Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

184: After Clause 96, insert the following new Clause—
“Report on the impact of pension market consolidation(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, publish a report on the impact of consolidation in the occupational pensions market.(2) The report must include an assessment of—(a) the level of market concentration among pension scheme providers, including trends in the number and size of schemes;(b) the effects of consolidation on competition, innovation, and consumer choice in the pensions market;(c) the potential barriers to entry and growth for small and medium-sized pension providers;(d) the adequacy of existing regulatory and competition safeguards in preventing anti-competitive behaviour regarding—(i) exclusivity arrangements,(ii) exit charges, and(iii) pricing structures;(e) the role of The Pensions Regulator and the Competition and Markets Authority in monitoring and responding to market concentration;(f) the merits of policy or regulatory measures to support new market entrants.(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Government to report on the impact of market consolidation on competition and new market entrants.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment has the distinction of being in a grouping all of its own, which obviously shows how important it is. The proposed new clause in it would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within 12 months on

“the impact of consolidation in the occupational pensions market”.

It would ensure, I hope, that Parliament and the public have transparency on how consolidation is reshaping the sector. We know that consolidation is accelerating in the pensions market and, although scale can deliver benefits—I hope—it can also raise risks: reduced competition, fewer choices for savers and further barriers for new entrants. A clear evidence base is an essential part of the solution to strike the right balance.

The report referenced in this amendment calls for information on a number of things. The first is market concentration—for instance, trends in the number and size of schemes and the level of provider dominance. The second is effects on competition and innovation: whether consolidation is driving efficiency or stifling creativity and diversity. The third is consumer choice: how member options are being affected. The fourth is barriers to entry: challenges faced by small and medium-sized providers in entering or growing in the market. The last is an assessment of whether current competition and regulatory safeguards are sufficient.

The report would also have a particular focus on exclusivity arrangements, exit charges and pricing structures that may distort the market. Furthermore, the Pensions Regulator and the Competition and Markets Authority would have a role in overseeing these risks. The review would also examine potential policies or regulations to support new entrants and maintain a healthy and competitive pensions market.

To summarise, we know that consolidation must serve savers’ interests, not just the interests of the largest providers. This proposed new clause would ensure that Parliament is properly informed—it should be informed on all things, whether on this or on the noble Lord, Lord Mandelson—that regulators are held to account and that future policy is based on evidence. From a Liberal Democrat perspective, well-functioning markets matter. Competition, diversity of approach and the ability for new entrants to challenge incumbents are essential if savers are to benefit over the long term. Ministers need to explain why a formal review of consolidation is resisted, given the scale of structural change this will accelerate. We are asking just for a review, and we hope the Government will not think this too much to ask for before we enter this new realm. I beg to move.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to close this debate and respond to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, on his Amendment 184. I am grateful to him for raising this issue, because it goes to the heart of how we ensure that pension reform delivers better outcomes for savers rather than simply neater market structures on paper. I think there is reasonably wide backing across the pensions industry for the Government’s broad objective of greater consolidation and efficiency within the defined contribution market. Many stakeholders accept, and indeed support, the proposition that increased scale, when combined with robust governance, strong investment capability and appropriate oversight, has the potential to deliver stronger long-term outcomes for members. Few would argue for fragmentation for its own sake.

However, support for consolidation is not the same as support for consolidation at any cost, or consolidation pursued without sufficient regard to its secondary effects. Well-founded concerns remain that the current design of the scale test risks it being too blunt an instrument. In particular, it does not distinguish adequately between schemes that are genuinely underperforming and those smaller or mid-sized providers that, despite operating below the proposed thresholds, none the less deliver consistently high-quality, well-governed and, in some cases, market-leading outcomes for savers. Indeed, the Government’s own analysis underlines this risk. The chart contained in paragraph 70 of the Government’s 2024 report shows no clear or consistent correlation between assets under management and gross five-year performance across large parts of the master trust and group personal pension market.

The principal scale-related concern identified appears to relate not to well-run schemes operating below the threshold but to the very smallest arrangements, in particular certain single-employer schemes where governance capacity and resilience can be more limited. That matters because consolidation in a pensions market is not a neutral process. This is not a typical consumer market. Savers are largely captive, choice is constrained, switching is rare and inertia is high. In such an environment, reductions in the number of providers can weaken competitive pressure long before anything resembling a monopoly appears. The risk is not always higher charges tomorrow but slower innovation, less responsiveness and poorer outcomes over time.

That is why this amendment is important. It would ensure that consolidation serves savers and that Parliament retains a clear grip on how the market is evolving. Small distortions in competition today—barely visible in the short term—can compound into materially worse outcomes over 30 or 40 years of saving. In a system built on long horizons, early and structured scrutiny is essential.

There is also the question of innovation. Smaller and newer providers have often been the source of advances in member engagement, digital capability, decumulation options and investment design. If consolidation raises barriers to entry through disproportionate compliance costs, restrictive exit charges or exclusivity arrangements, innovation risks being squeezed out, even where headline charges appear to fall. Efficiency gains that come at the expense of progress are a poor bargain for future retirees.

The report required by this amendment would not obstruct sensible consolidation; nor would it second-guess the direction of travel. Rather, it would provide Parliament with the evidence needed to ensure that consolidation is proportionate, targeted and genuinely in the interest of savers. It would help ensure that regulatory and competition safeguards remain fit for purpose as market structures change, and that opportunities for new high-quality entrants are not inadvertently closed off.

For these reasons, I believe that this amendment strikes the right balance. It is supportive of reform, alert to risk and grounded firmly in the long-term interests of those whose retirement security depends on the decisions we take today.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for introducing his amendment, which would require the Government to conduct a report on the impact of consolidation in the occupational pensions sector within 12 months of the Act being passed. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, for her remarks and her acknowledgement of the benefits of consolidation and the widespread support for it.

The fact is that consolidation is already happening across the pension landscape. The number of DC pension providers has reduced from roughly 3,700 in 2012 to about 950 schemes today. On the DB side, the number of schemes is similarly down from about 6,500 in 2012 to 4,800 in 2026, with a record number of transactions currently estimated in the buyout market. Our aim is to accelerate this trend of consolidation through the DC scale measures and DP superfunds. As I have said before, scale brings numerous benefits directed at improving member outcomes, including better governance, greater efficiency, in-house expertise and access to investment in productive markets.

I am not going to respond in detail to the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, on innovation and other things, because we have given them a decent canter in previous meetings in Committee, but it is absolutely essential that pension schemes remain competitive post-scale. We expect that schemes with scale will innovate and drive competition, especially, for example, in consolidating single-employer trusts. The market will evolve, as will the needs of members, and we expect that the schemes and the industry will be able to align with this.

It is absolutely right that the Bill will lead to major change in the occupational pensions market. Although I do not agree with this particular proposal, I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that we must understand and monitor the impact of these reforms, because the impacts of consolidation really matter. That is why a comprehensive impact assessment was produced, analysing the potential impacts of the Bill, with plans to evaluate the impact in further detail. An updated version of the impact assessment was published as the Bill entered this House; crucially, it included further details of our ongoing monitoring and evaluation plans, including critical success factors and collaboration across departments and regulators.

We have provided the market with clarity on our approach so that changes can be put into effect, but we need to allow time to assess and evaluate the impacts following full implementation. We will assess the overall impacts over an appropriate timeframe, given that the full effects of consolidation will be after the Bill has been implemented.

As I have mentioned before, we published a pensions road map, which clearly sets out when we aim for each measure to come into force. The fact is that many of the regulations to be made under the Bill will not have been made or brought into force within a year of the Bill becoming an Act. Any review at that point could be only very partial. However, the Government are committed to strong monitoring and evaluation of this policy, especially of its impact on members. The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, is absolutely right to point to the crucial role of the Pensions Regulator and the CMA. They are best placed, in the first instance, to monitor the impacts of consolidation as part of their respective statutory functions, including an analysis of emerging trends. The Pensions Regulator, for example, will play a key role in monitoring the impact of consolidation on the trust-based DC pensions market via its value-for-money framework.

I can therefore assure the Committee that we will keep this area under review, consistent with our stated policy aims for the sector and for good member outcomes. We will also continue to monitor our working arrangements with the regulators; this includes their ongoing monitoring of the pensions industry. We will submit a memorandum to the Work and Pensions Select Committee with a preliminary analysis of how the Act has worked three to five years following Royal Assent. The committee may then decide to conduct a fuller inquiry into the Act, consistent with standard practice, as set out in the Cabinet Office’s Guide to Making Legislation.

Given the above, a separate government report risks duplicating work while putting an undue burden on all those involved. If issues are identified by regulators before the Government submit a post-legislative memorandum, and there is a need for government action, then an evidence-based response can be taken. I completely agree with the noble Lord about the importance of this and I thank him for raising this debate. However, I hope that he feels reassured and able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that; it gives me some reassurance, and I am always happy to say when that happens. The aim of the amendment is to improve the Bill, not to undermine it. Some of the things that the Minister has suggested may happen are already happening. When figures are quoted quickly—such as 950 schemes of one sort and 4,826 of the other—the numbers do not seem so large, but they are pretty substantial in terms of those impacted.

