(8 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, this is clearly a probing amendment. It flies in the face of the norm that there is, in general, no time limit on investigating or bringing a charge for alleged criminal behaviour. My reason for tabling such an amendment is to encourage debate and a reasoned response from the Government. I shall not repeat my arguments, given at Second Reading, for bringing this to the Committee now. Noble Lords are well aware of the industrial growth in historical cases of alleged criminal behaviour of service personnel, going back over time not just years but decades. The Bill clearly indicates that it is acceptable for the Armed Forces to be treated differently in legislation where there is a military operational reason for so doing. An amendment on these lines, not necessarily using my precise words, would fit that purpose.
The growth in the number of historical claims now being dealt with by the MoD has been the topic of recent media coverage, which has quoted the irritation of Ministers and even the concern of the Prime Minister. Therefore, I hope to hear not only that the MoD is well aware of the growing problem but that it has specific plans in mind to tackle it. If it is to be by some form of inclusion in the Bill of Rights that we have recently heard about in the Chamber, I urge that it should be in the form of an amendment to the Bill before the Committee today. Better still, as I have already proposed—although I do not do so now with great hope—why not include the relevant part in the Bill before the Committee?
Wherever possible, legislation that applies to the discipline and behaviour of our Armed Forces should be contained in one Act. Not only will this alleviate the problem of potential conflicts between Acts, as has been happening with the Human Rights Act, it will make it easier for the Armed Forces themselves to be aware of and to be dealt with by their own specific legislation. I look forward to the Minister’s response on that point. I hope he will be as forthcoming as possible about the Government’s intentions in this area so that the opportunity to debate and help form acceptable legislation is not missed. This should not be in any way a party matter and I hope the debate will avoid any such approach. The Armed Forces are ultimately responsible to the Government of the day, regardless of which party may be in power. I look forward to the noble Earl’s response. I beg to move.
I just want to make one or two short points. It is interesting that although the noble and gallant Lord is perfectly correct that it is not the practice in the United Kingdom for there to be any statutory limitation on prosecution for crimes other than summary crimes, it is quite commonplace in the civil law countries for there to be limitations. So our allies in France or Germany, for example, would, I suspect, be protected by a limitation of the kind proposed. I am not suggesting that we should adopt that philosophy, which is quite contrary to our practice, as we can see in cases of historical child abuse. I wonder, however, whether the wiser course, rather than going into the area of limitation, which is so difficult and would be seen as an invitation to start doing this for other crimes, would be simply to have a blanket immunity for our servicemen when engaged in military operations, of the kind that I think used to be the case—I stand to be corrected—before the law was changed some years ago by the previous Armed Forces Act. This is certainly an important point to consider, but I favour doing so not by way of limitation but by way of exclusion entirely for acts of that kind while engaged on military operations, while making it quite clear that we are not dealing with cases of one serviceman on another—let us say of one serviceman assaulting another, stealing from him or things like that.
My Lords, as I indicated at Second Reading, I, too, am entirely sympathetic to the general feeling underlying this amendment. As the noble and gallant Lord has said, he is not wedded to this language. I am not clear, for example, whether,
“engaged in military operations outside the United Kingdom”,
would include peacekeeping operations in Northern Ireland, or matters of that character. However, I also see the basic difficulty, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope indicates. This is certainly contrary and alien to English law down the years. We recognise the problems of delay, and if you can show plain and incurable prejudice through delay, you might well get the cases struck out. One would hope for a measure of fastidious thought before anybody launches prosecutions in these cases. It is deeply offensive to people that, in relation to the problems in Northern Ireland, amnesty was given to a whole lot of terrorists, but there is still a risk, apparently, on the part of the soldiers who were acting on our behalf.
I am a bit troubled by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope’s suggestion of a blanket immunity. What happens if there is a clear case of murder on the face of it? Should we really, with ample evidence and so forth, say that there can be no prosecution? I do not know: would Sergeant Blackman have taken the benefit of that? One must have regard to where these things go, but I certainly hope that the Government will give very sympathetic thought to this. A clever and ingenious lawyer might be able to find some formula whereby what I suspect all of us here feel could be reflected in some form of protection for those on active service abroad.
