Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Leong and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th December 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the problem is that I have a 10-minute speech and there are five minutes left before Hansard leaves us, so is it sensible to draw stumps at this point? I have not counted how many amendments I have, but I also wish to speak to the amendment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. I would have thought it sensible to break at this point.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

That is a sensible suggestion.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Debate between Lord Leong and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th April 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, having been involved in and seen the campaigning of the bereaved families and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, in particular in the Joint Committee on the Draft Online Safety Bill onwards, I associate myself entirely with the noble Baroness’s statement and with my noble friend Lord Allan’s remarks.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for setting out the amendment and all noble Lords who spoke. I am sure the Minister will be pleased to hear that we support his Amendment 236 and his Amendment 237, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has added her name.

Amendment 236 is a technical amendment. It seeks the straightforward deletion of words from a clause, accounting for the fact that investigations by a coroner, or procurator fiscal in Scotland, must start upon them being notified of the death of a child. The words

“or are due to conduct an investigation”

are indeed superfluous.

We also support Amendment 237. The deletion of this part of the clause would bring into effect a material change. It would empower Ofcom to issue a notice to an internet service provider to retain information in all cases of a child’s death, not just cases of suspected suicide. Sadly, as many of us have discovered in the course of our work on this Bill, there is an increasing number of ways in which communication online can be directly or indirectly linked to a child’s death. These include areas of material that is appropriate for adults only; the inability to filter harmful information, which may adversely affect mental health and decision-making; and, of course, the deliberate targeting of children by adults and, in some cases, by other children.

There are adults who use the internet with the intention of doing harm to children through coercion, grooming or abuse. What initially starts online can lead to contact in person. Often, this will lead to a criminal investigation, but, even if it does not, the changes proposed by this amendment could help prevent additional tragic deaths of children, not just those caused by suspected child suicides. If the investigating authorities have access to online communications that may have been a contributing factor in a child’s death, additional areas of concern can be identified by organisations and individuals with responsibility for children’s welfare and action taken to save many other young lives.

Before I sit down, I want to take this opportunity to say a big thank you to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and all those who have campaigned on this issue relentlessly and brought it to our attention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to all the amendments in this group, other than Amendment 295 from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Without stealing her thunder, I very much support it, especially in an election year and in the light of the deepfakes we have already seen in the political arena—those of Sadiq Khan, those used in the Slovakian election and the audio deepfakes of the President of the US and Sir Keir Starmer. This is a real issue and I am delighted that she has put down this amendment, which I have signed.

In another part of the forest, the recent spread of deepfake photos purporting to show Taylor Swift engaged in explicit acts has brought new attention to the use, which has been growing in recent years, of deepfake images, video and audio to harass women and commit fraud. Women constitute 99% of the victims and the most visited deepfake site had 111 million users in October 2023. More recently, children have been found using “declothing” apps, which I think the noble Baroness mentioned, to create explicit deepfakes of other children.

Deepfakes also present a growing threat to elections and democracy, as I have mentioned, and the problems are increasingly rampant. Deepfake fraud rates rose by 3,000% globally in 2023, and it is hardly surprising that, in recent polling, 86% of the UK population supported a ban on deepfakes. I believe that the public are demanding an urgent solution to this problem. The only effective way to stop deepfakes, which is analogous to what the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has been so passionately advocating, is for the Government to ban them at every stage, from production to distribution. Legal liability must hold to account those who produce deepfake technology, create and enable deepfake content, and facilitate its spread.

Existing legislation seeks to limit the spread of images on social media, but this is not enough. The recent images of Taylor Swift were removed from X and Telegram, but not before one picture had been viewed more than 47 million times. Digital watermarks are not a solution, as shown by a paper by world-leading Al researchers released in 2023, which concluded that

“strong and robust watermarking is impossible to achieve”.

Without measures across the supply chain to prevent the creation of deepfakes, the law will forever be playing catch-up.

The Government now intend to ban the creation of sexual imagery deepfakes; I welcome this and have their announcement in my hand:

“Government cracks down on ‘deepfakes’ creation”.