We are worried about the impact of consolidation. I rather get the impression that the Minister is aware that there could be problems that need to be reviewed as we go along, and we will need time to assess what is happening. I take cognisance of the Minister’s reassurances: they take us along the same path as I am suggesting. We will have time, obviously, to review what is happening as time progresses. In the light of that, I beg to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 184 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support and have added my name to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I support all his remarks, especially on the only excuse for not recognising that people need pre-1997 indexation going forward. There is a wrong that is being corrected; therefore, that wrong probably applies even more to benefits from the past. One of the reasons why I say “even more so” is because the members who have the most pre-1997 accrual are the oldest—by definition, they must be. They have much less time left to live and many of them have, sadly, already passed away. Therefore, to right this wrong by promising people money in future that they may never see, or will see almost none of, does not seem a solid way of righting a wrong.

I understand—I will go through this in more detail in the next group—that the Financial Assistance Scheme, for example, is supposedly funded by public money, while the PPF itself and employer contributions, in the form of the levy, provides the money for PPF compensation, but £2 billion from the scheme was transferred to the public purse. Thankfully, when we were trying to improve the Financial Assistance Scheme in 2005, Andrew Young recommended stopping annuity purchase, which had been happening and, unfortunately, transferred much of the money to insurers rather than putting it towards the Government to pay out over time. Nevertheless, the Financial Assistance Scheme itself represents some of the biggest losers and the ones with the most pre-1997 accrual.

Therefore, I urge the Government to recognise that the cost of the requirements in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, are easily affordable from the PPF reserve—£14.5 billion is available. The cost estimate for this retrospective addition to the pre-1997 accruals that were not paid in terms of inflation uplifts could be around £500 million out of the £14.5 billion, depending on how the arrears are paid. I would be grateful to the Minister if she could confirm some of the Government’s estimates for what this would be; I have looked at the PPF’s estimates.

I add that the Financial Assistance Scheme does not only help those who affected by insolvency. The European court case was about insolvency, but the MFR protected employers who just wanted to walk away from their schemes before the law changed. Paying in only the MFR was hopelessly inadequate to afford the pensions. There was a brilliant campaign by the unions that went to the European court, and the Government had a great fear that they would lose that. Prior to that, we had an appeal by the workers of Allied Steel and Wire and many of the other schemes to the Pensions Ombudsman, who found in their favour and against the Government, and to the Public Accounts Select Committee. Then we had to go to the High Court, taking a case against the Government, and we won. We also went to the Court of Appeal, taking a case against the Government, and we won on behalf of those whose schemes had failed, whether the employers were insolvent or not, which means that they are all now included.

Even so, the Financial Assistance Scheme and the PPF have not recognised the pre-1997 inflation losses that have left many of these members with half their pension, or even less in some cases. I hope that the Government will look favourably on the amendment. I welcome it, and I am very grateful to the Minister for the recognition that we need to do something—there may be further consideration of that; we will come back to it in subsequent groups—to recompense for the losses of the past.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I wish only to say that I agree with the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the lengthy exposition from the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I give them my support.

This group deals with technical amendments in the main, but they go to a question of basic fairness for pensioners whose schemes have failed. There are eight amendments in the Minister’s name, which shows that Bills can be amended, because the Government are amending their own Bill. Their amendments are no less important than those proposed on this side of the Room or those proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on the other.

The Government have accepted the principle of restoring inflation protection for pre-1997 service in the PPF and the FAS. These amendments ensure that the policy operates as intended, covering cases where the schemes technically add indexation rules that did not apply to all pre-1997 service.

The concern here is consistency and completeness. As has been said by other speakers, without these clarifications, some pensions will fall through the cracks due to historic scheme design quirks, rather than any distinction of principle. Any schemes that were and will be proposed will have quirks that are going to be found out in due course. I ask the Minister to confirm that the Government’s intention is to deliver equal treatment for those with equivalent service histories and that no group will be excluded because of technical anomalies.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I will mainly speak to and concentre on the government amendments in this group. I start by thanking the Minister for setting them out so clearly. We welcome the additional clarity that they provide.

In particular, these amendments ensure that the Financial Assistance Scheme and the PPF payments are treated consistently where a pension scheme formally required pre-1997 indexation but where that requirement did not in fact apply to the specific pre-1997 service for which financial assistance is being paid. Put simply, this is a technical clarification to ensure that indexation under the FAS reflects a member’s actual scheme entitlement, even where a scheme nominally provided for pre-1997 indexation but did not apply it to the service being compensated. We believe that this is a useful and sensible point of clarification—one that helps to ensure that the system operates as it should do.

However, I would be grateful if, when she closes, the Minister could confirm that it is now the Government’s view that these amendments are sufficient to close what may previously have been a gap in the original drafting. In particular, can she confirm that the Government are satisfied that these changes are enough to avoid confusion, to avoid the risk of legal challenge and to ensure that the Financial Assistance Scheme remains, in essence, what it should be—a safety net—rather than becoming an unintended upgrade?

I want also to make a broader process point, because these changes emerged relatively late in proceedings in the other place. I would welcome assurances from the Minister that the relevant stakeholders have been properly consulted and that the Government do not anticipate the need for further amendments on this issue in the Commons—or, indeed, as the Bill continues to go through Parliament. The Minister for Pensions, Torsten Bell, has previously stated that this change will affect around 250,000 members of the PPF, increasing their pension payments by an average of around £400 a year. The Minister cited that figure in her opening remarks, but is that still the Government’s firm and final assessment of the scale and impact of this measure? Perhaps the Minister could clarify that for us.

I also note the comments made by Sara Protheroe, the PPF’s chief customer officer, who said:

“While implementing this change will be no small task”—


that is probably an understatement—the PPF is

“fully committed to delivering this at the earliest opportunity if and when it becomes law”.

That welcome commitment raises an important practical question for the Government, does it not? What assessment has the Minister made of the extra resources that might be required? What support will be provided to the PPF to ensure that delivery can take place smoothly and without delay? Have the Government assessed whether additional resources, which could come via capacity or funding, will be required to implement this change effectively? If so, how do they intend to provide that support?

Regarding Amendment 203ZB, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, I will have more to say in subsequent groups. As the noble Lord said, there are amendments on the FAS and PPF in three different groups today. I hope that the Committee will forgive me if I delay my brief comments. I also listened carefully to the remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. It is best that I make comments in later groups.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I offer my support for the amendment moved and the other amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. She suggested that, in some ways, her amendments are more important than mine. I agree and I will come on to why that is so in a moment. I recognise the importance of the government amendments but, in the words of my noble friend the Minister, we have to recognise the impact of the lack of past increases on those affected.

Retrospection has been mentioned. It is a complete red herring. By its nature, any form of compensation will be retrospective. We are not going to compensate people for what happens in the future. The compensation being paid all too slowly to the Post Office managers is retrospective. The money being paid to the infected blood victims is retrospective, but we still have to pay. “Retrospection” is not a relevant word in this context. We are clear, and we all agree, that these people have lost out, to use the words of my noble friend the Minister, so retrospection is a red herring.

My noble friend the Minister also mentioned the significant impact on public finances. That is true because it has been defined in that way, but we are setting the rules. We are not being subjected to rules imposed by outside interests. If the Treasury does not have the wit or ingenuity to adjust the rules in a way that would allow for these payments from the PPF, which, in reality, would have no impact whatsoever on public expenditure, those who have been affected by the lack of increases will draw their own conclusions as to what the Government really want to do. My noble friend also said that this is a compensation scheme and that it was never designed to offer full redress. Well, that is what we are debating; it is exactly what we are saying is wrong and should be rectified.

The point that I wish to emphasise in this section is the need for urgency. That is why this amendment is the important one. To be brutal, we are dealing with a declining population. It has been estimated that more than 5,000 pensioners with pre-1997 rights are dying each year. We have to take action. Even my amendment, which I proposed to bring the pension up to its current real value, does not address the issue for these people because many of them will not be here. Compensation via lump-sum payments, along the lines suggested in these amendments, are, I believe, the way in which this problem should be addressed. I strongly support these amendments.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I will briefly speak in support of the amendments. I emphasise that they look at how to do this by lump-sum payments, rather than by increasing pensions. That is important. It is what we in my profession used to call “creative accountancy”. It seeks to achieve a result by lump sums, more or less off the Government’s balance sheet. There has been some blending of the funds in the past. It is a way of doing it in a creative accountancy way, largely getting rid of the problem by lump-sum payments. I hope that the Government will look at this in a creative way in order to provide some justice without incurring an ongoing debt.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 187A, 188A, 189A and 203ZA tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. She has long been a formidable and principled advocate for pension savers and much of the Committee will be sympathetic to the underlying concerns that she raised in her remarks. In particular, her consistent focus on member protection, governance and long-term security has materially shaped the debate on pensions policy over many years—and rightly so.

However—the Committee might expect me to say this—while I share the noble Baroness’s objectives, I am not persuaded that the amendments, as drafted, strike the right balance in this instance. I listened carefully to her remarks and her constructive suggestions as to how such payments could be made in the form of lump sums, whether through several lump sums or another way. As ever, she is constructive and positive, and I accept that. These amendments would use the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme to make retrospective lump-sum payments to compensate for unpaid historical indexation. We think that that would represent a significant shift in principle.

I listened carefully, as I always do, to the remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, who called retrospection a red herring. I was not absolutely sure what he meant by that. As I see it, retrospection is just that: retrospection. I think that it describes the payments in the way that it is meant to do. However, the PPF was designed as a forward-looking safety net, not as a mechanism for reopening past outcomes or making retrospective compensation payments. The Minister, to be fair to her, made this clear in her closing remarks in previous groups.

