Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, it is fair to say that I am not keen on Chapter 4 of the Bill, which appears to allow the state to trample on and prevent the establishment of smaller funds, and, if necessary, requires their assets to be moved, presumably to another fund. “Squashing new entrants” was the telling phrase used by my noble friend Lady Noakes. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to provide some reassurance.

I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes and have added my name to most of them. It is essential to permit the regulations to be pro- competitive rather than over-exclusionary, and for the review required by Clause 43—the timing of which we are yet to hear about—to consider the competitive landscape for pension scheme provision.

It is also important that the regulations made encourage innovation, as Amendment 170 would. The substantial £25 billion minimum provided for in the Government’s reforms seems set to deter such innovation—innovation that is characteristic of smaller, growing operators. We have heard that, at length, on several days, but we have not yet received an adequate answer. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has already raised some good points about other risks that may arise from the proposed arrangements.

My noble friend Lady Noakes rightly suggested that the Pensions Regulator should be made to consider the competitiveness of new entries. I share her praise for the fintech sandbox, although I would say that that was a long time ago—indeed, when I was a Treasury Minister about 10 years ago. I am, however, less sure about the FCA’s overall success. I have therefore added my name to my noble friend Lord Younger’s stand-part notice, which questions the need for Clause 45. The Government’s Explanatory Notes are far from helpful and the implications of this clause are unclear. Why does it extend the FCA’s supervisory jurisdiction to default arrangements under Chapter 4? What, if any, new delegated powers are being given to it?

I have encountered a lot of problems with the FCA over the years. The truth is that I have not found it business or fund-friendly. It presents itself as the champion of the consumer, but adds cost, delay, bureaucracy and uncertainty in a way that often raises prices and returns to the very consumer that it was set up to protect. I am therefore of the view that its role should be minor and constrained. What is the background and rationale for this clause? We need to know more if we are going to support it.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank everyone for their contributions. It might take 300 years to get it right, but we do not have 300 years; we are trying to get it right in the course of a few meetings, as the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, pointed out. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, gave us the view from the coalface with regard to the decisions that trustees have to take and about trustees working on behalf of their members. The key concern, which is why I support these amendments, is that the default should be shaped around members’ needs and outcomes, not regulatory convenience or market consolidation by default.

The amendments in this group emphasise the importance of competition, innovation and transparency. They highlight the need for clear member communication before defaults are subject to mandation, for a value-for-money framework to be in place first and, I am afraid, for Ministers to justify why mandation is limited to automatic enrolment defaults. The amendments seek to put some meat on to what this Bill is meant to do. They are, I think, necessary to make sense of the precautions that are needed if this Bill goes forward.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I hope that the Committee will think that it makes sense if I begin with the four amendments in this group tabled in my name. I start with our probing stand-part question on Clause 45. This is a short clause, but an important one. It makes changes to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The purpose of the question is simply to understand the practical effect of those changes, particularly in the context of the wider programme of consolidation and reform of assimilated European Union law.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who I am pleased to say is in her place and has spoken so eloquently, may feel a certain sense of déjà vu, having spent a considerable time on the Front Bench examining precisely these issues. My questions to the Minister are therefore straightforward. What, in practical terms, does Clause 45 change in the operation of the Act?

I start with some fairly basic questions for clarification. Will further secondary legislation be required to give effect to these provisions? If so, do the Government have a timetable over which they envisage this process taking place? How does this clause interact with the statutory instruments recently considered by the Grand Committee as part of the wider reform programme? This is a live and important area. As assimilated European Union law becomes domestic law and increasingly interacts with our financial institutions, the FCA and other relevant regulators, it is essential that Parliament has clarity on how these changes fit together and where accountability lies.

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There should have to be quite a high likelihood that members and others will be better off after changes. I am very sceptical about providers being able to make unilateral changes; there needs to have some evidence behind that. My amendment uses the phrase “there is evidence”, which does not mean that you have to have 100% evidence on one side of it, but it cannot just be a matter of convenience—a matter that it is easier for the providers—and therefore it is bound to be easier for the members and the scheme as a whole. That is quite simple and it needs investigating. I hope that, if the best interests test is to stay there, the Government will ensure that a high standard has to be passed, not one that is a minority standard.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I have just a short comment. The Minister needs to explain why existing protections are insufficient and how this power will be constrained in practice. The concern is that lowering the evidential bar for intervention risks undermining legal certainty, which we have before intervention, and then trust in the scheme governance. An override of contractual terms should be firmly evidence-based and used sparingly. When there is a contract and we are saying that the contract could be overridden, we need to know with some facts in what circumstances it can be overridden for some wider purpose which the Government think is needed. I do not think that is proven as yet.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I speak briefly to Amendment 175, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. This amendment relates to new Section 117D, the best interests test as set out in Clause 48. This new section establishes the test that must be satisfied before a unilateral change can be made. It requires a provider to reasonably conclude that such a change is reasonably likely to lead to

“a better outcome for the directly affected members … (taken as a whole)”

and to

“no worse an outcome for the other members of the scheme”,

also taken as a whole.

Many of the questions that my noble friend and the noble Baroness have raised reflect concerns that have been put to us during scrutiny of the Bill. In particular, there remains uncertainty about what, in practice, is meant by a better outcome, and how that judgment will be assessed, evidenced and challenged. I say again, as we have said on different parts of the Bill, that we believe we need definitions and clarity.

We will listen carefully to the Minister’s response on this point. The clarity and robustness of the best interests test are critical, particularly where changes may occur without the explicit consent of individual members. If that clarity is not forthcoming, this may well be an issue to which we will need to return.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

Once again, I find myself in the position of being in broadly the same area as the noble Lord, Lord Fuller. I agree with much of what he said. We can always be in favour of reviews. The only substantial objection is that the Secretary of State—or more accurately, the hard-pressed officials—has better things to do, particularly with having to implement the Bill when it is an Act.

The Pensions Commission is also crucial. The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for whom I have a lot of respect, challenged me on why I am not doing more on adequacy, in effect. Of course, the answer is that I fully support the Pensions Commission; that is where the focus should be on that area. I think my noble friend the Minister is aware of some of my views on the level of inadequacy in pension provision, but the commission is where it should be at.

Pensions are inherently political. I make no apology for making political points. I am against the idea of moving towards a joint regulator. There are two broad types of pension provision: individual contracts and employer-sponsored collective provision. I am very much in favour of the latter as opposed to the former. The former has, and always will have, severe problems, whereas collective provision is what has led the high standard of private provision across, broadly, half of the working population.

The problem with having a single regulator is essentially cultural. One or the other approach is bound to predominate in its thinking. It is impossible to ride two horses, unless you are in a circus, and that is not where we want to be. We need a regulator for collective employer-sponsored provision, and a regulator for market-based provision. That is what we have got so, in a sense, in my few remarks I have already carried out the review that has been called for and reached a satisfactory solution.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, what worries me is that the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, says we should grab the challenge. I am not sure that I am ready to grab the challenge and not convinced that we should abandon, in any way, the Financial Conduct Authority. I wonder what representations have been made by the FCA on this. I would like to hear how the FCA feels about the Pensions Regulator taking over and what has happened in the past.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I can assure the noble Lord that the FCA will not give anything up. In fact, it would probably rather swallow the Pensions Regulator.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

Maybe that would be a good thing. I am not convinced that the regulator pushing away from primary legislation to regulation is necessarily the way forward. I am not convinced that what has happened to date has failed. Therefore, I am not sure why we want to change this without adequate proof. The idea that the FCA wants to swallow up everything else is fairly normal in the gladiatorial forum that we have. I would like to see what the FCA and others have to say about this before we make a final decision.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I speak to both Amendments 180A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Coffey, and Amendment 206, which stands in the name of my noble friend Viscount Younger of Leckie and myself. Both amendments address the regulation of pensions and how the regulation is best exercised in the interest of scheme members and future pensioners.

It was the intervention of my noble friend Lady Coffey at Second Reading that first prompted me to reflect more deeply on the role of regulators. As my noble friend argued then, and has argued again today in speaking to Amendment 180A, this Bill misses a significant structural opportunity by retaining two separate pension regulators. I agree with her. There is something inherently odd about the fact that very similar pension products can be treated differently depending on whether they fall within the remit of the Pensions Regulator or the Financial Conduct Authority. That observation is not controversial; it is simply a reflection of how the current system operates.

I recall clearly the passage of the then Pension Schemes Bill in February 2020 and remember responding to amendments from across your Lordships’ House by explaining that personal pension schemes were regulated by the FCA, rather than the Pensions Regulator, and that imposing requirements on personal pension providers through that legislation would risk creating a patchwork of overlapping regulatory oversight. Providers, it was argued, would otherwise be required to respond to two separate regulators in relation to the same activity. That was the Government’s position at the time, and it illustrates that the existence of regulatory fragmentation in this area is not a matter of dispute.

A great deal of work has gone into managing the fragmentation, with strategic documents, dating back to 2018, seeking to grapple with the issue. The FCA and the Pensions Regulator have published joint regulatory strategies explicitly acknowledging the complexity that arises where their remits intersect and the need for close co-ordination. More recently, an independent review of the Pensions Regulator in 2023 again highlighted the challenges inherent in this divided regulatory landscape. Taken together, these developments point to structural issues in the regulatory ecosystem that can, at the very least, create confusion and the risk of inconsistency.

