House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

My Lords, with all due respect to my noble friend who has just spoken, there is no point in going into all those details about methods of election, interesting as they are. Amendment 11 is wrong, and I oppose it because it would undermine the very basis of our democracy, which actually works very well.

The noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, referred to the Joint Committee report published in 2012. I had the duty—I almost said pleasure—to sit on that committee, along with the noble Baroness and others, for eight months while we went into these matters in very great detail. I recommend that report to noble Lords. The report itself was critical of the then Government’s plan to introduce a directly elected second Chamber. The minority report, which was signed by 12 of the 25 members of that committee, was even more critical of the Government; I especially recommend that to noble Lords.

If we had direct election to this upper House, it would not only upset the delicate balance of our constitutional settlement. It would also totally undermine the delicate relationship between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I seem to recall that in speaking on this matter back then in 2012, I said something like, “Mr Speaker, I don’t care about the House of Lords; I care about the House of Commons”. If I may correct myself, I do now care passionately about the House of Lords. It is for that very reason that I hope Amendment 11 does not have support here.

The great value of your Lordships is that the majority are not politicians, as the noble Lord, Lord Moore, most articulately said a few moments ago, whereas if we had direct election, the moment anybody stands for election and puts their head above the parapet, they become a politician. I can be critical of politicians because I am one to my fingertips; I have been a full-time one for more than 30 years. As a new Member of this House, I appreciate just how valuable noble Lords who are not politicians are in the work that they do and the scrutiny that this House brings to holding the Government to account.

My second point is that if the upper House is elected, that undermines the position of the House of Commons. It undermines the authority and accountability of the House of Commons. The electorate have to know where the buck stops. There is a direct relationship between the voter and the elected person, which is embodied in our House of Commons, one of the best democratic institutions anywhere in the world. If the upper House were to have democratic accountability and authority, that would challenge the House of Commons—and then the electorate would not know where the buck stops. As Tony Benn used to say, “If you don’t know how to get rid of the people you elect, then you don’t have accountability and you don’t have true democracy”. It is very strange to find myself agreeing yet again with Tony Benn.

My third point is simply that a well-functioning democracy is not just about elections. Our democracy works because of the checks and balances of civic society. That includes the work of your Lordships’ House as a revising Chamber, not as a representative Chamber. I beg your Lordships not to support Amendment 11.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend, for two reasons. First, I served with her on the Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill. Secondly, I intend to follow her in actually referring to the text of Amendment 11, which makes me somewhat exceptional in this debate, because it has been about an elected second Chamber. The amendment does not actually stipulate that.

Let me begin with one or two quick points. First, it is not self-evidently the case that an appointed second Chamber is undemocratic. I have developed this case before; there is a democratic argument for an appointed second Chamber.

Secondly, it is not self-evidently the case that elected second chambers fulfil functions that benefit the political system, certainly not in terms of facilitating good law. Following what the noble Lord, Lord Moore, said, this Chamber is defined by its relationship to the other place. This is a complementary second Chamber. It adds value by fulfilling functions the other place does not have the time or political will to carry out. That renders it distinct, it adds value and I would argue that good law is a public good that deserves to be preserved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mancroft (Con)]

My Lords, before this debate concludes, I think this House owes a great debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who has confirmed for the Committee now what I feared in the past: that it is HOLAC’s duty to advise the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister’s duty to advise the King, and the King’s job to appoint. That is as it should be. What he does confirm, however, is that the sole power of appointment to the Second Chamber, from the passage of this Bill onwards, now rests in the hands of the Prime Minister, who has the majority in the House of Commons. If that is not an unbalanced and damaged constitution, I do not know what is.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly, mainly because I endorse the words of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and agree with virtually everything he said. I do not think it is appropriate for these amendments to be in this Bill for two reasons. First, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, about scope. This is in essence a one-clause Bill with a very specific purpose. Secondly, the amendments—though I agree with a number of them—are, in essence, disparate and discrete, so it is not appropriate to embody them in a Bill of this sort. They need to be drawn together. If there is going to be change, it needs to be in a clear, coherent Bill that addresses the concerns that we have heard today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I think we can all agree that we want the same thing: a House that serves with integrity, a Second Chamber that commands public trust, and an appointments process that preserves the best of our traditions while adapting to the demands of modern democracy.

The House of Lords Appointments Commission provides a non-statutory safeguard within the process for appointments to your Lordships’ House. It has a clear but limited role: to recommend non-party-political Members for the Cross Benches, ensuring that this House benefits, as many noble Lords have pointed out, from independent expertise; and to provide vetting advice on nominations for life peerages. Crucially, its recommendations are advisory and do not bind a Prime Minister.

Many of the amendments in this group seek to place the power of nomination to this unelected Chamber in the hands of an unelected committee, as my noble friend Lord Hannan emphasised. This includes proposing significant changes to the powers and operation of HOLAC, including making its recommendations binding, rendering it statutory or altering its remit entirely. While I deeply respect noble Lords’ intentions in tabling these amendments, I must express my concerns, which were echoed by several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, about the direction of travel that most of these proposals suggest.

