Railways Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Thursday 10th September 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I think it might fall to me to speak next, if my noble friend does not want to speak to his amendments at this stage.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I will speak at the end, if I may.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group: Amendments 65 and 73. Rather than the broader issues of funding, mine are much more nitty-gritty questions about the transparency of the business plan and how the funding processes for Great British Railways are to work.

Amendment 65 is to Schedule 2, which is that part of the Bill where Great British Railways shows us in its business plan how its money is received and allocated towards activities. If I remember correctly, we are in that bit where it has to set out various things. We are at line 27 on page 71:

“The plan must set out … the activities Great British Railways proposes … the costs of carrying on those activities, and how Great British Railways proposes to meet those costs”.


Strictly speaking, all the things that I am asking for in Amendment 65 might be comprised within that.

This is an opportunity for us to be clear about what Great British Railways should do. In a separate group I will come to another issue related to the relationship with local government bodies. In this particular instance, there would be important transparency in Great British Railways being required, when setting out its business plan, to show what contributions are received by GBR itself from GBR companies, presumably by way of profits or revenue remitted to GBR for this purpose, and vice versa: how much is being paid out through GBR companies and how much is being received. Amendment 65 is for that purpose: where the activity is carried out by a GBR company, the contributions received from or provided to GBR in relation to those activities. I hope that is a straightforward transparency issue when the business plan is being presented. A good plan would do that anyway; it is just a case of trying to be clear about that now.

This affords me the opportunity to say something to my noble friend Lord Moylan. We discussed on Tuesday the question of GBR companies, and he returned to this issue and chastised me, saying that I was inaccurate. I do not think I was as inaccurate as he might imagine.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I never chastised.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I would never dream of doing that. It is inconceivable that I should do that. I drew to my noble friend’s attention an email that I had received that said that he had made a mistake and that the Minister had also made a mistake. I gave no opinion myself on that. It was very well argued, and I shared it with the Minister and the noble Lord. In writing to the noble Lord—I hope he has received that by now—I explicitly said that I did not know whether it was right or wrong, but I wondered whether he wished to make a comment. Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, may wish to make a comment at any time he chooses, but not a comment, I hope, that is intended to be a rebuttal of any chastisement, or even a mild criticism, suggested by me.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that correction. He has shared the email with me. I think it is worth putting on the record the point, made in that email, that it is important to distinguish between joint ventures on the one hand and corporate activities of companies on the other. However, the point of the debate on Tuesday was that I was seeking to establish under the legislation that GBR companies do not have to be wholly owned. Hansard will show that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, was seeking to establish that GBR companies are required to be wholly owned. That was the simple debate.

As I understand it, Clause 99 of the Bill makes it clear that GBR companies are a subsidiary of GBR, and a subsidiary under the Companies Act does not require to be wholly owned. If the Government had wanted GBR companies to be wholly-owned subsidiaries, they would have said so. So, as far as I am concerned, it is a subsidiary and, as we know, under the Companies Act, a subsidiary is a matter of control, not of complete ownership. As far as I am concerned, I got what I wanted out of that debate, which was my assurance that GBR companies are not required to be wholly owned.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, we are now redebating what was debated the other day. However, since there was an element of confusion, the noble Lord has accurately characterised the difference in position between himself and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, but it was in the context of an important debate about whether GBR would be able to carry out partnership—I use the word loosely—arrangements with private sector developers for the development of land in which GBR had a stake, with a view to achieving things like more housing or whatever it might be. Of course a subsidiary does not have to be wholly owned, since it is a question of control, so there can easily come a point where a joint venture company might not be controlled by GBR, and the question then is whether those arrangements would still apply.

The fundamental issue in the debate as I saw it—I entirely understand what the noble Lord is saying—is whether the structure proposed by the Government in the Bill inhibits what we would all agree are desirable developments that could take place using GBR assets working with the private sector. I heard the Minister give assurance on that, and of course I accept that, but I was merely advancing this to him because the suggestion was that confusion had arisen about joint ventures, subsidiaries and wholly-owned control in the course of debate, and that the Minister had fallen into that confusion, along with others. Therefore, I was giving him the opportunity to say whether that was in fact the case, although I do not expect him to do so today because he has only just had the email.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I think that was an intervention. I can only speak for myself, but I do not think I am confused now. The Bill does not inhibit this from happening in future and that is a satisfactory position for us to have reached. That is relevant to this debate in that my Amendment 65 is about the relationship between GBR and its companies, and financial transactions—the resources provided to or the resources received from GBR companies—ought to be explicit in the business plan.

