Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I put my name to Amendments 110 and 112, along with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I declare an interest as the warden of Wadham College, Oxford.

Under the terms of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, universities are under a statutory duty to,

“take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the establishment and for visiting speakers”.

The Act goes on to say that this includes the duty,

“to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the use of any premises of the establishment is not denied to any individual or body of persons on any ground connected with … the beliefs or views of that individual or of any member of that body; or … the policy or objectives of that body”.

Universities are required under this statute to have a code of practice in place to facilitate the discharge of these important duties. We might contrast the terms of that statute with the relevant clauses of the Bill and the proposed guidance associated with it.

It is very easy to understand why Parliament should have passed those parts of the Education Act. It was to underline not just the importance of free speech as a public good in itself, but to highlight its particular relevance—its inescapable importance—to institutions of higher learning. That is to say, you cannot have one without the other. Noble Lords will remember the context in which that legislation was passed. Speakers were being howled down in some of our universities, to the shame of those institutions. Some were being refused facilities to speak—the so-called “no platform policies” that some institutions adopted, again, to their shame. An institution that shouts down a speaker with unpopular views or bans arguments that cause offence is not really a university at all: it is an intellectual closed shop. That is something very different and much less attractive.

Under the proposed guidance accompanying this Bill, which universities will be under a duty to have regard to in discharging their new policing obligations—for that is what they are—academics must devise processes to exclude from those universities people who intend to speak or give presentations in a way that may be guilty in some way of exhibiting traits of what the guidance terms “non-violent extremism”. The definition of non-violent extremism has already been drawn to the attention of the Committee. I suppose in the sense of non-violent extremism, it must, if we extract it from the proposed guidance accurately, be,

“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.

It is those things that must be banished from British universities.

The patent lack of understanding in this Bill about how universities work—and some noble Lords have already alluded to this—becomes very clear when one considers the processes that the guidance mandates our universities to follow in order to discharge their new speech-policing obligations under the Bill. They are to be found in the guidance. The proposed guidance states that, in order to comply with the duty,

“all universities should have policies and procedures in place for the management of events on campus and use of all university premises”.

The guidance goes on:

“We would expect the policies and procedures on speakers and events to include at least the following … Sufficient notice of booking (generally at least 14 days) to allow for checks to be made and cancellation to take place if necessary … Advance notice of the content of the event, including an outline of the topics to be discussed and sight of any presentations, footage to be broadcast etc … A system for assessing and rating risks associated with any planned events, providing evidence to suggest whether an event should proceed, be cancelled or whether mitigating action is”,

to be contemplated or required.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend. I was under the impression that the noble Lord, Lord Bates, indicated in his letter dated 27 January that the Government would now withdraw paragraph 66 from the proposed guidance. It might save an awful lot of consideration in this Chamber if that is indeed the case.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

If that is the case, no doubt my noble friend the Minister will make that clear.

The greater point is that universities are not places of surveillance in the sense intended in this Bill, and they cannot become so without fracturing what is best about them. As far as I can tell, no concern at all appears to be expressed in the legislation or in the guidance that what is being proposed is a form of institutionalised censorship with academics at its heart.

If the guidance means what it says, and we must assume that it does, it calls into question a situation in which people in British universities would not be allowed to argue, with Plato perhaps, that democracy is flawed. It is not a crime to argue that democracy is flawed. No one in a British university could deliver a lecture that evinced a lack of respect for someone else’s religion. It is not, thank goodness, a crime in this country to demonstrate a lack of respect for someone else’s religion. Perhaps no one in a British university would be allowed to decry individual liberty in favour of, say, collective empowerment—a notion with a long intellectual pedigree. Again, it is not a crime to express that view in the United Kingdom. Obviously, the point is not whether noble Lords agree or disagree with any of these propositions, or whether any noble Lord would wish to advance any of them—for my part, I would not particularly. The question is rather whether we have really reached a state of affairs in this country in which it is now necessary for a senior politician, even a politician as senior as the Home Secretary, to be granted the power to influence, by power of direction if necessary, what can and what cannot be said in a university in the absence of any crime being committed. That is the point. This legislation seeks to control not only violent extremism but also speech in universities even where that speech is not otherwise a crime. This is its central failing and it is the reason I have put my name to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

The role of surveillance and control is one that is entirely inimical to the purpose of a university as we have understood it, which is to analyse, to explain and to discover. In that sense, open debate is the lifeblood of an institution of higher learning. Of course, as noble Lords have recognised, universities do not have immunity in the face of the criminal law—and they should not be immune to it. Indeed, like everyone else and every other body, they have existing obligations under anti-terrorism legislation, including the obligation to disclose to the authorities information they have about terrorism activities. But no one is suggesting that they are failing to discharge those obligations, and this Bill neither defines nor seeks to address any such failing. That is because there is none.

Let me conclude by pointing out one striking omission from the proposed guidance that is to accompany the Bill. Nowhere within it is there any attempt to explain how its terms are consistent with the entirely appropriate and laudable legal obligation placed upon universities to secure freedom of speech. There is no attempt to square that circle. This may be because no one in the Home Office considered the Education Act properly before deciding to legislate for our universities in this way, or it may be because it is simply obvious that the freedom of speech duty mandated in the Education Act is in conflict with the Bill, so any attempt to argue that they can coexist is doomed to failure.

These proposals may spring from the best of intentions. They doubtless spring from a desire to do something, perhaps anything, about the real problems we face around radicalisation. However, in practice they will inevitably undermine the place of freedom of speech in our universities. They are wrong in principle and they are unworkable in practice.

[Baroness Brinton]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 112A, 112B and 112D. I shall start by speaking to those amendments and then to the others in the group. It is a matter of serendipity that I follow my noble friend Lord Macdonald because Amendments 112A, 112B and 112D try to address the exact points that he has raised and insist that the two duties must be examined together in order to balance the right to freedom of speech. I defy officers of universities and colleges to achieve that and I think that it would be a tall task for civil servants. One of the reasons I have been keen to table these amendments is that, as a senior university administrator, I have sat with two codes of practice and two different sets of statutory guidance which are completely in conflict with one another. We have to make it clear to those who will try to deliver the legislation on the front line exactly how it would happen. That is why the first part of the amendment talks about the recognition of the duty on free speech and the second part makes it clear that any guidance must be produced in the form of a single document so that staff do not have to trawl through parallel sets of guidance and codes of practice to try to find out which trumps the other.

I hope that the amendment is straightforward and simple, but it is included in a group which seeks to tackle the absolute, fundamental problems around the duty and how it conflicts with the duty on freedom of speech. I want to make two points. The first goes back to the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, which many noble Lords have quoted. Clause 43(4) states,

“(including where appropriate the initiation of disciplinary measures) to secure”,

those rights, but that is a two-way right, and universities have certainly used it where there might be either radicalisation or something close to the infringement of personal liberties or, worse than that, the possible incitement of a crime. On 20 September 2013, the Guardian reported that a number of our universities and students unions across the UK had banned the song “Blurred Lines”, a song that is degrading to women and which encourages rape. That demonstrates that the current boundaries for freedom of speech are well understood in our universities and are applied by them and by the student bodies. I come back to this. I do not understand why we need a duty when it is absolutely evident that this is already working in practice. I repeat my request for specific recent examples of where this has not succeeded and has not been followed through.

