Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Monday 13th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Greengross (CB)]

My Lords, I am speaking in favour of Amendment 55ZB from the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, which would ensure that Gypsies and Travellers are not evicted from an unauthorised site unless they have refused to go to a suitable alternative site. I note the noble Baroness’s comments that, when she met with the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, she was told that the provision of sites for Gypsies and Travellers was a planning matter and that an amendment which dealt with it was not for this Bill.

On 4 November, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Greenhalgh, in response to my question highlighting that only eight local authorities out of 68 in the south-east of England have identified a five-year supply of specific, deliverable sites for Gypsies and Travellers, responded that it is the responsibility of local planning authorities to make an assessment of the need for both permanent and transit sites and to identify sites in their local plans. The Government are of course correct that this is a planning matter, yet the evidence is clear that this issue has not been appropriately addressed by many local authorities.

This amendment provides some protection for the Gypsy and Traveller communities, as it stipulates that they cannot be forcibly evicted unless they have refused a suitable alternative site. While this Bill is not about planning, we cannot ignore the impact it is going to have, if passed, on nomadic communities at a time when there are too few suitable sites.

It is encouraging to hear that, in Leeds, there have been systems established and sites made available to address this issue. It is even more encouraging still to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Greenhalgh, is taking steps to encourage these types of systems across the country.

This amendment would provide appropriate protection for Travellers and Gypsies, while also ensuring that, where a suitable alternative site is available, this cannot be refused. Further, it highlights why more must be done to encourage local authorities to provide suitable sites for Gypsies and Travellers.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have a question for the Minister which is relevant to Amendment 55ZB, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. The noble Baroness will know that the offence which will be created by new Clause 63 contains a defence in subsection (6), at line 40 of page 59 of the Bill. The defence is that it is open to the Traveller to say that he or she had a “reasonable excuse” for not moving on when asked to. Does the noble Baroness accept that it would be open to the Traveller to say, “I have a reasonable excuse for not moving on; my reasonable excuse is that there is no suitable pitch in the local authority area to which I can go, and it is therefore completely unreasonable on the facts of my case to expect me to move on”? Does the noble Baroness accept that it would be open to the Traveller to present that defence? It is certainly the defence I would advise the Traveller to use, were I representing him or her. If the noble Baroness accepts that that defence in principle would be open to the Traveller, I respectfully suggest that much of the force of the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, is reduced, because there is a balance in this provision.

I make one other point: I do not myself find it particularly helpful when we are debating these difficult issues—and they are difficult issues—relating to a balance between competing interests for noble Lords to refer to Auschwitz. Let us be proportionate and reasonable about these issues. We have here a difficult question of the rights and interests of the Traveller and the rights and interests of the occupier or owner of land. I remind noble Lords that this criminal offence applies only if it can be shown that the occupation of the land by the Traveller is causing “significant damage”, “significant disruption” or “significant distress”. I understand the concerns, but let us keep a sense of balance and recognise, if I am right in my understanding of subsection (6), that there is a defence open to the Traveller who can show that they have a reasonable excuse—which, so far as I can see, would cover the absence of suitable pitches in the area.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I support this group of important amendments, which seek to bring some sort of equality into the Bill when dealing with the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities, which is significantly absent from the Bill as it stands.

On Friday, the most reverend Primate led a debate on the challenges to freedom of speech and the role of upholding freedom of speech. He said in his remarks that one of the threats to freedom of speech is the “dehumanisation” of those with whom we disagree:

“We must be alert to how our habits of communication can stifle our creative imagination—how they might make us see others as somehow less than fully human.”—[Official Report, 10/12/21; col. 2109.]


While this section of the Bill is not about freedom of speech, it is certainly about the loss of freedom to roam.

In Committee, we heard speeches from some quarters which made assumptions about the character and lawfulness of the Travelling community, without evidence being provided to substantiate the allegations. All the amendments in this group deal with Part 4 of the Bill, which seeks to demonise and terrorise the Travelling community. I support Amendment 55ZB and congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, on her contribution.

The Travelling community is often portrayed as being less than fully human. It is true that their way of life is very different from that of those in this Chamber, but they are human, and they have the right to a roof over their heads, to educate their children and to have access to healthcare. This can be achieved only when they have somewhere to stop with their caravans. The Minister has rightly said that the provision of sites is a local authority matter and dealt with through the planning process, but she is reluctant to ensure that local authorities step up and fulfil this role.

As a vice-president of the LGA, I receive a regular copy of the Local Government First periodical. In the latest edition, there are two articles on Gypsies and Travellers. The first is from Sarah Mann, the director of Friends, Families and Travellers, about countering inequalities. GRT communities are known to face some of the poorest life outcomes across multiple indicators among the UK population. FFT provides local government with training on cultural awareness to provide more inclusive services, and this has resulted in the provision of more transit and permanent sites in certain areas. The second article was from Boris Worrall, chief executive of Rooftop Housing Group, which provides high-quality accommodation solutions to the Travelling community. He writes that the evidence shows that

“where high-quality sites are provided for the … (GRT) communities, and managed effectively, there is a wealth of evidence about better outcomes for residents, positive community relations and the avoidance of taxpayer costs.”

There are solutions out there to what some sections of our community see as the problem of GRT. It is part of the role of government to promote these to the benefit of all. The draconian measures in this Bill are not the answer and are a sledgehammer to crack a nut. My friend Lord Avebury, had he been here, would have had much to say on this matter.

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The arguments for or against the provisions in Clause 63 come down to one issue and one issue only: is it acceptable for a person to take their vehicle on to other peoples’ land without their permission and cause significant damage, disruption or distress? I know the answer that the British people would give to that question. If noble Lords vote through any of the amendments in this group, those who do so would send a clear message that such behaviour is acceptable. I therefore ask my noble and learned friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for answering my earlier question. As I understood her answer, it was that there can be no reasonable excuse for causing significant damage or significant disruption. I point out to her that the defence under new subsection (6) is that the defendant would have a defence if they have

“a reasonable excuse for … failing to comply as soon as reasonably practicable with the request”

to leave. It has nothing to do with whether they have caused disruption, distress or damage; they have an absolute defence if there is a reasonable excuse for not leaving the land when asked to do so. That is why I put to her that, surely, it could be a reasonable excuse that there is nowhere else they can go. Would she like to reflect on that?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

