Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 20th March 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Moylan]

176: After Clause 77, insert the following new Clause—
“Traffic emission road charging schemes(1) This section relates to schemes under which drivers are charged for using roads within a specified zone (affected roads) according to the traffic emissions of the vehicle concerned.(2) A devolved authority may only introduce such a scheme if, before the scheme is introduced, consent to the introduction of the scheme is granted by all local authorities which have affected roads within their boundaries.(3) In considering whether to grant consent under subsection (2), the relevant local authorities must have regard to their duties in relation to air quality under section 83A of the Environment Act 1995 (duties of English local authorities in relation to designated areas).(4) Where consent is sought under subsection (2), the question of whether to grant consent must be considered by the relevant local authority in full Council.(5) Where such a scheme has been introduced by a devolved authority before the coming into force of this section, the devolved authority must request consent to the continuation of the scheme from all local authorities which have affected roads within their boundaries.(6) In considering whether to grant consent under subsection (5), the relevant local authorities must have regard to their duties in relation to air quality under section 83A of the Environment Act 1995 (duties of English local authorities in relation to designated areas).(7) Where consent is sought under subsection (5), the question of whether to grant consent must be considered by the relevant local authority in full Council. (8) Where consent is sought under subsection (5) and not granted, the devolved authority must cease to implement the scheme within three months of the decision not to grant consent.(9) In this section—“devolved authority” means—(a) Transport for London,(b) the Mayor of London, or(c) the Mayor of a Combined Authority;“local authority” means—(a) a district council,(b) a county council, or(c) a London borough council.”

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 176, I will speak also to Amendment 178B, both of which are in my name; I am grateful to the noble Lords who have given them their support.

In our discussion of the Bill, we have had much debate on the powers of mayoral authorities and the balance between upper-tier authorities—local authorities, regional authorities and mayoral authorities—and those lower down the chain. These amendments continue that debate in a different way. With noble Lords’ agreement, I will start by speaking to Amendment 178B; I will come to Amendment 176 after that.

Amendment 178B is very brief and technical but has quite a lot of effect. It amends the Greater London Authority Act to allow the assembly to amend the mayor’s budget by an absolute majority, rather than requiring a two-thirds majority, as now. Although it is drafted to apply to London, if granted this would have a wider effect, because there are other metropolitan mayoral authorities with similar arrangements for the scrutiny and passing of a mayoral budget. I will speak about London, from my experience, and the other matters can be taken later.

When the Blair Government set up the Greater London Authority through the 1999 Act, they were wedded to the idea that it should have a very strong mayor—a sort of Nietzschean super-figure bestriding the capital and, crucially for our purposes, able to impose his or her own budget on London, even if opposed by a majority in the elected assembly. No reason was ever given for this, as far as I understand, and it entailed a significant denial of the norms of democracy. When he was mayor, Ken Livingstone, who had a certain sense of irony, used to sit in the public gallery of the assembly when his budget was being debated. Every time he lost a vote and there was a majority against, he would give a little chuckle and declare a triumph, because although 50% or even 60% of the members were voting against that provision in his budget, it had no effect because they could not achieve a two-thirds majority.

When it was set up, it was explained that the Greater London Authority’s powers were strictly limited to it being a strategic authority for London; it was not meant to be a delivery authority. The mayor did operate four functional bodies in addition: Transport for London, the Metropolitan Police, the fire and rescue authority and the London Development Agency. Although the architecture around the development agency later changed slightly, that position remained. However, the powers of the mayor have increased very significantly. As the Government have made clear in discussion on this Bill, the intention is to increase the powers of mayors in other parts of the country as part of their devolution and levelling-up approach.

