Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Katz and Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

The noble Lord can never test my patience too far. I simply say that, in terms of the police’s operational use, there are three clear, easy-to-understand, easy-to-interpret defences one could use in this situation. Fear of dissident reprisal does not necessarily fit into that category so easily. Notwithstanding his inability to test my patience, I am going to make some progress, as we have more to discuss.

Under Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, Clause 139 would apply only where a protest is directed at or connected with the place of worship, before conditions could be imposed. Additionally, Amendments 372ZA, 372AA, 372AB, 372BA, 372BB and 372D in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would raise the threshold for police intervention by requiring proof that a protest has the explicit purpose of intimidating individuals accessing a place of worship and that it would, in fact, intimidate them. The amendments also propose limiting police powers to protests occurring

“within 50 metres from the outer perimeter”

of a place of worship.

As seen with recent demonstrations, protests can have an unintended impact on the lives of a community and those seeking to exercise their freedom of religion without intimidation or fear. I want to be clear that Clause 139 seeks to address a clear legislative gap arising from such protests. Police currently have powers to intervene where there is a serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, we have already heard consistently from both the police and religious communities that these thresholds are too high to protect worshippers who feel too intimidated to attend their place of worship, even though the protesters do not intend to have such an effect. Requiring officers to demonstrate both the purpose and effect of intimidation would restrict their ability to act at an earlier stage, reducing operational flexibility.

Clause 139 responds directly to that problem. It does not ban protests; it simply gives the police the ability to impose proportionate conditions where a procession, assembly or one-person protest may create an intimidating atmosphere in the vicinity of a place of worship. This will protect the freedom to worship without undermining the fundamental right to protest. Both rights are essential, and the clause is carefully designed to balance them. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, herself said, the duty to protect minority communities and their right to go about their lives—whether it is their freedom of worship or any other aspect—is indeed paramount. The clause seeks to do that.

The noble Baroness’s proposal to introduce a rigid 50-metre boundary would further constrain the police, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The noble Baroness calls the proposal in the Bill vague, but I put it to her that the rigidity of a 50-metre boundary goes too far. For example, let us consider the practical example of the proximity of St Margaret’s Church to both this House and Parliament Square. Having this rule in place, notwithstanding any particular provisions on protests in Parliament Square, would make that sort of protest impossible. To use one of the examples promoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, any protest outside churches or cathedrals would presumably also be limited in that way.

Activity occurring outside that distance may still create an environment that discourages worshippers from entry, yet the police would be unable to impose conditions unless the protest moved closer. This would undermine the clause’s purpose of enabling proportionate intervention where there is a risk of an intimidatory atmosphere near a place of worship. As noble Lord, Lord Pannick said, that includes the comings and goings—going to and from a place of worship, as well as actually being within the building.

I take this opportunity to thank the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, who, I am afraid, is not in his place, for meeting me and members of Jewish community organisations, including the Board of Deputies of British Jews, CST and the Jewish Leadership Council, to discuss the clause. As I reiterated at that meeting, I want to make it clear that the Government will write to police forces and local authorities following Royal Assent to remind them of their existing powers to protect community centres, schools and places of worship. This will ensure that all agencies are fully aware of the tools they already have to respond to intimidatory behaviour in these settings.

Amendment 373, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seeks to remove the cumulative disruption clause from the Bill. I have been clear that the right to peaceful protest is a fundamental democratic right in this country. However, it should be balanced with the need for individuals and communities to feel safe in their own neighbourhoods. Over the past few years, we have seen the impact of protests on the lives of communities and, of course, the tragic antisemitic terror incident that took place at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation’s synagogue on 2 October, which led to the unfortunate murders of Adrian Daulby and Melvin Cravitz. Protests subsequently continued, which highlighted concerns around the protection of specific communities, including Jewish communities, which are affected by the cumulative impact of protests.

There are other examples where communities face serious disruption from protests taking place in the same area week after week. On this, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On the streets of London over the past couple of years, we have seen protests almost weekly. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is right that the cumulative impact has the effect of forcing home a particular message that those protesters want to make. However, that should not come at the price of other citizens not being allowed to enjoy their regular rights.

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

I remind my noble friend that in Committee a number of us raised the statement that was issued by a whole range of civic society organisations, whose members often live in the communities in which they carry out protests. He will recall in particular that the TUC supported that civic society statement.

I speak as one of the perhaps few people in this House who has had responsibility for organising mass national demonstrations in central London. Can my noble friend reassure those organisations that this is not, as they fear, in effect, a quota on national demonstrations in London? Can he also give some guidance to the police on how they pick and choose between those different organisations if there is to be a quota?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for that and for all the work that she has done in organising those national protests, at least one or two of which I am sure that I have attended.

It is absolutely not a quota. It is simply to say that if you are regularly marching in areas side by side with other communities, that repeated activity should not impede their ability, for example, to come and go to a synagogue. It cannot be right, as I know is the case, that synagogues should have to alter their regular service times on a Saturday morning to allow for protests. There must be a way that police can accommodate the needs of the protesters and of those worshippers. I want to be clear: this is not about imposing a quota on protests. The provision does not allow police to ban a protest but places a duty on senior officers to consider cumulative disruption when deciding whether the serious disruption to the life of the community threshold in Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 is met.