As the noble Lord probably knows, that will be a determination for the courts to make.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am simply anxious that the matter is not left on the basis that the Minister put it, because I respectfully suggest that that is not right.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

Perhaps we could discuss this further if that is amenable to the noble Lord, but I accept his point that it is not right to just leave it like that. In determining what is a reasonable excuse, it would be for the police and the courts to determine whether the excuse was reasonable.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, although we have equality—quite rightly—there is no doubt that women need to be dealt with differently from men in their situations of going to prison and in prisons. There is no reason not to be tough on crime, but there is every reason to follow these two admirable amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. It is time that women’s very special situations were recognised, partly as the mothers of children—we have had some appalling stories of women in prison who are pregnant—but partly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, just said, to stop them offending and to find the best way to deal with them. It may well be that prison is necessary for some of them, but it may well not be necessary for some of those who actually do go to prison if this new board were in place and could provide some of the services that are so admirable in the youth justice system. So I strongly support these two amendments.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I add my support to these amendments. Will the Minister, when he comes to reply, agree that the application of the justice system to women poses especial challenges for everyone involved in the justice system, from the Secretary of State downwards? Does he agree that, at the moment, regrettably, there is a crisis of confidence as to how the criminal justice system in particular, but also the civil justice system, addresses the needs of women? Does he therefore accept, as has been suggested by previous speakers, that the creation of a women’s justice board would focus much-needed attention on these important topics?

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, my role as a loyal government Back-Bencher is to help my noble friend the Minister, and I think I can do that best by strongly supporting these amendments.

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[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose the Question that Clause 165 stand part of the Bill; I seek not to add but to remove something from the Bill. Section 9B of the Juries Act 1974 gives the judge the power to consider whether a disabled person can undertake their duties as a juror when there is doubt on the part of court officials. New Section 9C requires the judge to consider whether a British Sign Language interpreter would enable the juror to be effective. The rest of the clause is concerned with sensible, consequential provisions.

The Committee should note that the judge is involved only if there is doubt on the part of officials. A potential juror with an effective hearing aid would not go through the Section 9B process since there would be no doubt that they could be effective. I undertook jury duty many years ago, long before arriving at your Lordships’ House. It was indeed interesting to me, but I regarded it as a duty or an obligation. It is not a right or a privilege in addition to being a duty, as, for example, voting in a general election is. Therefore, I see no requirement to make these special provisions so far as a completely deaf juror is concerned.

I accept that many deaf people can also lip-read, which would no doubt supplement the assistance of a BSL interpreter. My concern is surely that many cases turn on the credibility of the witness and, sometimes, which witness is not telling the truth. Suppose in a case involving an expert witness, counsel is asking searching questions and makes a provocative suggestion. The expert witness might calmly respond, “No, that is not correct”, knowing full well that opposing counsel will return to the matter later. However, what the deaf juror inadvertently could pick up is, “No, that’s wrong”, which might appear to be the counsel having the witness on the ropes, when that is far from the facts.

A further difficulty might arise in the jury room when deliberating the verdict. I have been in the jury room. Discussion could be fast and furious, and I cannot see how the interpreter could possibly keep up. It would be possible to slow the proceedings down, which might be beneficial, but since we do not research how juries operate we cannot tell what the effect would be. The other jurors may simply ignore the deaf juror.

Finally, the clause also, quite properly, makes consequential provisions that put the interpreter under the same obligations of confidentiality as the other jurors. However, he or she is not a decision-maker and will still be in a different position, and we cannot know what, if any, chilling effect on discussions may arise from the interpreter’s presence. I expect noble Lords supporting me will come up with far better arguments than mine, but I oppose the Question that Clause 165 stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I have added my name to the noble Earl’s opposition to Clause 165. I understand that jury service is a civic duty and there are strong equality arguments that a deaf person should not be disqualified because they cannot proceed without an interpreter. I also understand that the judge has discretion over whether the nature of the issues in the case makes it appropriate for a sign language interpreter to retire with the jury, and that the clause makes it very clear that the interpreter will have a duty not to interfere in or influence the deliberations of the jury. I understand all that, but I have concerns about the consequences of allowing a 13th or 14th person to sit in the jury room. I say 13th and 14th, because there will be a need for at least two interpreters, as any one interpreter is going to struggle to perform this task for more than 30 minutes at a time.

The first set of concerns relates to the effects on the dynamics of the jury. A jury depends on effective communications between the 12 persons serving on it. To ensure that the interpreter performs their role effectively, he or she may need to intervene in the deliberations to prevent people from talking over each other; and the interpreter may need to ask people to repeat themselves or to clarify what they are saying. This will have an effect on the dynamics of the jury room. There is also the potential problem that what is said by the interpreter to the deaf person cannot be understood and monitored by the rest of the jury.

That was the first set of concerns. The second type of concern is that Clause 165 makes provision only for a subset of otherwise excluded members of a jury. We are not making any provision for potential jurors who have insufficient command of English to participate effectively, or persons who cannot read relevant documents because of a low level of literacy or poor eyesight. The clause also makes no provision for deaf or hearing-impaired people who do not use British Sign Language but instead use text communication systems. It is a bit odd to make provision only for deaf persons, and then only for a subset of deaf persons.

My third concern is that, as I understand from helpful discussions with the Minister, provisions similar to Clause 165 have been the subject of testing in other jurisdictions, but no modelling has been done with shadow juries in this country. The noble Earl mentioned that we cannot do research with real juries, but research is often done with shadow or model juries. I ask the Minister whether it would not be sensible, before such a significant change to jury trial is introduced in this country, to conduct some research with shadow or pretend juries to see how this is going to work.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, this was an especially thoughtful and constructive debate. I agree with the words that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, used to describe the debate. His reference to the magistrate was interesting, but the problem with all analogies is that they are different. I am going to focus specifically on the jury issue because I recognise that a number of Members of the Committee have made particular points about jurors.

I will start with the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who referred us to the Equality Act; that is an important starting point for the debate, although it may not be the finishing point. We must ensure that the services of the courts are accessible to everyone, including those with disabilities. We must pay due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and advance equality of opportunity wherever possible. That, in a nutshell, is why Clause 165 is part of the Bill. Having said that, and because I know that this will be a debate that is looked at by those outside this House as well as by those inside it, let me place on record what need not be said but I am going to say it anyway: that everybody in this Committee shares that aim. We heard a very personal example from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, of Lady Judge’s work in this area. Again I say this for the avoidance of doubt where there should not be any: I am proceeding on the basis that all who have questioned or opposed our proposals do so with the very best of motives and certainly not for any other reason.