We are seeing mayors accumulate more powers and larger budgets. For example, the Mayor of London is now responsible for the housing budget for London, which is billions-plus. These powers are being accumulated but the co-decision and scrutiny functions that go with them are not being kept up to date. In fact, the Government recognise this. It may not be government policy yet, but I even saw in a newspaper that the Government were speculating on increasing the scrutiny of elected mayors by setting up panels of local MPs to scrutinise what they were going to do. There is no need to do this: the assembly exists. The scrutiny body is there already: it needs empowerment, which this amendment provides. I am putting a burden on my noble friend by inviting her to explain why we should be denying democracy in our great cities and urban areas—such a burden that quite possibly she will decide to agree with me. I look forward to that very much indeed.

Turning to the question of balance of powers, we come to Amendment 176, which is drafted to cover the whole country and is not specific to London. However, I will speak of it in London terms because of my own experience and allow noble Lords to draw parallels with other areas. It relates to the ULEZ charge—a power the mayor has in fact had since the foundation of the Greater London Authority; road user charging was in the Greater London Authority Act as far back as 1999. It has been expanded in geographical terms. Under Ken Livingstone, it was small and very focused. There was a low emission zone around Heathrow Airport and a congestion charge around just the very centre of London. It has been expanded to include not only inner London, which has already been delivered, but outer London as well—the current proposal—into areas wholly different from inner London and best understood by their own elected councils. Yet, they have no say.

This amendment would give councils that say, not just in London but in other parts of the country. It would give a power of co-decision with local councils in the extension of a road user charging scheme—ULEZ in this case. It would require that that decision be made in full council. It would not be a decision of the executive arm—for example, the cabinet or the locally elected mayor. It would also be retrospective, so that existing schemes would have to be subject to such a vote in order to continue. It would also ensure that local councils have regard to their air quality duties under the Environment Act when making their decisions. Nobody is in favour of poor air quality; it is a question of how to get there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tope (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, not least for taking me down memory lane. He began by describing the Greater London Authority Act. I had the honour, and sometimes the pleasure, of taking that Bill through this House from the Front Bench, along with my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I remember the debates very well indeed. The noble Lord’s references to the prospective Mayor Livingstone were slightly wide of the mark. As I recall, the then Labour Government were terrified of the threat of Mayor Livingstone—and it was a threat as far as they were concerned. We spent much of our debate on the Greater London Bill discussing measures to reduce his powers. However, we should not divert too much into history.

I welcome Amendment 178B, on the budget. As it happens, when we were doing the Greater London Bill, I was the leader of a London borough council. I was certainly the only council leader in the Lords, and perhaps the only one in Parliament at that time. I went on to lead the Liberal Democrats on the Greater London Authority for its first eight years. I remember only too well the first eight years of Mayor Livingstone’s budget. Never once did he come close to getting majority support for it. It was always passed, because it had to be, but always without the two-thirds majority to amend it.

That has continued to be the case throughout the life of the Greater London Authority. In both of the last two years, in the preceding debate on the budget—it is a two-stage process—there was not even majority support for the mayor’s budget. When it came to the all-important final decision, a two-thirds majority was not there. So I entirely support what the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said about the need for some democracy there and that the practice for majority support for a budget should apply, as it does virtually everywhere else.

I move now to what I call the ULEZ amendment, although it is not strictly speaking a ULEZ amendment. The expansion of the ULEZ to outer London is hugely controversial in outer London at the moment. I should declare an interest, as I was a leader of a London borough council for 13 years—incidentally, a London borough council that has been under Liberal Democrat control for the last 37 years and has won the last 10 elections with a majority, so we must be doing something right there.

ULEZ is hugely controversial and is causing a lot of upset. This amendment is not about the particular proposals for its expansion; it is more about the relationship between the London boroughs and the mayor. That needs to work on a form of consensus. The mayor has the strategic authority, as you cannot deal with a subject as important as air pollution on only a borough-by-borough basis. It must of course be dealt with on a London-wide basis, in this case, so from that point of view I am wholly in agreement. However, the borough and the borough councils have to do the mechanics and implementation, and they are getting most of the heat from the objections here.