Amendment 377C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to extend the notice period required for planned processions from six days to 28 days. As I explained in Committee, six days provides the police with adequate time to work with organisers who are planning protests to ensure that any conditions imposed are necessary and proportionate. The noble Lord’s Amendment 377D seeks to amend Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 to enable a chief officer of police to consider

“serious damage to property, or … serious disruption to the life of the community”

and the demands on police resources when determining whether to apply for an order prohibiting public processions.

Section 13 of the 1986 Act rightly sets out a high threshold for considering whether public processions should be prohibited. Widening the scope of this power, including to take account of police resources, would risk undermining the right to peaceful protest under Articles 10 and 11 and the legislation becoming incompatible with the ECHR. The noble compared this with the measure we discussed last week around aggravated offences. The latter was a clear manifesto commitment announced before the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven.

I hope I have been able to reassure noble Lords who have spoken in this group. They have raised some very legitimate issues about whether existing public order legislation and the measures in Part 9 of the Bill strike the right balance between protecting the right to protest, protecting communities and preventing disorder. As I have said, there is an ongoing review examining just this issue, and I put it to the noble Lord that we should wait for the outcome of that review. Accordingly, this is not the occasion to press any of the amendments to a vote today. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to withdraw his amendment.

ILO Convention 190

Debate between Lord Katz and Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway

Monday 26th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

To answer the noble Lord’s question, yes, of course it applies in all workplaces, but I am not going to tell the NEC how to do its business.

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, alongside many other people across this House, I welcome this Government’s focus on reducing violence, and in particular the introduction of those new measures on non-disclosure agreements that silenced thousands and thousands, particularly women, who were facing harassment. That is serious when you are at work trying to earn a living, so we should congratulate the Government on listening.

On the duty to prevent harassment, will my noble friend the Minister also listen to concerns that, at the moment, Health and Safety Executive workplace inspectors do not have a specific role to enforce that duty? If there are other ideas, I think people would be happy to listen to them, but can he reassure us that there will be a comprehensive enforcement regime for that duty to prevent harassment?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My noble friend is right to recognise the important step this Government have taken to avoid NDAs when it comes to prevention or speaking out about harassment and discrimination. Our Benches are very proud of that landmark piece of legislation in the Employment Rights Act. In terms of enforcement, as I have already said, one of the other things that the Employment Rights Act does is create the Fair Work Agency, which will be relevant in terms of enforcing all the new rights at work that the Act creates. Having said that, health and safety at work legislation still covers people at work in terms of work-related violence and other risks arising from work activities, and that will certainly still be in place enforcing those aspects.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Katz and Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

I hardly know where to start.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Give it a go.

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

Certainly, I believe that everybody at work—whatever background they come from and whatever their class, sex, gender or sexuality—should have the right to be treated fairly. I believe that our legal system, our Equality Act, precisely provides that protection for people, but that we can build on it through equality action plans and so on. But I have to say that maybe some noble Lords opposite also need to consider people’s real experience.

I was elected as the first ever woman general secretary of the TUC. Clearly, we were not a movement that rushed things, because it took an awful long time to get to that point. I have enough self-awareness to know that it was not because there were not talented women, black or white, who could have been elected and who had the talent, skills and ability. There was something else going on, and I hope that there would be enough honesty in this House to recognise that black people and women face real barriers that will not be overcome unless we take positive action.

The other point I would just like to reflect on is that, whenever I spoke about seeing more women playing active roles in not just the trade union movement but in public life, including, by the way, lending my support to women who were arguing that we needed more women in the boardroom—I supported that principle—I was always fascinated that, whenever I raised those issues, people, largely men I have to say, would start talking about merit. Well, I have to say, when I look at the upper echelons, I do not always see in those male-dominated and white-dominated ranks people who got there on the basis of merit. I have never seen an advert for a position on a board. I have never known any board member to go through an open recruitment process to get that position. It has very often been a case of a tap on the shoulder.

If we look at how many judges and newspaper editors we have, and specifically at race, sex and gender, yes, the picture has progressed, but we still have a very long way to go. Therefore, I think this amendment is a little disingenuous in trying to suggest that people who have been held back for years because of their class background, race or gender, if given a helping hand and a bit of encouragement to go for it, will somehow cause a meltdown of society.

Achieving what my noble friend said is, quite rightly, part of my history and our history. I hope that it is part of our progress as a country that we value equality. We know that ultimately it is good for all of us, and long may we keep struggling to achieve that goal.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Katz and Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am afraid the noble Lord will not; he will hear from me. I thank my noble friend Lord Watson of Invergowrie in absentia for tabling Amendment 66 and my noble friend Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway for so ably speaking to it. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, for tabling Amendment 64. This has been a broadly helpful debate, if somewhat spicier than expected, on flexible working.

