raises an issue of real significance. I say simply that it is a remarkable achievement for the Government to bring forward a Bill on courts and tribunals that ignores all the serious problems facing our justice system, not simply diversity but the recruitment crisis, the crisis in legal aid, the appalling state of the judicial estate and the vital need for modernisation.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I concur with the remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Marks. I remind the House that I have a parental interest in these matters in that my daughter is a barrister and sits as a part-time district judge. We support the amendment, particularly because of the concern about both gender and ethnic representation in the judicial system, which is currently well below what should be expected.

I have only one reservation about the amendment, which is that it calls for a report to be laid within a year of the Act passing. That does not seem to be a reasonably long enough period in which to judge the extent to which progress is being made. I would have thought that if the Government were disposed to accept the principle here, and I hope they would be, a more realistic period of two to three years would be one in which we would be able to genuinely measure whether there was an impact that all of us around the House would wish to see. Subject to that, we certainly support the principles of the amendment and I hope the Government will look at it sympathetically.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, one of the things that might be reviewed is how the arrangements for delegating decisions work in the context—mentioned by my noble friend—of a large number of litigants in person. This number has increased since the withdrawal and limiting of legal aid. Court officials find themselves giving forms of advice to unrepresented litigants, if only to ensure that the court can proceed with the minimum of chaos and disruption. A clerk in a county court, for example, may simply remind the litigant of what the court needs to know in order to resolve a case and what would not be advantageous to spend lots of time on. That is a valuable function. Of course, legal advice can go far beyond that into areas on which it would be wholly inappropriate for a court official to give, or purport to give, advice. Wise officials make quite clear the limit of what they can say.

By whatever mechanism we review these provisions, whether it is that suggested in the amendment or the reasonably adequate existing ones offered by the Justice Select Committee and Constitution Committee, we should look at them in a context in which officials are being asked for advice or guidance by people who are not represented.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. We are dealing here—at least potentially—with matters of significant constitutional concern. The power which the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor is being given includes a power to make “consequential provision”. That is a very broad phrase: it is not merely transitional, or transitory or saving, it is consequential—something that is a consequence of that which is in the legislation. It is, therefore, entirely appropriate that this amendment should be approved by this House.

[The Earl of Listowel (CB)]

My Lords, on the matter of meeting the new challenge of litigants in person, particularly in the family courts, I highlight the value of the family, drug and alcohol court national unit. While the national unit supports these drug and alcohol courts for children in the public law system, the same judges—and I imagine the same clerks—also work in public family law. The wonderful thing about this unit is that it supports judges, clerks and the administration in family courts to become better at their job; better at managing these cases which are often very difficult and troubling.

So when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, writes to me—I am grateful to him for his letter today on the matter of the Family Drug and Alcohol Court National Unit—and says that the responsibility is now passing down to local authorities, I hear what he says and understand why he says it. However, there is a distinct benefit to the judiciary and the courts in training them to be more effective in working with these families, particularly now that they are often litigants in person. I therefore hope that he may keep an open mind, and that perhaps he will be persuaded that some money should come from central government for this special national unit for supporting family drug and alcohol courts.

We have a challenge with regard to the many families in this country who are struggling to stay together or to manage amicably and effectively a separation with the least damage to their children. Having well-equipped judges and clerks in the courts to help this process is vital, and I suggest to the noble and learned Lord that this special national unit can help with that.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register, particularly those in respect of the insurance industry. The 2017 Conservative manifesto provides an interesting lens through which I feel one ought to consider various amendments in this group. It states the following in a section entitled, “Cutting the cost of living”:

“We will reduce insurance costs for ordinary motorists by cracking down on exaggerated and fraudulent whiplash claims”.


At a high level, the Bill seeks to do that principally by dictating how whiplash claims procedures will work in the future; that is, through the use of a tariff. Several amendments in this group seek to interfere with the principle of a tariff either by removing it or by making it rather more generous than market forces allow today. Both of these approaches seem to fly directly in the face of that express manifesto commitment. I remain very much of the view that any tariff should be set out in the Bill, just as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has recommended.

We are in extraordinary and difficult circumstances here, with around 1% of the population of the UK annually successfully concluding a whiplash claim. I submit that a social and political necessity trumps jurisprudential purity, such as that advanced by my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf, even before considering the manifesto commitment point that I made earlier.

A tariff will bring benefits in terms of certainty and the potential for ordinary citizens to file claims online easily, without the need for external professional help. Any reduction in hassle and the costs of processing a claim will inevitably benefit everyone. Indeed, we heard at Second Reading how a tariff system seemed to work well in Spain. Deleting Clause 2 would deny those benefits. It would certainly deny the Government the ability to deliver on their manifesto commitment because the hugely unsatisfactory status quo would simply continue, with a numerous minority of our fellow citizens continuing to abuse the current environment to their financial advantage. Therefore, I strongly oppose Amendment 18.