Trial by jury is a fundamental aspect of our criminal justice system, and serving as a juror is one of the most important civic duties that anyone can be asked to perform. I agree with my noble friend Lord Attlee that it is a duty and not a right, but the Government and I want to ensure that as many people as possibly can perform that duty. Reasonable adjustments can be made by our courts to enable most people with disabilities to complete jury service. This, importantly, includes deaf jurors who can lip-read. I invite the Committee to reflect very carefully on the position of the deaf juror who can lip-read and to consider it in respect of each of the objections that have been put. I will come to some of them to which this would not apply, but a number of the objections would potentially apply to a juror who is deaf but who can lip-read. Nobody else in the court is likely to know how good the lip-reading is, whether the lip-reader gets every nuance, or how lip-reading affects the dynamics either in the jury box or in the jury retirement room.

That is the first point we get from the deaf juror who lip-reads, but there is another point as well: it underlines the proposition that there is no bar in principle to a deaf person serving on a jury. This is about one issue only, which is the 13th—I will come back to the 14th—person in the jury retirement room. That is why we need the legislation, because at the moment it is 12 and no more; I put the jury bailiff to one side. The issue at the moment is that, unlike a lip-reader who, if the judge considers that they can effectively discharge their duties as a juror—which I will come back to—can serve on a jury, a juror who needs a British Sign Language interpreter is unable to get that assistance because entry to the deliberation room is limited to the jurors, and no one else may enter. The essential point that this clause focuses on is permitting the BSL interpreter to go in, thereby enabling that juror to fulfil their duty.

I recognise that there have been what I might call practical, and almost philosophical, principled objections and concerns raised about the proposal. I note that the Bar Council of England and Wales has expressed its support, subject, it is fair to say, to the right safeguards, which I believe we have in place. I reassure the Committee that we considered the safeguards very carefully in developing the legislation. We looked at research and current practice in the USA, New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland—which is planning to legislate for this form of interpretation—and Australia, where provision is already made for BSL interpreters or the equivalent in its jury systems.

I will first deal with the philosophical or principled objections. I understand the reservations that this might undermine the jury deliberation process, and I understand the argument, although I do not accept it, that interpreters could unduly influence or impact the dynamic of the discussions. There has been a lot of research, particularly in New South Wales, to explore whether deaf people can sufficiently access court proceedings and make informed decisions as jurors. The research suggests that deaf jurors are not hindered from speaking during deliberations and that other jurors seemingly have no issue with the presence of the interpreter or interacting with the deaf juror.

We have put safeguards in the Bill to help to address these issues. Offences relating to research and sharing research during the trial will apply as much to the interpreter as they do to the jurors. As has been pointed out, there is a new offence whereby an interpreter intentionally interferes in or influences the deliberations of the jury or proceedings before the court. I have said “interpreter”, but I accept, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out—I acknowledge my gratitude to him and others for sparing time to discuss this with me—that there will be two BSL interpreters present in the jury deliberation room, not only because they need to switch over as it is a very intensive process for the interpreter but because it has the benefit that they will be able to monitor each other and maintain a consistently high quality of interpretation. To take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I say that the nuances will be as much picked up by the sign language interpreters as we can anticipate—or not—that they will be picked up necessarily by a lip-reader.

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that the jury room is not just confidential but also private; those things are different, and it is both. There is no intention to allow the academics or the researchers in. There is certainly no intention to move from what I think in the judicial review context is called “the judge over your shoulder” to the Minister standing over the juror’s shoulder. We are certainly not going there.

The interpreters will be bound by a confidentiality agreement and be bound by law, and there is an offence to keep everybody honest. They will also be required to swear an oath or affirmation to that effect, alongside their existing interpreter’s oath or affirmation.

I turn to the practical concerns around the nature of evidence and whether a deaf juror will be able to interpret facial expressions, together with audio evidence, effectively. Again, I heard the example from the noble and learned Lord as to how something was said in a tone of complete resignation. The word used in the Act, and in this clause, is “effectively”. The judge would have to decide whether the juror could effectively discharge their role as a juror. This provision does not require judges to admit such jurors on to the jury; it simply removes the blanket ban that would otherwise be present. It means that jurors who need a BSL interpreter can be considered alongside other jurors for whom other reasonable adjustments might be required.

The ultimate decision will be for the trial judge, who will take into account the nature of the case and the nature of the evidence that is going to be heard. No doubt he or she would want to hear submissions from the parties, although they would not be bound by them. As I have said, none of this is new. Again, I ask the Committee to consider how the trial judge should deal with a juror who says, “Well, I lip-read.” The trial judge, again, would have to consider what the evidence in the case was going to be and whether they were going to be able to fulfil their role effectively. There is no difference in principle, and the test and approach of the judge would have to be the same.

I accept that there will be cases where a deaf person would not be able to serve on a jury. I expect that there will be cases where a lip-reading juror might not be able to serve on a jury—for example, if the evidence is audio only and there is nobody to look at; there is just a telephone call playing.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I ask this question out of ignorance. Can the Minister confirm what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, said, which is that a BSL interpreter does not interpret in the way that a foreign-language interpreter would, but rather attempts to summarise the gist or essence of what has been said?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I was going to come to that point, but let me deal with it now. BSL is treated as a language. It has its own grammatical structure and syntax; it is recognised as a minority language in the UK. There is not a sign for every word, but words can be spelled out where a sign is not possible. The noble Lord and I have both had cases where we have had simultaneous foreign language interpretation. It is also the case that not every word in every language is easily translatable into another language. Certainly, we have looked at that point, and we do not think that that should be a bar to a deaf juror effectively participating in a jury. For these purposes, BSL is sufficient to enable the juror to participate effectively, but depending again on the nature of the case, that may be a factor in a particular case which the judge would want to take into account.

It is important to start from the proposition that everyone should be able to serve as a juror unless there are good reasons to believe that they would be unable to do so effectively. I underline that word “effectively” in the instant case. I come back to the fact that deaf jurors who can lip-read serve successfully, and we do not believe that there is a reason why there should be a blanket ban on jurors who need BSL interpreters to serve.