I turn to Amendment 73. Now we really are in a happy position. It is many years since I was responsible for the public expenditure of a government department. I do not mean as Secretary of State; I mean as the official responsible. Knowing what powers one is using in relation to spending money is important. Amendment 73 is a probing amendment but I have used the structure of saying that the same activity should not be funded out of both the powers in the Bill, where financial assistance can be provided by the Secretary of State to GBR, and Section 6 of the Railways Act 2005, which noble Lords who know these things better than I do will remember is a broad-ranging power to provide financial assistance to GBR. I want to establish at this point—we might return to it at a later stage to see whether it is a satisfactory position—which GBR activities will be in receipt of financial assistance from the Government under the Section 6 power that exists now under the 2005 Act, or the financial assistance to be provided under this legislation. We need to avoid the confusion of two different powers providing financial assistance to the same activity.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. Amendment 59 looks at the statement of objectives that the Secretary of State sets out for GBR and what is intended to be achieved over the funding period. The objectives, as we can see in paragraph 2(2),

“may include objectives as to standards to be achieved when carrying on activities”

that are to be set out in the business plan. It is a simple proposition and one of those happy subjects that we always discuss in Committee: should the word be “may” or should it be “must”? The implication of “may” is that it may not be, and we are considering whether it would be acceptable for the statement of objectives not to include reference to the standards that are to be achieved in relation to these activities. One of these lists about which we are not supposed to be too specific follows, but standards to be achieved are not set out as such in that subsequent list. They tend to be objectives relating to other things.

However, my other amendment is intended to see how these things interact. Separately, in Clause 65, Great British Railways has the responsibility to consider whether it should have a performance scheme, which, as I understand it, is essentially about minimising disruption to the network and to passengers. The question is: where are the objectives in relation to minimising disruption to passengers? I do not see them in paragraph 2(3). You could argue that they arise from the carriage of passengers and goods, but I do not think it is sufficiently explicit. I am not sure whether it is included in objectives as to standards. Are those the same standards as in a performance scheme?

I see the two amendments being linked. We are looking to ensure that the objectives set out standards and are clear about what is required in terms of avoiding disruption and enabling passengers to be confident about the availability of services according to the timetable. I beg to move.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, it may be helpful to the Committee, since I have such a large number of amendments in the group and no one else who is present has any, if I speak now, and then it will be easier for the noble Baroness to comment on the amendments I have moved.

I shall start with Amendment 63A. I have tabled it because in the last 24 hours I have been contemplating the wipe-out of 10% of the global population by artificial intelligence, which a whistleblower at Anthropic has said is a very likely prospect some time in the next 10 years. It is possible that these claims are somewhat overblown—I do not know—but it is astonishing that we have a Bill whose measures in all likelihood, as I say, will stay in place for 30 years but we are not having any debate about digital, artificial intelligence or the innovative future of the railway.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

May I just interrupt my noble friend? I think he has moved on to the next group. We are on the group led by Amendment 59, to which I just spoke.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

And today’s Committee is due to conclude with Amendment 63.

Railways Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th September 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, in the course of preparing for this Committee, I have had a number of meetings with the Minister and his officials, and I thank them for making themselves available for those meetings. I say that now because I shall almost certainly forget to say it at more appropriate times later on, but if I do it is not because I do not mean quite seriously how grateful I am for the contribution and effort that they have made.

We are here on the first day of the Committee to create a Soviet-style railway in the United Kingdom and to go back—and we now know explicitly that it is the Government’s and the Prime Minister’s intention—to the warm and fuzzy 1970s. The 1970s are now the paradigm of where our nation should be. Those of us who remember the 1970s—there may be a number of us in the Room—do not have such fond memories of the standard of public services then compared with what we have today. We do not today have bodies unburied, we do not have refuse piled high in the streets as a result of government folly and we have railways that run broadly on time compared to the—I see that the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, is not here to be annoyed by this—relative catastrophe of British Rail in its worst days as it trundled towards its final station. Now it is to be resuscitated. We are to get Great British Railways in place of British Rail and we are going to have it on a totally nationalised basis.

There are two separate things going on here. First, the Minister makes a case that the railways would operate more efficiently if, as he puts it, track and train were united. That argument can be debated. I do not wholly accept it, but it can be debated, but it is not necessary in order for track and train to be united that they should all be owned by the Government in a single company. We know that because the Williams review, which was warmly welcomed by the Minister when he was chairman of Network Rail and was supported by the Conservative Government at the time, gave an alternative way forward, so the decision to nationalise the whole thing is particularly spiteful. The only explanation for it—because it is not necessary for the purpose of achieving the Government’s stated objectives—is that it has been done to pay off the trades unions that made such generous contributions to Labour’s victory at the polls in 2024.

We know that privatisation has been a huge success on the railways and that passenger numbers increased enormously after privatisation. It would be astonishing if the Government nationalising the railways achieved anything like that increase in passenger numbers. New operators entered the market and competition stimulated improvements.

I have four amendments in this group, but one of them is consequential, so three that I intend to speak to. My Amendment 2 addresses a particularly vicious little clause in the Bill, which says, first of all, that the body designated as Great British Railways has to be owned wholly by the Crown. In other words, a future Minister would have to pass primary legislation to redesignate or designate a different body in the private sector to carry out Great British Railways’ activities. What is the need for that? It is simply to gratify the trades unions. A second part almost seems to impose a penalty of some sort on any Minister who makes even a suggestion that Great British Railways should be transferred to the private sector. My Amendment 2 deletes that part; it does not stop Great British Railways going ahead as a nationalised body but it allows a future Secretary of State without the need for primary legislation to redesignate a different body, not necessarily owned by the Crown, to carry out the role of Great British Railways.