My Lords, I had not intended to speak to this amendment; I ought to be better prepared. Down the years, I have often been involved with coronial law. Indeed, I was Treasury Counsel in the early 1980s when for the first time it was decided, contrary to my argument, that there could be an inquest in this country in respect of a death abroad. It was the Helen Smith case. She was the nurse who fell from a balcony in Jeddah on to some railings and impaled herself. There was long, fraught litigation in the early 1980s. Since then, this area has developed hugely and has been complicated and clouded by the impact, reverting to where we were earlier in the week, of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the need, in certain circumstances, for an Article 2-compliant investigation into a death.
I confess that when I first read the proposed new clause, I rather thought that that essentially is the present law. I shall listen, fascinated, when the Minister tells us exactly what the present position is in terms of inquests in respect of such deaths as are encompassed here. Certainly, I understand that the coroner will be informed in every case. There will always be an inquest, and he will always determine by what means the death occurred. The phrase “and in what circumstances” may be more contentious because this is a very technical area and I seem to recall that that phrase has been the subject of a good deal of specific litigation about exactly what it encompasses.
There is routinely an inquest in these cases. As I understand it—but this is very much anecdotal—the result of our now having and retaining a chief coroner is that these inquests are now heard by a comparatively limited number of coroners and essentially they deal with these matters in a way which is regarded as essentially satisfactory on all sides. That may be a misunderstanding of the position, and I know there was a problem some years ago when coroners were thought to be seeking to investigate way beyond the scope of what ordinarily would be permitted in terms of inquiring into military supply and matters of that sort, but I thought it was now under control. However, I shall say no more. I do not think this is a very useful contribution. I shall listen to what the Minister says.
My Lords, there is one aspect of this amendment to which I think I should draw attention. It arises because of its scope. The amendment applies to every violent or unnatural death of every person subject to service law within the United Kingdom. The coronial system does not apply in Scotland. I do not know whether it is the intention that we should extend the coronial system to Scotland in the case of every violent or unnatural death, but the system which applies in Scotland is very simply this: every death of that kind is reported to the procurator fiscal of the area in which the event occurred. There is then an exercise of discretion because it does not follow that every death is subject to an inquiry. It is a matter for the procurator fiscal, possibly with the advice of a law officer or his counsel, to decide whether it is in the public interest that there should be an inquiry. If there is such an inquiry, it goes not to a coroner but to a sheriff, who does indeed determine by what means and in what circumstances the death occurred. It is there that the public interest is served because if there is something to learn from the event, the opportunity is taken through the accident inquiry to determine the circumstances and in some way to improve practice or inform the public about how events of that kind could be avoided in future.
As I listened to the debate I wondered whether that system applied in the case of persons subject to service law. I think I am right in saying that when one reflects on the tragic events on the Mull of Kintyre, when a Chinook helicopter flying from Northern Ireland to Scotland with a number of very senior people on board crashed and everybody was killed, that event was dealt with under the Scottish procedure. I would have thought that that procedure is perfectly adequate to cope with all that one would expect from events of this kind and the need for the circumstances to be inquired into.
There are two features that need to be stressed. First, not every death of this kind is the subject of an inquiry because it is only if the public interest requires it. On the other hand, where the inquiry is resorted to, it is a full inquiry, with the results that I think the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is looking for; that is, the lessons to be learned from the evidence that is laid. I wonder whether he really does intend that every death—even a road accident, for example—occurring north of the border should be subject to this system; or, to take another example, whether training exercises in the Highlands, where unfortunately deaths do occur due to the very severe weather on mountains, should be subject to the coronial system. I think the Scottish prosecutors—the procurators fiscal, I should say—would rather that they retained control of these events and dealt with them under the Scottish procedure, which they would believe is perfectly adequate to provide the lessons that people need to avoid these events occurring again.
