Military in the Gulf

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 4th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his service in the command position he has in the reserves. This also answers the important Question from the noble Lord, Lord Empey. Of course, exactly what priorities we set in the region and how we move forward will be a matter for the Government to consider as they look to the future and the laying down of forces in the Middle East region. What I will do is ensure that the point he makes, about the need for basing autonomous ships that support that sort of uncrewed capability, is considered in the discussions that take place.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, despite all the noise about the imminent arrival of much more money, is it not now a fundamental fact that the biggest constraint on both the generation and deployment of British capability is affordability? If one was to look at the relative balance of payments of, let us say, the UAE and the United Kingdom in its December 2024 figures, one would see that the UK was running a $40 billion deficit and the UAE was running an $80 billion surplus. Might not there be scope for some agreement whereby the generosity of the UAE might help get the defence investment plan over the line this side of the Summer Recess?

King’s Speech

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 21st May 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, now a fellow traveller on the International Relations and Defence Committee. I draw the attention of the House to my relevant defence-related commercial interests, particularly my role as chairman of Defence Holdings PLC and as European defence adviser to Blackstone.

Unsurprisingly, I want to confine my comments on the gracious Speech to defence-related issues, and with due humility, because whenever I stand to speak and look around this Chamber I still feel young. I thought I might start by offering some thoughts on leadership. Among the many famous dictums on leadership sits Napoleon Bonaparte’s view that a leader when faced with a difficult or indeed potentially catastrophic situation had a duty to his army and his country to do two things. The first was to establish the truth and the second, in the context of that truth, was to offer hope. To explain this a little more fully, the truth I am talking about is not some sort of confected delusion or some exercise in self and public deception; rather, it is the ugly reality that only brutal honesty can lay bare.

Only in the context of unvarnished truth is it possible to offer practical hope. To explain, the hope that I am talking about is not some passive form of wishful thinking akin to optimism, nor some alchemy dreamed up by the authors of the defence strategy publications. Rather, the military idea of hope is a combination of desire, positive expectation and some action. Hope is a motivating force that provides both strength and resilience in uncertain times.

In the context of defence, the gracious Speech undoubtedly nodded in the direction of some truth. It talked of dangers and threats, but the narrative of peril was completely neutered, because it so obviously sat in the wider context of government inaction on funding the latest strategic defence review. We need to do much better.

I offer some selective views on both truth and hope. The first truth is that the dangers we face are more complex, active and potentially existential than we realise. I say this because the threats are not only military ones that can be identified and physically defeated; rather, they are also threats to the resilience of our critical infrastructure, the integrity of our society and the values we hold dear and want to live by.

The second truth is that our defence capability is in a mess. Not only are our Armed Forces woefully underresourced, but they have been procured for a different world, age and mindset. We remain the prisoners of our remarkable national story. We cling to the totemic symbols of global authority: our nuclear deterrent, aircraft carriers, fifth generation jet fighters and exotic platforms—the global projection of hard power. I am not saying that many of these things are not needed, but by the time such things are paid for, there is little left over for the conventional combat readiness which is the baseline requirement of credible deterrence on a localised basis.

This leads to the third hard truth: our pretensions to NATO leadership, a core aspiration of the last defence review, are frankly laughable. The same is true of some of our other pretensions; for example, to the status of a technological superpower. In short, the British public have been subject to 25 years of delusion and to quote my friend—he has been oft quoted today—the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, we now find ourselves

“underprepared, underinsured and under attack”,

and we are not safe—that is the truth.

In respect of hope, however, I can offer some more positive thoughts. In respect of the threat, I do not personally worry that Russian paratroopers are imminently going to land in Kent or roll tanks up to the gates of Paris. The wars in Ukraine and now Iran have demonstrated the inherent advantages of defence over attack. We can triage the threats of the moment and should prioritise our support to Ukraine and the desperate need to build national resilience and ameliorate the more critical risks to our societal integrity.

We need to spend more on warfighting readiness to contribute to more credible deterrence, to help build back some international respect and to better justify our leadership credentials. I do not accept this as being unaffordable. Affordability is a political choice. Moreover, if the future promises on defence funding are realised, our challenge is more one of timing than money. I am intimately aware that private equity recognises the need for, and mutual benefit of, investing in defence and the stability it helps ensure, and it is keen to make that investment quickly.

