Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Pannick Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Elton
My Lords, forgive me. I want to make, not a pre-emptive remark, but an introductory one. I apologise to your Lordships for intruding on your discussions on this particular amendment, but I am very surprised by the form and volume of the Marshalled List at Third Reading. Having been here for 39 years I do not recall there being anything like this in the past. I draw your Lordships’ attention to paragraph 8.142 of the Companion, and suggest that this is a matter to be considered by the Procedure Committee before we continue in the next Session.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I understand that Amendment 5, to which I wish I speak, arises in particular out of concern that the House may unintentionally have been misled on Report. I support the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, on Amendment 5. I fully understand the argument deployed by the Government on Report—it would be absurd to allow a person regarded as dangerous back into the country in order to pursue an appeal. My concern is that legal practitioners understand the policy of the Home Office to be to wait until a person with leave to remain travels abroad before then making the decision to curtail their leave, with the express intention of depriving them of the right of appeal from within the United Kingdom. That seems to be difficult to reconcile with the rule of law. I ask the Minister in his response to Amendment 5 at least to give the House an assurance that decisions to curtail leave to remain will not be deliberately delayed until a person travels abroad, with the intention of depriving them of a right of appeal from within this country.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I declare an interest as co-chair of the human trafficking parliamentary group. If there are reasonable grounds for someone being understood to be a victim of trafficking, it would be extraordinarily unjust and contrary both to the Council of Europe’s convention and the directive of the European Union, to both of which the Government are signatories, to treat that victim in the way that it is possible that he or she would be treated if the amendment were not passed.
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers
My Lords, I apologise for the fact that I was not able to be present to move a similar amendment on Report, but I could not have improved on the explanation of its merits given then to the House by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The amendment is needed to remedy two anomalies in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which, in its present form, impacts adversely on the independence of the Supreme Court.
The first anomaly arises from the terms of Section 48(2) of the Act, which provides that the Lord Chancellor must appoint the chief executive after consulting the president of the court. The effect of the amendment is to make the president of the Supreme Court, rather than the Lord Chancellor, responsible for the appointment of the chief executive of the court. The amendment is appropriate because the Act expressly provides that the functions of the chief executive of the Supreme Court are to be carried out in accordance with the directions of the president of the court. Those functions include the non-judicial functions of the court in so far as the president delegates them to the chief executive.
More generally, the Act requires the chief executive to ensure that the court’s resources are used to provide an efficient and effective system to support the court in carrying on its business. The president and chief executive of the court work in partnership to ensure that the court operates efficiently. Under Section 50 of the Act, the Lord Chancellor is responsible for ensuring that the court has the resources that he thinks are appropriate to enable the court to carry on its business, but he has no role under the statute in relation to the manner in which the court is run. This is quite deliberate. The whole object of the creation of the Supreme Court was to make sure that it was, and was seen to be, independent of the legislature and the Executive.
The chief executive is the accounting officer of the Supreme Court and, as such, reports not to the Lord Chancellor but direct to Parliament in accordance with Section 54 of the Act. This requires the chief executive to prepare a report after each financial year, which the Lord Chancellor is required to lay before each House of Parliament.
The first danger of the provision that the chief executive be appointed by the Lord Chancellor is that the Lord Chancellor, when making the appointment, will be concerned to appoint a candidate who will have regard to his wishes when deciding on the administrative arrangements of the court. Let me make it plain that there is no suggestion that this consideration influenced the appointment of the first chief executive of the court. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained to the House how she was appointed by an ad hoc commission that included three Law Lords, under the chairmanship of a Civil Service commissioner. There is no complaint about what happened on that occasion. That process resulted in the appointment of Jennifer Rowe. I take this opportunity to recognise the admirable way in which she has performed her duties under my presidency, and to confirm that she is rightly recognised as deserving much of the credit for the successful birth and early years of the Supreme Court.
The second danger of the provision is that, because the Lord Chancellor appoints the chief executive, the chief executive will be expected to defer to the wishes of the Lord Chancellor in relation to the manner in which the Supreme Court is managed. Such an interpretation of the Act might not seem unreasonable. After all, the Lord Chancellor is to provide the court with such resources as he thinks are appropriate for the court to carry on its business. Why should he then not have a say in how those resources are used? The answer is of course that this would be in conflict with the objective of the creation of the Supreme Court, which was to give effect to the separation of powers. Lest there be any doubt about this, perhaps I may remind the House of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, the then Lord Chancellor, said to the House on 14 December 2004, when bringing forward the amendments which became the governance sections of the Constitutional Reform Act. He said:
“The chief executive will be able to allocate resources as he considers appropriate to ensure an effective and efficient system to support the court in carrying out its business. In other words, the chief executive will be solely responsible for the administration of the court, in accordance with directions from the president, and will be free from ministerial control”.—[Official Report, 14/12/04; col. 1237.]
The danger that there will be a perception that the chief executive should defer to the wishes of the Lord Chancellor is a real one. I must tell the House that during my presidency it was made quite clear to me that those who served in the Ministry of Justice at all levels were of this view. It made relations with the Ministry of Justice difficult. When responding on Report to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, said that,
“the Government retain a fundamental concern with regard to accountability and proper lines of accountability which need to be established so that the elected Government are responsible for the proper fiscal and managerial operation of the court”.—[Official Report, 4/12/12; col. 653.]
Far from justifying the Government’s opposition to the amendment, that statement underlined its desirability, for the chief executive of the Supreme Court is accountable not to Ministers but to the president of the court and to Parliament.
The second anomaly that the amendment is designed to cure arises from the terms of Section 49(2) of the 2005 Act, which requires the chief executive to obtain the agreement of the Lord Chancellor on the number of officers and staff of the court, and on the terms upon which they are to be appointed. The staffing needs of the court are quite complex. They include security officers; secretaries for the justices and administrators; librarians; judicial assistants; operators of the television system that provides live coverage of the proceedings of the court; the staff of the communications department; cleaners; and the staff of the public cafeteria. It makes no sense at all for the chief executive to be required to obtain the consent of the Lord Chancellor, through his officials, on the number and terms of employment of this diverse staff complement. These are matters which pre-eminently should be decided by the chief executive, working in consultation with the president, who himself will be in a position to obtain the views of the other justices as to their needs. There is nothing useful that the Lord Chancellor’s officials can add. Furthermore, the requirement to obtain the consent of the Lord Chancellor to these matters detracts from the independence, and the appearance of independence, of the Supreme Court, which was the objective of its creation. On Report, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, did not press this amendment on the understanding that it raised a live issue that was subject to ongoing discussions in which the president of the court was involved.
This morning, the president, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, informed me that these discussions had not borne fruit and that, in particular, he had been given no justification for the present form of the relevant provisions in the 2005 Act. Shortly before I came into the Chamber, I received on my BlackBerry a copy of a letter written by the Lord Chancellor to the noble and learned Lord, explaining that the Government would not be in a position to agree to the amendment because further time was required to consider its implications. I am not at present persuaded that there is any need for further time, but I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about this in due course. I beg to move.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, perhaps I may add two points to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, said. The first is to inform your Lordships that the chairman of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, whom I am pleased to see in her place today, wrote to the Minister on 10 December stating the committee’s support for the amendment on the basis that,
“it is not constitutionally appropriate”,
for the Lord Chancellor to retain his present functions in relation to the appointment of the chief executive of the Supreme Court and in relation to the deployment of the court’s staff.
The second point that I want to emphasise is that allowing the Lord Chancellor to retain these functions is impossible to reconcile with the Supreme Court being seen as independent of the other organs of government. The need for the Supreme Court to be seen as independent was the main reason why it was created by the 2005 Act and why the Law Lords left this place. It is of especial importance that the administration of the Supreme Court is seen to be independent of the Executive when the Executive are the respondent in a very a large proportion of the cases heard by the Supreme Court. This amendment is of constitutional importance; the arguments in its favour are simply overwhelming.
Baroness Jay of Paddington
My Lords, my name is not on this amendment but I have spoken several times on this subject during the course of the Bill. I welcome the Minister’s further discussions with the Lord Chancellor, and the government amendment. As he said, it reflects the Constitution Committee’s considerations of this matter which, as he mentioned in the discussion on a previous amendment, have been going on since the beginning of this year. I am delighted that he has taken the view that he has and that he is proposing Amendment 8.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I, too, am very grateful to the Minister for bringing forward Amendment 8. It is important to underline that Amendment 8, and the personal obligation that it will place on the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, is not to question in any way the commitment and the work done in this field by the current Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, which has been considerable. Nor is it to suggest that appointments to the Bench should be made other than on merit. There are highly qualified women and members of ethnic minorities at the Bar, in solicitors’ firms, in the CPS and in the government legal service, and every effort needs to be made to communicate the message that applications from them for judicial appointment would be specially welcomed.
The House heard in Committee and at Report the personal commitment of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, on the issue of promoting judicial diversity. I am pleased that through his efforts the amendment has been tabled on behalf of the Government.
Baroness Prashar
My Lords, I, too, welcome this amendment and thank the Minister for accepting the arguments. The Judicial Appointments Commission recommended this way back in 2008 and I am delighted that it has been agreed and that it is recognised that promoting diversity is a tripartite effort and that leadership is much needed. I want to put on record my thanks.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Pannick Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, I am not a criminal lawyer and have none of the experience that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, has, but I sat as a criminal judge—grotesque though that may seem—in the days when I was a recorder. I cannot claim much greater experience than that, but I support the amendment as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, has said, this amendment was drafted by the committee so it is a JCHR amendment, and our report deals with our reasons in detail. In paragraph 60, our conclusion says:
“We do not see the justification for the width of the order-making power in clause 23(1) of the Bill, which, as it stands, authorises the filming and broadcasting of witnesses, parties, crime victims, jurors and defendants in court proceedings. We urge a much more cautious approach. Before any extension of this power we recommend that the Government conduct a much more comprehensive public consultation, carry out a more detailed impact assessment in the light of that consultation and conduct a review of the operation of the power after an elapse of years. In the meantime, we recommend that the Bill be amended to confine the scope of the power to the filming and broadcasting of judges and advocates in appellate proceedings, as the Government currently intends”.
I am also cautiously conservative on this issue because I do not believe that criminal trials are best conducted in televised goldfish bowl.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I do not share the concerns expressed by the two previous speakers. The broadcasting of court proceedings will enhance public understanding of our justice system, which in general works efficiently and fairly. There is also the possibility that allowing in the cameras may illuminate those areas of the law that are much in need of reform, a result that I would have thought law reformers as distinguished as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, would welcome.
So what if broadcasters focus on sensational cases? That is what print journalists do and we do not exclude them from the courtroom. Amendment 113 would confine broadcasting to appellate proceedings but, if the Lord Chief Justice thinks it appropriate, why not allow the broadcasting of a judicial review application that raises issues of importance? Such applications normally involve no witness evidence and often raise issues of law of considerable constitutional importance. Of course there should be no broadcasting of the evidence of witnesses, and jurors’ faces should not be shown, but I cannot understand why there should be no possibility of the broadcasting of the judge’s sentencing remarks at the end of a criminal trial. There are many cases where, at the end of the criminal trial, the judge is speaking not only to the defendant or other persons in court but is seeking to communicate to the public at large. The judge should be assisted to do so.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, made what I respectfully submit was a quite extraordinary suggestion that judges need to be protected because their words may be misrepresented. She also suggested that judges need anonymity in the community at large. I doubt very much whether there are many judges—or, indeed, many noble Lords—who think that our judges need or deserve such protection.
In any event, Amendment 113 is entirely unnecessary because your Lordships will see that Clause 23 will not come into effect without the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, who no doubt will carefully consider the details of any scheme to allow broadcasting of court proceedings. For the same reason, Amendments 113ZA and 113ZB in this group are also unnecessary in seeking to impose conditions on the broadcasting of court proceedings. I am content to proceed on the basis set out in Clause 23, that the broadcasting provision would come into force only,
“with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice”.
It would be far better to let him—or possibly, after next October, her—decide on the detail of the broadcasting scheme.
For the same reason, Amendment 120B, requiring a resolution from both Houses, is unnecessary. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill—for both of whom I have the highest regard—are the 21st century equivalents of the 18th century Scottish judge Lord Eskgrove. When a court reporter wrote down the terms of one of his judgments being delivered in court, Lord Eskgrove complained:
“The fellow takes down my very words”.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Would the noble Lord address the points raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, rather than referring to me as an 18th century gentleman?
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I have made such points as I think may assist the House in answer to the arguments brought forward in this debate and the arguments presented by the Joint Committee.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I apologise for arriving late at this part of the debate. I did not propose to speak and hold no strong views about this amendment, but I have to rise just to deal with a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He said that judges neither need nor deserve any protection. That is true in general, but I think he has overlooked the fact that certain judges get death threats. There are groups of judges, of which I happen to be one, who during their time as a judge received a number of death threats. In my case they came both from people who could recognise me because they had appeared before me in court and from those, such as Fathers 4 Justice, who not only made death threats against me but, I must tell your Lordships, also threatened to kidnap my dog, which I thought was much more serious than the death threat against me. More serious than the threats that either I or the family court judges receive are those made against judges in terrorist trials. They absolutely need and deserve protection, so I take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Lord Pannick
I entirely agree that judges deserve all the protection necessary in those circumstances. However, the press and broadcasters are perfectly entitled to publish photographs of the judge who has heard the terrorist trial or any other sensational case. This amendment would have no impact in that respect.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
Does the noble Lord accept that there is something different about the moving camera? There is a famous book by Christopher Isherwood, Goodbye to Berlin, in which the first line is: “I am a camera”. The reason why he starts that way is because he is saying: “I am providing you with a subjective view from my eyes—my edited account of what was happening in the 1930s during the rise of Hitler in Berlin”. He was pointing up the fact that the camera is very subjective. Does the noble Lord agree with that?
Lord Pannick
Of course there are differences, but no difference that could possibly justify these amendments. Noble Lords will know that the proceedings of our Supreme Court are broadcast virtually every day that the court sits. None of us has any knowledge of that; it has caused no adverse effects and I cannot understand the noble Baroness’s concerns.
Lord Pannick
“Abolition of scandalising the judiciary as form of contempt of court
(1) Scandalising the judiciary (also referred to as scandalising the court or scandalising judges) is abolished as a form of contempt of court under the common law of England and Wales.
(2) That abolition does not prevent proceedings for contempt of court being brought against a person for conduct that immediately before that abolition would have constituted both scandalising the judiciary and some other form of contempt of court.”
Lord Pannick
My Lords, this amendment seeks to abolish the crime of scandalising the judiciary in England and Wales. I am delighted that the Minister has added his name to this amendment. The amendment is also signed by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who has played a leading role in arguing for reform of this area of the law. The amendment is also in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell—a former Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland—and the noble Lord, Lord Bew.