My Lords, there were specific provisions in the Coroners Act 2009 relating to investigations in Scotland. Sections 12 and 13 provided that the Secretary of State would notify the Lord Advocate if,
“the Chief Coroner thinks that it may be appropriate for the circumstances of the death to be investigated”,
and there would be an inquiry under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976. I think that is the position.
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I would add a word to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has said, mainly because he mentioned my name at Second Reading. I am afraid that this is one of two judgments for which I was responsible. He has been kind enough to say that this judgment is not subject to criticism on the grounds on which it was made. He summarised it quite accurately as the case of a civilian, a 17 year-old boy in Germany who was, I think, the son of a serviceman, and because of that was subject to military discipline in Germany. The noble Lord has narrated exactly the circumstances whereby the civilian spent time in Colchester. I think that he was sent back for trial by court martial in Germany.
My point—and the Minister may already have this in mind—is that one is dealing with a crime committed in another country. In the case of Germany, there is a very active and much-respected criminal justice system. The Germans might well have wanted to assert themselves, as this was a crime committed on their territory. However, under arrangements which we had in place, it was possible for us to say that this was a military matter which could be dealt with under our court martial system. The Germans were prepared to concede jurisdiction to the system which we had under military law.
I suspect that the situation is quite different in Iraq. I do not know what the criminal justice system is like there, but I have no doubt that we would insist that we bring people home. We do not have the same problem of maintaining a diplomatic dialogue there, which we certainly would have with the Germans if this amendment were to be carried. We must be rather cautious with this amendment in considering the various jurisdictions in which offences may be committed abroad. We would need be absolutely sure that these jurisdictions were prepared to concede jurisdiction to us under the extraterritorial system, when they could perfectly well assert their own right to try a case before their own civilian courts.
I dare say that the Minister has this carefully in mind but it seemed, recalling as best I can the circumstances of Martin, that that was part of the background. Of course I cannot take anything away from or add anything to the judgment which I wrote, but I think that it is proper to say that when I first saw the case I was taken aback by the fact that this boy was going to be tried by a court martial. It seemed to be a rather extraordinary thing to happen. However, having studied the legislation and been informed about the background, in the end I was satisfied that it was proper that the court martial should be allowed to proceed. There is this additional element to the issue, which I do not think that the noble Lord touched on in his address but which I respectfully suggest we should bear in mind in considering whether the line that he is urging us to take is a sound one.
Does the noble and learned Lord agree that Martin could have been tried in this country and that it was not just an arrangement between the German authorities and the British military authorities that caused his trial to be in Germany? I think that it was a decision of the Attorney-General.
Of course we had extraterritorial jurisdiction, but the fact that the crime was committed in Germany was an important factor in deciding the proper course for bringing the case before a tribunal to try the boy for the offence. One has to be careful about the local jurisdiction; I seek to emphasise that point.
My Lords, I have considerable sympathy for Amendment 4, which stems from my view that I see the composition of the board of courts martial as much more to do with discipline and military things. Clearly with some of these very serious crimes, jurisdiction is very important. I am not clear how that could be clarified to make sure that things do not slip through the net because of it. However, the other aspect is perception. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, talked about public perceptions of courts martial. I think that there is also the perception of the military about the way in which they are put on trial. If we went down this route mitigation would have to be very clearly put, particularly when in what one might loosely call a war zone where there has been fighting and nation building, because the circumstances in which something like the Baha Mousa case happens are different from the normal civilian understanding. We would have to be absolutely certain that we were able to get that sort of proper mitigation into the civil court. However, I have great sympathy with Amendment 4, because some of these things should not generally be tried by court martial nowadays.
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, for laying out so clearly exactly where this stands, although I have to say that the result does not leave things particularly clear for a number of reasons which he has explained. I will not reiterate what I said in my speech at Second Reading, where I went into the detail of this complex issue, but suffice it to say that the decision by the Supreme Court in the case of Smith and others v Ministry of Defence has, without doubt, raised the spectre of military personnel who take a decision in the heat of action being taken to court to face a claim under the Human Rights Act. As I say, it has raised that spectre. That is clearly wrong and I do not believe that it is what was intended. Indeed, mention has been made of how the case is not against those involved, but the result is that the spectre has arisen. I feel very strongly about this. I have been in action and have taken decisions that resulted in men dying. I believe that I took the right decisions, but it would be wrong for one then to have to go through the courts to explain all of that.