Finally, we should all continue to recognise that, in human terms, and despite the neglect we have subjected them to, we continue to have in our Armed Forces a most remarkable national asset. We owe it to them to tell the truth and to offer them some hope—the hope that their service deserves. So I am not downhearted and without hope, although I am mightily frustrated that the political elite of my nation seems to spend the majority of its time convulsed in wholly meaningless distractions. There is an urgent need to be honest with the nation about our predicament and to offer it hope through practical action. This should now be the Government’s cohering purpose.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, happy new year to everyone. I will speak to Amendments 1 and 38. In an earlier debate on the Bill, I raised the concern that the UK is required, under Article 11 of the treaty, to continue to pay Mauritius even were the military base on Diego Garcia to become unusable. There seems to be no break or conditional clause agreeing any reasons why the UK may cease these payments before the 99-year date is reached.

Article 15 sets out how Mauritius may react should the UK cease payment, but this is a reason why Mauritius may terminate the treaty, not the UK. If the UK were to persist in not honouring its obligation to pay, the treaty would perforce be terminated by Mauritius. For the avoidance of doubt, would that mean that Article 1 of the treaty is still applicable and sovereignty would remain with Mauritius? Can the Minister confirm the Government’s view on this? I have forewarned her of this question.

In Committee on 18 November, the Minister said in response to my question about the base no longer being usable:

“I will reflect on this and try to come back to him with a more thorough response, because I can see that he … wants to know that the Government have given this the proper consideration that he would expect. I undertake to do that”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 772.]

If she has written with this further information, I have not yet received it. Fundamentally, does she feel that the environmental risks and the risks of other possible events, such as a major destructive attack on the base or even a decision by the United States that it has no further use for it, are sufficiently remote and unlikely for the UK to be able to accept—or have a possibly messy and even dishonourable termination, where considerable sums of taxpayers’ money may be involved?

As this is Report, I do not intend to do more than point this out without detail, but experience tells us that much can and does change over time. In well under the past 100 years, foes have become friends and friends, potential and real, have become foes. Weapon technology may well change and has frequently done so, as has how operations are mounted and security maintained. America could decide that it has no need for the base for operational reasons or even cease to act as a world police force and revert to isolationism. Is there any legally binding agreement between the UK and the United States that it will continue its use of the base or have need of its use for the 99-year duration of the treaty?

I do not wish to suggest any lack of importance of the base to national and international security at the present time. There is also the putative threat of the sea rising this century due to global warming, flooding the base. My Amendment 1 suggests one feasible way to correct this apparent lack of foresight. I shall listen with close interest to the Minister’s response, but unless the Government can reassure the House that the issue of non-usability of the base has been fully considered and a reasonable solution adopted, I may seek the views of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 1, to which I attach my name, and to reinforce the arguments made by my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig of Radley. This amendment is not moved by any wider purpose than common sense, and we trust that the Government will respond accordingly.

Currently, the Bill makes no provision for the circumstances under which the requirement to pay an annual fee for the use of the Diego Garcia base is revisited in the event of the base becoming unusable for military purposes. My noble and gallant friend has already mentioned the potential risks to the utility of the base arising from an extreme environmental event, the future potential for a policy change by the United States and the potential for the technical obsolescence of the base to come about. I argue that concerns regarding potential legal initiatives to constrain the use of the base, particularly partial constraints deriving from nuclear exclusion agreements or the question of Mauritius as the sovereign power having to honour obligations for the authorisation of offensive operations from the base, should be added to that list of concerns.

I fear that the greatest future concern should perhaps be the full or partial destruction of the base through military action by a hostile state. This might seem a surprising concern given the extremely remote nature of this base, but I have been to it. I argue quite strongly that the strategic importance of the base, its entirely militaristic purpose and its extreme remoteness from civilian life all combine to make it a highly vulnerable and attractive target.

The principal tenets for the use of force in warfare are distinction, military necessity, humanity and proportionality. Pause for a moment to imagine the early stages of a global conflict, when a desire for escalation dominance prompts a hostile nation to destroy a western strategic asset as a proportionate response, with no risk of collateral damage to a civilian population, attracting relatively minor moral opprobrium but resulting in huge military benefit. I cannot think of an obviously better or more considered target than Diego Garcia.

Many in the Chamber may think my concerns are drawn from the world of fantasy or nightmare, but do the last 72 hours not give serious cause for concern regarding our ability to predict with certainty the next two years of geopolitics, let alone the next 100? This treaty needs to cater far better for what the future might hold.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I add my voice to those of the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Craig of Radley and Lord Houghton of Richmond. It seems to me that this is precisely the kind of question that ought to have been looked at in detail. The more we have sat here and gone through clause by clause, the more it seems that these issues were avoided in the negotiations. I wonder whether the Minister has read the report in today’s Times newspaper about where the impetus for this treaty had come from. It quotes a senior figure involved in the administration of the BIOT as saying that it was

“championed by a small number of civil servants”

and that

“in multiple conversations with military and BIOT administration staff it is clear that there is no one who supports this treaty”.