I appreciate my noble friend Lord Dundee’s Amendment 45 and the clarification that my noble friend Lord Hailsham has suggested in Amendment 46. These amendments would establish HOLAC on a statutory basis and establish a cross-party board to oversee its work. They received support from my noble friends Lord Attlee and Lord Norton of Louth, the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Their aim—to secure greater legitimacy and transparency for HOLAC—is honourable. Their effect, however, would be disastrous: a great mistake, as my noble friend Lord Howard pointed out.

Placing HOLAC on a statutory footing would not clarify its role; it would fundamentally alter it. Legislation would create a legal framework against which HOLAC’s decisions could be formally challenged in court, opening the door for the malicious and the litigious to claim it had failed to fulfil its legal duties. Candidates who were not recommended for appointment as Cross-Bench Peers could contest the basis on which they were excluded. Those who failed the propriety test, which is based on judgment rather than law, could argue it had been misapplied. Instead of providing independent advice to the Prime Minister, HOLAC would become a body subject to judicial review, forced to justify its reasoning in court, constrained by legal precedent and bound to operate based not on judgment, but within the narrow confines of justiciability. The Prime Minister’s discretion, exercised on HOLAC’s advice, would be second-guessed in not this House but the courts—a point made brilliantly by my noble friend Lord Howard. The process would become slower, more contested and more uncertain, exposing every appointment to challenge, delay and dysfunction. We should be under no illusion: making HOLAC statutory would not reinforce its authority but undermine it. It would not enhance trust but erode it, and it would not improve the system but entrench its weaknesses.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

In the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill, now an Act, we included an ouster clause. Why could that not be included in this measure?

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I defer to my Front-Bench colleague, my noble and learned friend Lord Keen: because of the way the ouster clause would be interpreted in court.

Amendment 43 in the name of my noble friend Lord Dundee takes a step further by transferring the responsibility for proposing peerages to HOLAC and away from the Prime Minister. This amendment would strip the Prime Minister—the only person in this process with a democratic mandate—of the power to propose life peerages and hand it to an unelected body. That would be a well-intentioned mistake. The Prime Minister does not act alone. HOLAC already plays an important advisory role by scrutinising appointments and applying the propriety test; but, crucially, it is the Prime Minister who makes the final decision. That balance matters. If HOLAC gets it wrong, if it misjudges a candidate or applies the propriety test too narrowly or too loosely, the Prime Minister can correct it. If the Prime Minister gets it wrong, he or she faces scrutiny, challenge and, ultimately, the judgment of the electorate. This is a system that holds both in check. If the Prime Minister is stripped of that role, HOLAC’s decisions become final. There is no backstop, no political oversight, no democratic accountability.

More than that—this point was made eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Butler—the amendment breaks a fundamental constitutional principle. The Prime Minister is the monarch’s chief adviser. It is not for an unelected commission to take on that role. Appointments to this House must be made by those who answer to the people, not by a body with no democratic mandate, no political accountability and no direct link to the people. We all want higher standards, but high standards must be upheld in a way that strengthens, not weakens, our democracy; in a way that builds trust, not erodes it; and in a way that reinforces the legitimacy of this House, not undermines it.

Amendment 44A from my noble friend Lord Hailsham seeks to add an additional test: that nominees must be fit and proper and independent-minded. While I entirely understand the intention behind this, I struggle to see how one could determine legally whether a potential appointee is independent-minded. It is, by its nature, a subjective judgment, and in a democracy such judgments should ultimately rest with those who are accountable to the people, rather than with those who are accountable to no one.

Amendment 12, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and Amendment 47, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham seek to prevent life peerages being conferred if HOLAC has recommended against the appointment. Amendment 12 establishes this power as absolute, but Amendment 47 concedes that HOLAC must give an explanation and allow representations before a decision is final. Amendment 116 merely amends the Short Title of the Bill in relation to Amendment 12.

These amendments do not simply tweak the appointments process; they fundamentally recast the role of the House of Lords Appointments Commission. HOLAC was created as an advisory committee: to advise, not to command. To make its recommendations binding is to transform it from a source of counsel into the ultimate arbiter of membership of your Lordships’ House. It would no longer be a check, but a gatekeeper. This is not some dry technicality. It is a profound shift in constitutional authority. At present, the system balances expert scrutiny with democratic accountability. HOLAC advises; the Prime Minister decides. If a Prime Minister presses ahead against its recommendation, the commission ensures transparency by informing Parliament. The check is there, the scrutiny is real and, crucially, it is the Prime Minister, not an unelected committee, who must justify their judgment to the country.

We do not strengthen the system by stripping discretion from those whom the people can ultimately hold to account. The power to recommend appointments to His Majesty should rest where it always has: with a democratically accountable Prime Minister, not an unelected tribunal with the right of veto. That is the system we have; it works. These amendments would replace it with something far more rigid, less democratic and more dangerous.