Of course these issues are highly complex, and that is part of the problem. The cases that were being considered looked at a number of different scenarios concerning things like the definition of combat operations, peacekeeping operations within Iraq, the issue of procurement, issues around the tanks and Snatch Land Rovers operating in a different context and being hit by IEDs. The sheer complexity has caused part of the problem. It has been said that some of these matters need to be investigated by the civil courts. That has dragged in the possibility of people fully in action being taken to the courts later for decisions they took, which I do not believe should be looked at in civilian courts. They should be covered by combat immunity.
I shall reiterate what I said before. It is a nonsense that one can use human rights legislation to drag military leaders through the courts for decisions made in war because, in combat, men and women kill and are killed on a regular basis fighting for their country. One has to wonder what exactly the right to life is when you are fighting. You have to make people stand up and do things where you know they are likely to be killed. I have done that. What is the right to life in those circumstances? It is very difficult, and I do not believe that the judgment was making that point, but that could be the result of what has been done.
As has been said, this is a probing amendment. I love it because it is nice and simple. Being a simple sailor, I love a simple amendment, but the complexity is far too great and I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, appreciates that. He has tabled it to probe the Government and find out. We need to know how the Government are going to take this forward. How will we clarify and resolve this position, because it really does need to be resolved? There is certainly concern in the military about this, and it spreads far and wide. There is also, I have to say, concern at times about fighting to win if you feel that some sort of legislative action is going to be taken against you. It would be a dreadful thing if our Armed Forces were to feel constrained.
What I would say to the noble Earl is this: we need an answer as to how this is going to be taken forward. Will it be done in the context of this Bill, as was mentioned by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, or will we do it in other legislation that is going through? How can we take it forward, because I do not believe that it can be left as it is? There is too much uncertainty. I know that it was not what the judgment aimed to do, but the uncertainty is there, and that is wrong. We have to clarify this.
I would be grateful if I could speak first because the noble and learned Lord might wish to comment on what I say. I do not think the issue is the liability of the military commander in the field directing operations. As I recall, the cases were about the provision of equipment which would have prevented the firing of one tank upon another—the “friendly fire” that caused the injuries—and, in the other, the use of Snatch Land Rovers in a situation where it was unsafe to use vehicles of that type. The Ministry of Defence, which really must promote something like this, should not get away with the provision of inadequate equipment of one sort or another. You would not expect a soldier to go into action in Arctic conditions wearing a tropical uniform that had been provided to him. It is a question of procurement, not of the decisions that are taken in the field.
I seem to recall the noble Lord, Lord West, saying at Second Reading that when you are in the field you have to get on with it and do what you can with what you have got. The fact that you have to do so does not mean to say that those who have provided you with inadequate equipment—who fail to give a steel helmet to a Tommy in the trenches, for example—should escape all liability or blame for what occurs by amendments to the Human Rights Act in this way.
My fear is that this judgment has opened up the spectre of things to be investigated by the civil courts. That is why this comes into train, although I know that they were aiming at high-level procurement.
I have to say as an aside that to start with in a war you always have to fight with the equipment you have got. Almost inevitably, certainly in the two wars that I have been in, the equipment that we had at the time was not what I would have used in that situation, but we had to get on with it. I bloody well—sorry, I knew that the equipment was not up to that task. I knew, for example, that I had put my ship in a position where my anti-aircraft capability would not work, but I was destroying an airfield and supporting Special Forces operations so I had to be there. Still, I knew jolly well that if there were heavy air attacks I would suffer; indeed there were, and I was sunk. I am concerned that something could happen in a court where someone says, “Why did West do that when he knew jolly well that the equipment was not up to it?”, and that is wrong. That is the point that I am making: there could be an unintended consequence. That is what I am nervous about.