I can explain the reasons for this amendment very briefly. It is no longer necessary to maintain as part of our law of contempt of court a criminal offence of insulting judges by statements or publications out of court. The judiciary has no need for such protection. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, explained in Committee, the wise judge—and he, if I may say so, was a very wise judge—normally ignores insults out of court. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, made a similar point in a case he decided, as he may recollect. Judges, of course, are as entitled as anyone else to bring proceedings for libel, and some have done so.
The law of scandalising the judiciary could have been left in the moribund state in which it has rested for many years. However, the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland unwisely chose earlier this year to seek to breathe life into it by bringing a prosecution, later dropped, against Peter Hain MP for some critical comments he had made in his autobiography concerning a Northern Ireland judge. That prosecution had two main consequences. First, it substantially increased the sales of Mr Hain’s book and, secondly, it led to this amendment.
When we debated this subject in Committee on 2 July, the Minister gave a cautious welcome to the amendment but said, very properly, that the Government wished to consult on the matter. As a result of the debate in this House, the Law Commission expedited the publication of a consultation paper on 10 August in which it proposed that the offence of scandalising the judiciary should indeed be abolished.
I emphasise that the amendment will not affect other aspects of the law of contempt of court and in particular the powers of the judge to deal with any disruptions during court proceedings. I also emphasise that the amendment is not designed to encourage criticism of the judiciary. Much of the criticism to which judges are subjected is ill informed and unsubstantiated. However, even where criticism is unjustified, it should not be a criminal offence.
The amendment will not affect the law in Northern Ireland or Scotland, in the latter of which the offence is known as “murmuring judges”. I understand that in Northern Ireland more consultation is required. It is ironic that the impetus for this amendment came from the Peter Hain case in Northern Ireland, and now the anachronistic law that led to that case is to be abolished in England and Wales but not in Northern Ireland. I hope that the Minister can give us an indication of when consultations with Northern Ireland will be completed and a decision reached.
Meanwhile, I am delighted by the historic decision which I hope that this House will take tonight to approve an amendment abolishing the offence of scandalising the judiciary in England and Wales. As Justice Albie Sachs said on this subject in a judgment in the Constitutional Court of South Africa in 2001, respect for the courts will be all the stronger,
“to the degree that it is earned, rather than to the extent that it is commanded”.
I beg to move.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I will clarify a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The Justice Committee in Northern Ireland recently agreed to proceed with an amendment to its Criminal Justice Bill that would see this offence repealed. I am sure that the words uttered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, about his own experience will carry great weight. However, this is a devolved matter for Northern Ireland.
Lord Beecham
No, I want to speak now if that is all right. Thank you. Burglary is a serious crime and a particularly distressing one. The forced invasion of one’s home adds a further dimension to the effect on its occupiers. I suspect several Members of the House will have shared my experience, at least in part. My home—which, incidentally, was built by the father of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, to whom I apologise for anticipating in this debate, for reasons that I shall give later—has been burgled and my office has also been burgled once. Fortunately, little damage was done; even more fortunately, no one was present at the time. Where the householder or other occupant is present, the impact of the crime transcends distress and, too often, becomes traumatic.
I say at once that we welcome the extension of the present law to non-residential premises, such as those of shopkeepers, to which the Minister has referred. However, in relation to domestic premises, while absolutely affirming the right of residents to defend themselves and their property, we have doubts about the Government’s proposals. The amendments have been spatchcocked into the Bill at virtually the last minute, almost, it would seem, as an initiation rite performed by the new Lord Chancellor. Unlike the proposals on community sentencing, we have not had the opportunity of a general debate under the recommittal procedure. I propose therefore to treat the debate on these amendments as, in effect, a Second Reading debate, which is why I sought to speak now rather than later.
Burglary is an offence against the person as well as against property, because a break-in destroys the victim’s peace of mind by violating the safe haven of their home. The householder is not in a position to exercise calm, cool judgment. The householder is entitled to use reasonable force to get rid of the burglar; and, in measuring whether the force is reasonable or not, you are not doing a paper exercise six months later:
“You have to put yourself in the position of the man or woman who has reacted to the presence of a burglar and has reacted with fury, with anxiety, with fear”.
These are not my words—although I concur with them—but the words of the Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, commenting on the recent case of two men jailed after raiding a remote cottage, when they were blasted with a shotgun. What is significant is that his words reflect the present state of the law. Although the victims in that case were questioned by police, their Member of Parliament, Alan Duncan MP—not, I think, generally known as a bleeding-heart liberal—said:
“The police did a very good job and investigated as thoroughly as they had to when a firearm is involved”.
The first question is what the government proposal adds to the present state of the law, as enshrined by the Labour Government’s Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and the present Government’s clarification, embodied in Section 148 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, passed only a few months ago. In my submission, it adds only confusion. It purports to allow the use of disproportionate force but not grossly disproportionate force. Can the Minister define, or even better exemplify, the difference between the two, especially bearing in mind the words of the Lord Chief Justice? What difference, if any, in his view would the amendment’s wording have had, for example, on the case of Tony Martin, who shot dead a burglar? What does the Minister make of the statement by Michael Wolkind QC, who represented Tony Martin? He said:
“The law already recognises that people react in a certain way in the heat of the moment”,
and argued that the law does not need changing.
The second element that the proposal might add to the Bill is, paradoxically and obviously unintentionally, a heightened risk to home owners. A study in Texas has demonstrated that the notorious “stand your ground” law, promoted by the US gun lobby and enacted in several US states, has led to more injuries and deaths being inflicted on householders and others by criminals, rather than fewer. Anyone who watched the recent TV programme on “stand your ground” would surely hesitate before opening the door to similar unintended consequences here, even allowing for the radically different gun culture that is such a blemish on American society.
There are other questions to be asked. Have the Government consulted the judiciary or the police on the proposed changes? If so, what responses have they received? If they have not consulted them, why not? Have they conducted an impact analysis? Your Lordships might think that a particularly fitting term in this instance for an assessment of the consequences of legislation. What is the evidence that the present state of the law, as defined by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is inadequate? The Minister has circulated what purports to be a fact sheet. Your Lordships might think that that document contains precious few facts and no evidence on which to base the Government’s proposals.
My right honourable friend Sadiq Khan sought information by means of Parliamentary Question on the number of home owners arrested or charged after defending their property against burglars since 1994. The answer was:
“The information on arrests is not collected centrally … It is not possible to match the arrests data to any subsequent outcomes”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/10/12; col. 641W.]
The Guardian recently reported, after a review by the CPS, that there were all of seven cases—I repeat, seven cases—between 1990 and 2005 in which a householder was prosecuted. In other words, there is simply no evidence to suggest that the problem the Government purport to be addressing is significant in terms of numbers, whereas it is clear that neither the police nor the courts are going to fall over themselves to prosecute householders who react in the way described by the Lord Chief Justice.
Is the Minister suggesting that where serious injury or death is inflicted on a burglar—or even someone such as the man featured in a recent BBC radio programme who was thought to be a burglar but was apparently just a confused man trying unsuccessfully to enter what he thought was his own home—the police should not investigate the situation in a proper manner, not least in the interests of those whom they interview? I wait to see not only what answers to these and other questions emerge from this debate but what transpires when this Bill goes to the House of Commons.
I have no doubt that the Lord Chancellor will seek to portray himself as the champion of the victims. It is a pretty hollow claim on the part of a Government who are both alienating and cutting the police force; undermining community policing; presiding over the reduction of community support officers, who provide invaluable back-up to front-line policing; and savagely slashing or altogether removing compensation for the victims of crime by their changes to the criminal injuries compensation scheme. Those changes, I might add, were forced through the House of Commons by the process of mugging several Conservative members of the relevant committee, including John Redwood MP, a senior former Minister, and substituting placemen in the form of Parliamentary Private Secretaries—not much consideration for victims of crime in that context.
I repeat that we are at one with the intention to protect the householder and punish the burglar. We remain to be convinced that the Government’s proposals are sound in law and safe, from the perspective of the very people they are supposed to protect.
Lord Pannick
Before the noble Lord sits down, in the light of his very powerful speech, is he going to invite his Benches to enter the Lobbies to oppose this amendment?
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I am treating this as a Second Reading debate, which we could and should have had some time ago, to allow the Government the opportunity to make their case—which, it seems to me, the Minister has failed to do today—either here or in the other place, but we will not be voting on these proposals today.
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I remember well when the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 was going through this House that I was much concerned by Section 76. I have always thought that the piecemeal amendment of the common law by legislation was a mistake unless such amendment was preceded by a report from, in the old days, the Criminal Law Revision Committee or, nowadays, the Law Commission. I suggest that there are two grave disadvantages in the sort of piecemeal amendment we are now asked to perform. First, it deprives the development in the common law of the flexibility that the common law provides as circumstances change. Once you put it in statute it is in statute, and if it is to be changed at all it has to be changed by statute. Secondly, it may often be initiated as the result of a particular campaign—this may be an example of that—without regard to the wider context.
I did not in fact oppose Section 76 when it went through the House because it at least did not in any way seek to change the law on self-defence. That is made amply clear by Section 9 itself. Section 76 was in some ways an odd provision because it refers both in subsection (1) to the test being one of reasonableness and in subsection (6) to the test being one of disproportion—although those two things might be thought to be opposite sides of exactly the same coin. That will not be so from now on because of the addition of the word “grossly” before the word “disproportionate”. For that reason Section 9, which made it clear that the common law was not going to be changed, has now itself been amended to show that, in this respect, the common law is being changed. We are thus now doing exactly what I feared would be the result if we stratified the law as we did in 2008.
What is being done is defended on the basis that it is very difficult for the householder, in the agony of the moment, to make a nice judgment as to what is reasonable or is not. That has always been the law, as my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf has made clear. Speaking from my own experience, I have always stressed that very point. In that respect, this will not change the law but it will, in fact, change the law in the way that I have described. Just as judges have got used to directing juries in accordance with Section 76, they will now have to change tack, which they should not be required to do.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, the Minister said that householders should not be subjected to criminal liability because of the use of force which may appear disproportionate in the cold light of day, and that the amendment is designed to redress the balance. It is very important to identify precisely what the balance is at the moment and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, have said, the law is very clear on this subject. The official specimen directions to a jury—what judges up and down the land actually tell jurors on this subject—are contained in the Crown Court Bench book which says:
“When considering whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable do bear in mind that the person who is defending himself cannot be expected in the heat of the moment to weigh precisely the exact amount of defensive action which is necessary; and in this regard, the more serious the attack (or threatened attack) upon him, the more difficult his situation will be. If, in your judgment, the defendant was or may have been in a situation in which he found it necessary to defend himself and he did no more than what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary to defend himself, that would be very strong evidence that the amount of force used by him was reasonable”.
This provides all the protection that the householder needs or, indeed, deserves. The Minister did not refer to any cases of unjust convictions, or even unjust prosecutions that should not have been brought. The highest that the Minister put it in his opening remarks is that such cases “might conceivably” occur in the future. This is surely the weakest basis for proposing law reform that your Lordships will have heard for some time. Furthermore, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, that these amendments are inconsistent with our obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights to protect the right to life. It is one thing to allow the householder to use proportionate force and to assess that on the basis of what they honestly and reasonably understand the facts to be at the time they act in circumstances of shock and distress. It surely is a very different matter for Parliament to authorise the use of disproportionate force.
With great respect, I cannot understand why the Opposition Front Bench is not opposing this amendment in the Division Lobby today, despite the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, eloquently explaining that the amendment would cause confusion and nothing positive. It is all very well to treat this as a Second Reading debate but it is the only opportunity that this House will have to oppose the amendment. I hope that the Opposition will reconsider their position. I am sure that many noble Lords would join them in the Lobby if a Division were called.
This amendment is unnecessary, unprincipled and inconsistent with our international obligations. I hope that the Government will think again.
Lord Morris of Aberavon
My Lords, I am sorry that I missed the beginning of the debate: I was engaged on other business. I support everything that has been said against this amendment. It is unnecessary and confusing, and will be inflexible. My experience is much more limited: I was a criminal practitioner who had to sum up in these kinds of cases on dozens of occasions.
On those occasions, I always would quote—I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for giving us an account of the current sentencing preferred remarks by the Sentencing Council—a namesake, who is no relation although I knew him. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest used to say that in the heat of a moment, one cannot judge to a nicety the appropriate amount of force that is reasonable. That phrase used to be quoted in the sentencing remarks and was referred to by my noble friend Lady Kennedy.
In summing up, will the Minister enlighten us as to the form of words that would be used by a judge to sum up a situation where he is saying that a disproportionate amount of force can be used? I should like to know what those words will be. That would clarify the situation beyond peradventure. I fear that the Lord Chancellor is making up the law on the hoof and will rue the day if this becomes part of our law.
Lord McNally
My Lords, this has been a very thoughtful debate, and people of great experience have put their views forward. I shall try again to explain where the Lord Chancellor is coming from and to reassure noble Lords on some of the points that have been made.
In bringing forward this amendment, the Lord Chancellor wants to clarify the situation and reassure the general public. Although the last contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Martin, was not in support of my proposal, it made the point that we are trying to deal with ordinary people dealing with situations in their lives. I understand lawyers making their points, but it is important that we see this from the public’s point of view. Although some recent cases have not led to prosecution and conviction, as I said, there may be cases in future which will benefit from the additional protection and clarification we are providing. Let me be very clear again, following on from what the noble Lord, Lord Martin, said, that this is not a vigilantes’ charter. In this country, there are still extremely strict rules about the possession and storage of guns which would still apply.
This is an attempt to recognise that people confronted by burglars, and acting in fear for their safety in the heat of the moment, cannot be expected to weigh up exactly how much force might be required. In these extreme circumstances, we think they should have greater legal protection. It is certainly not a licence to kill, whatever the circumstances. People will still be prosecuted if the use of force was unreasonable in the circumstances. The use of grossly disproportionate force will never be reasonable.
It will be for the courts to determine in each case what is disproportionate or grossly disproportionate. We want to make clear though that householders, who cannot always be expected to be thinking clearly if they are confronted by an intruder, will not be treated as criminals if they use a level of force which in the circumstances as they believed them to be is reasonable but turns out to have been disproportionate. We are clear that it is not open season for vicious attacks on anyone, even an intruder.
Let us also be clear, if somebody has been killed or seriously injured, an arrest may be necessary for the police to investigate thoroughly. A revised code of arrest for the police—PACE Code G—came into force on 12 November 2012 with new guidance on the circumstances in which an arrest may be necessary. The guidance also encourages the police to consider whether voluntary attendance at an interview might be a practicable alternative to a formal arrest. The changes we are making to the law will complement the improvements made to PACE Code G.
We are not changing the fundamental premise that a person can only use force that was reasonable in the circumstances as they believed them to be. The law on the use of force in other circumstances, for example, to defend oneself on the street, to prevent crime or to protect property will remain unchanged. We are trying to rebalance the law so that householders will not be thought of as criminals but, as I said at the beginning, quite properly as victims.
