(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, and to the House, for having pushed him so rudely.
When one sees the way the tide of opinion is flowing strongly, it is very easy to think that it is best to keep one’s head down and not provide a cautionary word about being careful what we wish for in taking these amendments through—should the House so decide. I note and appreciate the concerns expressed in powerful speeches this afternoon. These are replicated in the briefing from the Electoral Commission referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. Several letters in the correspondence columns of the broadsheets have carried an equivalent message.
I also recognise that the drafting of parts of these clauses can best be described as uncompromising. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, referred to this, though I think he was slightly dismissive about the consultation processes provided for in Clause 15, in new Sections 4C and 4D. He pointed out that the procedures for scrutinising secondary legislation are proving increasingly inadequate and ineffective for modern conditions. He knows that I agree with him. I am pleased to be able to tell him and the House that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which I chair, will publish a further end of term report at the end of this week. This will give grist to his mill—and indeed to mine.
Among the concerns raised is the use of what can be described as tertiary legislation. I spoke to the noble and learned Lord in advance of this debate, so he knows broadly what I shall say about creating bodies over which there is absolutely no parliamentary control but which, none the less, have powers that concern some of the most fundamental aspects of our society. One recent example is the College of Policing, an independent body able to introduce regulations and codes that affect every one of us.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lord Blencathra have made common cause in attacking this. I entirely support them. To come to the point, I am not yet convinced that, if these two amendments were agreed, we would not be creating another body equivalent to the College of Policing, but this time for electoral purposes—an equally important part of our national life.
Am I enthusiastic about Clauses 15 and 16? Not at all, but I recognise that there is some parliamentary involvement and approval in this process. If these amendments were accepted, the Electoral Commission—with all the criticisms that have been made of it, fairly or unfairly—would float free from any even minor scrutiny or accountability. In my view, this would be even less desirable.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Hodgson. I wish him a very happy birthday.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, made a very important point about impact. I will come back to it in a moment in my remarks.
In the first instance, we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, about the timing of reviews to look at whether the structure is working effectively now and will work effectively at some date in the future. I want to probe the Minister a little further about the situation now and the current operation of the system. Specifically, I want to ask her whether the Government think that the existing powers to investigate, measure and check are sufficient.
As I understand it—I stand to be corrected—under the present system, money from the fund is passed to recipient bodies or recipient groups by what are called distributors, which have clear responsibilities to decide which bodies are worthy of funding and should get the money, and, after the funds have been passed over, to ensure that the proceeds are spent properly, effectively and in accordance with the way envisaged at the time of the grant. Again, as I understand it, there are currently four distributors: Big Society Capital, Access, Fair4All Finance and the Youth Futures Foundation.
The work of these four distributors is overseen by the Oversight Trust, which has no power to determine where the money goes but is charged with ensuring that the distributors have effective procedures in place to ensure good governance and proper performance of their duties. Clearly, the Oversight Trust has a very important role to play in maintaining public trust and confidence in the dormant assets scheme.
Can my noble friend enlighten me on three points? First, can a new distributor be appointed or dis-appointed? Who decides that and initiates it? If a decision is made to go ahead, what powers, if any, does the Oversight Trust, which is responsible for monitoring that body, have in making that final decision? That is my first question: can we remove or add distributors? How do we do it? What role does the Oversight Trust have in that process?
Secondly, and more generally, are the Government satisfied that the Oversight Trust has the powers necessary to fulfil this important role? For example, are distributors required or obliged to collaborate and co-operate with the Oversight Trust to ensure that it performs its duties effectively?
Thirdly—this point was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker—what role, if any, does the Oversight Trust have in measuring the impact of what the distributors are doing? Do we look in any way at whether the distribution policy being followed by one of the four groups now in power to do this makes sense for our society, or are they free as a bird? It would be helpful if the Minister could say a little about that.
Finally, it must be of importance, as we begin to see the expansion of the whole scheme—I think every Member of your Lordships’ House thinks that it is a good idea in principle; I certainly do—to ensure that the governance structure is adequate for the increased responsibilities that will be placed on it. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to reassure me on these points when she replies to the debate.
My Lords, Amendment 45 in this group is in my name. As has already been pointed out, it differs from the other amendments in the group, which call for reports, as it is a targeted amendment focused on ensuring that the scope for new asset classes being added to the dormant assets arrangements under the Bill is kept under review. The other amendments are broader and seek reports on the impact and operation of the scheme. I do not support littering legislation with reports on the impact of Bills—that is what the post-legislative scrutiny process is for—so I do not support the other amendments in the group.
