Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2012
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
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Lord McNally
That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 29 October be approved.
Relevant documents: 10th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, in moving the draft Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2012, I shall speak also to the draft Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Amendment of Schedule 1) Order 2012. The Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2012 set out the merits criteria both for applications within the scope of the civil legal aid scheme, which are described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, and for exceptional funding cases that fall outside that schedule.
The merits criteria are those that the director of legal aid casework must apply in deciding whether an individual qualifies for civil legal services. When the director delegates his functions under the regulations to providers or his employees, they will also be required to apply these criteria. The criteria include both general merits criteria and specific merits criteria. Specific merits criteria are applied for particular types of case where the general criteria are considered to be too strict or where bespoke criteria are appropriate for particular types of case.
Noble Lords may be aware of the funding code created under Section 8 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. These regulations replace that funding code. The funding code criteria are based on a list of factors set out in Section 8 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. These include the importance of the case to the client, the prospects of success and the likely costs. The regulations before us are based on a list of similar factors set out in Section 11(3) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.
The criteria must also reflect the principle that, in many disputes, mediation and other forms of dispute resolution are more appropriate than legal proceedings. I hope that this is a principle we all share. Our approach in making these regulations has been broadly to retain the existing merits criteria. In our consultation on legal aid reform we consulted on one significant change to the current funding code criteria; namely, that legal aid will be refused for any individual case which is suitable for a conditional fee agreement or CFA. That is reflected in Regulation 39(b).
At present that funding code requirement is disapplied for judicial review cases, claims against public authorities and claims for clinical negligence. We have removed these exceptions. We believe that our limited resources should not be focused on cases where alternative options for funding exist. The Legal Services Commission, or the Legal Aid Agency as it soon will become, has significant experience in determining whether a CFA is likely to be a real alternative. If funding is refused on this basis, an applicant can ask for a review of that decision. If they still are not satisfied, they can seek an independent appeal.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has tabled a regret Motion regarding Regulation 53(b). This states that the regulation will substantially reduce the availability of legal aid in public law cases because the word “reasonable” has been omitted in relation to other means of challenging the relevant decision. I am assuming that this is in comparison to Regulation 39(d), which raised concern in the House of Commons.
Let me first explain what this regulation provides. Regulation 39(d) concerns alternative dispute resolution, such as complaints systems which might allow the client to resolve the dispute without issuing proceedings. The director has a wide discretion to decide whether such alternatives are reasonable in the circumstances. This criterion applies to public law, as well as other claims.
By contrast, Regulation 53(b) is about alternative routes to address the problem predominantly through proceedings. No concept of reasonableness is needed here because if there is an alternative route to resolving the problem in proceedings, that should be taken. This is because judicial review should be a tool of last resort. We recognise that the equivalent provision in the current funding code may on its face appear wider. However, in accordance with its published guidance, the Legal Services Commission has in practice applied this provision so that if there is an alternative appeal or procedure that addresses the problem, legal aid will not be granted for judicial review. Regulation 53(b) therefore reflects current working practice.
The Government made clear in Committee in the House of Commons that if pursuing an administrative appeal or other procedure meant that the individual could not obtain the remedy they needed, the director of legal aid casework would have the flexibility to fund. This is because the regulation specifically refers to alternative routes that “are available”. The director would need to interpret this in a realistic way. Where the director of legal aid casework found that alternative proceedings could not provide the remedy that the client needs, funding for a judicial review would not be refused under this criterion. I stress that this point would be put beyond doubt in published guidance.
However, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others have expressed concerns about this matter, and others have expressed very strong anxieties about how we have framed this provision. I am not convinced that such anxieties are justified, but I will listen to what noble Lords have to say and see if, in my reply, I can move further to meet those anxieties and concerns.
I turn now to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Amendment of Schedule 1) Order 2012. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, will speak to his Motion shortly, but I would like to explain first what the order does. This order makes legal aid available in relation to a review by the First-tier Tribunal where it has identified an error of law in its own decision on a welfare benefit appeal. It also brings into scope certain applications as required by the 2007 Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance. Finally, it addresses a technical issue in relation to legal aid for judicial review.
The first aspect of the order makes available advice and assistance in relation to a review by the First-tier Tribunal where it has identified an error of law in its own decision on a welfare benefit appeal. This follows a commitment made by the Government during Commons consideration of Lords amendments of the then LASPO Bill to explore whether there was a way for independent verification to be used to identify any First-tier Tribunal welfare appeals which involved a point of law.