This will send a clear message that the creation of these intimate images is not acceptable. However, this appears to cover only sexual image deepfakes. These are the most prevalent form of deepfakes, but other forms of deepfakes are also causing noticeable and rapidly growing harms, most obviously political deepfakes—as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, will illustrate—and deepfakes used for fraud. This also appears to cover only the endpoint of the creation of deepfakes, not the supply chain leading up to that point. There are whole apps and companies dedicated to the creation of deepfakes, and they should not exist. There are industries which provide legitimate services—generative Al and cloud computing—which fail to take adequate measures and end up enabling creation of deepfakes. They should take measures or face legal accountability.

The Government’s new measures are intended to be introduced through an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill, which is, I believe, currently between Committee and Report in the House of Commons. As I understand it, however, there is no date scheduled yet for Report, as the Bill seems to be caught in a battle over amendments.

The law will, however, be extremely difficult to enforce. Perpetrators are able to hide behind anonymity and are often difficult to identify, even when victims or authorities are aware that deepfakes have been created. The only reliable and effective countermeasure is to hold the whole supply chain responsible for deepfake creation and proliferation. All parties involved in the AI supply chain, from AI model developers and providers to cloud compute providers, must demonstrate that they have taken steps to preclude the creation of deepfakes. This approach is similar to how society combats—or, rather, analogous to the way that I hope the Minister will concede to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, society will combat—child abuse material and malware.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 293 and 294 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, Amendment 295 proposed by my noble friend Lady Jones and Amendments 295A to 295F, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.

Those noble Lords who are avid followers of my social media feeds will know that I am an advocate of technology. Advanced computing power and artificial intelligence offer enormous opportunities, which are not all that bad. However, the intentions of those who use them can be malign or criminal, and the speed of technological developments is outpacing legislators around the world. We are constantly in danger of creating laws that close the stable door long after the virtual horse has bolted.

The remarkable progress of visual and audio technology has its roots in the entertainment industry. It has been used to complete or reshoot scenes in films in the event of actors being unavailable, or in some cases, when actors died before filming was completed. It has also enabled filmmakers to introduce characters, or younger versions of iconic heroes for sequels or prequels in movie franchises. This enabled us to see a resurrected Sir Alec Guinness and a younger version of Luke Skywalker, or a de-aged Indiana Jones, on our screens.

The technology that can do this is only around 15 years old, and until about five years ago it required extremely powerful computers, expensive resources and advanced technical expertise. The first malicious use of deepfakes occurred when famous actors and celebrities, mainly and usually women, had their faces superimposed on to bodies of participants in pornographic videos. These were then marketed online as Hollywood stars’ sex tapes or similar, making money for the producers while causing enormous distress to the women targeted. More powerful computer processors inevitably mean that what was once very expensive rapidly becomes much cheaper very quickly. An additional factor has turbo-boosted this issue: generative AI. Computers can now learn to create images, sound and video movement almost independently of software specialists. It is no longer just famous women who are the targets of sexually explicit deepfakes; it could be anyone.

Amendment 293 directly addresses this horrendous practice, and I hope that there will be widespread support for it. In an increasingly digital world, we spend more time in front of our screens, getting information and entertainment on our phones, laptops, iPads and smart TVs. What was once an expensive technology, used to titillate, entertain or for comedic purposes, has developed an altogether darker presence, well beyond the reach of most legislation.

In additional to explicit sexual images, deepfakes are known to have been used to embarrass individuals, misrepresent public figures, enable fraud, manipulate public opinion and influence democratic political elections and referendums. This damages people individually: those whose images or voices are faked, and those who are taken in by the deepfakes. Trusted public figures, celebrities or spokespeople face reputational and financial damage when their voices or images are used to endorse fake products or for harvesting data. Those who are encouraged to click through are at risk of losing money to fraudsters, being targeted for scams, or having their personal and financial data leaked or sold on. There is growing evidence that information used under false pretences can be used for profiling in co-ordinated misinformation campaigns, for darker financial purposes or political exploitation.

In passing, it is worth remembering that deepfakes are not always images of people. Last year, crudely generated fake images of an explosion, purported to be at the Pentagon, caused the Dow Jones industrial average to drop 85 points within four minutes of the image being published, and triggered emergency response procedures from local law enforcement before it was debunked 20 minutes later. The power of a single image, carefully placed and virally spreading, shows the enormous and rapid economic damage that deepfakes can create.

Amendment 294 would make it an offence for a person to generate a deepfake for the purpose of committing fraud, and Amendment 295 would make it an offence to create deepfakes of political figures, particularly when they risk undermining electoral integrity. We support all the additional provisions in this group of amendments; Amendments 295A to 295F outline the requirements, duties and definitions necessary to ensure that those creating deepfakes can be prosecuted.