Turning to the quantum in the tariff table, I accept that the issue is rather a Goldilocks one. If the quantum is too generous, the problem of exaggeration and fraud will persist. If it is not generous enough, the genuinely injured will be badly dealt with. The Government have attempted to walk this line in their draft statutory instrument; I make no comment on the numbers it contains. The structure of the Bill allows the Lord Chancellor to vary the tariff with suitable safeguards.

I fear that Amendments 10 and 17B are too generous because they depend on the Judicial College numbers, which are derived from cases heard. The numbers are actually above where the market—if I may call it that—is today because the cases that tend to get to court tend to have non-standard features, such as being more complex or involving psychological issues. Therefore, I fear that if either of these amendments were adopted, there would be no saving per the impact assessment—possibly even a negative saving—and thus they too defeat the Government’s manifesto commitment. Accordingly, I oppose them.

In turning to Amendment 30, I start by expressing my support for Amendment 12, which restores constitutional balance in a very elegant way. Indeed, I congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, on his excellent speech. Amendment 12 goes some way to addressing the issues that were set out well by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, in introducing Amendment 30. However, Clause 3 is not only a fully important part of a package to frustrate the designs of the claims industry but an important part of a strategy to deliver the manifesto commitment. On that basis, I feel that this amendment should also be resisted.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My noble friend Lord Kinnoull referred to “jurisprudential purity”. I would prefer to describe it as the essential role of the judiciary in deciding what compensation is appropriate. I would be very grateful if the Minister would tell the House whether there is any precedent for a Minister, rather than judges, deciding on the appropriate level of compensation for a civil claimant when that compensation is being paid not by the state—I recognise that that may be a different matter—but by a private wrongdoer or, more accurately, their insurance company. I suggest that either there is no precedent or this is rare, for a very good reason: put simply, judges, not Ministers—or their civil servants, more accurately—have expertise and independence in this area. For those reasons, I strongly support the speech made by my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I confess to having found this group of amendments rather difficult. As I observed in Committee, the real question as I see it in Part 1 is whether it is right to fix especially low awards for whiplash injuries suffered in road accidents, to deter the disproportionate number of false claims which undoubtedly are made following such accidents. That is what Clause 2 does: it seems to me impossible to escape that conclusion. Obviously and inevitably its effect, therefore, would be to penalise those who genuinely claim for such injuries sustained in that way. They are to pay the price of the policy underlying Clause 2, the policy of deterring the dishonest. Obviously, one regrets that.

Whether to pursue that policy and, if so, to what extent and how vigorously—in other words, how far to reduce the awards so as to make the making of a false claim less attractive—is, it seems to me, par excellence a political question. It is purely a political question and therefore I, for my part, see no particular point in involving the judiciary as Amendment 12 would do. We know what the judiciary regards as the appropriate level of damages for honest claims of this sort: the Judicial College guidelines clearly tell us that. Therefore I do not support Amendment 12.

To my mind, the real question is the altogether more fundamental question raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf’s Amendment 18 and that is the one I confess that I find the more difficult. I flagged up my concerns about this and about the whole of the Part 1 policy in Committee. My noble and learned friend suggests that the proposal will create an undesirable precedent and introduce injustice into the system. Of course, I recognise the force of these criticisms and to a degree I share his doubts as to whether the incidence of false claims remains grave enough to justify this wholly exceptional measure. However, at the end of the day I am reluctantly persuaded that this provision is justified: it is surely intolerable that we are known as the whiplash capital of the world, so I have concluded that it is open to government, as a matter of policy, to seek to deter dishonest claims in this way.

I do not suggest that there are any exact analogies between the law of compensating injuries negligently caused and what is here proposed. I accept that the criminal injuries compensation scheme, to which in effect my noble friend Lord Pannick and the Minister referred—statutory awards for injuries criminally caused—is a very different creature, but it should be recognised that broad questions of policy can and on occasion do have a part to play in this area of our law. For example, the courts have held, under what lawyers here will recognise as the Caparo principle, that in certain circumstances claims are barred altogether, not just restricted. In short, there is no duty of care held to arise, even when injury follows on from what otherwise would be plain negligence, where it is held, for whatever reason, that it would not be fair, just and reasonable to compensate in those circumstances. For example, years ago in the case of the Yorkshire Ripper, the police were held exempt from claims despite their failure to apprehend the killer, which manifestly they should have done, and, as we all recall, a series of subsequent women died.

On balance, my conclusion is that there is a sufficient policy reason here for restricting damages in this case. With some hesitation, I shall not feel able to support the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf.