I am assured that we believe that the amendment is compatible with the ECHR and that we have recently published a memorandum in support of that view which I will put in the Library of the House.
Listening very carefully, I again pray in aid although I am not saying he is in support of this particular amendment, the Lord Chief Justice, who caught the mood behind the amendment at his press conference in September. He was reported as saying that,
“I am not talking about individual cases, but I know of cases, and I do read the newspapers occasionally”,
where,
“it looks as though the householder is the criminal”.
He then pointed out the circumstance of a householder facing a burglar.
“You are probably very cross and you are probably very frightened—a mixture of both—and your judgment of precisely what you should or should not do in the circumstances cannot, as another predecessor of mine (Lord Lane) said, you cannot measure it in a jeweller’s scale”.
The realisation that in such terrifying circumstances you cannot measure it in a jeweller’s scale led the Lord Chancellor to conclude that it would be better to clarify the law in a way which he believes will be more reassuring to the householder and give better guidance to the court.
Lord Pannick
Before the Minister sits down, have the Government consulted the Lord Chief Justice and the judiciary on this matter and, if so, what has been their response to the amendment?
Lord McNally
The amendment is a government amendment, and the Government stand by the amendment.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Pannick Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Pannick
“Supreme Court security officers
(1) In Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (the Supreme Court) after section 51 insert—
“Court security51A Security officers
(1) A Supreme Court security officer is a person who is—
(a) appointed by the President of the Supreme Court under section 49(1) or provided under a contract, and(b) designated by the President as a Supreme Court security officer.(2) The President may give directions as to—
(a) training courses to be completed by Supreme Court security officers;(b) conditions to be met before a person may be designated as a Supreme Court security officer.(3) For the purposes of sections 51B to 51E, a Supreme Court security officer who is not readily identifiable as such (whether by means of uniform or badge or otherwise) is not to be regarded as acting in the execution of the officer’s duty.
(4) In those sections “court building” means any building—
(a) where the business of the Supreme Court, or of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, is carried on, and(b) to which the public has access.51B Powers of search, exclusion, removal and restraint
(1) A Supreme Court security officer acting in the execution of the officer’s duty may search—
(a) any person who is in, or seeking to enter, a court building, and(b) any article in the possession of such a person.(2) Subsection (1) does not authorise a Supreme Court security officer to require a person to remove any of the person’s clothing other than a coat, jacket, headgear, gloves or footwear.
(3) A Supreme Court security officer acting in the execution of the officer’s duty may exclude or remove from a court building, or a part of a court building, any person who refuses—
(a) to permit a search under subsection (1), or(b) to surrender an article in the person’s possession when asked to do so under section 51C(1).(4) A Supreme Court security officer acting in the execution of the officer’s duty may—
(a) restrain any person who is in a court building, or(b) exclude or remove any person from a court building, or a part of a court building,if it is reasonably necessary to do so for one of the purposes given in subsection (5).(5) The purposes are—
(a) enabling business of the Supreme Court, or of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to be carried on without interference or delay; (b) maintaining order;(c) securing the safety of any person in the court building.(6) A Supreme Court security officer acting in the execution of the officer’s duty may remove any person from a courtroom at the request of—
(a) a judge of the Supreme Court, or(b) a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.(7) The powers given by subsections (3), (4) and (6) include power to use reasonable force, where necessary.
51C Surrender, seizure and retention of knives and other articles
(1) If a Supreme Court security officer acting in the execution of the officer’s duty reasonably believes that an article in the possession of a person who is in, or seeking to enter, a court building ought to be surrendered on any of the grounds given in subsection (2), the officer must ask the person to surrender the article; and, if the person refuses to surrender the article, the officer may seize it.
(2) The grounds are that the article—
(a) may jeopardise the maintenance of order in the court building (or a part of it),(b) may put the safety of any person in the court building at risk, or(c) may be evidence of, or in relation to, an offence.(3) Subject to subsection (4), a Supreme Court security officer may retain an article which was—
(a) surrendered in response to a request under subsection (1), or(b) seized under that subsection,until the time when the person who surrendered it, or from whom it was seized, is leaving the court building.(4) If a Supreme Court security officer reasonably believes that the article may be evidence of, or in relation to, an offence, the officer may retain it until—
(a) the time when the person who surrendered it, or from whom it was seized, is leaving the court building, or(b) the end of the permitted period,whichever is the later.(5) In subsection (4) “the permitted period” means such period, not exceeding 24 hours from the time the article was surrendered or seized, as will enable the Supreme Court security officer to draw the article to the attention of a constable.
(6) Subsections (3) to (5) do not apply where a knife is—
(a) surrendered to a Supreme Court security officer in response to a request under subsection (1), or(b) seized by a Supreme Court security officer under that subsection,but, instead, the knife must be retained in accordance with regulations under section 51D(3) unless returned or disposed of in accordance with those regulations or regulations under section 51D(1).(7) If a Supreme Court security officer reasonably believes that a retained knife may be evidence of, or in relation to, an offence, nothing in subsection (6) prevents the officer retaining the knife for so long as necessary to enable the officer to draw it to the attention of a constable.
(8) In this section “knife” includes—
(a) a knife-blade, and(b) any other article which—(i) has a blade or is sharply pointed, and(ii) is made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person.51D Regulations about retention of knives and other articles
(1) The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make provision as to—
(a) the provision to persons—(i) by whom articles have been surrendered in response to a request under subsection (1) of section 51C, or(ii) from whom articles have been seized under that subsection,of written information about the powers of retention of Supreme Court security officers,(b) the keeping of records about articles which have been so surrendered or seized,(c) the period for which unclaimed articles have to be kept, and(d) the disposal of unclaimed articles at the end of that period.(2) In subsection (1) “unclaimed article” means an article—
(a) which has been retained under section 51C,(b) which a person is entitled to have returned,(c) which has not been returned, and(d) whose return has not been requested by a person entitled to it.(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the Lord Chancellor must by regulations make provision as to—
(a) the procedure to be followed when a knife is retained under section 51C;(b) the making of requests by eligible persons for the return of knives so retained;(c) the procedure to be followed when returning a knife pursuant to a request made in accordance with the regulations.(4) In subsection (3)—
“eligible person”, in relation to a knife retained under section 51C, means—
(a) the person who surrendered the knife under subsection (1) of section 51C or from whom the knife was seized under that subsection, or(b) any other person specified in regulations under subsection (3);“knife” has the same meaning as in section 51C.
51E Assaulting and obstructing Supreme Court security officers
(1) Any person who assaults a Supreme Court security officer acting in the execution of the officer’s duty commits an offence.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction—
(a) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or(b) to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or(c) to both.(3) Subsection (2) applies—
(a) in England and Wales in relation to offences committed before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (general limit on magistrates’ court’s power to impose imprisonment), and(b) in Northern Ireland,as if the reference to 12 months were a reference to 6 months.(4) A person who resists or wilfully obstructs a Supreme Court security officer acting in the execution of the officer’s duty commits an offence.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (4) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.”
(2) In section 48(3)(a) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (delegation of President’s functions to chief executive) after “under section 49(1)” insert “or 51A(1)(a) or (b)”.”
Lord Pannick
My Lords, Amendment 112 is in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and myself. The noble and learned Lord is abroad today and sends his apologies to the House.
The amendment seeks to give security officers at the United Kingdom Supreme Court the same powers as those available to court security officers in the other courts of England and Wales under Sections 52 to 57 of the Courts Act 2003. Those sections give court security officers statutory powers to search people, to exclude or remove people from court buildings or to restrain them in court buildings, and to seize, retain and dispose of offensive articles in court buildings. The provisions also create a criminal offence of assaulting or obstructing a court security officer.
There is at present a gap in the law because the Courts Act 2003 confers these powers only on staff appointed and then designated as security officers by the Lord Chancellor in relation to those courts where he is responsible for running an efficient and effective service. In the case of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 vests in the president of the court the power to appoint staff, and the chief executive is under a duty to run an efficient and effective service. The powers conferred by the Courts Act are therefore not at present available to Supreme Court security officers.
Although, of course, Supreme Court security officers would hope never to have to use such powers, it is necessary for them, and for the judges, lawyers and members of the public they are protecting, to know that they have these vital powers at their disposal as security officers should the need arise. Unhappily, as we all know, there have been cases of such powers being needed in courts around the country.
I am sorry that your Lordships do not today have the advantage of hearing from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, the immediate past president of the Supreme Court, but I hope I have said enough to persuade noble Lords, and, in particular, the Minister that this amendment is necessary. I beg to move.
Lord Goldsmith
My Lords, I support this amendment. I understand that the Government may be in a position to say something favourable about it, so there is no need to say anything further, other than that the amendment may anticipate a little bit the debate that may take place on the next amendment about the importance of recognising the Supreme Court as an independent court no longer dependent on the Lord Chancellor.
Lord Pannick
“Chief Executive of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
(1) The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
(2) For section 48(2) (chief executive), substitute—
“(2) The President of the Supreme Court shall appoint the Chief Executive in accordance with the arrangements for the time being in force for the selection of persons to be employed in the civil service of the State.”
(3) In section 49(2) (officers and staff), omit the words “with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor.””
Lord Pannick
My Lords, again, this amendment is tabled in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and myself. It raises two issues of fundamental importance concerning the independent status of the Supreme Court—that is, its independence from the Executive. The first issue is that it would make the president of the Supreme Court and not the Lord Chancellor responsible for appointing the chief executive of the Supreme Court. The current position is that Section 48(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 provides that:
“The Lord Chancellor must appoint the chief executive, after consulting the President of the Court”.
The process for the appointment of the first and current chief executive, Jenny Rowe, involved an ad-hoc commission chaired by a Civil Service commissioner and which included three of the then Law Lords along with a retired senior civil servant as the external member. The Ministry of Justice provided the commission with secretarial support and a firm of head-hunters was used to identify potential candidates. The amendment does not envisage any change in the substance of that process. It worked well and produced an appointee who is widely recognised as deserving much of the credit for the successful birth and early years of our Supreme Court. However, in principle this is an appointment which should be made by the president of the Supreme Court and not by the Lord Chancellor.
The power to appoint all the other officers and staff of the Supreme Court is already invested in the president of the court by Section 49(1) of the 2005 Act, even if, in practice, he delegates the exercise of this power to the chief executive. Section 48(4) of the 2005 Act says that the chief executive has to act under the direction of the president, so it is an anomaly that the power to appoint the chief executive is not also a matter for the president.
There is also an important question of principle: of course, the Supreme Court acts independently of the Executive, but it must also be seen to do so. Indeed, that was the major reason why the Supreme Court was created by the 2005 Act and why the Law Lords left this place. For the president of the Supreme Court to have the responsibility for appointing the chief executive would emphasise to all concerned that this is an independent institution.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, has asked me to tell your Lordships that in his experience of the first three years of operation of the Supreme Court, the existing appointment provision led more than once to confusion in parts of the government machine that the chief executive should in some sense be acting at the behest of Ministers. The amendment is designed to put it beyond doubt that this is not the case. If the appointment power were to be vested in the president, there then arises the question why the Lord Chancellor should be consulted at all on this matter, particularly given that the chief executive is and would continue to be appointed in accordance with civil service recruitment rules, and the process is and would continue to be presided over by a Civil Service commissioner.
The Lord Chancellor is, of course, no longer a judge, and any role he might have in the process could only now be as a politician and government Minister.
I can tell your Lordships that the justices of the Supreme Court, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, the new president, simply do not understand how it can be constitutionally appropriate for the Lord Chancellor to exercise any such role. So the amendment would therefore confer responsibility on the president of the Supreme Court for appointment of the chief executive of that court, and would remove the role of the Lord Chancellor.
A second issue is raised by this amendment, arising from the terms of Section 49(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which provides that the chief executive of the Supreme Court requires the consent of the Lord Chancellor when she decides on the number of officers and staff of the court, and the terms on which officers and staff are to be appointed. The noble and learned lord, Lord Phillips, has said publicly that he considers it critical to the court’s independence, and the perception of its independence, that the chief executive owes her primary loyalty to the president of the court and not to a Minister. The justices of the Supreme Court believe it would be preferable for the statutory provisions to be changed to make it even clearer that the chief executive has a direct accountability to Parliament for the proper use of the court’s resources and that she acts entirely independently from ministerial direction.
This is not just a matter of principle, important though the principle of independence is. The practical reality is that it makes no sense whatever for the chief executive to have to agree with the Lord Chancellor, which means of course his officials, on the number of officers and staff of the court. The justices of the Supreme Court are clear that neither the Lord Chancellor nor his officials can be in any position to second guess decisions that the chief executive makes in consultation with, and, if necessary—although the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, assures me that it never came to that during his time—at the direction of the president, about the staffing requirements of the court.
In any event, the chief executive already has two separate disciplines upon her in making those staffing decisions—the budget that Parliament has decided to make available to the court, and the requirement on her as chief executive under Section 51(1) of the Act that the chief executive must ensure that the court’s resources,
“are used to provide an efficient and effective system to support the Court in carrying on its business”.
The amendment would therefore remove the need for the chief executive to seek the agreement of the Lord Chancellor to these matters, to make even clearer her direct accountability to the president on the one hand and to Parliament, if needs be via the Public Accounts Committee, on the other. I can tell your Lordships that the current president of the Supreme Court, the noble and learned lord, Lord Neuberger, supports this amendment on both of the matters that it covers: removal of the role of the Lord Chancellor in the appointment of the chief executive and in relation to staffing issues at the Supreme Court.
I understand that discussions are continuing on these important issues. I hope that the Minister will agree to consider these important issues further between now and Third Reading so that we can, if necessary, return to the matter then. I beg to move.
Lord Mayhew of Twysden
It seems almost trite to make the point that wherever you have a chain of command within an organisation, that chain of command should be clear and not muddled or uncertain. If you find that those defects are present, you are bound to get trouble sooner or later—and it will probably be sooner. In the case of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, it seems to me to be very important that there should be no such blemish in its constitutional arrangements, for the very reason that has been explained so powerfully to us this evening, and which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips—with the support of all his brethren—would have been adopting, we understand, were he present. The whole point of the setting up of the Supreme Court is that it should be operationally squeaky clean of any contamination by the Executive. That was the point of moving it away from the Judicial Committee of your Lordships’ House, something that many of us regretted. If that is to be the case, however, then it is particularly important that there should be no capability of misunderstanding and resulting conflict—let alone litigation—arising out of an assertion that there is a dual chain of command here.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, I am minded of the fact that during the dinner break one of my noble friends remarked how cold the House had become given that we are in the winter months. I hope that some of my words may warm the temperature spiritually if not physically. Before I deal with the substance of what has been laid in front of us, I assure the House that Her Majesty’s Government fully and utterly respect the independence of the judiciary, and that there is no question of our duty to uphold that independence.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has alluded to, and as many noble Lords will recall, this House considered what are now Sections 48 to 50 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Then, as now, the concern was how the court’s independence might be maintained following the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords transition into the UK Supreme Court. Several noble Lords have already made strong arguments as regards the current situation. I am not here to revisit arguments that have been raised historically. However, the Government retain a fundamental concern with regard to accountability and proper lines of accountability which need to be established so that the elected Government are responsible for the proper fiscal and managerial operation of the court.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who was the Attorney-General, made very specific points about the challenges faced by the Lord Chancellor in appointing the chief executive, and the fact that a chief executive appointed by the Lord Chancellor has two masters in effect—one judicial and the other ministerial—and, as was argued, this breaches the principle of the separation of the Executive and the judiciary.