Picking up some other points, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, asked about the obligation point and whether there would be a special dispensation. No, there would not be a special dispensation. Like any other juror, the deaf juror who needed a BSL interpreter would have to ask for permission to be excused. Of course, given that the judge would also be considering whether they could effectively participate, perhaps the anterior question would be their effective participation, and then the question would arise as to whether they could be excused. That would also apply, of course, to any other juror who was a lip-reader. One would imagine that a judge would be sympathetic to a lip-reading juror who might say to the judge, “I know that I can serve, but I am very concerned that I might miss something. My lip-reading is good, if not 100%, but I would rather not serve.” Ultimately, however, that would be up to the judge. There would not be a special dispensation.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments in my name make two straightforward revisions which will allow these provisions to operate more effectively and support the principle of open justice across our courts and tribunals. Let me divide them into two groups.

Amendments 243, 244, 245, 248 to 261 inclusive and 325 expand the scope of Clauses 167 and 168 so they apply to all of our courts, tribunals and all bodies that exercise the judicial power of the state, with the exception of the Supreme Court, for which there has already been separate provision, and devolved courts and tribunals, for obvious reasons. This is an important amendment. It ensures that all jurisdictions may use these powers to provide transmissions of proceedings to remote observers in order to uphold the principle of open justice, subject, of course, to further regulation, guidance and judicial discretion.

Digital technologies have become mainstream, even in our smaller and what might be called more obscure jurisdictions. It is now evident that these powers should not be limited to HMCTS courts and tribunals but would be best made effective in all courts and tribunals. Importantly, that also ensures that the offence of making unauthorised recordings or transmissions of proceedings is applied universally across our entire justice system and not just in specific jurisdictions. This will shorten the length of the Bill by around six pages by removing the need for a distinct schedule for tribunals. I was going to add, “making this legislation simpler”, but that might test the patience of the Committee.

Ensuring that our courts and tribunals are as open and transparent as they can be is an ongoing task. The president of the Family Division, Sir Andrew McFarlane, recently published his review of transparency in the family courts. With respect to the president, it is right to say that that was a phenomenal piece of work, which has been well received. The remote observer clauses in this Bill are in harmony with his recommendations, as the Bill allows transparency by permitting journalists to observe family hearings remotely if they cannot attend in person.

The second part of this group of amendments, Amendments 246, 247, 262, 324, and 329, provide technical amendments so that the secondary legislation to enable these powers may be introduced on time. Let me explain what I mean by that. The remote observation provisions in the Bill are intended to replace the temporary and less extensive powers in the Coronavirus Act. They have been vital in allowing our courts to administer justice effectively and transparently during the Covid-19 pandemic.

We want to make sure that there is no gap in the legislative cover. It has therefore become necessary to ensure that these new powers can be enabled in secondary legislation before the date that the existing legislation expires. With this Bill now not expected to receive Royal Assent until only shortly before that date, these amendments take the necessary step of allowing the enabling secondary legislation for these powers to be introduced by the made affirmative procedure. These amendments therefore provide that legislation is continually in place to uphold open justice in remote hearings.

As this morning, I am aware that the group contains amendments from other noble Lords, so I will pause there to allow them to introduce their amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I shall speak to Amendment 259B in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned lord, Lord Judge.

Clause 169(2) would allow a jury to be in a different physical location from the judge, so long as all 12 members of the jury are in the same place as between themselves. I am very concerned about this proposed power. In order to ensure the effective management of a criminal trial, a judge needs to be in the same room as a jury. The judge needs to be able to communicate effectively with the members of the jury. The judge needs carefully to watch the jury to see that they are focused and ensure that their needs are addressed. The judge needs carefully to watch the relationships between the 12 members of the jury. The jury needs to be able to communicate speedily and easily with the judge if it has any particular issue that it wants to raise. Members of the jury need to be able to study the witnesses giving evidence—what they say, what they do not say, and their body language and facial expressions while doing so. All this is so much more difficult through a computer screen, as we have all discovered, whether through court proceedings or parliamentary proceedings, during the pandemic.

I have had very helpful discussions with the Minister about this matter, and I am very grateful to him and thank him for those discussions and the time that he has devoted to them. I understand from him that the Government have no plan to encourage the use of remote juries. Instead, as I understand it, the Government believe that this would be a useful power essentially for three reasons: we may be afflicted by another pandemic; there may well be advances in technology; and, in any event, this power may be useful today if a judge and lawyers, for example, go on a site visit and one or more members of the jury is physically disabled, in which case the site visit can be watched by the whole jury online. That is the example that the Minister gave me.

I have to say that I find these justifications unpersuasive. I am always suspicious of broad powers being taken in legislation “just in case”. I certainly do not doubt the Minister’s good faith, but his assurances as to what is intended to be done under this proposed power do not bind—cannot bind—his successors in office to what he has done; they may have very different proposals or intentions as to the use of these powers. With great respect, the site visit example is, I think, very far-fetched. I am not aware of any such problem in any case in recent years, if ever.

In any event, if Ministers think that provision should be made for such a limited, specific use of remote hearings, with juries in a different place to the judge and the defendant, let it be made clear in the drafting of the clause that a remote hearing cannot take place with the jury in splendid isolation from the judge, the witnesses and the defendant in relation to the hearing of oral evidence, the submissions of counsel or the summing-up by the judge.

Although they have not yet been spoken to, I express my support for Amendments 259A and 259B, both of which concern aspects of the proposed power to be conferred on the court to require a person, including a defendant, to take part in proceedings by audio or video link. I can well understand that this may be a useful power for a preliminary hearing, but not for a substantive trial, unless the defendant consents to that. I am very unhappy about this in relation to young persons.

There are real issues as to whether a defendant would have effective access to a hearing, were his or her presence to be remote, and real concerns as to whether they could effectively communicate with their legal representatives. The Ministry of Justice may be hoping to save some money if it does not need to transport defendants from prison to court, but I am doubtful that it will save much money because it will need to invest in very high-quality computer systems. In any event, I fear the price will be a reduction in the quality of justice, and that price is too high.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful again to the Committee for a very interesting and wide-ranging debate. I thank my noble friend Lord Deben for the most back-handed compliment I have ever received and assure him that, when it comes to justice, I absolutely subscribe to the proposition that justice must be not only done but seen to be done. That reminds me to underline what Clauses 167 and 168 are about: they are about justice being seen to be done. These clauses do not mandate remote hearings; that is for a judge to decide. What they do is permit remote observation of those hearings, which underpins open justice.