The other point I want to make on academic freedom moves away from the purist freedom-of-speech argument. Much of our debate has been about societies, students and academies talking outside the normal framework. Recently I was talking to a postgraduate student who is working on Middle East peace studies. He and his colleagues have just completed a module in a Masters course on suicide bombers. How free will they be to access information on that issue and thus actually help this country and the wider world to understand what motivates these people to become so radicalised that they are prepared to give up their lives? Would accessing videos online to try and understand the linguistic and pedagogic emotions behind those decisions be caught as radicalisation, would it require a special exemption in order to have that debate, or would it just be banned completely? We need to understand how the pure academic freedom to research would be affected by this duty.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my support for the noble and learned Lord’s amendment is for real, to use his own term. I was reading a little—obviously I do not have the experience of other noble Lords, including my noble friend—about control orders at the time they were to be abolished and TPIMs introduced. One could not help but feel quite disturbed by some of the experiences undergone and the impact, as has been said, not only on the individuals subject to the orders but on members of their families so, as I say, I support this amendment.

I have just one question for the noble and learned Lord. It is about whether it is necessary—he must consider it is because he has included them—to have the words about the individual having “no connection”. As I read it, but I might have missed something, the amendment to Schedule 1 to the 2011 Act takes out the references to having a connection with a locality because the 200-mile limit is being introduced. If that is so, and we are losing references to there being a connection in the Schedule, is that reference necessary in the amendment?

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I think noble Lords on all sides of the Committee have acknowledged that, because of the situation in which we presently find ourselves, powers of this sort are regrettably necessary. However, as noble Lords have said, their legitimacy is critical, and the rigour with which conditions are examined before they are imposed and the nature of that imposition itself are of the utmost importance. For all those reasons, I support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise that I was not here at the beginning of the noble and learned Lord’s remarks. I support the amendment and the remarks made by my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I have a question for the Minister. Members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am one, with heavy heart agreed that we had to agree with the independent reviewer, but we said:

“We look to the Government to be proactive in bringing forward ideas about how to mitigate the alienation and resentment likely to be caused in some minority communities”,

by relocation. I would be very grateful if the Minister could give the Committee some idea of what ideas might be brought forward by the Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I rise to oppose the amendments for many of the reasons outlined here today. First, they are unnecessary. We have heard a lot about gaps, targeted and not blanket surveillance and bringing things up to date. This is, of course, absolute nonsense. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, the Met and presumably the other agencies already have the powers they need—powers that, I suggest, go far beyond what they need. We heard a lot today about Paris and Lee Rigby, but in fact all my information says that the shortcomings of the pre-investigation in Paris and in the Lee Rigby tragic murder were due not to a lack of surveillance but to a lack of good police work. That is what was fundamentally missing. It was not about not having enough recordings or surveillance. It was about a lack of information and a lack of talking to marginalised community groups. The cross-party committee which reported in November on the handling of the Lee Rigby killers exposed major internal failings in the way that agencies pursue leads. It found that both men had been known to the agencies for years—one had even been considered a priority—but basic issues such as delays, poor communication and bad record-keeping caused the problems, not the surveillance of the suspects.

Although these amendments are obviously within the letter of the law, they seem to me to be fundamentally undemocratic in the way that they are being brutally pushed into our parliamentary process. This seems to me a way of short-circuiting real scrutiny. It is great that they were looked at before, but they still need looking at again; if they are—I hope the Minister is listening—they absolutely must be looked at by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It should look at these amendments before there is any more discussion in either of these Houses.

For me, this snoopers’ charter reduces our rights, and surely that is exactly what the terrorists are after. Terrorists want to impact on our society and on every single person who does not believe the way that they do. That is what we are letting happen here. It is absolutely mad. The Mayor of London recently referred to “this civil liberties stuff” in the most dismissive way, as if that is negotiable—that civil liberties are not terribly important when we compare them with the threat of terrorism. That is exactly when we need our civil liberties. That is what we in the West should be known for.

There is also the cost. My experience of the Met over the past 15 years is that it cannot deal with the data that it already has. I have asked many questions about its databases and the information that it gets from them. The Met does not know how many databases it has—it cannot tell me how many to the nearest hundred. Also, it often cannot search its databases. For example, I had the dubious pleasure of being on its domestic extremist database, I think under the regime of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and I hope that I am not on the database anymore—the Met has changed its definition of what a domestic extremist is—but who knows because I cannot get the information. However, the Met cannot search that database for serious criminal activity. Because the definition was changed to relate to serious criminals, if you ask, “Can you look through the database and find out how many serious criminals you have?”, you will be told, “Oh, we haven’t logged that, so we can’t do that”.

Not only are we expecting the Met staff to deal with more data when they cannot sort and file the data that they already have, but, I would argue, they have enough powers. The noble Lord, Lord Blair, talked about some very tragic incidents where more surveillance might actually solve a crime or find a lost child. In fact, the police already have these powers. They have them under RIPA and, in my view, they are already misusing them. Under RIPA they do not have to go to a judge to ask if they can put surveillance on somebody; they just have to go to a chief inspector in a nearby unit and ask, “Could you sign this for me? It’s surveillance on somebody or other”.

We should not be thinking about giving more powers to our spies and to the police. We should be very careful about this. We should think about taking back some of those powers and making sure that we persist in keeping our civil liberties and human rights and do not let the terrorists take them away from us.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I was surprised that at an early stage in his speech the noble Lord, Lord West, suggested—until he revised the figure—that communications data were employed in some 95% of criminal cases. My experience from the years when I was responsible for prosecuting serious crime and terrorism was that the figure was 100%. I cannot remember a serious criminal case, and I certainly cannot remember a terrorism case, in which communications data were not used. Of course, there is a difference between data which are employed to detect terrorism and data which are then used as part of a prosecution to convict terrorists. Certainly, so far as the latter is concerned, there was a vast amount in every case.

The noble Lord, Lord Evans, will remember some of those cases which occurred when he was director-general of the Security Service. The men who tried to commit mass murder on London’s Underground are serving long prison sentences. The men who wanted to detonate a bomb containing radioactive material in Oxford Street are serving long prison sentences. The men who wanted to put a bomb in Bluewater shopping centre at half-term when it would be particularly busy are serving long prison sentences. In the case of the men who wanted to put a bomb in a nightclub—the Ministry of Sound—two were recorded by members of the noble Lord’s service. The leader of the gang said to one of his colleagues, “No one will be able to criticise us for blowing up a nightclub; all those slags dancing around”. This is material which is of the utmost importance in criminal prosecutions.

It is also true, of course, that technology is changing and our capacity to monitor this sort of material must change with it. I accept that, but I do not believe that these amendments are the right vehicle for achieving that change. These amendments suffer from the deficiencies which the original Bill suffered from; in particular, they are insufficiently specific. I agree with everything that the noble Lord said in his compelling speech a few minutes ago. These amendments are deficient for the same reasons that the original Bill was deficient and I shall not support them. This is not, as my noble friend Lord Carlile said, a party political matter. It is a matter of analysing the material and determining whether it is fit for purpose. With respect, I do not agree with my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones that we must do something. We must do the right thing and I do not think that this is the right thing. In everything, we must maintain balance and proportionality. No one has argued in this debate that we should not have a mechanism whereby the security services can access material of this sort. The question is what sort of mechanism.