As I have said, the Government will listen to the arguments and have an open mind on the issue. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, alluded to, we are indeed engaging with the Supreme Court in order to consider the impact of this arrangement and of the amendment as tabled, and to resolve any concerns it may have about its independence and how this might best be preserved. However, it is our considered view that this constitutional change should not be rushed and that the Government and the Supreme Court should continue to discuss and consider together how any reform may be taken forward.
Reference has been made to Third Reading. I cannot at this time give an absolute concrete assurance from the Despatch Box, which I am sure noble Lords will appreciate, as to whether we will have concluded our consultation with the president of the Supreme Court, but these discussions are of course ongoing.
In lieu of these comments, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will be content to withdraw Amendment 112A on the understanding that this is a live issue which is being looked at, and which has been raised directly with the president of the court.
Lord Pannick
I am very grateful to the Minister. Of course, he gives no absolute concrete assurance, but I take from that that he gives a more qualified assurance that he will at least do his best to ensure that these important matters can be brought to a conclusion in time for Third Reading. It may be appropriate to seek to bring these matters back at that time, particularly as I do not understand the Minister to have identified any factor that can explain how it can be compatible with respect for the independence of the judiciary—which he says, and which of course I accept, the Government fully uphold—to maintain the constitutional provisions that this amendment seeks to remove.
The only factor to which the Minister referred that could come anywhere near providing any possible explanation was accountability. However, the whole point about the independence of the Supreme Court is that it is not accountable to Ministers; it is accountable to Parliament, of course, and it is answerable to Parliament in the sense that Parliament can override any decisions that the Supreme Court makes, and it is Parliament which decides on the resources that are provided to the Supreme Court in order that it can perform its function.
We have not heard any possible explanation of how these constitutional arrangements can be maintained consistently with the independence of the judiciary. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I will say to the Minister that I am sure that when and if it is necessary to bring this matter back before the House at Third Reading—I hope at an earlier time of day—there will be rather more noble Lords, and noble and learned Lords, who I am sure would wish to express similar views to those that the House has heard tonight. However, for now, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Pannick Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Pannick
My Lords, I support the amendment. One of the great defects in legal reform is the piecemeal nature of the exercise. As holes appear they are filled in. No doubt we do not need an autumn and spring statement on the legal state of the nation, but a periodic review would, in my opinion, be very helpful in focusing attention on the system as a whole. I very much hope that the Minister will accede to that proposal.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I also support the amendment. I remain very concerned about the impact of changes to legal aid on the family courts. It is absolutely necessary to have a review from time to time to see how the courts are coping with the endless litigants in person who will find themselves trying to cope at a very traumatic time of their lives when their relationships have broken down and there is no legal help at all. I very much support the amendment.
The Earl of Listowel
My Lords, as treasurer of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Children, I hope that I can say a brief word in support of the consensus across the House in favour of allowing parents flexibility. That is very heartening to me. At the early years conference hosted by the Daycare Trust earlier today, a practitioner complained that many children are now put into school at eight o’clock in the morning and are not collected until five or six in the evening. In my experience of caring for children, when some young people have to stay on past the end of the school day, they are very tired and unhappy because they have been left behind. It is encouraging to hear the whole House agree that, whatever the detail may be, we need to allow parents flexibility in their employment for the benefit of their children. I hope that the Government will continue to make more opportunities for flexible employment available to parents and increase parental leave.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I am in the position which is often that of dissenting judges in the Court of Appeal who say that they have the misfortune to disagree with their judicial colleagues. Eminent though the previous speakers are, I cannot support these amendments. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, reported on judicial appointments in March this year. We set out the scale of the problem. The problem is that about 16% of High Court judges and only 11% of Court of Appeal judges are women. Only one member of the Supreme Court’s 12 justices is female. We found that one of the reasons why there are so few women on the Bench at High Court level and above is the inflexibility of the working arrangements. We observed that there are increasing proportions of women at senior levels in all other professions and that this has occurred in recent years, in part, because of the increasing use of flexible working hours. We concluded that, for the number of women within the judiciary at the highest levels to increase significantly, there needs to be a firm commitment to flexible working and a recognition that many women will want to work part time for family care reasons.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, was concerned to emphasise in his remarks at the beginning of this debate that he is in favour, of course, of flexible working: it is part-time working to which he objects. However, I say to the noble and learned Lord that a part-time worker is simply one who needs to work flexibly on a regular basis because of continuing family care commitments that arise every week of the year.
Lord Howard of Lympne
Can the noble Lord tell the House to what extent the commendable progress, to which he referred, that has taken place in other professions has been a result of a statutory provision requiring part-time appointment?
Lord Pannick
I am not suggesting that it has. The problem, as the noble Lord will recognise, is that the judiciary is way behind other professions in securing that women are represented in high proportions at the senior level. Of course, there is the utmost commitment of those in senior positions to do all they can. This is a fiendishly difficult problem but part-time working has been recognised as one of the central means by which women are able to combine family care commitments with progressing in a profession.
Lord Woolf
Perhaps my noble friend, who regularly appears in the Supreme Court and is familiar with many of its judges, can help us as to how many of them have family commitments.
Lord Pannick
I am sure it is true that all Supreme Court justices—particularly the 11 men, if it is those to whom the noble and learned Lord is referring—have family care commitments. However, the same point can be made about all senior men in all other professions. We all have family care commitments. The difficulty, as the noble and learned Lord knows, is that the family care commitments that address the needs of children and, perhaps more relevantly at the senior levels of the judiciary, aged parents, tend in our society to fall on women rather than men. That is a social fact.
I say to those who support the amendment that I entirely understand the points they make about practical difficulties but it is important not to exaggerate the problems. Judges regularly take time off from judging to do other things. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, mentioned that judges are regularly appointed to head inquiries. Supreme Court justices sometimes take four to six weeks off to sit on the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong. One could give many other examples. The idea that the system cannot—
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
Is that not the perfect example of what one means by flexible working as opposed to part-time working? They are not currently appointed part-time, but that is possible because of flexibility. That is what we should be aiming for.
Lord Pannick
My answer to the noble and learned Lord is that if the legal system is able to accommodate this type of problem—that judges regularly take time off to carry out other activities—then, like all other professions, it ought to be able to accommodate a female judge taking time off on a regular basis for domestic reasons. It remains to be seen whether allowing part-time judges to sit will result in more women judges at high levels. These powers are permissive, not obligatory, and no woman or man—although one anticipates that it is likely to be women who are so appointed—will be appointed unless it is practical.
My primary objection to these amendments is based on the factor to which the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, referred—which is the message that is sent out—although I arrive at a different conclusion. I suggest that it would be a very unfortunate message indeed for the law to confer an exemption for the senior judiciary from one of the most important means of enabling talented women to rise to senior positions in all professions. Watering down the part-time provisions in this Bill would wrongly suggest, wrongly, that the senior judiciary is not serious about doing all that it reasonably can to assist talented women to be appointed at senior levels. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Warnock
My Lords, I had no intention whatever of entering this debate but it seems to me that there is quite a serious analogy here between the teaching profession at the top level and the legal profession. There is no doubt that in a school, particularly a boarding school, part-time members of the staff, although they are respected and have authority, are not regarded as the most senior, reliable and ready to sacrifice their time. They are not, in fact, of the same level of authority as the full-time members of staff. Nothing would be more destructive of the trust which the general public have in the senior judiciary than if the Supreme Court were divided among the “real” members and the “unreal” members—the part-timers who could not take on the really difficult and complicated cases.
I rely on this analogy strongly to support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, because I believe that, for one thing, it is quite uncertain that this provision would have the apparently desired effect of encouraging more women to come forward; and quite apart from that, it would have the disastrous consequence of dividing the Supreme Court between the top and the lower levels.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but I want to speak to Amendment 86D, which arises out of the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. The amendment is in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, chairman of the Constitution Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, former chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission, and the noble Lord, Lord Powell of Bayswater, who is also a member of the Constitution Committee. I am very pleased to see the noble Baronesses, Lady Jay and Lady Prashar, in their places. The noble Lord, Lord Powell, apologises to the House that he is unable to be present as he has to be abroad today.
As your Lordships have heard, Section 64 of the Constitutional Reform Act imposes a duty on the Judicial Appointments Commission to have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for appointments. The purpose of Amendment 86D is to ensure that this statutory duty to promote diversity is also placed on others who have leadership roles in relation to the judiciary: that is, the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has said, the promotion of diversity is one of the greatest challenges facing our legal system. Figures produced by Professor Alan Paterson, a very distinguished expert in the field of judicial studies, show that of the OECD countries, the representation of women in our Supreme Court—one member out of 12—puts us shamefully in the last place in that measure of diversity.
The aim of achieving a more diverse judiciary does not mean reducing the standards for appointment. On the contrary, merit remains the criterion. The task, as Section 64 recognises, is to identify ways of bringing to the fore those highly skilled women and members of ethnic minorities who are in the legal profession—there are very many of them—so that they can be considered for appointment on merit. The amendment would impose a statutory duty on the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor in this regard.
The Government have previously argued that a specific statutory duty is not needed because everybody understands the need to move forward on this. There are three answers to that approach. First, Section 64 does contain a specific statutory duty on the Judicial Appointments Commission. It is right and proper to make clear that responsibility does not lie solely with the JAC but also with others in a leadership role. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, who I am pleased to see in his place today, made a very powerful speech on that point in Committee.
Secondly, a statutory provision such as this importantly emphasises to the public the recognition by all those in a leadership role that this is a subject to which priority must be given. Thirdly, and finally, the amendment, and the enactment of a statutory duty along these lines, is no criticism whatever of the efforts made by the current Lord Chief Justice—I know personally that he takes the need to promote diversity very seriously indeed—or of the new Lord Chancellor, or, indeed, his predecessors. They all take these matters very seriously, as I know does the Minister, who is personally committed to promoting diversity in the judiciary. However, they will not always be in post and it is important to take this opportunity to address the matter in legislation.
Amendments 86A to 86C, to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has spoken, also have my support, although he acknowledged that Amendment 86C may be less preferable to Amendment 86D. Amendment 86DA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, which is also in this group, is to similar effect. Again, it has my support, although, if I may say so, it is optimistic indeed for proposed new subsection (4) of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, to suggest that the problem of a lack of diversity may be cured in five years. I remind the noble Lord that in a recent lecture, Lord Sumption of the Supreme Court suggested that 50 years was more realistic on current progress.
Baroness Jay of Paddington
My Lords, I rise briefly, but powerfully, I hope, to support the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in his amendment and to say that I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said. As has been said, this point was very much the burden of the Constitution Committee’s report on judicial appointments, which I had the privilege of chairing. Above all, our message was that there needed to be decisive and persistent leadership on this question among those making appointments at every level.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and regretfully disagree with my noble friend Lord Beecham about the prospects for a timescale of five years to make this happen because one of the things which was absolutely clear in the evidence that we took from a number of people who had held office over a long period was that many of them had a personal commitment to improving diversity, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has reinforced, but that none had actually succeeded in doing that. It seemed unlikely that that was to do with their capabilities but was much more a case of there being resistance within the system. Therefore, the obligation on the Judicial Appointments Commission to have a statutory duty to enforce and support diversity seemed to be one that should properly be extended to the wider group of people in leadership positions, as the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Marks, said.
The response from the Government to our report was surprising in the sense that it referred almost exclusively to the fact that the one thing the Government did not want to do was to overburden the statute book with this provision. Indeed, the Constitution Committee has returned to this subject in the past few weeks. We heard evidence on 21 November from the new Lord Chancellor, Mr Grayling, who again said that he was absolutely committed to making this objective happen. However, when asked why it did not happen, he said that it would be unfortunate to try to impose more legislation on the statute book when the objective could be achieved through the leadership which he and his predecessors said they were capable of. However, I point out to the House and the Minister that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which I have signed, requires only 13 words to be added to the statute book. Therefore, it seems to me that the overburdening of legislation is not necessarily a powerful argument for rejecting it. The simple fact is that this is a very straightforward recommendation which could be absorbed into the Bill very easily.
The noble Lord, Lord Powell of Bayswater, who is, indeed, another signatory to this amendment and is not here this afternoon as he is in the United States, when speaking with the new Lord Chancellor, Mr Grayling, in our committee, referred again to the recommendation we had made about putting a statutory duty on him and the Lord Chief Justice. The noble Lord, Lord Powell, said—I think this was echoed by other members of the committee and is the point we all abide by—that it was not that we did not recognise that there had been progress but that,
“it has been at the pace of a pregnant snail”.
We now need to overtake the pregnant snail to which the noble Lord, Lord Powell, referred, and put this on the statute book in these very simple 13 words.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I shall come clean with the House. Earlier, overtaken by the excitement of getting government amendments through, my noble friend Lord Taylor nodded through government Amendment 83, to which I was supposed to speak. It is grouped with Amendment 93, which gives me the opportunity to catch up with it. This allows me to make a concession which was argued with some passion by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in Committee, about the provisions enabling the Lord Chancellor to sit on the selection panel for the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court’; sadly, the noble and learned Lord was here for only a fleeting moment.
In Committee, these provisions were a matter of considerable concern to many of your Lordships. Although I thought that I defended the position with considerable persuasiveness, the Lord Chancellor decided, the brief says here, that we have carefully considered the arguments that were put forward at that stage as well as those set out in the reports of the Constitution Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The amendments respond to those concerns by removing from the Bill those provisions relating to the Lord Chancellor’s ability to sit on the selection panel for the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court. Thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, we have already agreed Amendments 83, 84 and 85 in this group and I am now using this opportunity to move Amendment 93 and to speak to Amendments 97 and 98. I hope that the House will find this acceptable.
In view of the importance of the roles of the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the UK Supreme Court to the administration of justice, we remain of the view that the Lord Chancellor should have a role in these senior appointments. Accordingly, while we will revert to the existing arrangements in that the Lord Chancellor will not sit on the selection panel but will decide whether to accept the selection, reject it or ask the panel to reconsider its selection, we intend to augment these to ensure that the Lord Chancellor is engaged earlier in the selection process. Taking on board the comments raised in Committee, we now propose that the selection panel consults the Lord Chancellor during the selection process. This already occurs in relation to Supreme Court appointments but will be new in relation to the appointment of a Lord Chief Justice.