This brings me to Amendment 12A in the name of my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising. This amendment proposes the opposite of the rest in this group, rendering HOLAC ineffective. While I am incredibly sympathetic to my noble friend’s position, especially on the untameable growth of committees and quangos, I accept that HOLAC has some role to fulfil, even if it should be limited. HOLAC plays an important role in safeguarding propriety and ensuring that this House retains, and is seen to retain, its reputation for expertise and integrity. I am sure that the Prime Minister, like his predecessors, will continue to place great weight on the commission’s careful and considered advice. The House of Lords Appointments Commission has an independent and important advisory role, but it is and must remain advisory. It also has a clear remit and that too must remain clear.

There was a suggestion while I was serving in government that HOLAC might seek to dictate the timing or publication of a peerage list. That is clearly not part of its remit and illustrates a potential tendency of the commission, even in its non-statutory form, to succumb to the temptations of overreach.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Devon, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and my noble friend Lord Dundee, which seeks to encourage HOLAC in its current form to confer life peerages on up to 20 Cross-Bench hereditary Peers. As my noble friend Lord True set out so eloquently last week, we firmly believe—

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 11th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, time precludes me from digressing to explain why my noble friend Lord True and the noble Lord, Lord Newby, exaggerated the significance of Magna Carta. The charter of 1215 did not have the impact they ascribe to it. I fear that this may be the only observation I make today that has not already been made by others.

As several speakers in this debate have stressed, any proposed changes to the composition, or indeed the structure or powers, of the House should be assessed in terms of their impact on the capacity of the House to fulfil its functions. Form should follow function. This House complements the House of Commons by fulfilling tasks that the elected House does not have the time, or sometimes the political will, to carry out. It fulfils these tasks by virtue of having, at the individual level, a membership that is characterised by experience and expertise and, at the collective level, the composition that gives it some detachment from government. It is the latter point on which I wish to focus.

The principal argument for the membership of the House of hereditary Peers derives not from who they are, or what they do—important though both are, as we have heard from many speakers—but rather from how they get here. They constitute the only body of Peers who arrive independent of prime ministerial patronage. Not only who they are, but their number, is not within the gift of the Prime Minister. That ensures some degree of detachment.

Prime Ministers may nominate persons of distinction; they may show some restraint in the number they nominate; they may be generous in inviting leaders of other parties to put forward names. The problem is that they may do none of these things. This has the potential to degrade the capacity of the House to fulfil its essential functions. As several noble Lords have already said, there is value in having a route into the House that is independent of prime ministerial control.

That is not an argument against passing this Bill. It is an argument against passing it is as a stand-alone Bill. If one removes the independent route into the House, one has to substitute a route that brings in Members that are not here on the basis of unrestrained prime ministerial power. The Bill therefore needs to be linked to one that covers the process by which names are proposed to the sovereign, be it independent of the Prime Minister or through ensuring that the Prime Minister does not nominate individuals who lack the experience or expertise—or for that matter the commitment —necessary to fulfil the essential tasks of the House.

The passage of this measure addressing output therefore needs to be conjoined with one that addresses input. I have a Bill being debated later this Session that addresses the points I have made, but obviously it does not need to be that Bill. The key point is that the provisions of this Bill should not be commenced until such time as a Bill addressing nominations, ensuring that there is some means of Members coming in independent of unrestrained, and possibly ill-judged, patronage is achieved.

This is wholly in line with the Government’s proposals for House of Lords reform. It ensures that two of their proposals are linked rather than treated as discrete measures, each independent of the other. The Government’s commitment to reform the appointments process must march in step with their commitment to enact this Bill. Picking up on the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Quin, this would not be a big-bang reform and I believe there would be consensus. It will be valuable to hear from the Leader of the House what is the argument of principle against adopting such an approach.

House of Lords Reform

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 12th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I begin with two propositions that, in my view, should form the basis for determining reform of this House. The first is that form should follow function—we need to determine what purpose an institution serves. What is the principal purpose of this House, as a second Chamber of Parliament? The second proposition is that good law is a public good. If one accepts that, that helps determine the principal role of this House. It is a House of legislative scrutiny. That is not its only role, but it is the one that establishes it as a necessary part of our constitutional system.

The House of Commons is the elected Chamber, and the fact that it is elected ensures that it enjoys primacy. The fact of election also creates political imperatives for its Members. They need to be elected and re-elected, and they focus on activities that enhance their chance of re-election. They devote time to constituents’ demands, which have become more onerous decade by decade. They focus on outward-looking activities that bolster their political profiles. The quest for electoral success drives them to put the interests of party ahead of the institution of which they are Members. Focusing on detailed scrutiny of legislation does not come high on their list of political imperatives.

That shapes the relationship between the two Houses. The House of Commons determines the ends of legislation, and we accept that. We focus on the means. If one accepts that good law is a public good, that is a necessary role, and this House is ideally placed to fulfil it. The fact of being an appointed Chamber is a benefit—we lack the political imperatives facing MPs. We have the benefit of the experience and expertise of the membership, and the benefit of procedure: we do not utilise programme Motions, there is no selection of amendments by the chair and we do not normally employ closure Motions. We devote as much time as is needed to considering all the amendments tabled to Bills. This House makes a significant difference to the detail of Bills, and its changes are generally acknowledged by government as having improved the legislation. The law of the land would be significantly diminished without the work of this House.

