Lord Tunnicliffe
Main Page: Lord Tunnicliffe (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Tunnicliffe's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall say something about the Scottish system of justice. If one is talking about convergence, which part of the United Kingdom one comes from may be relevant to a consideration of the issues. I did my national service in a Scottish regiment and I live in Scotland. The Scottish system of justice differs from the English in relation to verdicts.
The Scottish system at the moment depends on the simple majority. There is a jury of 15 and someone can be found guilty so long as eight on the jury are in favour of guilty. Verdicts are from time to time returned by a simple majority as narrow as that, although most majority verdicts are much more in the area of 13 to two. The fact is, however, that a simple majority verdict is enough for a conviction to be recorded.
So far as the question of lingering doubt or confidence in these verdicts is concerned, my experience as a prosecutor and a judge in Scotland is that that system is accepted without question. There is, of course, an additional element in the Scottish system in that there are three verdicts, not two, and a jury of 15, not 12. I am not concerned to explore the size of the jury or the use of the not proven verdict. The important point is that a simple majority verdict is good enough.
The system has one feature that I think is absent from the proposal in Amendment 1. There is never a question of a failed trial because no verdict has been reached. A Scottish jury always reaches a verdict. There is no question of a failure to reach the required majority because a simple majority will do. If it is not achieved, there is an acquittal. It may be that an acquittal is good enough. When the jury comes to return its verdict, it is either not guilty or not proven. If it is guilty, the jury is then asked, “Is that unanimous or by a majority?” and the foreman will say whether it is a majority or unanimous verdict. The real point and the value of the system for the Scots is that retrials are not required because there is a failure to reach a verdict. If the required figure is not reached, acquittal follows. There is some value in that.
I do not know how far one takes the principle of convergence, but it might be relevant to consider how it applies to those who come from Scotland to serve in any of the three services, who in their domestic system do not have the system which applies in England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland.
My Lords, I worked out before this evening that Amendments 1 and 2 were, in fact, Amendment 3 in Grand Committee on 1 March. Mindful of the guidance in the Companion, that arguments fully developed in Committee should not be repeated on Report, I took the trouble to read the report of the Grand Committee. At the time, I indicated that I was to some extent attracted to some of the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I said:
“I am putting a burden on the Government, today and perhaps in subsequent meetings and in writing, to argue the case for why we should not move in the general direction of these amendments and make the whole process for the defendant more analogous to that of a civil court”.—[Official Report, 1/3/16; col. GC 48.]
I still cleave to that general direction. The Minister then made a spirited defence, stretching from col. 50 to col. 54, which I read and also found persuasive in the sense that making small changes is likely to have unforeseen consequences which might be difficult. I have heard nothing today to change my general direction of travel. The Government should consider examining in the Ministry of Defence, perhaps in concert with the Ministry of Justice, whether the decision-making process where the citizen is on trial—the member of the Armed Forces becomes a citizen at this point—should not be closer to the civil system.
Moving in that direction would create some significant change and there may well be some significant consequences. I am not convinced that today’s amendments would not have unforeseen deleterious effects. Accordingly, these Benches will not be able to support them. We ask the Government to think seriously about the arguments that have been brought forward in Committee and on Report, and to look at the extent to which there should be some movement towards the citizen when on trial having much closer rights and a similar process to the civilian courts.
My Lords, I remind the House that I am still a commissioned officer in the reserves, although I am not training. This is my 60th year of life, so I will not be doing it for much longer. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, suggested that both the general public and those in the Armed Forces do not have confidence in the system of discipline in the Armed Forces. My experience is different. I have never had members of the Armed Forces come to me and say that they lack confidence in the system of military discipline. I have to admit that it is a robust system.
I have also never heard a member of the public—someone who is not in the Armed Forces—say that there is something seriously wrong with the system of military discipline, apart from when one reads articles in the Daily Mail, some of which are not very well researched.
One of the problems with what the noble Lord suggests is that we do not understand the dynamics of how the court martial panel works. In Committee, I suggested to the Minister that we need to do research, along the lines proposed by the Opposition Front Bench, to understand what the effect would be. We need to war game it before we start altering the system. I suggested to my noble friend that he keeps this under review and makes sure that we are going in the right direction.
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 4 in my name. These amendments deal with a matter raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House in its 21st report. That matter concerns the regulation-making powers in new Sections 304D(10) and 304E(9), which are inserted into the Armed Forces Act 2006 by Clauses 10 and 11 of the Bill. These powers allow regulations to be made in relation to appeals against reviews of sentence.
It would perhaps be helpful to remind the House that Clauses 10 and 11 of the Bill are part of the statutory framework that we are creating for offenders assisting investigations and prosecutions. New Sections 304D and 304E provide that a person who has been sentenced by the court martial may have their sentence reviewed to take account of the assistance that they have given or offered to give to an investigator or prosecutor, or a failure by that person to give the assistance that they offered to give to an investigator or prosecutor, and in return for which they received a sentence that was discounted. A person whose sentence is reviewed under new Sections 304D or 304E may appeal against the reviewing court’s decision on sentence. The Director of Service Prosecutions may also appeal against a decision. New Sections 304D(10) and 304E(9) allow regulations to be made in relation to the conduct of proceedings on such appeals. Both provide as follows:
“In relation to any proceedings under this section, the Secretary of State may make regulations containing provision corresponding to any provision in Parts 2 to 4 of the Court Martial Appeals Act 1968, with or without modifications”.