When we look at issues such as this, we need to bear in mind that the days when the local newspaper would send people to sit at the back of the Crown Court or magistrates’ court are long gone. In the real world, you will have greater transparency if you have a live feed to journalists from the courtroom than if you say, “You’ve got to come along and take a note”. They simply do not any more, and I am concerned with making sure that we actually have open justice and that it is not just something we talk about.

Amendments 245A and 245B seek to prohibit those transmissions being made to remote observers in all cases where a child is among the parties. Amendment 259A similarly seeks to remove children from the application of Clause 169, which is about video and audio links in criminal proceedings. It would prevent the court, as a blanket ban, from making a direction to enable any participant in a hearing to attend by live link where a child is party to proceedings.

I absolutely agree with the intention of safeguarding children in our courts. We have debated that point in a number of areas of this and other Bills, but I suggest that these amendments are both ineffective and unnecessary. They are unnecessary because we already have in place sufficient tried and tested legislation and guidance to safeguard the privacy of children in these proceedings. Section 47(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 prevents anyone being present at a youth court hearing except members of the court, parties and participants, accredited media representatives or specifically authorised persons.

In other courts, procedure rules provide that it is legitimate to hold a hearing in private

“to protect the interests of any child or protected party”.

Courts have a statutory duty to have regard to the welfare of children. Judges, magistrates and tribunal members retain judicial discretion over whether a case is to be heard in private, with full consideration of their duty to protect minors or other vulnerable parties, where necessary. The ineffective or counterproductive point is that there may be cases where it is beneficial for a child, whether as a witness or a defendant, to participate by live link. If one is focusing on cases where children can be affected, one also has to bear in mind that there are lots of cases which affect children where a child is neither a party, nor a witness, nor physically involved at all.

Clause 169, as drafted, gives courts the flexibility to make decisions to direct remote participation where it is considered in the best interests of child participants to do so. I draw the Committee’s attention to the word “may” in the first line of subsection (1) in new Section 51. It is vitally important that we continue to protect children. That is why we have built these safeguards into our provisions.

Amendment 259B, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spoke to first, seeks to exclude juries from the provisions in Clause 169 that enable a jury assembled together to participate in a trial through a live video link, where appropriate and deemed to be in the interests of justice. The Committee is entitled to a clear statement from the Dispatch Box and I will make one: there is absolutely no intention for this to become a regular feature of trials, with the jury sitting in one room and the judge and the witnesses in another room. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, reminded us, Scotland did put that provision in during the pandemic—I think cinemas were used, so that everything was on a big screen and the audio was very good. That was done in response to the pandemic, and this measure is a future-proofing measure.

I hear what my noble friend Lord Deben says about that and about civil servants tapping Ministers on the shoulder, but, since the pandemic, we have witnessed big changes in how we run our jury system. We have seen —and here I pay my respects again to judges and all others involved in the justice system, who have worked extremely hard to do this—suitable procedures put in place. But we have also seen how legislation tied our hands during an emergency and impeded our ability to progress quickly and make full use of the technological options open to us. We do not want that to happen again. Clause 169 is designed to provide courts with the flexibility to keep pace with new technology as it develops.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, that is the second reason for this clause. Technology is developing in ways that we could not have imagined a few years ago, and we have no idea where it will take us in the future. We want to be sure that we have a statutory basis to take advantage of technology as it develops, so that we can provide a justice system that is fit for the century that we live in and for the way that people live their lives. Those are the two main justifications for Clause 169.

I gave the noble Lord the example of a site visit. Again, I make clear that this is not the main justification for it, but it is important if one has a jury with a disabled person on it. The idea is shocking that, in 2021 a disabled person could be told that they cannot sit on a jury because, at some point during the three-week trial, it will look at the locus in quo, which is a room at the top of a winding staircase, and they cannot climb the stairs. The whole thing could be done very effectively via video, and so that is not a reason to stop them serving on a jury.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. Can he say whether there has ever been such a case?

While I am on my feet, I have another question. The Minister mentioned that technology may develop. I think the concern from those of us who have doubts about this proposal is not advancing technology but human communication. However good the technology becomes, there is still a vital distinction between watching proceedings on a screen and being in the same room as other people. I suggest to the Minister—this is certainly my experience and, I think, the experience of most lawyers and judges—that, although the courts have worked wonders during the pandemic, they have recognised the inferiority of any system that is within our contemplation by means of technology compared with being the same room. The ability to communicate and have an interchange with other people is manifestly weakened by having to do it over a screen.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Absolutely. I do not disagree that face to face is better; no doubt that is what we all feel in this Committee—that it operates much better when we are in the same room than it did when it was all on screens. I absolutely accept that. Let me give an example. Before I became a Minister, I did a three-week trial entirely on screen, with witnesses around the world. After about a day, you forget, and you get used to the new system.

I am not saying that we want this clause here because screens are better; we want this clause in the Bill because screens may be necessary if we have another pandemic and because we do not know where technology is going to go. I do not want to get too techy about it, but there is a very real difference between watching a screen in the sense of a computer monitor and some of the things that I have seen in banks, where there is a big screen down the middle of a table and six or seven of you sit in a row and look at it, while the people you are talking to have the same thing in their office. After about half an hour, you really feel that they are on the opposite side of the table to you. Again, I am not suggesting that that is suitable for courts, but it is an example of how technology can, and will, develop. We want to future-proof it, as I have said.

Amendment 259BA would require anyone taking part in any sort of criminal hearing via live link to submit to a prior assessment of their physical and mental health before the court could consider whether it is appropriate for them to take part in criminal proceedings over a live link. I share the concern of the noble Lord that we must ensure that audio and video links are used appropriately. Again, we have built safeguards into Clause 169, setting out procedures and guidance that courts must follow. The court must decide whether it is in the interests of justice; that includes taking the views of the person who would attend by live link on whether they can participate effectively in the proceedings. The clause also requires that the parties have an opportunity to make representations to the judge.