Such an approach would raise serious concerns about cost, complexity and consistency. Although we are somewhat clearer about costs from the helpful remarks from the Minister in the previous group, I am still uncertain—as, I think, other Members of the Committee are—about what the overall costs would be and what the impact would be on the levy and on other contributors. That uncertainty makes me cautious about supporting these amendments, which risk turning a clearly defined insurance mechanism into an open-ended compensation scheme. I suspect that the Minister—without wanting to steal her thunder—may take a similar view in her response, judging from her remarks in the previous group.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, to the Committee. His comments have inspired me to make a very small intervention. It is true that there is a lot of index investment, and inevitably that will capture things inadvertently, but there are now many more indices that will be socially responsible or environmentally responsible, and trustees can choose to use them.

If pension trustees collectively and pension funds made a little more noise and made more approaches to the index providers, we may well get indices that are more pushy in what they do for social and environmental protection. Ultimately, most of the time they are paid to invent an index or they are doing it for their own platforms, but I see an open door there to apply pressure.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson—may there be many in the future. In coming to the Moses Room for the pensions Bill debate, I never thought that I would have to declare an interest, but according to the Companion I need to say that I am the president of the Liberal Democrat Friends of Israel. I need to put that on the record because of what has been said.

I understand where we are coming from, but the trouble is that in the modern world, investments are global. You do not necessarily have one cup being manufactured in the UK or in the countries mentioned by noble Lords. Very often, you have bits of equipment manufactured here, in Israel, in America and elsewhere. I give the F35 aircraft as an example: the parts are assembled from all parts of the world. It becomes a global thing, and it is difficult in the global economy to identify where something is manufactured or whatever.

The point at issue—it is a good point—is that trustees have to make the decision. They will take into account all the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and my noble friend Lady Janke, but at the end of the day they have a fiduciary responsibility to their members. This is not the first time this has happened. Hertfordshire very recently had an amendment to divest from one country. It was passed on the chairman’s vote. What happened? It went back to the pensions committee of Hertfordshire County Council, which decided that its fiduciary duty was not to make political statements but to look after the investments under its control. Whether it is Myanmar, Israel, China or Russia, it is a very slippery slope when you do that. So, as people involved in pensions, we have to leave it to the trustees to use their judgment, taking into account all the factors that the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and others mentioned. It is a fiduciary judgment. Our view is that the fiduciary duty should be robust, not restrictive, focused on long-term member outcomes, informed by real-world risks and clear enough to avoid defensive or overly narrow decision-making. I do not support this amendment.

[Baroness Janke (LD)]

I belatedly state my interest: I am a member of the LGPS. I apologise; I should have said that at the beginning of my speech, so I just put it on the record.

Youth Unemployment

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

My noble friend raises an interesting point. There seems to be some evidence that young people are doing less of that type of work. This is part of what Alan Milburn will look at in his review, which will consider the causes of the growing numbers of young people who are neither earning nor learning. That is of course why being able to provide placements through some of the courses that young people take and the work experience that will be part of the youth guarantee gateway will be important for those young people who have not otherwise had the opportunity to understand what it is like to be in a workplace.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords—

[The Earl of Clancarty (CB)]

My Lords—

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[Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, we have plenty of time. It is the Lib Dem Benches next, then the Cross Benches.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that information, but can she say what assessment has been made of the impact of poor mental health on young people’s ability to gain work? What is the connection between the Department for Work and Pensions and the NHS in dealing with this problem?

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, it is fair to say that I am not keen on Chapter 4 of the Bill, which appears to allow the state to trample on and prevent the establishment of smaller funds, and, if necessary, requires their assets to be moved, presumably to another fund. “Squashing new entrants” was the telling phrase used by my noble friend Lady Noakes. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to provide some reassurance.

I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes and have added my name to most of them. It is essential to permit the regulations to be pro- competitive rather than over-exclusionary, and for the review required by Clause 43—the timing of which we are yet to hear about—to consider the competitive landscape for pension scheme provision.

It is also important that the regulations made encourage innovation, as Amendment 170 would. The substantial £25 billion minimum provided for in the Government’s reforms seems set to deter such innovation—innovation that is characteristic of smaller, growing operators. We have heard that, at length, on several days, but we have not yet received an adequate answer. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has already raised some good points about other risks that may arise from the proposed arrangements.

My noble friend Lady Noakes rightly suggested that the Pensions Regulator should be made to consider the competitiveness of new entries. I share her praise for the fintech sandbox, although I would say that that was a long time ago—indeed, when I was a Treasury Minister about 10 years ago. I am, however, less sure about the FCA’s overall success. I have therefore added my name to my noble friend Lord Younger’s stand-part notice, which questions the need for Clause 45. The Government’s Explanatory Notes are far from helpful and the implications of this clause are unclear. Why does it extend the FCA’s supervisory jurisdiction to default arrangements under Chapter 4? What, if any, new delegated powers are being given to it?

I have encountered a lot of problems with the FCA over the years. The truth is that I have not found it business or fund-friendly. It presents itself as the champion of the consumer, but adds cost, delay, bureaucracy and uncertainty in a way that often raises prices and returns to the very consumer that it was set up to protect. I am therefore of the view that its role should be minor and constrained. What is the background and rationale for this clause? We need to know more if we are going to support it.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank everyone for their contributions. It might take 300 years to get it right, but we do not have 300 years; we are trying to get it right in the course of a few meetings, as the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, pointed out. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, gave us the view from the coalface with regard to the decisions that trustees have to take and about trustees working on behalf of their members. The key concern, which is why I support these amendments, is that the default should be shaped around members’ needs and outcomes, not regulatory convenience or market consolidation by default.

The amendments in this group emphasise the importance of competition, innovation and transparency. They highlight the need for clear member communication before defaults are subject to mandation, for a value-for-money framework to be in place first and, I am afraid, for Ministers to justify why mandation is limited to automatic enrolment defaults. The amendments seek to put some meat on to what this Bill is meant to do. They are, I think, necessary to make sense of the precautions that are needed if this Bill goes forward.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I hope that the Committee will think that it makes sense if I begin with the four amendments in this group tabled in my name. I start with our probing stand-part question on Clause 45. This is a short clause, but an important one. It makes changes to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The purpose of the question is simply to understand the practical effect of those changes, particularly in the context of the wider programme of consolidation and reform of assimilated European Union law.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who I am pleased to say is in her place and has spoken so eloquently, may feel a certain sense of déjà vu, having spent a considerable time on the Front Bench examining precisely these issues. My questions to the Minister are therefore straightforward. What, in practical terms, does Clause 45 change in the operation of the Act?

I start with some fairly basic questions for clarification. Will further secondary legislation be required to give effect to these provisions? If so, do the Government have a timetable over which they envisage this process taking place? How does this clause interact with the statutory instruments recently considered by the Grand Committee as part of the wider reform programme? This is a live and important area. As assimilated European Union law becomes domestic law and increasingly interacts with our financial institutions, the FCA and other relevant regulators, it is essential that Parliament has clarity on how these changes fit together and where accountability lies.

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There should have to be quite a high likelihood that members and others will be better off after changes. I am very sceptical about providers being able to make unilateral changes; there needs to have some evidence behind that. My amendment uses the phrase “there is evidence”, which does not mean that you have to have 100% evidence on one side of it, but it cannot just be a matter of convenience—a matter that it is easier for the providers—and therefore it is bound to be easier for the members and the scheme as a whole. That is quite simple and it needs investigating. I hope that, if the best interests test is to stay there, the Government will ensure that a high standard has to be passed, not one that is a minority standard.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I have just a short comment. The Minister needs to explain why existing protections are insufficient and how this power will be constrained in practice. The concern is that lowering the evidential bar for intervention risks undermining legal certainty, which we have before intervention, and then trust in the scheme governance. An override of contractual terms should be firmly evidence-based and used sparingly. When there is a contract and we are saying that the contract could be overridden, we need to know with some facts in what circumstances it can be overridden for some wider purpose which the Government think is needed. I do not think that is proven as yet.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I speak briefly to Amendment 175, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. This amendment relates to new Section 117D, the best interests test as set out in Clause 48. This new section establishes the test that must be satisfied before a unilateral change can be made. It requires a provider to reasonably conclude that such a change is reasonably likely to lead to

“a better outcome for the directly affected members … (taken as a whole)”

and to

“no worse an outcome for the other members of the scheme”,

also taken as a whole.

Many of the questions that my noble friend and the noble Baroness have raised reflect concerns that have been put to us during scrutiny of the Bill. In particular, there remains uncertainty about what, in practice, is meant by a better outcome, and how that judgment will be assessed, evidenced and challenged. I say again, as we have said on different parts of the Bill, that we believe we need definitions and clarity.

We will listen carefully to the Minister’s response on this point. The clarity and robustness of the best interests test are critical, particularly where changes may occur without the explicit consent of individual members. If that clarity is not forthcoming, this may well be an issue to which we will need to return.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

Once again, I find myself in the position of being in broadly the same area as the noble Lord, Lord Fuller. I agree with much of what he said. We can always be in favour of reviews. The only substantial objection is that the Secretary of State—or more accurately, the hard-pressed officials—has better things to do, particularly with having to implement the Bill when it is an Act.