Of course, appeals to the First-tier Tribunal on welfare benefits matters are appeals against an administrative decision of a public authority. This is quite different from an appeal to the Upper Tribunal, where one must identify an error of law arising from the decision made by the First-tier Tribunal in order to bring the appeal. To appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, the appellant need only set out their reasons for disagreeing with the public authority’s decision in plain language. I understand that many appellants will wish to question whether the public authority has applied the law correctly. But this is precisely the job of the tribunal: to decide what the correct facts are and how the law should be correctly applied to them.
The Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, against this order suggests that the Government have not fulfilled the undertaking given during the passage of the then LASPO Bill in this area. The then Lord Chancellor said at that time that he would “explore the options” available for a system of independent verification. I repeated the same assurances to this House, stating that we were,
“committed to doing further work to see how we might provide funding for those appearing before the First-tier Tribunal whose case also turns on a point of law”.—[Official Report, 23/4/2012; col. 1557.]
That is exactly what we have done. We have given very serious consideration to the various options for independent verification. We have come to the conclusion that imposing an additional task of verifying whether a case involved a point of law on either the judiciary of the First-tier Tribunal, the successor to the Legal Services Commission or the Department for Work and Pensions would be unworkable. This is because it would have resulted in significant extra administrative and cost burdens. We do not consider it right to impose these burdens in the current economic climate.
It is also important to remember that legal aid will not be limited to welfare benefit cases in this area only. We have retained legal advice and assistance for appeals under the Equality Act 2010. We have retained legal advice and assistance for reviews before the First-tier Tribunal, as I indicated. We have retained legal advice and assistance for applications for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. We have retained legal advice and assistance for substantive appeals in the Upper Tribunal. We have retained legal advice, assistance and representation for onward appeals to the Court of Appeal. We have retained legal advice, assistance and representation for onward appeals to the Supreme Court. We have retained legal advice, assistance and representation for welfare benefit judicial reviews. It is important to stress that at no point in progressing our legal aid reforms did we say that it was our intention for all welfare benefit First-tier Tribunal appeals to receive legal aid. The Government’s position throughout has been that in these economic times we need to target legal aid at cases of the highest priority, where it is needed most. That was what the LASPO Bill was about. This is what we have done.
I turn briefly to the second aspect of the order, which brings into scope certain applications to meet our international obligations under the Hague Convention 2007. The convention sets out certain requirements for the provision of legal aid in relation to the recognition, enforcement or establishment of a decision in relation to maintenance, and there are reciprocal arrangements for signatory countries. We expect it to come into force in April next year. The convention is broadly equivalent to the EU maintenance regulations for which services are already made available under Schedule 1 to the LASPO Act. Most countries that have signed up to the convention will already be covered by the EU maintenance regulations—with a few exceptions, such as Norway.
The third part of the order addresses a technical issue in relation to legal aid for judicial review. In our consultation response on legal aid reforms, we confirmed that legal aid would be available for judicial review subject to a few specific exclusions. That remains our position. It is reflected in paragraph 19 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the LASPO Act, which puts within scope legal aid for judicial review in almost any area bar the exclusions debated and agreed by Parliament. However, an arguable effect of how the LASPO Act is drafted is that judicial review may be in scope for any area of law listed in Schedule 1, despite the exclusions in paragraph 19. This order simply makes a technical amendment to ensure that judicial review is governed exclusively through paragraph 19, and that the specific exclusions have the intended effect. I hope that this explanation has been helpful and I commend the orders to the House. I beg to move.
Amendment to the Motion
Lord McNally
I heard that as well. I am very grateful for the contributions to this debate and not least for all the free legal advice I have been given. It has been a useful debate and I have listened very carefully to the points made. A number of noble, and indeed noble and learned, Lords have raised the issue of judicial review. The difference is in approach between Regulations 53(b) and 39(d).
As I said earlier, the Government believe that the current drafting of Regulation 53(b) meets the concerns raised both here and in another place. However, having listened to the arguments that have been put forward today, I recognise the strength of feeling that the regulation has provoked. I make it clear at the outset that it has never been our intention to cut off legal aid for all judicial reviews. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, was just setting a hare running about other plans for judicial review. In our view, this provision has been misunderstood.
That said, I have heard the anxieties that have been forcefully expressed about this provision. In the light of that, I believe we should put the situation beyond doubt by setting it out in the regulation. Therefore, having listened carefully and having consulted with colleagues, I can tell the House that, once these regulations are made, the Government will bring forward as soon as practicable, and in any event well before April 2013, amending regulations to revise Regulation 53(b). These regulations will introduce discretion into Regulation 53(b) so that the director of legal aid casework will have the express power to grant legal aid for public law claims, even if the alternative routes have not been exhausted, if he none the less considers that such an appeal or procedure would not be effective in providing the remedy that the individual requires. This would clearly address the situations that are causing noble Lords concern. It would, for example, put beyond doubt that legal aid for judicial review would be available where the claimant required urgent interim relief and this could not be provided in any other way.