I wonder if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, would let me speak before him because I intend to quote him at some length and he can correct any mistakes I make. I make it clear that the Opposition would not support this amendment as set out. I am not talking about little technicalities about wording; I am talking about an erosion of the Human Rights Act. We believe that that is a proper and admirable piece of legislation and that its retention is important. No doubt this will be the basis of a major battle between the parties in the weeks to come when the legislation is published.
I turn to the specific area of the judgment. Before Second Reading, I had not heard of Smith and others v Ministry of Defence. I googled it, thinking, “This will give me the information”, only to discover that the judgment was 72 pages and 188 paragraphs long. At the very moment when I had a sense of doom, I noticed that it had been given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, whose office is some 50 metres from mine, so I tried to save myself some effort by going to see him, and I thank him for the briefing he gave me.
I looked through the 72 pages to get a wider flavour of the judgment. I will concentrate solely on the Challenger 2 event. The Snatch Land Rover issue is complicated by the fact that it was not formally a combat situation but a peacekeeping one, so while it is important to the debate, it is capable of being part a much wider debate. In my view, however, the tone of the judgment on the Challenger 2 event is straightforward. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has already quoted paragraph 76 of the judgment, but if the Committee will forgive me I shall quote a few more paragraphs. Paragraph 82 states:
“The Challenger claims proceed on the basis that there is no common law liability for negligence in respect of acts or omissions on the part of those who are actually engaged in armed combat”.
That is a pretty flat statement. It continues:
“So it has not been suggested that Lt Pinkstone or anyone else in the Black Watch battle group was negligent. Nor, as his decision to fire was taken during combat, would it have been appropriate to do so. The Challenger claimants concentrate instead on an alleged failure to ensure that the claimants’ tank and the tanks of the battle group that fired on it were properly equipped with technology and equipment that would have prevented the incident, and an alleged failure to ensure that soldiers were provided with adequate recognition training before they were deployed and also in theatre. Their case is founded entirely on failings in training and procurement”.
Its final sentence says that:
“The Ellis claim at common law also raises issues about procurement”.
If we delve further into the document, we get what is in a sense the substance of the ruling. Paragraph 95 says that:
“The same point can be made about the time when the failures are alleged to have taken place in the Challenger claimants’ case. At the stage when men are being trained, whether pre-deployment or in theatre, or decisions are being made about the fitting of equipment to tanks or other fighting vehicles, there is time to think things through, to plan and to exercise judgment. These activities are sufficiently far removed from the pressures and risks of active operations against the enemy for it to not to be unreasonable to expect a duty of care to be exercised, so long as the standard of care that is imposed has regard to the nature of these activities and to their circumstances. For this reason I would hold that the Challenger claims are not within the scope of the doctrine”—
that is, combat immunity—
“that they should not be struck out on this ground and that the MOD should not be permitted, in the case of these claims, to maintain this argument”.
Its argument was to rule that it should be struck out through the doctrine of combat immunity.
The tone of the whole judgment is summed up in paragraph 100 where the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, says:
“The sad fact is that, while members of the armed forces on active service can be given some measure of protection against death and injury, the nature of the job they do means that this can never be complete. They deserve our respect because they are willing to face these risks in the national interest, and the law will always attach importance to the protection of life and physical safety. But it is of paramount importance that the work that the armed services do in the national interest should not be impeded by having to prepare for or conduct active operations against the enemy under the threat of litigation if things … go wrong. The court must be especially careful, in their case, to have regard to the public interest, to the unpredictable nature of armed conflict and to the inevitable risks that it gives rise to when it is striking the balance as to what is fair, just and reasonable”.
In other words, over and over again in the findings as I read them—as an amateur and not as a general, although I was made acting pilot officer, and having never been a lawyer, although I was a great employer of lawyers—the noble and learned Lord seems to go out of his way to express that this is not about combat. It is about when it is reasonable and practical to do so that the MoD has a duty of care.