The Pensions Commission is also crucial. The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for whom I have a lot of respect, challenged me on why I am not doing more on adequacy, in effect. Of course, the answer is that I fully support the Pensions Commission; that is where the focus should be on that area. I think my noble friend the Minister is aware of some of my views on the level of inadequacy in pension provision, but the commission is where it should be at.

Pensions are inherently political. I make no apology for making political points. I am against the idea of moving towards a joint regulator. There are two broad types of pension provision: individual contracts and employer-sponsored collective provision. I am very much in favour of the latter as opposed to the former. The former has, and always will have, severe problems, whereas collective provision is what has led the high standard of private provision across, broadly, half of the working population.

The problem with having a single regulator is essentially cultural. One or the other approach is bound to predominate in its thinking. It is impossible to ride two horses, unless you are in a circus, and that is not where we want to be. We need a regulator for collective employer-sponsored provision, and a regulator for market-based provision. That is what we have got so, in a sense, in my few remarks I have already carried out the review that has been called for and reached a satisfactory solution.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, what worries me is that the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, says we should grab the challenge. I am not sure that I am ready to grab the challenge and not convinced that we should abandon, in any way, the Financial Conduct Authority. I wonder what representations have been made by the FCA on this. I would like to hear how the FCA feels about the Pensions Regulator taking over and what has happened in the past.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I can assure the noble Lord that the FCA will not give anything up. In fact, it would probably rather swallow the Pensions Regulator.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

Maybe that would be a good thing. I am not convinced that the regulator pushing away from primary legislation to regulation is necessarily the way forward. I am not convinced that what has happened to date has failed. Therefore, I am not sure why we want to change this without adequate proof. The idea that the FCA wants to swallow up everything else is fairly normal in the gladiatorial forum that we have. I would like to see what the FCA and others have to say about this before we make a final decision.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I speak to both Amendments 180A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Coffey, and Amendment 206, which stands in the name of my noble friend Viscount Younger of Leckie and myself. Both amendments address the regulation of pensions and how the regulation is best exercised in the interest of scheme members and future pensioners.

It was the intervention of my noble friend Lady Coffey at Second Reading that first prompted me to reflect more deeply on the role of regulators. As my noble friend argued then, and has argued again today in speaking to Amendment 180A, this Bill misses a significant structural opportunity by retaining two separate pension regulators. I agree with her. There is something inherently odd about the fact that very similar pension products can be treated differently depending on whether they fall within the remit of the Pensions Regulator or the Financial Conduct Authority. That observation is not controversial; it is simply a reflection of how the current system operates.

I recall clearly the passage of the then Pension Schemes Bill in February 2020 and remember responding to amendments from across your Lordships’ House by explaining that personal pension schemes were regulated by the FCA, rather than the Pensions Regulator, and that imposing requirements on personal pension providers through that legislation would risk creating a patchwork of overlapping regulatory oversight. Providers, it was argued, would otherwise be required to respond to two separate regulators in relation to the same activity. That was the Government’s position at the time, and it illustrates that the existence of regulatory fragmentation in this area is not a matter of dispute.

A great deal of work has gone into managing the fragmentation, with strategic documents, dating back to 2018, seeking to grapple with the issue. The FCA and the Pensions Regulator have published joint regulatory strategies explicitly acknowledging the complexity that arises where their remits intersect and the need for close co-ordination. More recently, an independent review of the Pensions Regulator in 2023 again highlighted the challenges inherent in this divided regulatory landscape. Taken together, these developments point to structural issues in the regulatory ecosystem that can, at the very least, create confusion and the risk of inconsistency.

It was on the basis of that experience in government and of careful consideration since then that I sought to identify what might realistically be done in this Bill. I came to the conclusion that Amendment 206 represents a proportionate and pragmatic compromise. It would require the Government to establish a formal published protocol setting out clearly how the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator co-ordinate, how responsibilities are divided between them and how they communicate when regulating the pensions industry. The evidence shows that there is complexity, overlap and, at times, confusion between the two regulators. Stakeholders frequently complain of unclear lines of responsibility and the regulators themselves openly acknowledge that co-ordination is difficult, hence the repeated reliance on joint strategies and informal arrangements.

It was our sense that the problem is one not of outright contradiction but of opacity, complexity and accountability. Amendment 206 is, therefore, carefully targeted at the problem, which is clearly evidenced. It seeks to improve co-ordination and clarity without asserting a level of regulatory failure that has not yet been conclusively demonstrated. That does not place it in opposition to the argument advanced by my noble friend Lady Coffey; indeed, I would be very happy to work with her, as we did so constructively on previous pension legislation, to strengthen this area further.

In my view, a formal co-ordination protocol has three important virtues. First, it can evolve over time as the regulatory landscape changes. Secondly, it can be tightened if problems persist or new risks emerge. Thirdly, it can itself become the evidence base for any future decision to pursue more fundamental consolidation of regulatory functions, should that ultimately be judged necessary. For those reasons, I commend Amendment 206 to the Committee and urge the Government to see it not as an obstacle but as a constructive and proportionate step towards greater clarity, accountability and confidence in the regulation of pensions.

Child Poverty: Faith-based and Voluntary Sector Organisations

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for a great question. I agree with her point that the role of cultural organisations and the opportunity to participate and engage with others to do collective action in different ways are crucial to children’s development—and often those are the kinds of opportunities that children from wealthier families have that others would not. In response to the specifics, Sunderland being very near to Durham, I would be delighted to learn more about what is happening there. I need to go and find out. My office can take note.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply about how the charities will work, but what worries me is how small, local charities will be included in this. It rather looks as if we are encouraging the larger charities to do all the good work that they do but, as the other questioners said, there are a lot of local charities. I would like to know that they are going to be included in this process.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

That is a great question, if I may say so—there are some good questions coming out today. We absolutely are not interested in talking solely to large charities. We are interested in talking to them too, but we need to engage locally. As I am sure the noble Lord knows, one way that this Government are going about our work in the DWP is that we are devolving quite a lot. We are aware that much of the work we want to do can be done much better at a local level. For example, it is much clearer in Manchester than it is in London what should happen in Greater Manchester. So we are devolving and encouraging local organisations in many of the pilots that we are running to engage with local charities, but we will also often engage with organisations that themselves are umbrellas, which can bring together local charities to come and talk to us.

The noble Lord makes a really important point. Having worked in the voluntary sector myself for a long time, I know that there are some insights that national charities give that are really helpful, but other things you find out only when you go to the coalface. Just last week I visited a small charity in Fife that is doing amazing work, and I learned things from it that I would not have learned from the biggest charity. So that is a good point, and I take it on.

Two-child Benefit Cap: Foreign-born Children

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My noble friend is so right. The cost of failing to tackle poverty is too high—for those children but also for our country. Hungry children do not arrive at school ready to learn. Poorer children are more likely to have mental health difficulties by the age of 11. They are more likely to have poorer employment outcomes and earn less. She is absolutely right: the rise in child poverty in England between 2015 and 2020 is estimated to have led to 10,000 more children entering our care system, with all the consequences for those children, as well as for the country and for the Exchequer. A child’s health opportunities and prospects should not be determined by how many siblings they have or by the accident of their circumstances. We will lift children out of poverty and this country will benefit from that.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that answer. To follow on from that—to get to the crux of the matter—could she tell us what assessment has been made of the cap’s overall effect on child poverty? Can she clarify and put on the record what the actual effect was and how we can benefit by the removal of the cap?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right about the effects of this. The Labour Party in government pledged to tackle child poverty. What this Government have brought forward is a child poverty strategy which, including removing the two-child limit, will bring another 550,000 children out of poverty by the end of this Parliament. That is what we are here to do; that is what we are shooting for.

I stress that this is about fairness. Of course, our benefit system is there to support those for whom this is their home; those who contribute. Of course it is there to be fair, but it is also there as a safety net, and our job is to get that balance right. In the case of children, it surely has to be right to tackle child poverty, to give them the opportunity and for the country to benefit from that.

Women’s State Pension Age Communication: PHSO Report

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, but it does not, in my view, completely address directly the issue that lies at the heart of the anger felt by many WASPI women. I am assured that the maladministration identified by the ombudsman, and the associated question of a financial remedy, arose from decisions taken under a Labour Government that were the responsibility of Labour Ministers. In the years that followed, there was notable and sustained support from Labour Members for the WASPI campaign, including calls for compensation, voiced by individuals who now occupy the most senior positions in government.

Now that Labour is in power, that position appears to have been abandoned. The result is not merely disappointment, but a profound sense of betrayal. It is no wonder that WASPI women are furious. At no point in the Oral Statement, as far as I can see or understand, was this reversal acknowledged. Instead, attention was diverted towards general references to changes in the state pension age, which did nothing to address the specific findings of maladministration or the expectations that were so clearly raised.

There is a strong sense of frustration surrounding this issue, not only among Members of this House but, more importantly, among the WASPI women. Much of that frustration arises not simply from the substance of the decision but from the manner in which it has been handled and communicated by the Government. From welfare reform to the winter fuel payment, and now this, a pattern has emerged of poor communication and delayed decision-making. Too often, it is not the policy itself that causes the greatest anger but the uncertainty, delay and lack of clarity that surround it. Indecision is itself a decision. In this case, it has meant leaving people’s lives and expectations suspended for months.