The security services in recent years, and perhaps in years long gone by, have been led by people who understand the tension between security and rights. When I was DPP and the noble Lord was the director-general of the Security Service, I enjoyed the discussions we had on this topic. Sometimes we disagreed about precisely where the line was drawn, but we agreed that there was a line. One of my fears about these amendments, as with the draft Communications Data Bill, is that they draw the line in the wrong place. One result of that would be an adverse impact on our great security institutions. There is no doubt that the security services in this country enjoy enormous public support, which is unfamiliar even in democracies such as France. It is clearly understood by people in this country that the security services are after “them and not us”. In other words, they are interested in targeting those individuals who are trying to do us wrong rather than the rest of us. The danger of breadth in legislation of this sort is that, if the idea gets about that the security services are interested in everybody’s communications, not just the material of those subject to investigation who are being targeted because it is believed that they are involved in crime, then the sense which the British people have of their security institutions will begin to alter in subtle ways, and not for the good. I would caution those who argue that legislation of this breadth is needed because it is future-proof. We must take great care with legislation that is enacted in the context of the sort of public confidence issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, indicated.

People are interested in these issues. They express their interest in different ways, but there is a feeling abroad that the Government and the security services are becoming nosy. I do not believe that that is true, but if we enact legislation that appears to people to be unnaturally broad, we run the risk of feeding that monster. I shall oppose the amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I may start by seeking the leave of the Committee to speak. I did not speak at Second Reading because I was suffering from a kidney infection and therefore was not able to be in the Chamber for the whole day. I have given notice to my noble friend the Minister and he is content for me to speak in Committee. I hope that noble Lords will allow me the same leave.

I rise to support both Amendments 2 and 55 and the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Hannay. I do not intend to make a Second Reading speech at this stage. The issues in relation to the concerns about this legislation are well known. I accept that we are in incredibly difficult times at the moment, and the more so in the light of what has happened over the past few weeks. We have seen the situation change again in relation to ISIL this morning. These are indeed difficult and troubled times, and I therefore understand the need for the Government to respond in order to protect our citizens.

However, I would dispute the comments made earlier that we need to send out a strong message to terrorists that we are serious about this. The message to send out to terrorists is that we hold our civil and individual liberties incredibly strongly, we value them hugely and we will not put forward legislation that permanently takes away the very liberties that terrorists would like to take from us. Putting a sunset clause into the Bill sends out a clear message that these are difficult times and we are responding to them, but that we are not going to change the way we do things in the United Kingdom permanently by giving away those liberties which terrorists would like us to give away. I therefore support the need for a sunset clause.

Amendment 55 gives comfort to those of us who are concerned about how this legislation will play out. We can all accept that there will be many individual cases where these powers will be used in subsequent years but it will turn out to be the case that they have been used incorrectly. The fact is that we as a Parliament should be able to say that at a certain time, whatever colour of Government we have at that point, we will reconsider these matters in light of how the powers have been applied and in the light of how we find the world at that time. An indication that this is not a permanent change would give some comfort to those of us who are concerned about these powers.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I agree that we should not give away our freedoms in response to terrorism. However, I am satisfied that, properly crafted, this legislation need not do so. It would be a good idea if part of that crafting were to include a sunset clause, primarily for the reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is the practicalities of this measure—how it will work in practice—that are most in doubt. Those practicalities will significantly impact on the rights of people on whom the orders are imposed. So a sunset clause is a good idea. It is also a good idea for the reason set out by my noble friend a moment ago.

Two years is too short. The threat will be with us for much longer than two years, so that will be too short a time to assess the workings of this legislation. However, I support the idea of a sunset clause so that the House can thoroughly review how the legislation is working in practice.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I will add briefly to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It relates to Amendment 7, to which I hope to return later, and concerns the problem of humanitarian assistance.

I do not want to elaborate just now, but there are concerns about people who offer humanitarian assistance in difficult areas such as Somalia, Syria and possibly Gaza. The way in which terrorism is defined in the Terrorism Act 2000 has a chilling effect on their activities, because of the risk that they might be caught up in what is thought to be a terrorist offence when they are actually trying to co-operate with the bodies there to provide humanitarian assistance. Of course, a prosecution—or a conviction—is a very different matter. However, the way that this measure is proposing to adopt in the fight against terrorism is a decision taken by a constable. It is a much easier thing to take at that stage.

The chilling effect of the threat of that kind of measure being taken against people who seek to provide humanitarian assistance may be quite considerable; it is difficult to assess at the moment. There is, however, considerable force in the point that the House should be able to look again at the way the measure is operating once we know what the effect is on those trying to carry out humanitarian efforts in these difficult areas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

I have a number of amendments in this group and they all relate to judicial oversight of the powers to remove passports and travel documents. They are all ways of giving weight to the right to a fair hearing, as provided by Article 6 of the European convention. Basically, they are ways of making the oversight of the power procedurally fair and it is on procedural fairness that I want to make this contribution.

The relevant parts of Schedule 1 provide for a judicial role and are modelled to some extent on the provision made for warrants for further detention in Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000. That governs the detention of a person arrested on reasonable suspicion of being a terrorist. If you make a close comparison of the two schedules, it becomes clear that the procedural safeguards that were introduced into the Terrorism Act are not present in this Bill. This makes it significantly weaker as a result.

When Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act was procedurally strengthened it was as a result of some of the recommendations of the previous Joint Committee that I was not on. That kind of coherence should be there in legislation of this sort. At the moment Schedule 1 is not compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights; the requirements on fair hearing are certainly not. I want to outline where the weaknesses lie, which is why I have tabled my amendments.

Amendment 24 refers specifically to,

“a warrant of further retention”,

to draw that analogy with the warrant for further detention that exists in the previous terrorism legislation. I have an amendment relating to gisting too. I repeat what others have said: a person who is having this power exercised against them really should know the basis on which the documents have been taken and there is the need for an extension. It is just not good enough to say, as it does in the Bill, that we should be preventing people dragging their feet or not being diligent enough. While we want to ensure that people are acting diligently and expeditiously, there has to be more to it. There should be some requirement to consider the grounds for the retention of the documents, so I have inserted that into my Amendment 27.

This is all drawing on the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. With regard to Amendment 29, I urge the Committee to recognise how important it is to have oral argument in something as important as this. To have it done just in writing is not good enough. This is all fair hearing stuff. I really urge the Government to have regard to the ways in which this has been done in previous legislation.

With regard to Amendment 30, I am very concerned that while the Bill provides for a closed material proceeding at the extension hearing, there is no provision for special advocates. I am no great fan of special advocates— that process of having secret hearings—but I certainly feel that if you are going to have a closed material proceeding, you really must have protections for the person who is having their documents taken. I urge the Government to look at this again because I do not think that Strasbourg is going to think that it is compliant. Strasbourg has accepted the procedure that we have introduced here but one of the things it sees as being an important element is the role of the special advocate. There is a case waiting to come up in Strasbourg—Duffy—but I think we will find that this is going to fall foul of our obligations. Having special advocates involved is a very important element here.

Amendment 31 is really just tidying up in order to make the procedures parallel with those in Schedule 8. Amendment 32 says that if the court allows closed material proceedings, the state must provide a summary. Of course, if the state does not want to do that and there are special reasons why the intelligence agencies do not want it to be in the public domain, it is open to the state to withdraw. I think it is important that we use the model of other legislation that we have to help us get the best kind of legislation that the Government are seeking in this set of circumstances.