I come back to my question. Where is the harm in sustaining the Human Rights Act as it has been used in this case, and what are the implications? The implications are that it says that simply because the process eventually leads to combat, the Ministry of Defence cannot use the doctrine of combat immunity to avoid its duty of care. Where it is reasonable to exercise its duty of care, it has a duty to do that.
Also in my career, I worked for the Ministry of Defence as a non-executive director of defence and equipment support. As such, I was asked to look into the safety of equipment in the MoD, and I have to say that it was variable. In some areas it did not meet the highest civil standard. I do not mean silly standards; I mean the general duty that you have in civil law to reduce risk to as low as is reasonably practicable. Civil law does not say that you cannot do dangerous things and no one is suggesting that the military should not, but where you have an opportunity to reduce risk, you have a duty to take it. That cannot be an unreasonable duty. My reading of the judgment is that that is where the duty remains: where it is practicable it should be exercised, but where it is impractical, specifically in combat, then a court should not regard it.
The area of harm that does exist is what in other circumstances people would call the chill factor. The Health and Safety at Work Act has been around for so long now that most industries that are subject to it, whatever you read in the press, are mature enough to live with it. However, there are still things like the presumption of guilt—the chill factor that will stop executives from doing their job. In fact people get over it and get used to it, but if it is influencing in combat the decisions that soldiers, sailors and airmen are making, then that is wrong. That is a challenge for the MoD, not a challenge to change the law but in its training, in its teaching of the doctrine and in ensuring that the people who are making decisions fully understand that this ruling does not relate to combat and that they should continue to make their combat decisions as they have been taught to, within the rules of what I loosely call the Geneva convention, and get on with the job.
We will not support this amendment. If it comes up on Report we will oppose it, or in trying to dilute the Human Rights Act, we will oppose it.
I can see why my noble friend was made an admiral and I only an acting pilot officer.
My Lords, I wonder whether I could say a word. First, I apologise for the fact that due to other business I was not able to hear the speech and analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, although he did show me in advance the paper from which much of his speech was drawn. I also expressed my regret to the Minister, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, that I have other business to attend to and might not be able to be here all the time.
I should like to say a few words because I feel a heavy weight of responsibility on my shoulders; I had the responsibility of writing the judgment. It covered an enormous amount of ground. I was not responsible for all the paragraphs because other people wrote as well. The starting point of the analysis was what to make of developments in the European court in Strasbourg, which has been expanding the jurisdiction in a way that I do not think judges in this country entirely welcome. It has always been understood that the European convention applies to our embassies abroad; that is accepted and has never been in doubt.
Gradually the thinking has developed so that, for example, when in Iraq the military set up a detention centre, bringing local people in to be detained and examined there, they had the protection of the human rights convention—the right not to be tortured, the right to life and so on—because we had control over what happens within the detention centres that we set up. What is different about the law which we were trying to analyse and explain is the extension of that jurisdiction, as I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, explained, to members of the Armed Forces serving outside the territory—not just outside the territory of the signatories to the European convention itself but outside the territory over which they have control. We are now contemplating Article 2 applying to areas where the Army are not in control of events but nevertheless have some duty, apparently, or have the protection under Article 2. That applies both ways. The amendment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, could in fact be read as applying to the need to be protected under Article 2 as well as the right to immunity from challenge under it for things done to other people.
What I was attempting to do, having secured the agreement of all my colleagues on my analysis, was that we had to recognise that Article 2 applied outside the territory, so we had to explain what that meant. It was not an easy task. One of the problems in trying to get across to people like the noble Lord, Lord West, and others was that we were not dealing with a case that put in front of us the kind of situation that he was faced with. They did not bring a case against the commander in the tank or anyone who was actually on the ground that they were in some way subject to criticism under Article 2 or subject to a claim for negligence at common law. I rather wish they had, because we would certainly have struck it out. We would have made it absolutely plain that people in that position, the heat of battle, are not to be exposed to criticism or to litigation because of things done in those circumstances. Decisions have to be taken for all sorts of reasons and it is quite impossible for a court to analyse them as to whether they were properly taken.