In recent months, expectations appear to have been raised only to be lowered again. Following the ombudsman’s report, many campaigners believed that a different outcome was genuinely under consideration, only to be told once more that nothing had changed. The Minister will recall suggestions that decisions on this matter were left unresolved until after the general election in 2024. That is not entirely accurate. Statements made before the election set out the Government’s position with some clarity, which makes it legitimate for WASPI women to ask why more recent communications appeared to imply that the issue and situation remained open.

Against that background, can the Minister explain how the Government now intend to communicate their position clearly and directly to WASPI women? Will letters be issued setting out the decision and the reasons for it? If so, when and in what form will that communication take place? Given the strength of feeling among those affected, this must be treated with the gravity it deserves. More broadly, there is a sense that poor managerial experience has characterised the handling of this matter, further undermining trust.

That damage has been compounded by the contrast between earlier rhetoric and the position now being taken. The Deputy Prime Minister and the Justice Secretary spoke of a cliff edge facing WASPI women. The Foreign Secretary said she was fighting for a fair deal. The Chancellor said she wanted justice. The current Secretary of State for Work and Pensions publicly associated himself with MPs campaigning for a better outcome. Those who once stood beside them now appear, in their eyes, to have turned away.

I know that the Minister referred to pension credit and the importance of take-up, and I completely share that with her. I did my very best when I was in her position to make sure that we did everything we could to ensure that pension credit was taken up and increased. I am not sure if progress has stalled or whether there has been any improvement, so can the Minister clarify the position on take-up of pension credit and whether this can be used to placate some of these genuine WASPI women?

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing this Statement to the House. The Government say the WASPI women should have known about the changes. I am reminded of a quote from the book The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy:

“But the plans were on display … you found the notice, didn’t you? … It was on display in the bottom of a locked filing cabinet stuck in a disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying ‘Beware of the Leopard’”.


Another relevant quote from the same book said:

“All the planning charts and demolition orders have been on display at your local planning department in Alpha Centauri for 50 … years”.


The issue here is whether these women were communicated with adequately. Some 3.6 million WASPI women have been badly treated. They were given some hope; we have an ombudsman who made a recommendation to provide some justice and pay some compensation. Can the Minister say why this recommendation has been ignored? We have heard apologies but no compensation.

If you were a woman who knew that, at a certain age, you would receive a pension you probably did not give it another thought that the rules had changed. Of course, lots of announcements were made, and lots of letters were sent—sometimes belatedly, as the ombudsman said—but the truth is that the messages were not received or understood. The ombudsman has recommended compensation of £1,000 to £2,950 per person. I ask the Minister, very bluntly, why this recommendation has not been implemented. It is not a question of justice, but a reluctance to spend money on a group of people who cannot fight back.

Can the Minister take back to her colleagues in the department that there is a feeling—I hope—across this House that the WASPI have been maltreated and that the least they should expect is for the recommendation of the independent ombudsman to be put into effect? It is not enough, in my view, but it has come from the ombudsman, and I would like to hear what reasoning the Minister can give for ignoring this. I hope that she will take back to her colleagues in the other House and in the department the feelings of this House that the ombudsman’s decision should be honoured.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their questions. Last November, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions told Parliament that the Government would make a new decision in response to the ombudsman’s findings on state pension-age communications. That followed relevant evidence coming to light as part of legal proceedings challenging the original decision announced in December 2024. The Secretary of State has now concluded the process to make a new decision, and there is a copy of the Government’s full response in the Library.

We need to be clear as to exactly what the ombudsman did and did not investigate. The ombudsman did not investigate the decision, first taken in 1995, to equalise the state pension age nor to accelerate the increases. There are different views about the raising of the state pension age and about the decision of the coalition Government in 2011 to accelerate equalisation and the rise to the age of 66. However, that is not the subject of the ombudsman’s decision. What the ombudsman investigated is how the change in state pension age was communicated to the women affected and whether, within a specific and narrow time period, there was maladministration and injustice, and if so, whether it warrants compensation. The ombudsman concluded that the department’s communications met expected standards between 1995 and 2004. However, it found that between 2005 and 2007 there was a 28-month delay in the DWP sending personalised letters to the women affected. The ombudsman found that this was maladministration. We accept that those individual letters could have been sent earlier and the Secretary of State has apologised for that. We also agree with the ombudsman that the women did not suffer any direct financial loss from the delay.

The question is about the impact of the delay in sending those letters. However, the evidence taken as a whole, including that from 2007, suggests that the majority of 1950s-born women would not have read and recalled the contents of an unsolicited pensions letter, even if it had been sent earlier. Further, the evidence also suggests that those less knowledgeable about pensions, the very women who most needed to engage with a letter and where it might have made a difference, were least likely to read it. An earlier letter would therefore have been unlikely to make a difference to what the majority of women knew about their own state pension age. Indeed, the 2007 report concluded that automatic pension forecast letters had only a negligible impact on pensions knowledge and planning and the department stopped sending them.

The evidence also shows that the vast majority of 1950s-born women already knew that the state pension age was increasing thanks to a wide range of public information, including in leaflets, through education campaigns, in GP surgeries, on TV and radio, in cinemas and online.

To compensate specifically only those women who suffered injustice would require a scheme that could reliably verify the individual circumstances of millions of women. That includes whether someone genuinely did not know the state pension age was changing and whether they would have read and remembered a letter from many years ago and acted differently. It would not be practical to set up a compensation scheme to assess conclusively the answers to those questions.

The alternative might be to introduce a targeted scheme, which we considered could possibly allow people to self-certify, but that could not be done in a way that was fair and represents value for money. Even if we asked women to self-certify that they experienced injustice, we would have no way of verifying it. As for a flat-rate scheme, it would cost up to £10.3 billion and would simply not be right or fair, given that it would be paid to the vast majority who were aware of the changes.

I fully recognise the strength of feeling on this issue. Many women born in the 1950s have experienced significant disadvantage, not least in the labour market. We will continue working towards equality for women in the workplace now and in future, and ensure that those with lower pension outcomes due to the inequalities they have faced in the past receive the right support. We are delivering support to low-income pensioners and pensioners more broadly by increasing the rate of the state pension, supporting the poorest through pension credit, and investing more money in the NHS to reduce waiting lists and to strengthen vital services.

For example, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, mentioned, our pension credit take-up campaign has been promoted to eligible pensioners and their friends and family. That is having a good effect and I would be very happy to talk more on that if noble Lords are interested. We are seeing significant numbers of increases in claims and awards, which is really helpful.

I turn to a couple of the other specific points that were mentioned. The noble Baroness challenged us as to why Labour in opposition took a different view. I will just say two things to her. The first is that she will appreciate, having been both in opposition and in government, that there is information that one has in government that one does not have when one is in opposition. We understand that many people are unhappy with what has happened. Although she is suggesting that it is entirely Labour’s fault, I suggest to her that quite a bit of the anger is about the rise in the state pension age and, in particular, the decision of the coalition Government to accelerate that in 2011, which meant a significant number of women finding that their state pension age went back more quickly than they had expected.

This decision is not about that; we need to separate the two things. We considered the ombudsman’s report very carefully, not just once but twice, and gave it due and proper process, including the information that Ministers were not able to see before they were in government. We concluded that it is right to apologise for the maladministration, but we believe that the decision we have taken on remedy and compensation is the right one.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that is the reason we made the decision. We accepted the ombudsman’s finding of maladministration. We did not accept the ombudsman’s approach to injustice for the reasons that I have explained about the impact of the not sending of those letters. The finding was narrowly about a 28-month delay. Because the evidence suggests that the majority of women were aware that the state pension age was changing, we do not accept that it is possible, on that basis, to construct a compensation scheme that would be targeted at those who experienced injustice.

The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, challenged me about the ombudsman. The ombudsman did their job, and the findings were fully and properly considered, but decisions on a compensation scheme of this scale are properly for Ministers and the Government to take. That is the case and, indeed, always will be.

This is a challenging issue, but it was right for the Secretary of State to review the evidence and to reach a decision based on due process and on the body of evidence. Looking forward to the future, we are taking important steps to support women in retirement to make sure that things like this do not happen again and to help them to build a better life for themselves and their families.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 26th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. As we know, this group addresses the use of scale, as measured by assets under management or monetary value, as a determinant of scheme quality.

The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, gave the example of the Orkney trust. I ask myself: what is the reason? Is it size? Personally, I think it is the calibre of the single malt whisky. Then we go to the other end of the country, to Guernsey. Is it because trusts are at the extremes of the country that causes the good benefits, or is it something else? You can always look for a reason: it could be size, location or anything else—or, indeed, the quality of the whisky.

We accept that scale can bring efficiencies, but there is a strong question over whether size alone is a reliable proxy for value. Amendments 91 and 95 recognise that some master trusts and group personal pension schemes deliver strong investment performance despite being below prescribed thresholds. Amendment 98 similarly acknowledges that innovation and specialism do not always depend on scale, location or whatever else.

We are also concerned about the rigidity of fixed monetary thresholds in the Bill. Amendments 99, 101, 106 and 108 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, are concerned about the rigidity of fixed monetary thresholds in the Bill. These amendments probe whether the figures chosen are evidence-based and future-proofed, or whether they risk being outdated—that is the point—as the market evolves. It is not cast in stone, and we should not try to see it as such.