Courts: Modernisation

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 6th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this is a mouse that roared. It may be a small Bill but it has extensive implications for the operation of our court system. Splitting the legislation originally set out in the Prison and Courts Bill will allow the Government to progress these vital reforms utilising the time available in both Houses.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, one matter that the Bill does not deal with is what was addressed in Clause 37 of the Prison and Courts Bill. It provided for rules for an online procedure in courts and tribunals in appropriate cases. The Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, has recently stated the urgent need for such procedures. When will the Government act on this much-needed reform?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, we intend to bring forward all of the reforms anticipated in the original Bill, which fell at the time of the general election, and we will do so as and when parliamentary time allows.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vinson (Con)]

My Lords, the ECJ works at a snail’s pace. There will be a massive amount of undigested legislation one way or the other at the end of the transition period—how does this affect the issue?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment. One of the primary purposes of the Bill is to promote legal certainty: I cannot understand how it can be anything other than destructive to legal certainty for Parliament to enact a Bill that includes Clause 6, which removes the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union from exit day—defined as 29 March 2019—when the Government’s own intention, and that of the European Union, is that there should be a transitional period during which the Court of Justice will retain jurisdiction, and during which we will agree to that jurisdiction.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I too support this amendment. I will be very brief. It seems that if the Government try to maintain the text as it is they are basically marching Parliament up to the top of the hill in order to march it down again—they are also marching Parliament to the top of the hill to defend a position on which they themselves ran up the white flag some weeks ago. Frankly, this is not a sensible way of proceeding. It will make a mockery of Parliament if it is asked to legislate something which it knows not even the British Government want to happen. Surely, the right answer is to remove Clause 6, as the amendment proposes.

If by any chance everything collapses or changes, or the Government somehow persuade the European Commission to draft the text in a different way, it will be perfectly possible for the Government to put it in the withdrawal and implementation Bill that will come forward after the conclusion of negotiations. Meanwhile, we should start with the standstill as it has been agreed and without this provision.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Because that addresses a distinct issue, which is the exit date from the EU. It is quite distinct from the question whether we are able to finally conclude an implementation period, which it is our intention to do. Let us be clear about that. The EU has also indicated its intention to do it as well. But we are engaged in a bilateral negotiation.

[Lord Pannick]

It is plain and obvious that nothing is agreed, but can the noble and learned Lord be clear with the Committee about the Government’s position in relation to negotiating this transitional implementation period? Do they now accept that they are no longer seeking to impose any red line relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice during that implementation period?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not sure I agree with the term “red lines”; it is not one that I am inclined to use. I am never quite sure what they are. Our position is that during an implementation period, if and when finally agreed, we will accept that there is a role for the European Court of Justice. Indeed, it is outlined in the EU’s own proposals for the agreement at Articles 82 through to 85. As the noble and learned Lord indicated, that is not yet the subject of final confirmation between the two parties but it is what is anticipated.

On a related point, during that period, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that as we cease to be a member state we will cease to have the right to have a judge in the Court of Justice of the European Union. That must follow. However, we will have the right to make interventions in cases that pertain to the United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

358C: Schedule 8, page 55, line 33, leave out sub-paragraphs (1) and (2)

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of three other members of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee: the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton.

Amendment 358C and Amendment 360A, with which it is grouped, address the powers tucked away in Schedule 8 to modify retained direct EU legislation by the use of delegated powers that relate to subordinate legislation. A power to modify is an important matter because “modify” includes a power to repeal—see Clause 14 (1).

This Committee has debated on previous days the surprising omission from the Bill of any provision that identifies the legal status of retained EU law. Is it primary legislation, secondary legislation or something else? The powers in Schedule 8, in paragraphs 3(1) and 5(1), which we are now addressing, have attracted the attention of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee because those provisions treat retained EU law as analogous to secondary legislation for the purposes of powers to modify. That is a surprising position for the Bill to adopt, certainly in relation to that part of retained EU law which confers important rights: for example, in the fields of employment, the environment and consumer protection. It means that, in addition to the other powers to modify retained EU law, which the Bill will confer and which we have debated in detail—Clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17—there is yet another set of powers recognised by Schedule 8 that will give Ministers the power to modify the retained EU law, on important subjects, which is brought into domestic law.

My concern is not reduced by paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 8 saying that these powers can be used only,

“so far as the context permits or requires”,

and paragraph 5(1) says that the powers may be used,

“unless the contrary intention appears”.

These statements are opaque in the extreme and certainly do not provide any degree of legal certainty.

I therefore look forward to hearing from the Minister why these powers are needed at all in addition to the other extensive powers which the Bill confers, and I look forward to hearing from him what these powers say, if anything, about the legal status of retained EU law. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad to be associated with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in supporting this amendment to seek some clarity. I will simply add two further points, having said that this distinctly lacks clarity at the moment.

First, I draw attention to paragraph 3, which says:

“Any power to make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation which, immediately before exit day, is subject to an implied restriction that it is exercisable only compatibly with EU law is to be read on or after exit day without that restriction”.