It was on the basis of that experience in government and of careful consideration since then that I sought to identify what might realistically be done in this Bill. I came to the conclusion that Amendment 206 represents a proportionate and pragmatic compromise. It would require the Government to establish a formal published protocol setting out clearly how the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator co-ordinate, how responsibilities are divided between them and how they communicate when regulating the pensions industry. The evidence shows that there is complexity, overlap and, at times, confusion between the two regulators. Stakeholders frequently complain of unclear lines of responsibility and the regulators themselves openly acknowledge that co-ordination is difficult, hence the repeated reliance on joint strategies and informal arrangements.

It was our sense that the problem is one not of outright contradiction but of opacity, complexity and accountability. Amendment 206 is, therefore, carefully targeted at the problem, which is clearly evidenced. It seeks to improve co-ordination and clarity without asserting a level of regulatory failure that has not yet been conclusively demonstrated. That does not place it in opposition to the argument advanced by my noble friend Lady Coffey; indeed, I would be very happy to work with her, as we did so constructively on previous pension legislation, to strengthen this area further.

In my view, a formal co-ordination protocol has three important virtues. First, it can evolve over time as the regulatory landscape changes. Secondly, it can be tightened if problems persist or new risks emerge. Thirdly, it can itself become the evidence base for any future decision to pursue more fundamental consolidation of regulatory functions, should that ultimately be judged necessary. For those reasons, I commend Amendment 206 to the Committee and urge the Government to see it not as an obstacle but as a constructive and proportionate step towards greater clarity, accountability and confidence in the regulation of pensions.

Child Poverty: Faith-based and Voluntary Sector Organisations

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for a great question. I agree with her point that the role of cultural organisations and the opportunity to participate and engage with others to do collective action in different ways are crucial to children’s development—and often those are the kinds of opportunities that children from wealthier families have that others would not. In response to the specifics, Sunderland being very near to Durham, I would be delighted to learn more about what is happening there. I need to go and find out. My office can take note.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply about how the charities will work, but what worries me is how small, local charities will be included in this. It rather looks as if we are encouraging the larger charities to do all the good work that they do but, as the other questioners said, there are a lot of local charities. I would like to know that they are going to be included in this process.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

That is a great question, if I may say so—there are some good questions coming out today. We absolutely are not interested in talking solely to large charities. We are interested in talking to them too, but we need to engage locally. As I am sure the noble Lord knows, one way that this Government are going about our work in the DWP is that we are devolving quite a lot. We are aware that much of the work we want to do can be done much better at a local level. For example, it is much clearer in Manchester than it is in London what should happen in Greater Manchester. So we are devolving and encouraging local organisations in many of the pilots that we are running to engage with local charities, but we will also often engage with organisations that themselves are umbrellas, which can bring together local charities to come and talk to us.

The noble Lord makes a really important point. Having worked in the voluntary sector myself for a long time, I know that there are some insights that national charities give that are really helpful, but other things you find out only when you go to the coalface. Just last week I visited a small charity in Fife that is doing amazing work, and I learned things from it that I would not have learned from the biggest charity. So that is a good point, and I take it on.

Two-child Benefit Cap: Foreign-born Children

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My noble friend is so right. The cost of failing to tackle poverty is too high—for those children but also for our country. Hungry children do not arrive at school ready to learn. Poorer children are more likely to have mental health difficulties by the age of 11. They are more likely to have poorer employment outcomes and earn less. She is absolutely right: the rise in child poverty in England between 2015 and 2020 is estimated to have led to 10,000 more children entering our care system, with all the consequences for those children, as well as for the country and for the Exchequer. A child’s health opportunities and prospects should not be determined by how many siblings they have or by the accident of their circumstances. We will lift children out of poverty and this country will benefit from that.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that answer. To follow on from that—to get to the crux of the matter—could she tell us what assessment has been made of the cap’s overall effect on child poverty? Can she clarify and put on the record what the actual effect was and how we can benefit by the removal of the cap?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right about the effects of this. The Labour Party in government pledged to tackle child poverty. What this Government have brought forward is a child poverty strategy which, including removing the two-child limit, will bring another 550,000 children out of poverty by the end of this Parliament. That is what we are here to do; that is what we are shooting for.

I stress that this is about fairness. Of course, our benefit system is there to support those for whom this is their home; those who contribute. Of course it is there to be fair, but it is also there as a safety net, and our job is to get that balance right. In the case of children, it surely has to be right to tackle child poverty, to give them the opportunity and for the country to benefit from that.

Women’s State Pension Age Communication: PHSO Report

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, but it does not, in my view, completely address directly the issue that lies at the heart of the anger felt by many WASPI women. I am assured that the maladministration identified by the ombudsman, and the associated question of a financial remedy, arose from decisions taken under a Labour Government that were the responsibility of Labour Ministers. In the years that followed, there was notable and sustained support from Labour Members for the WASPI campaign, including calls for compensation, voiced by individuals who now occupy the most senior positions in government.

Now that Labour is in power, that position appears to have been abandoned. The result is not merely disappointment, but a profound sense of betrayal. It is no wonder that WASPI women are furious. At no point in the Oral Statement, as far as I can see or understand, was this reversal acknowledged. Instead, attention was diverted towards general references to changes in the state pension age, which did nothing to address the specific findings of maladministration or the expectations that were so clearly raised.

There is a strong sense of frustration surrounding this issue, not only among Members of this House but, more importantly, among the WASPI women. Much of that frustration arises not simply from the substance of the decision but from the manner in which it has been handled and communicated by the Government. From welfare reform to the winter fuel payment, and now this, a pattern has emerged of poor communication and delayed decision-making. Too often, it is not the policy itself that causes the greatest anger but the uncertainty, delay and lack of clarity that surround it. Indecision is itself a decision. In this case, it has meant leaving people’s lives and expectations suspended for months.

In recent months, expectations appear to have been raised only to be lowered again. Following the ombudsman’s report, many campaigners believed that a different outcome was genuinely under consideration, only to be told once more that nothing had changed. The Minister will recall suggestions that decisions on this matter were left unresolved until after the general election in 2024. That is not entirely accurate. Statements made before the election set out the Government’s position with some clarity, which makes it legitimate for WASPI women to ask why more recent communications appeared to imply that the issue and situation remained open.

Against that background, can the Minister explain how the Government now intend to communicate their position clearly and directly to WASPI women? Will letters be issued setting out the decision and the reasons for it? If so, when and in what form will that communication take place? Given the strength of feeling among those affected, this must be treated with the gravity it deserves. More broadly, there is a sense that poor managerial experience has characterised the handling of this matter, further undermining trust.

That damage has been compounded by the contrast between earlier rhetoric and the position now being taken. The Deputy Prime Minister and the Justice Secretary spoke of a cliff edge facing WASPI women. The Foreign Secretary said she was fighting for a fair deal. The Chancellor said she wanted justice. The current Secretary of State for Work and Pensions publicly associated himself with MPs campaigning for a better outcome. Those who once stood beside them now appear, in their eyes, to have turned away.

I know that the Minister referred to pension credit and the importance of take-up, and I completely share that with her. I did my very best when I was in her position to make sure that we did everything we could to ensure that pension credit was taken up and increased. I am not sure if progress has stalled or whether there has been any improvement, so can the Minister clarify the position on take-up of pension credit and whether this can be used to placate some of these genuine WASPI women?

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing this Statement to the House. The Government say the WASPI women should have known about the changes. I am reminded of a quote from the book The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy:

“But the plans were on display … you found the notice, didn’t you? … It was on display in the bottom of a locked filing cabinet stuck in a disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying ‘Beware of the Leopard’”.


Another relevant quote from the same book said:

“All the planning charts and demolition orders have been on display at your local planning department in Alpha Centauri for 50 … years”.


The issue here is whether these women were communicated with adequately. Some 3.6 million WASPI women have been badly treated. They were given some hope; we have an ombudsman who made a recommendation to provide some justice and pay some compensation. Can the Minister say why this recommendation has been ignored? We have heard apologies but no compensation.

If you were a woman who knew that, at a certain age, you would receive a pension you probably did not give it another thought that the rules had changed. Of course, lots of announcements were made, and lots of letters were sent—sometimes belatedly, as the ombudsman said—but the truth is that the messages were not received or understood. The ombudsman has recommended compensation of £1,000 to £2,950 per person. I ask the Minister, very bluntly, why this recommendation has not been implemented. It is not a question of justice, but a reluctance to spend money on a group of people who cannot fight back.

Can the Minister take back to her colleagues in the department that there is a feeling—I hope—across this House that the WASPI have been maltreated and that the least they should expect is for the recommendation of the independent ombudsman to be put into effect? It is not enough, in my view, but it has come from the ombudsman, and I would like to hear what reasoning the Minister can give for ignoring this. I hope that she will take back to her colleagues in the other House and in the department the feelings of this House that the ombudsman’s decision should be honoured.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their questions. Last November, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions told Parliament that the Government would make a new decision in response to the ombudsman’s findings on state pension-age communications. That followed relevant evidence coming to light as part of legal proceedings challenging the original decision announced in December 2024. The Secretary of State has now concluded the process to make a new decision, and there is a copy of the Government’s full response in the Library.