Those two propositions should therefore form the basis of reform. We should avoid big bang reforms that destroy the complementary role of this House as a Chamber of legislative scrutiny. There is a democratic argument for an appointed second Chamber—those familiar with the literature will be aware of that. We should equally avoid discrete reforms that are detached from the purpose of the House. An arbitrary age limit, for example, may remove some of the experience and expertise that contributes to the work of the House, but removing Members who may have made little or no contribution would not have such an effect.

To bolster the capacity of the House to fulfil its key function necessitates focusing on how Members reach this House. We need to ensure that those qualified to contribute to the work of the House are nominated. We need to enhance our structures and procedures to reinforce what we do. That means looking not just at how we deal with Bills once introduced—should we consider, for example, taking evidence on Bills?—but also at the legislative process holistically. Expanding pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny would likely contribute to better Bills and would play to the strengths of the House. We are ideally placed to enhance post-legislative scrutiny. Such changes would enable us to engage more with those outside the House who wish to contribute their knowledge on a particular measure.

There is scope for reform, but we need to ensure that it derives from our understanding of what this House exists to do. In my view, we already do a good job of legislative scrutiny. We can take steps to ensure that we do it even better—that should be our focus, and that should drive reform.

Parliamentary Democracy and Standards in Public Life

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 11th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness on initiating this debate. She raises some important questions. Parliamentary democracy is now under threat, not least as elected Governments seek to tackle problems that often go beyond their borders and with a public who respond to the failure to tackle those problems by embracing the calls of populist politicians. Some democracies, such as the United States, have a history of populist movements—a tendency now writ large—but we see it elsewhere as well, not least in some nations of Europe.

In the United Kingdom, we have largely managed, so far, to resist that trend, and the reason for that rests in the fundamental nature of our parliamentary democracy. Those calling for a codified constitution largely miss the point of what sustains the institutions of the state. Some nations have codified constitutions, but no culture of constitutionalism. By that, I mean an acceptance at mass and elite level of the legitimacy of the constitutional processes. That is what underpins the rule of law. We have a culture of constitutionalism that is so well embedded that it has facilitated our uncodified constitution and has provided stability through the fact that the constitution does not impose an unwieldy straitjacket. We benefit from a culture that has reinforced the value of that system. Some of the basic rules of society are so well ingrained that it is not necessary to enshrine them formally.

That culture still pertains, and it is essential to our well-being as a nation. If we start to move to a more formalised system, we are in danger of creating a society with some degree of rigidity. Problems with maintaining standards in public life have undermined confidence in the system, but that is an argument for recognising and bolstering the core culture, not an argument for eroding it.

Institutions matter, but in terms of public trust, the focus is on those who occupy them. We have seen some officeholders exhibit an egregious disregard of standards in recent years. We need to avoid displacement activity—advancing constitutional reform as if that is the answer—and instead we need to focus on behaviour. We need to embed a culture of responsibility and, instead of blaming our constitution, we need to be reflecting on how we recruit public officials, how we tighten the regulatory framework and how we inculcate a commitment to delivering outputs in the best interests of the nation.

Democracy Denied (DPRRC Report)

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 12th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I too welcome both excellent reports. My starting point is that good law is a public good, most law emanates from the Executive, and Parliament’s role is to ensure that the legislation that they bring forward is justified and as well drafted as it can be. We need therefore to have in place the means to scrutinise and influence legislation, be it primary or secondary; the need to ensure secondary legislation is scrutinised effectively is well made in the reports before us.

We have the means of scrutiny but we do not follow through in influencing the Executive. That is the problem, and I argue that there are two reasons for it. One is well identified in the reports before us—it is the attitude of the Executive—and the other is to be found in this House. On the first, as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee makes abundantly clear, the culture of the Executive is to see the delegation of legislative powers as a matter of political expediency. Ministers and officials have got so used to the convenience of employing delegated legislation that they not only neglect the fundamental principles detailed in the committee’s report but exhibit at times a rather lazy attitude to drafting. It is part and parcel of a wider attitude to Parliament, one borne in part of ignorance of Parliament.

The government response commits to the inclusion in the Guide to Making Legislation of the principles adumbrated in the committee’s report in order

“to remind departments, both ministers and officials and also the PBL Committee, of the constitutional principles underlying the relationship between Parliament and the executive.”

But why do they need reminding of something that should be ingrained as part of their culture? What is in the Government’s response is not so much a concession as an admission of a failure to comply with the provisions of Section 3(6) of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. In replying, could my noble friend the Leader of the House explain what other steps are being taken to ensure compliance with this statutory duty?

I turn to the second part of my thesis: namely, that part of the reason lies with this House. The committees produce valuable reports, but they are toothless if the House itself is not prepared to act. There is little point giving a committee the power to bark if the House is not prepared to bite. As the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, said in Tuesday’s Second Reading debate on the Financial Services and Markets Bill, Parliament’s reluctance to reject SIs makes such power “purely nominal”. When an SI comes before the House, we debate it but then agree to it. A regret Motion may be passed, but that constitutes an expression of opinion—one that, as far as I am aware, is invariably ignored.