I could all too easily divert myself into talking about the shortcomings of the mayor’s present proposals, but I do not want to. I say that as someone from a council that strongly supports any measures that will genuinely reduce air pollution and tackle that issue. But the way the consultation was conducted and the way the implementation is being proposed owe everything to the mayor’s awareness of the timetable he has to meet before the next mayoral election—he wants the expansion firmly embedded in good time before May 2024—and nothing to good common sense.

This amendment is actually about the relationship between the Mayor of London and the borough councils, particularly their leaders. I was very much minded to put my name to this amendment, but I did not do so and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, knows why: I think that proposed new subsection (2) is wrong. It says that

“before the scheme is introduced, consent to the introduction of the scheme is granted by all local authorities”

within the affected area. That gives any one authority the power to veto, in effect, the whole scheme. That is simply wrong.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

With every possible respect for the noble Lord, would he accept that it would in fact allow the mayor to tailor the scheme to include those boroughs that are willing to have it and exclude those that are not? It would not veto the entire scheme for other boroughs that wished to see it implemented as the mayor had proposed.

[Lord Tope (LD)]

My Lords, I accept that a mayor, were he or she so minded, could act in that way. However, I have to say that the current mayor has shown no interest whatever in conceding anything to any of the boroughs, let alone to one single borough. We could get to a state in which the mayor allows one borough—I will not name one, although Bromley comes to mind, remembering the trouble we had with the introduction of the Freedom Pass—to opt out and the mayor could accept that, but I would not want to put that responsibility on some future mayor.

It would be much better if we stuck to the majority principle that we were talking about just now; the boroughs should have the right themselves to opt out of the scheme. I would hope that they would not do so, but they could have the right to opt themselves and their area out of it, but not the right to either stop it for everywhere else or rely on the benevolence of the mayor—little of which we have seen recently—to opt that borough out. So a much better way would be to reword the amendment. I suspect that the noble Lord is not going to press this to a vote tonight, although a lot of people in London think he is: much better that we come back on Report with clearer, better wording to try to achieve what we want to do.

I think, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said, that what this amendment is actually about is the relationship between an executive Mayor of London—in a sense, a presidential system—and the borough councils, which are essentially a parliamentary system. Nobody has given enough thought, and there are many other examples, to how we match the mismatch between a presidential and parliamentary system. We have a situation now where the boroughs are all, in a sense, elected parliamentary bodies, with borough council leaders playing an increasing role through London Councils in the running of London, and a presidential-style elected mayor who has all the power vested in the mayor, with none vested in the boroughs and none, for that matter, vested in the London Assembly either. I say that with some regret after serving as an assembly member—indeed, as the leader of the Liberal Democrat group there—for eight years.

I hesitate today to ask for a reconsideration of the government of London—I am not sure I would want to go through all of that again—but that is, in essence, what this amendment is about. If we can agree a slightly different form of wording for this to come back on Report, I should be happy then to give it my support.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities (Baroness Scott of Bybrook) (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 176, tabled by my noble friend Lord Moylan, would change the local consents required for traffic emission road-charging schemes to be introduced, and apply these new requirements retrospectively. I reassure the Committee that this amendment is not necessary for regions outside London as it maintains the status quo. In London, the amendment as drafted could remove established devolved powers from an elected mayor and as we have discussed in Committee, this is not our intention for devolution.

In London, under the Greater London Authority Act 1999 the mayor has the authority to create a new road scheme that charges users, or vary one, so long as doing so will directly or indirectly facilitate the achievement of the policies and proposals in the mayor’s transport strategy. As drafted, this amendment could be in conflict with the Greater London Authority Act, and it would potentially create legal uncertainty and conflict between the mayor and the London borough councils.

The Department for Transport has not made statements in support of the ULEZ: Transport Ministers have been completely clear that this has been a matter for the mayor to decide. I understand that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport has been engaging and will continue to engage with MPs whose constituents may be impacted by the proposed ULEZ expansion.