Those are the reasons for my amendments. I support the reduction to seven days that is being proposed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I hope that the Government will see why it is important that we create fair proceedings around this special set of powers.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I support what the noble Baroness has said. There cannot be any doubt that the power to exclude British citizens from their own country is a wholly exceptional power of the sort that we have not seen before. In fact, it is warranted by the threat that emanates from the globalisation of terror and the ease with which young men in particular, but some young women as well, can pass in and out of parts of the world that are controlled by terrorists, and of course the threat that they represent to us when they return from those zones.

However, it is the exceptional, drastic nature of this power, warranted though it is, that requires that procedural fairness is absolutely guaranteed by the processes under which the power is exercised. It is because the power is so extraordinary that it is so important, in order to avoid the scenario that the noble Baroness was talking about at the outset of this debate, that we observe the highest degree of procedural fairness. To that extent, I support what she has been saying.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Wednesday 16th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I am not going to labour the importance of communications data in serious criminal trials. That has been widely acknowledged. However, I cannot think of a single major terrorist trial in recent years in which this material has not been deployed to significant and sometimes determinative effect. As the central purpose of the Bill is simply to preserve a situation in which this material may be accessed and used under appropriate lawful authority, I support it.

Of course, the ambit of the Bill goes far beyond phone calls. The world has changed, bringing with it the internet, e-mails and social media. I listened with great interest to what was said a few moments ago by the noble Lord, Lord Knight. However, I do not believe that any sane rule of law jurisdiction can confer on the internet a form of immunity so that what occurs there cannot be used as evidence of criminal wrongdoing if it is such evidence. As for extraterritoriality, it is difficult for me to understand why e-mails to and from individuals in the UK should be accessible if they are routed through a UK server but somehow inaccessible if they are routed through the United States. For my part, I prefer these matters to be resolved by legislation, which can be debated, amended, repealed and improved, rather than by nods and winks between our authorities on the one hand and overseas providers on the other, which is what may have happened too frequently in the past.

The point surely is the means by which the state obtains access to the preserved material. If these means are proportionate and prescribed by law, the process is consistent with the rule of law. There is nothing in the Bill that alters the mechanisms by which this preserved material may be accessed by the state. It remains, in criminal cases, by warrant following suspicion. The Bill has nothing to do with a snoopers’ charter or with Operation Tempura. It mandates the limited preservation of data so that, where real suspicion exists, they may be accessed by lawful authority. It is not the bulk collection of data for random mining by the security agencies or the police. It is not a snoopers’ charter.

I make two other points. First, since the Snowden revelations first appeared in the Guardian and since we first learnt about Operation Tempura, many people have called for a wholesale review of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. I have been one of them. We have argued that RIPA is hardly capable of regulating this sort of activity in 2014 and that the technological means of communication have altered so dramatically since the year 2000, when it was passed, that we need fresh legislation. The Bill brings that review in its wake. I welcome that very strongly. Secondly, many of us have looked with some admiration at the work of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which was set up following a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission in the United States, and have called for the establishment of a similar board in our country. It seems, and I would welcome the Minister’s confirmation, that we will also have a privacy and civil rights oversight board in the United Kingdom.

From my perspective, these are powerful reforms, both coming in the wake of the Bill. My noble friend Lord Paddick referred to others. These powerful reforms show balance and the advantages of coalition. With respect to some of my noble friends, I very much doubt that we would have had these reforms without coalition. In combination, the Bill and these reforms seem to herald an environment with more respect for the appropriate relationship between national law enforcement imperatives and the prize of personal freedom. The Bill, set out as it is with clarity about extraterritoriality, in combination with these reforms will place us in a better environment than we have hitherto seen in this area. I welcome and support it.

Immigration Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Monday 12th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I also put my name to the amendment at Report. I have listened with great care to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said. It seems that his remarks, if they are adopted by the Government, indicate that the shift in the Government’s position is substantial. If they are not adopted by the Government, they amount to a demolition of the substance of this shift. I see the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, nodding at that. I, for one, shall be listening extremely carefully to the Minister’s response to the six points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

I want to remind the House why it is important that the Government acknowledge those points. The Home Secretary’s reasonable belief that a man or a woman may avail themselves of the nationality of another country will not assist a citizen in whose case that belief turns out to be ill-founded. He or she will be deprived, in Hannah Arendt’s phrase, of the “right to have rights” and locked out of any mechanism at all for achieving those rights for ever, until another state decides to take this individual on. If that is the position that the Government’s shift leaves us in, as a potential result of decision-making in the Home Office, then this shift does not go far enough.

For my part, I remain of the view that the United Kingdom should not embrace a policy where one of its potential results is statelessness, associated with so many of the degenerate states of the 20th century, and where the outcome, if it is statelessness, is so hostile to human dignity in its most basic form. This is particularly so where that policy is also bound to strike against the international accord that is so central to the maintenance of security both between and within states. In the long run, we cannot and will not make the United Kingdom a safer place by dumping our security threats abroad, sometimes into states where the capacity for dealing with them is completely debased, so that they simply grow. I agree with Professor Goodwin-Gill that a rule-of-law country accepting a United Kingdom citizen on the basis of his passport, lawfully certified and issued by the United Kingdom Government, will be perfectly entitled to respond to our unilateral withdrawal of that passport by insisting that the United Kingdom take this individual back. Which of your Lordships can doubt that if the tables were reversed we would take precisely the same approach?

I will conclude by speaking frankly. The history of this matter is that it appears to have been conjured up to serve an entirely party-political purpose in the midst of a debate in the other place. It is illiberal, it is an affront to civilised international relations, it will not improve our security and, in all likelihood, it threatens a legal and diplomatic quagmire, to no useful purpose and to the detriment of the reputation of the United Kingdom.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, who made a very powerful speech. I welcome the fact that there has been movement on the part of the Government in these amendments, and I very much welcome the helpful questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who has played such a role in getting us to where we are now. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, acknowledged, some people may still be made stateless as a result of the clause. Therefore, I am not as happy as some other noble Lords appear to be—or perhaps content is the word—and I support Motion B1.

In the Commons, some of the most pertinent questioning came from the Government’s own Back Benches. Sir Richard Shepherd asked,

“how the people of Britain will know that the action has been taken in a rational and reasonable way, when it is obscured from public view”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/5/14; col. 194.]

Dr Julian Huppert asked:

“What will happen if somebody in the UK goes through the process, the Home Secretary believes that they are able to get citizenship from another country and they make a bona fide application for that citizenship, but it is turned down?”.

In effect, this was also the question posed today by my noble friend. When pressed—and he had to be pressed—the Minister, James Brokenshire, responded that they could be given,

“limited restricted leave to remain”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/5/14; col. 196.]

But that is not a satisfactory substitute for citizenship and the rights that go with it.

My noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and others have expressed very grave concerns that the Government may well be waiting for someone to be out of the country to deprive them of citizenship. One concern of the Joint Committee on Human Rights was how often that has happened under the current powers. I very much welcome the fact that the Minister said he has responded to the Joint Committee’s latest letter about that and that he will make that information available to whoever is given responsibility for the review. I thank him for that.

In the Commons, James Brokenshire prayed in aid the fact that the matter had been considered by the Joint Committee on Human Rights as well as in another place—that is, here—to argue that,

“it is not correct to say that it has not been subject to careful consideration”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/5/14; col. 213.]

Indeed, the Minister made the same point earlier. But the Joint Committee on Human Rights was very critical of the speed with which this measure was introduced and we—I am a member of the committee—made it very clear that we believed that a public consultation,

“would have made for better informed parliamentary scrutiny of the Government’s proposal”,

and that the Joint Committee that was proposed would allow for just that kind of proper scrutiny.