We need to be clear as to exactly what the ombudsman did and did not investigate. The ombudsman did not investigate the decision, first taken in 1995, to equalise the state pension age nor to accelerate the increases. There are different views about the raising of the state pension age and about the decision of the coalition Government in 2011 to accelerate equalisation and the rise to the age of 66. However, that is not the subject of the ombudsman’s decision. What the ombudsman investigated is how the change in state pension age was communicated to the women affected and whether, within a specific and narrow time period, there was maladministration and injustice, and if so, whether it warrants compensation. The ombudsman concluded that the department’s communications met expected standards between 1995 and 2004. However, it found that between 2005 and 2007 there was a 28-month delay in the DWP sending personalised letters to the women affected. The ombudsman found that this was maladministration. We accept that those individual letters could have been sent earlier and the Secretary of State has apologised for that. We also agree with the ombudsman that the women did not suffer any direct financial loss from the delay.

The question is about the impact of the delay in sending those letters. However, the evidence taken as a whole, including that from 2007, suggests that the majority of 1950s-born women would not have read and recalled the contents of an unsolicited pensions letter, even if it had been sent earlier. Further, the evidence also suggests that those less knowledgeable about pensions, the very women who most needed to engage with a letter and where it might have made a difference, were least likely to read it. An earlier letter would therefore have been unlikely to make a difference to what the majority of women knew about their own state pension age. Indeed, the 2007 report concluded that automatic pension forecast letters had only a negligible impact on pensions knowledge and planning and the department stopped sending them.

The evidence also shows that the vast majority of 1950s-born women already knew that the state pension age was increasing thanks to a wide range of public information, including in leaflets, through education campaigns, in GP surgeries, on TV and radio, in cinemas and online.

To compensate specifically only those women who suffered injustice would require a scheme that could reliably verify the individual circumstances of millions of women. That includes whether someone genuinely did not know the state pension age was changing and whether they would have read and remembered a letter from many years ago and acted differently. It would not be practical to set up a compensation scheme to assess conclusively the answers to those questions.

The alternative might be to introduce a targeted scheme, which we considered could possibly allow people to self-certify, but that could not be done in a way that was fair and represents value for money. Even if we asked women to self-certify that they experienced injustice, we would have no way of verifying it. As for a flat-rate scheme, it would cost up to £10.3 billion and would simply not be right or fair, given that it would be paid to the vast majority who were aware of the changes.

I fully recognise the strength of feeling on this issue. Many women born in the 1950s have experienced significant disadvantage, not least in the labour market. We will continue working towards equality for women in the workplace now and in future, and ensure that those with lower pension outcomes due to the inequalities they have faced in the past receive the right support. We are delivering support to low-income pensioners and pensioners more broadly by increasing the rate of the state pension, supporting the poorest through pension credit, and investing more money in the NHS to reduce waiting lists and to strengthen vital services.

For example, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, mentioned, our pension credit take-up campaign has been promoted to eligible pensioners and their friends and family. That is having a good effect and I would be very happy to talk more on that if noble Lords are interested. We are seeing significant numbers of increases in claims and awards, which is really helpful.

I turn to a couple of the other specific points that were mentioned. The noble Baroness challenged us as to why Labour in opposition took a different view. I will just say two things to her. The first is that she will appreciate, having been both in opposition and in government, that there is information that one has in government that one does not have when one is in opposition. We understand that many people are unhappy with what has happened. Although she is suggesting that it is entirely Labour’s fault, I suggest to her that quite a bit of the anger is about the rise in the state pension age and, in particular, the decision of the coalition Government to accelerate that in 2011, which meant a significant number of women finding that their state pension age went back more quickly than they had expected.

This decision is not about that; we need to separate the two things. We considered the ombudsman’s report very carefully, not just once but twice, and gave it due and proper process, including the information that Ministers were not able to see before they were in government. We concluded that it is right to apologise for the maladministration, but we believe that the decision we have taken on remedy and compensation is the right one.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that is the reason we made the decision. We accepted the ombudsman’s finding of maladministration. We did not accept the ombudsman’s approach to injustice for the reasons that I have explained about the impact of the not sending of those letters. The finding was narrowly about a 28-month delay. Because the evidence suggests that the majority of women were aware that the state pension age was changing, we do not accept that it is possible, on that basis, to construct a compensation scheme that would be targeted at those who experienced injustice.

The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, challenged me about the ombudsman. The ombudsman did their job, and the findings were fully and properly considered, but decisions on a compensation scheme of this scale are properly for Ministers and the Government to take. That is the case and, indeed, always will be.

This is a challenging issue, but it was right for the Secretary of State to review the evidence and to reach a decision based on due process and on the body of evidence. Looking forward to the future, we are taking important steps to support women in retirement to make sure that things like this do not happen again and to help them to build a better life for themselves and their families.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 26th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. As we know, this group addresses the use of scale, as measured by assets under management or monetary value, as a determinant of scheme quality.

The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, gave the example of the Orkney trust. I ask myself: what is the reason? Is it size? Personally, I think it is the calibre of the single malt whisky. Then we go to the other end of the country, to Guernsey. Is it because trusts are at the extremes of the country that causes the good benefits, or is it something else? You can always look for a reason: it could be size, location or anything else—or, indeed, the quality of the whisky.

We accept that scale can bring efficiencies, but there is a strong question over whether size alone is a reliable proxy for value. Amendments 91 and 95 recognise that some master trusts and group personal pension schemes deliver strong investment performance despite being below prescribed thresholds. Amendment 98 similarly acknowledges that innovation and specialism do not always depend on scale, location or whatever else.

We are also concerned about the rigidity of fixed monetary thresholds in the Bill. Amendments 99, 101, 106 and 108 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, are concerned about the rigidity of fixed monetary thresholds in the Bill. These amendments probe whether the figures chosen are evidence-based and future-proofed, or whether they risk being outdated—that is the point—as the market evolves. It is not cast in stone, and we should not try to see it as such.

Amendments 101, 104 and 108 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and others, raise an additional concern: the risk of mandating common investment strategies. Diversity of approach is a strength of a pension system. Forcing schemes into uniform strategies risks herding behaviour and systemic vulnerability. My question to the Minister is this: is the Government’s objective genuinely better member outcomes—which I believe we all want—or prioritising administrative simplicity at the expense of innovation, competition and resilience? All the amendments in this group tackle this problem, and those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, particularly stress that. I hope we will continue to push these through to the next stage of the debate on this Bill.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, today’s groups build directly on the issues explored in last Thursday’s debate. That discussion was both stimulating and constructive, and the contributions made, particularly on mandation, highlight the value of the scrutiny that this Bill continues to receive in Grand Committee. On this group, in the interests of brevity—I am sure that will please the whole Committee—I shall keep my remarks focused on the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. A number of significant and related issues have been raised by other noble Lords, and we will wish to return to these later today. We will listen carefully to the Minister’s response to the points made on this group.

Amendment 98 would introduce a clear and proportionate innovation exemption for relevant master trusts under Clause 40, so that schemes delivering genuinely specialist or innovative services are not automatically required to meet the scale threshold simply because of their size. We have been challenged today not to be obsessed with size. We recognise the policy aim of improving outcomes through scale. However, as I said, size is not always a reliable proxy for quality or value: there are master trusts that are smaller by design yet deliver strong member outcomes through innovation, whether in investment approach, governance or engagement with particular workforces. As the Bill is currently drafted, such schemes risk being forced to consolidate or exit, not because they are failing members but because they do not meet a blunt asset size test.

Amendment 98 provides a sensible alternative route, recognising that innovation and specialisation can also deliver high-quality outcomes. This amendment simply ensures that size alone is not determinative. I hope the Minister will see this as a constructive amendment that supports innovation and choice while remaining fully aligned with the Bill’s objective of improving outcomes for savers.

Amendment 102 is, again, a probing amendment. Clause 40 gives the Secretary of State the power to determine by regulations the method for calculating a master trust’s total assets for the purposes of this provision. That is a potentially significant power, because the way that total assets are defined and measured will determine which schemes fall within scope and which may benefit from exemptions.

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So I totally endorse the noble Baroness’s Amendment 97, and I wish more power to her elbow. I sense that this will be another of those themes that comes back on Report, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said. We will have to tease this through. I encourage the Minister to observe that all the party groups on this side of the Room are at one. As we go from Committee to Report, I hope she will consider a slight adjustment in the approach so that we can deliver a pensions Bill that works for members—because this one does not.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on having a group of nine amendments all on her own. We normally share groups rather than have them all on our own. This group considers how scale requirements interact with default pension arrangements where most savers remain invested. I have listened to the debate and, having spent a large part of my career in accountancy and advising clients, I know that the trouble is that the majority of clients are not expert enough to know what they should do with their pension. They seek advice from various organisations on what they should do. We should make sure that the quality of the advice they get suits their position in life. As other noble Lords have said, we are concerned about the overly rigid scale test, which could unintentionally narrow choice within defaults and push schemes towards one-size-fits-all designs.

Amendment 97 highlights the importance of allowing defaults that reflect members’ differing ages, health conditions, retirement plans and risk profiles. Amendments 97A to 101B probe—this is the point—whether the authority can take account of the combined value of assets across multiple default arrangements, rather than assessing each in isolation. Without this flexibility, schemes that offer well-designed cohort-based defaults could be penalised simply for tailoring provision.

Amendments 168A and 170A reinforce this point, seeking to ensure that schemes are not excluded from the market for moving beyond crude uniform defaults. Our concern is that defaults should be designed around member needs, not regulatory convenience. I hope the Minister will explain how the Bill avoids pushing schemes towards uniformity at the expense of suitability and long-term outcomes.