Maybe if we had had those conversations with the people on the ground, military and civil, issues of the kind raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, would have been anticipated, but if they were not, is not the fundamental purpose of this Chamber to address them at this stage? For that reason, should we not be backing the points made by the noble and gallant Lords?

Strategic Defence Review 2025

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

In saying that we need to do more and to act more urgently, there are already steps that have started to be taken across government. We are already looking at how we extend and develop the reserve and cadet forces, which are important. We are already looking at how we celebrate the involvement of young people at remembrance events, as I just said. We are also having seminars and conferences with industry and with finance—I am going to an event on Thursday night with veterans and the City of London. All sorts of different events are taking place that seek to address the very real and important issues that the noble Baroness has raised. The real challenge for the Government is how we do that more quickly and more urgently, but it is certainly one that they have addressed and have taken on board. It is a whole-government response; it is not just the government response now—although the Government have to lead it, of course—but how we all come together to address that very real challenge that we face.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

More fundamentally, does the Minister agree that the real resilience of a nation does not rest on the state of its physical infrastructure, or military numbers, or the number of boy scouts or reserves that we have, but, rather, it rests on its moral fibre and its societal integrity? The Minister does not explain or tell the House what the delivery pathways are that will enhance the human dimension of national resilience, for they are sorely needed.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

It is an important challenge and an important question put by the noble and gallant Lord. The starting point is to speak up and speak out, in a way that sometimes does not happen. For example, there is very real resilience among the population in many respects, but we need to explain to people, through government, devolved Governments and local government, the very real threats and challenges that they face now. The point that members of the public, more generally, need to understand is that it is not the traditional warfare, necessarily, that is the threat we are currently facing but the cyber attacks that we have already seen many examples of in our country, the threats to underwater cables and the threat to data. Indeed, it is why the carrier strike group was in the Indo-Pacific recently, protecting the trade routes on which this country’s economy and prosperity also depend. We need to do more on that, because, as the noble and gallant Lord says, building resilience among the population is something that needs to be done. I have confidence in the British people that if that is explained to them, they will stand up for it.

Ukraine

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Friday 31st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful for this debate on Ukraine and the opportunity that it presents. Mine will be an uncomfortable but honest contribution. I start by observing that it is difficult to draw any comfort from an analysis of the tactical situation on the ground, and it is even more difficult to derive any moral satisfaction for what we are continuing to ask Ukraine to do.

I say this primarily because the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues to be a limited war—limited by both the means and the geography. These limitations are ones imposed by the United States and by NATO more widely. They almost exclusively constrain Ukrainian activity to Ukrainian soil and deny Ukraine the capabilities required to carry the fight to Russia. They do so, arguably, and understandably, to avoid provoking Russian escalation—hence a preference for financial sanctions as opposed to Tomahawk missiles. But such choices limit Ukraine’s ability to hurt Russia in ways that might bring the war to a conclusion on acceptable terms.

In short, therefore, we continue to accept that Ukraine is fighting a proxy war on behalf of NATO that we are denying it the means to win. Reflecting on this, I worry that we forget that war is not ultimately a battle of physical exchange but a battle of human will. Sadly, the trajectory of this war increasingly looks like one that is hurting Ukraine more than Russia. More specifically, it is hurting Ukrainian society more than Vladimir Putin. Putin appears content to incrementally grind this war towards a ceasefire that will be humiliating to Ukraine and embarrassing to western Governments.

To set alongside and to help balance this gloomy prediction is the potential reality that, even with a ceasefire that rewards Russia, Russia will finish this war in strategic deficit. Finland and Sweden will have joined NATO, the Baltic will have become a NATO lake, NATO’s European members will be en route to spending 5% of GDP on defence and Russia’s war economy may be starting to exhaust it domestically.

However, those who draw comfort from that should remind themselves of the human nature of warfare. So long as Putin remains in power, danger lingers. He recognises the reticence of America to intervene decisively and will observe the relative sluggishness of NATO rearmament. Potentially, Putin will boil at Britain’s boasts regarding its part in inflicting such huge casualties on Russia. He will see Britain as America’s proxy. He will have a fully mobilised set of armed forces, an untouched suite of strategic capabilities, a fully mobilised war economy and a window of opportunity to act while NATO—certainly the UK at the moment—still prioritises welfare benefits over national security.