Amendment 1 is addressed at sloppy drafting more than anything else. The Bill talks about a body corporate being designated as Great British Railways, whereas later, in the next clause, it is implicit that the body corporate should be a company constituted under the Companies Act. But the Bill does not actually say that the body corporate has to be constituted under the Companies Act; it only says that it has to be wholly owned by the Crown. Other bodies corporate could be designated, as long as they were wholly owned by the Crown. It is simply sloppy drafting not to say at this point that it is to be a body constituted under the Companies Act.

When I mentioned this to the Minister, he said, “Oh well, everybody knows it’s going to be a company constituted under the Companies Act”. Well, they do not, if they read the Act—it needs to be written into the Act by him that that is what the intention is. It should say quite explicitly that that is what he intends to do. We will come back to this when we discuss amendments later in Committee that relate to the board of this company. There are some from the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, to which I have added my name, about the board of this company and how this corporate structure works, because the Bill is very silent on that. This needs to be done.

Finally, Amendment 8 probes Great British Railways’ organisational structure. To this day we still have no idea at all—and maybe the Minister has no idea at all—how Great British Railways is going to be structured. Let me give a couple of options. It could be that it will be structured geographically, roughly mapping the existing structures, so that one division deals roughly with the south-western main line, one division deals with the east coast main line, and so forth. It could be structured like that, but you could have a totally different structure. There might be an argument for saying that we should have one division that deals with operating the railways, one that deals with managing the major stations, another division that deals with the minor stations and another again for retail. You could have an organisation that was completely functionally based rather than geographically based. These are important questions, which I think Parliament should have a chance to have a say on, yet not only is the Bill silent about them but the Government are silent as well. The effect of Amendment 8 is to require the Government to publish their organisational structure before the Bill can come into effect.

That is enough for the moment—I understand that other noble Lords have things to say. I will just say in advance—and I hope that the noble Baroness will forgive me for pre-empting her—that I have taken note of the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. They are not wholly aligned with my view of the role of the private sector and she will not therefore, I think, be surprised if I find myself not able to support them. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to join this first group in Committee. I am sitting to the left of the Liberal Democrats because that is where I now find myself; I always want to be sitting behind my noble friend on the Front Bench in Committee to back him up, but I cannot do that because there is no back row in this Room, so I cannot be self-effacing in the back row. Anyway, I look forward to Committee. I do not have the experience of railways that the Minister and my noble friend speaking for the Official Opposition do—I do not pretend to that intimate knowledge of the railways—but I hope to bring something of my interest in how competition should be applied in the delivery of public services to some of the issues that we will be debating.

I turn to this group. There are a number of amendments in my name which are just about trying to find out, as I was going through the Bill, whether it works in the way described or precisely what it means. Rather in line with what my noble friend was just saying, we need to be sure that we understand that the Bill is functionally correct in the way that it works. I have just two amendments in this group.

Amendment 3 relates to the question of what must be wholly owned. As my noble friend said, Clause 1 is constructed around the proposition that Great British Railways not only must be wholly owned by the Crown but cannot be anything else. That relates to GBR itself. The purpose of Amendment 3 is to test whether that also applies to GBR companies. We do not encounter GBR companies in Clause 1, but we do subsequently as a means by which GBR will undertake its activities. This is not surprising. As my noble friend said, we do not know how GBR will be corporately structured but, by way of example, we know how Network Rail is structured. It has a significant number of wholly owned subsidiaries and quite a number of joint venture subsidiaries, including through Platform4.

For example—and here I declare my interest as chair of the Cambridgeshire Development Forum and others—Platform4 is a Network Rail subsidiary company that has just recently, happily, entered into an agreement with partners to develop at Cambridge North station as part of the Government’s proposal to develop around stations, with 450 homes around the station. It is a joint venture company; it is not wholly owned by Network Rail. So my starting proposition is that this prohibition on companies not being wholly owned must apply to GBR itself but cannot apply to GBR companies. I want to be sure that that is the case. If it is not absolutely clear in the statute then it ought to be, which would be the purpose of my amendment.

That differentiates the amendment from those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to which we will no doubt turn in a minute, who wants precisely that to be the case. For the reasons I have just explained about the many joint ventures for things such as housing developments and commercial developments around stations through companies such as Platform4, if I may respectfully say so before she has put her case, I do not agree with the noble Baroness that all GBR companies should be—

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 4 deals with relations with the devolved authorities in Scotland and Wales. I have a number of amendments here—five, in fact. They all appear in a sense to be relatively minor but they go to the heart of the devolution settlement. They raise the question of whether the Bill is in line with the new Prime Minister’s policy—I know he has not been elected to anything but he is the new Prime Minister—of making devolution a reality. I will run through the amendments fairly straightforwardly and leave it to others to debate them and the Minister to respond.

One of the things that can be done is that any combined authority or devolved authority has a right to request. I always find this slightly offensive, because we are a free country—everyone has a right to request something from the Minister—but apparently, this valued “right to request” is going to be given. You can go along and ask GBR if it will run a service local to you, which might even be branded your way, to which you might contribute some of the costs. That is the general idea. I can understand that in relation to English combined authorities but not the devolved Administrations.