Outside London, charging schemes have been introduced for addressing congestion issues, improving air quality and raising funds for investment in new transport infrastructure and improving transport quality. The Transport Act 2000 already sets out how road-charging schemes can be introduced. In combined authority areas, these powers are held between the combined authority and the local traffic authorities—that is, the constituent authorities of the CA. Therefore, outside London local authorities are already required to introduce schemes and existing legislation already delivers what this amendment seeks to achieve.

Additionally, the amendment would require the reconfirmation of a number of existing charging schemes and it would allow any local authority unilaterally to revoke them. These schemes have been introduced and agreed locally and, where they cover multiple local authorities, agreed jointly. Decisions on whether to amend or revoke these schemes would therefore also be made jointly, as the powers in the Transport Act 2000 already ensure. I nevertheless recognise how important this issue is not only to my noble friend but to many others, and not just in London. I am happy to meet with him to discuss these matters further.

Amendment 178B, also in the name of my noble friend Lord Moylan, seeks to lower the threshold for amending the Mayor of London’s final draft budget from two-thirds of assembly members present and voting to a simple majority. While the amendment would undoubtedly strengthen the power of the London Assembly and mirror the voting threshold applied at earlier stages of the assembly’s consideration of the mayor’s annual budget, it must also be balanced against the benefits of the current strong mayoral model in London. I agree with my noble friend that it is crucial in any of these systems that we have strong audit and scrutiny. That is why the Bill strengthens both audit and scrutiny committees in these new authorities.

I recognise my noble friend’s interest in and experience of London governance matters and I would be pleased, as I say, to engage with him not only on his earlier amendments but these. Perhaps we might review the operation of London’s devolution settlement separately from the Committee’s consideration of the Bill, and I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment at this time.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for what was a very valuable debate and I shall briefly go through those who spoke.

The noble Lord, Lord Tope, put his finger on it by saying that this is really a question that will not go away: about the balance of powers in areas that have strong regional government—combined authorities, metropolitan mayors and so forth—with the local councils, the constituent councils. As my noble friend the Minister made clear, those arrangements differ in different parts of the country, but we have to learn lessons from them and apply those lessons in an evolving way to existing structures; we cannot just dig our heels in and say that what was good in 1999 is good for ever. We have to be able to improve things; we understood that. On the question of subsection (2), I had a strong sense, listening to the noble Lord, that we were actually in violent agreement, but I am going to speak to him afterwards to discover if there is a difference between us and what can be done to reconcile our understanding of the boundary issue.

I was very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. I give some credit to the Green Party here as an example of what can be achieved by a more democratic scrutiny of the mayor’s budget. Only a few weeks ago, in consideration of the mayor’s budget the Green Party put forward in the assembly a costed amendment that would have required the mayor to introduce lavatories at up to 70 London stations. It got a majority in the London assembly; it was supported by the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats; of course, it fell. Having a majority is not enough in this sort of democracy. There is something very strange about that; however, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her support.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, was right to point out that the weakness of process and the rushing of air quality measures is provoking a backlash and cynicism among the voters. She also expressed very well the genuine and real suffering of those who face the prospect of the current proposed ULEZ scheme in London. I have to be honest: what I would expect if this amendment were passed is not that boroughs would actually block a mayoral scheme to introduce a ULEZ; they would moderate it, because they too are interested in better air quality, and so are local people. They would have their say, so it would be introduced in a slower and more manageable way, with more local consensus and better support for those who are in need of making what can be a very expensive transition.

The noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, drew on a very long experience of local government again to put her finger on the question of the democratic deficit. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, made it abundantly clear that the Labour Party stands four-square behind the Labour mayor’s proposal to impose a ULEZ on outer London; there was not one word of criticism.