I hope the Minister does not regard the series of amendments in this group as combative. They are meant to try to help pensioners or future pensioners. It is wrong if the Government look for a simple process but do not look at the benefit for the people concerned. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, who talked about what happens in gilts and the like. I come from a period in the chartered accountant profession when you always went into gilts in what you thought were the last few years of your working life. Now, things have changed. We have to look at what you do and when you do it, and those things depend on the people involved.

I hope the Minister will see that these amendments are trying to say that things should not be too prescriptive. They are not against what the Government are trying to do, which is look after people. But are doing it on a one-size-fits-all basis, which does not work in the real world that we are in. I hope the Government go back and think about this a little more so that, when we come to Report, we can be a little more innovative.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak briefly in support of this group of amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Altmann. She has once again demonstrated her expertise and the value that she brings to our scrutiny of these important issues. Most importantly, she explained the spirit in which these amendments were tabled.

Throughout our proceedings on this Bill, a consistent theme across the Committee has been the need for proportionality in the steps we are taking on scale and value for money, and for definitions that are sufficiently comprehensive to reflect how the market actually operates in practice. I do not intend to repeat the points already made by the noble Baroness or ask the questions she has posed, but we will listen carefully to the Minister’s response on these issues.

Clause 40, as drafted, risks applying the scale test in an overly narrow and mechanical way by requiring the regulator to assess each default arrangement in isolation without regard to the wider context in which it is offered. That approach is not necessarily proportionate; nor does it reflect the economic reality of how master trust providers operate. This amendment would allow the regulator to take into account the combined assets of several non-scale default arrangements offered by the same provider. In doing so, it would not dilute the principle of scale; rather, it would ensure that scale is assessed in a comprehensive and realistic way, focusing on the resilience, governance and efficiency of the provider as a whole.

That matters because, without this flexibility, we risk forcing consolidation for its own sake and potentially requiring well-run, well-performing defaults to be wound up simply because they fall on the wrong side of an arbitrary threshold—even where the provider clearly operates at scale overall. This amendment therefore speaks directly to the principles that we have already raised in Committee: that regulations should be outcome-focused rather than box-ticking, and that they should avoid unintended consequences that could undermine member confidence rather than enhancing it. For those reasons, I believe this is a sensible and proportionate refinement of Clause 40, and I hope the Minister will give it serious consideration.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendments 112, 114 and 117 in the names of my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady McIntosh of Pickering, which aim to set a cap on asset allocation.

In response to our debate on the previous group, the Minister consistently described the mandation power as seeking to achieve a “modest but meaningful” investment in private assets; and said, importantly, that it was designed as a “narrow backstop” to delivering the Mansion House Accord. If that is the case, why is the proportion of assets that can be mandated under this power not capped in line with that accord? Indeed, as I read it, it could be up to 100% of assets. Why is that? The Minister may point to consultation and other measures that will constrain the use of the power but, for something so controversial and which the Government say they do not want to use, I cannot understand why they are not constraining it in primary legislation.

I will touch on timescales in our debate on the next group, but the Minister says that this Government do not want to use this power. However, as things currently stand, it would be open to the next Government to use the power, and the one after that—as well as a couple of Governments in between if we do not go to full Parliaments, as we have not always done in recent years. In those circumstances, it would also be sensible to limit the power to delivering what the Government say they want it to do.

Why do the Government not want a maximum limit in primary legislation? What is their objection to it? The cynic in me wonders whether the power is so widely drawn that, when we remove mandation on Report—I might be getting ahead of myself but that is on the cards—the Government could bring forward a series of concessions at ping-pong to limit the use of the power to what they say they want it to do. I am sure that that is not the case, but it might be better than the position in which the Government think that this power, as it appears in the legislation, has been drawn appropriately. I am really interested in the Minister’s response on this.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I will come in at this moment because I wish to speak in favour of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which I have co-signed, because he is unable to be with us today. These words are both mine and the noble Lord’s, more or less.

I am not in favour of the asset allocation mandation clauses generally. Amendment 119, however, seeks to probe the reasons why the Government have chosen a particular asset class for mandation: private equity. I have no problem with pension schemes choosing to invest in private equity; historically, it has generated good returns, in large part because of the use of debt to leverage those returns. Private equity may be a good investment for pensions schemes, and this amendment would not prevent that.

However, my understanding is that the principal motive of the Government for mandating asset allocation is to drive greater economic growth. I agree that venture capital and private debt—two other asset types listed in the Bill—may indeed create growth, but I do not understand why the Government believe that private equity is a growth driver. I have to assume that this is because the Government have fallen for the story that the private equity industry often tells about how much investment it makes, how many people it employs, what great returns it generates, and so on. What private equity actually does is buy existing companies or assets, allowing the previous owners to cash out.

Very rarely, I believe, does a private equity company provide new equity into a company. Rather, it typically does the opposite: it funds the acquisition with a very high proportion of debt. The leveraged buy-out is the basic model of most private equity activity. That debt is not borrowed by the private equity itself; rather, it is pushed down into the underlying company, and the interest and any debt repayments are made from that company’s profits.

One effect of this is to reduce the taxable profits—in other words, the debt interest is tax deductible—and therefore the tax is payable by the company. The debt itself is often located in offshore low-tax locations, so tax is not paid on the interest by the private equity or the lender, which may well be related. This is a direct loss to the Exchequer. I hope the Minister can reply to that.

The high leverage also has the effect of reducing investment by the company in its products or services. Instead of investing in its future growth, the company now has to use much of its cash flow to pay the interest. What often happens is that the private equity undertakes a cost-rationalising exercise so that the profits are improved in the short term with a view to selling the business again as soon as possible. The leveraged effect of the debt means that private equity can make a substantial gain even if the underlying business grows only in line with inflation.

The cost rationalisation often invokes workforce reductions. Studies indicate that private equity-owned companies typically have lower levels of employment even five years after the original buy-out. This certainly tallies with my experience, although I have not had the benefit of the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who worked for private equity-owned companies during his career.

In the meantime, if there are any profits left, rather than being invested in growth they are usually paid out as dividends. In fact, it is not uncommon, if a company has managed to reduce its debt ratio, for a PE to recapitalise the company to put in more debt in order to allow the payment of a dividend. Of course there are exceptions, but, as many examples show, such as Thames Water—indeed, much of the water industry—Debenhams, Southern Cross and Silentnight, private equity cannot legitimately claim to be a force for growth. Are there good returns for its investors, and particularly its partners? Yes—but is it a force for growth? It is not really. It is said that £29.4 billion was invested in UK firms by private equity in 2024. Yes, but that investment was almost entirely in buying out existing businesses, which is very different from providing capital for growth.

So the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I are baffled as to why the Government think that mandating pension funds to invest in private equity will be good for the country. It may be good for someone but not necessarily for the country. I repeat that I have no problem with a pension fund investing in private equity if the trustees believe it is right for the fund and its members, but I see no benefit, and probably a downside, for the country as a whole. If we must mandate allocation, let us at least target it to asset types that generate growth, such as venture capital or infrastructure. If the Government’s primary motive for mandation is to drive UK growth, we should exclude private equity from the list. I hope the Minister and her colleagues will give thought to this, because we are on the same wavelength and we want the same answer, but not in the way that the Bill proposes at the moment.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

This group of amendments is quite interesting in starting to sketch out what is important in the value-for-money approach that is being adopted through the Bill. I did not know when the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, would speak to Amendment 49 and I will be interested to hear what he has to say on this, because the only other form of occupational pension is, in effect, the defined benefit, where you know what you are getting. I was a bit surprised that he felt that that would need to go further, because that is a direct relationship between somebody and their employer. Nevertheless, I am sure he will explain further.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, has tabled Amendments 55 and 56 to Clause 12, which are sensible, but one thing that concerns me at the start of that clause is the word “may”. We should be beyond that at this stage, which is why I also support my noble friends on the Front Bench in opposing Clause 13 standing part of the Bill. There are just too many ifs, buts and maybes, but when it comes to Clause 13 there is nothing at all. It is just a blank cheque for the future. I am conscious that things can vary over time, but we should be in a position where we are getting some clarity on what will be in these value-for-money assessments so that people can make choices. We should be getting that clarity now. If necessary, we can put down regulations for affirmative procedures but, candidly, I do not think it is good enough that we have this sort of approach to defining what is there for the future.

I say to the Minister that I appreciate that this is a real step forward and I welcome that. People put their money in, they are not exactly sure what return they are getting and they might look every now and again at where it is coming out. I appreciate that there is a whole journey to go on in pensions education, as well as for the trustees, in terms of what is really happening with their advisers who continue to do low-risk, low-reward. I encourage the Minister, however, to come back on Report with a much stronger sketching out of what will be in these assessments, as required by Clause 13. For example, instead of just having the word “may”, have some “must” in there and then open up the power later to adjust as necessary. It is also valuable to be able to repeal.

Amendment 74 concerns the “Duty to formalise the Value for Money framework”; I know that my Front Bench will speak to that shortly. It is a useful exercise to check whether it is working. There are other amendments which basically make comparisons with other pension providers. That gets trickier if it is done at such a detailed level because, again, people might want some basic information on what is happening with their money. To pick at random, they might want their money with Standard Life instead of Scottish Life; if there is some variation, they might want to make a change. It is those sorts of things that I encourage the Minister to have more detail on by the time we reach Report.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, as has been expressed, this group establishes the foundation of the value-for-money framework. We welcome the ambition to improve outcomes for savers. However, the effectiveness of value for money will depend on how it is defined, measured and implemented, and I welcome the comments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Altmann and Lady Kramer, which elaborated on these points.