A Motion to reject an SI is deemed a fatal Motion. It benefits the Executive to use such language; it is misleading. Rejecting an SI is not akin to rejecting on Second Reading a Bill that comes from the Commons. Voting down a Bill kills it for the rest of the Session; voting down an SI kills it until the next day. The Government can simply re-lay it with the odd word changed. If we were to keep rejecting it, that might be a different matter, but simply voting down an SI when first laid is akin not to rejecting a Bill but to passing an amendment and inviting the Commons to think again. Rejecting an SI is to invite the Government to think again, which they can do and, if necessary, submit a fresh SI, accepting the points made by the House. Despite what some have claimed, there is no convention that we do not reject SIs. The House has asserted its right to reject SIs and on rare occasions has done so.

We will be effective in our work in respect of delegated legislation only if we have the political will to act. We have the power. We owe it to the two committees that have reported to be willing to exercise it.

Her Majesty the Queen’s Platinum Jubilee

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 26th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I join everyone who has spoken in this debate in congratulating Her Majesty on this unique milestone.

It is important to recognise the contribution of the Queen not only to consolidating the position of the monarchy in the UK but also to national and international governance. She has consolidated the position of the monarchy as being above politics. The monarchy has moved from a position of active engagement in the political life of the nation to one of political neutrality. That has been the direction of travel since the late 19th century, but it has been achieved notably during the Queen’s long reign. Some people wonder what the point of the monarch is if she exercises no powers, but by transcending politics she has strengthened the position of the monarchy, and to the benefit of the nation. The noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, captured the position eloquently in his piece in last week’s edition of the House magazine, when he wrote that her role as head of the nation is

“being about the soul of this country”,

embodying expressing identity and national mood, providing a sense of stability and continuity to allow for and facilitate change, recognising success and achievement, and supporting the idea of service to others. She can bring people together in a way that politicians cannot.

The Queen holds prerogative powers that she exercises on advice, and powers that she exercises where she relies on convention or practice, but which serve a purpose for still vesting in the Crown. The fact that, ultimately, she could employ them is important. It is symbolically important in signifying that although Ministers exercise the powers, there remains a higher body to which they owe a duty in exercising them. Loyalty flowing to the Crown is also important for protecting our system of government. Ironically, an unelected monarch serves as the ultimate protector of the political institutions that have displaced the sovereign as the body that governs. As Gerald Kaufman said in the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee year,

“What she has done in making this United Kingdom a permanent democracy, a democracy that is impregnable, is perhaps the greatest of her many achievements”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/3/2012; col. 862.]


Having a monarch operating above the fray of partisan conflict reflects the value of a parliamentary, as opposed to a presidential, form of government. In a presidential system, the positions of Head of State and Head of Government are vested in one person. In a parliamentary system, the Head of State and Head of Government are separate. The Head of State can thus represent the unity of the nation in a way that a partisan figure cannot. In practical terms, it also makes for a useful division of labour between the monarch, exercising essential state functions, and the Prime Minister, focusing on delivering public policy.

Her Majesty has contributed to national governance, not only by demonstrating, by virtue of holding the Crown, that Ministers have high authority—and that the loyalty of public bodies is to the Crown, not government—but also in being in practice a repository of knowledge, as has been mentioned already in this debate, able to advise successive Prime Ministers. As Tony Blair observed,

“she has got an absolutely unparalleled amount of experience of what it’s like to be at the top of a government.”

Four of her five most recent Prime Ministers had not been born when she ascended the Throne. During her reign, she has known US Presidents from Dwight Eisenhower onwards. The value of her advice has been attested to by successive Prime Ministers. She represents not only a repository of knowledge but also someone who is not a political rival. Judging from occasions when she made public utterances—again, this has been touched upon—she appears to have a knack for asking the right questions. The same would appear to apply to her meetings with Prime Ministers. As Gordon Brown recorded, her questions

“are designed to get the best out of you.”

She has contributed internationally, not only by engaging the interest of other world leaders—an invitation to the palace or to Windsor is something not likely to be turned down—but also at times by soothing tensions at Heads of Government conferences. She has also fulfilled a major role in cementing the relationship between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, as has already been touched upon, not least in her state visit to Dublin in 2011. It was, as Paul Flynn said in the other place,

“a very powerful symbol of reconciliation, which I believe will have a profound effect on healing the wounds that have disfigured life in the island of Ireland for generations.”—[Official Report, Commons, 7/3/12; col. 870.]

She is a major source of the nation’s soft power and enhances the reputation of the United Kingdom. An Ipsos MORI global survey in 2018 found that views of the Royal Family had a net beneficial impact on people’s views of Britain.

The Queen has helped shape the monarchy, being generally deft in knowing when to act and when not to act, and enhancing the position through her dedication and obvious commitment to service. It is worth remembering that she did not ask to be Queen; she was not born to be Queen. However, when circumstances beyond her control led to her becoming heir apparent and then Queen, she dedicated herself to the service of the nation as we have heard so eloquently throughout this debate. I do not know many people—indeed, anyone other than the Queen—who have served in the same job for 70 years and with such dedication.