For example, I do not understand at all why Scotland should be confined by statute to running that service using Great British Railways. If the path is available and the service can be run, why should Scotland not make its own choice about who the operator of that service should be? As I understand it, that would not be possible under the Bill; it would have to be a GBR service. I think that is a bit insulting to Scottish devolution. The same applies to Wales. My Amendment 21 would correct that and allow them to exercise railway functions through a body corporate other than Great British Railways.

Amendment 145 goes hand in hand with Amendment 146, because they relate to Scotland and Wales. They relate to the fact that, under the Bill, there will have to be a memorandum of understanding between Great British Railways and the Scottish and Welsh Governments. There is a great deal of reliance on memoranda of understanding in the Bill, but we never see them and have no entitlement to do so. I am not saying that they will not be published, but I am not sure that the Government are under an obligation to publish them. They are so much a part of this Bill, but their substance is being concealed from us in Parliament and wrapped up in documents that are ancillary to the main agreement. My Amendments 145 and 146 would require those memoranda to be laid before Parliament before they could come into effect.

Finally, I have the paired Amendments 294 and 295. Again, one relates to Scotland and one to Wales. Amendment 294 relates to Clause 82. There is something fantastically cheeky in Clause 82, which reads:

“Great British Railways must consult the Scottish Ministers before making a decision within subsection (2)”—


which would be a decision about cross-border services and additions to a part of the railway network operated by Great British Railways that is situated in Scotland—

“if it appears to Great British Railways that the decision will significantly affect the interests of Scotland’s economy or of persons living in, working in or visiting”

the area. I come back to a similar question I asked in the last group: what economic capacity would Great British Railways be employing to make disinterested decisions about whether something would have a significant effect on the interests of Scotland’s economy? Secondly, is it not more likely that the Scottish Government would be the appropriate body to make a decision about whether something will have a significant effect on the interests of the Scottish economy? My amendment would put that right by reversing it. Amendment 295 would do something similar for Wales.

There is a certain arrogance in the Bill, certainly with regard to local government in England, but the arrogance towards the Scottish and Welsh Governments is beyond the pale, given what the Prime Minister has been saying and what those Governments would accept. I hope that, when the Minister replies, he will say that the matters to which I have drawn attention are slips in the drafting that he will be happy to correct, either through my amendments or amendments that he will draft and submit to us on Report. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I want to talk to my Amendment 22 in this group. Before I do that, I might just say so to my noble friend that I see the point he is driving at with Amendment 21, but I think it is a little more complicated. It seems to me that this is about the circumstances that apply where the Scottish or Welsh Ministers wish to use Great British Railways or a company jointly owned by themselves and Great British Railways. In effect, they are not subsidiaries of Great British Railways: we can already see in the Bill this distinction between GBR companies and a company that is jointly owned by Scottish and Welsh Ministers and GBR.

They can use that to provide services but, as far as I can see, they are not prevented from doing the following. If you look at subsequent clauses, we have seen the whole process of designation of passenger services, which those of us who did the public ownership Bill will remember. They have to designate passenger services with a public sector company, but the definition of a public sector company in a later clause is not the same. It could be a company wholly owned by Scottish Ministers or by Welsh Ministers; they are not required to use Great British Railways. They could even do the same thing that the Secretary of State can, which is exempt services from designation, and then do the same as the Secretary of State does with TfL but in Glasgow, Cardiff and so on. So I think it is a little more complicated.

In particular, I think putting “other body corporate” in here is not necessary. More to the point, if I may say so to my noble friend, is to re-enter the question of the scope of who might provide designated services, which I know he will do with further amendments at a later stage.

Amendment 22, on my part, is just to see whether there is really a problem. At the point at which Scottish and Welsh Ministers look to change arrangements that they have made with Great British Railways to provide some services, they are required to consult with the Secretary of State and Great British Railways. However, those arrangements will necessarily lead to issues that need to be governed by the regulatory functions of the Office of Rail and Road and relate to the licensing of those operators through the ORR. It seems to me perfectly reasonable to require that Scottish and Welsh Ministers, at the point of making or changing those arrangements, should also consult the Office of Rail and Road in order to ensure that there is not a difficulty associated with what they are asking GBR to do on their behalf. The purpose of Amendment 22 is to put in that consultation with the ORR.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Monday 2nd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I shall endeavour to be brief. I have only one amendment in this group. There is also an amendment by my noble friend, Lord Lansley, which, as I understand it, has a similar effect to my own, or at least points in the same direction.

The reason I raise this—I refer to my local government experience—is that anyone with local government experience is seized of the question of vires. We are always worried about whether we actually have the power to do that which we want to do, because, as is well known, if you do not have the power in law, you are probably acting outside your responsibilities and can be held liable for it, and all sorts of terrible things can ensue from that.