I bring to your Lordships’ attention the wording of Amendment 295, which, as well as making it an offence to create a deepfake, goes a little further. It also makes it an offence to send a communication which has been created by artificial intelligence and which is intended to create the impression that a political figure has said or done something that is not based in fact. This touches on what I believe to be a much more alarming aspect of deepfakes: the manner in which false information is distributed.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Lord Leong and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, with all his experience as a fund manager, and particularly to hear what he forecast for the future: the ability of AI to deliver information in a new format that is of much greater interest and use to a consumer. I must admit, I had not really thought about that.

It is also a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Sheehan, and in particular to support the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, on her amendment. We are obviously saving the best for last in contributing to our final group in Committee. As a former company secretary, I well remember the noble Baroness as a financial journalist and an absolute champion of corporate governance. This appears to be an absolutely crucial part of it. In a sense, it is the other side of the coin from what you expect of the corporate; it is what you expect of those who invest in the corporate, in terms of exercising their voting rights. The noble Baroness illustrated the sorry history of the voluntary approach put forward by the FCA. I could loosely describe her amendment as trying to put some lead in the FCA’s pencil, which seems wholly needed.

The noble Baroness asked a number of further questions. A really interesting and important question is: how on earth can the US, with its relatively unregulated systems compared to ours and its culture of not regulating on a federal basis, do it on a compulsory basis when we have not? Particularly from what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, said, it sounds as though it will be eminently possible to do this, as the technology improves, without overly imposing costs on investment managers. Indeed, it is already being done for those operating in the states. There seems absolutely no reason why the Government should not move forward in the way that the noble Baroness suggests.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, for tabling Amendment 212, and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I will be brief.

In 2019, the European Union introduced the second shareholder rights directive, which sets out stipulations regarding the utilisation of specific shareholder privileges linked to voting shares during general meetings of companies that are headquartered in a member state and have their shares traded on a regulated market located or functioning within a member state. It was brought into UK law by secondary legislation, amending the occupational pension schemes regulations of 2005, and it has now been assimilated into UK law. As per the Explanatory Notes to the regulations, they encourage investors to be transparent about how they invest and approach their engagement as shareholders. It was a negative statutory instrument, so no debates were tabled.

The amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, carries greater weight than the shareholder rights directive. It would mandate the FCA to establish regulations necessitating investment managers and life insurers to furnish standardised reports concerning company voting activities upon request. Furthermore, it would instruct the FCA to offer guidance to firms on the specific format for such reporting.

We agree in principle with the amendment that it is right for shareholders to be more transparent. The noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, mentioned being transparent about where investments are made, which we need to know if we are to achieve net zero. This was fully supported by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. Fund managers need to be more transparent about informing where their funds are invested.

I ask the Minister: what impact has there been on investor transparency in the four and a half years that the SRD has been in UK law? I look forward to his response.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Lord Leong and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Monday 5th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, once again, with the indulgence of the Committee, I will speak on behalf of my noble friend Lady Bakewell to Amendments 125, 126 and 127.

Before doing so, I say that I support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, which strike me as extremely practical. It must be extremely frustrating when faced with some of the restrictions. This point about vehicles seems to me a particular irritant for trading standards officers—a vehicle being defined as premises. What era are we living in?

We need to bring the powers of trading standards officers up to the 21st century, which is very much the spirit in which Amendments 125, 126 and 127 have been tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, my noble friend Lady Bakewell and the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley. Amendment 125 would delete paragraph 17 of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act, which at present requires trading standards officers to exercise physical powers of entry to premises—this is in the digital age—before accessing information and the seizing of documents that may be needed in criminal proceedings. Accepting this amendment would be an opportunity to finally update the powers of trading standards in this respect. It would have the effect of changing their information-gathering powers to enable documents requested in writing without the need for physical entry to be used in criminal proceedings. This means also relieving the undue burdens placed on businesses and trading standards officers.

For legitimate businesses there is presently the burden of having to interrupt their normal business to provide the requested documents there and then, whereas, under what is proposed in this amendment, if the request is made in writing rather than physically, they will have more time to source the required documents and even seek legal advice should they wish to. For the small band of trading standards officers, the requirement to exercise physical powers of entry across the country to seize documents they may need to use in criminal proceedings is not cost-effective for their cash-strapped local authorities. If a local authority in, say, my noble friend’s Somerset had to deal with a case in Cumbria, it would simply not be viable for this to happen. The criminal activity could go unpunished and the public and consumer would still be at risk from rogue-trader activity.