It is entirely fitting that today we pay tribute to what the Queen has done and the contribution she has made to the life of this nation.

House of Lords: Remote Participation and Hybrid Sittings

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 20th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the sole criterion for assessing the hybrid proceedings should not be whether they have proved popular or convenient to Members, but whether they have facilitated—indeed, enhanced—the capacity of the House to fulfil its functions, primarily those of scrutinising legislation and calling the Government to account for their actions and policies.

The fact that we have managed all-Hybrid Sittings is, as we have heard, a tribute to those responsible for the technical delivery of proceedings. Without their work, the bottle of parliamentary scrutiny would be near empty. As it is, it is a quarter or a half full. Some Members of the House have generalised on the basis of it being half full. The fact that the House has been able to achieve some changes to legislation and even prevent certain provisions being pursued does not make the case for a continuation of Hybrid Sittings. When one compares performance during the pandemic with the period before, we are falling short, and by a considerable margin.

The capacity of the House to engage in detailed scrutiny has diminished as the use of prerogative and order-making powers by Ministers has expanded massively. The UCL Constitution Unit, along with other bodies, has produced a damning analysis of the situation in the other place. We are in a not dissimilar position, as is clear from the report of the Constitution Committee published on 13 May. As the committee identified, the problem is not just the sheer number of statutory instruments laid before Parliament but the use of fast-track legislative procedures and inadequate explanatory material. Scrutinising Bills and ministerial actions is made difficult by procedural limitations, by the prohibition on interventions and by our inability not only to be present in numbers in the Chamber to challenge Ministers but to meet informally outside the Chamber—essential for lobbying and information exchange. We are operating, but at a sub-par level.

The way forward, as the Constitution Committee recommends, is to engage in lesson-drawing: are there features of the Hybrid Sittings that have enhanced the capacity of the House to fulfil its functions and that may therefore be worth utilising in future? I suggest that we undertake four lesson-drawing exercises rather than one. The first is to identify any features that merit being retained when we resume meeting physically. That is the most pressing inquiry. The second is to identify features that may be utilised when we decant the Palace in preparation for the restoration and renewal programme. The third is to identify features that may be utilised as part of the R&R programme and be integral when we return to the Palace. The fourth, as the Constitution Committee identifies, is to consider how we cope if there is a future crisis and we are unable to meet physically. How can we enhance current facilities, should we need ever again to have Hybrid, or purely Virtual, Sittings?

There are thus several lesson-drawing exercises. Committees may wish to continue to utilise the power they already have to take evidence online. The ability to take evidence virtually may be built into the R&R programme. Remote working by staff may be utilised more extensively, but temporarily, during the period of decant. In all our reflections, there must be one overriding consideration: the need to restore and, if possible, enhance our capacity to scrutinise legislation and call government to account. That is how we add value to the political process; that is how we complement the elected Chamber.

Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 3rd September 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Haselhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I fully support the amendments on the Marshalled List, particularly Amendment 5 which refers to “facilitating improved public engagement”. I wonder whether there is still a possibility that that engagement could be other than remote. A question was asked in the other place about the possibility of access to the Elizabeth Tower for visitors when those works are completed, in a way that is independent of decant works which by then may have started or be about to start.

This leads me also to inquire whether we have closed our minds or shut the door on access to Westminster Hall. I know that there are complications but, if there were a means of allowing people to come through Westminster Hall on a particular line of route and then exit in the usual way, that would be a more meaningful way for people to engage. Those of us who have taken parties round the Palace on many occasions are impressed by the magic felt by many people, the emotional contact they may experience by being here. To lose that entirely would be a shame. Such access may be impossible in view of the works that have to take place in the Palace, but I hope that we will look at the possibility.

I am minded of what is available in the visitors’ centre on Capitol Hill in Washington where tableaux tell the story of Parliament through the ages. There is also the possibility of viewing a film. Perhaps a passage through Westminster Hall could be allowed and the Grand Committee Room—or the Westminster Hall chamber as it has become known—might also be a place where a film could show the work of Parliament and what it is all about. I hope we have not told ourselves that it cannot be done. It would be encouraging to know that this possibility is at least being investigated so that, by the time we have to decant from the building, there might still be an opportunity for something more than remote access for members of the public.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I add my thanks to my noble friend Lord Howe for the amendments and place on record my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, for all the work he has done on securing these amendments. They are extremely important—in particular, as my noble friend Lord Haselhurst would add, Amendment 5.

This might be the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Bill, but we and the sponsor body need to look at it as the Parliament restoration and renewal Bill. It is not simply a case of bricks and mortar; it is about the space and how it is employed for the future. Picking up on what my noble friend said, it needs to be adaptable space. That is the point that needs to be put over to the sponsor body: not only should we use the space in the way indicated by my noble friend but there are going to be changes that we cannot anticipate in the way that we might want to use it. This place was designed originally to accommodate meetings in committee rooms dealing with private Bills. That did not take into account how Parliament would evolve, particularly as a public body. We cannot anticipate all the needs in future, so adaptability is going to be a clear theme.