I also point out that, although the intention behind the amendment is understandable, perhaps even laudable, in practice, it could prevent or deter some people from using a facility that could help them to participate in hearings with as little distress, inconvenience and delay as possible. I therefore urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

Sexual Misconduct in the Police

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 26th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that question and for the conversation that we had the other day on this matter. On whether the inquiry could be on a statutory footing, one change since February 2020, when we amended the law, is that police officers are now under a duty to co-operate as witnesses with investigations, inquiries and formal proceedings under the revised standards of professional behaviour. They are guilty of a disciplinary offence if they fail to do so. On the fundamental question, should we assess it necessary, the inquiry can be converted into a statutory inquiry where witnesses can be compelled to give evidence.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that a practical measure which would enhance the confidence that women have in the police force would be for any officer against whom a credible complaint of sexual misconduct is made to be immediately suspended, and that it is not good enough for this matter to be left, as it currently is, to the discretion of chief constables?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

Officers can be and are suspended for allegations of misconduct. Every case is different, so it is left to the discretion of police chiefs to decide on a case-by-case basis. I would not want to make a blanket determination because there may be spurious allegations. It would be up to the police chief in question to determine whether a suspension was relevant or appropriate.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I want to mention two specific matters. The first has already been addressed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. Clause 169 will allow members of the jury to take part in a criminal trial remotely through the use of video and audio links, as long as all the members of the jury are together in the same place. I very much share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord: they have also been expressed by the Bar Council and the Law Society.

They expressed concerns because the success of a jury trial depends in large part on a good working relationship between the judge and the jury. Trust and confidence need to be built up. The jury needs to be attentive and mindful of its onerous responsibilities; the judge needs to watch the jury to ensure that members’ interests are protected and they are properly performing their responsibilities. People, of course, go to prison, sometimes for long periods of time, as a consequence of this procedure. Counsel, both prosecution and defence counsel, have to engage with the jury through advocacy and through their questions to witnesses. All of this is much more difficult to achieve through a video screen. The Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, said last year, and I agree, that a remote jury trial

“would make the jury spectators rather than participants in a trial”.

Most of us lawyers and judges in this House will testify from our own experience in the past 18 months that a remote hearing is a far less effective means of communication than a live hearing in the courtroom. I expect that almost all Members of this House will have had the same experience participating in parliamentary proceedings over the past 18 months. I very much hope that the Government will think again on this very important subject.

The other matter I would like to mention today is an amendment to enhance the protection of women. It is an amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, will table for Committee and which I will support. I am speaking on it today because the noble Baroness cannot be in her place. I will do my best briefly to explain the issue.

The House will recall that the Voyeurism (Offences) Act 2019 amended the Sexual Offences Act. Essentially, it made it a criminal offence to take photographs up a person’s skirt or kilt—it is sexually neutral—when this is done in order to obtain sexual gratification or to cause humiliation, distress or alarm. In the debates on the current Bill in the House of Commons, an amendment was proposed to add a further voyeurism offence. The offence would be to take a photograph or video of a woman who is breastfeeding, provided that this is done to obtain sexual gratification or to cause humiliation, distress or alarm. Sadly, this is a mischief which occurs frequently, and it has understandably caused immense distress to many women victims, as has been explained by Stella Creasy MP, the moving force behind the amendment in the House of Commons. These women complain to the police; the police are sympathetic but explain, rightly, that there is nothing they can do about it.

In Committee in the House of Commons, the Minister, Victoria Atkins, for whom I have great admiration, agreed that this is

“unacceptable, creepy and disgusting behaviour”.—[Official Report, Commons, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Committee, 24/6/21; col. 748.]

Who could disagree with that? But on behalf of the Government, she opposed the amendment to make such conduct a criminal offence because the Government want to await a Law Commission report on the publication of intimate images on the internet.

I can see no good reason why we should not now amend the law to make this form of distressing and inexcusable conduct a criminal offence. I very much hope that the Government will think about this and accept the forthcoming amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, in Committee or on Report.

Policing: European Championship Final

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 15th July 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con) [V]]

I totally agree with my noble friend in praising the police for the exemplary job they do, and I will take his point back.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, people who attended the match told me that the chaos, the threats and the violence caused by thousands of drunken and ticketless fans outside the stadium, many of whom forced their way inside, made this a frightening experience. That was especially because there were very few police officers to be seen. I do not understand how the Minister can say that the police did a good job on this occasion. It is surely all very well for the Minister to say that lessons need to be learned, but I suggest to her that the lesson that should be learned is that someone in the police service should take responsibility for all this and should resign.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con) [V]]

My Lords, as regards the chaos outside, the noble Lord is absolutely right. In fact, I understand that many of the people who did not have tickets had no intention of watching the match; they came to cause trouble. On the numbers of police, I understand that almost 2,000 officers were deployed to Wembley on Sunday. To put that in context, it is the size of an average police force.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 6th October 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

32: Schedule 1, page 7, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (2)

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, last but I hope not least, Amendment 32 is in my name and in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

Amendment 32 addresses a very odd provision in paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 1. As currently worded, it states that provisions of the EU regulation on free movement for workers cease to apply if

“they are inconsistent with … the Immigration Acts”

or

“capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of any such provision.”

I suggested in Committee, with widespread support from all sides of the Committee, that the parliamentary draftsmen could and should do better than that. Paragraph 4(2) as currently drafted defies the need for legal certainty. The Bill should set out which provisions of the workers regulation will cease to apply.

The Minister promised to look at this matter, and she indicated that she would discuss it with me. Faithful to her word, as she always is, she has discussed the matter with me—for which I am very grateful—and has now tabled Amendment 32A, which satisfactorily addresses the point. I am very grateful to her. Amendment 33 addresses a similar problem, but sadly it has not received a favourable response from the Minister.

Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 1 tells us that

“EU-derived rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures cease to be recognised and available in domestic law”

in two circumstances—that is if

“they are inconsistent with, or … capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of,”

a provision of the Immigration Acts, or if

“they are otherwise capable of affecting the exercise of functions in connection with immigration.”

I simply do not understand how advisers on immigration law, far less those individuals who are the subject of immigration law, are supposed to work out what their legal rights and obligations are. Legal certainty requires, in my view, that the schedule should set out those EU-derived rights et cetera which are disapplied, or those which are retained. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, criticised the legal uncertainty in our 11th report of this Session published on 2 September.

I think the only answer the Minister could possibly give to the concern I have identified about legal certainty is that Ministers and parliamentary draftsmen do not now know which provisions of EU law survive and which do not. That rather makes my point, I think. However, I do not intend to divide the House on this matter, troubling though it is. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, my name is attached to the noble Lord’s Amendments 32 and 33 because they address two long-standing concerns of the Constitution Committee. The first is the broad and unjustified use of Henry VIII powers. The second is the confusing and counterproductive complexity of immigration law, which we believe needs to be clear and consolidated. That is why I support these amendments. I welcome the fact that the Government have addressed the first of these issues by tabling Amendment 32A, which makes more specific the scope of the power, confining it, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, to Articles 2 to 10 of the workers regulations.