I shall concentrate on Amendments 49 and 54 and I hope I can persuade the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that they are of value. These amendments will extend the scope of the Bill’s value-for-money provisions. They ensure that they apply not only to defined contribution schemes but defined benefit occupational pension schemes as well.

The arrangements make it clear that regulations can make different provision for different types of scheme. Critically, however, all schemes must be covered by the value-for-money assessment, with a proper value-for-money rating. Members of DB schemes deserve the same transparency and assurance about value for money as members of DC schemes. DB schemes still represent a significant part of the pensions landscape. Excluding them risks creating an uneven playing field and less scrutiny where it is still needed.

A single, consistent framework across occupational pensions improves comparability, avoids regulatory gaps and ensures that all savers benefit from the same standards of accountability. The two amendments in my name would ensure that the Bill delivers on its promise of value for money across all pension schemes. The measure is simple: every saver in every scheme, whatever its type, deserves value for money. Other noble Lords have expressed this in detail.

The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, spoke about pensions jargon. We are here in a very rarefied atmosphere, where people have some knowledge—I have less than many in the Room—of what pensions are about and what phrases such as “default pensions” mean. We need to make it clear to people who have no interest in pensions other than receiving a cheque at the end of the month at a certain age what it all means. Some people need to be clear about the choices they make, and we need to do as much as we can. These amendments, both those that have been spoken to already and the two in my name, seek to protect people’s interests.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, we come again to a varied group. I shall focus my remarks on the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. I welcome the contributions from other noble Lords and I look forward to the Minister’s response. We have a few amendments in this group: Amendments 50, 51, 52, 53, 57 and 74, and the Clause 13 do not stand part proposition.

Before I turn to the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, I will say a few words about the value-for-money framework that sits at the heart of the Bill. The introduction of a value-for-money framework has the potential to be genuinely transformative for workplace pensions if it is designed and implemented well. We support the principle of value for money. However, much of what this legislation seeks to achieve will stand or fall on how the framework is designed, applied and enforced.

As drafted, the provisions are relatively skeletal, despite the pivotal role that value for money is expected to play. If value for money is to drive real improvement rather than box ticking, it must be transparent in its methodology, robust in its metrics and genuinely comparable across schemes. Cost alone cannot be the determining factor. A scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently weak net returns does not represent good value for money for savers. Comparability will be key. Without clear, standardised metrics, there is a risk that value for money simply reinforces price-chasing behaviour rather than improving outcomes. My amendments are therefore intended not to oppose the concept of value for money but to strengthen it, to ensure that it is implemented in a way that improves saver outcomes, respects fiduciary duty and avoids unintended consequences.

I turn to the amendments in more detail. Amendments 50 to 53 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted in the case of Amendment 53, are probing amendments that go to the heart of whether the value-for-money framework established by Clause 11 will operate as a genuinely effective tool for improving saver outcomes.

Clause 11 creates a very broad enabling power. It allows for the creation of a value-for-money framework, but is largely silent on what value for money should actually consist of. Given the centrality of value for money to the Bill as a whole, it is important to test the Government’s intentions on the minimum elements that will underpin the framework.

Amendment 50 would require value-for-money regulations to include publication of a fees-to-returns ratio. The purpose here is straightforward: cost on its own is not value. As I have said, a scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently weak net returns cannot sensibly be said to offer good value to members. If value for money is to be outcome-focused, it must show what savers are receiving relative to what they are paying, rather than allowing headline charges to dominate decision-making.

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[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, this is an interesting group of amendments. My noble friend has explained the importance of clarity in who decides whether something is fully delivering. I want to ask about the different assessments being made at this point. We are now, effectively, on Clause 15 onwards. We have the ratings coming through. My noble friends on the Front Bench will explain why they do not agree with certain elements. There is merit, however, in trying to work out whether something is taking a nosedive and whether it is it fixable, but we need to be more specific about a reasonable period, and then a prescribed number of VFM periods needs to be put in the Bill, which it is not at the moment.

Thinking through what has been suggested, I am trying to understand how this will work. Clause 13, which we have discussed briefly, has a certain amount of potential calculations. We then have the trustees doing their own assessment, and then we jump forward to Clause 18 and the Pensions Regulator may check. This is all feeling quite random. Normally when we do ratings, the CQC or Ofsted make that judgment, so I am trying to understand how this will work in practice. Are the guidelines going to be fixed—for example, the average or the benchmark across all pension schemes is this, or the FTSE 100 index has changed this much, or the costs are this percentage? It would be helpful to start to get a proper pitch. I appreciate that the consultation may have gone out, but there must be thinking in the Government’s mind, not just the regulator’s, on what “good” looks like. There are risks, as identified by my noble friends, that we may be overburdening to the point that the minutiae become an industry in their own right. I am surprised to see the penalties put in primary legislation, which is unusual nowadays, although I agree that we need a better sense of how that compliance element, as set out in Clause 18, will work alongside the other amendments. My noble friend is right to say that we need to keep this straightforward and simple for people to be able to understand.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

These are obviously probing amendments. They are all to do with the jargon: if we are arguing about the jargon, how much more confused will the normal punter be in trying to understand the jargon. This group focuses on how value for money is expressed, enforced and communicated.

We support the principle that members should be able to understand whether their scheme is performing well. However, value-for-money ratings also carry significant power. They will influence trustee behaviour, in particular, as well as employer decisions and market structure. That makes proportionality and precision essential.

I am particularly concerned about overreliance on short-term performance metrics. Saving for a pension is, or certainly should be, inherently long-term. Schemes should not be penalised for temporary underperformance driven by market cycles or responsible long-term investment strategies.

We also question whether compliance mechanisms become blunt instruments. Labelling schemes “poor value” without clear context may drive consolidation for the wrong reasons, reducing competition without improving outcomes. Clear language matters—I use the word “jargon” once again—but so does nuance. Members need information they can trust, not simplified labels about market complexity.

I have some questions for the Minister. How will this regime distinguish between persistent structural failure and short-term variation? How will it use this intermediate rating? How will it encourage genuine improvement rather than defensive behaviour by trustees? Trustees are meant to be very careful; they will be cognisant of the intermediate position. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s views on that.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, again, this is a substantial group. I will not detain the Committee for too long but, before I turn to my amendments, I briefly welcome those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. As she set out so clearly, her amendments seek to simplify the language used in value-for-money assessments so that they are more readily and intuitively understood by scheme members. This goes to a point that has arisen repeatedly during our discussions in Committee: many of the concepts in this Bill, as well as the language used to describe them, are dense, technical and difficult to grasp. A considerable level of prior knowledge is often required simply to understand what is being proposed, let alone its practical effect. I am reminded of a remark attributed to Joseph Pulitzer. He said that information should be put before people,

“briefly so that they will read it, clearly so that they will understand it … picturesquely so that they will remember it, and, above all, accurately”.

Surely that is the standard to which we should aspire, in not only this Bill but more broadly in our legislative work. Clarity, intelligibility and accessibility should be central objectives. The language we choose and the way in which we define key terms in legislation are fundamental, yet they are too often treated as secondary concerns.

I therefore warmly welcome the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, precisely because they address this issue head-on. Jargon is easy to reach for, but it is also, in a sense, lazy. When we are constructing a value-for-money framework whose purpose is to communicate value for money, we must be vigilant about terminology that obscures rather than illuminates and about euphemisms and phrases that sound authoritative but fail to convey real meaning. Many noble Lords will be familiar with Eric Blair’s essay, Politics and the English Language, and the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness serve as a timely reminder of some of the lessons it contains.

The first amendments in this group to which I have added my name—Amendments 60 and 61—would remove sub-paragraph (ii) from Clause 15(1)(b) as well as subsection (2). These amendments speak to a simple point: where responsible trustees or managers have determined that a scheme is not delivering value for money, that judgment should be sufficient to justify a rating of “not delivering” without the need to satisfy additional statutory conditions that risk being overly prescriptive.

Trustees already sit at the centre of this framework. They are charged with assessing investment performance, costs, charges, service quality and long-term member outcomes. They are subject to fiduciary duties and regulatory oversight. It is therefore entirely reasonable to trust their professional judgment when they conclude that a scheme is failing to deliver value for money. As the Bill is currently drafted, that judgment must be supplemented by one of a series of defined conditions, whether persistent intermediate ratings, a lack of realistic prospect of improvement or regulatory non-compliance. While well-intentioned, those conditions risk turning what should be a principles-based regime into a mechanistic one, encouraging trustees to focus on meeting thresholds rather than acting decisively in members’ best interests.

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[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, this is an interesting part. It recognises a lot of our labour market, where people are working with multiple employers over a variety of time periods. Even those young people who were on the Kickstart scheme will have got contributions to a pension scheme, which they may completely forget about once they go to their next, perhaps longer-term, job.

I remember a few years ago the lovely people over in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. They have a “good purposes” fund where they go after dormant assets all over the place and take them away, with a general promise that the money will come back if somebody tries to get it. I seem to recall telling them to jog on when it came to pension funds, although some negotiation might have been arranged.