Here I am thinking ahead to the Railways Bill, which we intend to amend when it comes to your Lordships’ House so as to give certain rail responsibilities to mayors in certain cities at least. At the moment, that Railways Bill merely gives them the opportunity to be consulted and to request, and we think devolution could go a little further. Thinking ahead to that, one wonders whether the response to that from the Government might not be, “Ah, yes, but even if we were willing to give them such powers, they don’t have the vires to do it. They do not have the legal power to operate a passenger railway service, and it would be inappropriate to bring that into the Railways Bill, where it would be out of scope”. But of course it would not be out of scope of this Bill, which is about exactly that question: the devolution of powers to local authorities. So I thought we would fend off that difficulty if it arose later by making it explicit in the Bill that those local authorities had legal power to run passenger railway services.

Of course, it would not follow at all from this measure alone that they would be able to run passenger railway services. If you want to run a passenger railway service, you have to have a railway and some trains. This Bill would not change that situation at all, but it would give them the legal power should it be made possible for them to have access to trains and to rail in the future. For that reason, I think it is a very sensible measure to include here and I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I thank your Lordships for the opportunity to contribute on this. I fear that those of us who participated during the passage of the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill, such as the Minister and my noble friend Lord Moylan, will be having our Groundhog Day moment on this group because we will be examining, as my noble friend said, the question of whether it should be possible for passenger rail services to be operated by mayors.

My amendment is different from my noble friend’s because I am setting out to examine whether the legislation needs to change to enable that to happen. There has been something of a pre-emption of this debate by the exchanges that took place on the group before last in relation to exactly this question of whether TfL and the mayor should be able to take responsibility for the Great Northern inner suburban services. It raises exactly the point that is the burden of my amendment. So I want to start by asking the Minister: is it possible, as he suggested on the earlier group, for passenger transport executives, accountable to mayors, to run passenger rail services? The Minister is nodding. I shall just explain why I think it is possible and then examine whether that is the case. Maybe we do not need to amend either this Bill or the Railways Bill in due course, but we might need to look at those issues when they come up.

It seems to me that, in the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act, it is provided that the Secretary of State, as the franchising authority, when he or she—it is a she—wishes to procure passenger rail services, must do so only by a direct award of a public service contract to a publicly owned company. A publicly owned company, as we then proceed to discover under Section 30C of the Railways Act, as amended by the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act, is a company owned by the Secretary of State. We know what this now means: it means that Great British Railways will effectively be the franchising authority in the fullness of time—I think we are looking two years ahead or so—of all the passenger railway services other than those outside the present franchising agreement, such as open access operators.

How then could Great Northern inner suburban services be handed to the mayor in any practical sense? The answer is that, under Section 13 of the Railways Act 2005, passenger transport executives may enter into agreements. Section 13(4) says:

“A Passenger Transport Executive … in England may enter into agreements for … the provision, by a person who is a … franchise operator … of … services for the carriage of passengers by railway within that area”.


So TfL could enter into an agreement with Great British Railways to provide passenger railway services extending beyond London. “How far?” noble Lords may ask. Section 13 of the Railways Act 2005 gives us the answer: “within the permitted distance”, which is 25 miles from the boundary of TfL’s area. That takes us out to Stevenage—yes, Stevenage, no less.

I am looking to the Minister to say whether any of this train of thought is not correct. Is it possible for mayors to be given not the franchising authority for the delivery of passenger services in their area but an agreement for the operation of passenger services, to the extent that that is negotiated with Great British Railways and approved by the Secretary of State under Section 13(5)? That operational control, of course, is subject to what we will discuss, no doubt, in due course: the directing mind of Great British Railways. The nature of the operational activities undertaken by TfL must therefore be entirely constrained by the agreement that Great British Railways and Transport for London will enter into. But it seems to me that it is possible to do it now. If it is not possible to do it now, the Bill should be amended so as to enable this to happen, which is what my amendment was originally intended to do.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I want to be absolutely clear in my own mind and check that my noble friend is as well. It is very easy, in London, to think that Transport for London runs those services, partly because they are branded to look like Transport for London, and that therefore, Transport for London is in roughly the equivalent position of a train operating company, but that is not its position. With those services, the Secretary of State’s role as franchising authority has been transferred to Transport for London—Transport for London is not the train operating company, but the franchising authority. All the services are run by train operating companies, which are invited to bid for them. I am not sure that that system applies in other conurbations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Under the arrangement that is struck, is it not likely that the only potential operating company that would be acceptable for such an agreement would be Great British Railways? Great British Railways would be agreeing with a mayor, “You can pay us to run services”, which is more or less exactly what the Bill envisages and which many of us find objectionable. What my noble friend is describing may be accurate and permissible—we will find out from the Minister in a moment whether it is—but it does not take us beyond the Railways Bill, which many of us would like to do. That is the purpose of my amendment.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My noble friend makes a good point. If the Secretary of State were to ask Great British Railways to enter into that agreement with Transport for London, I do not know who would be the operator of the passenger rail services concerned. It might be Great British Railways, because Section 13 of the Railways Act 2005 clearly envisages payment for this. That could be to GBR, in exactly in the same way as it has been in the past to Great Northern or any other operator.

The point is that the agreement under the 2005 legislation enables passenger transport executives to enter into agreements with the franchise operators to run those services. As far as I can see, that is not being taken away, as long as the legal authority is not transferred to the mayor. What my noble friend Lord Moylan is correctly saying about the current legal status of TfL is not what can be reproduced in relation to Great Northern in suburban services, as far as I am aware.