I was going to point out to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that his amendment is ineffective because Clause 31 deletes Section 14 from the 2008 Act, but he got there first. I would just explain that Section 14 was put in in the very specific context of the first Bill, the then Dormant Bank and Building Society Accounts Bill. At the time, there was considerable controversy about whether a voluntary scheme would work. There was much scepticism about whether banks and building societies would yield their assets, which is why that specific reporting section was put into the 2008 Act. It reported within a few years. It has been some time since I looked at that report but, broadly, it concluded that it had been effective. Not absolutely every bank and building society is in the scheme but, in terms of value, substantially the whole amount are.
I focused my amendment on bringing in other asset classes because it took a long time for this Bill to come forward after the 2008 Act. It was 13 years before more asset classes appeared, which is just too long. Indeed, my noble friend the Minister admitted as such at Second Reading when she said that the industry had been “nudging”—a polite term—the Government to get on and get this Bill done. I do not think that we can necessarily rely on the Government to prioritise or be proactive about the source of new funds coming into dormant assets, which is why I suggested a periodic report specifically on asset classes to keep up that pressure.
When the Dormant Assets Commission, which was set up to be independent of government, reported about four years ago it identified a number of additional assets. It decided to concentrate on the financial services sector, but even within that it noted, as we discussed at Second Reading, that a number of sources of assets in the financial services sector have not yet been brought within the scheme’s scope. The report also outlined a long list of assets outside the financial services sector, ranging from Oyster cards—I was astonished to find that there are 42 million cards with a balance on that have not been used for more than a year—to a large amount of money in unclaimed gambling winnings, which I find surprising. There are also lots of balances on things such as telephone accounts and energy accounts. There are lots of forms of dormant assets hanging around; they ought not to be retained by the companies that hold them but ought to be released for the kind of good works that are fostered by this Bill and the 2008 Act.
I hope that one day the Treasury will be shamed into no longer being the only body keeping its dormant assets out of the scheme, in the form of National Savings & Investments accounts. I believe it amounts to something close to state larceny for the Treasury to insist that it can keep dormant National Savings & Investments money because it has been used to fund public expenditure. It is not the Treasury’s money to keep. However, I acknowledge that shame is not something generally found in the Treasury, so we may have to wait a very long time to see those assets come within the scheme.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall move the amendment and speak to Amendments 16 and 17 in my name. I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for adding their names. I have also added my name to Amendment 18 in the group, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots.
My amendments are probing amendments, following the interesting stand part debate that we held in Committee on Clause 30, which gives the Government extraordinarily wide powers to give financial assistance. The Minister’s response in Committee raised as many questions as he answered and we have therefore tabled amendments to gain further enlightenment.
There is no constraint on the ability to provide financial assistance in the Bill, other than that it can be only
“in consequence of the making of a final order”.
My noble friend the Minister sought to reassure us that this was
“not a general compensation scheme”
and would be used only in exceptional cases. The Minister said the power
“will only be used in instances where the public interest, particularly national security interests, require it”.
Later, he said that
“the nature of national security makes it very hard to predict where some of these issues might arise. However, where they do and where national security is an issue, it is important that the power is there”.—[Official Report, 16/3/21; cols. 223-26.]
I was puzzled by this. Is national security a necessary condition for the use of the power or not? Our horrible hybrid working practices mean it is not easy to pursue questions in Committee when the Minister gives answers, so I tabled Amendment 15 to explore this further.
Amendment 15 adds to Clause 30(1) the words “if he or she”—that is, the Secretary of State—
“considers that there is a risk to national security”,
so that the financial assistance power could be used only if it were necessary on national security grounds. There could easily be other grounds for giving financial assistance—for example, if we had an industrial strategy, which I am definitely not advocating. I do not believe it would be appropriate to allow considerations broader than national security to underpin financial assistance under this Bill. If my noble friend the Minister thinks anything beyond national security could be involved, I suggest he needs to explain to the House what those circumstances could possibly be.
Amendment 16 takes out some words from Clause 30(2) so that financial assistance can be provided only by way of loans, guarantees or indemnities. The current wording allows practically anything under the sun and certainly allows grants and soft money. My noble friend the Minister will know that I am deeply sceptical about giving a Government powers to throw taxpayers’ money around. Powers such as these, drafted with good intent, can end up being used as cover for politically expedient expenditure. The best way to stop that happening is not to have the power in statute, as it is too much of a temptation and, even if I trust the current Government to act responsibly, which of course I do, I would not trust Governments of a different party—if we were unlucky enough to experience that again.
Lastly, Amendment 17 says that financial assistance has to be provided on arm’s-length terms. I should probably have drafted this in terms only of loans, guarantees or indemnities, as I do not think that subsidies or grants—which I am sure my noble friend the Minister will tell me he needs the power to provide—can ever be on arm’s-length terms. I was prompted to table this by what my noble friend the Minister said in Committee:
“For example, if the Government provided a loan, it would normally have to be at market rates.”—[Official Report, 16/3/21; col. 224.]