I reiterate the point that the space can be used to connect with people outside. That is a crucial point that has already been stressed. We need not only to educate but to be able to engage. That would play to the strengths of this House in particular, but the institution of Parliament as a whole needs to be able to connect with people outside in different ways, including in ways that, as I say, we might not able to anticipate at the moment—so we need to have that space available but not rigid.

So we need to be outward-looking and adaptable. I reiterate my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, for all the work he has done on this. I was delighted with the agreement that was reached with the Government, so I very much support the amendments before us.

Palace of Westminster: Restoration and Renewal

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 6th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, like other noble Lords, I was pleased and relieved by the Motion approved by the House of Commons last week and I welcome the Motion before us. Like my noble friend Lord Inglewood and many others, I regret how long it has taken to put the Motion before both Houses.

In the time available I wish to make three points focusing on paragraphs 4, 8 and 7 in that order. The first is straightforward, and that is to follow the vast majority of those who have spoken in endorsing the decision for a full decant and to emphasise the need to move as expeditiously as possible. The delay in making a decision has added millions to the cost. The charge to the public purse of maintenance and repairs over the next five years is estimated at over £440 million. By the time we leave, on the figures we have been given, it is likely to be over half a billion pounds. The repairs that are necessary to keep the Palace running are making the place an eyesore rather than a shining edifice of which we can be proud. One cannot now show visitors around without having to negotiate some screened-off section of a corridor or some scaffolding.

To pursue the “do nothing” option would be grossly irresponsible. As we have heard, the dangers are too great. It is also not a cost-free option given the sheer expense of maintenance and repair. Of the other options detailed in the various reports, it is important to stress that all of them entail moving out of this Chamber for some time. Even the rolling programme option would entail moving out for some years.

We might recognise the distinction between the two Chambers but, as several noble Lords have mentioned, the wiring and the pipes do not. Trying to hold Sessions in what would be a building site would constrain the work and be a health as well as a security hazard. Even if Members wish to remain on site, we really cannot expect our staff to do so. More than 7,000 people work in Parliament. They do not get a vote in this, but we have a duty of care to them. I am not prepared to vote in such a way that may put them, and indeed our visitors, at risk.

My second point is to draw attention to and endorse the requirements stipulated in paragraph 8. That should reassure those who are worried about whether we return or not. We need to move out and we need then to move back in. All the plans are predicated on that and this will be enshrined in legislation. We need to deal with the various suggestions, embraced by one or two speakers today, that we should move out permanently and Parliament be located somewhere else in the country. There are two obvious problems with this, one political and the other financial. Parliament is where it is because government is where it is. If we move to another part of the country, government will have to move as well.

We could create our own Bonn or Brasilia, but the problem with that is the cost of creating new buildings and relocating thousands of civil servants and parliamentary staff. It would have to be created at enormous expense in addition to restoring and renewing the Palace of Westminster. The Palace is a world heritage site and cannot be neglected. Returning to the Palace, then, is necessary politically and is inescapable from the perspective of cost. I fear that we will not be heading off to Birmingham or, indeed, Hull. If we were starting from scratch or dripping in enormous wealth, it might be different.

My third point is that there has to be an effective delivery authority and, as drawn out in the report of the Public Accounts Committee, good governance. In replying, perhaps my noble friend could say more as to when the legislation to establish the sponsor board and delivery authority will be introduced and what form the board will take. We need to ensure value for money, but—as has been stressed—we need also to avoid interference in operational matters by parliamentarians. We need to set the policy, but we need a delivery authority of the sort that delivered Crossrail and the Olympics. As the PAC also noted, there needs to be external assurance within the programme, alongside the creation of an audit committee. It is also important, as it said, that the National Audit Office is empowered to audit the delivery authority and to carry out value for money studies. Perhaps my noble friend can confirm that this will be the case.

The message from this debate is quite clear. The sooner we get on and legislate the better. Churchill had an appropriate phrase: “Action this day”.

House of Lords: Size

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Monday 5th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a very good debate, and an important one. It is not an exercise in navel-gazing; it matters because this House matters. Addressing size is only part, but a necessary one, of what needs to be done to protect and enhance the role of this House as a valuable—and, I would argue, invaluable—second Chamber. This House adds value and, contrary to what some have said, is justifiable in democratic terms. Democracy—demos kratia—is about how people choose to govern themselves. In a representative democracy, the choice of who is to govern is fundamental. In the United Kingdom, we choose a Government through elections to the House of Commons, a Government who are responsible for a programme of public policy and accountable for that policy to the electors at the next election. There is core accountability. We have the benefit of a second Chamber that fulfils tasks that add value to the political process without challenging that core accountability. As my colleague Professor Colin Tyler, a specialist in democratic theory, put it in evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill, if you “divide sovereignty within Parliament”, you undermine the capacity of Parliament to give effect to the will of the people.