Tobacco and Vapes Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Thursday 13th November 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I hope noble Lords will forgive me: I have tabled an amendment to my own amendment, just for the purpose of making it clear that it became apparent that, in relation to brand sharing, for example, it might be appropriate for this to apply in Part 6 as well as Part 5. All the arguments similarly apply.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I think I am correct in saying that all of the amendments I have proposed so far have generally been met with a buoyant response and a good level of engagement. I suspect that Amendment 198 will be less welcome; I will speak to it briefly, partly because my noble friend Lord Lansley has already explained what the amendment says and made a comment with which I do not, in essence, disagree.

The amendment seeks to establish a vaping and nicotine industry forum so that the Government can engage with the industry properly. It would disapply the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which Ministers treat as if it were binding but which has not been the subject of a parliamentary statute imposing it on Ministers. My noble friend Lord Lansley says that this should not be necessary—I rather agree with him—but, in fact, it is necessary in practice because Ministers are treating the framework convention as binding. They are, therefore, excluding from their consultation vaping industry firms that are part of tobacco groups. They will engage with those firms that are involved exclusively in producing vapes—or are at least involved in producing vapes without being tobacco firms—but they will not engage with the others. Obviously, that leads to a very fragmented level of engagement with the industry.

We must be practical and realistic about this. As the tobacco companies transition—they clearly are transitioning—away from cigarettes and into vaping and e-cigarette products, the Government should start to engage with them differently as to their background. That is what Amendment 198 proposes; I do not have to say very much more about it.

Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Lord Lansley

Report stage
Wednesday 6th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, the purpose of Amendment 3 in my name is to explore the question of when and under what circumstances it is the Government’s intention to meet their duty in Section 4(1)(d) of the Railways Act

“to promote competition in the provision of railway services for the benefit of users of railway services”.

It was prompted by a very brief exchange that took place in Committee, where the Minister confirmed that it is not the Government’s intention to remove that duty. However, it is clearly their intention, in relation to passenger railway services, very substantially to reduce competition and perhaps to exclude it altogether. There may well be other areas of activity in the provision of railway services which are open to competition, and I want to examine where those should be. Of course, I approach this not with the intention that the duty to promote competition should be removed from the Act, but with the view that it should be exercised.

I am in favour of competition. I might say, in this context, going back many years, that where privatisation is concerned, we have found that competition between private organisations yields benefits. In the railways, in some circumstances, we have found that the absence of competition has been at the heart of the problem: that the performance has not been exposed to competition and therefore has not improved in the way we would have wished it to. So, competition works, privatisation does not necessarily work, but the combination of privatisation and competition, in my view, has worked in the past. However, we are not here to discuss privatisation; we are here to discuss competition, and there is a continuing role for competition, in my view.

I am not planning to talk at length about Amendments 13 and 17 in this group, I will leave that to my noble friend on the Front Bench, but Amendment 17 is directly relevant. One of the principal opportunities for competition would be with open-access operators. In Committee, we touched upon but did not find out whether, and to what extent, it was the Government’s intention to continue to permit open-access operators or indeed to promote them. In my view, promoting them can be a very effective way of stimulating competition and innovation, which are often—as Schumpeter would have said—very intimately linked together.

My contention in this amendment is very simple: to explore where competition will be available. Clearly, it can be done with things such as the provision of rolling stock and services to railways, and maybe, to some extent, in relation to rail freight. As far as passenger railway services are concerned—and we are dealing with that here—the Government’s intention appears to be that every aspect of the passenger railway services should be subject to the “directing mind”—as the Explanatory Notes sets out. Therefore, it will be very difficult for there to be any substantial competition, except if that can be achieved by the role of open-access operators. I hope, when he responds to this debate, the Minister will be able to say they will have a continuing role, or even that they might be encouraged to bring the innovation and competition that would enable us to avoid the downside of a dominant provider.

We have seen this in other circumstances. For example, in France, the dominance of SNCF has led to abuse such as anti-competitive pricing or the overbooking of train paths to restrict competition from other providers. We do not want to see the dominance of public sector providers, on passenger railway services, to lead to that kind of abuse. Still less do we want to see monopoly activity on the part of public sector companies in passenger railway services lead to an elevation of the interests of the companies themselves over the interests of the users of railway services. The general duty to promote competition is for the benefit of the users of railway services because, very often, they are the ones who most see the benefit of that.

I will just tease the Minister, finally, by saying that in this legislation he has the opportunity to move in the opposite direction to the fourth railway package under the EU’s transport legislation. Here is an uncovenanted Brexit bonus for the Government, in being able to move in the opposite direction to the thrust of legislation in the European Union. With that teasing moment, I beg leave to move Amendment 3.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 13 and 17 in my name, but also to respond to my noble friend Lord Lansley in relation to Amendment 3. We come now to the heart of a considerable confusion that exists in the Bill, one that the Government have done their very best to avoid and that needs to be flushed out.