I am just trying to understand how all of this is going to fit together. That is why I think Amendment 83 is particularly helpful; basically, it says that the pensions dashboard must be in place. This is about making an informed choice. One of the things I am trying to understand is whether Clause 22(3)(b), which my noble friends on the Front Bench have suggested should be removed, is passive and non-engaged. Will the trustees running the scheme be required to make some effort to try to contact that person so that it does not just slide away without people even realising?

In terms of the other aspect, I assume, under Amendments 80 and 81, it is right to try to get into some more detail about prescribing, which could perhaps be further enhanced by just getting to understand in Clause 25 what the Minister is thinking at this point, especially when it suggests that the trustees or managers of a scheme can determine whether it is the best interests for this to transfer or not. Are we talking about, say, people who are in prison, people who have gone abroad or people who are on a career break? It would be helpful to have a sense of what Ministers are thinking in terms of having this variety of powers, first, to be able to do it, but then to say, “Actually, we’ll leave it to the managers or trustees of the scheme to determine whether it is that person’s best interests”. I would be grateful for some understanding, again, of how this might work in practice, but the solution will definitely be Amendment 83 and I hope that the Minister will give that consideration for Report.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, this is an appropriate time to stand, because Amendment 83 is signed by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and by me. In the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, today, and having discussed the matter with him, I speak on my behalf and his to Amendment 83. As has been stated, it is intended to deal with the risk that consolidating small pots might worsen the problem of lost or forgotten pensions.

We are all aware of the problem of people losing track of small pension pots: a problem that has increased in recent years as people tend to move between jobs more frequently, and may therefore end up with several small pensions, perhaps from many years ago. Chapter 2 of the Bill allows the Government to make regulations to consolidate small, dormant pension pots. I, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, support this as we believe that providing additional scale to small, dormant pots should enable greater efficiencies and a reduction in costs.

However, a possible unintended consequence could be to make it more difficult for a person to trace a forgotten pot if it is moved to a consolidator without their knowledge: for example, if any notice is sent to an old address. The introduction of a pension dashboard, as enabled by the Pension Schemes Act 2021, was intended to make it easier for people to identify pensions that they have lost track of or even forgotten. This has been somewhat delayed, but progress does, at last, seem to be happening. The connection deadline is October 2026, so hopefully people may start to be able to access the dashboard in the not-too-distant future.

In order to avoid making the problem of lost pensions worse, Amendment 83, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and myself, simply says that the regulations that would mandate the consolidation of a dormant, small pot could not be made until the dashboard had been available for at least three months. The three months is designed to give a bit of time to ensure that it is actually working and that any teething issues have been resolved. I think it prudent to ensure that we do not cause unintended consequences from what is otherwise a good policy, I hope the Minister will be sympathetic to the intention of the course outlined in Amendment 83.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 83, which has received wide support. I think it is really important, as is the idea of lengthening the 12-month period for so-called dormant pots, and Amendment 81 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, where, for example, a woman may take time off to care for children or other loved ones and intends to return, but her pension will have been moved before she gets back. Those are distinct possibilities under this scheme. We are talking about moving somebody’s savings—or investments; I am doing it myself—from one place to another, just because they have not done anything with their pension for a while. The pension fund is not meant to have anything done with it when you are younger; it is meant to just sit there and stay there.

Of course, the big problem that needs to be solved here is the costs to providers of administering all these very small pots. But the aim of the dashboard itself is meant to be to help people move their pots from one place to another. It seems to me that this particular section of the legislation is trying to deal with something that is meant to be dealt with by a different policy area. The consolidators, of course, will be attractive to providers to establish, and the money saving from not administering these small pots will also be attractive to the providers. But have the Government given any consideration to the idea of making, for example, NEST the consolidator? That is a Government-sponsored scheme. It has obviously had to have reasonable charges. Any transfers do not incur an upfront fee. That would run less of a risk of having consolidators that end up perhaps not performing well.

Parental Leave and Pay Review

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister very much for all the things that are happening, but can she confirm whether this urgent review—the word “urgent” was used—will look specifically at low-paid and self-employed parents, who are often excluded from adequate support? I did not hear the Minister mention them at all.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises a very important point. I am pleased to say to him that, yes, the review is considering specifically whether the current support available meets the needs of self-employed parents. That is explicitly referred to in the review’s terms of reference. He is right that, currently, self-employed mothers can get maternity allowance but self-employed fathers are not eligible for support. There are some challenges. The bigger challenge is that the scheme goes back to the late 1800s, and a lot of aspects of modern families and the modern workplace are not necessarily reflected in its structure. We are looking at all of that.

Youth Unemployment

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

The noble Lord is talking about the Government’s job guarantee, which will come in after 18 months with a guaranteed job for all those on universal credit. However, it is not the case that there is no action under the youth guarantee before that. The new youth guarantee gateway will ensure that if, after 13 weeks, a young person is not earning or learning then they will have a meeting followed by four weeks of intensive support. During this period, they will receive tailored guidance and be offered up to six options, which could be work, work experience, sector-based work academy programmes, apprenticeships, training or learning. There will be 300,000 more opportunities funded by this Government to support young people long before they get to that 18-month point. However, that point is a guaranteed jobs backstop.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that, but what assessment has been made of the impact of poor mental health on young people’s ability to enter work? How joined up is the Department for Work and Pensions with the NHS—if it is joined up at all?

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

There are certainly larger numbers of young people who, by virtue of mental health issues, are not in the labour market. That is why we have asked Alan Milburn to focus on this issue, why the Secretary of State for Health has initiated a review into the growing numbers of young people experiencing mental health problems, and why the Department for Education will ensure that there is a mental health professional to support every single school. That is joined-up government.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will say a little more in our debate on the next group about how surpluses should be used, but we must recognise that employers in defined benefit schemes underwrite defined benefit scheme finances; they are the ones who have been putting in very large sums of money to keep these schemes going for the past 20-odd years. It is only right that we should recognise the interest that employers have in taking money that is no longer required within a scheme.

We have had so many years of deficits in pension schemes that we have rather forgotten that this was like an everyday happening in the pensions world, if you go back to the 1990s, when surpluses arose. Indeed, pension schemes were not allowed to keep pension surpluses; there were HMRC rules which made that rather difficult to do. These were perfectly ordinary transactions in the pensions world which we have just forgotten about because of the deficits that have existed for the last 20 or 30 years, which employers—not employees—have had to bear the burden of.

On the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, I understand the technical point about removing assets rather than surplus, but surplus is the language that has always been used in the context of pension schemes; it is in the 1995 Act. The noble Lord’s amendments amend only this Act; as I understand it, they do not go on and amend the earlier Act. It is just language that has been used for a long period; I think people know what it means, and it will be very confusing at this stage to change the language.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for putting these amendments down and speaking in detail about them. We also heard good words from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I almost thought, “Is there any point in getting up and speaking?” but I am a politician.

This group goes to first principles. What is a defined benefits pension surplus and what is it for? For us, DB surplus is not a windfall or an accident, as I think others have said. It is a result of long-term assumptions, member contributions, employer funding decisions and investment outcomes—all those—but above all, it exists within a framework of promises made to members in return for deferred pay. We are therefore concerned about renaming—we keep on coming back to this—“surplus” as simply “assets” available for redistribution.

Language matters here because it shapes both legal interpretation and member confidence. Treating surpluses as inherently extractable risks weakening the fundamental bargain that underpins DB provision. Our position is not that surplus should never be accessed, but that it should be considered only after members’ reasonable expectations have been fully protected. That includes confidence in benefits security, protection against inflation erosion, and trust and accrued rights not being retrospectively interpreted. I have always thought that with DB pensions you need prudence. How far do prudence and good governance go?

Finally, the question for Ministers is whether the Bill maintains the principle that DB schemes exist first and foremost to deliver promised benefits or whether it marks a shift towards viewing schemes as financial reservoirs once minimum funding tests are met. In that case, one has to think, “What is the minimum for the funding tests?” We shall come on to that in an amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has put down later in the Bill on where companies fail. It is a question of when those surpluses are available, if they are ever available.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, when I entered the department in July 2019, defined benefit pension schemes did, on occasion, report surpluses. However, those surpluses were neither of the scale nor the character that we are now observing. If one looks back over the past quarter of a century and beyond, it is evident that both the funding position of defined benefit schemes and the methodologies used to assess that funding have changed materially.

The surpluses reported today are not simply large in absolute terms but different in nature. They are measured against significantly more prudent assumptions, particularly in relation to discount rates, longevity and asset valuation, than would have been applied historically. It is therefore right that these emerging surpluses are examined with care and transparency. Bringing them into the open is necessary, and I say at the outset that the Government are right to have raised this issue explicitly in the Bill.

That said, we consider that the Bill does not yet fully reflect a number of the practical and operational issues faced by both trustees and sponsoring employers when seeking to make effective use of those provisions. In that respect, our position is not materially distant from that of the Government. Our concerns are not ones of principle but of application and implementation. We recognise that issues relating to potential deadlock between trustees and sponsors are important, but we are content for those matters to be considered at a later stage in the Committee’s proceedings. Our immediate focus is on understanding how the proposals are intended to operate in practice, how decisions are expected to be taken within existing scheme governance arrangements and how these new powers interact with established trustee fiduciary duties and employer covenant considerations.