She mentioned the estimate of 4,000 premature deaths in London. I do not dispute that figure, but it is difficult to know what it means: is a premature death 10 years before you would have died or a week before? These are difficult figures to interpret, but that figure I regard as reliable and I am not disputing it in any way. However, I want to point out is that when I was deputy chairman of Transport for London—a post that came to an end in 2016—and on the board, the figure was also 4,000. The measures are introduced—the local traffic neighbourhoods, the ULEZes—but the estimated figure never changes. So is it really doing any good?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise that I was unable to take part in the Second Reading of the Bill.

Amendment 177 proposes the preparation of a code of practice for consultation by local authorities and public bodies on contentious matters to ensure that they are impartial and not manipulative—which follows on well from the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, on the last amendment.

Conservatives used to criticise Ken Livingstone, as leader of the GLC, for conducting bogus consultations designed to justify whatever decisions he had already made. Unfortunately, there have been a number of serious examples of similar behaviour by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea affecting the area of the borough in which I live—I declare my interest. I will mention here just two. The first was a council scheme to turn Sloane Square into a crossroads, when two bogus consultations were held that purported to show widespread support for the scheme. The council was pressurised to hold a third consultation, conducted impartially by an independent third party, that showed that 72% of respondents were opposed to the scheme, which was then dropped.

The second was the Cadogan Estates scheme to have dedicated parking bays created outside its high-end designer shops in Sloane Street. This was taken up by the council and rebranded as a scheme to “improve the public realm”. Among the manipulative consultation materials, to give but one example, was a question on whether people wanted “more trees and planting”, which was welcomed because people generally like more trees. The result of this is that Cadogan now has permission to disfigure the street with 52 ugly “planters”—work on which has now started.

The request that the consultation be conducted impartially by an independent third party—failing which, the local residents’ associations wished to review and comment on the consultation materials in draft form—was ignored. The response of the Minister in the other place in a letter of 31 August last year to Richard Drax MP was as follows:

“On consultations by local authorities and public bodies, the Government has been clear that communities must be at the heart of the planning process. The Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill, as introduced into Parliament, will reform the process for producing plans so that it is faster and easier for communities to engage with. The Bill will increase and enhance the opportunities for involvement to ensure that development is brought forward in a way that works best for local people”.


The Minister’s response does not address the problem, perhaps because the central Government and all their predecessors like to be able to hold bogus consultations just as much as local authorities and public bodies. I suggest that His Majesty’s Government be obliged to draw up a code of practice for such consultations to ensure impartiality, either by having them conducted or having the consultation materials and process pre-approved by an independent third party.

Amendment 178 seeks to amend the legislation on business improvement districts, or BIDs, so that residents have a say in their establishment, policies and management bodies. There has been widespread criticism of the undemocratic way in which BIDs are established and operate. The Government’s website says:

“There is no limit on what projects or services can be provided through a BID. The only requirement is that it should be in addition to services provided by local authorities”.


As a result, powerful local businesses can push through projects for their own commercial benefit, for which they are willing to pay. My area, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, is happy to agree to them if they can be described as “improving the public realm”. Local residents may be affected by these projects—for example, streetscape, parking and traffic management—but cannot influence them.

We have recently had imposed on us two new BID schemes led by the Cadogan Estate—one for the Brompton Road, since renamed Knightsbridge, and one for the King’s Road—in which residents’ views were ignored from the outset and look likely to continue to be ignored. The Brompton Association was deliberately excluded from the BID proposal for the Brompton Road, in what seems to me a manipulative ploy and an ominous sign of things to come.

The BID legislation should be amended so that local residents of a particular ward within which a BID falls are consulted on proposals for their establishment, are represented on the BID proposal groups which prepare the business plan, participate in the vote on the establishment and are represented on BID management bodies. In addition, local planning authorities should be able to veto BID proposals if there is a significant objection from local residents, not just if they conflict with a significant policy of the local planning authority.

