Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Taken together, these amendments would introduce basic, evidence-based safeguards. They are about ensuring that youth diversion orders, if they are to exist, are tailored, workable and fair to the child. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will press her amendment to a vote, because I strongly support it. I would like to force a vote on mine as well but, obviously, the House is going to be very tired by the end of this Bill, so I will not—she said bitterly.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am saddened by the attack from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on the Ministers, because they have sat through hours of debate on the Bill and listened most patiently. I have not always agreed with them, but they have responded with the utmost courtesy. They should be thanked, rather than criticised, for their efforts.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their amendments in this group. We accept the Minister’s amendments, which seem entirely reasonable.

I appreciate the sentiments behind the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. However, we believe that they are somewhat misguided. Youth diversion orders, whatever one may think of them, will be implemented as a means of dealing with some of the most serious offences committed by people of the age of criminal responsibility. We should not be making concessions to people who have committed or intend to commit terrorism offences. We believe that engaging in these acts forfeits any right to the conditions of the noble Baroness’s Amendment 409H as a primary consideration.

Similarly, regarding Amendment 409J, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I entirely understand and acknowledge the issue she is trying to grapple with. Our position, however, is simple: court proceedings should be carried out in the language of the land. That said, the Government do offer translation services, and I ask the Minister to set out measures that are already in place to ensure that offenders understand orders that are made by the courts.

Turning to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, youth diversion orders must be underpinned by the principle of proportionality. Amendment 417A would ensure that they are being used in this expected manner. We particularly support the intention behind Amendment 409G—that youth diversion orders will be a serious step to take, and that ensuring that multi-agency evidence backs up the decision to issue an order is therefore incredibly important. Similarly, the sharing of data on terrorists and terrorism networks is becoming an increasingly urgent need. Any step that improves the efficiency of the sourcing and sharing of information between authorities is welcome, so we also support this amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

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In some ways I can see the problem. I do not know that this amendment will tackle it. It could bring into scope a whole range of activities that are superficially offensive, and undoubtedly hurtful to anyone who has been a victim of terrorism, but mean that we do not do what we need to do, which is a much harder job—have these arguments out in public regularly and call it out, as it were. Arresting them and carting them away just turns them into a new kind of martyr, in my mind, and we do not want to give anything to their martyr status. I can see the aim, but I do not think this is the method.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, my answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is that this amendment is not going to solve all problems in this area, but it is going to make a significant contribution. She is concerned about hard cases, and she identifies some of the possible hard cases. My answer to that is that the CPS will prosecute only in a case where it believes there is a more than 50% chance of a conviction and it is in the public interest. Many of the examples that she gives are most unlikely to satisfy those criteria.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, if noble Lords in this House do not believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, is giving the answer to a problem that is a reality within our society, then I hope that the Minister, if he is not accepting this, will tell us what the answer is. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about going into the campuses and talking to these young people. You will never shame the likes of Gerry Adams, so just trying to talk them away is not going to solve the problem.

I am speaking for those in Northern Ireland who went through 30 years of terrorism. Every day you went out, your loved one went to the gate and watched you get into the car, believing it was the last time they would see you. Society cannot live under that. It should not be asked to live under that. Therefore, if the Minister says this is not the answer to the problem, I respectfully ask him to give us the answer and not close his eyes to reality. We have to deal with it, and we need to deal with it now.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the two amendments in my name. Like many noble Lords, I was surprised by the decision of the High Court that the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was unlawful, in view of her detailed description of its terrorist activities in her House of Commons Statement on 23 June 2025.

In reading the High Court judgment, I was struck by the inconsistency of the arguments of the learned judges. At the beginning of the judgment, they set out the details of Palestine Action’s Underground Manual, which is standard textbook terrorist stuff: guidance to form small autonomous secret cells and to recruit only trusted participants. Then there is operational terrorist tradecraft: instructions to use secure email and VPNs, to conduct reconnaissance, and to pick targets based on complicity with the Israeli arms industry. It then has a section on targeting and tactics, with lists of defence firms, universities, financial firms and government buildings, and practical advice aimed at serious property damage to disrupt those targets.

The court then concludes that proscribing the organisation was “disproportionate” and that the Home Secretary did not follow her own policy, even though it said that

“the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety”.

I submit that the Home Secretary must have the absolute right to proscribe an organisation based on the advice that she has received from our advisory bodies.

In coming to her decision, the Home Secretary sought copious advice on the terrorist nature of Palestine Action. As all noble Lords know, the Home Office and the FCDO do not proscribe organisations willy-nilly. We all complained about their failure to proscribe the IRGC. The Home Secretary had reports from a proscription review group, a cross-departmental group including counterterrorism policing, which encompasses specialist police officers from many police forces. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the CTP gave their reports.

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre produced its assessment. JTAC comprises counterterrorism experts from United Kingdom intelligence agencies, police forces and government departments. Its report is very significant and was summarised as having concluded:

“Although most of its activity could not be classified as terrorism within the definition in Section 1 of the 2000 Act … Palestine Action had ‘commit[ted] or participate[d] in acts of terrorism to the extent of the attacks at Thales, Glasgow … at Instro Precision (a subsidiary of Elbit) in Kent … and at Elbit in Bristol … JTAC noted that those participating in the Bristol attack had ‘entered the [Elbit] warehouse, using weapons including sledgehammers, axes and whips’ and ‘during the attack two responding police officers and a security guard were assaulted and suffered injuries. One police officer had been assaulted with a sledgehammer and sustained a serious back injury’.


JTAC noted that Palestine Action had cleverly issued videos of the damage to property but not its violence against the responders.