I hate weasel words such as “normally” almost as much as I hate throwing taxpayers’ money around in non-commercial transactions. I therefore ask my noble friend the Minister to say a little more about the boundary between commercial and non-commercial terms for assistance given under Clause 30. What will drive the use of market rates and, I hope, market terms and conditions? What criteria would be used for abandoning arm’s-length terms?
I would have preferred not to have this broad and undefined power sitting on the statute book, because it implies an intent to provide financial assistance. The Government could have relied on the Appropriation Act for genuinely exceptional circumstances. However, if the Government are set upon having the power, Parliament is entitled to some better explanations than we got in Committee of its potential use. I beg to move.
My Lords, once again I have the pleasure of flying in the slipstream of my noble friend Lady Noakes. Before I turn to my own Amendment 18, I will say that I entirely support the remarks she made about Amendments 15, 16 and 17, to which I have added my name.
Amendment 18, like my noble friend’s, is a probing amendment and seeks to discern the possible financial impact of this Bill on the small battalions. I hope the House will forgive me if I become a little granular and practical about how this clause might work. It can far too easily be assumed that this Bill will impact only on big companies. That is not the case. It has not been the case in the past and certainly will not be the case in future, with the big increase in the number of sectors of the economy falling within the provisions of the statute.
I would like to take the House back to our first day in Committee, when I raised the case of Impcross Ltd. Impcross had been the subject of a reference under the old regime. It was statutory instrument 2019/1490. I am not—repeat, not—going to ask my noble friend to comment on the details of the Impcross case. It would be utterly improper for me to ask, and probably even more improper for him to answer. But I want to use the Impcross case as an example of how drastic an impact the provisions of this Bill could have on smaller companies and their owners.
Impcross is based in Stroud and machines parts for the aerospace industry. Its annual turnover is just shy of £12 million, so it is not a large company but a small one, and one that in the year to 30 June 2019—according to the records at Companies House—made a small operating loss. Significantly, it has a person with significant control. In this case, the accounts reveal that a particular individual owns between 50% and 75% of the company. If you look back through the records, you can see that the individual appears to have been at the company for many years, so it is not fanciful to believe that the company is the result of a lifetime’s work and effort and, further, that perhaps the particular individual is now considering his future options, which might involve selling up the company and enjoying the fruits of his labours.
One exceptionally important and helpful aspect of the Bill the Government have brought forward is the establishment of timeframes, which we have already talked about today. We are a bit nervous about how good the timeframes are—we think they may be a bit too flexible for our wishes—but nevertheless there are some there. The Impcross case was referred in early December 2019. It was not until 10 September 2020, nine months later, that Gardner Aerospace, the Chinese-owned potential buyer, withdrew. That cannot have been an easy nine months for all involved, but it serves to underline—if I may say so to my noble friend on the Front Bench—the real importance of sticking to the fixed timetables. Otherwise, the company in the gun sights has a very uncomfortable time indeed.
This does not deal with any potential economic consequences. Let us take the example a little further. If companies are in interesting sectors, they are often sold on a multiple of turnover. Let us say it is two and a half times turnover, which would mean Impcross was worth £30 million. Let us suppose that was the figure that Gardner Aerospace offered, but that when it was refused permission to complete the transaction the next best offer was £27 million, a reduction of 10%; it could well be more. My noble friend the Minister, who has enormous and extensive experience of the City, knows that once an offer has failed to complete, there is always a concern among other buyers that there is something they have not spotted and that there is something wrong that they will need to look at more carefully.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, this is a large group of amendments and I shall not comment on all of them. I had not intended to speak about Amendment 51A, to which the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, spoke a while ago, but the way in which he framed his comments has prompted me to do so. The noble Lord persistently used the term “trade associations” to describe the professional bodies that are involved in supervisory activities in relation to money laundering. I declare an interest as a member, and former president, of the largest of the professional bodies to which he referred, namely the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.
The ICAEW does act as a regulatory body for its members in relation to money laundering, as it does in relation to other activities, but its members carry out as professionals. This activity is overseen by an independent regulatory board, which is chaired by a QC and has lay members on it. I fear that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has not presented the whole story on this—perhaps he did not know it; those who listened to his contribution ought to be aware that it is not the whole picture by any means.