My noble friend Lord Lansley refers to competition. In fact, he refers to the abusive practice by monopoly railways in France. That, of course, is in response to European Union legislation, which has had to mandate access to competition in order for it to flourish in the European Union. It is going in the direction that we went in, somewhat later than us. We are now going back to the Attlee Government, basically, and moving away from that. It is a Brexit bonus, as I think I said in an earlier debate.

The matter is made worse because the Government have not been clear about their view on competition. It has been made much worse by the Government’s confusion and blank refusal to address the question: who is going to make the decisions about competition? Who is going to decide, in relation to open access, which providers will have access to the service? I refer, as I was encouraged to do by the Minister, to the Labour Party document Getting Britain Moving. In its section 7 on “The role of open access”, beginning on page 22, it says clearly:

“The ORR will continue to make approval decisions on open access applications”,


but that is not confirmed by the Minister. Instead, we have the spectre of Great British Railways making open access decisions. That appears to be part of the great controlling brain: one of its functions is that it would make those decisions about open access. But in doing so, it will be making decisions directly about competition with itself.

We are very concerned that the sort of abusive monopoly activity seen in France, which my noble friend has referred to, is exactly what we would be exposing ourselves to if we allowed this measure to go through without having appropriate safeguards in place in advance. That is the thrust of Amendment 17, which simply calls for a report. In Committee the Minister made fun of me for calling for so many reports, but he should understand that we are doing this as a way of drawing attention to an issue of serious concern without trying to hobble or wreck the Bill. He has not given us any assurance in response. He has taken no notice of our very genuine and serious concerns.

Amendment 13 relates to a similar topic, in relation not to open access for passenger railway services but rather to access for freight services. They too compete, so to speak, for paths on the railway; they need access to the railway if they are to operate. The previous Government had an informal and non-statutory target of seeing the volume of freight on the railways increase by 75% by 2050 from a base of, I think, two years ago. This amendment would effectively put that target into the Bill.

Nobody in the Labour Party, either in opposition or in government, has resiled from or rejected that target. If anything, I think they want a more exacting target. The Minister, if pressed, would probably say that it was a perfectly respectable target, one that he would want to sign up to, so there should be no objection to seeing it in the Bill. It would give some assurance that Great British Railways, in its operations, would not simply favour its own activities at the expense of freight operators. Ideally, we would also want some sort of assurance that it would not favour its own passenger activities at the expense of open access operators.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, this is the last group on which I plan to speak. My amendment was prompted by a debate in Committee that gave rise to the question of how the new legislation would work. We have established, including during the previous group, a number of things that do not change, including the licensing of railway services and the prohibition on operating without a licence. The relationship with open- access providers therefore does not change, since they can make applications to the Office of Rail and Road for that purpose—I am paraphrasing, but that is, broadly speaking, how it works.

Where we have a change is in the process for franchising, which is to be removed. The Government have chosen to change the franchising provisions in the Railways Act, in Section 30 et cetera, and to replace that text with what we see in the Bill. I really want to explore this question: to what extent will all designated railway services be brought under Section 30, from new Sections 30A to 30C? I want to explore the consequence of the use of the word “only” in that provision. It says that a service must “only” be provided by

“a direct award of a public service contract to a”

wholly owned public sector company. In effect, it will be wholly owned by the Secretary of State—not, as we have discovered, other public sector companies.

The removal of the word “only” would, in the way in which the text works, as far as I can see, create an opportunity for the Secretary of State to provide or secure the provision of services by routes other than the direct award under Regulation 17. Clearly, that is not the Government’s intention. I will not return to the debate I promoted in Committee, but it would be good legislation to leave that option open to the Secretary of State, even if it were not the Government’s present intention to use it, because they may find it valuable to be able to do so in future.

Let us look at a practical example. Imagine that the Government thought it desirable to say that a service such as the one from Fenchurch Street to Southend and Shoeburyness should form part of the Overground services under the operating control of Transport for London. As far as I can see, as things stand, if that service is designated under Section 23 of the Railways Act—the designation requirements—it will have to be run by a public sector company wholly owned by the Secretary of State, unless it is the subject of an exemption under Section 24. In Committee, I think we heard the Minister say that the Government have no plans to extend the exemptions under Section 24. That raises another question for the Minister. Would he entertain that there may be circumstances in which it would be desirable to extend Section 24 exemptions? While London is a straightforward example, will the Government be open to that possibility, if it were a practical mechanism of securing the best operation of those services?

To what extent is the language of the Bill very deliberate, in that it requires that the Secretary of State may secure the provision of these services only through a direct award, but it does not say that the Secretary of State may provide or secure the provision of these services only by this route? I am making the distinction between “provide” and “securing the provision of”. This is customarily seen in legislation as a distinction between a government department doing it itself and doing it by means of a contract.

Where in this does the Department for Transport’s operator of last resort holdings company sit? Does giving an award of a contract to OLR Holdings Ltd constitute securing the provision of a service, or does it constitute providing the service? Is it regarded as part of the department for these purposes, or is it part of a wholly owned public sector company? There would be something rather odd now about treating it as part of a franchise agreement, since these franchises have already ended. Bringing it under a regime that is about the ending of franchise agreements seems odd.