We now come to the crucial question of proportionality. From reading the evidence, I am certain that the Home Secretary’s proscription of Palestine Action was lawful and proportionate, and a necessary response to an escalating campaign that threatened critical national infrastructure. The statutory test, the court admits, was satisfied. Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 permits proscription where an organisation

“commits or participates in acts of terrorism … prepares for terrorism … promotes or encourages terrorism, or … is otherwise concerned in terrorism”.

The Home Secretary concluded that Palestine Action met that test and laid an order, which was approved by both Houses of Parliament.

Operational intelligence supported that decision. The JTAC assessment concluded that the group had conducted incidents resulting in serious property damage and that the Underground Manual provides

“practical advice and advocates for serious property damage”.

That assessment links the manual and the recorded actions to the statutory definition of property damage designed to influence government. The High Court judgment itself accepted that three of Palestine Action’s activities amounted to terrorist offences, which strengthens the factual basis for proscription.

The proscription was proportionate because of the severity and escalation of conduct. The pattern of over 300 direct actions with increasing frequency and severity, including attacks on defence suppliers and critical infrastructure, supports a conclusion that ordinary criminal law and targeted prosecutions were insufficient to address the systemic risk. It was proportionate because of the targeting of national security supply chains. Where actions against defence firms and related infrastructure create heightened national security risks, proscription is a legitimate, proportionate tool to protect those interests where the conduct is political and aimed at influence.

Proscription was also proportionate because policy and process safeguards were engaged. The Home Office relied on PRG and JTAC operational inputs and then laid the order before Parliament—steps that reflect the five policy safeguards that the Secretary of State must consider after concluding that it satisfies the terrorism test: the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities, the threat to the UK, its presence in UK, and the threat to British nationals overseas.

Of course proscription interferes with Article 10 and 11 rights to peaceful free association and expression, but it is narrowly aimed at an organisation which has been shown to promote or prepare acts meeting the statutory terrorism definition. Where evidence shows a real risk to infrastructure, violence and public safety, the interference with Article 10 and 11 rights is justified and necessary in a democratic society. Indeed, the court said:

“We do not consider that the proscription of Palestine Action is likely to result in any general impact on expressions of support for the Palestinian cause or even opposition to Elbit. This provides some support for a conclusion that the proscription was proportionate”.


Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Home Secretary was in breach of convention rights because there might be some supporters of Palestine Action who are not advocating destruction and violence but general support for the organisation. However, if these people want to protest about Israel or Gaza or anything else, then they can do so, but not under the umbrella of an organisation advocating violence and damage and terrorism.

The court went on to say:

“Real weight must attach to the fact that Palestine Action has organised and undertaken actions amounting to terrorism as defined at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act. Those actions are small in number but they are still significant and it is also significant that these actions have happened in the United Kingdom … It is significant that Palestine Action has not suggested that its actions that have been assessed to comprise terrorism were either a mistake or an aberration”.


Indeed, Palestine Action has lauded those who took part in the actions.

The court said:

“It is, further, significant that the contents of the Underground Manual provide good evidence of Palestine Action’s continuing intention to promote the use of violence regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public”.


Let me just repeat that last sentence. The court concluded that Palestine Action intends to continue with terrorist activities

“to promote the use of violence, regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public”.

But then the court makes an extraordinary statement:

“Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was disproportionate. At its core, Palestine Action is an organisation that promotes its political cause through criminality and encouragement of criminality. A very small number of its actions have amounted to terrorist action within the definition at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act”.


So that is all right, then. The court has decided that three terrorist actions were not enough to justify the Home Secretary’s decision. How many does it want? Five actions, 10 actions, 15 terrorist actions, or to wait until persons—innocent people—are killed?

The Home Secretary has a duty to protect the public, not the court, and she should not be second-guessed in this way on the facts when there is clear evidence of terrorist activity. Even if it is only three serious incidents, there was the danger of escalation. The court said:

“When striking the balance between issues such as these, the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety”.


I agree about the latitude and my Amendment 422 seeks to ensure that only the Secretary of State can make that judgment based on the advice of all the anti-terrorist organisations at her disposal, and at her own discretion. She is the one who answers to Parliament, to us, on the rightness and wrongness of her decision. My Amendment 422 seeks to ensure that supporters of any proscribed group who were arrested after that group was proscribed and before it was de-proscribed can be prosecuted for such an offence.

Of course, my amendments will be technically flawed, and my noble friend on the Front Bench will object on principle, with perhaps good reason, but I believe the concept is right. I hope that the Minister will bring forward an amendment at Third Reading to implement what I am advocating here. If he will not, will he tell the House what he proposes to do to reverse this perverse decision?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I remind the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the House, that the judgment in Palestine Action to which he objects is under appeal and the Court of Appeal, in due course, will pronounce on the wisdom or otherwise of the High Court decision and the legality of the Home Secretary’s decision. These criticisms, with some of which I certainly agree, are premature. What matters is not what the noble Lord thinks or what I think, but what the Court of Appeal says and, if necessary, what the Supreme Court says on such an important matter.

In any event, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who is a noted constitutionalist, that it is in principle wrong to seek to remove the power of the courts to assess the legality of judgments of the Home Secretary. Surely, it is a very valuable protection of the rule of law in this country that the courts pronounce on legality and Parliament does not remove the power of the courts to do so.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I have no objection to the court pronouncing on a point of law. However, on this occasion, it was not pronouncing on a point of law but making a judgment on the facts of the case and disagreeing with the Home Secretary on the facts.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am not defending the Divisional Court’s judgment, but it would say that it was intervening on a point of law, because a point of law covers whether the Secretary of State was lawfully entitled to form the conclusion that she did in the circumstances. However, as I say, this is all highly premature.