We have shared the draft indicative regulations with noble Lords relating to the appointment process and these provide for this consultation by the panel in relation to all appointments to the Supreme Court and to certain senior judges in England and Wales, such as the Lord Chief Justice and Lords Justice of Appeal. In addition to this, we will, as I have said, restore the current position whereby the Lord Chancellor will receive the selection panel’s report and, in the light of that, decide whether to accept or reject the panel’s recommendations, or alternatively ask the panel to reconsider its recommendation. I hope that noble Lords will agree that this approach now establishes an appropriate mechanism for the Lord Chancellor’s views to be heard, while safeguarding the impartiality of the selection process. I beg to move.
Lord Pannick
I thank the Minister for reverting to the important Amendments 83, 84 and 85. As the noble Lord mentioned, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee was critical of the proposal in the Bill for the Lord Chancellor to sit as a member of the appointments committee appointing the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court. The Minister's advocacy in Committee was outstanding but, as he will know, sometimes the best advocacy is in support of a completely hopeless cause. I genuinely thank the Minister and the Lord Chancellor for listening on this important subject. It is a matter of constitutional concern. I thank them for bringing forward amendments to the Bill in accordance with the recommendations of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
I wonder whether it is worth mentioning that, of course, the Supreme Court is of interest in jurisdictions other than those in which the Lord Chancellor has authority now, and there may be a question about the balance of that. Admittedly, other jurisdictions have representation on the selection committee, but it may be worth while keeping in place that balance.
Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2012
Lord Pannick Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Pannick
As an amendment to the above Motion, at end to insert “but that this House regrets that Regulation 53(b) will substantially reduce the availability of legal aid in public law cases because the word ‘reasonable’ has been omitted in relation to other means of challenging the relevant decision”.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I tabled a Motion of Regret because the Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations will very substantially restrict the availability of legal aid in public law cases, particularly judicial review. In his very helpful speech, the Minister indicated that he would listen very carefully to this debate and that he might be able to move further in his reply. Therefore, I will explain the problem in the hope that he will be moved if not by me then by the many noble—and noble and learned—Lords who are limbering up to express their concerns on this issue.
The problem is caused by Regulation 53(b), which states that legal aid for a public law claim will be available only if the director of legal aid casework is satisfied that the individual has exhausted all administrative appeals and other alternative procedures which are available to challenge the decision before bringing a public law claim. Therefore, the director will have no discretion. Alternative procedures must be exhausted before legal aid is available to bring the legal challenge. The problem is that in many of these cases—whether they are judicial reviews, housing appeals or habeas corpus claims about people in detention—it is simply not reasonable to expect the litigant to exhaust other procedures and appeal mechanisms before going to court. The other procedures may take months and sometimes years to arrive at a conclusion. They may involve no power to grant an interim remedy to protect the position of the claimant—for example, if the claimant is challenging the removal of housing provision in the services provided or the removal of services which have been given to him or her to address a mental health problem. The courts themselves recognise the force of this point. If you want to bring a judicial review in the High Court, you must exhaust other remedies except if the court is satisfied that the alternative procedures are less effective or less convenient.
Lord McNally
I do not believe that these matters remove access to justice. I notice that an organisation called MyLegal put out quite a long briefing, the interesting bit of which was on the last page, where it said that Ken Clarke had said these measures would cost £25 million. The briefing said that that was wrong and that it was £14 million. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, said that it would cost only £5 million. What I do know is that it will have a cost. When I am carrying out my other responsibilities in the Ministry of Justice and I am suddenly told by this House, which has no responsibilities in the Ministry of Justice, that I have to find £5 million, £15 million or £25 million, there are decisions that must be made. I sit on boards where people lose their jobs and where the management of these changes is extremely difficult. I have never tried to hide that but I ask this House to have a sense of responsibility. We came up with a concession after a lot of exploration and talks with departments and various boards. It is a narrow concession but it comes on top of a whole range of other concessions which we believe retain legal aid in a vast swathe of the process of welfare and which we think is in keeping with the promises we made to Parliament.
I ask this House not to go further in voting on this. I must make it clear that, if the amendment is carried and this concession is lost, the Act is still an Act of Parliament and will still be implemented in April but without this concession. I would consider that a rather pyrrhic victory.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I am very pleased that the Minister has agreed to bring forward amending regulations that will deal with Regulation 53(b) and I thank him for considering the points that have been made in the debate. He mentioned that the regulations would focus on whether the alternative remedy is effective. I hope that when he and his officials read the record of this debate, they will see that the concern is that the criterion should state that the issue is whether the alternative remedy is a reasonable one to use in all the circumstances. It is not just a question of efficacy; it is also a question of speed and convenience, for example. The Minister indicated that he would consult noble Lords who have expressed concern about this. I very much hope that he will take further advantage of the free legal advice available from, in particular, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Woolf and Lord Goldsmith. I would be very happy to act as their junior in this respect. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Pannick Excerpts(11 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Pannick
Lord Pannick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 117, I shall also speak to Amendments 118, 131 and 132, which address an issue of constitutional concern. The Bill would allow the Lord Chancellor to sit as a member of the appointments commission for the posts of Lord Chief Justice and president of the Supreme Court. The amendments would deny the Lord Chancellor such a role. The amendments are also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, former chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, a former Lord Chief Justice, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, who is the distinguished chairman of the Constitution Committee, all of whom I am pleased to see in their places.
At present the Lord Chancellor can ask the appointments commission to think again about a proposed appointee, but the Lord Chancellor is not a member of the commission. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 rightly recognised the need for a clearer separation of powers between the Executive and the judiciary. The change proposed by the Government would regrettably go back on that and it would have substantial disadvantages. First, it would increase the danger of political partiality in the appointment of a senior judge. I recognise, as I am sure will all noble Lords, that the present Lord Chancellor would not contemplate acting in such a manner, but even Mr Kenneth Clarke cannot continue in political life for ever. He is already above the retirement age for judges—a matter that we will be discussing later this afternoon. It would be highly undesirable to give a future Lord Chancellor the power so actively to influence the appointment of the senior judiciary.
The second disadvantage is that the Government’s proposal would undermine the appearance of political independence of the senior judiciary. There is a real danger that a new president of the Supreme Court or a new Lord Chief Justice would be undermined in the eyes of the public by being seen as the Lord Chancellor’s man or the Lord Chancellor’s woman. That would be most regrettable. Appearances matter in this context. There is a third disadvantage, which is that the Judicial Appointments Commission would inevitably find it more difficult to conduct an objective assessment of the rival candidates if it has the Lord Chancellor as one of its members. Indeed, the Bill implicitly recognises the dangers involved because it provides that the Lord Chancellor, if he does sit as a member of the appointments commission, may not chair it. It is unnecessary to give the Lord Chancellor the power to sit on the appointments commission with all the dangers that I have identified.
The Lord Chancellor undoubtedly has a proper interest in the appointments process and needs to work with the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chancellor and the Government need to have confidence in the president of the Supreme Court. However, the Lord Chancellor’s and the Government’s interests are fully met by the ability of the Lord Chancellor to be a consultee during the appointment process and by the current position which gives him the right of veto.
Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, conducted an inquiry into judicial appointments, on which we reported in March. The conclusion we reached in that report has been repeated in our report on the Bill, which was published on 18 June. In each of those reports, we stated, in relation to the role of the Lord Chancellor in the appointment process that any closer involvement—that is, closer than currently exists,
“risks politicising the process and would undermine the independence of the judiciary”.
I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
Why did he exercise it? We do not know. Did he say so at the time? He did not say, “For political reasons I do not want that person as the head of the division”. He did not give us his reasons. It was not discussed with anybody. He just vetoed that appointment and it was unfairly damaging to the person concerned.
Lord Pannick
I am grateful to the Minister, who says that he has been listening. I am sure that he has been, and I have listened to what he has said. I will certainly want to reflect, as I am sure the House will, on what the Minister described as a very important debate—and he is right. This goes to the heart of the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary. The Minister said that it is important to keep the Lord Chancellor in the process because the Lord Chancellor is responsible to Parliament and these are appointments at the very apex of the system. The Minister is right and no one disputes that the Lord Chancellor must have a role. The question is whether that role is best fulfilled as a member of the appointments commission.
The Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, emphasised that the veto is a nuclear option. There are two points to make about the Lord Chancellor’s existing powers. First, the fact that the veto is so difficult to exercise in political terms is highly material to the influence that the Lord Chancellor currently has. We need to be very careful about expanding the political role of the Lord Chancellor, or at least the political potential for involvement, through an appointments commission process. The second point, which has been made very forcefully by noble Lords who know how the system works, is that the Lord Chancellor at present does not just have a veto which is difficult to exercise. He can and does make his views known to the appointments commission during the process of consideration for appointment to these posts. There is nothing improper or secret about that. It is not a question of nudges and winks. It is called consultation. Plainly, the Lord Chancellor is entitled to be consulted by the special appointments commission that is going to appoint to these highly important posts. If the current system has defects, the alternative proposed by the Government is far worse, for all the reasons that have been pointed out, and no more transparent.
I will certainly reflect on this debate and I am sure the whole House will want to reflect on the matter and return to it on Report. I hope that the Government will reconsider this question over the summer and I am sure that if, as we have been told today for the first time, it is the Government’s intention that the Lord Chancellor will sit on the appointments commission, it is highly desirable that the Bill expressly makes that clear so that we all know what the Government intend on this matter of fundamental constitutional concern. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Pannick
“8A Section 35(3) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is repealed.
8B A judge of the Supreme Court shall vacate that office on the day on which he attains the age of 75.”
Lord Pannick
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, and two former Lord Chancellors, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Irvine of Lairg and Lord Mackay of Clashfern. It concerns the retirement age for judges of the Supreme Court. The Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 lowered the retirement age for the judiciary from 75 to 70, with an exception for those first appointed to judicial office before 31 March 1995. There is a strong case for raising the retirement age back to 75 for Supreme Court judges.
Judges are joining the Bench at a later age than their predecessors. It then takes time for them to rise up the career ladder to reach the Supreme Court, typically in their early to mid-60s. Since those appointed to the Supreme Court are, by definition, the very best of our judges, it is particularly unfortunate that we are disposing of such valuable resources after they have served a short time in office. This argument is specific to the Supreme Court. It is not the case that if the retirement age for Justices of the Supreme Court was to be raised to 75, the same must follow for the magistracy and for all levels of the judiciary in-between. The fact of the matter is that judicial wisdom and experience at the highest level is being lost to our courts, although not to the field of arbitration where retired judges from the Supreme Court are very much in demand for much higher fees than the Lord Chancellor’s department is prepared to pay.
There is no basis for concern that judges tend to lose their mental and physical powers after the age of 70 and up to the age of 75. It is important to recall that these judges are not hearing exhausting witness trials but considering stimulating points of law. Nor is there any basis for concern that a retirement age of 75 in the Supreme Court would result in a court that is less attuned to modern society. Experience is to the contrary. The Appellate Committee of this House and now the Supreme Court are far more innovative than the Court of Appeal, where the average age of the judges tends to be a decade younger.
Nor is there any basis for concern that a retirement age of 75 would hinder the promotion of diversity, an important value that we discussed last Monday. Despite most of the members of the Supreme Court retiring at 75 in recent years—the same was true of the Appellate Committee—there has been a steady flow of vacancies. The appointment of only one woman to the Appellate Committee and to the Supreme Court and of no one from the ethnic minorities, regrettable though that is, has been caused by the perceived lack of suitable candidates and not by any lack of vacancies. Indeed, increasing the age limit to 75 may well enhance the prospects for appointing more women, as so many female judges and lawyers have taken many years out of their careers for family care reasons and may find it more difficult than men to rise to the top by their early 60s.
In our report in March, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee recommended that the retirement age be increased to 75 for Supreme Court judges and for Court of Appeal judges. We advised increasing the retirement age because,
“proven judicial quality and experience are at a premium in the development of the law”.
This amendment focuses only on the Supreme Court because the arguments are especially strong at that level. I look forward to hearing from the Minister the Government’s view on this important topic. I beg to move.
Lord Hart of Chilton
I support the amendment for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I must declare two interests. First, I was a member of the Constitution Committee and heard the evidence and, secondly, some of my best friends are between the ages of 70 and 75. The evidence showed that there was a real risk that we were losing substantial talent from the Supreme Court. There was one particular example of losing someone just at his prime. It would be wrong for the Supreme Court to lose people of enormous proven energy and ability when they have just got into the driving seat of their full power, and to lose talent of that sort when people have risen to that point with only a limited time available to them in the Supreme Court itself.
Lord McNally
As I said, this is hardly the audience for arguing or expecting support for retirement at 70. Indeed, sometimes when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, tells me about his itinerary for the following week, I realise that his idea of retirement is something quite different from that of most normal people. I am well aware that people can make a contribution.
The amendment is astute in singling out the Supreme Court, as it is in this court—which may be the pinnacle of a long career—where taking up office is more likely to occur when a judge is in his or her 60s. This can give rise to particularly unfortunate individual cases where a judge’s term of office may be rather shorter than we would have liked to see. I understand the arguments and the case that has been made. However, these individual cases need to be balanced against the bigger picture and the advantages of a uniform retirement age of 70 across the whole of the judiciary.
Mandatory retirement ages for judicial office-holders have played an important role in ensuring that the judiciary is, and is seen to be, independent. Quite rightly, once appointed to a salaried position, it is difficult to remove a judge from office before retirement. This, of course, is constitutionally correct and removes any risk of unwarranted interference from the Executive. While many judges may be able to continue to work, and to contribute as fully as ever, beyond the age of 70, that will not always be the case. Without the mandatory retirement age, if a judge beyond 70 insisted on continuing, there would be no way of removing him even where his colleagues considered that he was no longer quite as sharp as he used to be. Therefore, a standard retirement age, set at the right level, is needed. I do not think that anybody disagrees with that principle.
The Government consider that 70 is the right level. Indeed, this is at the higher end of international comparisons. It is also important in this context to consider the impact on public confidence in the justice system. The age of 70 strikes a balance between the desire of judges wishing to serve and the public interest in sustaining a judiciary that is fully effective in discharging its responsibilities. The amendment seeks to make a special case for the Supreme Court, so that the mandatory retirement age should be increased to 75. However, the reasoning for the age of 70 applies to judges of the Supreme Court as it does to other judges. People are people, whichever court they are sitting in. The age of 70 is, in our view, the right one—notwithstanding that it may seem premature in individual cases.
The retirement age also contributes to the need to bring in newer judges. Turnover in the senior judiciary is not significant as many judges remain in post until retirement. Given the statutory limit on the numbers of judges who can sit in senior courts, in particular the Supreme Court which is limited to just 12 judges, the opportunity to promote talented members of the judiciary from the lower courts is limited. Extending the retirement age to 75 in the Supreme Court would further limit movement from the Court of Appeal, which would, in turn, reduce opportunities for promotion to the Court of Appeal and have a trickle-down effect through the courts. This would also have the effect of delaying some of the positive impact on diversity, which that we would otherwise see through promotions from the lower courts.