A little gloss on that from the Minister would be helpful. The second thing that needs clarifying is the impact on the devolution aspects of the Bill. The Government’s Explanatory Notes say that,

“in relation to the devolved administrations these pre-existing powers”—

that is, the powers that can be used under the clause we are discussing—

“are subject to the devolution provisions described in paragraphs 36 to 41 of these notes, meaning powers in pre-exit legislation cannot be used to modify retained EU law in a way that would be incompatible with EU law as it existed on exit day until the relevant subject matters are released from the interim limit on their competence”.

I imagine that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pricked up his ears at that phrase, because it goes to the heart of the argument we have been having about the impact of the Bill on devolution and the idea that powers will be released to the devolved Administrations only once the UK Government are satisfied with the way they will deal with the framework provisions. The appearance of the phrase,

“until the relevant subject matters are released from the interim limit on their competence”,

in the Explanatory Notes is quite worrying. The provisions are of course there because some of the provisions here relate to existing devolved powers. The devolved Administrations must have the capacity to take this kind of action if the UK Government have the capacity to do so. However, it is subject to this rather extraordinary restriction: the Government hold on to the powers until they are satisfied that they can be released. For the benefit of clarity, I hope that the Minister can help us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I cannot give the noble and learned Lord an answer as to dates, but clearly we are concerned to ensure that any proposals we have to make are in place in time for consideration by the whole House before Report.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, who I have always regarded as a true Renaissance Minister in all respects. I am very pleased to hear him confirm that the Government are seriously considering the issue of the legal status of retained EU law. The Committee of the House will look forward to seeing amendments from the Government in that respect. I am far less persuaded of the need to include in this Bill paragraphs 3(1) and 5(1) of Schedule 8, in addition to all the other extensive powers which the Government—and Ministers—will be giving themselves to amend retained EU law, under Clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17. The question is: why is it necessary also to include these powers in Schedule 8?

The concern, as the Minister will understand, is that future Ministers may decide that it is much more convenient to use the extensive, unrestricted powers in Schedule 8 than to comply with whatever restrictions are imposed by this House, by the other place—by Parliament—on the powers to modify under Clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17. So we might need to come back to this matter on Report.

I was also interested to hear the Minister say in his reply that the Bill is not the place for “radical policy change”. I will remind him of that when we debate the amendments—which no doubt will be put forward on Report—to take out the provisions in the Bill that remove from retained EU law the European Union charter of rights. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 358C withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I have listened with admiration to the contributions of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, throughout this Committee. They have been exemplary examples of scrutiny. But on this occasion, I am afraid, I am not persuaded. The reason I am not persuaded is that the 2011 Act imposed a referendum condition which applied in a series of circumstances, and they were all circumstances in which the powers of the EU and its institutions were extended. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill which became the 2011 Act made very clear that its purpose was to implement the commitment of the coalition Government —I quote from paragraph 11 of the Explanatory Notes —that,

“there is no further transfer of sovereignty or powers [from the UK to the EU] over the course of the next Parliament... Any proposed future treaty that transferred areas of power, or competences, would be subject to a referendum on that treaty”

The plain fact of the matter is that there is no transfer of further powers or sovereignty to the EU from the UK. On the contrary, this Bill is very simple. The agreements being negotiated are designed to achieve exactly the opposite, whether we like it or not—the return of powers to the United Kingdom from the EU. The 2011 Act simply has no application and it is entirely right and proper that if this Bill repeals, as it will, the 1972 Act, it should also repeal the 2011 Act.

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

My Lords, I would like to intervene briefly to support my noble friend Lord Adonis, and I do this in defence of your Lordships’ House. When the 2011 Act was debated here, I was speaking on the Opposition Front Bench with my noble friend Lord Triesman. I think we gave it six days, possibly seven, in Committee, and three days on Report. We did our best to scrutinise this piece of legislation. It seems to me that the idea that it should be repealed in a schedule without any debate in the House of Commons is, as my noble friend Lord Adonis says, a bit of a constitutional offence.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, makes very good points, as he always does. Can I be allowed to make a political point in return? He says that there is no transfer of powers involved in what is going on now. Let me assure you that there is a big transfer of powers to Brussels. Brussels is going to be able to legislate, during the implementation period that we have now signed up for, without any British Minister taking part. We are asking for opt-ins to various pieces of Brussels legislation as part of the negotiations and British Ministers will have no say over those policies—no say on policies on goods trade or on financial services. We will be trying to maintain equivalence with a regime over which we have no say. As to the idea that this Bill is taking back control to Britain, it is in fact handing control in large parts to the EU, where British Ministers and the British Government will have no say at all. We on this side of the House should point out this position and explain that the way to deal with it is to stay in the EU, and that is what we should fight to do.