I hope this will meet the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and others. Indeed, we will have the time to consult noble Lords about the wording of the amending order that I will bring forward in the new year. I hope that in the light of that the noble Lord will not press his regret Motion.
Lord Reid of Cardowan
My Lords, for those of us who have experienced neither legal training nor legal practice but who have listened to the very articulate and understandable critique by many noble and learned friends, can the Minister answer this question for me? I very much welcome what he has said. Is it implicit in what he says that, whatever discretion is given, it will not only come into effect if the First-tier Tribunal decides that it has made an error in law? That was explicit in many of the critiques which have come out. Is that conditionality now removed?
Lord McNally
My Lords, I, too, am not a lawyer. I think that the noble Lord is asking what comes next, and that relates to the second order, not the first one, which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked about. I will try to cover the point which he has raised when I get to that.
As I said, there was never any attempt on our part to change the rules as far as judicial review was concerned. However, when a former Lord Chancellor, a former Lord Chief Justice and a former Attorney General tell you that it needs clearing up, I think it is only wise to see whether it can be cleared up, and that is what we will do.
Moving on, I have explained in detail how we have listened to the concerns of this House—in particular, in extending legal aid in welfare areas. I have never hidden the fact that the LASPO Bill was a very difficult Bill involving some difficult choices. I can remember answering questions at this Dispatch Box two years ago, when we first launched the consultation. I said then that, if you have a system which is targeted to help the poorest and most disadvantaged in your society and you are forced to make cuts in that system, you are going to affect the poorest and most disadvantaged in your society. I have never hidden that fact.
The idea that LASPO was nothing other than a very difficult Bill is again before this House. Many of the arguments that have been deployed tonight were deployed during the passage of that Bill. However, I remind this House that the LASPO Bill is now an Act that went through both Houses of Parliament and carries with it financial implications that have to be considered when discussing any changes to it. There is no infinite pot of money available and we have to think very carefully about how taxpayer-funded money is spent. The Bill was therefore designed to ensure that public funding remains available for the most serious cases and for those who need it most. In making hard decisions and tough choices, we have listened to the concerns of some of the very same Peers who have spoken today, and we made changes during the passage of the LASPO Bill.
Not for the first time, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, claims that the Government have not listened. I take this opportunity to set the record straight. I remind the House of the Government’s original proposal following the consultation on Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales. Our response to the consultation stated that,
“it remains the Government’s view that legal aid should be removed for welfare benefits cases, as proposed in the consultation. However, it will be retained for judicial review of welfare benefit decisions, and for claims about welfare benefits relating to a contravention of the Equality Act 2010 that are currently funded, as proposed in the consultation”.
That was our starting point. Since then, we have moved considerably from that position in response to arguments deployed in both Houses. During ping-pong on the LASPO Bill, having listened carefully to the arguments, we agreed to make available legal aid for advice and assistance for welfare benefit appeals on a point of law in the Upper Tribunal, including for applications made to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal. In addition, we agreed to make legal aid available for advice, assistance and representation for welfare benefit onward appeals in the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. The order before us today makes a further concession which is not insignificant.
It may be helpful if I illustrate how this will work. An individual will make an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against an administrative decision of a public authority. If the appeal is unsuccessful, the claimant can request a statement of reasons for the decision. The appellant can then apply to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. At this point, the First-tier Tribunal must consider whether to review its own decision if it considers that it has erred in law, and legal aid for advice and assistance will now be available in relation to that review. If the tribunal decides not to review, the next step is for the First-tier Tribunal to decide whether to grant or refuse permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Where the tribunal refuses permission to appeal, the appellant can then apply directly to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal. Again, legal aid will be available for an application for this stage of the process. If permission is granted by the Upper Tribunal, then legal aid is again available for the substantive appeal before the Upper Tribunal.
Therefore, it is wrong and misleading to suggest that we are not making legal aid available in respect of points of law. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we considered this matter in great detail following the debates during the passage of the Bill. We have explored every possible option to find a workable solution. Our considered assessment is that other methods of independent verification would have proved unworkable. We did consider the CAB proposals but we felt that they would create unreasonable cost and administrative burden. The cost is important. We have never tried to hide the fact that part of the exercise was for legal aid to make a contribution to the cuts in the spending review for the Ministry of Justice, a department which spends money only on prisons, probation, court services and legal aid. The proposals would have placed burdens on the successor to the Legal Services Commission, the tribunal judiciary and the Department for Work and Pensions.