Amendments 101, 104 and 108 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and others, raise an additional concern: the risk of mandating common investment strategies. Diversity of approach is a strength of a pension system. Forcing schemes into uniform strategies risks herding behaviour and systemic vulnerability. My question to the Minister is this: is the Government’s objective genuinely better member outcomes—which I believe we all want—or prioritising administrative simplicity at the expense of innovation, competition and resilience? All the amendments in this group tackle this problem, and those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, particularly stress that. I hope we will continue to push these through to the next stage of the debate on this Bill.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, today’s groups build directly on the issues explored in last Thursday’s debate. That discussion was both stimulating and constructive, and the contributions made, particularly on mandation, highlight the value of the scrutiny that this Bill continues to receive in Grand Committee. On this group, in the interests of brevity—I am sure that will please the whole Committee—I shall keep my remarks focused on the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. A number of significant and related issues have been raised by other noble Lords, and we will wish to return to these later today. We will listen carefully to the Minister’s response to the points made on this group.

Amendment 98 would introduce a clear and proportionate innovation exemption for relevant master trusts under Clause 40, so that schemes delivering genuinely specialist or innovative services are not automatically required to meet the scale threshold simply because of their size. We have been challenged today not to be obsessed with size. We recognise the policy aim of improving outcomes through scale. However, as I said, size is not always a reliable proxy for quality or value: there are master trusts that are smaller by design yet deliver strong member outcomes through innovation, whether in investment approach, governance or engagement with particular workforces. As the Bill is currently drafted, such schemes risk being forced to consolidate or exit, not because they are failing members but because they do not meet a blunt asset size test.

Amendment 98 provides a sensible alternative route, recognising that innovation and specialisation can also deliver high-quality outcomes. This amendment simply ensures that size alone is not determinative. I hope the Minister will see this as a constructive amendment that supports innovation and choice while remaining fully aligned with the Bill’s objective of improving outcomes for savers.

Amendment 102 is, again, a probing amendment. Clause 40 gives the Secretary of State the power to determine by regulations the method for calculating a master trust’s total assets for the purposes of this provision. That is a potentially significant power, because the way that total assets are defined and measured will determine which schemes fall within scope and which may benefit from exemptions.

--- Later in debate ---

So I totally endorse the noble Baroness’s Amendment 97, and I wish more power to her elbow. I sense that this will be another of those themes that comes back on Report, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said. We will have to tease this through. I encourage the Minister to observe that all the party groups on this side of the Room are at one. As we go from Committee to Report, I hope she will consider a slight adjustment in the approach so that we can deliver a pensions Bill that works for members—because this one does not.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on having a group of nine amendments all on her own. We normally share groups rather than have them all on our own. This group considers how scale requirements interact with default pension arrangements where most savers remain invested. I have listened to the debate and, having spent a large part of my career in accountancy and advising clients, I know that the trouble is that the majority of clients are not expert enough to know what they should do with their pension. They seek advice from various organisations on what they should do. We should make sure that the quality of the advice they get suits their position in life. As other noble Lords have said, we are concerned about the overly rigid scale test, which could unintentionally narrow choice within defaults and push schemes towards one-size-fits-all designs.

Amendment 97 highlights the importance of allowing defaults that reflect members’ differing ages, health conditions, retirement plans and risk profiles. Amendments 97A to 101B probe—this is the point—whether the authority can take account of the combined value of assets across multiple default arrangements, rather than assessing each in isolation. Without this flexibility, schemes that offer well-designed cohort-based defaults could be penalised simply for tailoring provision.

Amendments 168A and 170A reinforce this point, seeking to ensure that schemes are not excluded from the market for moving beyond crude uniform defaults. Our concern is that defaults should be designed around member needs, not regulatory convenience. I hope the Minister will explain how the Bill avoids pushing schemes towards uniformity at the expense of suitability and long-term outcomes.

I hope the Minister does not regard the series of amendments in this group as combative. They are meant to try to help pensioners or future pensioners. It is wrong if the Government look for a simple process but do not look at the benefit for the people concerned. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, who talked about what happens in gilts and the like. I come from a period in the chartered accountant profession when you always went into gilts in what you thought were the last few years of your working life. Now, things have changed. We have to look at what you do and when you do it, and those things depend on the people involved.

I hope the Minister will see that these amendments are trying to say that things should not be too prescriptive. They are not against what the Government are trying to do, which is look after people. But are doing it on a one-size-fits-all basis, which does not work in the real world that we are in. I hope the Government go back and think about this a little more so that, when we come to Report, we can be a little more innovative.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak briefly in support of this group of amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Altmann. She has once again demonstrated her expertise and the value that she brings to our scrutiny of these important issues. Most importantly, she explained the spirit in which these amendments were tabled.

Throughout our proceedings on this Bill, a consistent theme across the Committee has been the need for proportionality in the steps we are taking on scale and value for money, and for definitions that are sufficiently comprehensive to reflect how the market actually operates in practice. I do not intend to repeat the points already made by the noble Baroness or ask the questions she has posed, but we will listen carefully to the Minister’s response on these issues.

Clause 40, as drafted, risks applying the scale test in an overly narrow and mechanical way by requiring the regulator to assess each default arrangement in isolation without regard to the wider context in which it is offered. That approach is not necessarily proportionate; nor does it reflect the economic reality of how master trust providers operate. This amendment would allow the regulator to take into account the combined assets of several non-scale default arrangements offered by the same provider. In doing so, it would not dilute the principle of scale; rather, it would ensure that scale is assessed in a comprehensive and realistic way, focusing on the resilience, governance and efficiency of the provider as a whole.

That matters because, without this flexibility, we risk forcing consolidation for its own sake and potentially requiring well-run, well-performing defaults to be wound up simply because they fall on the wrong side of an arbitrary threshold—even where the provider clearly operates at scale overall. This amendment therefore speaks directly to the principles that we have already raised in Committee: that regulations should be outcome-focused rather than box-ticking, and that they should avoid unintended consequences that could undermine member confidence rather than enhancing it. For those reasons, I believe this is a sensible and proportionate refinement of Clause 40, and I hope the Minister will give it serious consideration.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendments 112, 114 and 117 in the names of my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady McIntosh of Pickering, which aim to set a cap on asset allocation.

In response to our debate on the previous group, the Minister consistently described the mandation power as seeking to achieve a “modest but meaningful” investment in private assets; and said, importantly, that it was designed as a “narrow backstop” to delivering the Mansion House Accord. If that is the case, why is the proportion of assets that can be mandated under this power not capped in line with that accord? Indeed, as I read it, it could be up to 100% of assets. Why is that? The Minister may point to consultation and other measures that will constrain the use of the power but, for something so controversial and which the Government say they do not want to use, I cannot understand why they are not constraining it in primary legislation.

I will touch on timescales in our debate on the next group, but the Minister says that this Government do not want to use this power. However, as things currently stand, it would be open to the next Government to use the power, and the one after that—as well as a couple of Governments in between if we do not go to full Parliaments, as we have not always done in recent years. In those circumstances, it would also be sensible to limit the power to delivering what the Government say they want it to do.

Why do the Government not want a maximum limit in primary legislation? What is their objection to it? The cynic in me wonders whether the power is so widely drawn that, when we remove mandation on Report—I might be getting ahead of myself but that is on the cards—the Government could bring forward a series of concessions at ping-pong to limit the use of the power to what they say they want it to do. I am sure that that is not the case, but it might be better than the position in which the Government think that this power, as it appears in the legislation, has been drawn appropriately. I am really interested in the Minister’s response on this.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I will come in at this moment because I wish to speak in favour of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which I have co-signed, because he is unable to be with us today. These words are both mine and the noble Lord’s, more or less.

I am not in favour of the asset allocation mandation clauses generally. Amendment 119, however, seeks to probe the reasons why the Government have chosen a particular asset class for mandation: private equity. I have no problem with pension schemes choosing to invest in private equity; historically, it has generated good returns, in large part because of the use of debt to leverage those returns. Private equity may be a good investment for pensions schemes, and this amendment would not prevent that.

However, my understanding is that the principal motive of the Government for mandating asset allocation is to drive greater economic growth. I agree that venture capital and private debt—two other asset types listed in the Bill—may indeed create growth, but I do not understand why the Government believe that private equity is a growth driver. I have to assume that this is because the Government have fallen for the story that the private equity industry often tells about how much investment it makes, how many people it employs, what great returns it generates, and so on. What private equity actually does is buy existing companies or assets, allowing the previous owners to cash out.

Very rarely, I believe, does a private equity company provide new equity into a company. Rather, it typically does the opposite: it funds the acquisition with a very high proportion of debt. The leveraged buy-out is the basic model of most private equity activity. That debt is not borrowed by the private equity itself; rather, it is pushed down into the underlying company, and the interest and any debt repayments are made from that company’s profits.

One effect of this is to reduce the taxable profits—in other words, the debt interest is tax deductible—and therefore the tax is payable by the company. The debt itself is often located in offshore low-tax locations, so tax is not paid on the interest by the private equity or the lender, which may well be related. This is a direct loss to the Exchequer. I hope the Minister can reply to that.

The high leverage also has the effect of reducing investment by the company in its products or services. Instead of investing in its future growth, the company now has to use much of its cash flow to pay the interest. What often happens is that the private equity undertakes a cost-rationalising exercise so that the profits are improved in the short term with a view to selling the business again as soon as possible. The leveraged effect of the debt means that private equity can make a substantial gain even if the underlying business grows only in line with inflation.