Your Lordships’ House made it very clear that it did not consider that there had been sufficient scrutiny by passing the amendment with such a significant majority. The only thing that has happened since then is that the House of Commons has debated for only 90 minutes something of such grave constitutional and moral importance. I really think that the case for a Joint Committee still stands. Indeed, the Home Affairs Select Committee, which published its report on counterterrorism after the debate in the Commons, has supported Lords Amendment 18, which underlines the point made by a number of organisations outside this House that the measure does not guarantee security against terrorism in any way.

I, too, have read the legal debate between the Government and Professor Goodwin-Gill. As a non-lawyer, I am not in a position to be able to judge that debate. Surely, however, the fact that there is such disagreement reinforces the case for a Joint Committee to tease out these very serious legal matters. The Floor of the House is not the place to do that. As the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, has already made clear, so much is at stake. I quoted earlier the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who is now in his place, because what he said was so important. He said:

“Statelessness is one of the most terrible things that can befall anyone”.—[Official Report, 19/3/14; col. 212.]

The Minister spoke of the evil of statelessness. Another expert in this area said that statelessness was a recipe for exclusion, precariousness and dispossession.

We have not completely averted the danger that we will make somebody stateless as a result of the amendment, welcome as it is. I hope, therefore, that noble Lords will stand firm and support Motion B1 because the amendment does not provide a cast-iron guarantee against the evil of statelessness.

Immigration Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I accept that there are some people in the class that my noble friend describes.

My noble friend Lady Williams talked about supporting a family on £5 a day—I cannot recall exactly what she said—but the payment levels for asylum seekers with children are much higher. A family with two children receives approximately £170 per week. Accommodation is also provided, with utilities—electricity and gas—provided free.

Amendment 72 would make the support given to failed asylum seekers and persons on bail, known as Section 4 support, the same as the support given to asylum seekers—Section 95 support. This is inappropriate, as the types of assistance are different and serve different purposes.

The support that we provide to asylum seekers enables us to meet international obligations. However, there are no obligations routinely to assist failed asylum seekers, the vast majority of whom can reasonably be expected to avoid the consequences of destitution by returning to their own countries—although I am mindful of my exchange with my noble friend Lord Avebury. Exceptions are made only where there is an unavoidable obstacle preventing the person’s immediate departure; for example, if they are too sick to travel, need time to obtain a necessary travel document or have made further submissions relating to their asylum claim. These arrangements ensure that the individuals do not suffer inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as a result of being left homeless or without support.

We also use Section 4 to provide accommodation to persons released from immigration detention on bail. The provision of accommodation in this instance is solely to avoid the person being unnecessarily detained through lack of a suitable bail address. Section 4 cases are provided with a weekly allowance to cover their essential living needs provided they move into accommodation supplied by the Home Office. Existing legislation explicitly prevents the allowance being provided in cash.

My noble friend Lord Roberts referred to the limitation as to the retailers involved. In my personal experience, supermarkets provide better value for money than many corner shops. The value and flexibility of the allowance is rightly less than the allowances provided under Section 95. Section 4 support is a temporary fix for people who are not asylum seekers and in nearly all cases need to make arrangements to go home.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to the situation in other European countries. She will be aware that these countries have different legal systems and that this country is a very attractive destination.

In answer to my noble friend Lady Williams, I fear that I will be unable to recommend to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State that she change the policy, for reasons that I have given. In light of these points, I hope that my noble friend Lord Roberts will agree not to press his amendments.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, will he respond directly to the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that the purpose of the present policy is to make life in the United Kingdom so unattractive for these vulnerable people that they leave?

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, no. The purpose of the current policy is to deter economic migration, because people would be able to come here, claim asylum and after a while be able to work. With this policy, we can deter economic migration through the asylum route and therefore properly determine the genuine cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Roberts of Llandudno]

My Lords, I will refer to Amendments 75 to 78 from the noble Lord, Lord Lester. They touch upon important points, including one made in the context of Clause 14 by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and myself.

The Government have an obligation to take into account the best interests of any child affected by their decisions. I accept that Amendment 77 must be understood in the light of the reply of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, to amendments tabled to Clause 14. He stated:

“We believe that the children’s best interests must be a primary consideration. … However, it is simply not the case that a child’s best interests will outweigh every other possible countervailing factor, including illegal immigration and serious criminality”.—[Official Report, 5/3/14; col. 1384.]

Amendment 77 seeks to put on the face of the Bill that the child’s best interests should be considered, no matter what the crimes of the parents might be. This remains true.

I support also Amendment 75, which seeks to limit the dangerously broad and vague power that the Home Secretary asks for. The lack of clarity was outlined to me in a Written Answer from the Minister, Lord Taylor, on 10 February, in which he stated:

“The Government does not wish to be overly prescriptive about the meaning of ‘seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom’, as the circumstances of each case will be different. However we intend it to cover those involved in terrorism or espionage or those who take up arms against British or allied forces”.—[Official Report, 10/2/14; col. WA 103.]

He cited terrorism, espionage and taking up arms against British or allied forces as possible specific examples. I hope that all here will wholeheartedly agree that the Home Secretary should be obliged to consider whether the deprivation of citizenship is both a necessary and a proportionate response.

Ultimately, this debate will focus on the finer details of this clause, but we must also take a moment to consider whether the deprivation of citizenship is an appropriate response to alleged criminality or threats to security, given its considerable implications for international law. For this reason, I have put my name to the call made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to oppose the clause in its entirety.

Although I have previously stated that I am not one who understands the law to any measurable extent, I remain a concerned citizen. I am deeply troubled that this provision could allow for the citizenship of millions to be removed, with slim chances of appealing.

Let us not forget the judgment of Chief Justice Warren ruling in the United States Supreme Court case of Trop v Dulles in 1958. He said that,

“use of denationalization as a punishment”,

means,

“the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture”.

I hope that the Minister will take these comments to heart in replying to the Committee.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, if Clause 60 operates in accordance with the Government’s intentions, it is bound to increase statelessness in the world. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has already reminded the Committee of the words spoken by Hannah Arendt many years ago, that statelessness deprives people of the “right to have rights”. It brings about a bleak, hopeless status, or rather a complete lack of status, that the British Government should have no role in encouraging, first, because of the positively terminal impact that the imposition of statelessness is bound to have on the ability of the rightless to function in a way that is even remotely human in the modern world and, secondly, because it is clear that such an imposition as a policy measure can have no sensible part in a co-ordinated international effort to combat security threats. In fact, it appears to be the antithesis of such an effort, even in circumstances where it is precisely co-ordinated international effort that we need.

