Lord Jackson of Peterborough
Main Page: Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Conservative - Life peer)(5 days, 17 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is no doubt that the amendment means well. It is laudable that we encourage football clubs and the football community to take seriously these important issues around human rights and modern slavery. My concern is about the wording, because I believe that the inclusion of such an amendment in the Bill in respect of the appropriateness of an owner will give rise to unnecessary litigation. Let us remember that the amendment does not distinguish between an individual and a football club. If it were to do so, it would be more sustainable in terms of developing policies around human rights and combating modern slavery. However, it does not do that. It is nebulous in its wording, and I think the drafting would cause grave difficulty because it references individuals—the owner, in essence—meaning that there will be problems down the line in how the amendment is interpreted.
It is a value judgment as to whether an individual respects human rights. What does that actually mean in primary legislation? How do you measure it? What is its objectivity? What does success look like in terms of respect? The wording is very loose and would be very difficult—
Our wording mirrors the wording in Clause 28, which says:
“A person may not become an owner of a particular regulated club unless”,
so I do not think that the wording is the point here.
I understand the point that the noble Lord makes, but I am reading the amendment that he has tabled. The third word is “promotes”. What does that mean in terms of an objective criterion for how an individual would promote human rights, and for how he or she would protect the human rights of those involved in football and the club that they were involved with? The amendment is an example of potential regulatory overreach. Seeking to enforce it would be a straightforward prima facie case of ultra vires actions, because it would be unenforceable.
Having said that, I have great sympathy with the noble Lord’s Amendment 200 on state ownership of football clubs. We will have a good debate on that. However, on Amendment 178, the noble Lord is gilding the lily. Although he has good intentions, it is not a workable amendment. It would damage the interests of football clubs and be difficult for the regulator properly to enforce.
My Lords, I support Amendment 178. Indeed, I have come in specifically to speak on the issue of modern slavery and I declare an interest as a co-chair of the modern slavery parliamentary group and vice-chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation.
I profoundly disagree with what the previous noble Lord said about individual ownership fitness criteria in relation to modern slavery. Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015—Section 56, I think—it is wrong to have a supply chain that operates on the exploitation of those who provide the goods for a company. So, if you have an individual owning a company who makes his money on the exploitation of people in the supply chain, it should not be all that difficult to discover it. That is absolutely where the regulator should be promoting modern slavery issues when he looks at the individual fitness of a person who wants to take over a club.
I see the point on human rights, although we have the Human Rights Act and it is fairly clear under that Act what the rights are of various people that might be impinged by an individual who did not have appropriate fitness criteria. I can see—
I thank the noble and learned Baroness for most generously giving way. If we have statutory sanctions already in place to deal with this behaviour, whether it is the Human Rights Act or the Modern Slavery Act, surely she is proving my case that this is regulatory overreach. My point is that we do not need further legislation when it is already covered by the existing legislation.
I do not want to deal with human rights. I have come here to deal with modern slavery. I disagree with the noble Lord. The problem is that Section 56 is voluntary and not mandatory. Consequently, companies are not obliged to follow what happens. In a 2019 review led by Lord Field of Birkenhead, of which I was a part, we picked up the fact that it was not mandatory. Consequently, if the regulator does not have to think about modern slavery, he would not have to look to see whether or not an individual taking over a club is making his money in a wholly inappropriate and extremely wicked way. Because it is not mandatory, it is important that someone else looks at it. If it were mandatory, I would entirely agree with the noble Lord.
My Lords, I will of course happily withdraw the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Taylor and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. I have a few points to make in response. Generally, this has been a useful and valuable debate. We have had reassuring clarity from the Minister on the issues of concern.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked a practical question about how this would work. There is already an issue, in a sense, for the regulator to deal with. Under Clause 28(2)(a)(iv), the regulator will have to look for—and will certainly want to know—the source of funding. I can only assume that that is because we do not want the funding of our football clubs to be in any way under suspicion and/or linked to criminal activity, particularly human rights abuses and modern slavery. In Clause 28(2)(b), there is a fairly wide power for the independent football regulator to require information. Clearly, there are practical questions in carrying out inquiries and investigations into the source of funding that owners will offer up, but this is just one of those issues that will undoubtedly be tested over time.
I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that putting amendments forward like this is tantamount to regulatory overreach. If we were not concerned about issues such as modern slavery and human rights abuses, we would be selling the world of football short.
Surely the noble Lord will concede something. Proposed new paragraph (f) in Amendment 185, which he signed, mentions
“whether A has been complicit in … non-crime hate incidents”.
We are talking about the ownership of a football club. What does complicit in a non-crime hate incident even mean in the context of a strategy to deal with human rights and potentially preventing someone, via primary legislation, owning a football club?
I would hope that we would be concerned by things like hate incidents—those are important considerations. I certainly do not want my football club to be associated in any way with that, and I know the club itself does not. I am sure that goes for most clubs up and down the country.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady, Butler-Sloss, and the Lib Dem Front Bench for their support. I take most of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, as being broadly positive, in terms of what we were trying to achieve with this little group. The issues are important, and I assure the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, that I have no great desire to become massively unpopular with Newcastle United fans. I am probably a bit unpopular because Brighton seem to beat them regularly anyway.