The cost rationalisation often invokes workforce reductions. Studies indicate that private equity-owned companies typically have lower levels of employment even five years after the original buy-out. This certainly tallies with my experience, although I have not had the benefit of the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who worked for private equity-owned companies during his career.

In the meantime, if there are any profits left, rather than being invested in growth they are usually paid out as dividends. In fact, it is not uncommon, if a company has managed to reduce its debt ratio, for a PE to recapitalise the company to put in more debt in order to allow the payment of a dividend. Of course there are exceptions, but, as many examples show, such as Thames Water—indeed, much of the water industry—Debenhams, Southern Cross and Silentnight, private equity cannot legitimately claim to be a force for growth. Are there good returns for its investors, and particularly its partners? Yes—but is it a force for growth? It is not really. It is said that £29.4 billion was invested in UK firms by private equity in 2024. Yes, but that investment was almost entirely in buying out existing businesses, which is very different from providing capital for growth.

So the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I are baffled as to why the Government think that mandating pension funds to invest in private equity will be good for the country. It may be good for someone but not necessarily for the country. I repeat that I have no problem with a pension fund investing in private equity if the trustees believe it is right for the fund and its members, but I see no benefit, and probably a downside, for the country as a whole. If we must mandate allocation, let us at least target it to asset types that generate growth, such as venture capital or infrastructure. If the Government’s primary motive for mandation is to drive UK growth, we should exclude private equity from the list. I hope the Minister and her colleagues will give thought to this, because we are on the same wavelength and we want the same answer, but not in the way that the Bill proposes at the moment.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

This group of amendments is quite interesting in starting to sketch out what is important in the value-for-money approach that is being adopted through the Bill. I did not know when the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, would speak to Amendment 49 and I will be interested to hear what he has to say on this, because the only other form of occupational pension is, in effect, the defined benefit, where you know what you are getting. I was a bit surprised that he felt that that would need to go further, because that is a direct relationship between somebody and their employer. Nevertheless, I am sure he will explain further.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, has tabled Amendments 55 and 56 to Clause 12, which are sensible, but one thing that concerns me at the start of that clause is the word “may”. We should be beyond that at this stage, which is why I also support my noble friends on the Front Bench in opposing Clause 13 standing part of the Bill. There are just too many ifs, buts and maybes, but when it comes to Clause 13 there is nothing at all. It is just a blank cheque for the future. I am conscious that things can vary over time, but we should be in a position where we are getting some clarity on what will be in these value-for-money assessments so that people can make choices. We should be getting that clarity now. If necessary, we can put down regulations for affirmative procedures but, candidly, I do not think it is good enough that we have this sort of approach to defining what is there for the future.

I say to the Minister that I appreciate that this is a real step forward and I welcome that. People put their money in, they are not exactly sure what return they are getting and they might look every now and again at where it is coming out. I appreciate that there is a whole journey to go on in pensions education, as well as for the trustees, in terms of what is really happening with their advisers who continue to do low-risk, low-reward. I encourage the Minister, however, to come back on Report with a much stronger sketching out of what will be in these assessments, as required by Clause 13. For example, instead of just having the word “may”, have some “must” in there and then open up the power later to adjust as necessary. It is also valuable to be able to repeal.

Amendment 74 concerns the “Duty to formalise the Value for Money framework”; I know that my Front Bench will speak to that shortly. It is a useful exercise to check whether it is working. There are other amendments which basically make comparisons with other pension providers. That gets trickier if it is done at such a detailed level because, again, people might want some basic information on what is happening with their money. To pick at random, they might want their money with Standard Life instead of Scottish Life; if there is some variation, they might want to make a change. It is those sorts of things that I encourage the Minister to have more detail on by the time we reach Report.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, as has been expressed, this group establishes the foundation of the value-for-money framework. We welcome the ambition to improve outcomes for savers. However, the effectiveness of value for money will depend on how it is defined, measured and implemented, and I welcome the comments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Altmann and Lady Kramer, which elaborated on these points.

I shall concentrate on Amendments 49 and 54 and I hope I can persuade the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that they are of value. These amendments will extend the scope of the Bill’s value-for-money provisions. They ensure that they apply not only to defined contribution schemes but defined benefit occupational pension schemes as well.

The arrangements make it clear that regulations can make different provision for different types of scheme. Critically, however, all schemes must be covered by the value-for-money assessment, with a proper value-for-money rating. Members of DB schemes deserve the same transparency and assurance about value for money as members of DC schemes. DB schemes still represent a significant part of the pensions landscape. Excluding them risks creating an uneven playing field and less scrutiny where it is still needed.

A single, consistent framework across occupational pensions improves comparability, avoids regulatory gaps and ensures that all savers benefit from the same standards of accountability. The two amendments in my name would ensure that the Bill delivers on its promise of value for money across all pension schemes. The measure is simple: every saver in every scheme, whatever its type, deserves value for money. Other noble Lords have expressed this in detail.

The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, spoke about pensions jargon. We are here in a very rarefied atmosphere, where people have some knowledge—I have less than many in the Room—of what pensions are about and what phrases such as “default pensions” mean. We need to make it clear to people who have no interest in pensions other than receiving a cheque at the end of the month at a certain age what it all means. Some people need to be clear about the choices they make, and we need to do as much as we can. These amendments, both those that have been spoken to already and the two in my name, seek to protect people’s interests.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, we come again to a varied group. I shall focus my remarks on the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. I welcome the contributions from other noble Lords and I look forward to the Minister’s response. We have a few amendments in this group: Amendments 50, 51, 52, 53, 57 and 74, and the Clause 13 do not stand part proposition.

Before I turn to the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, I will say a few words about the value-for-money framework that sits at the heart of the Bill. The introduction of a value-for-money framework has the potential to be genuinely transformative for workplace pensions if it is designed and implemented well. We support the principle of value for money. However, much of what this legislation seeks to achieve will stand or fall on how the framework is designed, applied and enforced.

As drafted, the provisions are relatively skeletal, despite the pivotal role that value for money is expected to play. If value for money is to drive real improvement rather than box ticking, it must be transparent in its methodology, robust in its metrics and genuinely comparable across schemes. Cost alone cannot be the determining factor. A scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently weak net returns does not represent good value for money for savers. Comparability will be key. Without clear, standardised metrics, there is a risk that value for money simply reinforces price-chasing behaviour rather than improving outcomes. My amendments are therefore intended not to oppose the concept of value for money but to strengthen it, to ensure that it is implemented in a way that improves saver outcomes, respects fiduciary duty and avoids unintended consequences.

I turn to the amendments in more detail. Amendments 50 to 53 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted in the case of Amendment 53, are probing amendments that go to the heart of whether the value-for-money framework established by Clause 11 will operate as a genuinely effective tool for improving saver outcomes.

Clause 11 creates a very broad enabling power. It allows for the creation of a value-for-money framework, but is largely silent on what value for money should actually consist of. Given the centrality of value for money to the Bill as a whole, it is important to test the Government’s intentions on the minimum elements that will underpin the framework.

Amendment 50 would require value-for-money regulations to include publication of a fees-to-returns ratio. The purpose here is straightforward: cost on its own is not value. As I have said, a scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently weak net returns cannot sensibly be said to offer good value to members. If value for money is to be outcome-focused, it must show what savers are receiving relative to what they are paying, rather than allowing headline charges to dominate decision-making.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, this is an interesting group of amendments. My noble friend has explained the importance of clarity in who decides whether something is fully delivering. I want to ask about the different assessments being made at this point. We are now, effectively, on Clause 15 onwards. We have the ratings coming through. My noble friends on the Front Bench will explain why they do not agree with certain elements. There is merit, however, in trying to work out whether something is taking a nosedive and whether it is it fixable, but we need to be more specific about a reasonable period, and then a prescribed number of VFM periods needs to be put in the Bill, which it is not at the moment.

Thinking through what has been suggested, I am trying to understand how this will work. Clause 13, which we have discussed briefly, has a certain amount of potential calculations. We then have the trustees doing their own assessment, and then we jump forward to Clause 18 and the Pensions Regulator may check. This is all feeling quite random. Normally when we do ratings, the CQC or Ofsted make that judgment, so I am trying to understand how this will work in practice. Are the guidelines going to be fixed—for example, the average or the benchmark across all pension schemes is this, or the FTSE 100 index has changed this much, or the costs are this percentage? It would be helpful to start to get a proper pitch. I appreciate that the consultation may have gone out, but there must be thinking in the Government’s mind, not just the regulator’s, on what “good” looks like. There are risks, as identified by my noble friends, that we may be overburdening to the point that the minutiae become an industry in their own right. I am surprised to see the penalties put in primary legislation, which is unusual nowadays, although I agree that we need a better sense of how that compliance element, as set out in Clause 18, will work alongside the other amendments. My noble friend is right to say that we need to keep this straightforward and simple for people to be able to understand.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

These are obviously probing amendments. They are all to do with the jargon: if we are arguing about the jargon, how much more confused will the normal punter be in trying to understand the jargon. This group focuses on how value for money is expressed, enforced and communicated.

We support the principle that members should be able to understand whether their scheme is performing well. However, value-for-money ratings also carry significant power. They will influence trustee behaviour, in particular, as well as employer decisions and market structure. That makes proportionality and precision essential.