In the Government’s impact assessment we identified that, in 2009-10, we funded 135,000 instances of welfare benefits legal advice. If the judiciary had to consider up to 135,000 interlocutory applications for legal aid, the impact on the tribunal service would be severe, and it could lead to serious delays in the resolution of other cases. Similarly, if the Department for Work and Pensions or the successor to the Legal Services Commission had to consider that large number of cases before they could be funded, it would result in a significant extra administrative and cost burden. We do not believe it right to impose these additional burdens in the current economic climate.
We have therefore decided on the approach set out in the order. This would impose no additional burdens on the tribunal judiciary because it must already consider whether to conduct a review on receipt of an application for permission to appeal against a finding of the First-tier Tribunal. The tribunal can conduct a review only if it is satisfied that there has been an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
Baroness Mallalieu
If the position is, as we have heard during this debate, that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, a former Lord Chancellor, and my noble friend Lord Bach, a Queen’s Counsel, cannot agree on the interpretation of the wording of Article 3 of this order, is it not clear that people who have no legal qualification and are going to have to look at it to see whether they can obtain legal aid are going to be completely mystified? Whatever the merits or otherwise of the order which the Minister is addressing now, this is badly drafted, unclear and needs to be looked at again.
Lord McNally
I do not accept that. I accept that the lawyers may have glossed the patch a little, as the noble Lord, Lord Reid, acknowledged. We are discussing various complex matters of its operation. I go back to the point that our initial intention was to take welfare out of legal aid—something that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has opposed from the very beginning; I understand and appreciate that. That does not take away the fact that we have argued our case through both Houses of Parliament and put an Act on to the statute book. This is about implementing that Act.
It is clear that the Government have listened. We have compromised. However, we can go no further with concessions which impact the fundamental objectives of our reform: to focus legal aid on the highest-priority cases while delivering the essential savings needed to address the deficit which is threatening this country’s stability.
I was at a conference the other day where the noble Lord, Lord Bach, used a term which he may have been saving up for his final remarks. He said that next year we face a “perfect storm” in terms of welfare, in that we are indeed carrying through the LASPO reforms and the welfare reforms at the same time. That is going to introduce strain. However, the perfect storm would be if we lost control of our currency and economy, and if we lost markets. That is when the people whom we have heard about today, whom people want to protect, would really feel the full blast of economic problems. We are trying to—
Lord Howarth of Newport
I am grateful. The noble Lord used to tell the House that taking welfare benefits out of the scope of legal aid would save £25 million, but we know also that his department is dumping all kinds of costs on other departments through the health consequences and the damage to vulnerable children living in circumstances of great poverty. What is the noble Lord’s assessment now of the net contribution to reducing the deficit made by his policy of removing access to justice for some of the neediest people in our society? Does he still think that it is £25 million? Does he think it is less? Does he think that that is the crucial difference that is going to avert fiscal disaster?
Lord McNally
I do not believe that these matters remove access to justice. I notice that an organisation called MyLegal put out quite a long briefing, the interesting bit of which was on the last page, where it said that Ken Clarke had said these measures would cost £25 million. The briefing said that that was wrong and that it was £14 million. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, said that it would cost only £5 million. What I do know is that it will have a cost. When I am carrying out my other responsibilities in the Ministry of Justice and I am suddenly told by this House, which has no responsibilities in the Ministry of Justice, that I have to find £5 million, £15 million or £25 million, there are decisions that must be made. I sit on boards where people lose their jobs and where the management of these changes is extremely difficult. I have never tried to hide that but I ask this House to have a sense of responsibility. We came up with a concession after a lot of exploration and talks with departments and various boards. It is a narrow concession but it comes on top of a whole range of other concessions which we believe retain legal aid in a vast swathe of the process of welfare and which we think is in keeping with the promises we made to Parliament.
I ask this House not to go further in voting on this. I must make it clear that, if the amendment is carried and this concession is lost, the Act is still an Act of Parliament and will still be implemented in April but without this concession. I would consider that a rather pyrrhic victory.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I am very pleased that the Minister has agreed to bring forward amending regulations that will deal with Regulation 53(b) and I thank him for considering the points that have been made in the debate. He mentioned that the regulations would focus on whether the alternative remedy is effective. I hope that when he and his officials read the record of this debate, they will see that the concern is that the criterion should state that the issue is whether the alternative remedy is a reasonable one to use in all the circumstances. It is not just a question of efficacy; it is also a question of speed and convenience, for example. The Minister indicated that he would consult noble Lords who have expressed concern about this. I very much hope that he will take further advantage of the free legal advice available from, in particular, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Woolf and Lord Goldsmith. I would be very happy to act as their junior in this respect. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.