In fact, the unilateral imposition of statelessness is very likely to be directly unhelpful to those efforts because it carries with it the very real risk of breaching the United Kingdom’s international obligations to a country which has admitted a person on the strength of their lawful possession of a United Kingdom passport. Of course, such a country would absolutely have the right to return an individual directly to the United Kingdom, and what then? As the JCHR has observed, the United Kingdom would appear to have no absolute right under international law to require other states to accept its outcasts. In my view, therefore, this proposal is not only ugly in the sense identified so many years ago by Hannah Arendt; it not only associates the United Kingdom with a policy beloved of the world’s worst regimes during the 20th century; but it threatens illegal and procedural quagmire hardly compatible with the comity of nations, still less with solidarity between free countries in the face of terrorism.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, have a fundamental problem with this clause. It has been suggested that it was added late to the Bill and designed to overcome the Government’s defeat in Al-Jedda, which was decided by the Supreme Court just last October, but in fact Clause 60 goes substantially further than merely reversing that decision.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of Reprieve, an NGO campaigning against the death penalty and secret prisons around the world. It was involved in the Binyam Mohamed case. I start by acknowledging two things. First, the Bill is a significant improvement on the Green Paper that preceded it, and a very welcome improvement. Secondly, there may be a very limited category and number of civil cases in which closed proceedings may be necessary to ensure that justice can be done in circumstances where, if there were no closed proceedings, material critical to the fair resolution of an issue would be excluded from the court’s consideration. This, of course, could include fair resolution in favour of the claimant as well as in favour of the defendant. I would expect this to be a very small—exceedingly small—number of cases.

My question for the House is whether the Bill as currently drafted achieves an appropriate balance between delivering justice in that very small category of cases and the wider public interest in enjoying a justice system that is open and public. Will the Bill deliver that very small—exceedingly small—number of cases, or might it deliver rather more; indeed, too many? My view is that, despite the obvious improvements, there is still a way to go. I want to focus on two areas: public interest immunity and the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction.

Public interest immunity has served us very well over many years and judges are very experienced in the exercise of this jurisdiction. It enables a party to the proceedings to invite a judge to conclude that any given material, while relevant to an issue in the case, should be withheld from that case on public interest grounds. Naturally, those public interest grounds can include national security grounds. In conducting this exercise, the judge is required to balance the public interest in protecting sensitive material from disclosure against the private litigant’s legitimate interest in seeing material that may assist his case or undermine the case of his opponent.

I am not aware that it has ever credibly been suggested that judges in our courts are inclined to get this balance wrong. My own experience over many years, including during the five years that I served as Director of Public Prosecutions, is that our judges do not get this balance wrong, despite what American intelligence agencies may quite erroneously believe. Some aspects of the Bill appear to have been included because of what almost everybody accepts is a misapprehension on the part of a foreign intelligence agency.

At present, the Bill requires the Secretary of State merely to consider public interest immunity and presumably to reject it as a suitable mechanism before going on to apply for a close material procedure. This is not enough. I urge the Government to take the opportunity represented by this legislation to strengthen, rather than undermine, our PII jurisdiction. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights has said, it should be placed on a statutory footing to strengthen confidence and to increase clarity. Such a reform could include, among other things, the test to be applied when national security material is the subject of a PII application.

I also believe that it would strengthen the integrity of any CMP were it to be invoked only following a full PII process. In other words, the judge would be invited to rule, in accordance with traditional PII principles, that the relevant material sought to be withheld could properly be withheld on public interest grounds. Having made that ruling, the court would then go on to consider, again on conventional PII principles, the extent to which a redacted form of the material, or a summary, could safely be disclosed consistent with the public interest.

Finally, if at the conclusion of this conventional PII process a party wished to go on to apply that the court should go into closed session to hear any remaining material permitted to be withheld under PII, only then would the court be empowered to accede to that application to the extent that it felt a fair trial would be impossible in the absence of factoring that material into its consideration of the issues in the case.

The scheme would be: first, consider the relevance of the material to issues in the case—normal PII; secondly, consider the extent to which its disclosure might damage national security—normal PII; thirdly, consider the extent to which redaction or summary can cure the problem—normal PII; fourthly, in appropriate cases after that process, rule that the material may be withheld on grounds of public interest; and only then, fifthly, upon an application by one of the parties, rule that the material withheld can be considered by a court in closed session because, in the view of the court, a failure to do so would render the proceedings as a whole unfair. It would be a strong PII system as we understand it today, with the possibility in a small number of cases, once that process had been exhausted, for the court to go into closed session. Such a scheme would encourage a focus throughout the process on the important principles to be decided. It would very strongly discourage abuse or inappropriate, overhasty recourse to the CMP procedure, which is, I fear, a real danger under the current proposals.

I turn to the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction and Clauses 13 and 14. These are far too widely drawn for the following reasons. Clause l3 relates to “sensitive material”. The listing of this category of material as deserving of special protection is an unfortunate throwback to the excesses of the Green Paper. Worse, whole swathes of material are deemed to warrant, without any further consideration, the tag of “sensitive”, so that they are automatically and absolutely excluded from disclosure. This includes any material emanating from the intelligence services in the widest sense.

Of course, some material emanating from the intelligence services, though certainly not all of it, may be “sensitive”, but that is the wrong test. It has been abandoned in the rest of the Bill and it should be absent from Clause 13. The test should be the extent to which a disclosure would be damaging to national security, as it is elsewhere. Even then, there should be no automatic carve-out. The power to withhold this material should be subject to a judge’s ruling on the merits, as it is in the case of an application for a CMP. It should be the same test.

Even worse, Clause 13(3)(e) allows the Secretary of State to specify that any other material may be excluded if its disclosure in his judgment could damage national security or damage the interests of our international relations. The exercise of this exceedingly broad executive power is reviewable by a judge, but not on its merits and only on JR principles; that is, the judge can reject the Secretary of State’s certification only if he finds its exercise to have been “irrational”. This test does not provide adequate supervision over such a sensitive exercise of ministerial power, undermining, as it must be, of important principles of open justice.

The Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction can sound a dry and technical subject, but, as my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill has pointed out, it exists in cases where a great deal may be at stake, including the very life of the complainant who may, for example, be residing in a foreign prison and potentially facing sentence of death, as was the case with a number of Guantanamo Bay inmates. As things stand, the courts will make a Norwich Pharmacal order only where the party against whom it is sought has become mixed up in wrongdoing and where the interests of justice require it. Are we now to say that, however mixed up in wrongdoing the party against whom disclosure is sought may have been, and however strongly the interests of justice may demand disclosure, the behaviour of the wrongdoer, if it is an intelligence agency, shall be afforded total and automatic protection in all third-party applications of this sort? I do not believe that we should say that and this proposal goes too far. It causes deep offence to conventional legal principles because it ousts the effective supervisory role of the court in a way that is almost calculated to lead to injustice, even on a heroic scale.

I accept that, in cases in which national security issues are genuinely engaged, some adjustment to the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction may be appropriate, but the solution is emphatically not entirely to exclude certain bodies from its range. The solution may be, as I think the JCHR indicated, a presumption against disclosure in national security cases in the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction, overturnable by the judge if, in his or her view, serious injustice is likely to occur in the event of non-disclosure.

Even in the field of national security, I do not believe that it is in the broader public interest to move to a scheme where the interests of justice are entirely exiled from the equation so that they cease to exist as a check against the abuse of state power.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I associate myself with the comments of my noble friend Lord Dear and the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. Certain things can go wrong all too easily. DNA is not a straight yes/no; at the end of the day, if something is done in a laboratory, you are talking about an analogue match that is reduced to certain points. We have seen sometimes the misinterpretation of fingerprints. When a computer has reduced it to X points, it is not necessarily a true match. There have been miscarriages of justice as a result. People have refused to admit mistakes later because of the tendency of the system to try to cover up its mistakes for the greater good, in order not to discredit something that is widely accepted as evidence.