All I could do in my judgment—the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has been very generous to me by setting out the various paragraphs in which I tried to do it—was to make it as plain as I could that there is an area that the courts will not go into. I did not secure the agreement of my colleagues on what to do about the cases in front of us. There was a four to three majority in favour of allowing the Challenger cases to go to trial to find out more about the facts before a decision was taken, and there was a five to two majority about the Snatch Land Rover cases that they should go to trial as well. There can be different views about this. The advantage of more facts was in fairness to the families that what was actually going on was absolutely clear before a final decision was taken. However, I made it as clear as I could that those who were taking the cases to trial should not think they were going to succeed. They had to get over the hurdles, which I explained in the various parts of my judgments. What the result of these cases will be, I simply do not know.
I cannot add to my judgment; that is not a position that a judge can ever enjoy. My judgment has to speak for itself. All I can say is that I would not change any of the words that I see when I read it over and over again. It is a difficult problem because one has to balance the need for the military to conduct operations without impediment, whether in wartime or peacetime, with, at the same time, the interests of the servicemen and their families. The noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Tunnicliffe, both illustrated the other side of the balance. I am not suggesting that legislation should not be resorted to, if the Government think that they can improve on what I attempted to say in Smith. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, one of the greatest judges that we have had in recent times, used to say that the law is made not by scoring boundaries by sixes but that you develop the law in singles. In a way, Smith was an attempt to face up to a problem and explain under modern circumstances what could be made of it. I do not claim that we achieved perfection by any means. I am deeply sorry that it has caused such alarm among senior members of the military for reasons that I certainly did not intend. I cannot do anything about that, except to apologise to them and hope they understand what I was trying to say.
The task that the Minister faces is the very difficult one of trying to analyse exactly how to express in legislation the need for protection of the individuals serving in our interest and, at the same time, giving freedom to those who have to take the decisions not to be impeded in a way that would defeat our national interest.
There is only one other point I wish to make, which I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, hinted at in his speech. Any legislation will have to stand up to scrutiny under the European convention itself. It has to be compatible with the convention rights. However, I think that the noble and learned Lord was pointing out the direction in which the Government could go by saying that there is a margin of appreciation, which gives quite a latitude to the Government in deciding how to frame legislation. In a way, I was trying to explain in paragraph 76 that and how the margin of appreciation might lie. Not everyone agreed with me, and perhaps the Minister can improve on what I was trying to say.
Before I sit down, I repeat my apology to the senior officers in the military who think that that are being in some way targeted by what I said. That was certainly not my intention and I did the very best I could to make it clear that they were not to be open to that kind of criticism.
I certainly do not have the view that that was the aim of the judgment by the noble and learned Lord. However, because he was not able to make a judgment on a case of someone involved in action, this spectre has appeared. It is unfortunate that a judgment was not able to be made. Therefore, there is the spectre of something being done. I generally do not like legislation, but there is merit in trying to achieve something in legislation. I have read the whole judgment and had a nice chat with the noble and learned Lord at lunchtime about the issue—that is one of the great joys of being in this lovely building. I quite understand it, but that is my worry.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. One cannot invent cases. The trouble with the courts is that you simply have to take what you are given. That is the real problem, which I think the noble Lord correctly identified.
Does the noble and learned Lord think that a way forward—
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I must, of course, declare an interest as I was, indeed, the author of the decision in Smith v Ministry of Defence which has given rise to this debate. I appreciate very much that our decision has given rise to concern, so I very much welcome the opportunity that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has given us to examine some of the issues that the case has raised.
When a judge writes a judgment, one of the rules that he has to work with is that the judgment must speak for itself. It is not open to him to add anything to it or to subtract anything from it once it has been issued, and it is not my intention to do that, nor would I wish to do so. However, I thought that it might help if I were to say a little about how the leading judgment which I wrote is designed and about what it says, as it is vital to any decisions about where we go from here that it should not be misunderstood.
As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, indicated in what he has just said, under our system it is open to anybody who believes that he or she has a claim of damages against a public authority to bring that claim to court. When that claim is brought before the court, the judge has to deal with it. There are two sides to every argument and the issues cannot be ducked, however difficult or uncomfortable they may be.