My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier made a strong case for his new offence of failing to prevent an economic crime. He will know that there is considerable concern about the practical impacts of such an offence on the commercial world and that there was only a small majority in favour of a new offence when the Government consulted on it. I have no idea what is in the Economic Secretary’s letter, to which he referred, but I believe that the Government made a wise decision last year in referring the matter to the Law Commission for further study. We should await its findings. I understand that it is due to report by the end of this year; that is not a huge delay for something that could have significant consequences for a large part of the commercial world.
I support the idea behind Amendment 51 in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, namely a review of the “know your customer” regulations. All noble Lords taking part in this Committee are PEPs—politically exposed persons—and I am sure that we have all bumped up against the ludicrous way in which some banks and other financial institutions act under the guise of their customer due diligence obligations. Looking again at this whole territory is definitely worth while.
Further, the UK’s money laundering rules were made in the EU. Now that we have left it, we have the opportunity to see whether the money laundering directives and regulations now embedded in our law are fit for purpose. The UK must remain committed to high standards in the fight against financial crime, but looking at the efficiency and effectiveness of the rules is entirely consistent with maintaining high standards.
The KYC rules are just one part of the money laundering rule set, and I would urge any review to go beyond KYC and look at the whole range of rules. For example, the SARs regime for suspicious activity reports is very burdensome for all involved, both the firms that make the reports and the regulators that receive them. In addition, there are restrictions on banks’ ability to communicate with each other about customers or potential customers, which increases costs and certainly reduces effectiveness. So, I urge my noble friend Lord Holmes to be even more ambitious in the review that he seeks.
Lastly, Amendment 96 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, seeks the establishment of a financial services whistleblower office. I wonder whether she has taken account of the changes made by the regulators to whistleblowing arrangements in regulated firms. Since early 2016, firms have had to have a nominated non-executive director as a whistleblowers champion—not responsible for whistleblowing but, effectively, for its oversight. Most firms align that specific required responsibility with the responsibilities of the audit committee chairman. In addition, the whistleblowing rules themselves were overhauled at the same time. I have not yet heard the noble Baroness speak to her amendment but I wonder whether the evidence base that she relied on as a background to her amendments pre-dates those new arrangements, and whether it would be wise to review how well the new arrangements are working in practice before creating yet another quango.
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 84, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, so I am afraid I am going to disappoint my noble friend Lady Noakes. We are normally on the same side but I am afraid that, on this issue, we are not. Perhaps I can turn away her wrath somewhat by saying that I much supported her views on Amendment 51A, which is a worthy amendment but does not go nearly far enough. We need to look at the whole regime; looking at one part of it is not sufficient, a point I was trying to make on an amendment we debated on the first day in Committee.
Like my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, and to the Economic Secretary to the Treasury for their briefing and correspondence. I apologise that the briefing was cut short for me because I had a power cut. My computer therefore went down, but I am grateful for the letter that was received earlier today.
The issue of failure to prevent has been pretty widely forked over in the speeches on this group, so I want to make two pretty quick points. The first flows from my membership of the Committee in your Lordships’ House which undertook the post-legislative scrutiny of the Bribery Act. We reported in March 2019 and our report found that the Act was:
“an excellent piece of legislation which creates offences which are clear and all-embracing.”
We went on to say that
“the new offence of corporate failure to prevent bribery is regarded as particularly effective, enabling those in a position to influence a company’s manner of conducting business to ensure that it is ethical, and to take steps to remedy matters where it is not.”
In our report, we noted, as did the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, that it was as long ago as May 2016 that the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, called for a consultation on a new offence of failure to prevent economic crime. We also noted that when Ministers gave evidence to the bribery committee on 4 December 2018, now over two years ago,
“Mr Argar said: ‘We intend to publish our response to it [the consultation] next year,’ and Ben Wallace MP added: ‘The Solicitor-General and I are pretty keen that we explore further the failure to prevent in broader economic crime … We raised it at the last inter-ministerial government meeting’”.
He added that John Penrose, the Government’s anticorruption champion,
“and I are keen to see this.”
The responses to the government consultation, although unpublished, and those suggested by Mr Glen to be inconclusive, are not as inconclusive as all that. The staff of our committee were able to find a lot of the submissions, which were available on the websites of the respondents, and none that we could find opposed the extension of the failure to prevent offence. Indeed, many supported it.
That takes me to my second point: the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The Government said in May 2019 that the call for evidence had closed in March 2017 and a response “will be issued shortly”. So, what are we waiting for? The Government have been standing on the edge of the pool for over two years. Each time they seem ready to jump in, inertia overcomes them and another round of consultation begins—now with the Law Commission, for which I have the highest regard. When my noble friend comes to reply, it would be helpful if she could let the Committee know what angles the Law Commission is supposed to focus on in this latest review and, in particular, what angles it will examine that have not been extensively looked over during the past four years.