The response of the Minister in the other place, in the same letter that I quoted on Amendment 177, was that

“the majority of BIDs set Baseline Agreements with their local authority to demonstrate the additionality it will provide over the term of the BID. The Government encourages the use of clear agreements and the fostering of strong ongoing relationships between BID bodies and their local authorities, to make sure each is aware of their obligations towards one another and to agree changes to such agreements where appropriate. The BID itself is responsible for deciding on the mix of representatives to ensure their Governance Board is an effective decision-making body with the right skills. The legislation does not preclude local authorities from being represented on the BID board, nor residents or members of the community”.

The Minister’s written response does not answer the point. The legislation does not preclude residents from being represented on the board of a BID. However, what happens at present is that BID promoters make arrangements for their own commercial advantage and exclude resident representation, as the views of residents do not always coincide, and frequently conflict, with those of the business promoters. I beg to move.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I had not expected to speak in this group, but since my noble friend Lord Northbrook has referred to a number of matters in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea—where I had the privilege of being deputy leader of the council for quite a period—I thought I would say just one or two things.

The current proposals for Sloane Square I have nothing to do with, I know nothing about; I ceased to be involved in the council in 2018, so I cannot speak for them. The other example my noble friend gave of what he called a “bogus consultation”, I was responsible for. Noble Lords might not be aware that this is an archaeological exercise because he has had to reach back to 2007. It is true that there were three consultation exercises, but I assure my noble friend that the first two—which supported the proposals—were not bogus at all; they were carried out in a very serious way. Indeed, the results surprised me in that there was as much support as there was. The third one that he referred to was conducted after a year of campaigning by opponents in what was quite the most unpleasant year of my life, certainly politically. It was a very long and really quite vicious campaign, all of it funded by the council so that the residents could have as much say as possible. It found against the scheme, which was not proceeded with.

Where I can find a level of agreement with my noble friend is in relation to BIDs. Here, I declare my interest in being a resident of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, as he is. I recently discovered that there is a BID to be introduced in Kensington High Street that is going to include Kensington Square, which I do not live in, but which I overlook from an adjacent street. The Kensington Square residents’ association has not been consulted about this, and it is to be introduced in Thackeray Street—which is where I do more or less live. The relevant residents’ association body for that has also not been consulted, as far as I can make out.

I think that in relation to BIDs my noble friend is putting his finger on a very important point: they do involve a transfer of say—I do not say control—to local businesses, which will pay extra money and expect to get what they want for that extra money. That transfer—those expenditures—can have an affect on local residents, and they should have some involvement in the establishment of a BID. I did not imagine I would ever have to go down the memory lane of Sloane Square improvements again in my life, but it is good that my noble friend has brought back those not always pleasant memories. I am with him when it comes to business improvement districts.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, our Amendment 511 is in this group. This is to ask the Secretary of State to inform each local authority of any new responsibilities before the commencement of relevant provisions.

Clause 222 has the list of the commencement of relevant provisions, so the amendment sits under Clause 222. However, it refers to Clause 74, which proposes to give the Secretary of State significant powers to intervene in a local authority regarding capital finance, including limiting borrowing and/or directing a local authority to sell specific assets. Such an intervention would follow a review that could be triggered by an assessment against a specific financial formula, the thresholds for which are to be set by regulation after the Bill has received Royal Assent.

So my question to the Minister is: how can we assess the impact of this provision without knowing those thresholds, without an impact assessment, and with incomplete information? Unsurprisingly, local government has expressed concerns about this. I understand that the measures relate to government concerns about some councils’ approach to capital and borrowing, but we need to set this in context. The LGA has drawn attention to the fact that rising energy prices, rising inflation and national minimum wage pressures are set to add around £3.6 billion in unforeseen extra cost pressures on council budgets by 2024-25. This is on top of the £15 billion cuts to council budgets by central government over the previous decade. Councils are simultaneously managing significant spending reductions and a growing demand for services.