Furthermore, it would be very difficult in practice to sustain a different retirement age just for the Supreme Court. Court of Appeal judges would be very likely also to make the case for extended retirement. A Court of Appeal judge who considers himself or herself a good candidate for appointment to the Supreme Court may find it difficult to accept that he or she had to retire at 70 if the Supreme Court were made up of judges who would automatically go on for another five years. If the age of retirement for the Court of Appeal were also extended, then why not the High Court and so on? If there is a clear business need, it is still possible for judges to continue to serve over the age of 70. Following retirement, members of the Supreme Court may go on to the supplementary panel. As a member of that panel, they might be asked to act as a judge of the Supreme Court. This enables the court to continue to make use of their experience and knowledge —but on a short-term basis.
I have listened to the contributions of the noble Lords and to the plea of my noble friend Lady Bottomley against ageism. Although the Government will keep this under review, we consider, for the reasons outlined, that the current mandatory retirement age of 70, together with the arrangements for sitting ad hoc after retirement, provide a careful balance between using experience, ensuring that the quality of the judiciary is maintained at all levels and ensuring the advancement of fresh talent. I also consider that differential retirement ages of different courts may be very difficult to sustain. We will keep this under review but, in the mean time, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he will keep this matter under review. I hope that that means that it will be actively looked at before we return to the matter, as I am sure that we will, at Report. My answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, about why we should have retirement age at all, is to point out the considerable difficulty of saying that someone is past it—particularly if they have tenure in the post. That is an extremely difficult task to perform in relation to individuals sitting on the Bench. That is why we have a mandatory retirement age. I have no difficulty with that. As I indicated, I am concerned that the retirement age of 70 is too high. However, I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, that if he looks at the New York Times of 16 September 2010, he will see that Judge Wesley E Brown was sitting in the United States district court at the age of 103. The article describes how a tube under his nose feeds him oxygen during hearings. Sadly, Judge Brown has since died, but he did continue to an age much greater even than 75.
I do not accept the argument that the retirement age needs to be mandatory across the judiciary. I would hope that we could move to recognising the special position of the Supreme Court for all the reasons given by myself and other noble Lords. I certainly do not accept the argument that public confidence in the judiciary would somehow be undermined were judges to continue to the age of 75. I am not aware of any recent example of the public lacking confidence in our judges on the Appellate Committee—now in the Supreme Court—because they were between the ages of 70 and 75. It has already been indicated that some of the best and most valuable work of those senior judges, led by the late and much lamented Lord Bingham of Cornhill, was done between the ages of 70 and 75. That work would be lost.
Nor do I accept that there is any problem about new talent coming through because there are many vacancies for positions in the Supreme Court. However, the central point is that we are losing the best of our judges at too early an age. I hope that the Minister and the Lord Chancellor will reflect on this matter over the summer, but in the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Pannick
“In section 64(1) (encouragement of diversity) after “under this Part,” insert “and the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice in performing their functions,”.”
Lord Pannick
My Lords, Amendment 121 is another amendment arising out of the report of the Constitution Committee. It has been tabled in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Prashar, the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. As your Lordships know from our debates on Monday, under Section 64 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the Judicial Appointments Commission has a duty to,
“have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for appointments”
to the Bench. As those debates indicated, this is an important provision because it rightly recognises that the high reputation that our judiciary deservedly enjoys may be damaged if we do not do something about the paucity of women and members of the ethnic minorities being appointed to judicial office. The task, as Section 64 recognises, is to identify ways of bringing to the fore the many highly skilled women and members of the ethnic minorities in the legal profession so that they can be considered for appointment on their merits. The point of this amendment is that that vital task should not just be imposed on and performed by the Judicial Appointments Commission.
As your Lordships’ Constitution Committee explained in its report, the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor have leadership roles, the former as the head of the judiciary and the latter as the Minister responsible to Parliament for the appointments process. They should each have a statutory duty to promote diversity. This is no criticism of the real efforts made by the current Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice, both of whom take this responsibility seriously. However, they will not always be in post. We are legislating for the future, so it is vital that the legislation should identify the importance of promoting diversity and that all those in leadership roles should have a statutory duty in this respect.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, have tabled Amendment 121AA. The noble and learned Lord will speak to his amendment, but as I understand it, the amendment has a similar purpose and effect. It is more detailed, and of course I will give it my support.
Amendment 121A, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Prashar, is simply a probing amendment. It arises out of a concern that on the proper interpretation of Sections 63 and 64 of the Constitutional Reform Act covering appointment on merit and “Encouragement of diversity”, those provisions might apply to the appointment of all other judges, but not to judges of the Supreme Court. The drafting concern is simply that Part 3 of the 2005 Act deals separately with the Supreme Court while Sections 63 and 64 are in Part 4. I would ask someone to give some thought to whether there is any substance in my concern. There may not be and this is only a probing amendment. I am not asking the Minister to deal with this today, so perhaps he may prefer to write to me. I beg to move.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, that is a very disappointing response. Promoting diversity is one of the greatest challenges facing the legal system and it is quite unacceptable that when a statutory duty to promote diversity is already imposed upon the Judicial Appointments Commission, that same duty should not be imposed, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, puts it, on those who have leadership roles in the legal profession. I am not persuaded at all that there are other statutory duties under the Equality Act, which do not seem to me to cover the same ground. Indeed, if they did it is incomprehensible why there is a specific statutory duty on the JAC under Section 64.
Lord McNally
I hear the disappointment in the noble Lord’s voice. I would hate this debate to end with any idea that I personally, and the Government, am not committed absolutely to furthering diversity in the legal profession and the judiciary. I have said that I will take the debate away—I may even take it to the individual noble Lords concerned—and consider what we do when we come back.
Lord Pannick
I am grateful to the Minister. I was about to say that I do not doubt for a moment the Minister’s personal commitment to diversity. I have heard him speak about it on a number of occasions, and he feels as passionate about it as others. The question is whether the Government’s position can move. I hope, for all the reasons that have been expressed in this debate around the House, that the Lord Chancellor and the Minister will look at this again over the summer and that progress can be made. I have no doubt that if there is no progress, no movement from the Government, the House will return to the matter on Report, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment. If we are serious about promoting diversity on the Bench, this is an area where there is real potential to make substantial progress. That is because there is a pool of highly talented female lawyers and ethnic minority lawyers in government legal service. The Constitution Committee gave the figures at paragraph 126. The figures are striking. In the Treasury Solicitor’s Department, more than 50% of senior civil servants are women and 15% of those at senior Civil Service pay band 1 are from ethnic minorities. In the CPS, women form 75.9% of Crown prosecutors and 63.9% of senior Crown prosecutors. Ethnic minority lawyers form 21.7% of Crown prosecutors and 18.3% of senior Crown prosecutors.
No doubt there are social and economic reasons why so many talented female lawyers and ethnic minority lawyers work not at the independent Bar, although many of them do, but in government legal service. I very much hope that the Government will accept the amendment so that consideration can be given as to how the legal system takes advantage of that pool of talent and ensures that the regrettable statistics of the limited number of women and ethnic minority lawyers on the Bench can be transformed.
Baroness Prashar
I, too, support the amendment. The JAC wrote to the then Lord Chancellor about this in 2008. If we are committed to promoting diversity, it is vital that some movement takes place. There has been no progress on this over the past few years. If the responsibility was taken seriously by the Lord Chancellor, there would have been some movement.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Pannick Excerpts(11 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Pannick
My Lords, I find this a much more difficult issue than some noble Lords who have spoken. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, emphasised that we all agree about the importance of diversity, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, emphasised his personal commitment to diversity, which I am aware of and, of course, I recognise. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, referred to the statistics and said correctly that some progress has been made, but the position is still woefully inadequate. Some 16% of High Court judges and only 11% of Court of Appeal judges are women. These figures are simply unsatisfactory and urgent progress is desperately required.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, mentioned, the Constitution Committee, of which she is the distinguished chairman and I am a member, conducted an inquiry into judicial appointments and reported in March. We found that one of the reasons for there being so few women on the Bench at High Court level and above is the inflexibility of the working arrangements. At paragraph 112 of our report, we observed that one significant reason for the increasing proportion of women at senior levels in other professions in recent years has been due in large part to the greater use of flexible working hours. At paragraph 117, we recommended that allowing flexible working, certainly at the High Court and Court of Appeal levels, was the “minimum change necessary” to promote diversity. We said that:
“For the number of women within the judiciary to increase significantly, there needs to be a commitment to flexible working”.
We need to recognise that many women will either want or need to take career breaks, or work part time or flexibly for family care reasons.
As I understand them, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Carswell and Lord Woolf, are essentially concerned about the practicality of part-time working, certainly at the Supreme Court level, but mention has also been made in this debate of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. In my experience, from the perspective of the Bar, I must say that the overwhelming majority of cases in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and certainly in the administrative court occupy three days or less. Of course, there is much work to be done by judges out of court—I do not for a moment suggest that judges work only between 10.30 am and 4.15 pm—but actual time in court, which has been mentioned, occupies three days or fewer. Of course, there are longer cases, sometimes six or nine months, but they are unusual, exceptional or out of the ordinary. In any event—this is why I find this a more difficult issue than some noble Lords who have spoken hitherto—we ought to bear in mind that even at the Supreme Court level, judges have taken time away. They continue to do so, as I understand it, for a month at a time to sit in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. As shown by a notorious example recently, judges at the Supreme Court level take time off, for very good public interest reasons, to sit on inquiries. We should not proceed on the basis that every judge works exclusively, full time in a particular court.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, mentioned—he is absolutely right to emphasise this point—the high reputation of our Supreme Court and, indeed, of our whole judiciary. It is a remarkable fact that as the public have lost confidence—regrettably—in many other institutions of our society, including, most regrettably, Parliament, but also the press and the City, the public rightly retain the utmost confidence in the judiciary. It is one reason why the public are quite prepared to listen carefully, as I am sure they will, to what Lord Justice Leveson will say about press freedom. However, we ought to bear firmly in mind that the confidence of the public in the higher judiciary is in danger of being undermined to the extent that the higher judiciary reflects and is composed of so high a proportion of men with such a small proportion of women.
The point was also made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that surely, when someone has reached their late 50s, or 60s, when in the normal course of events they would be eligible for appointment to the Supreme Court, they ought to be prepared to sit full-time. However, surely one can envisage circumstances in which a women aged 60—slightly younger or older—may have a child aged 15 and may find it difficult to sit on the Bench during school holidays. She may also have an elderly relative for whom she is caring. These are not unrealistic examples.
In any event, I suggest that the provisions in the Bill which concern the noble and learned Lords who have spoken are merely permissive. They would obviously not be applied in relation to a Supreme Court appointment unless and until an occasion arose when it was practical to do so. I suggest to noble Lords that, given the importance of a real commitment to flexible working, it would be most unfortunate indeed if the Bill were to contain that commitment but exclude it in principle in any circumstances at Supreme Court level.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
This is an issue close to my heart. When I was a young lawyer in the 1970s I contributed to a book called The Bar on Trial, written by a group of young lawyers seeking to address the nature of the Bar at that time. I wrote the chapter on women and I have been writing about women and law ever since. The issue of flexibility is the one that exercises women in the profession more than probably any other. It is the reason why women’s careers look different—they are the people who have children and who are the primary carers.
Increasingly, women now at the Bar, perhaps unlike those of previous generations, have a different way of wanting to deal with their role as mothers. Their children are not going off to boarding school in their primary school years, they are not away from home, they are still living with their parents and there is therefore the issue of who is the primary carer. Still, I am afraid, it usually falls to women, so I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for emphasising that this is about flexibility. I regret that the words “part-time” are used. Can we find a way of reformulating this so that it is about flexibility?
I am concerned that often the ways of doing things are still championed by those who have gone through the system and come out at the other end—and I say that respectfully to those who are now retired as judges. We have to be capable of changing to deal with a changed world and the changed aspirations not just of women in the profession, but also sometimes of men in the profession and of the general public, if we want to see our judiciary change in its appearance.
It is right that we are talking first about the High Court. Currently, judges go out on circuit. It is a problem, and I do not know how to square this circle, because I think it is important that judges go out on circuit to try, for example, big criminal cases. It still matters because there is something wrong with the idea that there is a local High Court judge to deal with these things—local circuits can become too cosy and it is sometimes better that someone from outside comes in to try big, difficult cases in which a lot of public outrage might be involved. It deals with the question of whether there is too much cosiness or familiarity when the same judges are always trying the same cases.
I want to pick up the comments of my noble friend Lord Pannick. When it comes to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, it is very rare that women still have very young children, but it must be possible for there to be flexibility when our children are adolescents, when they are taking exams or having time out of school. It must be possible to make arrangements so that judges can have time to deal with such domestic issues. It became an embarrassment even to raise those things at one time, but it is now possible and sets of chambers accommodate those men and women who want to have time for their families—that is how the working world has to be.
When it comes to the Supreme Court, of course it is right that at the moment, by and large, those who go to sit on the Supreme Court will be about 60—that is the sort of age we are looking at—but, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, sometimes a woman of 60 is the mother of adolescent children taking exams and going through important parts of their growing lives. It should be possible to find ways of accommodating that. There is something wrong with a system when, of 25 people consulted on the recent appointments to the Supreme Court, 24 were men. Is it any wonder that we only have one woman on that court? I can say emphatically that there are women who could have taken up those new appointments, but who were not considered. I hear retired judges, and even sitting judges, saying, “We only want the best”. Of course, we only want the best, but I want us to open up what those ideas of “the best” are. Sometimes they are defined by men who have no idea about the contribution that highly intelligent women of a different experience might bring to those senior courts. That is why it is not good enough to stick with the old system. We have to embrace change if we want to see a different kind of judiciary. We should see the Bench as a whole, and not replicate the same people with those cut from the same cloth. I strongly endorse the efforts to change the arrangements and so am against the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Pannick Excerpts(12 years ago)
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, Motion A is the Commons response to the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. That amendment has prompted a great deal of high quality, thoughtful and principled debate, and I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord and other legal luminaries in this House who have given us the benefit of their expertise in exploring its effects. Although we have not been able to agree on precisely what those effects are, I thank the noble Lord for his clear argument and his commitment to the important constitutional principle of access to justice. I fully understand his motives in doing so. However, the House of Commons has given us its view on the amendment, and I ask the House to support the position that it has taken. I beg to move.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I am very disappointed by the Government’s response to the amendment on the purpose of legal aid, approved by this House on Monday. Noble Lords will know that this amendment had its origins in a recommendation of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. The recommendation was strongly supported by many noble Lords at Second Reading and in Committee. The amendment was approved in this House on Report by a majority of 45 votes. After the other place disapproved of the amendment, this House voted again on Monday night, and your Lordships approved an amendment in similar terms, this time by a majority of 15 votes.