The claims with which we were dealing arose out of casualties sustained in two distinct phases of the United Kingdom’s engagement in Iraq. The first was a friendly fire incident involving two Challenger tanks during combat operations on the fourth day of the offensive. The second involved the use of Snatch Land Rovers on two occasions during a period when our forces were exercising the powers of government for the provisional Administration in Iraq—assisting the civil power, in other words. These claims were brought under two distinct branches of our law. The claims in the two Snatch Land Rover cases are brought under the Human Rights Act for breach of a convention right. The Challenger friendly fire claims dealing with combat do not raise a human rights issue at all. They are brought under the common law only. The second of the two Snatch Land Rover cases has an additional case under the common law, too.
As for the human rights claims, we held that a decision of the Strasbourg court left us with no alternative but to hold that the protection of the right to life under Article 2 of the convention applies to members of the Armed Forces when they are serving anywhere outside the territory of the United Kingdom, as well as inside its territory. Of course, as has been pointed out, that raises the question of how that article was to be applied in the situations that were described to us in these cases. The majority held that the court did not have sufficient facts to decide the issue for itself, so the Snatch Land Rover cases would have to go to trial. However, we gave as much guidance as it was open to us to give in paragraph 76 of the judgment. I said that the court must avoid imposing unrealistic or disproportionate obligations on the state in connection with the planning for, and conduct of, military operations in situations of armed conflict. It would be easy to find that the claims are beyond the reach of Article 2 when those thought to be responsible were actively engaged in contact with the enemy. In the Snatch Land Rover cases, it was not open to us to declare that the state had absolute immunity in these matters. The law with which we are dealing—human rights law, convention law—does not work that way, but we expected the trial judge to pay very close attention to the guidance which we were giving.
Under the common law claims, we first had to examine the doctrine of combat immunity, which has been referred to, because the MOD argued that all the common law claims should be struck out on this ground. As noble Lords have heard, the majority rejected that argument. But it is very important to note that the claims in the Challenger friendly fire incident—when it was plain that our forces were, indeed, engaged in combat—were not directed at those who were conducting the operations on the ground. Those who formulated the claims were very careful to direct their claims in a different direction. The complaints were of failures in training and the provision of equipment, which occurred long before the tanks crossed the start line. So the issue which has caused concern was not directly raised at all in the Challenger tank claims. The majority view was that combat immunity did not apply to things done or admitted to be done at that preliminary stage. However, it is crucially important to note—and I cannot stress this point too strongly—that we did not say that the doctrine of combat immunity no longer exists: it remains part of our law. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, gave us a description of people engaged with the enemy on the beaches, in the air and in other situations. That is not what our judgment was dealing with, and there is nothing here which deprives commanders, and those serving under them in that situation, of that protection while they are engaged in combat.
The difficult question we were left with arose in the Snatch Land Rover cases and it was a different one. It was whether the immunity applies to what was going on in Iraq after the combat phase was over, when our troops were, as I have said, assisting the civil power, no doubt in situations of considerable danger. Here too, the majority held that the court did not have the information to decide for itself whether the claims should succeed. We did not rule out the possibility of applying the immunity, but the issue had to go to trial because we needed to know more—as will the judge—about the precise situation with which our forces were dealing at the time. In paragraph 99 of the judgment, I repeated the guidance given in paragraph 76 that, when considering the issue of what is just and reasonable, great care must be taken not to subject those responsible for decisions at any level who are engaged in operations of the kind that were being conducted in Iraq after the end of hostilities to duties that are unrealistic or excessively burdensome.
As the Minister has made clear on several occasions, the case is now in the hands of the trial judge. I suggest that it would be premature to draw any further conclusions until his decision is known. However, I hope very much that it will be appreciated that those serving in our Armed Forces, to whom we owe so much, are not as vulnerable to legal challenge as some people have been suggesting. As the author of the judgment, and as a former national service officer, I am greatly encouraged by the perception that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has taken from it and the way in which he has appreciated the guidance we were trying to give.