This group and the next deal with flexible working. I agree with many of the comments that noble Lords across the Committee made in highlighting how important flexible working is in helping people to balance work with responsibilities in their personal lives, particularly caring responsibilities. As the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, pointed out, flexibility can lead to happier, healthier and more productive employees. He is absolutely right on this point. It is good for employees, good for businesses and, in turn, good for the economy.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, outlined in some detail, along with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, a primary benefit of flexible working for families is that being able to work part-time, or having flexible start and finish times, can make it easier for parents to balance work and childcare needs. Similarly, for those caring for a vulnerable adult or a child with a disability, flexible working can help people to manage their caring responsibilities while remaining in work.

I echo some of the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, about how we regard flexible working. To be clear, flexible working is not solely about working from home—something on which, post pandemic, we have become somewhat focused. Indeed, the ACAS guidance sets out eight examples of flexible working, and working from home is only one of those eight. It talks about compressed hours, staggered hours, remote working, job sharing and part-time hours as well as working from home.

According to the 2023 flexible jobs index, although nine in 10 want to work flexibly, only six in 10 employees are currently working flexibly and only three in 10 jobs are advertised with flexible working. Equally, the Government recognise that business needs vary and that not all flexible working arrangements are possible in all circumstances. That is why the Government are increasing access to flexible working by making it the default, except where not reasonably feasible. I concur with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Fox: this is not a soft policy but an important economic and human management tool, and we should regard it as such.

Amendment 66 in the name of my noble friend Lord Watson would require the Secretary of State to review and publish a statement on the adequacy of the maximum compensation that an employment tribunal may award to an employee with a successful claim related to flexible working. The maximum compensation award is currently set at eight weeks’ pay for an employee bringing a claim to a tribunal.

Section 80I of the Employment Rights Act 1996 already means that the Government may review the maximum number of weeks’ pay that can be awarded to an employee. If they consider it appropriate to do so, they can then use this power to change the specified number of weeks’ pay by which the maximum amount of an award of compensation is set. It is therefore not necessary to include anything further in the Bill. It is worth pointing out to noble Lords that the maximum has risen every year since its introduction, from £250 in 2002 to £719 now—so this is not something that is caught in aspic. Therefore, we would argue that a statutory review on the maximum compensation award within six months of Royal Assent could create uncertainty across the board and detract from some of the other important reforms that employees, employers, trade unions and the wider economic and business community will need to prepare for.

Before leaving this, it might be helpful to speak to the wider points from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on tribunals. I cannot speak in any great detail on this issue, but I understand that the Ministry of Justice is undertaking a review of the employment tribunal system. I would hazard that it has not been sufficiently invested in in recent years, and the slowness of that system is certainly something that we should seek to address.

Before leaving Amendment 66, it is worth pointing out that there is a risk in creating uncertainty for both businesses and workers alike by creating the possibility of differing awards for different types of claims. As things stand, a number of types of claims—for example, relating to redundancy and unfair dismissal—face the same maximum award as those relating to flexible working. It might be undesirable to create confusion and undue complexity through in effect having a two-tier system.

I turn to the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, Amendment 64, which would extend the right to request flexible working to candidates with a job offer. In practice, the Government believe that this is already the case. The right to request flexible working, which is being strengthened in this Bill, is already a day one right. This means that employees can request flexible working from their first day in a role. We know that, in practice, many employers and employees will begin discussions about working arrangements before the candidate starts work.

As the noble Baroness said, before joining an organisation, informal and constructive discussions can offer a more effective way in which to identify working arrangements that work for employees and employers than a one-off formalised request and response might otherwise achieve. Mandating through legislation a right to request flexible working prior to appointment would not account for the fact that not all job offers come to fruition, for a number of reasons. However, candidates with a job offer have some limited rights. Discrimination and contractual rights are among those. The hypothetical example that the noble Baroness cited in her contribution would indeed be taken care of; discrimination based on protected characteristics is currently outlawed during the recruitment process. However, we would contend that it is not a status that we would want to overformalise at this point.

Additionally, under this proposal, employers would still have up to two months to consider and respond to a request. If the intention of this amendment is to significantly bring forward in time people’s ability to have a flexible working request accepted, it would not succeed in this respect. While the Government encourage employers to start conversations about flexible working with new starters at an early stage, it would not be appropriate to extend the legal framework for flexible working to all candidates under offer.

Lastly, to respond to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, on sex discrimination, I contend that this form of discrimination would actually carry a higher risk of penalty and payout than unreasonable refusal of flexible working, so it is probably a little out of place in the debate on this amendment.

To close, I therefore seek that noble Lords do not press their amendments in this group.

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend is absolutely right that the maximum cap applies to a number of areas, and many people believe that it is too low on those areas as well. Is he at least able to write to me or to the noble Lord, Lord Watson, and explain when the next review of the cap will take place, and the opportunities there will be for organisations such as Maternity Action and trade unions to make their case that the maximum cap should be higher?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend Lady O’Grady for that; I would of course be very happy to write to her and my noble friend Lord Watson on this. The point that we are making is that there is already a mechanism in place to upgrade. That does not mean that it is not something that organisations concerned about the limit of compensation can lobby on, but the amendment as tabled is superfluous; it would not add any powers that are not already in law or in the Bill already.