My second example concerns East West Rail. We are not far away from the point when East West Rail will be running services itself on its new rail services. That will be very welcome—not least from my point of view, living in Cambridgeshire—when it reaches, as the Budget told us, all the way into Cambridge in due course. It will be running services quite soon in Oxford and Bletchley. It has not had a franchise; clearly, it will not now be given a franchise. It is a wholly owned public sector company. Is it the Government’s intention that it will be brought within the scope of Section 30? If so, this is odd, as this is an arrangement for franchises, but it has never had a franchise.

Of course, on the face of it, the Government will continue to designate railway services. Presumably—and here is a question to the Minister—there will be a comprehensive designation of railway services under Section 23, and that will, as a consequence, bring them all under Section 30 because of the way the legislation is now to be phrased. Therefore, is the intention, in effect, to bring all designated railway services under the scope of Section 30 et cetera, other than those exempted under Section 24?

I am sorry for asking a range of questions to explore how this works. We did, as the Minister has kindly mentioned, have the opportunity to discuss this a few days ago, so I hope he will have had the opportunity to think about explaining precisely how these interactions in the legislation will work. I beg to move.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley for posing those very interesting questions. I am sure that the Government have answers to them, but they illustrate that this legislation is essentially very rushed and that they have not properly considered it.

I promise not to repeat what I said in Committee, but I cannot resist referring back to the final impact assessment, produced by the Department for Transport. It said that the purpose of the Bill is to meet a manifesto commitment, so it has not undertaken the normal practice of looking at alternative methods by which the same objectives might be achieved, because they are all in a terrible rush as the Government want to have a headline, essentially, and want to get ahead of the franchises as they expire. Therefore, I appreciate what my noble friend Lord Lansley has said, and I look forward to the Government’s reply.

Amendments 5 and 6, standing in my name, are linked. If Amendment 5 were to pass, I understand that there has been discussion with the Government Front Bench that Amendment 6 would pass without a Division in order to avoid having two votes on the same topic.

In Committee, I referred to two different models by which the private sector might be involved in the running of railways. One is the franchise system that we are currently discussing, which is the main subject of this Bill, but the other, generally dubbed the concession system, is the one used by Transport for London for the operation of all its services other than the London Underground, which is directly provided by Transport for London. All the other services—the buses, London Overground, the DLR, the tram and so forth—are provided under a concession system; that is, they are run by private companies on a contract.

The key difference between the franchise system and the concession system is that under the franchise system, as envisaged at privatisation, the fares risk rests with the operator. That was the model that was set up back when privatisation was introduced. If the fares went up and the companies generated more fares income, they would keep it; if they lost money on fares, it would be their problem that they did not make money because the fares were not good enough. Companies had the incentive to generate more fares, principally by generating more passengers, through all the clever things that they would do.

I was frank and straightforward in saying at Second Reading that that aspect of privatisation has never worked well because, essentially, private operators are not in control of fares income, which is closely correlated with the economic cycle—which of course they cannot control, manage or in any serious way mitigate. That aspect has never worked well, and Covid put an end to it in any meaningful sense. It has never recovered from that, nor, given this legislation, is it ever going to have the chance to recover.

The concession system is different, in that the fares risk remains with the franchisor. In the case of Transport for London, it is the franchisor of the services I referred to and it retains the fares risk. The obligation of the private sector operator is simply to have the trains and equipment in the right place, pointing in the right direction first thing in the morning, properly staffed, cleaned to a certain standard and so forth. If it fails to do those things, it will suffer financial penalties. The important point is that all those things are within its control. It receives a fee for that, but, in practice, because of competition, it is a modest fee given that risk is very limited. The risks are all things that are just a matter of it doing its job properly; if it does it properly, it will get that modest fee without penalty.

The purpose of Amendment 5 is to open up an option. It makes no obligation on the Secretary of State. When a franchise is terminated, the Secretary of State would have the option of awarding it not only, as the Bill is currently drafted, to a public sector company that is a subsidiary of the Department for Transport but to a private sector entity on a concession basis. The reason for it is simply that we know that it works. We know from Transport for London that the system can be made to work very effectively. We know that some of the best services on the Transport for London network—some of the best modes—are provided under this system. Why should it be that the Government would want to rule that out? Of course there could be a role for the private sector operating on that concessionary basis.

My noble friend Lord Lansley’s amendment gives the Government more options than mine does. My amendment gives the Government one extra option, but he would give the Government effectively limitless options by deleting the word “only”, whatever options might be available. It would give the Government more flexibility in dealing with circumstances that they may not have foreseen when they drafted this Bill.

Amendment 6 goes with Amendment 5 simply by defining in a separate clause what I mean by concession. Amendment 5 opens up the choice to do something on a concession basis and Amendment 6 says what a concession is. Despite every effort on my part and that of the Public Bill Office, we could not quite combine these into one amendment, so they stand on the Marshalled List as two amendments which, in practice, are closely linked, as one amplifies and clarifies the other.

I would very much like to hear from the Minister why Amendment 5 would not be acceptable, except to a control freak. That appears to be perhaps the Government’s vision for the railways.