We have a Chamber that draws on experience and expertise to complement the work of the elected House. By general consent, this House does a good job. Debate about Lords reform focuses primarily on composition, not on functions—there is a general agreement about the functions of a complementary second Chamber. The House of Lords Reform Bill in 2012 was premised on the House continuing to do its existing job. But of course composition and functions are intrinsically linked; who is in the House determines how effectively the functions are fulfilled. We are a legitimate Chamber, but whereas the Commons takes its legitimacy for granted through election, our legitimacy has to be earned through the work that we do. We therefore need to ensure that we are working effectively and efficiently; we need to ensure that the quality of what we do is maintained.

We know from the Ipsos MORI poll of 2007 that electors considered the two most important factors in determining the legitimacy of this House to be trust in the appointments process and in considering legislation carefully and in detail. Seventy-six per cent considered trust in the appointments process to be very important, while 73% thought the same for considering legislation carefully and in detail. Some element of election came way below.

It is three years almost to the day since I initiated a debate on the size of the House. It was clear then that there was a problem; the problem is even greater now. As we have heard, of legislative chambers that meet regularly throughout the year, we are the largest. It is true that the Chinese National People’s Congress has more Members, but it meets for only about two weeks each year. It is true that we have a smaller membership than existed prior to the 1999 Act; the difference is in terms of activity and perception. There is a justified expectation now that those created as Peers should contribute to the work of the House. The level of activity places a burden on the resources of the House, and on the public purse. Any inactivity reflects badly on the House, since we appear to be carrying passengers. So either way there is a problem.

We need to address size, which necessarily entails not only reducing numbers but also, as we have heard, controlling future appointments. That is where public perception becomes important. Some noble Lords appear to say that this is not too important: it is only perception. We do not exist in a vacuum. The more we grow in number, the more the media draw attention to our size, whatever good work we do. Indeed, as we have heard, that coverage masks the work of this House: that is the reality. New creations will be pored over by the media to see if someone has been a party donor. It only takes one for the media to generalise about the whole. Whatever we say, that will remain the case. We therefore need to move from deprecating such activity—or simply ignoring it—to doing something practical about it, hence this Motion and the recognition that action needs to be taken.

It is quite clear from this debate what that action needs to be. We need to establish a Select Committee to address the various options for reducing the size of the House. As has been stressed, we cannot resolve what the precise action is in a single debate such as this. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, seemed to think that the committee may not reach agreement and that was, therefore, an argument for not having a committee. If there is going to be a committee with a majority and minority view, I would rather have that than no committee at all. It can come forward with recommendations. The sooner we get under way and the sooner the committee reports, the better. It need not be a lengthy exercise. It may not succeed, but it is an essential start. I am delighted that my noble friend the Leader of the House is to reply. I trust that she will acknowledge that this is not a parochial issue. It is about ensuring that this nation’s constitutional arrangements benefit it. I end as I began: addressing size is only part of what needs to be done, but it is a necessary part. Let us get on with it and then address what else needs to be done.

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, I have no difficulty in agreeing with the Motion before your Lordships’ House. I am therefore extremely tempted to follow the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and sit down now. Sadly for him, and for the House, he is not going to be so lucky.

I start with an admission. In a previous incarnation I was responsible, albeit to a modest extent, for increasing the size of your Lordships’ House. When I was chief of staff to Charles Kennedy, we got a proposal from the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, about a very modest increase in the number of Liberal Democrat Peers. We objected to it, on the grounds that it was modest, and we would rather like a few more. We tried to find out what the other parties were getting but were told that that was completely improper and we could not be told. We said that unless we got a few more we were not going to agree to anything. There was a great deal of huffing and puffing but, to cut a long story short, we ended up with 60% more than had been on the original note. This was haggling about the composition of a legislature in one of the world’s largest countries. This process was, and remains, ridiculous and unsustainable in the long term.

As my noble friends Lord Tyler and Lord Rennard have set out, my party has had a long-standing policy to elect people to your Lordships’ House and, in the process, reduce the number of Members. We believe that in a democracy legitimate power and political authority ultimately derive from the people. In the 21st century, and in a modern innovative country such as ours, it is simply wrong that the public never have the opportunity to vote for Members of this House or to hold us to account on our record. Members of this House are, individually and collectively, legislators. It is straightforward that we should be accountable, through elections, to those whom we expect to follow the laws which we enact. A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, have made a point about regional representation in your Lordships’ House which strengthens this argument. As long as we have the current system there will be a predominance of people from London and the south-east in your Lordships’ House. There is a lot of talk about rebalancing the economy and the northern powerhouse, but the northern regions are not fully represented in your Lordships’ House. Until they are, any sense of political rebalancing in terms of the balance of arguments in Parliament simply will not happen. Regional elections would help to redress that balance.

It is also worth pointing out that every other second Chamber in the world, I think, except possibly the Council of Elders in Papua New Guinea, is elected. Although they may all be wrong, and we may be—

[Lord Norton of Louth]

Sixteen Chambers are wholly appointed.

[Lord Newby]

I stand corrected. I had better be careful because the noble Lord will correct what I am about to say, but I believe that many countries have more than one Chamber and that a minority, at best, have a non-elected second Chamber.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

That is true of wholly elected Chambers; they are in a minority as well. No one model is in an absolute majority.