I would have welcomed a similar willingness to move on the issues that the Constitution Committee has raised in relation to paragraph 6 of Schedule 1, which nullifies EU-derived rights and remedies. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has quoted some parts of paragraph 6 and they are really extraordinary: rights should disappear because

“they are inconsistent with, or are otherwise capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of, any provision made by or under the Immigration Acts”

and, even stranger, because they are

“otherwise capable of affecting the exercise of functions in connection with immigration.”

I can think of all sorts of functions that people might consider were “in connection” with immigration, but we really need laws that are clearer than that.

Adrian Berry, chair of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, said when he gave evidence to us:

“How is the ordinary person, never mind the legislator, to know whether the law is good or not in a particular area if you draft like that?”


I know that parliamentary draftsmen have had a pretty heavy diet of work lately, not least with Covid-19 orders, but it is possible to do better than that, unless the instructions given to them were so unspecific as to leave things so wide open that they had to draft the legislation in that extraordinary way.

Paragraph 69 of the Explanatory Notes tries to explain why this is necessary, but fails to do so—at least I find it completely unpersuasive. I did learn a little more about Chen carers than I knew previously, which was almost nothing. I am sure that my noble friend Lady Hamwee thinks of little else at some stages of the Bill than the quite obscure provision that resulted from the Chen case before the European Court of Justice. However, I certainly found the argument unpersuasive.

The committee says:

“The statute book requires clarity rather than obscurity and provisions such as these threaten to frustrate essential ingredients of the rule of law.”


An essential ingredient of the rule of law is that it is on record and visible and capable of being understood, particularly by those who practice it professionally, but preferably by a wider range of people as well, including those who may face either a penalty or, in this case, the inability to have a right to which they believe they are entitled as a consequence of wording as vague as this.

There is still time to improve this: the Minister could come back at Third Reading with an amendment that makes clear the purpose of this paragraph, and I am only sorry that she has not done so thus far.

--- Later in debate ---

I understand the intent of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the objective that lies behind his amendments, but I hope that Amendment 32A has gone some way to clarifying the effect of paragraph 4. I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

I thank the Minister, certainly for government Amendment 32A, which deals with the concern that we have expressed in Amendment 32. However, the Minister’s attempt to defend paragraph 6(1) of the schedule is, I am afraid, wholly unconvincing. Her observations do not provide me with any useful clarification as to how the paragraph is going to apply. As the Minister has said, there are too many provisions and the position is too uncertain, and therefore the legislation cannot list the provisions. What she is suggesting, as I said in my opening remarks, is that the position is too uncertain for clarification, but the inevitable consequence is that the position is too uncertain for those who are advising immigrants and for immigrants themselves. They cannot possibly know with certainty how this provision will apply. I should respectfully warn the Minister that, if and when paragraph 6(1) is the subject of litigation in individual cases, the Government may well find that the courts will adopt a very unsympathetic approach to it and will give it the narrowest possible interpretation because it is so lacking in certainty. That is the real risk that the Government are running.

I have never seen a provision like paragraph 6(1) before in legislation—that is, a provision that depends on whether something is capable of affecting the exercise of functions—and I hope never to see such a provision in legislation again. I shall regard it as one of the increasing number of undesirable consequences of the decision to leave the EU and as setting no precedent for any other legislative content. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 32 withdrawn.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 30th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I moved Amendments 4 and 5 in Committee; they are amendments to what the Public Law Project called the “breathtakingly wide” powers proposed to be given to the Secretary of State. It is ironic that when elsewhere negotiations are going on—or maybe not going on—regarding the sovereignty of the UK Parliament, we are being faced with exercising our sovereignty in order to pass it back to the Executive.

Amendment 4 would substitute in Clause 4, which is about regulation-making powers, the word “necessary” for “appropriate”. Amendment 5 would take out the ability for the Secretary of State to make regulations “in connection with” anything in Part 1. Taken together, these terms give the Executive huge latitude. I am glad that the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser, Lord Pannick and Lord Alton, have been added to my amendments. The clause would read, “such provision as the Secretary of State considers necessary in consequence of any provision” of Part 1.

The amendments follow the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, a member of which, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, made a very balanced speech at the last stage of the Bill. She acknowledged, as I do, that consequential amendments through means of secondary legislation are generally needed—although, as she said, when they can be they are to be put in the Bill, with regulations then used for tidying up. But as the breadth and number of amendments in Committee showed—that is, amendments to the Bill —a huge number of topics can fairly be said to be connected with Part 1. Those topics were all approved by the clerks to the House as being within scope of the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, chair of the DPRR Committee, said that he spoke in sorrow, rather than being vicious, about its reported criticisms or concerns about the clause. I think we are entitled to expect more of the Government—and this is not vicious, but many degrees up from sorrowful—than the defence that:

“There are clear constraints on the use of the power in Clause 4. It can be used only to make regulations that amend primary or secondary legislation ‘in consequence of, or in connection with’ Part 1”.


That is exactly what we object to. I had forgotten to comment on the offensive—and I say that deliberately—power to amend primary legislation through regulations. The Government’s reply to the committee’s report included the Minister again asking your Lordships to consider the illustrative draft of the regulations which, shortly before the last stage, had been circulated, and to

“take comfort that this power is specifically to deliver the end of free movement”.—[Official Report, 7/9/20; col. 641.]

That is also relied on in the long letter from the Home Office, which I received at lunchtime today—and I dare say that the timing was similar for other noble Lords. I have to confess that I have not been able to get my head around quite all of it.

The draft regulations referred to are, frankly, fiendishly complicated, and are causing a lot of anxiety both as to the extent they are understood—especially as to any omissions—and to the extent they are not understood. But whatever they are like, we have nothing that we can look to as an assurance that there will not be more regulations. The “lawyers”, I am told, are engaged in an exhaustive process of analysing this draft. It may bore others as much as it does me to say it, but whatever the intentions of this Government and this Minister today, that would not matter one jot tomorrow in terms of curbing the power in Clause 4. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I agree, as I usually do, with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. She mentioned the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. There was also a report on this subject by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. We issued a report on 2 September, our 11th report of the session. At paragraph 22, we said:

“We agree with the conclusions of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee about the powers in clause 4. A Henry VIII clause that is subject to such a permissive test as ‘appropriateness’, and which may be used to do anything ‘in connection with’ in relation to so broad and important an issue as free movement, is constitutionally unacceptable. Such vague and subjective language undermine fundamental elements of the rule of law.”