This is a busy group, and noble Lords have done a sterling job in setting out their reasoning and rationale. I shall, therefore, not detain the Committee further by relitigating those points but will speak to my Amendment 25 in this group. Like a number of our amendments in this part of the Bill, it is a probing amendment intended to seek clarity. Clause 9 inserts new Section 36B into the Pensions Act 1995. The new section gives trustees of defined benefit trustee schemes the ability by resolution to modify the schemes’ rules so as to confirm a power to pay surplus to the employer or to remove or relax existing restrictions on the exercise of such a power.

The clause contains one explicit limitation on that power. New Section 36B(4) provides that the section does not apply to a scheme that is being wound up. In other words, wind-up is the only circumstance singled out in the Bill in which the new surplus release modification power cannot be used. Amendment 25 would remove that specific exclusion, and I want to be clear that the purpose of doing so is not to argue that surplus should be released during winding-up; rather, it is to test the Government’s reasoning in identifying wind-up as the sole circumstance meriting an explicit prohibition in primary legislation.

By proposing to remove subsection (4), the amendment invites the Minister to explain whether the Government consider wind-up to be genuinely the only situation in which surplus release would be inappropriate or whether there are other circumstances where the use of this power would also be unsuitable. If those other safeguards are already captured elsewhere, it would be helpful for the Committee to have that clearly set out on the record. Equally, if wind-up is used here as a proxy for a broader set of concerns, the Committee would benefit from understanding why those concerns are not addressed more directly.

Surplus release is a sensitive issue. The way in which the boundaries of this new power are framed therefore matters. Where the Bill chooses to draw a line in the legislation, it invites scrutiny as to why that line has been drawn there and only there. This amendment is intended to facilitate that discussion and to elicit reassurance from the Minister about how the Government envisage this power operating in practice and what protections they consider necessary beyond the single case of wind-up. On that basis, I look forward to the Minister’s response and any clarification she can provide to the Committee.

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I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about history, but the whole point is that we can rewrite history. We do that here all the time; it is called progress. In fact, I have quite a long speech on the point of principle, which I am already drafting, for my Amendment 203. The world has changed, and fairness demands that something is done for the pre-1997 pensioners. The two proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, are a very small step towards achieving the justice that the people concerned deserve.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

This seems like a good moment to come in. I first ask the Minister: do the Government agree that a responsible use of surpluses should strengthen confidence in DB schemes and not leave members feeling that prudence has benefited everybody but them? In this, I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, because people do feel aggrieved.

I have three amendments here. Amendment 32 is designed to ensure that regulations take account of the particular circumstances of occupational pension schemes established before the Pensions Act 1995. Members of pre-1997 schemes, so often referred to in this debate, are often in a different position to those in later schemes. These schemes were designed under a different legal and regulatory framework. Current legislation does not always reflect those historical realities, creating unintended iniquities.

Amendment 32 would require regulations under Clause 9 to explicitly consider—that is all—these older schemes. It would allow such schemes, with appropriate regulatory oversight, to offer discretionary indexation where funding allowed, so it would provide flexibility while ensuring that safeguards were in place. It would give trustees the ability to improve outcomes for members in a fair and responsible way, and it would help to address the long-standing issue of members missing out on indexation simply because of their scheme’s pre-1997 status. It would also ensure that members could share in scheme strength where resources permitted. Obviously, safeguards are needed, and Amendment 32 would make it clear that discretionary increases would be possible only where schemes were well funded. Oversight by regulators ensures that employer interests and member protections remain balanced.

My Amendment 41 is about advice. When you are as knowledgeable as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, you do not need the advice, but many pensioners are missing it. This amendment would allow a proportion of pension scheme surplus to be allocated towards funding free—

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

The amendment talks about surpluses, so it is talking specifically about defined benefit schemes. It is not talking about DC schemes because such schemes do not have surpluses. I just want to be clear.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord; it is just that impartial pension advice for members is not always available to everybody. Many savers struggle to navigate pension choices, whether around a consolidation investment strategy or retirement income. Without proper advice, members risk making poor financial decisions that could damage their long-term security. If you are in the business, you have to take the good with the bad, but we would like to give members a bit of advice if the money is available. Free impartial advice is essential to levelling the playing field.

Surpluses in pension schemes should not sit idle or be seen simply as windfall funds. Redirecting a small—I stress “small”—proportion to fund member advice would ensure that surpluses are used in a way that benefits members directly. Amendment 32 would not mandate a fixed share; it would simply give the Secretary of State powers to determine what proportion may be used. This would, I hope, create flexibility and safeguards so that the balance between scheme health and member benefit can be properly managed. Further advice from surpluses reduces the need for members to pay out of pocket and it builds trust that schemes are actively supporting member outcomes beyond the pension pot itself.

Amendment 44, to which my noble friend Lord Thurso referred, would insert a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to publish

“within 12 months … a report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows”.

It aims to explore options for improving outcomes for members of older pension schemes. I maintain that this amendment is needed because many pre-1997 schemes were established before modern indexation rules. Trustees’ current fiduciary duties may limit their ability to avoid discretionary increases, which is what this amendment is about. Members of these schemes may be missing out on pension increases that could be sustainable and beneficial. I will not go on about what the report would do, but there would be many benefits to this new clause. It would provide an evidence-based assessment of whether discretionary indexation can be applied safely; support trustees in making informed decisions for pre-1997 scheme members; and balance members’ interests with financial prudence and regulatory safeguards.

The amendments in this group are clearly going to progress on to Report in some way. Sometime between now and then, we are going to have to try to amalgamate these schemes and take the best bits out of them in order to get, on Report, a final amendment that might have a chance of persuading the Government to take action on these points. Many of the amendments in this group—indeed, all of them—follow the same line, but there needs to be some discipline in trying to get the best out of them all into a final amendment on Report.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for their amendments in this group. I also thank other noble Lords for all their other contributions in Committee so far this afternoon. Our debate on this group has stimulated a most valuable discussion. Of course, I look forward to the Minister’s responses to the points that have been raised.

I wish to start off by saying that I thought it was helpful that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, steered the Committee—my words, not hers—towards a focus on scheme members. The debate went a lot beyond that, but I just wanted to make that point at the outset. I wish also to take this opportunity to set out our stance on indexation, as well as some of the related questions that we for the Opposition have for the Government on this point.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, these amendments raise understandable concerns about fairness, inflation and the use of defined benefit surpluses. But our core line is simple: mandating how trustees and employers use DB surpluses would be overly prescriptive and risks being actively anti-business. Many employers are already using surpluses constructively, improving DC provision for younger workers, supporting intergenerational fairness, strengthening scheme security through contingent assets, SPVs or insurance-backed arrangements, or reducing long-term risk in ways that benefit members as well as sponsors. Employers have also borne DB deficit risk for many years, as we have heard a bit about this afternoon. If they carried the risk in the bad times, it is reasonable that they can share in the benefits in the good times, provided that decisions are taken jointly with trustees.

I will explain this through a simple analogy—I say at the outset that it will not be up to the standard of the buckets analogy utilised previously in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, but here we are. The employer and members walk into the casino together. The bets are placed and the investment strategy, funding assumptions and longevity risk are collective decisions overseen by trustees. If the bet goes wrong, the employer must cover the losses, often over many years, through additional contributions and balance sheet strain. If the bet goes right, however, some argue that the employer should be excluded from any upside and that all gains must automatically be distributed to members.

That is not, we believe, how risk sharing works. In any rational system, the party that underwrites the losses must surely be allowed to share in the gains—I know there are other arguments, but I believe this was the one posed by my noble friend Lady Noakes—otherwise, incentives are distorted, future participation is discouraged and employers become less willing to sponsor schemes at all. The fair outcome is that neither the employer nor the members take everything and that surplus is discussed and allocated jointly by trustees and employers in a way that balances member security, scheme sustainability and the long-term health of the sponsoring employer. I think this was the central argument of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and, in a different way, my noble friend Lord Fuller. Legislation should support that partnership, not override it.

My noble friend Lord Willets made an interesting point. He asked whether it is fair that, in DB schemes, current employees often contribute to enhancing or rescuing the surplus position of pension schemes, making up for past mistakes—or deficits, perhaps—and the potential consequence of that linking to lower remuneration for those current employees. I add one more thing, which is probably a bit unfair because it is slightly hypothetical: if that current employee, having perhaps been paid less, is then made redundant, that is a double whammy for them. The question is whether the surplus should be used for helping current employees or giving them a better deal, as well as, or instead of, looking to help the pre-1997 members. That is the way I look at it.

Against that backdrop, amendments that would make benefit uplifts—whether pre-1997 indexation or lump sum enhancements—a statutory condition of surplus extraction raise real concerns. Automatic uplift would ignore wider economic impacts, including higher employer costs; increased insolvency risk, ultimately borne by the PPF; knock-on effects on wages, investment and employment; and potentially higher PPF levies.

For PPF schemes, mandatory uplift is manageable because the employer covenant has gone and Parliament controls the compensation framework. Imposing similar requirements on live schemes risks destabilising otherwise healthy employers. Uplift should therefore be an option and not an obligation. That said, focusing on choice does not mean ignoring power imbalances. In some schemes, there is genuine deadlock. Trustees may be reluctant to deploy surplus for fear of sponsor reaction or member backlash, so instead sit on it and de-risk further. That may be a rational defensive response, but it is also a deeply inefficient outcome. The Government should be looking at how to enable better use of surplus by agreement, rather than mandating outcomes.