I am particularly concerned about overreliance on short-term performance metrics. Saving for a pension is, or certainly should be, inherently long-term. Schemes should not be penalised for temporary underperformance driven by market cycles or responsible long-term investment strategies.

We also question whether compliance mechanisms become blunt instruments. Labelling schemes “poor value” without clear context may drive consolidation for the wrong reasons, reducing competition without improving outcomes. Clear language matters—I use the word “jargon” once again—but so does nuance. Members need information they can trust, not simplified labels about market complexity.

I have some questions for the Minister. How will this regime distinguish between persistent structural failure and short-term variation? How will it use this intermediate rating? How will it encourage genuine improvement rather than defensive behaviour by trustees? Trustees are meant to be very careful; they will be cognisant of the intermediate position. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s views on that.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, again, this is a substantial group. I will not detain the Committee for too long but, before I turn to my amendments, I briefly welcome those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. As she set out so clearly, her amendments seek to simplify the language used in value-for-money assessments so that they are more readily and intuitively understood by scheme members. This goes to a point that has arisen repeatedly during our discussions in Committee: many of the concepts in this Bill, as well as the language used to describe them, are dense, technical and difficult to grasp. A considerable level of prior knowledge is often required simply to understand what is being proposed, let alone its practical effect. I am reminded of a remark attributed to Joseph Pulitzer. He said that information should be put before people,

“briefly so that they will read it, clearly so that they will understand it … picturesquely so that they will remember it, and, above all, accurately”.

Surely that is the standard to which we should aspire, in not only this Bill but more broadly in our legislative work. Clarity, intelligibility and accessibility should be central objectives. The language we choose and the way in which we define key terms in legislation are fundamental, yet they are too often treated as secondary concerns.

I therefore warmly welcome the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, precisely because they address this issue head-on. Jargon is easy to reach for, but it is also, in a sense, lazy. When we are constructing a value-for-money framework whose purpose is to communicate value for money, we must be vigilant about terminology that obscures rather than illuminates and about euphemisms and phrases that sound authoritative but fail to convey real meaning. Many noble Lords will be familiar with Eric Blair’s essay, Politics and the English Language, and the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness serve as a timely reminder of some of the lessons it contains.

The first amendments in this group to which I have added my name—Amendments 60 and 61—would remove sub-paragraph (ii) from Clause 15(1)(b) as well as subsection (2). These amendments speak to a simple point: where responsible trustees or managers have determined that a scheme is not delivering value for money, that judgment should be sufficient to justify a rating of “not delivering” without the need to satisfy additional statutory conditions that risk being overly prescriptive.

Trustees already sit at the centre of this framework. They are charged with assessing investment performance, costs, charges, service quality and long-term member outcomes. They are subject to fiduciary duties and regulatory oversight. It is therefore entirely reasonable to trust their professional judgment when they conclude that a scheme is failing to deliver value for money. As the Bill is currently drafted, that judgment must be supplemented by one of a series of defined conditions, whether persistent intermediate ratings, a lack of realistic prospect of improvement or regulatory non-compliance. While well-intentioned, those conditions risk turning what should be a principles-based regime into a mechanistic one, encouraging trustees to focus on meeting thresholds rather than acting decisively in members’ best interests.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, this is an interesting part. It recognises a lot of our labour market, where people are working with multiple employers over a variety of time periods. Even those young people who were on the Kickstart scheme will have got contributions to a pension scheme, which they may completely forget about once they go to their next, perhaps longer-term, job.

I remember a few years ago the lovely people over in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. They have a “good purposes” fund where they go after dormant assets all over the place and take them away, with a general promise that the money will come back if somebody tries to get it. I seem to recall telling them to jog on when it came to pension funds, although some negotiation might have been arranged.

I am just trying to understand how all of this is going to fit together. That is why I think Amendment 83 is particularly helpful; basically, it says that the pensions dashboard must be in place. This is about making an informed choice. One of the things I am trying to understand is whether Clause 22(3)(b), which my noble friends on the Front Bench have suggested should be removed, is passive and non-engaged. Will the trustees running the scheme be required to make some effort to try to contact that person so that it does not just slide away without people even realising?

In terms of the other aspect, I assume, under Amendments 80 and 81, it is right to try to get into some more detail about prescribing, which could perhaps be further enhanced by just getting to understand in Clause 25 what the Minister is thinking at this point, especially when it suggests that the trustees or managers of a scheme can determine whether it is the best interests for this to transfer or not. Are we talking about, say, people who are in prison, people who have gone abroad or people who are on a career break? It would be helpful to have a sense of what Ministers are thinking in terms of having this variety of powers, first, to be able to do it, but then to say, “Actually, we’ll leave it to the managers or trustees of the scheme to determine whether it is that person’s best interests”. I would be grateful for some understanding, again, of how this might work in practice, but the solution will definitely be Amendment 83 and I hope that the Minister will give that consideration for Report.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, this is an appropriate time to stand, because Amendment 83 is signed by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and by me. In the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, today, and having discussed the matter with him, I speak on my behalf and his to Amendment 83. As has been stated, it is intended to deal with the risk that consolidating small pots might worsen the problem of lost or forgotten pensions.

We are all aware of the problem of people losing track of small pension pots: a problem that has increased in recent years as people tend to move between jobs more frequently, and may therefore end up with several small pensions, perhaps from many years ago. Chapter 2 of the Bill allows the Government to make regulations to consolidate small, dormant pension pots. I, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, support this as we believe that providing additional scale to small, dormant pots should enable greater efficiencies and a reduction in costs.

However, a possible unintended consequence could be to make it more difficult for a person to trace a forgotten pot if it is moved to a consolidator without their knowledge: for example, if any notice is sent to an old address. The introduction of a pension dashboard, as enabled by the Pension Schemes Act 2021, was intended to make it easier for people to identify pensions that they have lost track of or even forgotten. This has been somewhat delayed, but progress does, at last, seem to be happening. The connection deadline is October 2026, so hopefully people may start to be able to access the dashboard in the not-too-distant future.

In order to avoid making the problem of lost pensions worse, Amendment 83, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and myself, simply says that the regulations that would mandate the consolidation of a dormant, small pot could not be made until the dashboard had been available for at least three months. The three months is designed to give a bit of time to ensure that it is actually working and that any teething issues have been resolved. I think it prudent to ensure that we do not cause unintended consequences from what is otherwise a good policy, I hope the Minister will be sympathetic to the intention of the course outlined in Amendment 83.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 83, which has received wide support. I think it is really important, as is the idea of lengthening the 12-month period for so-called dormant pots, and Amendment 81 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, where, for example, a woman may take time off to care for children or other loved ones and intends to return, but her pension will have been moved before she gets back. Those are distinct possibilities under this scheme. We are talking about moving somebody’s savings—or investments; I am doing it myself—from one place to another, just because they have not done anything with their pension for a while. The pension fund is not meant to have anything done with it when you are younger; it is meant to just sit there and stay there.

Of course, the big problem that needs to be solved here is the costs to providers of administering all these very small pots. But the aim of the dashboard itself is meant to be to help people move their pots from one place to another. It seems to me that this particular section of the legislation is trying to deal with something that is meant to be dealt with by a different policy area. The consolidators, of course, will be attractive to providers to establish, and the money saving from not administering these small pots will also be attractive to the providers. But have the Government given any consideration to the idea of making, for example, NEST the consolidator? That is a Government-sponsored scheme. It has obviously had to have reasonable charges. Any transfers do not incur an upfront fee. That would run less of a risk of having consolidators that end up perhaps not performing well.

Youth Unemployment

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

The noble Lord is talking about the Government’s job guarantee, which will come in after 18 months with a guaranteed job for all those on universal credit. However, it is not the case that there is no action under the youth guarantee before that. The new youth guarantee gateway will ensure that if, after 13 weeks, a young person is not earning or learning then they will have a meeting followed by four weeks of intensive support. During this period, they will receive tailored guidance and be offered up to six options, which could be work, work experience, sector-based work academy programmes, apprenticeships, training or learning. There will be 300,000 more opportunities funded by this Government to support young people long before they get to that 18-month point. However, that point is a guaranteed jobs backstop.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that, but what assessment has been made of the impact of poor mental health on young people’s ability to enter work? How joined up is the Department for Work and Pensions with the NHS—if it is joined up at all?

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

There are certainly larger numbers of young people who, by virtue of mental health issues, are not in the labour market. That is why we have asked Alan Milburn to focus on this issue, why the Secretary of State for Health has initiated a review into the growing numbers of young people experiencing mental health problems, and why the Department for Education will ensure that there is a mental health professional to support every single school. That is joined-up government.

Parental Leave and Pay Review

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister very much for all the things that are happening, but can she confirm whether this urgent review—the word “urgent” was used—will look specifically at low-paid and self-employed parents, who are often excluded from adequate support? I did not hear the Minister mention them at all.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises a very important point. I am pleased to say to him that, yes, the review is considering specifically whether the current support available meets the needs of self-employed parents. That is explicitly referred to in the review’s terms of reference. He is right that, currently, self-employed mothers can get maternity allowance but self-employed fathers are not eligible for support. There are some challenges. The bigger challenge is that the scheme goes back to the late 1800s, and a lot of aspects of modern families and the modern workplace are not necessarily reflected in its structure. We are looking at all of that.