Even if such a scenario is misjudged, it presents real dilemmas for the Ministry of Defence, particularly those now engaged on the defence investment plan, the exercise that determines how the MoD will spend its money for the remainder of this Parliament. Noble Lords may recall that the Government pledged £10 billion of new investment money to prime the capability priorities of the strategic defence review, but £6 billion of that has to come from defence efficiencies, and the MoD has now discovered an in-year black hole which the service chiefs are now scrambling to fill with in-year savings. The reality of the financial situation is dire, and I suspect that uncomfortable announcements lie ahead.

I can imagine that the main decisions to be taken on defence investment will be the hard choices regarding three separate policy objectives. The first is the combination of spending on Ukraine and re-establishing deterrence through a return to warfighting readiness. The second is in making the nation more resilient to hybrid threats, not just critical national infrastructure but society itself. The third is the investment in the technology needed to give substance to the concept of the integrated force, a force capable of achieving decisive advantage from a position of significantly enhanced lethality. All three policy objectives need huge investment. Without such investment, we potentially fail both Ukraine and NATO, we expose society to hybrid threats, and we completely undermine the only real hope of credibility that the defence review offers our Armed Forces.

Hard investment choices have for ever been the challenge of peacetime planners, but we should not be engaged in peacetime planning. We face an outcome to the current conflict that leaves behind a humiliated Ukraine, a residually dangerous Russia and an impoverished Britain devoid of threat awareness with an unfunded SDR. I have worried for the last 15 years that when it comes to national security the Government of the day have consistently put their perceived duty to reassure society above their duty to respond to geopolitical realities. I hope the Minister can reassure the House otherwise, but I am lost as to what hard facts he can call upon to do so. We need to do more.

Ukraine: Negotiations

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Tuesday 9th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

All I can say is that we have sanctioned numerous individuals. We have taken action in all sorts of ways to deal with the shadow fleet. As far as seizing Russian assets is concerned, negotiations continue with other nations, because we need to get international agreement to do some of that, but we will take action economically to try to punish Russia as well.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

I thank the Minister for his response, but I thought his view of the prospects for peace was somewhat glossy. Is not a better strategic assessment, first, that Putin shows absolutely no intention of seeking a protracted or final peace, perhaps other than a temporary pause for his own tactical or strategic advantage; that, secondly, the general trend of American policy is to slightly lessen or reduce the security guarantees to Europe; and, thirdly, therefore, that the security of and support to Ukraine will increasingly rest on the European pillar of NATO? I must now defer to the outcome of our own defence review. Although in many respects it was an excellent review, the resources are simply not going to be in place in time to deter Russia effectively.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I apologise to the noble and gallant Lord and to the House. I did not intentionally try to gloss over the seriousness of the situation that we face; I was just trying to point out the necessity for us to continue the actions we are taking to try to achieve as successful an outcome as we can. As part of that, our involvement with the Americans is extremely important. As I have said at this Dispatch Box on many occasions, we know there are sometimes issues and points made either by President Trump or on behalf of him, but we try extremely hard to be positive and to build a relationship with him, because the involvement of the United States in Europe and beyond is essential to the peace and security of our nation and our alliances. We will continue to do that, and I know the noble and gallant Lord will appreciate that as well.

On spending and the European pillar, the noble and gallant Lord will know that for many decades all of us as a European collection of nations simply did not spend enough on defence. We are now starting to see increases in spending right across Europe, including in our own country, which will allow us to deal with some of the challenges that we will face. As for our own nation, I know the noble and gallant Lord wants us to go further and faster, but he will know the commitment has been made for 2.6% by 2027, with an increase to 3% in the next Parliament should the circumstances allow, and he will have read in the Defence Industrial Strategy published yesterday about the aspiration for defence and security spending to reach 5% by 2035. So, there is a trajectory. It is not as fast and as much as the noble and gallant Lord would want, but, across Europe, we are seeing an increase in defence spending which we can all welcome.