I am also worried that, if DNA exists and is associated with a case, you use it to try to prove some guilt. You do not know how it got there. I might have tried on a jersey in a department store and left a couple of hairs on it. It might later have been bought by someone else and the knife that went into the person might have carried one of my hairs inside the wound. With our DNA techniques, it could be deduced that I was the person who was at the place in question—you do not know

The trouble is that, because we have an adversarial system, we do not seek to find the truth in our courts; we see who has got the best lawyers to discredit the evidence on the other side. That can be dangerous sometimes with things such as DNA, which is fairly new. We have widely different quoted figures for what an exact match is and for the probability of a match that do not take into account laboratory accuracy. We need to think about exactly how accurate it really is. You also get criminal seeding of sites, which has been going on for a long time—taking ashtrays from pubs and leaving DNA evidence elsewhere to sow false things.

What worries me, finally, is what we saw happen with RIPA—that is, function creep. This will start off in the serious crime arena and then get extended, because it is an easy way to find who was where when or who handled what. We have to be very careful about making sure that that does not happen if we are going to retain DNA as evidence. That is why I approve of the Government’s stand and of what the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, said.

We seem to treat very lightly the fact that someone should be arrested. Actually, that goes on your record and it stays there even if you are never then prosecuted or a charge is not laid properly. The fact that you have been arrested will disbar you from all sorts of things. A simple example is the American visa waiver scheme. I am fairly certain that you cannot get a US visa waiver if you have been arrested. For some people, there is no smoke without fire. We have to be very careful before thinking that just an arrest is okay and that it is all forgotten in the wash—it is not.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, this is a difficult and sensitive issue, and I have great sympathy with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said a moment ago. When he was Attorney-General and I was Director of Public Prosecutions, we often saw the result of DNA evidence in successful prosecutions. Nobody for one moment would underestimate, in spite of what has been said recently, the importance and the potency of that evidence, particularly in cold-case reviews.

Nevertheless, I am driven to support the Government’s position on this amendment, largely because of the sentiment that was expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. The rational and honest conclusion of the previous Government’s policy was a national DNA database. The policy was discriminatory in a sense that has not been addressed so far in this debate. Everybody knows that more young black men than young white men are arrested on the streets of our cities by proportion of population, and therefore more are swabbed. Therefore, a database that was growing as that one was, uncontrolled by any process of anti-discrimination, was inherently dangerous.

The safe process, if the Government had wanted to go down that road, as was once explained very eloquently by Lord Justice Sedley on the “Today” programme, was to institute a national DNA database. That was the logical and only fair extension of the previous Government’s policy. I cannot support the concept of a national DNA database. It seems an inherently totalitarian concept. The idea that newborn babies would be separated from their mothers in our hospitals to be swabbed before being returned for suckling, or however the process is conducted, seems deeply totalitarian and unacceptable.

The Scots have got it about right. These are questions of balance. Of course the position of victims is critical, but we also have to develop a system which achieves a balance between justice for victims and justice for defendants in a free society in which the Government play an appropriate and not overly intrusive role in people’s lives.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

My Lords, on this occasion I have not actually been tempted. I had hoped to come in anyway, although I was a little late getting here, and I apologise for that. I would like to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, that I much appreciate the remarks she has just made. I well remember the experience we had together and the hugely valuable contribution that she made to that committee. I can also say that I share her views on absolutely everything that she has said, so I will not speak at great length. I agree also with what I have heard since I came into the Chamber. The Minister ought to know—if he was in any doubt—that there was not complete unanimity on this point on the Benches immediately behind him, even though the voices so far have come from elsewhere.

The arguments adduced on the previous occasion in Committee to which the noble Baroness has referred were, frankly, unbelievably thin. I do not blame the Minister for that—I suspect that they are inherently thin, and unless they are a lot thicker this evening then I will find myself in some difficulty, and he needs to know that.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I support these amendments. I declare an interest as the independent reviewer of the counterterrorism review. I should also like to pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for the many hours that he has devoted to these issues over the years.

Why should it be the court rather than the Home Secretary? In my brief analysis, there are four reasons. First, on any analysis, the measures in this Bill are an exception to our normal rule-of-law principles for reasons set out very clearly by my noble friend Lord Goodhart. Secondly, they constitute a very serious potential stigmatisation of those subjected to them: a declaration of belief on the part of the state that the individual is involved in acts of terrorism. In my estimation it can hardly get much worse. Of course, the orders are anonymised, but family, friends and no doubt, the wider community, quickly become aware of the fact. Thirdly, our courts are very well used to adjudicating issues of national security, and they do it time and time again—for example, every time a question of public interest immunity arises, and in many other situations too. I am not aware of any credible argument that they do so incompetently. They may of course embarrass the Government and one or more of the agencies from time to time, but that is an entirely different point. Fourthly, and finally, our courts are independent, and they therefore bring the vigour of their independence to their decision making. In this area, that becomes a question of important public confidence.

My analysis is that it is the exceptionality of these measures, their severity, and the damage that they may do to their subject—who after all has heard no more than the gist of the case against him, quite exceptionally—that demands that they should be orders of the court rather than punitive and potentially damning directions of the Home Secretary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I also support the Government’s position on these amendments. The counterterrorism review gathered a great deal of evidence about relocation, as well as other measures applicable under the control order regime. The evidence was considered extremely carefully, as far as I could see. After all, the review was conducted by no less a division of the Home Office than the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, which is to be found in the deepest bowels of that department of state. Its conclusion, which I thought was certainly in accordance with the evidence, was that relocation was disproportionate and unnecessary in the face of other measures available under the TPIM legislation and particularly in the light of the Government’s decision to increase the amount of funding for surveillance, which after all is the main technique used by countries like us around the world to deal with these sorts of issues. I agreed with the conclusions of the counterterrorism review, as I thought that they were clearly in line with the evidence, of which there is a great deal. I am sure that the Government’s position on these amendments is the right one.

[The Archbishop of York]

I, too, as someone who supported the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, in his amendment, believe that it is the duty of the Home Secretary to make the application to the judge and the judge to determine. To bring back relocation would make the case worse—not because we lost the last Vote, but I generally feel that on this particular bit of the Bill the Government have got it right. So I hope that we do not have to go through the Lobby Doors again but that the amendment will be withdrawn. Nothing will cause me greater difficulty in my understanding of British justice than bringing back relocation. That actually causes more difficulty in our communities than anything else. If there is going to be relocation, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, should in his amendment have said that it should be done on the orders of a judge and not the Secretary of State.

I go with the Government on this, as I think they have got it right. Of course, we lost the last and most important amendment, but there we are.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I support the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It covers the same ground as my amendment, which would have amended Clause 6 by substituting civil standards of proof for “obviously flawed”. I agree with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said.

The great advantage of the balance of probabilities as a test is that it is flexible. At the more serious end, it approaches the criminal standard. There could hardly be a more serious finding to make against an individual, as has been said often today, than that he has been engaged in terrorist activity. Therefore, the burden of proof in these cases ought to approach the criminal standard. There is not the slightest justification for a burden of proof which is less than the civil standard.

With one exception there is no precedent that I can find in English law for a serious finding, such as is involved here, being made on the basis of reasonable belief. In the earlier debate I referred to many instances of prevention orders being made by the civil courts, some in serious cases such as sexual harm and so on, and in every case the burden of proof has been the balance of probabilities, and so it should be here.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, Clause 4 of the Bill indicates that the finding which will be made in relation to a TPIM is that an individual has been involved in,

“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”;

or in,

“conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so”;

or in,

“conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or is intended to do so”;

or in,

“conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the individual concerned to be involved in”,

such conduct.