That is the view of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, in a unanimous report from Members from around the House. I am very disappointed that the Government have been so far unwilling to engage with that advice—and certainly to accept it.

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee noted, in paragraphs 18 to 19 of its excellent report, the exceptional breadth of Clause 4(1). What it does is empower the Secretary of State not merely to make regulations “in consequence of” this legislation but “in connection with” this legislation. As the committee explained, that would confer on Ministers the power to make whatever regulations they think appropriate, provided they have some connection with the legislation, “however tenuous”. Given the exceptional breadth of the delegated powers in Clause 4, I also support Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which would impose a sunset clause on these powers.

I have one further point. This Bill is far from unique in seeking to confer excessively broad powers on Ministers. The Constitution Committee has repeatedly drawn attention to the need for effective limits on delegated legislation, to ensure ministerial accountability to Parliament. I am pleased that Members of the House of Commons, in the last few days, have begun to recognise the dangers of such legislation, not least because, when regulations are brought forward, they are unamendable. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee has regularly made this point in reports over the last few years. The unacceptable breadth of provisions such as Clause 4 in the Bill is, I regret to say, typical of a Government who, too often, see Parliament as an inconvenience rather than the constitutional authority to which the Government are accountable.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, first of all, I would like to apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for missing, in these rather disrupted circumstances, the very beginning of her speech today. But I am very pleased to be able to support her amendment and the others that are grouped with it.

In Committee, we had a discussion about some of the powers contained in this Bill, and I am pleased to be a signatory to Amendment 4. But I would also like to support Amendment 5 and, for the reasons my noble friend Lord Pannick has just advanced, Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which is about a sunset clause. Amendment 5 seeks to narrow the powers of the Secretary of State, and in a way that is at the heart also of Amendment 4, which is what I want to address this afternoon.

All these amendments seek to rein in some of the powers which Ministers are taking. It is a particular pleasure to be able to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lord Pannick. He referred to the Constitution Committee and its work, and I entirely agree that the substitution of the word “necessary” for “appropriate” places a higher threshold into the Bill—but you might wonder why on earth we would be spending so much time on just two words. Why does that really matter?

Yesterday in Grand Committee, in the context of the Trade Bill, I questioned, yet again, the Government’s overuse of secondary legislation and their unconvincing assertion that this amounts to effective parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. I recall that the last time the House of Commons failed to pass an affirmative action Motion was in 1978, the year before I was elected to the House of Commons. The chairman of the 1922 Committee, Sir Graham Brady, has rightly warned of the dangers of the Government taking a whole range of powers that effectively neuter due parliamentary process, and I agree with him.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 7th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, that was indeed a passionate speech.

When I was a first-year law student at Hertford College, Oxford, we learned that apparently the Roman Emperor Caligula ordered that laws should be displayed in small letters as high up as possible to make it difficult for people to know their legal rights and obligations. Amendment 3 focuses attention on an extraordinary provision in this Bill—paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 1—which, if enacted, will make it impossible for people today to understand their legal rights and obligations.

Paragraph 4 is concerned with the EU regulation on free movement of workers. Paragraph 4(1) is a model of clarity; it says that Article 1 of the regulation “is omitted”. However, paragraph 4(2) displays the parliamentary draftsman at his or her most coy. It is so extraordinary that it must be read out:

“The other provisions of the Workers Regulation cease to apply so far as—


(a) they are inconsistent with any provision made by or under the Immigration Acts (including, and as amended by, this Act), or


(b) they are otherwise capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation of any such provision.”


It is simply not acceptable that when people want to know whether a provision of an EU regulation continues to apply, they must ask themselves whether the provision is

“capable of affecting the interpretation, application or operation"

of a provision of the immigration Acts. This is drafting so opaque that it puts a brick wall between the individual and the law which applies to him or her. It is drafting so lazy that it is comatose. The same woeful drafting technique also appears in paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 1, a provision addressed in Amendments 4 and 5 in this group tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which I support. If the Government want to ensure that provisions of a regulation cease to apply, they should say so with clarity.

Amendment 3 is in my name, and in the names of two other members of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, our chair, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith. The Constitution Committee’s report, published last week, drew attention to paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 1 as unacceptably vague and inevitably productive of legal uncertainty. We quoted the evidence given to the Commons Public Bill Committee by Adrian Berry, the barrister chair of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association. He said of this provision:

“You need to make better laws. Make it certain and put on the face of the Bill those things that you think are going to be disapplied because they are inconsistent with immigration provisions.”—[Official Report, Commons, Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill Committee, 9/6/20; col. 52.]


I agree. Basic standards of legislative drafting need to be upheld. Paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 1 is way below what is acceptable. I can think of no precedent for such a provision.

I hope that the Minister says that she understands the objection to this provision and that she will bring forward a suitable amendment on Report. I give due warning that if the Government do not address this concern, and if other noble Lords share my concern, I will return to this topic on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, we did vote to leave the EU, and I do not think anyone can be in any doubt about some of the reasons. People voted for a variety of reasons, but the noble Baroness will totally understand that I am not going to get into a debate about why people did or did not want to leave the EU. I will leave it there.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her careful response to Amendment 3. It was very thoughtful—not a response off the top of her head. I am also grateful for the offer of a meeting, which I will happily take up.

The Minister gave an example of a provision in the regulations that she said was inconsistent with the immigration Acts. I accept that there may well be many such provisions. My point is very simple: spell them out in Schedule 1. Do not use this vague language of drafting which means that people cannot identify what their rights and obligations are. My amendment is not designed to keep or remove any particular right; it is simply designed to require the Government to instruct the parliamentary draftsman to produce a provision that implies basic standards of legal certainty. I hope the Minister has noted the substantial concern around the House at this lack of certainty in the drafting of Schedule 1. It is simply not good enough and it needs to be addressed. I look forward to discussing this with the Minister prior to Report.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I totally understand the point that the noble Lord makes about certainty. In addressing this, I should like to meet him, because I totally get what he is saying. He is not being difficult; he is just asking that we lay out the law and provide certainty.