F35A and F35B Jets

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Tuesday 1st July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I do. To reiterate and clarify, the procurement phase for the 48 F35Bs should, and will, end by March 2026. For the second procurement phase for the additional 12 F35As and the 15 F35Bs, which will give us 75 in total, our expectation is that they will be procured by 2033. It is important we meet the schedule and I have every confidence that we will be able to do so.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister confirm that the following precis of programme A activity rings true? The F35As are not additional to the programme; they replace 12 F35Bs. The 12 F35As cost $20 million less per plane than the F35Bs, therefore resulting in a saving to the programme of $240 million. However, we have no sovereign capacity to air-to-air refuel an F35A. Therefore, we will create an allied dependency unless some additional programming action is taken.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The answer is yes to all those points. The F35As come from the F35 schedule, so 12 of the additional 27 will be F35As instead of F35Bs. F35As are some 20% cheaper than F35Bs, so the noble and gallant Lord is right: that creates an additional sum of money which can be used in a way that the Government feel is appropriate and consistent with the SDR. He is right about the refuelling capability; there will need to be allied support for that. Many of our capabilities require allied support and help to function. I do not see a particular problem with that, but he is right to point it out.

Strategic Defence Review

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I say to my noble friend that, as this progresses, it may be that we have to look at innovative and different ways of funding. I am no expert on all these things, but I am not averse to looking at any novel or innovative ways in which funds may be raised.

There is a more general point to be made. The current threats mean that we have to ensure that our Armed Forces have the funds and resources that they need—I think people recognise that. Difficult decisions were made about funding the increase to 2.5%, and people accepted that because of the new threats that we face. We need to continue to make the point that there cannot be security for nations or countries without armed forces. You cannot do anything about poverty or refugees being moved and a whole range of other things unless you have security. Security delivers the stability that we need to live the lives that we want.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

I briefly add my congratulations to the authorship of this review. It is, in my view, the most considered, professional and comprehensive review that I have ever seen at close quarters. However, the spectre of fiscal pressure attends every chapter and every page. If this is not funded, it is not a review but a delusion. The reviews that I have known—as vice-chief, chief and all that—have fallen foul of the same problem: a delusional delivery through some alchemy of efficiency, technical superiority, lethality or a new design of battle. The Ministry of Defence will not be capable—it is not viable—of funding this by some internal alchemy of efficiency. As the previous speaker said, we need to find the money elsewhere. This country can easily afford the Armed Forces it needs. If it does not, it will be a laughing stock. What it cannot afford is 9 million people of working age drawing benefits.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble and gallant Lord for the warm welcome that he gave to the report of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. I know that the direction of travel that it sets out is supported by the noble and gallant Lord, and I thank him for that. He lays out the challenge for the Government. He knows what the Government’s position is with respect to funding. People will have heard his continuous campaigning and demand for additional resources. We are, as a Government, committed to ensuring that the recommendations of the report from the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, are implemented, and we will do all that we can to see that that happens.

UK Nuclear Deterrent

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for his question. We are trying to ensure that, whatever may have happened in the past, we move forward in a way which guarantees our strategic nuclear deterrent. That is the fundamental point that must ring out from this Chamber: there is unity of purpose across the Chamber that the strategic nuclear deterrent, particularly in the geopolitical times of today, will be maintained and renewed by this Government.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, does not the Minister crystallise in what he says the stupidity of the situation in which we find ourselves? The declaration that at all costs, at any cost, the nuclear deterrent will be retained, must mean, under a time of fiscal pressure, that the balance of the MoD’s programme—the conventional methodology for deterring attacks—is further undermined. Is this not a ridiculous situation, and should we not return to the time when the nuclear enterprise was funded completely separately from the conventional requirements of defence?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble and gallant Lord for his question. Clearly, others will have heard the points that he made. All I am saying to this Chamber is that, at this geopolitical moment in history, it is particularly important that His Majesty’s Government, plus His Majesty’s Official Opposition and all parties, are united in saying to others that the nuclear deterrent will remain at the heart of our defence policy, whatever the debates about the budget.

Future Defence Capability

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Wednesday 26th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My understanding is that discussions have taken place between ourselves and NATO and SACEUR about the capabilities that they would expect from us. We are currently looking at both the cost and our ability to provide the capabilities. It is my understanding that those negotiations are still under way. If that is incorrect, I will write to the noble and gallant Lord.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, in the context of additional defence funding, what is now the Government’s dominant policy consideration about how that funding should be spent? Is it to make good our deterrent capability against Russia, or to make good the potential deficit caused by the abandonment of European security guarantees by the United States of America?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble and gallant Lord for his question. The fundamental thrust of the Government’s policy is the “NATO first” policy, which obviously deals with the threat from Russia but also our security. We have seen that not only our own country but many countries across Europe are now stepping up their defence spending to provide the security assistance that may be needed, in the short term with respect to Ukraine and in the longer term across the whole of Europe. The important point is that the “NATO first” policy does not mean “NATO only”; it means that we will also accept the responsibilities we have elsewhere. The defence review seeks to balance that and see what capabilities we will need to do so.