In the impact assessment for the Bill, it is accepted that:

“Consumer rights must keep pace with market innovations, so that consumers remain confident engaging with businesses offering new products and services”.


That is a good statement, but for this sort of consumer confidence to become more robust, the enforcement powers of trading standards need to be seriously updated and not inhibited by the present inflexibility.

Amendments 126 and 127 propose to substitute the words “England or Wales” and “Scotland” for the words “United Kingdom” in paragraph 44(3) and 44(2) of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act. The effect of these amendments would be to add a new paragraph to Schedule 16 to the Bill, which would give new powers to trading standards officers to operate across UK national borders where necessary. Cross-border activities should be included in the Bill; current legislation does not make it clear that trading standards officers in England and Wales can exercise their powers across the border with Scotland, or vice versa, even though consumer protection is a reserved power. In fact, the current legislation implies that this cross-border enforcement activity is not permitted, and we are told that, currently, trading standards officers err on the side of caution. Who can blame them in the circumstances? For the success of these new powers and the Bill to take root, trading standards officers should be able to pursue and enforce across the whole of the United Kingdom.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. We are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, and my noble friend Lady Crawley for bringing forward this group of amendments relating to Schedule 16, which is introduced by Chapter 6, Clause 207. They seek to amend Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

Amendments 124A and 124B appear to add clarity without altering the intention of the Bill as written. Having said that, we would be interested to hear from the Minister whether there is any reason these changes should not be enacted.

Amendment 124C would make a more substantial change to financial penalties. The current level 3 is no deterrent or obstruction. A mere £1,000 is just petty cash for most businesses, whereas level 5, which is an unlimited fine, would serve as a deterrent and perhaps support some co-operation in investigation. We would like to hear from the Minister whether there has been any assessment of the suitability of obstruction being a level 3 fine since the Consumer Rights Act came into law in 2015. We also seek clarification on whether this is the right place to make such a change, given that its impact would be much wider.

Amendments 125, 126 and 127, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, with the support of my noble friend Lady Crawley and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, make a lot of sense in pursuing investigations in all parts of the United Kingdom, not just England and Wales. That was succinctly explained by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, so I shall not repeat the point. This would obviously be a matter for the Scottish Government. If the Government agree on the merits, is this something they have discussed with their Scottish counterparts?

The amendments in this group are sensible and designed to be helpful. They should be supported. We look forward to the Minister’s response.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Lord Leong and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Monday 29th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this is quite a set of amendments and the Minister rather rattled through his speech, but I have only one question: why are they now being included in the Bill here in Committee? Why were they not in the original version of the Bill? What is the motivation behind these new amendments? I am always a little suspicious. With the data protection Bill coming down the track, we will have hours of endless excitement. The words “data protection” and “government” are sometimes a bit of a red rag, so one always has to kick the tyres quite hard on any provision that appears to be opening a door to disclosure of data and so on. Obviously, in a competition context, it is most likely to be commercial confidential information, but the Minister needs to explain what kind of information we are talking about and why we need to have these provisions included at this stage.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his overview and explanation of the various government amendments. I look forward to his response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones: why now? These are mainly technical and tidying-up amendments and we are in broad agreement with most of them in this group.

Amendment 217 makes it clear that any imposed or conferred duties to process information do not contravene data protection legislation. That is welcome. Amendment 213 ensures the disclosure of information under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Bill, which allows UK regulators to provide investigative assistance to overseas regulators. This is in line with the restrictions on the disclosure of certain kinds of information found in the Enterprise Act 2002, which is fine. I ask the Minister what assessments are in place to safeguard the sharing of such details with autocratic regimes, which may not have robust governance and accountability systems in place and whose values we do not share? On Amendment 218, I ask the Minister whether the intent is similar to that of Amendment 1, as set out so eloquently by my noble friend Lady Jones of Whitchurch on the first day of Committee?

Finally, I refer to Amendment 216, which replaces the definition of data protection legislation for the whole of the Bill, so the definition in Amendments 73 and 208 are removed. Can the Minister confirm that such a definition is consistent with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Enterprise Act 2002? I look forward to the Minister’s response and comments.