Such regulations are subject to the negative procedure.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee noted in its report that most provisions of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1968 are provisions governing proceedings before a court, and that it is reasonably common for such provisions to be set out in subordinate legislation, subject to the negative procedure. However, the committee noted that the 1968 Act includes provisions about the recovery of costs and expenses in appeal proceedings, the effect of which may be modified by the Lord Chancellor by regulations, subject to the affirmative procedure. For example, under Section 31A of the 1968 Act an appeal court is prevented from directing the Secretary of State to pay legal costs to a successful appellant except where affirmative procedure regulations made by the Lord Chancellor provide otherwise. The committee is concerned that it would be possible for regulations under new Sections 304D(10) and 304E(9), which are subject to the negative procedure, to make provision corresponding to the costs provisions of the 1968 Act but with modifications that, if made to the 1968 Act by the regulations under that Act, would be subject to the affirmative procedure. The committee takes the view,
“that as a matter of principle the powers conferred by sections 304D and 304E should be limited so that they do not allow the making of modifications which under the 1968 Act would require the affirmative procedure”.
I therefore propose to amend Clauses 10 and 11 to limit the regulation-making powers in new Sections 304D(10) and 304E(9) so that they may not be used to make provision corresponding to a provision that may be included in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor under Sections 31A, 33, 33A, 46A or 47 of the 1968 Act, and that they may be used to confirm regulation-making powers corresponding to the powers in Sections 31A, 33, 33A, 46A and 47 of the 1968 Act, only if the powers are, like the powers in the 1968 Act, subject to the affirmative procedure.
It may be helpful if I give one example of the effect of the proposed amendments. As mentioned previously, under Section 31A of the 1968 Act, an appeal court is prevented from directing the Secretary of State to pay legal costs to a successful appellant, except where affirmative procedure regulations made by the Lord Chancellor provide otherwise. The effect of the proposed amendment is that regulations under new Section 304D(10) could not make provision allowing an appeal court to direct the Secretary of State to pay legal costs to a successful appellant, but could confer a power on the Lord Chancellor to make regulations providing that an appeal court may direct the Secretary of State to pay legal costs to a successful appellant, but only if the Lord Chancellor’s regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure.
This is somewhat complicated but I hope noble Lords will accept that the amendments address the committee’s concerns regarding the parliamentary procedure to which regulations under new Sections 304D(10) and 304E(9) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 are subject. I therefore hope noble Lords will support the amendments. I beg to move.
My Lords, discharging our responsibility as the Opposition, I have carefully read the Minister’s letter of 11 April and studied the 21st report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and Amendments 3 and 4, and I am satisfied that they meet the committee’s concern. They have our support.
My Lords, I have a certain sympathy for the amendment of my noble friend Lord Judd but I feel that allowing people to enter the services at 16 is a good thing. I tried to join when I was 14, which was slightly too young in my mother’s and the Navy’s opinion, but I joined at 17. As my noble friend said, a number of the people who join the services at that age come from disadvantaged backgrounds, and what the military does to those people is quite remarkable. If we were able to show that, everyone would see it, but there is no need to do so. It is right that we still take people into the services at 16. They gain a great deal and it is a useful and good thing for our society, in the same way as the cadet forces add a great deal to our society.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 7 and 8. Whether we like it or not, this is a fundamental debate about whether young people of 16 should be recruited into the Armed Forces. We have to respect that this is a serious debate and that both sides believe with conviction that their position is right. I respect the work of Child Soldiers International and I recognise the persuasive nature of the arguments it makes. It refers to issues of morality, welfare, economic and even diplomatic issues.
But there is the other side of the debate, which is that for many young people the great start they are given in life by being recruited at 16 provides them with opportunities that no other direction would give. They have the best start to adulthood. We believe that on balance, the argument for the opportunities provided is stronger than the argument that there should be no recruitment until the age of 18. We also believe that there should be the maximum practical protection for these young people.
When British service personnel operate abroad and are stationed abroad, there is an agreement made with the Government of that particular country. A protocol is brought about whereby decisions can be made according to the machinery agreed in that protocol about whether a person committing an offence in, for example, Kenya, should be tried by the local courts or by court martial. Obviously, that would apply to all cases of offences that are committed in Kenya which would be contrary to its law. In all probability, as has happened in Germany, very much would depend on whether the local population was involved. For example, under a protocol with the Kenyan Government, the rape of a Kenyan woman would almost certainly be tried in a Kenyan court. On the other hand, if it involved personnel who were on duty there together, it would almost certainly be dealt with under the protocol by the service disciplinary system. I am proposing that if it amounts to a serious sexual offence, or an extra-territorial offence such as I have described, it could be heard in this country.
Amendments 11 and 12 were Amendments 15 and 16 in Committee. I have reread the debate and do not note anything, other than Kenya, that has been added to them tonight. They go to the essence of the scope of military law. We were not persuaded to support them in Committee and we will not do so now.
My Lords, I am relaxed about these amendments but I expect that my noble friend the Minister will have something to say about them. Just to tease the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, slightly—