At no stage during this parliamentary process has the Minister or anyone else on behalf of the Government made any proposal, publicly or privately, for meeting the concerns of this House, whether by a revision of the wording of the amendments approved in this House or in any other respect. That is despite what the Minister kindly described as the very high quality debates that we have had in this place.
In my view, to ignore the views of this House in this way by bringing forward no proposal whatever to meet the concerns expressed here is, at the very lowest, most regrettable. It is all the more regrettable when the issue is of constitutional concern. I hope that these views may be shared, even by noble Lords who did not support the substance of this amendment.
The sorry state of this saga is exacerbated by the application of financial privilege to this amendment, even though it expressly stated that the allocation of financial resources was a matter for the Lord Chancellor’s discretion. This raises issues of considerable concern, which I hope will be shared on all sides of the House. Of course I recognise that financial privilege is not a matter for the Government, but I have had no indication at all that the Government made any representations in support of my contention, shared by many other noble Lords, that it would be quite inappropriate to apply financial privilege to an amendment that expressly stated that financial resources were a matter for the discretion of the Lord Chancellor.
Notwithstanding these matters, I have, with regret, come to the conclusion that I can take this amendment no further. Noble Lords have asked the other place to think again and it has done so. Although I disagree with the result, I do not think it appropriate to invite the House to press the matter further. I should add that if I were a Member of a House of which 80 per cent of Members were elected, I would certainly persist on this matter. Furthermore, given the very limited time made available in the other place for consideration of the amendments that we passed in this House, and given the general absence of scrutiny of this legislation in the other place, I suggest that it is not the procedures of this House that are urgently in need of reform.
I hope I will be permitted to make one other observation; I do so despite the genuine respect I have for the Minister. The unsatisfactory manner in which the Government have treated this amendment is, I regret, typical of the unsatisfactory manner in which the Government have proceeded on this Bill generally. The Government were defeated on this Bill on 11 occasions on Report and three times again last Monday. So large a volume of defeats occurred because the Government adopted inflexible attitudes and lost the arguments on their merits. Part 1 of the Bill has been made marginally better by the amendments, which are the product of the considerable work done on all sides of this House. The Bill would have been marginally better if this amendment had been accepted, but this remains a bad Bill and there remains in particular a bad Part 1 in it on legal aid.
The Government’s general inflexibility on the Bill, as with Amendment 1 in particular, has involved a failure adequately to assess the impact of the provisions before their implementation, a refusal to take on board the fact that many of the financial savings at which Part 1 is aimed are illusory because the denial of access to legal services will result in other financial costs to the state for disadvantaged persons who will be denied the benefits to which they are entitled, and because of a refusal to recognise that the limits on the scope of legal aid imposed by Part 1 will hit hardest the weakest and most impoverished sections of our society, often on complex questions of law such as are raised by immigration law.
The Government’s treatment of my Amendment 1 is, I regret, consistent with this inflexibility and narrow perspective. I am sorry to say that the product of the Minister’s hard work and the process followed by the Government on the Bill do not reflect well on this Government’s reputation. They have damaged access to justice, a fundamental constitutional principle, as this amendment sought to recognise. The Minister has repeatedly emphasised in this House that the Government have accepted amendments during the passage of the Bill, but those amendments have mainly been on matters that should never have been excluded from the scope of legal aid in the first place.
I pay tribute to the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Beecham, for their tireless and eloquent work in exposing the defects in Part 1. I thank them, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Hart of Chilton, for adding their names to the amendment. I thank all other noble Lords who supported the amendment during the passage of the Bill.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on Monday, and the sense of it being approved twice in your Lordships’ House, sought to enshrine in Part 1 of the Bill access to justice as the objective of the Bill. Such a statement of principle was made in the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 and has been reaffirmed in every Act of successive Governments, including Conservative Governments, dealing with legal aid. When the Labour Government introduced the Access to Justice Bill in 1998, it included Clause 4(1), which instructs the Lord Chancellor to promote,
“the availability to individuals of services of the descriptions specified … and, in particular, for securing (within the resources made available, and priorities set, in accordance with this Part) that individuals have access to services that effectively meet their needs”.
At that time, the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, in opposition, wanted to place further duties on the Lord Chancellor. The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, speaking from the Front Bench on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, said:
“What needs to be stated at the outset is the reason for providing the funding”.—[Official Report, 19/1/99; col. 480.]
It would be helpful if the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, speaking as a Liberal Democrat, would explain to us why the Liberals have now changed their tune.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Pannick Excerpts(12 years ago)
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Lord Pannick
My Lords, as your Lordships have heard, the amendment that noble Lords approved on Report by a majority of 45 votes would state the purpose of legal aid: to promote access to legal services within the financial resources that are made available by the Lord Chancellor and subject to the other provisions in Part 1 of the Bill. The amendment had its origins in a recommendation from your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, and was tabled by noble Lords from all sides of the House—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, the noble Lord, Lord Hart of Chilton, who is also a member of the Constitution Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, from the government Benches and, of course, me.
The amendment echoes the wording of Section 4 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which is the current statutory provision. It is similar to the statutory provisions that have been found in earlier legislation from 1949 onwards. The other place disagreed with this amendment after a debate that was restricted to 27 minutes—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, a few moments ago. Those 27 minutes to which the other place was restricted concerned not just this amendment but two others approved in this House after Divisions and to which we will come. They concern the very important subjects of the independence of the director of legal aid and the mandatory telephone gateway, which we will discuss later this afternoon. All those subjects had to be dealt with in 27 minutes—hardly the thorough consideration that the Minister suggested in his opening remarks.
The Minister in the other place, Mr Jonathan Djanogly, and the Minister today have made four main points. The first, which was emphasised in the other place but has not been mentioned today, is that financial privilege was applied to the amendment. Your Lordships will know that financial privilege in the other place does not prevent your Lordships asking the other place to think again about an amendment. Financial privilege simply requires that the amendment be varied in this House from the original amendment. That is why the amendment now before this House is not exactly the same as that which was approved on Report.
I do not want to make this a debate about financial privilege but I hope I may be excused for saying that I know that many noble Lords were as surprised as I was that financial privilege was applied to Amendment 1. The original amendment made it very clear that access to legal services would come within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor and in accordance with the rest of Part 1, and therefore that amendment had no financial implications whatever.
Your Lordships may also be interested to note that when I made these points to the authorities in the other place and I asked for a brief explanation of the reason for financial privilege being attached to this amendment, because neither I nor the others responsible for tabling this amendment could understand the point, I was told that no reasons are given for the decision on financial privilege. Again, I doubt that I am the only noble Lord who finds it very regrettable that this House should be told that financial privilege controversially applies to an amendment but noble Lords are not told why that is so.
However, that is a side-show. In any event, the amendment now before your Lordships responds to financial privilege, and it does so by making it clear beyond any possible doubt that the question of what financial resources to make available is a matter for the discretion of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chancellor alone. That is what the amendment says beyond any question. It also makes it clear that its terms and effect are subject to the provisions of this part—in other words, subject to the restrictions in the Bill on what topics are within the scope of legal aid.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
Can the noble Lord explain what this amendment therefore adds to the provisions in the Bill? That is what puzzles me.
Lord Pannick
I was coming to that. If the noble Lord will have a little patience, that was the second point made in the other place. My first point, which I just want to complete, is that, with great respect, I do not accept that this amendment has any financial implications whatever.
The second point made by the Minister in the other place was that made just now by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. What is the point of this amendment? The view taken by noble Lords on Report was that now that legal aid is to be confined by this Bill, it is absolutely vital that we retain in the legislation a statement of principle that the purpose of legal aid is to promote access to justice within the available financial resources. That is important for this reason. The Government are proposing to limit legal aid by reason of current financial constraints and Parliament is accepting that. However, we all hope and expect that the economy will improve and, when it does, Clause 9(2) gives the Lord Chancellor a power to modify the substantive provisions of Part 1 to bring matters back within scope. When the economy improves, the case for relaxing the temporary limitations on legal aid should be considered by reference to principle, and the principle is that stated—I hope uncontroversially—in this amendment, which is to Clause 1 of the Bill. It is vital that this principle is not forgotten by reason of the temporary financial constraints under which we are all operating, and I can think of no better way of preserving the principle than setting it out at the beginning of the Bill. I happily give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
But is not the effect of putting this at the beginning of the Bill precisely what the Minister said—that is, it leaves it open to lawyers to bring applications for judicial review and to ask judges to determine whether the financial situation has so improved that the provisions for legal aid should be extended? Is this not just making more work for lawyers?
Lord Pannick
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, again jumps the gun. This is the third point that was made in the other place, which I was coming to and will now address—
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I hope I am not jumping the gun, but I do not understand from what the noble Lord has said so far why the principle of maintaining the rule of law, a duty which is imposed on the Lord Chancellor, and a duty to secure access to justice under the Human Rights Act do not themselves adequately state the general principles within which this Bill needs to be looked at.
Lord Pannick
The answer to the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, is that we are dealing with a Bill that specifically relates to legal aid. It is surely appropriate to include in a Bill relating to legal aid the purpose of legal aid—and to say so in uncontroversial terms. Nothing is more likely to lead to legal uncertainty—the concern that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has—than that these matters should be left somehow to be implied, in the context of legal aid, by reference to the Human Rights Act. That would seem to me most unsatisfactory.
I turn to the third point: uncertainty. It was a point that the Minister emphasised this afternoon—uncertainty and, as he put it, the spectre of litigation. I find it difficult to understand this concern, given that the amendment makes it clear beyond doubt, in the plainest of language, that it is entirely a matter for the Lord Chancellor how much money to provide for legal aid purposes. The amendment makes it clear beyond doubt that this provision is subject to the detailed provisions in the Bill which specify what subjects are within scope.
In any event, this concern about litigation is a particularly unpersuasive argument in the present context. As I mentioned, the substance of this amendment has been part of legal aid legislation for many years. If lawyers were going to make mischief by reference to this type of wording, noble Lords will recognise that they would have done so by now.
Finally, the fourth point that has been mentioned by the Minister this afternoon is that the other place is, of course, the elected Chamber and that we should defer to its judgment. For my part, I recognise that there is, of course, force in this argument. Noble Lords will wish to reflect carefully on this amendment, as on all the other amendments before the House this afternoon, before asking the other place to think again.
I suggest to noble Lords, however, that this is an occasion—on this amendment certainly—when it is appropriate to ask the other place to think again. The amendment now before noble Lords addresses the concerns expressed by the Minister, Mr Djanogly, in the other place. There is simply no substance to the Government’s opposition to this amendment. It raises an issue of principle of considerable importance and it involves no financial cost whatever to the Government. I beg to move.
Lord Howarth of Newport
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for the avoidance of any doubt whatsoever, has made it clear beyond peradventure in the drafting of this amendment in lieu that what he and the House have sought to achieve contains no threat to the Government’s public expenditure plans. The wording makes it clear that,
“subject to the resources which the Lord Chancellor decides, in his discretion, to make available”,
the Lord Chancellor shall exercise his powers to secure that individuals have access to legal services.
For the sake of a completely illusory financial requirement, the Government propose to impair a constitutional principle of the first importance which goes back not just to 1949, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, reminded us, but to 1215. That is the principle of equality before the law. It should not be in doubt that it is the duty of the Lord Chancellor to secure equality before the law. We all recognise that there are constraints in the present very difficult circumstances of the economy, and that we face an imperfect situation. But it must be right to legislate in principle to ensure that, in normal times at the very least—I would contend at all times—it is a paramount duty of the Lord Chancellor to secure equality before the law for all our citizens. It is no use the law declaring high principles of which citizens cannot avail themselves in practice if financial constraints and the lack of support through legal aid mean that they are not able to substantiate their rights in the courts.
I praise the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for persisting in this cause. I very much hope that the House will want to support him once again in inviting the other place to think again.
Lord McNally
My Lords, we can go round in circles. The qualification of financial privilege is a matter for the Clerks of the House of Commons. Former Mr Speaker Martin, when we last discussed this matter at the time of the Welfare Reform Bill, made very clear where the line is drawn.
I might not have had as long and continuous a place in the House of Commons as my noble friend but I have been around this place for the past 40 years, and one of the reasons why I teased some former Members of Parliament is that for the past 40 years, under various Administrations, I have heard these debates about the paucity of the way in which the House of Commons discussed a matter and the brutality with which the guillotine was used. That may well be one day—perhaps soon—the reason for a proper parliamentary reform Bill that takes in both Lords and Commons, but it is not an excuse for assuming that somehow, on this particular Bill and this particular issue, the Government are using chicanery or arguments that are not well understood in the relationship between these two Houses.
I also point out to the House that the one thing I have not done, and certainly did not do in my remarks at Report stage, Third Reading or today, is to hide behind financial privilege. I do not think that the Pannick amendment stands up to scrutiny and I was grateful for the contribution of a number of my noble friends in that. Part 1 of the Bill, the Lord Chancellor’s functions, states:
“The Lord Chancellor must secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with this Part”.
This seems to me a very clear statement of intent. The difference between the Act being replaced and this Bill is that the Act being replaced is an open-ended Act. It does not restrict where legal aid would apply. The whole point of the Bill—what makes it different from the previous Act—is that it limits, specifies and draws attention to where legal aid will apply and what will be out of scope. That is the danger of the Pannick amendment—that in its general good will to all men approach, it leaves the idea that things may be added. Indeed, both the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and to a certain extent the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that when better days are here this whole circumstance may change. It may change, but not under a vaguely-worded Part 1 of the Bill. We have, in the course of the Bill, accepted an amendment from my noble friends that removed the ratchet and left a regulator in terms of what can be put back into the Bill, but that will be a matter for reflection and discussion in the future.
What worries me is that all the learned Lords who have spoken may be absolutely right, and if they are right we will all live happily ever after. But if they are wrong it is a future Lord Chancellor and the taxpayer who will have to pick up the consequences. Therefore, I think at this stage in the passage of the Bill, the Lord Chancellor of the day and the Government of the day see dangers in what, if it is anything, is either meaningless or has a meaning that has implications for the future; and if it does have implications for the future, in a Bill structured in this way, I think we are right to resist it.
I hope noble Lords will agree that the Lord Chancellor of the day and the Government of the day could and should have a sense of responsibility and care for the central architecture of the Bill, which we keep on talking about. The Bill is not open-ended but specific and the Pannick amendment is not something that should show on the face of the Bill. I hope that noble Lords reflecting on this, and the fact that it has been well considered and well debated and that I have not tried to hide behind financial privilege in addressing your Lordships either previously or today, will support the Government and the Commons in their amendment.
Lord Pannick
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this full debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his consideration of the amendment and for meeting me last week to discuss the issues raised. The other place rejected the amendment and the Minister invites the House to reject the amendment because of a concern or belief that it would impose further obligations on the Government. In this House, a number of noble Lords objected to the amendment on the precisely opposite ground that it would impose no obligations on the Government. Perhaps I may briefly reply to both those concerns.