This is a very grave finding. As I suggested earlier, it is a finding which justifies a standard of proof on the balance of probabilities rather than reasonable belief. I support the amendment for the reasons that have already been set out.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. It was always a great source of regret and sorrow to me that during Labour’s years in government we saw an erosion of the standards of proof on many different fronts. I remember getting support from the Conservative Benches and agreement that erosions of the standard of proof were taking place. Therefore, this rather strange volte-face by the coalition Government has come as a surprise to me. I want the Government to think again about this erosion of the standard of proof. As noble Lords who have already spoken have said, the consequences are serious. This House should not contemplate having anything less than the balance of probabilities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I support the amendment for reasons already advanced. For my part, I have no desire at all to see this sort of scheme become a normal and conventional part of our legal arrangements; it is not, for all the reasons that noble Lords have repeatedly advanced this afternoon. It is an exceptional scheme, and it is important that it continues to be seen as such. The amendment lays it bare; it mandates appropriate and continuing scrutiny, engaging the regular attention of this House and providing reassurance that these measures will not continue for a moment longer than they are required or necessary. A strong part of providing that reassurance will be annual scrutiny by this House of the continued necessity for such a scheme as is undoubtedly going to pass into law.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. I am not going to take up the time of the House, because I think that the arguments are simple. It is about the exceptional nature of this shift, which requires us to keep it under scrutiny. I remember having conversations with colleagues when we were discussing control orders, and hearing repeated over and over again in this House how important it was that liberty is maintained and that requires eternal vigilance. That is why when you depart from the norms that are in our system you have to have them under review as often as yearly.

I know that the Minister speaks passionately about liberty—I have heard him do so. I remind him that that vigilance requires that we keep this constantly in front of us, and I think that once a year is not asking too much.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, some of us are even closer to the crossfire.

I start with a question which perhaps picks up where my noble friend Lord Carlile left off. It concerns the time limit on the measures. I had intended to ask it later under some amendments which I have down, but I shall ask it now. I found it quite hard to follow the Bill at the points where it begins to refer to revival, revocation, expiry, and so on. I needed a flow chart to understand just what was available in terms of imposition of measures. Are there any circumstances in which an individual can be subject to a TPIM or a series of TPIMs lasting more than two years, and, if there is one episode of new terrorism-related activity, which is defined, how long in all can a series of TPIMs last?

I should make it clear that I very much support the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and supported by others. I also support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On his Amendments 42 and 43, he quoted the conclusion today of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the issue of a full merits review. It is perhaps worth reading into the record as part of this debate the comments that the committee made in leading up to that conclusion. It said that the Government in replying to its previous report had argued that,

“there is no reason to doubt that courts will continue to apply intense scrutiny in TPIMs cases, as they have in control order cases, and that ‘continued reliance on case law’ is the best way to deliver that intense scrutiny”.

That became part of the conclusion. It seems to me that that does not amount to an argument for the principles of judicial review and that intense scrutiny is not excluded by the approach which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has advocated and which I support. I have checked the Government’s response to the previous report by the JCHR. Nothing significant has been left out of the paragraph that I have just quoted.

On the “balance of probabilities”, I added my name to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Can the Minister explain why under Clause 26, which introduces “enhanced” TPIMs, there is a higher standard of proof than for standard TPIMs? The same applies to the Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill which is to have pre-legislative scrutiny. The memorandum from the Home Office to the JCHR regarding the draft Bill with the enhanced TPIMs, which, in particular, would provide for relocation, said that the higher test is because of the more stringent measures allowed by the draft Bill. Clearly it would apply the same argument to Clause 26. So called standard TPIMs are fairly stringent but, even apart from that, I do not follow the logic. The standard of proof as to the facts which permit a step to be taken is a different matter from the steps which are available. I regard those as closely related but logically separate issues. I am lost as to why the higher standard of proof, which, as my noble friend Lord Carlile has encouraged the House to think, would not be a risk to the Government in this context, cannot be applied.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I support the amendments. I can do so relatively briefly because I can quite easily and simply adopt many of the arguments that have been made.

Terrorism is the gravest and most dangerous kind of crime and TPIMs are a properly grave response to that threat. A consideration of what the imposition of a TPIM represents gives some clue as to what the correct process should be. The imposition of a TPIM represents a public finding that an individual is involved in acts of terrorism. Of course, the individual’s name is not publicised, but surely his friends and his wider community are aware of it. It is a grave step and a grave potential stigmatising of an individual with an association with the gravest kind of crime. It is in those circumstances that one is driven to the conclusion that, if a TPIM is to be imposed, it should be imposed not by a member of the Executive but rather by a court. It is in those circumstances that I support the amendments to that effect.

I have not yet heard an argument why it is better for these measures to be imposed by a member of the Executive. I have heard arguments from my noble and learned friend, whose advocacy I have heard many times in courts up and down the land and which never ceases to impress me, as to why it is not necessarily constitutionally inappropriate but not as to why it is positively better than the alternative. The argument that has been made by a number of my noble friends and other noble Lords is that, given what a TPIM represents and the gravity of the measure, if it can be done by a court it should be done by a court unless there is a very good reason why it should not. I have heard no such reason.

The same applies to the burden of proof. I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick: the balance of probabilities is a test which is tailor made, perfectly made, for the process which the court needs to go through in this situation. It is not the criminal standard of proof because these are, in essence, civil penalties, but a civil standard of proof which, as he said, is flexible, realistic, well understood by the judiciary and does justice in civil cases up and down the land, including in other civil preventive measures.

Again, I do not understand what the argument against this is. If it is that it should be easier to impose a TPIM—that we cannot trust a judge to come to a safe conclusion about whether something is more likely than not—that is a false argument. It is, if you like, a somewhat cowardly argument. We can trust the judges to apply a balance of probabilities test in TPIMs in a way that is both just and entirely capable of protecting the public.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I, too, support the Government and I am very much with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. If my noble friend Lord Carlile succeeds in getting answers to his questions about evidence, I shall consider that there is a huge amount of favouritism going on. That is exactly the sort of thing that we have all asked for on many occasions, but inevitably we are not satisfied because we know that advice to the Government is advice to the Government, and we cannot read their heart as we are being asked to do.

I do not quite understand the distinction between politics and security. For all the reasons we have talked about and will continue to talk about, it is a much more nuanced and complicated—there is probably a geometric term for it that I do not know—picture than a simple polarisation as regards the impact of particular measures. Of course surveillance is going to be costly, but another balance that one must come to is where one puts one’s efforts and spends one’s money.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I, too, support the Government on this issue. It does not surprise me at all that if the Government presently have a power, they will seek to use it, and it does not surprise me at all that if the security services presently have a power, they will seek to retain it. But the question is, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said: what is a fair balance? Noble Lords will know that the counterterrorism review considered these issues very anxiously and received a great deal of evidence. It came to the conclusion that public safety could be protected in the absence of the power of relocation but in the presence of additional surveillance, for which funding was indicated, and with the sort of measures that have now been brought forward in the TPIM Bill. That was the considered conclusion of the review and appears to be the conclusion of the Government. I must say, having scrutinised the evidence which was supplied to the counterterrorism review, it was also my conclusion. I therefore support the Government on this question.

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

My Lords, having acknowledged on a number of occasions recently my capacity to fall to temptation whenever I am in the Chamber and make some remarks, I am even more tempted on this occasion because I am able to make a remark that, for most of the past six months, my noble friends on the Front Bench thought they would never hear: I support the Government.