My questions to the Minister are as follows. How do the Government intend to preserve flexibility while avoiding blunt compulsion? How will they support trustee-employer partnership rather than hardwiring outcomes into legislation? What consideration has been given to mechanisms for breaking deadlock—including overprudence, if that is a term that can be used—so that surplus can be used productively rather than simply locked away?

To conclude, these amendments raise important issues. Our concern is not with the objectives but with the method. Choice, partnership and proportionality should remain the guiding principles. I look forward to the responses from the Minister.

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Moved by

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

45: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause—
“Independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the day on which this Act is passed, commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes for banks.(2) The Secretary of State must by regulations set out the terms of reference for the review, including the bank or banks to be investigated.(3) The regulations in subsection (2) must make provision for the terms of reference to include —(a) the origin, rationale and implementation of state deduction in bank pension schemes,(b) the clarity and adequacy of member communications regarding state deduction from inception to present,(c) the differential impact of state deduction on pensioners with varying salary histories, including an assessment of any disproportionate effects on—(i) lower-paid staff, and(ii) women, (d) comparisons with other occupational pension schemes in the banking and public sectors, and(e) the legal, administrative, and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions, including potential mechanisms for redress.(4) The Secretary of State must ensure that the person or body appointed to conduct the review—(a) is independent of the banks investigated and its associated pension schemes,(b) possesses relevant expertise in pensions law, occupational pension scheme administration, and equality and fairness in retirement income, and(c) undertakes appropriate consultation with—(i) affected scheme members,(ii) employee representatives,(iii) pension experts, and(iv) stakeholder organisations.(5) The person or body conducting the review must—(a) submit a report on its findings to the Secretary of State within 12 months of the date the review is commissioned, and(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish the report in full.(6) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a written response setting out the Government’s proposed actions, if any, in response to the report’s findings and recommendations.(7) Regulations under this section are subject to the negative procedure.(8) For the purposes of this section—“state deduction” means any provision within a defined benefit occupational pension scheme that reduces pension entitlements by reference to the member reaching state pension age or by reference to any state pension entitlement;“defined benefit pension scheme” has the meaning given in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into clawback provisions in occupational defined benefit pension schemes, for example, the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

This proposed new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit schemes. It is a very narrow request that focuses specifically on clawback provisions in the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morgan of Drefelin) (Lab)]

My Lords, there is a Division in the House—we all knew it was coming—so we need to adjourn. If it is acceptable to the Committee, we will adjourn for 20 minutes because there is, I believe, a number of Divisions coming.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I will try to make this quick. Proposed new clause in Amendment 45 requires the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes. It focuses on the clawback provisions, particularly in the Midland Bank staff pension scheme and associated legacy arrangements.

Why is this review needed? State deduction provisions can reduce members’ pension entitlements, sometimes in ways that are complex or unclear. There are concerns about fairness and transparency and a disproportionate impact, particularly on lower paid staff and women. It ensures members, regulators and Parliament have clarity about the origin, rationale and effects of these provisions.

The review will examine the history and rationale for state deduction in a Midland Bank staff pension scheme and assess clarity. It will be conducted by a person or body independent of HSBC and associated schemes. We will also try to ensure that it must consult affected scheme members, employee representatives, pension experts and stakeholder organisations. I beg to move.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, we are broadly supportive of the purpose behind this amendment. It raises an important set of questions about whether members of defined benefit schemes have been given clear, timely and accessible information about state deduction or clawback provisions, and whether the rationale for those provisions has been properly explained to them over time.

Of course, individuals must take responsibility for managing their own finances and retirement planning. But that responsibility can only be exercised meaningfully if people are properly informed in advance about what will happen to their pension, when it will happen and why. When changes or reductions are triggered at state pension age, members need adequate notice so that they can make sensible and informed financial decisions. In that context, a review of the adequacy of member communications, the transparency of the original rationale and the accessibility of this information is welcome. While we may not necessarily agree with some of the more precise parameters and timetables set out in the amendment, as a way of posing the question and prompting scrutiny, it is a reasonable approach.

That said, we have spoken to someone who has intimate, working knowledge of the Midland Bank pension scheme and has experience of the workings of the scheme. They confirmed to us that they were fully aware of this provision, because it was in all the literature they were sent when they were enrolled. Given this, can the noble Lord give some more insight into why he thinks some members of this scheme were aware, and others not, and how could this be addressed?

I would be interested to hear from the Minister whether she has any initial views on the issues this amendment raises. In particular, how accessible is this information to members in practice today, and what steps, if any, would the Government or Department for Work and Pensions take if it became clear that these arrangements are not well understood?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for introducing his amendment and drawing attention to this issue, which is of real importance to some members in integrated schemes. After a lifetime of work, people rightly expect their pension to provide security and stability in retirement. For many, their occupational pension forms a key part of that.

Integrated schemes can feel confusing or unexpected to those affected, particularly when their occupational pension changes at the point when their state pension is paid. These schemes are designed so that the occupational pension is higher before state pension age and then adjusted downwards once the state pension is paid, because the schemes take account of some or all of a state pension when calculating the pension due. However, if it is not clearly explained, the change could come as a surprise. I acknowledge that and the worries some members have expressed. It is important to be clear that members are not losing money at state pension age. The structure of these schemes aims to provide a smoother level of income across retirement by blending occupational and state pension over time.

Concerns have been raised that deductions applied within integrated schemes may represent a higher proportion of income for lower-paid members, many of whom are women. This reflects wider patterns of lower earnings during their working lives, rather than any discriminatory mechanism within the schemes themselves, but I appreciate why this feels unfair to those affected. The rules governing these deductions are set out in scheme rules. Employers and trustees can decide on their scheme’s benefit structure within the legislative framework that all pension schemes must meet. The Government do not intervene in individual benefit structures but do set and enforce the minimum standards that all schemes must comply with.

Although this type of scheme is permitted under legislation, it is essential that members understand how their scheme operates. Therefore, it is extremely important that people have good, clear information about their occupational pension scheme so that they can make informed decisions about their retirement. What matters just as much as the rules is that people understand them. Good, clear information is essential so that members are not taken by surprise when they reach state pension age.

If a member believes that the information they received was unclear or incomplete, they are not without redress. They can make a complaint through their scheme’s internal dispute process or, if needed, escalate their case to the Pensions Ombudsman for an independent determination.

The Government absolutely share the desire for people to have confidence in the pensions they rely on, but, given the protections already in place and the long-established nature of schemes, we do not believe that a review is necessary. For those reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

I thank the noble Baroness and withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 45 withdrawn.

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If, however, the employer was not in robust financial health and questions were raised about the financial strength of the employer, that contingent liability would almost certainly be treated by bankers—and probably trade creditors as well—as an actual liability in the calculations that are done on decisions being made on advancing or maintaining lending or advancing trade credit. That would then amplify the problems for a company that was perhaps struggling financially, which would in turn increase the possibility that the employer would be tipped into insolvency. This amendment is potentially very risky, and I hope that the Government will not accept it.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

This amendment raises a very important point. The question, though, is when the surpluses could be paid out. If the company seems to be in a robust way, there is no reason why the pension fund should be overprotected. While everything in the garden is lovely, there is no reason to give them a 10-year position when things may have deteriorated in subsequent years. So, I agree in principle with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, but 10 years is far too long, because in those 10 years, all sorts of things can happen. If it was five years or fewer, it would be very good, but while everything in the garden—in the company—is lovely, the pension fund should not be overprotected for the extent of 10 years.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have enormous sympathy with the thoughts behind the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. However, I share the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in that it is not clear how that would work, because this would then need to be a contingent payment or some kind of conditional payment which can be recouped, and that would impact creditors or debt holders of the company as well. Does the noble Lord feel that if, as a consequence of the surplus payment, members also got enhanced benefits, that would in some ways compensate for the future eventuality of what he is concerned about?

Finally, in the days before we had a Pension Protection Fund, I was very much in favour of increasing the status of the unsecured creditor position of a pension scheme. But in the current environment, where there is a Pension Protection Fund, and where the Bill will be improving the protections provided by it, it is much less important to increase the status on insolvency of the pension scheme itself than it would have been in past times. I certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that if there were to be any such provision, it should be a lot less than 10 years.

Youth Guarantee Scheme: Evaluation

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

The noble Lord is right that I have been able to speak to Make UK about the important role of apprenticeships in delivering engineering skills for young and older people. I understand the concerns raised about the funding rates for engineering apprenticeships. That is why, as I said when I met Make UK, we will continue to monitor that in order to ensure that they meet the costs of training. We will continue to find other ways to encourage people on to apprenticeships, such as removing some of the bureaucracy associated with them, supporting the reform of end-point assessment, and removing the requirement for separate maths and English qualifications for adults.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, although we welcome the youth employment scheme, can the Minister say whether the Government will monitor the employment of 26 and 27 year-olds? If you are a small business and you can get someone at 24 for nothing, will that reduce your employment of 26 to 27 year-olds? We do not want to displace the unemployment from the 24 year-olds to the 26 year-olds.

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

Of course we do not want to displace the unemployment, but, as I suggested in responding to my noble friend, there is something particularly challenging and important about young people who do not even get the opportunity to get into the workforce and to have the chance of a successful future. That is why, although there will always need to be an age cut-off for a scheme, the youth guarantee, with its additional investment from the Budget and its focus on support from school onwards, will be effective in getting young people into the workplace, and keeping them there when they get to the age of 25 or 26 as well.