First, on the concern that the amendment would impose further obligations and would somehow undermine the architecture of the Bill, to use the Minister’s words, with great respect I have enormous difficulty in understanding those concerns. I could understand the concern if the amendment had any adverse financial consequences, but it plainly does not. It says,
“subject to the resources which the Lord Chancellor decides, in his discretion, to make available, and subject to the provisions of this Part”.
I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks, Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Phillips of Sudbury, for their views, which I share, that it is impossible to understand how in the real world this amendment could result in litigation that had any prospect of getting off the ground—certainly any more so than the original Clause 1. So the only possible objection to the amendment is that it does not impose further obligations on the Government and that it does nothing. That was the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, and was a concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. I say to those noble Lords and to the House, with great respect, that that is to misunderstand the purpose of an objects clause. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the Bill recognises that we are cutting back on legal aid, most regrettably, because of current financial stringency, but that the principle of securing that individuals have access to legal services that effectively meet their needs, which has been part of our law since 1949, has not been forgotten. It is still the purpose of legal aid and, when the economy improves, that is the principle by which Ministers and Parliament should assess—
Lord McNally
I hate to stop the noble Lord’s flow, but he has just put his finger on it. This is not an interim, pro tem measure, waiting for a return to the 1949 Act. Although, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, financial considerations of course have played a part, the main intention of the Bill is to restructure, reshape and re-point the direction of legal aid away from the open-ended nature of the 1949 Act and successive Acts and put it into a closed system. It is that closed system that the noble Lord’s amendment, with great skill aforethought, plans to undermine. That is why we are resisting it.
Lord Pannick
I entirely accept the Minister’s point that the Bill seeks to identify those subjects for which legal aid should be made available. But the Minister will recognise that, in the anxious debates that we have had through the progress of the Bill, we have considered a number of sensitive topics in respect of which the Minister’s argument has been that we would like to provide legal aid for this subject but, regrettably, we cannot do so because we do not have the money under the current financial stringency. The House has listened to that debate and accepted, with a heavy heart, that in relation to many of the subjects in respect of which legal aid has previously been made available it will regrettably no longer be made available. Having accepted that the Government must have their way for financial reasons on many of those very difficult areas, I believe that it is absolutely vital that we retain in this Bill a statement of the principle of why legal aid is made available so that when the economy improves—
Lord Pannick
I have given way to the noble Lord before. I anticipate that the House is anxious to move on. The House has heard the debate in relation to this matter. I say to the House that that part of the 27 minutes which the other place devoted—I am not giving way—
Lord Pannick
The House wants to move on. That part of the 27 minutes which the other place devoted to consideration of this amendment shows that the purpose and effect of this amendment were not understood. I think that we should ask the other place to think again on this important matter, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord McNally
My Lords, we now turn to Motion C and to Amendments 3 and 4, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble Lord is not learned, is he?
Lord McNally
The noble Lord’s amendments concern the independence of the director of legal aid casework. I am confident that we all share the sentiment that the Lord Chancellor should have no involvement in a decision about legal aid funding in an individual case. However, I share the view of the House of Commons that this amendment has undesirable and unforeseen consequences and that it is possible to provide the assurance and protection required without adopting the amendment.
The primary concern with these amendments is that they would have the effect of preventing the director being appointed as a civil servant. It is our strong view that the director will enjoy full independence from the Lord Chancellor yet can be appointed as a civil servant. For the avoidance of doubt, we are abolishing the Legal Services Commission and creating a new executive agency to provide Ministers with greater policy control and improved accountability for legal aid. Giving full independence to the director would run entirely contrary to this intention.
Clause 4 already provides protection in subsection (4) with a statutory bar on the Lord Chancellor’s involvement in making funding decisions in individual cases. The Bill also imposes a duty on the Lord Chancellor to publish any guidance and directions issued to the director, thereby providing transparency. Noble Lords will recall from Report stage that we amended the Bill to offer greater transparency by requiring the director to produce an annual report for the preceding financial year on the exercise of their functions during that period. This report will be laid before Parliament and published.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lords, Lord Hart of Chilton and Lord Faulks, I tabled the amendment on the independence of the director that was approved in this House. I thank the Minister and the Government for listening on this important subject and for including in the Bill, as the Minister explained, a reference to the independence of the director, which will give great comfort to all those who will be involved in the administration of this legislation.
Although these are matters of constitutional principle, they can be addressed by compromise, I am happy to say. I very much hope that the Government will be able to adopt a similarly conciliatory approach to the amendments that your Lordships’ House approved earlier this afternoon. I thank the Minister.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, tempting though it is to regard the notion of an entirely independent civil servant as somewhat oxymoronic, I echo the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and welcome the fact that the Government have moved sufficiently to meet the considerations that were advanced on Report. We are glad to be able to conclude these matters, and look forward very much to seeing precisely how the system works in practice.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Pannick Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Pannick
(c) that—(i) it is necessary to make the services available to the individual under this Part to prevent specific injustice in a particular case; and(ii) it is appropriate to do so, in order to prevent such injustice, from the funds (if any) which the Lord Chancellor in his discretion makes available to the Director for the purposes of this paragraph.”
Lord Pannick
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and in the names of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Hart of Chilton. Its purpose is simple—to implement more effectively the Government’s proposal to include an exceptional cases category for legal aid as set out in Clause 10. The problem which this amendment seeks to address is that Clause 10 is too narrowly drafted and will prevent the very flexibility that it is designed to provide. That is because the exceptional cases category set out in the clause applies only if the refusal of legal aid would amount to a breach of rights under the European Convention on Human Rights or would create a risk of doing so.
The difficulty, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, stated when moving his amendment at the Report stage, is that it is inevitable that:
“All of a sudden a case will obviously require, in the interests of justice, to be supported by legal aid because of the wider interest that is involved”.—[Official Report, 12/3/12; col. 119.]
The case may concern a difficult and important question of statutory interpretation in the Court of Appeal or in the Supreme Court in a type of case generally excluded from the scope of legal aid. This amendment would confer a power on the director of legal aid to fund litigation if both of two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the director considers that funding the litigation is necessary—a strong term—to avoid injustice. I have adopted in the amendment the suggestion made in Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that the discretion should be defined not as a power to promote justice, but as a power to avoid specific injustice, a much narrower concept. The noble and learned Lord has asked me to express to the House his apologies for not being able to be here today.
The second condition which would need to be satisfied before the power could be exercised by the director is that the director considers that the case is an appropriate one for use of the funds, if any, made available for this purpose by the Lord Chancellor. That wording is designed to ensure that funding remains entirely within the discretion of the Lord Chancellor. The amendment, I emphasise, does not require additional funds to be found. The amendment leaves it to the Lord Chancellor to decide what funds, if any, to provide for this purpose.
If then the Lord Chancellor is not required to provide funds for this exceptional category of cases, your Lordships will wish to know what is the purpose of the amendment. The answer is that even if the Lord Chancellor were to say that no money is currently available for this exceptional category of cases—I hope that that would not be the case—it is vital to include a discretion in the Bill so that a statutory power exists to fund exceptional cases which can be exercised with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor when the economy improves.
Noble Lords should not approve a Bill confining legal aid in the manner proposed by the Government without including in it a provision which at least allows the Lord Chancellor, in his discretion, to provide some funding for the exceptional cases about which I am concerned. Parliament may not have a chance to address legal aid issues again for some time. I very much hope that even at this late stage the Minister will be able to accept the amendment, which confers power on the Lord Chancellor to allow funding for exceptional cases but imposes no duty on him to do so. I beg to move.
Lord Hart of Chilton
I support the amendment, which is also in my name. Interested bodies such as Citizens Advice, Justice for All and the Law Society have all pointed out that the Government’s exceptional funding safety net does not stretch wide enough for the reasons so clearly given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I emphasise that the amendment of itself imposes no extra financial burden on the Lord Chancellor; it simply provides an opportunity for a discretion to be exercised if it is necessary—I emphasise the word “necessary”—to prevent a specific injustice occurring. If it was decided to use this power, the costs would be provided from discretionary funds made available to the director by the Lord Chancellor.
The amendment should be seen as a simple, practical and positive act of assistance to the Government, who, if they accept it, will have the flexibility to act in the circumstances provided for. Legislative opportunities for any Government are few and far between. In my view, this opportunity should be seized and the helpful amendment accepted.
Lord Pannick
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his consideration of this matter and to other noble Lords who have spoken. The noble and learned Lord raised two points, as I understood him. His first concern was that this amendment would somehow politicise the functions of the director. It would not. The Lord Chancellor would remain responsible for funding questions and would decide whether it was appropriate to provide additional funding. It would be entirely a matter for the director to decide on the allocation of such funding, if any. There is no question of any politicisation of these responsibilities.
The noble and learned Lord also suggested that it was satisfactory for the exceptional cases category to be confined to those cases in which an issue arises pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights. In my view, that is not adequate. The exceptional cases category should be sufficiently broad to cover exceptional cases whether or not an issue is engaged under the European convention.
I suggest to noble Lords that there is no basis for resisting this amendment. The Government agree that there should be an exceptional cases category—and they are right. This amendment would ensure that the exceptional cases category is sufficiently broad to enable the director to deal with exceptional cases, if and when the Lord Chancellor provides funding. This amendment imposes no duty whatever on the Lord Chancellor and requires no funding to be provided. It is purely permissive, and I invite noble Lords to support it on that basis. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Pannick
“(7) To the extent specified in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor by statutory instrument, the amendments made by subsection (4) and section 48 and the repeal made by section 49(1), do not apply in relation to a costs order made in favour of a party to proceedings of a description specified in the regulations.
(8) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (7) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”
Lord Pannick
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. It seeks to confer on the Lord Chancellor a power to disapply provisions of Part 2 in particular categories of case. Noble Lords will know that Part 2 removes the power of the court to make unsuccessful defendants pay success fees and “after the event” insurance. Successful claimants would need to make these payments out of their damages. Concern has been expressed in your Lordships’ House that this may deter or prevent claimants bringing meritorious claims and may operate unfairly by effectively reducing the damages which they obtain. This concern has been expressed in a wide variety of legal contexts from industrial injuries to insolvency claims.
The Minister’s response to these criticisms has been to express the hope, and sometimes the belief, that Part 2 will not have the adverse consequences for access to justice which critics of these provisions fear. The reality is that neither the Government nor the critics of Part 2 can be sure what effect it will have on access to justice in practice. The Minister will, I hope, accept that it is possible that after the Bill is enacted and comes into effect, experience may show that in specific contexts the concerns expressed by those of us who are worried about the implications of Part 2 are justified, and that access to justice is being impeded.
This amendment would confer a discretion on the Lord Chancellor to respond to any problems that are seen to occur after enactment by excluding defined categories of case from the statutory provisions if he thinks it appropriate to do so. The new provision would confer a power in Part 2 equivalent to the Lord Chancellor’s power in Part 1 under Clause 9(2) to modify Schedule 1 in relation to the scope of legal aid—a power for the Lord Chancellor which the Government accepted was appropriate in Part 1. I cannot see why the Lord Chancellor would not wish to have such a discretion in Part 2 equivalent to that which is given by the Bill in Part 1. In neither context does the discretion impose any duty on him.
Parliament is unlikely for some time to have another opportunity to look at these important matters. Given the importance of the changes that we are making in Part 2, given the concerns that have been expressed about their impact on access to justice, and given that these matters may look very different indeed in some legal contexts in the light of experience after these changes are made, it is surely wise to add to the Bill a power for the Lord Chancellor whereby it would be entirely within his discretion to modify the effect by excluding categories of cases. I beg to move.
Lord Alton of Liverpool
My Lords, I shall be brief. I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Pannick. Just over a week ago, your Lordships were reminded by no less a person than Her Majesty the Queen that during her time as monarch she had signed more than 3,000 pieces of legislation enacted by Parliament. All of us who have been Members of this House and the other place know that we have a penchant for passing vast swathes of legislation that we never revisit subsequently. We all know that we sometimes legislate in haste and repent at leisure. I have had the feeling during the passage of this legislation that we will later regret some of the measures we have passed.
The problem then is what we are able to do about it. Although we sometimes add sunset clauses, and Select Committees can revisit legislation and make recommendations, we often do not put in the kind of belt-and-braces provision that my noble friend Lord Pannick has placed before your Lordships’ House this evening. It is eminently reasonable. It is perfectly good for Parliament to say that if things were to work out in the worst-case scenarios in the way that your Lordships at various stages in Committee and on Report have suggested may happen, and if the Minister is proved not to be correct in what I am sure he sincerely believes regarding the way in which this legislation will be interpreted in due course, there ought to be some way of doing something about it if it is to be found wanting.
Giving this discretionary power to the Lord Chancellor and making it consistent with Part 1, as my noble friend has just described, seems to be the perfect way of dealing with the problem. It is eminently reasonable and, like my noble friend, I cannot see any good reason why the Government would want to resist something that requires no expenditure and does not place on them any duty but simply gives them a discretionary power. I hope that the amendment will commend itself to your Lordships.
Lord McNally
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has tabled his amendment along the lines he suggested on Report. He suggested then that it might be sensible to have a power to disapply the effects of Part 2 in relation to the abolition of recoverability of success fees and insurance premiums in respect of particular categories of case. The amendment now seeks to achieve that.
I have referred on several occasions during the passage of the Bill to its central architecture. The Government’s view, quite simply, is that the current recoverability regime is wrong in principle. It is wrong in principle to impose substantial additional costs on losing parties, whether in relation to success fees or insurance premiums. Those costs add to the already significant costs of civil litigation and allow for risk-free litigation by claimants and what I earlier described as inflation in our legal system.
I have explained the rationale for our proposals and why we consider that they should apply across the board without exception, and I do not propose to repeat those arguments now. The amendment seeks to allow different recoverability in different classes of case. We are implementing a package of reforms, not all of which are contained in the Bill. This package has been carefully put together to be fair between claimants and defendants.
I understand the noble Lord’s intentions. I understand that he thinks it sensible to allow for exceptions to be made at a later date. However, we are legislating now on what we consider to be a fair and overdue basis. Funding arrangements need a degree of certainty. Claimants and defendants need to be able to plan and adapt to the new regime. The amendment would only create uncertainty. Will an exception be created? For what and when? Rather than settling the issue of CFAs, as this Bill seeks to do, the amendment would open the door to constant campaigning and calls for individual exceptions. The amendment may be well intentioned but it is fraught with difficulty. It would provide uncertainty and confusion where we are seeking to introduce clarity. It would provide increased costs where we are seeking to reduce costs. It is wrong in principle and unnecessary. I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. I simply do not understand how the amendment undermines certainty any more than does the equivalent provision in Part 1. I repeat that it would simply confer a discretionary power on the Lord Chancellor. I understand that the Government believe that the architecture in Part 2 is correct, but the Minister should accept that experience may show that in some contexts, the architecture does not work. The amendment would, importantly, ensure that if those concerns prove to be justified, the Lord Chancellor will have a power to do something about it.
This is an important matter. I wish to test the opinion of the House.